An Examination of Retributive Justice: Does it Have Merit?Xue, Rachel JusticeRetributive justicePunishmentDesertNormative ethicsMoral philosophyPenal philosophyCriminal justiceLegal philosophyJohn RawlsHistory of punishmentEthicsPhilosophyB AThis paper explores the concept of retributive justice and whether it is defensible as a guiding principle of punishment. While retributive justice is intuitively appealing to many people, and many modern scholars have defended retributive justice from a variety of normative perspectives, proponents overlook the downsides of a backward-looking system of justice. In this paper, I will argue that retributive justice is theoretically incoherent and practically unfeasible as a theory of justice. By exploring its historical development and its prevalence in the penal system of the United States, I aim to provide a descriptive foundation of retributive justice from which I can mount my argument against its practice. To support my argument, I will evaluate the justifications provided by major modern retributivists, namely Michael Moore, Herbert Morris, and Jean Hampton, and explain why their arguments are unsound.Désirée Lim, Thesis SupervisorUygar Abaci, Thesis Honors Advisoropen_access2026-04-08T02:47:43Zhttps://honors.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/10297rbx5033