An Experiment on the Stable Set

Open Access
Rupsis, Matthew Scott
Area of Honors:
Bachelor of Science
Document Type:
Thesis Supervisors:
  • James Schuyler Jordan, Thesis Supervisor
  • Russell Paul Chuderewicz, Honors Advisor
  • coalition
  • majority
  • pillage
  • game
  • stable set
  • game theory
  • experiment
  • LEMA
This paper conducts an experiment on the 3-person majority pillage game. Using a binary decision model, the experiment is used to confirm the predicted stable set of (½, ½, 0), (½, 0, ½) and (0, ½, ½) by Jordan and Obadia (2007). Analysis looks at both the individual decision perspective and the group perspective. The results found in this paper can be applied to understanding coalition behaviors in bodies such as congress and the United Nations, and also serve as a justification for further use of experiments to understand game theory elements.