How The Relativity of Simultaneity Supports Block Time Theory
Open Access
Author:
Marshall, Jason Andrew
Area of Honors:
Philosophy
Degree:
Bachelor of Arts
Document Type:
Thesis
Thesis Supervisors:
Emily Rolfe Grosholz, Thesis Supervisor Vincent M Colapietro, Thesis Honors Advisor
Keywords:
time eternalism presentism relativity simultaneity
Abstract:
Most things in the universe we can understand to be physical phenomena processed by one or more of our physiological senses. However, the notion of time has always intrigued philosophers and physicists alike because of its intangibility and its omnipresence in our phenomenological experience. Intuitively, we assign the present moment special ontological status because it is this instant in time when we feel that we are freely capable to enact our will. In this paper, I support the eternalist philosophical approach, or block time theory, wherein all points in time share the same ontological status. By means of special relativity, Minkowski space, and inspired by the classic Rietdijk-Putnam argument, I show how the presentist view of time fails to make sense when speaking of ontological properties of the universe.
