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Economic Interconnectedness and Global Justice: Rethinking Compatriot Partiality

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I make two claims: that immigration constitutes a political obligation and that it does not impede citizens' ability to support their compatriots. To establish immigration as a political duty, I respond to two primary frameworks of justifying compatriot partiality: Andrea Sangiovanni's framework of reciprocity-based internationalism and Michael Blake's framework of a shared threat of state coercion. By applying these frameworks to international relations, I contend that both frameworks generate global egalitarian duties between certain countries. The latter half of the thesis focuses on the economics of immigration. I analyze the empirical literature on low and high-skilled immigration's effects on wages, prices, output, crime, and welfare systems and find that immigration does not hinder a country's ability to provide for its citizens. I conclude that more open immigration policy is both a political duty and economically viable for certain countries. These claims dispel compatriot partiality as grounds for immigration restrictions and make a normative claim for fewer immigration restrictions and greater freedom of movement.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

There are two primary frameworks of justifying compatriot partiality in egalitarian obligations: Andrea Sangiovanni's framework of reciprocity-based internationalism, henceforth referred to as RBI, and Michael Blake's framework of a shared threat of state coercion, henceforth referred to as SC. This paper argues that both frameworks generate egalitarian duties at a global scale with certain countries.

Sangiovanni delineates the special relationships between citizens as comprising social reciprocity and political reciprocity. Social reciprocity is the expectation of equal social standing within a society, generated through the mutual contributions of compatriots to collective culture and social norms. Political reciprocity is the guarantee of equal legal standing, generated through upholding and participating in a common political and legal system.

Sangiovanni reasons that by adhering to social and political norms, systems, and institutions, compatriots engage in a collective venture that enables each other to develop and make use of talents and abilities.¹ They are therefore aiding in the mutual provision of a central class of collective goods that are necessary for developing and acting on a plan for life.² Sangiovanni concludes that social and political reciprocity generate special duties of egalitarian justice to fellow compatriots. He terms this theory RBI. Notably, this paper does not contest the

1. Andrea Sangiovanni *Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State*. pg. 28

2. Andrea Sangiovanni *Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State*. pg. 4

social and political reciprocity that exists within a state, or that they generate special duties.

In his paper, Sangiovanni does not directly address whether social and political reciprocity can be freestanding and solely sufficient for egalitarian duties. I posit that they must be freestanding to be consistent with his theory. Without each form of reciprocity being freestanding, his theory would not capture the citizens of countries who only participate in one type of reciprocity.

In response to RBI, my primary aim is to expand the theory by identifying the economic reciprocity within a state and demonstrate how it is foundational to develop talents and act on a plan of life. Subsequently, I contend that economic reciprocity applies between citizens of different states under certain conditions, therefore generating egalitarian duties of global justice.

Economic reciprocity arises with a mutually reliant network of trade and exchange that, like political and social reciprocity, enables compatriots to develop and make use of talents and abilities. Compatriots uphold this network through formal, informal, and unrecognized labor. The interdependent network of labor allows for social and political institutions to function and provides for the necessities of life, generating residual egalitarian obligations. I argue that economic reciprocity extends beyond the state to intimately linked countries, henceforth referred to as ILCs. ILCs stand in an economic relationship with another country that is necessary for citizens to act on a basic plan for life. Therefore, economic reciprocity generates the same freestanding egalitarian duties between ILCs that social and political reciprocity do in a state.

Blake's theory of SC grounds compatriot partiality in the shared legal and political institutions that set laws and procedures that restrict compatriots' autonomy through threats of coercion³. This coercion may come through physical coercion, in the case of criminal

3. Michael Blake. *Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy*.

punishment, or economic coercion through unjustified fines, taxes, or civil procedures. Coercion threatens human dignity through the obstruction of autonomy with force, giving it a particularly high burden to justify. Blake contends there are special egalitarian duties that compatriots have in order to ensure fair institutions and justify coercion.

This paper argues that the global monetary system is a network of coercion that carries the same duties to justify. While economic coercion may not inherently pose as severe a threat to human dignity as physical state coercion, it can lead to similar outcomes by denying the conditions of autonomy to those who are the most vulnerable. This is the case with the United States monetary policy.

The United States' control over the world's reserve currency establishes a unique economic interconnectedness on a global scale. The Federal Reserve's control over the global monetary system empowers it to create policy without consent from those who are affected by it and enact economically coercive policies. I argue that the United States' network of economic coercion that dominates compatriots in the United States extends to coerced countries, henceforth referred to as CCs, who are affected intimately by United States' policy.

All in all, I argue that if compatriot partiality is grounded in RBI and SC, then egalitarian duties extend to citizens of ILCs and CCs, and the United States ought to ensure the same egalitarian rights and privileges that are given to its own citizens.

The latter half of the thesis focuses on the economics of immigration. Critics of immigration often cite that the introduction of migrants hinders the ability of a country to care for its compatriots. This thesis analyzes the empirical literature for both skilled and unskilled labor. I conclude that the introduction of migrants is beneficial to a country's ability to provide

for citizens through increased production, decreased prices, and a net positive fiscal present value.

The aim of this thesis is to prove that more open immigration policy is both a political duty and economically viable for certain countries. These claims dispel compatriot partiality as grounds for immigration restrictions and make a normative claim for fewer immigration restrictions and greater freedom of movement.

Chapter 2

Reciprocity-Based Internationalism

The engagement among compatriots in a mutualistic political and social relationship allows fellow citizens to achieve the necessities of life and a well-functioning state. These relationships are political and social reciprocity.

Each individual may not and need not contribute equally to a state. Some citizens may have greater resources or abilities, but their ability to use and develop these talents is dependent on the contributions of compatriots. Sangiovanni writes:

Domestic markets—and, indirectly, global markets as well—require the background provided by the shared legal corpus of the state, which governs areas ranging from torts to administration to property rights, contracts, corporations, and criminal law. Without such a legal background, your talents and efforts would have been of little use to anyone, and would certainly not have garnered the returns they do now. And were people to have had different preferences and tastes, your talents might not have had any market value at all.⁴

Social reciprocity encompasses the education, culture, and groups of a society. Through social interaction and participation, individuals contribute to the culture and norms in the social sphere. By submitting themselves to social and cultural norms, compatriots sustain interaction and collaboration. In return, compatriots owe each other equal social standing.

4. Andrea Sangiovanni. *Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State*. pg. 25

Political reciprocity encompasses institutions, systems, and laws. Citizens comply with and contribute to the political sphere to create an institutional order. These institutions regulate property rights, the justice system, and economic institutions, which allow compatriots to develop and act on a plan of life. In return, a fair return is owed to compatriots in the form of equal legal standing.

Sangiovanni considers the disability rights movement to exemplify reciprocity in the social and political sphere. The claim made by disability rights activists is distinctly not that they ought to have compensation because they have these unlucky difficulties.

The claim of disability activists is that, despite their contributions to the social and political spheres, they lack equal social standing in relation to other citizens. The disabled are a marginalized community that has been disregarded socially through negative social attitudes, physically through inaccessible environments, and economically through extra costs to surmount inaccessible environments.⁵ Disabled citizens contribute to the joint provision of political and social goods through paying taxes, complying with laws, upholding social norms, and participating in shared public and social institutions. Yet, these citizens are denied equal standing. Sangiovanni's RBI posits that the disabled, as well as all citizens, ought to have a fair return for contributing to the political and social spheres.⁶

5. Conor Heany. *Revising Sangiovanni's Reciprocity-Based Internationalism: Towards International Egalitarian Obligations*. pg. 5

6. Andrea Sangiovanni. *Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State*. pg. 30

Freestanding Spheres of Reciprocity

In order for Sangiovanni's theory to account for all the citizens of a country and therefore properly ground duties of egalitarian justice without unjustly excluding particular groups, as in the case of the disabled, it must be the case that contributions to either political or social reciprocity are sufficient on their own to generate egalitarian duties, making them freestanding.

Consider the implications if these duties were not freestanding. A citizen who lives in the wilderness and is self-sufficient is not interacting socially with other compatriots, participating in education, or other social institutions. Therefore, there is no social reciprocity. However, they are living within and complying with a system of property rights, the justice system, and economic institutions. In that, they are upholding those systems through adherence, and therefore engaging in political reciprocity. This citizen would certainly have the same egalitarian rights that his fellow citizens have despite not participating socially. It follows that political reciprocity is a sufficient condition for a freestanding egalitarian duty.

The same is true for social reciprocity. Take an individual who makes counterfeit Gucci slippers. They are not complying with the property and economic laws and norms of their country. In that, they are not participating in political reciprocity. However, they still may be participating socially by granting equal respect to individuals, participating in social institutions, and adhering to social norms. This person would not be denied duties of egalitarian justice. Otherwise, it would be the case that those who break the law are no longer captured in Sangiovanni's RBI. Thus, it must be the case that social reciprocity is also freestanding.

Reciprocity in the Economic Sphere

While Sangiovanni focuses on socio-political relationships, he overlooks an essential component crucial for developing and acting on a plan of life. The exchange of goods, services, labor, and capital is an essential mechanism through which we develop and act on a plan of life. Specialization and exchange allow compatriots to pursue their endeavors while others work to fulfill their necessities. Within a state, these interconnected exchanges are what allow for the maintenance of common goods that are necessary for life. This is the essence of economic reciprocity.

Human nature is one of dependence and vulnerability.⁷ Without economic cooperation and coordination, humans struggle to produce basic necessities. Economic cooperation allows us to pursue our plans, while others grow our own food, make our own clothes, develop our own medicine, and so forth. It is the work of others, whether formal, informal, or unrecognized, that enables us to develop and make use of our talents.⁸ A foundational example is food production. In the United States, direct on-farm employment accounted for only 1.3% of our population. Yet, the other 98.7% is dependent on them to survive.⁹

7. USDA Economic Research Service. *Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy*.

8. Formal labor refers to a traditional employee or contractor. Informal labor includes jobs which are not legally regulated, recognized, or protected. An example is an unregistered street vender or undocumented migrant farmers. Unrecognized labor refers to work which provides economic value but is not recorded in traditional measures of productivity. An example of unrecognized labor is if someone partakes in child care or elderly care of a family member without compensation.

9. Malleon, T. *Interdependency: The fourth existential insult to humanity* pg. 161

Consider a talented doctor who invents a vaccine that prevents a disease. That doctor is contributing to the collective venture to a theoretically higher degree than an individual agricultural worker. However, without agricultural workers, the doctor would not have the food that enables him to prioritize research. Without sanitation workers, the doctor could not ensure an adequate place to work or eat. Without construction workers or civil engineers, the doctor would have no place to work at all or a way to get there. Moreover, that doctor is relying on an accumulation of scientific knowledge, the development of technologies, the establishment of institutions, and economic public goods.¹⁰ All of these are supported economically, intellectually, socially, and politically by compatriots.

Externalities exemplify how economic interdependence extends beyond transactions. Consider a parent who spends time giving their child excellent care and home education. They are engaged in unrecognized labor, where there is no transaction or exchange of capital. Yet, there are net positive externalities to society as a result of their childcare.¹¹ Increases in quality and time of childcare is associated with greater school readiness, better language skills, greater math abilities, less likelihood to commit crimes, a higher IQ, and a greater likelihood to achieve high education levels.¹² All of these net positives equip the child to contribute to the public good and benefit general society

10. Malleon, T. *Interdependency: The fourth existential insult to humanity* pg. 166

11. Kennedy, P. W., & Welling, L. *Production Externalities and the Efficiency of Parental Childcare Choices*. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d'Economie pg.

12. Deborah Lowe Vandell. *Child Care Quality: Does It Matter and Does It Need to Be Improved?*

Economic reciprocity is a recognized principle in liberal democracies. The civil rights movement exemplifies this principle. In the 1930s, African Americans were rejected from federal funding for dependent children, unemployment insurance, and social security. They were also denied from participating in prominent unions like the AFL (American Federation of Labor).¹³ The demands made by African American activists were rooted in economic reciprocity. Activists argued that African Americans should not be discriminated against arbitrarily when they were working and contributing economically like other workers.

Like social and political reciprocity, economic reciprocity must be freestanding as well. Consider a rural farmer. They may be removed from any social institutions, while not complying with legal institutions by selling inorganic food as organic. This person would not be participating in social or political reciprocity. Yet, the farmer would still be participating in economic reciprocity through the production and sale of their food. The farmer is providing their country with an essential good, in this case, food, that allows their fellow citizens to pursue their life goals. Thus, economic reciprocity must also be freestanding.

In summary of my argument thus far, social, political, and economic reciprocity all exist within a political state. Social reciprocity is the idea of the expectation of equal social standing within a society, generated through contributions to collective culture and social norms. Political reciprocity is the guarantee of equal legal standing, generated through upholding a common legal system. Economic reciprocity is the guarantee of fair economic compensation and opportunities,

13. Hamilton, D. C. *The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and New Deal*

generated by the productivity contributions to the collective and upholding a shared economic system. Each is freestanding in their ability to generate egalitarian duties.

Global Claims of Economic Reciprocity

Sangiovanni argues that reciprocity is exclusive within a social-political authority as it provides citizens with the collective goods to pursue and develop a plan of life, and the global order does not satisfy these conditions. Sangiovanni writes:

First, while of course the global order is also sustained by our compliance, trust, resources, and participation, the range of areas over which it has authority, even in the most comprehensive inter-, trans-, and supranational institutions such as the European Union, is comparatively narrow. ... More fundamentally, the global order does not have the financial, legal, administrative, or sociological means to provide and guarantee the goods and services necessary to sustain and reproduce a stable market and legal system, indeed to sustain (on its own) any kind of society at all.¹⁴

In Sangiovanni's view, the global order does not create a distinct legal system or social culture. However, as I will argue, the relationship between ILCs, intimately linked countries, is necessary to create a provision of a central class of collective goods, namely those goods necessary for developing and acting on a plan of life. Moreover, this economic reciprocity between certain nations allows for the political and social institutions to function.

14. Andrea Sangiovanni. *Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State*. pg. 21

Critical to the provision of collective goods (protective services, medical services, legal systems...) is not only funding but the fulfillment of basic necessities for countries: food, water, electricity, and medicine. Those who provide these necessities are reliant on another country to supply the most basic goods critical to the lives of their citizens. They have a relationship of economic reciprocity.

The condition Sangiovanni specifies is that a relationship must provide citizens with the collective goods to pursue and develop a plan of life.¹⁵ Citizens of one nation who are intimately linked with another for the production of essential goods and overall economic well-being meet that condition. Thus, if the discontinuation of trade were to inhibit citizens from acting on a basic plan for life, there are duties of economic reciprocity.

Consider the case of the United States and Mexico. According to the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Model) run by Purdue University, if the United States halted trade with Mexico, it is estimated that 4.9 million Americans would be out of work.¹⁶ This would be an extremely large shock to unemployment and an economic crisis for the United States, which would significantly obstruct the life plans of citizens.

Moreover, the United States agricultural industry relies on about 10% of its workforce from H-2A workers, who are nearly all from Mexico.¹⁷ An end to this program would cause a

15. Andrea Sangiovanni. *Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State*. pg. 21

16. *Growing Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico*

17. Bier, J. *H-2A Visas for Agriculture: The Complex Process for Farmers to Hire Agricultural Guest Workers*

supply shock in the food supply, leading to a sharp increase in the cost of food, resulting in higher rates of poverty for Americans. Mexican direct investment in United States firms is estimated to employ more than 123,000 jobs in the United States.¹⁸ In 2020, 77% of all fresh vegetable import volume was from Mexico.¹⁹ Under these conditions, there is an intimate economic relationship between Mexico and the United States: one that provides for the essential goods necessary to act on a plan of life. Therefore, there are duties generated from economic reciprocity.

Meeting a high volume of trade is not sufficient for economic reciprocity. For example, the relationship between Spain and the United States would not be characteristic of an ILC. The United States imports \$18.6 billion in goods, but they are largely made up of plastics, rubber, and leather.²⁰ The loss of these goods could be substituted, and they do not make up goods that are necessities for life or critical for acting on a plan for life.

Notably, countries with duties of economic reciprocity are likely to be in close vicinity with each other, as they are likely to trade essential goods. In this case, the United States would owe Mexico duties of egalitarian justice. Mexico would likely also owe the United States duties of egalitarian justice as well due to their reliance on the United States' labor and capital. This would create reciprocal duties between the countries.

18. Wilson Center. *Growing Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico*.

19. Davis. *U.S. Fresh Vegetable Imports From Mexico and Canada Continue*

20. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce. *2021 Statistical Analysis of U.S. Trade with Spain*.

The duties of economic reciprocity will look different in each country. It is not that there is a specific demand for a type of egalitarian justice. Rather, a country owes egalitarian duties that are consistent with those they recognize in their laws and programs.

Chapter 3

Shared Threat of State Coercion

It is a basic liberal principle that humans have the right to exist as autonomous agents. Essential to autonomy are the circumstances and conditions under which autonomous action is possible. Coercion is an example where autonomy is not possible. Coercion includes physical force and the threat of force to restrict the actions of an individual. Coercion can also be non-physical. For example, a threat to take essential goods that are necessary to live from an individual is coercive.

Blake grounds his argument for compatriot partiality in the need to justify a shared threat of state coercion. Coercion is not compatible with autonomy, as an individual is subjected to the will of another. However, the use of coercion is essential to liberal democracies enforcing criminal and private law, giving these nations a heavy burden to justify coercion.

Blake writes egalitarian duties “are required for the justification of coercive force to all those who face it”, and “that a moral concern with relative deprivation is implied by a liberalism committed to autonomy, and therefore a concern for specifically economic egalitarianism is only morally required within the context of domestic legal system.”²¹

Notably, Blake is not asserting that there is no concern for absolute deprivation in the international setting, but that concerns of relative deprivation only arise in the setting of a shared coercive network. He finds that no international institutions have a network of coercive practices

21. Blake, M. (2001). *Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy* pg. 265

like those that are practiced by nations. Thus, relative deprivation and egalitarian duties are only relevant in the domestic sphere.

Theoretical Extension of Mutual Coercion

In Blake's analysis of international coercion, he considers only international political organizations. He is correct that there is no formal legal or political multinational organization that shares a similar coercive power of the state. International political organizations like the United Nations have limited enforcement or coercive capabilities. Similarly, the IMF and World Bank have limited economic powers that stem from their member countries.

However, Blake does not consider domestic governments' potential for exercising coercion with an international scope. If a nation's government were to exert power over other countries' citizens similar to the coercive power it has on its own, then it would implicate those other countries' citizens in the same coercive network.

The rest of this section aims to distinguish under what circumstances a country may be coercing and dominating another country and distinguish that from domination alone.

Laborde characterizes domination in the global order as:

Thus domination describes a state of vulnerability on the part of poor and weak states, whereby offers are made to them on terms that they cannot refuse, and threats do not need to be carried out or even issued to be successful, all by virtue of the sheer inequality of power and resources between them and rich and powerful global actors.²²

22. Laborde, C. *Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch*

The power differences between states create the conditions for domination. Weaker states can be dominated even without direct acts of coercion, because of the mere possibility, threat, or expectation of interference.²³ This allows more powerful states to leverage their position to further their interests sometimes arbitrarily or solely for their own benefit. Weaker states have few ways of recourse. However, domination does not necessarily meet Blake's condition of a coercive network.

To define coercion, this paper adopts Wertheimer's two pronged theory of coercion which states that, "A coerces B to do X if and only if (1) A's proposal creates a choice situation for B such that B has no reasonable alternative but to do X and (2) it is *wrong* for A to make such a proposal to B,".²⁴ For the following section, I will refer to these as conditions (1) and (2) of coercion.

Essential to autonomy are the circumstances and conditions under which autonomous action is possible. Poverty is an example of a coercive condition in which autonomy may not be possible. In the case of poverty, an individual is particularly vulnerable to coercion as they do not have access to essential goods, giving them no reasonable alternatives. For example, an individual may be given two choices: take a job well below the fair market value or remain unemployed and unable to afford food. Of course, the latter is not a legitimate option, and the former must be taken, giving the individual no choice in accepting an unfair contract (condition 1). It is wrong for an employer to leverage poverty to compensate unfairly (condition 2). This

23. Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*

24. Wertheimer, A. *Coercion* pg. 172

same exchange would not be coercive if the individual were not in poverty, as their essential needs would be met, allowing them to reject that contract, negotiate, find another job, or take the risk of starting their own firm. Below, I consider a number of cases where conditions (1) and (2) are met, demonstrating my point that coercion, albeit of a different kind from the sort that Blake is primarily concerned with, may run rampant in the international sphere. I indicate the aforementioned conditions with brackets where they arise.

As I will show, there is a great deal of overlap between domination and coercion in the global order. Consider powerful country P, weak country W, and other country O. P may have an informal policy that they do not trade with countries who trade with country O due to long-standing religious tensions. Country P is so powerful that its allies also do not trade with country O out of fear of retaliation. However, country W just had a drought and is on the brink of famine. They desperately need the agriculture trade of country O, but to act against country P's arbitrary dislike for country O would be even more devastating out of fear of being put on a blacklist of no trade.

Country P is clearly dominating country W. At the same time, this policy is coercive. (1) Country W has no reasonable alternative but to not trade with P. (2) It is wrong to impose one's arbitrary dislike for a country on another country, with the stakes being famine. This thought experiment exemplifies how coercion exists at the global scale. To meet Blake's conditions of a shared threat of mutual coercion, in this case, citizens in country P and W must both be coerced in the same network.

Consider the same countries. Country P has a centralized fiat monetary system that regulates the dominant reserve and trade settlement currency country of the world. Group X are unelected officials in the government of country P that control this system. The decisions of

group X can leave millions unemployed, induce people into poverty, and set the rules of who gets capital and at what cost. If group X decides to decrease the money supply and set rules that favor a small fraction of banks, millions will become unemployed. In that instance, citizens in country P are being coerced. (1) There is no reasonable alternative but to continue with the only monetary system that they have access to. The only option would be to uproot their lives and find citizenship elsewhere where the monetary system takes no effect, which may not be possible. I suspect this is far from reasonable. (2) It is wrong for group X to act against the interest of the majority and induce them into poverty.

Country P is the dominant global superpower, and every other country has integrated its monetary system within its own. Country W holds a large portion of their reserves in P's currency, as a condition to be a part of the global economic system. Therefore, country W will have millions unemployed and have to pay more as interest on their debt, which would likely lead to less funding for the welfare state. It is difficult to see how Country P is not exercising coercive power over Country W. (1) Country W has no other alternative but to partake in the monetary system. They have no leverage as a country to form their own financial system separate from country W, and if they do not partake in the monetary system, they will be cut out of trade. (2) It is wrong for group X to arbitrarily make changes that are intended to benefit a small few while those worse off bear the costs.

The actions of group X are coercing both the citizens of its own country P, and country W to a significant and similar degree. Given the intimacy of the value of currency to everyday life, group X has subjected citizens in both countries to serious and significant coercion. A citizen of country P and O may become unemployed, induced into poverty, or lose

their home. Therefore, the monetary system and group X are imposing a shared system of coercion on the citizens from country P and O, and it would stand they owe each other duties of egalitarian justice to justify this coercive system. These conditions are met by the United States and certain countries.

To summarize, monetary systems can be coercive theoretically. If an individual is to take part in the economy, they are left with two choices: use a currency, which is heavily controlled by a foreign central body that does not represent you, or do not use the currency. (1) The individual has no reasonable alternative but to participate in the monetary system, as it is essential to any plan of life. (2) It is wrong to be forced to participate in a monetary system that does not represent you or consider your interests. This claim is distinct from markets or pricing mechanisms being coercive. It is that the current structures of centralized monetary systems can be coercive.²⁵

The United States' Domination and Coercion

The United States has the most dominant role in the global order. One way it exerts this dominance is through its monetary system. The United States dollar makes up about 58% of

25. Nearly all government backed monetary systems in the world are centralized in the sense that there is a central body which makes monetary policies. Oftentimes this central body is appointed by the executive. Crypto currencies, at least those which are sufficiently decentralized, are an example of a decentralized monetary system, which may be free from theoretical coercion. Take the example of bitcoin. There is no centralized body which is deciding the rules of monetary distribution. Though this may limit the abilities to create effective monetary policy, it allows a predictable, open, and non-arbitrary set of monetary rules, making it not coercive. However, as it stands, there is not wide acceptance of bitcoin as payment, making it not a reasonable alternative.

foreign exchange reserves held by central banks, and 89% of all foreign transactions use the US dollar for settlement.²⁶ Reserves in central banks are held to stabilize other currencies, and a change in the value of those reserves can have catastrophic impacts on countries. The monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States policy can alter the real value and interest payments on reserves.

Economists at the Brookings Institute studied the effect of the Federal Reserve raising interest rates.²⁷ They found that when the Federal Reserve increased the federal funds rate by 25 basis points (0.25%) there was a reaction shock, which increased the probability of a financial crisis in EMDE (Emerging Market and Developing Economies) countries by over 3%. In 2022, the Federal Reserve increased interest rates by 140 basis points. The authors found this resulted in an increase of 51-55% chance of a financial crisis in the EMDE countries. Additionally, the probability of a currency crisis rose 78%.

Financial and currency crises are associated with higher unemployment, decline in real wages, worsened health and education outcomes, capital outflows, decreases in equity prices, and greater levels of poverty.²⁸ These effects result in conditions of coercion, where the countries and individuals who are already worse off are most affected.

26. *Dollar Dominance Monitor* - Atlantic Council.

27. Arteta, C., Ruch, F. U., & Kamin, S. *US interest rate increases and crisis probabilities in developing economies*.

28. World Bank. *FINANCIAL SPILLOVERS OF RISING U.S. INTEREST RATES*

Is the United States' monetary system coercive? It seems that the countries in EMDE have no reasonable alternative but to take part in the United States' dominant monetary system. Without holding the US dollar, or a similar currency that is stable, developing countries are denied the ability to settle trades or maintain stability in their own currency. This would lead to high rates of inflation, difficulty attracting foreign investment, an inability to export goods, and overall economic turmoil in a country.²⁹

It is worth noting that there are no alternative reserve currencies. The second highest reserve currency is the EURO at about 20%, which is about one-third of global US dollar reserves. However, the EURO reserves hold about 18% of their reserves in US dollars, meaning the United States monetary policy would still have a significant effect on the currency. Furthermore, the dollar is used to settle 89% of global foreign exchange transactions, leaving no alternative but to be exposed to the dollar in a significant way.³⁰

To conclude, it is evident that EMDE countries have no alternative but to participate in a US dollar-dominated system, and they are particularly vulnerable as developing countries to the worst effects of United States policy.

This paper is not seeking to break ground in moral judgment of monetary policy. However, I suspect that it is wrong for the Federal Reserve to induce currency and financial crises in EMDE countries without considering these effects. As matters stand, the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate that does not consider or fairly evaluate the global effects of monetary policy. Thus, the disastrous effects to EMDE countries are not considered in policy decisions.

29. Finance and Development | F&D. *Finance and Development*.

30. Atlantic Council *Dollar Dominance Monitor*.

It is evident that the United States monetary system creates a network of coercion, at least one that holds between EMDE countries. However, that alone does not trigger egalitarian duties. It must be the case that this network is also coercive to United States citizens.

We can see a distinct parallel in how citizens of the United States have no reasonable alternative to avoid participation in the US dollar monetary system. To remove themselves, a citizen would have to uproot their life and find citizenship in a country that is not intimately affected by US monetary policy. Interest rate changes may be wrong for two reasons. One reason is that the Federal Reserves are unelected officials, and it is highly difficult for average citizens to check them due to the nature of lobbying. When the actions of central banks may benefit a small group, commercial banks for example, there are large incentives for those banks to create lobbying groups. Alternatively, when the harm is dispersed among the lower class, there is much less incentive to lobby on an individual basis and greater costs to organization.³¹ The second reason is that low-income Americans disproportionately bear the cost of rate hikes, but the upper class disproportionately benefit from lowering rates.³²

To summarize, I have demonstrated that both citizens in EMDE countries and the United States are coerced by the same system of monetary policy. It is therefore unclear why the egalitarian duties that Blake recognizes are owed to citizens of the United States do not also apply to citizens of EMDE countries. After all, EMDE countries and their citizens have no reasonable alternatives, and it is wrong for the US government to induce conditions of poverty without adequate consideration of the policies' effects. Likewise, United States citizens have no

31. Rouanet, L., & Hazlett, P. *The redistributive politics of monetary policy*

32. Dean Baker. *How Will the Fed's Rate Hikes Help the Poor?*

reasonable alternative but to partake in the monetary system. It is wrong to have unelected officials, who may be captured by lobbyists, uphold monetary policy that disproportionately burdens the poor with the costs but disproportionately benefits the wealthy with growth.

Consequently, if compatriot partiality is justified through Blake's theory of SC, this would mean that duties of egalitarian justice between US citizens and EMDE countries should also be duly recognized.

Chapter 4

The Economics of Immigration

Following the influential work of Joseph Carens, I assume that fulfilling egalitarian duties necessitates expanding the right to freedom of movement and, more specifically, extending this right to at least some non-citizens who are not refugees. Carens has argued, from an egalitarian perspective, that immigration restrictions not only impede freedom of movement but also undermine equality of opportunity and the principle of equal moral worth.³³ I recognize that the egalitarian-based argument for free movement has been subject to a number of criticisms. However, in what follows, I will operate on the premise that greater freedom of movement is an important means through which egalitarian duties can be partly fulfilled. Other measures, such as guest worker programs and economic aid, have been inadequate and in some cases harmful.³⁴

Economic-based critiques regarding greater freedom of movement as a means of fulfilling egalitarian duties can be categorized broadly into two concerns. First, that freedom of movement

33. Carens, Joseph. *The Ethics of Immigration*.

34. Oberman, K. *Poverty and Immigration Policy*; Lenard, P. T., & Straehle, C. *Temporary labour migration, global redistribution, and democratic justice*; Norlander, P. *Do guest worker programs give firms too much power?*

will not serve to sufficiently reduce global inequality. Second, greater freedom of movement would serve to worsen the economic conditions in the host countries, particularly for those who are worse off. My thesis is primarily concerned with the latter and proving that immigration and expanding freedom of movement to ILCs is a viable economic policy for host countries. To be clear, I will be leaving aside the question of free movement for citizens of non-ILC countries.

One of the most cited reasons for immigration restrictions is that taking immigrants will limit a country's ability to provide for its own citizens. Within that notion is an assumption of compatriot partiality. As the first section of this paper demonstrated, compatriot partiality may not be justified in some instances. In order to examine the empirical claims against immigration in the cases where there is no RBI or SC, this section will assume the legitimacy of compatriot partiality. With that assumption, immigration becomes an economic question. If allowing immigration hinders the ability to provide for fellow compatriots, then it may be justified to restrict immigration. This section asserts that immigration does not hinder the ability to provide for fellow compatriots, and for some countries, including the United States, it furthers the ability to provide for compatriots.

Immigrants are often siloed into two categories: skilled and unskilled. These categories are often imprecise, reductive, and inconsistently applied. However, this paper does not seek to break ground in the categorization of migrants, nor is precision particularly important for this paper, as I will argue all migrants are economically beneficial and enhance the ability to provide for compatriots. In this paper, I use the terms high-skilled and low-skilled to simply capture the connotation of these terms in political rhetoric

Skilled Labor

The positive economic value of high-skilled labor has a strong consensus in the empirical literature. Even those with strong beliefs of compatriot partiality or concerns over immigration are often supportive or unconcerned with high-educated or highly wealthy individuals coming into a country. There are serious moral considerations that arise with high skilled migration, both with partiality towards high skilled migrants and the prospect of brain drain.³⁵ However, this section is concerned solely with the economics of immigration and dispelling the view that immigrants, both skilled and unskilled, hinder the ability to provide for compatriots.

Frequently, anti-immigration rhetoric supposes jobs to be a finite quantity within an economy. This perspective suggests that when an immigrant enters a country, they will predictably take or compete for jobs that would have otherwise gone to natives. The reality is far more complex. When workers are hired, they can create productivity spillovers in the industry, or even along the supply chain, creating more jobs. More workers can increase production and profits, in turn, creating more jobs. Some workers create firms themselves. The question is whether immigrants create more jobs than they take.

A 2022 paper looked at immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States.³⁶ It found that, as a whole, immigrants start more firms on average than native-born United States citizens. This is true across the board for firms as small as ten employees to as large as Fortune 500 companies.

35. Lim, D. *Selecting Immigrants By Skill: A Case Of Wrongful Discrimination?*

36. Azoulay, Pierre, Benjamin F. Jones, J. Daniel Kim, and Javier Miranda. *Immigration and Entrepreneurship in the United States*.

Moreover, the jobs created by immigrants tend to be higher or equal paying to that of native-started firms. These findings suggest that immigrants create more jobs than they take.

Another paper looked at entrepreneurship of immigrants and their children.³⁷ It found that nearly 45% of Fortune 500 firms were started by immigrants or their children. Those Fortune 500 firms employ nearly 14.8 million people, a little over 10% of the current workforce. Again, these findings suggest immigrants create more jobs than they take.

Another important factor in economic contribution is innovation of new technologies. A 2022 paper looked at immigrants' innovation, using patents as a proxy.³⁸ Immigrants tend to produce 23% more patents, with a higher share of top-cited and high market value patents. This all amounts to immigrants generating 25% of the aggregate economic value created in publicly traded companies, markedly higher on a per capita basis than native inventors.

Even those immigrants who are not entrepreneurs or innovative, may increase jobs through productivity spillovers. Productivity spillovers are generated in highly interconnected fields and innovative ones where innovation of technology or method by one person or firm benefits another or the industry. From 2000-2015, STEM fields in the United States had a labor supply shock from the increase of migrants. Typically, this would be associated with a decrease of pay due to more supply of labor. However, these productivity spillovers increased the U.S.

37. *New American Fortune 500 in 2023*

38. Bernstein, S., Diamond, R., McQuade, T., & Pousada, B. *The Contribution of High-Skilled Immigrants to Innovation in the United States*

born STEM workers' salaries by 4.67%. From 2000-2015, Immigrant labor generated 103 Billion USD for native workers.³⁹

To summarize, recent empirical data seems to indicate that immigrants are more innovative than natives, more entrepreneurial, may benefit natives through productivity spillovers, and create more jobs than they take. However, these entrepreneurial and innovative benefits may be captured with solely high-skilled immigration. The next section examines only the effects of low skilled immigration.

Low-Skilled Immigration's Effect on Wages and Unemployment

The data is at worst mixed on whether low-skill immigration reduces wages and increases unemployment. A highly studied event in economics of immigration is the Mariel boatlift.

In 1980, Fidel Castro sent 125,000 Cubans to Miami, many of whom were prisoners, in just a six-month period.⁴⁰ All of these migrants had to find jobs in low-skilled labor positions. This case study represents a sort of worst scenario for the labor market impacts of low-skilled migration, as it was geographically confined to one city, in a short time, with many people.

Despite being the worst scenario, the data on the Mariel boatlift are mixed. Nobel economist David Card's 1990 paper found that there was no effect on the wages of unemployment of non-Cuban workers.⁴¹ These results signal that Miami's economy and

39. Gunadi, C. *An inquiry on the impact of highly-skilled STEM immigration on the U.S. economy*

40, 41. David Card. *The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market*

industries were able to adjust to more labor, increasing the productivity of the city. Borjas' 2017 paper had different findings. Using a synthetic control method, Borjas found that the wage rate of those without high school diplomas fell substantially by an estimated 10-30% in subsequent years, while other workers were not affected.⁴² A third paper published by Peri in 2017 also used a synthetic control method and found no short term or long-term lowering of wages.⁴³ Peri concludes that Borjas's claims are predicated on a narrow choice of samples. Though Peri's paper effectively addresses Borjas's methodological flaws, empirical research has not reached a definitive conclusion as to whether the Mariel boatlift resulted in the unemployment of native workers.

Other papers found the introduction of immigrant labor to have no effect or a positive effect on natives' wages. A 2011 Paper from Ottaviano and Peri found that immigration from 1990 to 2006 in the United States increased native workers' wages, including those who had no high school diploma.⁴⁴

A Chicago Booth poll of top economists helps to give a summary of the overall academic consensus.⁴⁵ When asked whether the average US citizen would be better off if a large number of

42. Borjas, G. J. *THE WAGE IMPACT OF THE MARIELITOS: A REAPPRAISAL*

43. Peri, Giovanni & Yasenov, Vasil *The Labor Market Effects of a Refugee Wave: Synthetic Control Method Meets the Mariel Boatlift*

44. Ottaviano, G.I.P. and Peri, G. *Rethinking the Effect of Immigration and Wages*

45. Clark Center Forum. *Low-Skilled Immigrants - Clark Center Forum*. (2021, January 22)

low-skilled foreign workers were allowed to enter the US each year, 2% strongly agreed, 50% agreed, 28% were uncertain, 9% disagreed, and 11% did not answer. The takeaway from the poll is that the top economists believe that citizens are significantly more likely to benefit as a whole rather than be worse off from low-skilled immigration, but that low-skilled Americans in particular may be disparately affected.

To conclude this section, the data suggest there is no definite consensus, but that low-skilled migration is likely overall beneficial for a country. If there are negative effects, they likely affect only low-skilled natives. These negative effects can be offset through compensation, while achieving higher net benefit for a country. Unemployment and wages only make up a portion of the effects of low-skilled labor. The next section examines how low-skilled migration affects prices and production.

Low-Skilled Laborers' Effect on Production and Prices

In economic theory, more labor supply means more production and lower prices. That economic theory holds true in the empirical data for low-skilled migration.

A 2007 paper by Lach looked at the introduction of Soviet migrants, most of whom were low-skilled, to the Israeli labor market.⁴⁶ It found that the ratio of immigrants in a city was inversely proportional to the prices in that city. For every 1% increase in immigrants as a percent of population, there was a 0.5% decrease in the prices. A 2016 paper from Balkan and Tumen

46. Lach, S. (2007). Immigration and Prices. *Journal of Political Economy*

found similar results.⁴⁷ The paper analyzed the influx of Syrian refugee labor into Turkey and found that the price of goods in Turkey decreased 2.5% due to the low-skilled immigration.

A National Bureau of Economic Research paper looked at immigration in the 1990s and 2000s in the United States. The paper found that immigrants tend to increase total factor productivity, reasoning that the gains come from “more efficient allocation of skills to tasks, as immigrants are allocated to manual-intensive jobs, promoting competition and pushing natives to perform communication-intensive tasks more efficiently”.⁴⁸ Moreover, the IMF found that migration into advanced economies increased output in the short term and long term.⁴⁹

A 2008 paper from Cortes looked at low-skilled immigration’s effect on the prices of housekeeping and gardening in the United States.⁵⁰ In both industries, Cortes found a decrease of prices in both sectors as a result of immigration. Decreased prices in these sectors do more than increase welfare for natives. They affect their time-use decisions. With more labor supply in jobs that are close substitutes to household production, like gardening and house care, the price and availability of these services increased, allowing more households to use those services. With fewer hours to work on household production, the average hours of market work by high-skilled women increased.⁵⁰ This is a microcosmic example of the essential work that low-skilled labor provides as a crucial enabling condition for the performance of high-skill labor.

47. Binnur Balkan Konuk & Semih Tumen. *Immigration and Prices : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Turkey*

48. Peri, G. *The Effect of Immigration on Productivity: Evidence from US States*

49. IMF *Migration to Advanced Economies Can Raise Growth*.

50. Cortes, P. *The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence from CPI Data*

To conclude, there is an empirical consensus that low-skilled labor decreases prices and increases production. However, there are economic considerations beyond productivity and employment. The next section will examine welfare consumption and crime rates of migrants.

Welfare and Crime

Two of the most common socio-economic concerns with immigration are an increase in crime or an increase in the welfare burden. As summarized below, the empirical consensus does not support either concern.

In a 2019 paper, The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas examined the best literature on immigration and crime.⁵¹ It found that immigrants commit fewer crimes than native-born citizens, and that areas with higher immigrant populations have similar or lower crime rates. Overall, immigrants are 60 percent less likely to be incarcerated than United States citizens.⁵²

The welfare usage of immigrants has been a particular point of focus in political rhetoric. Immigrants use 27% less welfare and entitlement benefits than United States natives on a per capita basis.⁵³ Immigrants are a net fiscal positive, meaning they contribute more to government expenditures than what is expended on them. The net present fiscal value of an additional immigrant is \$173,000- \$259,000.⁵⁴

51. Orrenius, & Zavodny. *Do Immigrants Threaten U.S. Public Safety?*

52. SIEPR. *The mythical tie between immigration and crime.*

53. Nowrasteh, & Howard. *Immigrant and Native Consumption of Means-Tested Welfare*

54. Blau, & Donehower. *Do Immigrants Cost Native-Born Taxpayers Money?*

Though immigrants are a long term fiscally positive, there are upfront costs, most of which occur at the local and state level, whereas the fiscal benefits of immigration are received at the federal level.⁵⁵ This creates asymmetry. State and local governments often cite the burdensome costs of migrants. One optimal solution worth considering, where all parties would hypothetically benefit, would be ongoing transfer payments from the federal government to state and local governments to offset the costs of immigration. That would ensure the fiscal benefits of immigration are distributed, while achieving a higher net benefit.

Empirical Conclusion

To summarize thus far, immigrants as a whole are more innovative and entrepreneurial than natives resulting in significant welfare gains to native citizens. The data is mixed on whether low-skilled immigrants decrease natives' wages or increase unemployment. Low-skilled immigration increases production and decreases prices. The presence of low-skilled immigrants allows for more labor hours for high-skilled workers, and the two forms of labor cannot be separated from each other. Immigrants do not commit more crime. Immigrants consume less welfare benefits on a per-dollar basis and are a significant net positive in fiscal impact on the United States. The empirical literature I have examined suggests that immigrants are beneficial for a country at all skill levels. Thus, the data supports that immigrants will assist, not hinder, the ability to provide for compatriots.

55. Blau, & Donehower. *Do Immigrants Cost Native-Born Taxpayers Money?*

Conclusion

This paper does not make a specific proposal to resolve egalitarian obligations to ILCs and CCs. However, it has underscored that any solution must provide consistent egalitarian duties amongst all countries that are implicated. International aid would be far from sufficient and may even be counterproductive. Guest worker programs have some redistributive benefits but have been linked to worker abuse violations and would fall short of the egalitarian duties. Thus, a solution with a more open immigration policy is warranted.

The contribution of this paper has been to contest compatriot partiality, prove that immigration rights are a political duty owed to certain non-citizens, and finally, assert that immigration is economically beneficial for the host country. The validity of either immigration as a political duty or economically beneficial should be sufficient to make a normative claim for a more open immigration policy, but combining these considerations makes for, I believe, a holistic and powerful argument.

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