Medical malpractice reform in the United States has been an important legal and medical issue for several decades. Protecting patients from medical errors while ensuring that desired physician behavior is not compromised is a significant challenge faced by legislators and policy makers. This thesis examines the possible effect of reward caps in medical malpractice claims on liability insurance premium rates and physician supply in obstetrics and gynecology. Two hypotheses are analyzed: (1) Imposing caps on medical malpractice rewards decreases liability insurance premium rates, and (2) States with caps on medical malpractice rewards experience an increase in the population of practicing obstetricians and gynecologists.
Findings for the first hypothesis were drawn from the comparison of average OB/Gyn. liability insurance premium rates and physician population, pre- and post-cap. The second hypothesis was analyzed using the change in liability insurance premium rates measured against the change in the population of practicing obstetricians and gynecologists. All data were restricted to a ten year period (1995-2005) in order to provide a relevant picture of recent developments in these medical malpractice trends.
The results of the analysis showed that the effect of reward caps on premium rates and on physician supply in obstetrics and gynecology is inconsistent. Although the results are inconclusive, they provide lawmakers and health policy officials with some enhanced understanding of this relationship upon which to base future malpractice reform.
