The Relationship Between the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System and Different Political Economies
Open Access
- Author:
- Aguilera, Luis
- Area of Honors:
- International Politics
- Degree:
- Bachelor of Arts
- Document Type:
- Thesis
- Thesis Supervisors:
- Bumba Mukherjee, Thesis Supervisor
Matthew Richard Golder, Thesis Honors Advisor - Keywords:
- Investor-State Dispute Settlement System
International Law
Political Economy - Abstract:
- This thesis examines the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System (ISDS) and whether there are different win-ratios between different parties’ characteristics in the court system. The ISDS is a union of international courts and tribunals that resolve disputes between multinational firms and states. The governments involved are all who have consented directly to full jurisdiction of the court or have consented indirectly to its jurisdiction under specific bilateral or multilateral treaties. Recently the ISDS system has been criticized by prominent American leaders from both sides of American politics with, at the time candidate, President Donald Trump, and Senator Elizabeth Warren arguing that it is a threat to American self-governance and sovereignty. Despite their critiques, the system is expanding as international trade has been exponentially growing the past three decades and countries and companies view it as a safeguard against the high risk of foreign direct investment. This paper will look at the who, what, where and attempt to explain why some states have better win ratios than others by taking a quantitative approach to the issue with a focus on economic and political variables as the explanation behind different results. By analyzing the trends in the system, this paper will aid in the political conversation over The United States’ involvement with the system and shed light on a rumored bias of arbitrators in the courts with a more quantitative discussion.