Veto Players and Post-regime Change Negotiations: A Comparative Case Analysis of Georgia, Greece, and the Republic of Congo

Open Access
Greensmith, Katherine Claire
Area of Honors:
Political Science
Bachelor of Arts
Document Type:
Thesis Supervisors:
  • Sona Nadenichek Golder, Thesis Supervisor
  • Gretchen Casper, Honors Advisor
  • veto players
  • negotiations
  • Georgia
  • Greece
  • Republic of Congo
Following a regime change, political actors must decide to whom and how power within a new regime will be distributed. Oftentimes this discussion takes place between the political elite and other actors, known as veto players, whose agreement is needed to peacefully establish the new regime. This study argues that who is included in the discussion determines whether or not the state’s new regime will experience conflict after its formation. Using a comparative case analysis of Georgia (1991-1995), Greece (1967-1973), and the Republic of Congo (1992-1995), the results of this study indicate that including all veto players in the negotiations to form the new regime improves the likelihood of that regime’s durability.