On Ignorance and Bliss: an analysis of the applicability of Rawlsian theory as a model for ethical decision-making in triage scenarios
Open Access
Author:
Dungan, Rachel Elizabeth
Area of Honors:
Biobehavioral Health
Degree:
Bachelor of Science
Document Type:
Thesis
Thesis Supervisors:
Gary King, Thesis Supervisor Dr. Lori Anne Francis, Thesis Honors Advisor
Keywords:
John Rawls triage ethical decision-making economic game theory
Abstract:
The paper uses economic game theory to investigate whether John Rawls’ philosophical position makes adequate provisions to render it capable of handling triage scenarios in the developing world. It provides an overview of the Rawlsian approach to social justice issues and focuses specifically on the application of his theoretical veil of ignorance as a tool, used to strip people of undeserved material advantages and to guide ethical decision-making. Some critics have argued that Rawls’ position is sound in theory, but realistically impotent when handling the conditions of extreme scarcity that often characterize community crises. An assessment of a theoretical example of a triage scenario that calls for definition of a model of delivery for limited vaccinations in a population. Analysis of this situation using economic game theory provides evidence that outcomes of choices made by ethical decision makers under the veil ultimately prove beneficial for the community at large. This suggests that Rawls’ rhetorical position can effectively be used to guide ethical decision-making in times of crisis under realistic conditions of moderate scarcity.
