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US AND THEM: ETHNIC AFFINITY AND THE DECISION TO INTERVENE IN CIVIL WARS

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ABSTRACT

Current research on the role of third party intervention in civil wars demonstrates that the decision to intervene results from a mixture of strategic interests and domestic politics. Prior to intervention, third parties assess the characteristics of the target state and predict possible outcomes to determine whether the benefits of an intervention will outweigh the costs. Research suggests that transnational ethnic affinities play a significant role in this cost/benefit analysis. Kin dyads that feature a state whose ethnic group in power has ethnic affinity with a marginalized ethnic group in another state where that minority kin group is engaged in a civil conflict, have a higher probability of intervention. This thesis addresses a series of cases of conflict in Cyprus. The analysis finds that ethnic affinity enhances the linkage patterns between the state experiencing the intervention and the potential intervener, and discusses other variables that may influence the decision to intervene. Research into this topic is important because it may be used to indicate which civil wars will be more likely to receive interventions.
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Introduction

Third party intervention in civil wars has been an ongoing topic of discussion among both academics and policymakers. According to Lemke and Thomas (2010), civil wars that experience third party interventions tend to be bloodier, last longer, and are more likely to recur than civil wars that do not attract interventions. Research regarding the role of third party interveners in civil wars focuses on both the causes and effects of intervention. The foundation of this thesis questions “why third parties decide to intervene in ethnic civil wars?” If the undeniable cost of a longer, bloodier battle looms as a possible consequence, which variables exert the influence necessary for a third party to intervene?

Current research on the role of third party intervention in civil wars suggests that the decision to intervene results from a mixture of strategic interests and domestic politics. Prior to intervention, third parties assess the characteristics of the target state and predict possible outcomes to determine whether the benefits of an intervention will outweigh the costs. Research has shown that ethnic affinities exist and do matter when it comes to deciding to intervene (Austvoll, 2005; Davis & Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002). Specifically, kin dyads that feature a state whose ethnic group in power has ethnic affinity with a marginalized ethnic group in another state where that minority kin group is engaged in an intra-state conflict, have a higher probability of experiencing an intervention. Examining ethnic affinity as a possible causal mechanism of intervention is important in predicting which civil wars may or may not experience interventions.

This thesis seeks to contribute to the greater discussion of third party interventions with the analysis of a series of case studies that assess which variables influence third party intervention in ethnic civil wars. The cases selected pertain to specific conflicts in Cyprus that all have significant strategic implications and consequences regarding the outcome of the conflict, and include potential interveners that provide variation on the ethnic group in power-
marginalized ethnic group kin dyad. As a whole, these cases present instances where the potential interveners have exhibited different responses to the influence of ethnic affinity over time. While research suggests that the aforementioned kin dyad type has provided a model for predicting which civil wars will experience interventions (Austvoll, 2005; Davis & Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002), this theory has not been unambiguously supported. The cases I study use the framework of the kin dyad model to investigate the existence of ethnic affinity in addition to other variables that may influence the decision to intervene.

I hypothesize that alternate explanations for the decision of potential third parties to intervene in civil wars depend on whether the ethnic kin is winning or losing the conflict. These and other hypotheses operate within the parameters of a literature review that suggests the decision to intervene is driven by strategic interests and domestic politics. The cases ultimately illustrate the significance of ethnic affinity as well as other variables in the decision-making process of potential interveners.

The thesis proceeds as follows. In the following section I present a literature review of past research regarding the importance of ethnic affinities in determining whether a third party will be more likely to intervene in an ethnic civil war. Next, I explicate hypotheses that address why potential third parties may not choose to intervene in an ethnic civil war. A description of the research design and analysis of case studies follows. Finally, in the conclusion of the thesis I briefly address the implications of the findings and discuss ideas for future research.
Literature Review

The impact of third party interventions on civil wars has been at the center of debate among academics. While some argue that interveners are bound by morality to stop bloodshed, others argue that third parties should refrain from getting involved in civil wars, because they are costly and may prolong conflict. Current research shows that civil wars that experience third party interventions tend to be bloodier, last longer, and are more likely to recur than civil wars that do not attract interventions (Lemke & Thomas, 2010). Such research on the role of third parties in civil wars can be divided into three broad categories: the causes of intervention, the effect of intervention on civil war outcomes, and the effect of intervention on civil war duration. Here I will summarize the first research agenda, and assess the importance of ethnic affinities in determining whether a third party will be more likely to intervene in an ethnic civil war.

Over the course of time there has been a wide range of theories about why third parties choose to intervene in civil wars. Mitchell (1970) argued that there were four factors that influence interventions: 1) the characteristics of the country in conflict, 2) the characteristics of the intervener, 3) linkage patterns between the groups in the target and the intervener, and 4) the characteristics of the international system. These seemingly broad factors provide an appropriate starting point to address the previous research on what conditions increase the likelihood of external interventions in civil wars.

J. David Singer’s “Inter-nation Influence Model” centers around the intervener’s perception of the current characteristics of the country in conflict, its predictions about the country’s future behavior, and its preferences about what that future behavior should be (Lemke & Regan, 2004). This model suggests that the third party assesses both current and predicted future policies and decides whether the expected outcome will be more or less preferred. If the
potential intervener is already pleased with the policies of the state experiencing the conflict it may choose to support the government to ensure those policies continue. On the other hand, if the potential intervener does not favor the current policies, it may choose to intervene on the side of the rebels. But if the intervener chooses the latter, it is relying heavily on the predicted future characteristics of the state, and these are not guaranteed. This model ultimately treats interveners as rational actors that conduct a cost/benefit analysis that is heavily reliant on the expectation of the intervention succeeding, and ending the conflict (Lemke & Regan, 2004).

Overall, a central claim of why third parties intervene in civil wars is that they are likely to do so for self-interested motives. Suhrke & Noble (1977) used case studies to demonstrate that civil wars often occurred against a backdrop of multiple levels of interest, allegiance, and involvement by third parties, thus outside of the civil war itself. With this in mind, Regan (1998) also found that the polarized structure of the Cold War weighed heavily in the decision making process of third parties. The different allegiances of and levels of interest of parties during the Cold War influenced the intervener’s cost/benefit analysis based on the desired outcome of balanced power in the bipolar system. Regan (1998) argues that as the international system became less polarized there was a decrease in the pressure to intervene on geographically strategic grounds, and interventions began to take on a multilateral character through supranational organizations like the United Nations.

Additionally, both Holl (1993) and Regan (2000) argue that third parties are more likely to intervene when conflicts approach termination and are less likely to intervene when the intensity of a civil war is high. If the intensity of the conflict is a strong determinant of intervention, the uncertainty over likely outcomes may ultimately decrease the probability of intervention. Regan (1998) uses the example of the United States in the 1990s to display the
impact the uncertainty of outcome plays in the decision to intervene. Specifically, the need for a high degree of certainty about short time frames and successful outcomes tended to drive debates about U.S. interventions in Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Congo/Zaire (1996). These findings offer support for the claim that interveners act on self-motivated grounds.

However, Regan (1998) admits that third parties are also more likely to intervene when a humanitarian crisis is imminent. Although Singer suggests that, “No nation has the resources to engage in serious efforts to influence a great many of the others at any given time” (1963, 423), third parties seem to abandon intuitive self-interested motives derived from the cost/benefit analysis to intervene in humanitarian crises. Regan’s study (1998), found that the existence of a humanitarian crisis associated with an internal conflict increases the probability of intervention to 60%. In addition, conflicts with casualties approaching 200,000 have a near certainty of attracting an intervention. Regan rationalizes that conflicts with these characteristics most likely generate public support for an intervention on ethical grounds (Regan, 1998). This suggests that the decision to intervene results from a mixture of strategic interests and domestic politics. Domestic costs and benefits are conceived in their political ramifications or audience costs (Regan, 1998). These audience costs can be incurred whether a decision is made to intervene in a civil war or not, so the decision makers have to weigh the competing demands of various constituencies that may play a role in the future of their political careers.

The role domestic politics play in foreign policy provides a platform for the potential impact of ethnic affinities on the decision making process of third parties to intervene in civil wars. Cooper and Berdal (1993) examined the possible motives of third party interveners in conflicts that were originated from and sustained by ethnic tension. The cases of Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Lebanon illustrated multiple motives for outside interventions in ethnic
conflicts including: “hegemonic ambitions; concerns about regional stability; ethnic sympathy for oppressed ethnic groups; a sense of international responsibility; and humanitarian concerns” (Cooper & Berdal, 1993). This case study analysis ultimately concluded that those who have intervened in ethnic civil wars have had both altruistic and self-interested motives.

One of Mitchell’s (1970) four factors that influence intervention was “linkage patterns between groups.” Research suggests that a reliable linkage pattern between groups is ethnic membership. There have been multiple definitions of ethnic identity throughout current research. For example, Saideman (2002, 32) conceptualizes ethnic groups as “collective groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systemically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of society.” Additionally, Fearon and Laitin (2000, 848) note that “ethnic identities” are defined mainly by “descent rules of group membership and content typically composed of cultural attributes, such as religion, language, customs, and shared historical myths.” Both of these definitions lend support to the belief that ethnic identity, by its nature, creates feelings of loyalty, interest and fear of extinction.

Saideman (2002) claims ethnic identity has the potential to influence individuals’ preferences towards domestic politics, and these identities should also influence preferences toward foreign policies. As Regan (1998) identified the role of audience costs in whether a third party decides to intervene in a civil war, it can be hypothesized that politicians seeking support at home will favor groups in other states that have ethnic ties with their constituents. If this is an accurate claim, groups with ethnic brethren elsewhere may be more likely to experience an intervention in the case of a civil war.
The current literature on the topic of ethnic affinities assumes that members of an ethnic group are concerned with the welfare and condition of other members of the ethnic group. Davis and Moore (1997) assume that even if members of an ethnic group are divided by an international border, their ethnic affinity will serve as a spur to interactions. They also claim that this type of affinity, driven by domestic politics, is not constrained to a certain regime type. In democratic states, the government may respond to the demands of the majority of the population, while in authoritarian states, the government may only respond to members of the coalition it relies on for political survival (Davis & Moore, 1997). Overall, leaders cannot repress everyone and must retain the support of some constituents. So regardless of regime type, if members of an ethnic group are dispersed across states, they will monitor the status and behavior of their brethren.

Upon analyzing external support for ethnic groups, Saideman (2002, 46) finds that ethnic ties undoubtedly matter. He shows that the existence of ethnic kin dominating a nearby state consistently influenced the “likelihood of groups receiving broad support, and groups in this situation were likely to receive the most intense forms of assistance.” Saideman (2002) also reports that the decision by third parties in these cases reflects both interest and opportunity. Interest because they are an ethnic kin and opportunity because they are nearby. This position suggests there are ethnic implications within the cost/benefit analysis of the potential intervener if they share a border.

Furthermore, Austvoll (2005) expands upon transnational ethnic affinities by distinguishing kin dyad relations. He uses ethnic civil war data to classify the ethnic affiliation of actors and their kin countries. By identifying actors and their kin countries as potential third party interveners he is able to categorize kin dyads based on whether each group is an “ethnic
group in power (EGIP),” or a “marginalized ethnic group (MEG)” (Austvoll, 2005). Within this scheme four possible dyad types exist: EGIP-MEG dyads; MEG-EGIP dyads; EGIP-EGIP dyads; and MEG-MEG dyads. Austvoll (2005) finds in his analysis that different types of kin dyads not only affect the likelihood of intervention, but may also determine the conflict actor that interveners support. States whose ethnic group in power (EGIP) has a marginalized ethnic group (MEG) participating in a civil war are most likely to intervene in favor of their ethnic kin (Austvoll, 2005).

Finally, a multitude of additional variables are likely taken into account before a third party decides to intervene in a civil war. Current literature suggests that interveners assess the characteristics of the target state and predict possible outcomes to determine whether the benefits will outweigh the costs of an intervention. Because this method relies heavily on the uncertainty of conflict outcome and duration, what ultimately causes third parties to intervene in civil wars is still up for discussion. However, the current literature also finds that domestic politics may influence the decision making process. This provides impetus for research regarding the role of transnational ethnic affinities on the decision to intervene. Research has shown that ethnic affinities exist and do matter when it comes to deciding to intervene (Austvoll, 2005; Davis & Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002).

**Theory Section**

In this section I present hypotheses that address why potential third parties may not choose to intervene in an ethnic civil war. This thesis conceptualizes a potential intervener as a state whose ethnic group in power has an ethnic affinity with a marginalized ethnic group in another state in which that minority kin group is engaged in a civil conflict. Although studies have illustrated a greater likelihood of marginalized ethnic groups receiving an intervention from
their kin in power in another country (Austvoll, 2005; Davis & Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002), the existence of such kin dyad has not been shown to make third party interventions certain. This suggests that in addition to ethnic affinity, potential third parties consider additional variables before deciding to intervene.

Potential third parties may have the luxury of choosing the best time to intervene in an ethnic civil war. Both Holl (1993) and Regan (2000) found that third parties were more likely to intervene when the conflict approaches termination. The temporal dynamics of the conflict itself are likely to play a role in whether it will experience an intervention. The third party has the opportunity to minimize outcome risk if the outcome is increasingly apparent in the foreseeable future. If intensity is high and outcome remains uncertain, a third party will likely elect to think twice before intervening.

Moreover, if potential third parties analyze the situation of an ethnic civil war to find that their ethnic kin are winning the battle, they may decide an intervention is unnecessary. As J. David Singer stated, “No nation has the resources to engage in serious efforts to influence a great many of the others at any given time” (1963, 423). It is intuitive that potential third parties will not go out of their way to intervene in a conflict simply to do so.

These considerations influence my first hypothesis:

H1: If the potential third party finds that their ethnic kin is winning the battle and termination approaches, they will be more likely to abstain from intervention.

The decision to intervene in a civil war is likely a mixture between strategic interests and domestic politics. Potential interveners must account for audience costs in the cost/benefit analysis before deciding to intervene. A number of variables have the ability to affect domestic
politics. Davis and Moore (1997) found that despite international borders, ethnic kin still interact. Thus influence of ethnic kin affinity on the decision making process to intervene in a civil war is rooted within the domestic realm of politics. Since studies have shown an increase in the likelihood of an intervention in the case of a humanitarian crisis (Cooper & Berdal, 1993; Regan, 1998), it is possible that an ethnic civil war may distinguish itself as a “humanitarian crisis” to those that share an ethnic affinity with the marginalized group in conflict. This claim is supported by Saideman (2002), and by Fearon and Laitin (2000) who assert that ethnic identity—by its nature creates feelings of loyalty, interest and fear of extinction. It is precisely the fear of extinction that may bolster ethnic affinities and cause the populace of a potential intervener to advocate for intervention. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H2: The neighboring ethnic group in power is more likely to intervene if the neighboring minority ethnic group suffers from mass killings.

However, if this fear has been watered down by a past intervention, or legacy of civil conflict, it is possible that the populace will wait out the conflict and choose not to intervene until the conflict truly becomes a globally-recognized humanitarian crisis. This concept is coupled with the logic that marginalized ethnic kin will only receive an intervention if they are an active group within their home state (Saideman, 2002). It is reckless to assume that a third party will intervene in an ethnic civil war solely for the sake of intervening. If the intervener weighs the costs and benefits of a potential intervention and finds it is unlikely that an intervention will produce desired results, their kin may not receive an intervention. If a potential third party has had a history of intervening in similar conflicts without achieving the preferred
outcome, they may choose to opt-out of a subsequent intervention. In other words, potential third parties may make the decision to intervene based on the outcome of past interventions.

H3: If the neighboring ethnic group in power has been unsuccessful in past interventions, intervention in a subsequent civil war is less likely.

Finally, an intervention from an ethnic kin in power may be dependent upon the power capabilities and physical features of the potential intervener. While the country may meet the ethnic group in power criteria, it may also have relatively low power capabilities. If the potential intervener is premature in its statehood, underdeveloped, lacks sufficient military prowess or economic clout, it may be altogether unable to legitimately implement an intervention strategy. So, the likelihood of a potential third party intervening in an ethnic civil war may decrease if the capability of mounting such an intervention is not logistically feasible.

Subsequently, if the potential third party does not have the power capabilities to intervene in an ethnic civil war in favor of its marginalized ethnic kin, it may choose to appeal to higher powers for an intervention. If this is the case, it may be possible to identify the influence of domestic politics on the decision making process. While the third party has conducted a cost/benefit analysis weighing the possible outcomes of the conflict, the administration is also pressured by audience costs that call upon the administration to aid the ethnic brethren. If the third party is unable to mount an effective intervention it may choose to turn to an alternate third party, or international organization for help.

H4: Weak potential third party interveners are less likely to intervene.
Research Design

I use a series of case studies to assess which variables influence third party intervention in ethnic civil wars. I have chosen to compare and contrast the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64 with the Cyprus conflict of 1974, and further will compare the presence and absence of interventions in both conflicts on behalf of both the Cypriot Greek and Turk communities. Previous research suggests that the decision to intervene in a civil war is a mixture between strategic interests and domestic politics. These cases were chosen because all have significant strategic implications and consequences regarding the outcome of the conflict, and include potential interveners that provide variation on the ethnic group in power - marginalized ethnic group kin dyad. As a group, these cases present instances where the potential interveners have exhibited different responses at different times. In short, these cases offer a good opportunity to investigate which variables made third party intervention more likely.

First, the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64 offers an interesting case of a former colony in Europe that is subject to significant influence from two power brokers in the region. Ethnic affinities exist in Cyprus between Greek Cypriots and Greeks in Greece and between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Turkey. Cleavages along ethnic lines between Cypriot Greeks and Turks quickly escalated into civil conflict following the island’s independence from Britain. Greek Cypriots advocated for a union with Greece and attacked and killed Cypriot Turks. Strategically it would not be in the best interest of Turkey to allow Cyprus to unify with Greece, and there is undoubtedly an ethnic affinity between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Turkey. However, in 1963-64 Turkey did not elect to intervene. This conflict ends in a cease fire upheld by British forces and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
In contrast, the Cyprus conflict in 1974 was initiated by a coup d’état backed by Greece and culminated in the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. This decision to intervene via invasion led to the separation of the Turkish Cypriot north from the Greek Cypriot south. According to the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR), this invasion cost thousands of lives, displaced even more people as refugees to their kin countries, and established the Turkish army as a long-term presence in the northern region of the island. My case studies will describe and analyze the decisions made by both Greece and Turkey over the course of the two conflicts.

Using these conflicts as case studies provides the opportunity to analyze what variables changed over time and influenced the actions of the potential interveners. These case studies will use the behaviors of the potential interveners, Greece and Turkey, as the dependent variables because their ethnic affinity with groups in Cyprus remains constant over time. The dependent variable indicates whether the potential intervener did in fact intervene. Since both conflicts reflect different responses from these potential interveners (that is, different values on the dependent variables), the opportunity to compare and contrast cases will yield insight about the importance of the independent variables that influence the decision-making process of third parties to intervene in ethnic civil wars. The independent variable ethnic affinity will be measured with regard to domestic and international support from each Cypriot community’s mainland kin country.

The case studies are developed from a variety of sources including the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project which monitors and analyzes the status of politically-active communal groups; and selected previous literature. The development of the case studies emphasizes the collection of information to build a thorough narrative of the events that comprise the conflicts. The case studies also map and emphasize the positions of both Greece and Turkey throughout each
conflict. Because they are the focus of the study it is important not only to illustrate their influence in Cyprus, but also to assess what motivations may be driving their decision-making processes. This will help answer the larger question of what variables caused Greece and Turkey to employ different methods over the two conflicts.

An analysis will follow the narration of both cases to test findings in the case studies against the hypotheses presented in the theory section. The analysis will primarily investigate the variables that appeared to have the greatest significance on the decision-making process of the potential interveners. It will also present counterfactuals in which the variables are imagined to have different values. These counterfactuals are intended to assess the plausibility of the asserted claims by showing how the outcomes would likely have been quite different under alternate circumstances.

The Two Cypriot Communities

Cyprus gained independence from the United Kingdom on 16 August 1960. The events that led to independence illustrate the legacy of fragmentation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Examination of these events also illustrates ethnic affinities between Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks as well as between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Turkey. These relationships have facilitated conflict and enhanced ethnic cleavages.

Although Cyprus is small in respect to surface area and population, it has always had geopolitical significance. The island has a historical legacy of being manipulated by surrounding states because of its strategic location between three continents and long coastline for potentially regrouping and launching forces in the Mediterranean. The island has been utilized to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and occasionally exercise influence onshore. In its robust history, Cyprus has been conquered by major powers that had interest in the Middle East. This list
includes the Egyptians, Greeks, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, Ottoman Turks, and the British (Joseph, 1997). According to James (2002), Cyprus has never been in a position to threaten any of its neighbors, and if Cyprus were ever targeted by a neighbor, it would be unable to mount an effective defense on its own. This reality may stress the importance of ethnic affinities between Cypriots and their mainland communities. Identifying with a larger, more powerful group could increase protection.

The Greeks settled on the island during the second half of the second millennium B.C. and left a significant demographic impact (Joseph, 1997). The indigenous Cypriots shared the culture, language and religion of the mainland Greeks, and viewed themselves as members of the Greek world. Although invaders would arrive and leave the island periodically, the indigenous population relentlessly retained their distinct Hellenic identity (James, 2002). Most Greek Cypriots are also members of the Greek Orthodox Church. Their political, social, cultural and intellectual lives were dominated by the church to the point where the archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church was recognized as the leader of the community. For the Greek Cypriots the church became a symbol of political and ethnic unity and helped preserve the Greek identity (Joseph, 1997).

The Turks settled in Cyprus following the period of Ottoman dominance beginning in 1571 (Joseph, 1997). The relatively large number of Turks that settled in Cyprus during this period made up approximately one-fifth of the population (James, 2002). Virtually all of the Turkish Cypriots are Turkish-speaking, Sunni-Muslims that identify with the Turkish nation, culture and heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Once Turkey emerged in Asia Minor following WWI, the Turkish Cypriots identified with this mainland country exclusively.
According to Joseph (1997), specific factors contributed to the preservation and subsequent politicization of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot ethnic identity. The first was the aforementioned dominance of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. The church was actually able to ascend to its dominant role as the symbol of political and ethnic unity among Greek Cypriots because of the Ottoman Empire’s “millet” administrative system. This system is considered to be an early form of religious pluralism which treated each religious ethnic identity within the Ottoman Empire as a distinct entity (Abu Jaber, 2007). The empire imposed taxes on a denominational basis and relied on administrative help from the associated religious institutions for governing the peoples. In order to complete administrative tasks and bring the Greek Cypriots under the umbrella of the empire, the Ottomans restored the Greek Orthodox Church. This system essentially helped Greek and Turkish Cypriots maintain their ethnic identity, but also institutionalized the separation of the groups along ethnic lines.

The third factor, according to Joseph (1997), was the fragmentation of education. The two communities had separate schools which were supported by their respective religious institutions. After Cyprus was officially proclaimed a colony of Britain in 1925, the Cypriot schools were similar to those in Greece or Turkey (Joseph, 1997). The schools emphasized religion, national heritage and ethnic values in addition to the history of the Greek-Turkish rivalry. By focusing on these subjects, the educational system enhanced the distinction between ethnic groups and ultimately transferred conflicting ethnic values and beliefs to generations of Cypriots.

Moreover, both communities remained adamantly loyal to their mainland brethren. The two Cypriot communities honored the national holidays, played the national anthem, and used the flag of its mother country (Joseph, 1997). Perhaps even more divisive was the fact that the
two communities were attached to two rival and often feuding countries. Cypriots from both ethnic groups fought as volunteers on opposite sides during the 1912-13 Balkan wars, WWI and the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-23 (Joseph, 1997). These actions illustrate the affinity of each community with their mainland brethren. These affinities would evolve into differing prospects for the political future of the island. Throughout British rule, the union of Cyprus and Greece, known as *enosis*, became the most persistent goal of the Greek Cypriots. While on the other side of the ethnic divide, the Turkish Cypriots countered with the proposition of the partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish sections, known as *takism* (James, 2002). The conflicting fundamentals of these positions ultimately led to the political polarization of the two ethnic groups.

The final factor Joseph (1997) claims to be a force in the preservation and politicization of the Cypriot ethnic cleavage was the British colonial policy of “divide and rule.” This policy bolstered the ethnic, administrative and political division established by the Ottoman Empire’s millet system. The British chose to use this policy instead of attempting to build a common collective political identity of “Cypriots,” because reinforcing the separation of the two groups facilitated them maintaining power on the island. Church dominance, the millet system, fragmented ethnic education, national loyalties, political polarization and this policy of “divide and rule” ensured that ethnicity would remain a determining factor in the future of Cyprus.

**Brokering Independence**

In 1955, a Greek Cypriot insurgency initiated a bloody anti-colonial revolt against Britain that would last until 1959. The insurgency was known as EOKA, a Greek acronym for the National Organization of Cypriot fighters. They began their military revolt and push for *enosis*
with simultaneous explosions in the island’s main cities. The mastermind of EOKA was George Grivas who assumed the moniker “Dighenis” in reference to a legendary folk hero of Byzantine Cyprus (James, 2002). Grivas was a Cypriot who enlisted in the Greek Army and fought against the Communists in the Greek Civil War (1946-49). Grivas was given support from Cyprus’ archbishop, Makarios, in an effort to move away from British decree and toward enosis. While EOKA was not large in terms of numbers, they were covertly supplied arms by Greece and constituted a significant threat to the British forces (James, 2002).

The revolt mounted in association with the rising demand of enosis by both Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks (Dodd, 2002). Prior to the beginning of EOKA’s military campaign, Greece raised the issue of enosis at the United Nations in 1954. However, widespread recognition of the ethnic composition of Cyprus by the international community stymied the possibility of enosis as a straightforward plan. At the time, both Greece and Turkey accepted the continuation of British rule and favored leaving Cyprus alone for the time being (James, 2002). But the onset of the insurgency in Cyprus in the following years prompted appeals to Athens from Cypriot Archbishop Makarios, and Greece became increasingly critical of Britain’s status quo stance on the state of Cyprus (James, 2002).

The mounting criticism from Greece internationalized the Cyprus issue and found a niche within the broader anti-colonial movement and decolonization process that was widely supported by the United Nations in the 1950s. Tensions between Britain, Greece, and Turkey were heightened by the potential outcomes of the anti-colonial movement. The British were primarily concerned that losing Cyprus would also mean losing their strategic bases on the coast of the island. Originally they strictly advocated maintaining the status quo in Cyprus to ensure their interests and prestige in the Middle East. In 1956, the British Prime Minister bluntly stated, “No
Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that” (James, 2002, 11).

Meanwhile, Greece and the Greek Cypriots insisted that nothing less than enosis would do as an outcome of the anti-colonial revolt. This caused considerable concern among Turkish Cypriots who found the prospects of enosis unacceptable. The growing interests of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in partition of the land only brought potential solutions to stalemate. Britain would not agree to enosis or the division of the island, but was also being influenced by domestic and international pressures to broker a diplomatic solution. For instance, since all feuding parties were members of NATO, the United States was particularly concerned that the mounting Greek-Turkish tension threatened to paralyze the south-eastern flank of the alliance (Joseph, 1997).

According to Joseph (1997) and Dodd (2002), international and domestic pressures influenced tripartite talks between Britain, Greece and Turkey in London and Zurich to settle the issue with the establishment of an independent Cypriot state, the Republic of Cyprus. The settlement was finalized and signed in London on 19 February 1959, by Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities (Joseph, 1997). However, the solution was essentially a bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey. The negotiated compromise was reached between the Greek and Turkish governments but astonishingly, in the absence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The ethnic, historical, linguistic, cultural and religious ties of the two Cypriot ethnic groups with their brethren defined the context within which the settlement was reached (Joseph, 1997).

The London and Zurich agreements comprised a series of treaties which established the political structure of the new Republic of Cyprus. The three treaties were: the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee. The Treaty of Establishment
between Cyprus and Britain set up the Republic of Cyprus and provided that its territory should comprise Cyprus with the exception of two areas that were to remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom (Polyviou, 1980). This treaty was ultimately aimed at safeguarding British military interests in Cyprus and influence in the Middle East by maintaining Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) for Britain in Cyprus. The Treaty of Alliance was a defense pact between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The parties under this treaty were contracted to resist any attack or aggression directed against the independence or territorial integrity of Cyprus (Polyviou, 1980). In order to achieve such an agreement, the treaty also provided for military contingents consisting of 950 Greek officers and 650 Turkish officers stationed in Cyprus (Joseph, 1997).

With the third treaty, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus undertook the obligation to maintain its independence and the constitutional order, and the three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey, guaranteed the continuation and maintenance of the Cypriot constitution as well as the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus (Polyviou, 1980). Under this treaty the guarantors were given the right to intervene in the case of any change or disturbance of Cyprus’ status in order to restore the state of affairs created by the London and Zurich agreements. This treaty was primarily aimed at mutual abandonment of the conflicting goals of enosis and partition within the two Cypriot ethnic communities (Joseph, 1997).

Additionally, the London and Zurich agreements also contained key components of the constitution which was drafted later and put into effect after the Republic of Cyprus officially came into being on 16 August 1960. The constitution was an original creation that was not copied from or inspired by that of another state. According to James (2002), Cyprus was blessed by the constitution because it signified the end of colonial rule, but it was also burdened by it, because its basic articles could not be changed without the agreement of the external guarantors
(Britain, Greece and Turkey) and extensive safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots made it incredibly difficult to operate. The inclusion of rigid safeguards in the constitution reflects the insecurity and fear of the Turkish Cypriot minority in the face of the Greek Cypriot majority. The Turkish minority comprised approximately 25% of the population. James (2002) suggests that if the Turks were a smaller minority they may have accepted the disadvantages of being the minority, and if they constituted a larger population, the Greek Cypriots might have accepted the inevitability of power sharing. However, the ratio of Turk to Greek Cypriots (1:4) made the Greeks feel they should hold a substantial amount of power while the Turks felt they were numerous enough to deserve a significant say in the processes of government (James, 2002). The size of the Turkish minority in addition to the island’s close proximity to Turkey, gave the minority Turkish Cypriots incredible bargaining power in demanding safeguards. However, these safeguards made the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus incredibly complicated.

Given the concerns of both ethnic communities, the constitution was based on communal dualism and provided for the establishment of a bi-communal state aimed to regulate and protect the two communities with reference to their ethnic origin, language, cultural traditions, and religion (James, 2002; Joseph, 1997 & Polyviou, 1980). Under the constitution, the two communities were defined as equals and were given the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays, and to use the Greek or Turkish flag without restriction. The two communities were also granted the right to establish separate special relationships with Greece and Turkey in educational, religious, cultural and athletic matters (Joseph, 1997). The constitution effectively institutionalized communal dualism in all spheres of government activity including: the presidential regime, legislative body, judicial system, municipality administration and public service. This political framework facilitated ethnic separation by exacerbating the distinctiveness
between both ethnic communities in their role in the government. Although the three treaties and constitution may have ruled out the conflicting goals of *enosis* and partition, measures were not taken to cut across ethnic boundaries and develop a collective Cypriot identity.

Overall, the independence of Cyprus was brokered by Britain, Greece and Turkey. The London and Zurich agreements were administered bilaterally between Greece and Turkey. Both the background of the domestic ethnic conflict in Cyprus and the events that led to the brokering of independence illustrate the impact of ethnic affinities between the Cypriot ethnic communities and their brethren. Despite four centuries of coexistence (Joseph, 1997), the two groups remained separate, distinct, self-contained and divided along linguistic, religious, and cultural lines. The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus institutionalized the ethnic and political divisions of the past through the constitution and reinforced the attachment of the two communities to their motherlands. The strong connections between Greece and Turkey with Cyprus through both ethnic affinity and their role in brokering independence made both countries perpetual potential third party interveners in the case of internal conflict.

**The Crisis of 1963-64**

Problems with the 1960 constitution ultimately led to the crisis of 1963-64 in Cyprus. Since its implementation, the two ethnic groups struggled to come to a consensus regarding the roles of each group in the government. The Greek Cypriots generally asserted that the constitution provided for a unitary state, while Turkish Cypriots claimed it was a partnership state (Dodd, 2002). The Republic of Cyprus was primarily an equal partnership state that required both ethnic communities to agree on major policies. It was unable to function as a unitary state because the presidential system called for both the Greek Cypriot president and
Turkish Cypriot vice-president to have veto power over matters in foreign affairs, defense and security (Dodd, 2002). This power led to repeated ethnically fuelled deadlocks that inhibited the government’s performance.

In light of the state heading for paralysis, President Makarios proposed amending certain articles of the constitution in November of 1963. He proposed thirteen amendments that addressed the constitutional deadlocks he claimed were preventing Greek and Turkish Cypriots from co-operating to run the government smoothly. These included: “the abolition of the veto right of the president and the vice president; abolition of the separate majority votes in the parliament; establishment of unified municipalities; unification of the administration of justice; participation of the two communities in the public service in proportion to their population; and abolition of the Greek communal chamber” (Joseph, 1997, 28). The provisions were ultimately aimed to establish a unitary state with majority rule. The Turkish Cypriots interpreted the provisions as a means to establish “Greek Cypriot” majority rule through the sacrifice of the privileges and safeguards of the minority established in the London and Zurich agreements. Turkey formally rejected the proposals immediately in its capacity as a guarantor under the Treaty of Guarantee (Dodd, 2002). Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk also found the proposal completely unacceptable and believed the provisions aimed to destroy the republic and attain enosis (Dodd, 2002). This political conflict over the constitution enhanced polarization along ethnic lines and reignited the popularity of enosis and partition among the two communities. According to Joseph (1997), the unworkable constitution, political polarization, ethnic passions, mutual mistrust, suspicion, fear, and limited interaction between groups created a perfect storm for the emergence of underground military groups and an open confrontation.
Although the Makarios proposals were formally rejected by both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, they were advanced in a plan to use intimidation to oust the Turkish Cypriots from their role in government. This plan, known as the Akritas Plan, was developed by leading *enosis*-minded Greek Cypriots with the goal of declaring self-determination as a precursor to *enosis* (Dodd, 2002). The plan was comprised of four major foci. First, the Greek Cypriot government would have to convince the world that the 1960 settlement was unjust and brokered outside the interests of the republic and that the Turkish Cypriots were hard to control within the parameters of the constitution. Second, the Greek Cypriots would have to show that the Treaty of Guarantee was an intrusion into Cypriot affairs, and should be null and void (Dodd, 2002). This measure would prevent a legitimate intervention from Turkey. Third, the Greek-led government would have to amend the constitution with Turkish Cypriot agreement, and finally, be prepared to forcefully suppress any opposition from Turkish Cypriots before any kind of international intervention could be organized and deployed (Dodd, 2002). Thus, the stage was set for an unavoidable clash between the two communities.

On 21 December 1963 a new phase of the ethnic conflict characterized by violence began. Armed Greek Cypriots wearing plain clothes posed as police and created an incident that resulted in the deaths of two Turkish Cypriots and the serious injury of one Greek Cypriot (Dodd, 2002). Given the prevailing atmosphere of tension, it did not take long for serious fighting to engulf the entire island (Polyviou, 1980). This event signaled the beginning of a planned attack against the Turkish Cypriot population designed to intimidate, as described in the Akritas plan. The Turkish Cypriots responded with equal violence. The outbreak of violence broke down inter-communal relations and initiated a process of physical separation of the Turkish Cypriots into armed enclaves across the island (Joseph, 1997). The violence did not
subside instead escalating to all-out Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriot areas across the island resulting in excess of 400 Turkish-Cypriot casualties. British troops were called in to attempt to keep the combatants apart and establish a border between the Greek and Turk sectors in Nicosia, called the “Green Line” (Dodd, 2002). Additionally, the Greek and Turkish military contingencies allowed under the 1960 treaties policed and occupied Cypriot sectors. This flare-up contributed to the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict. The problem ceased to be a domestic Cypriot affair, becoming instead an issue of major concern to international politics and diplomacy.

According to Joseph (1997), the declaration of independence, cross boundary ethnic ties, superpower concerns and interests, the danger of war between two NATO allies, and the threat to regional and international peace and security were all factors that contributed to the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict of 1963-64. Granting the island independence made it an autonomous fixture in the international system free to interact with other states and international organizations and develop its own foreign policy. The Republic of Cyprus became a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the British Commonwealth of Nations and established diplomatic relations with Britain, Greece, Turkey, the United States, the Soviet Union and others (Joseph, 1997). Since the island was no longer a colony, its problems could no longer be contained within the jurisdiction of the imperial power. Upon independence, outside nations were now able to interact directly with the brand new Republic of Cyprus.

Moreover, the ethnic affinities between the two Cypriot communities and their motherlands (Greece and Turkey), made foreign involvement in Cypriot affairs virtually unavoidable. “The Cypriots looked upon Greece and Turkey as their protectors and counted on their diplomatic, military, economic and moral support” (Joseph, 1997, 32). But what enhanced
the importance of the ethnic ties was the fact that both Greece and Turkey considered the two Cypriot communities as part of their respected nations. The amount of national pride and honor the two Cypriot communities displayed gave them a special appeal in domestic Greek and Turkish politics (Joseph, 1997). With immense domestic support for their Cypriot ethnic brethren, both Greece and Turkey adopted the Cyprus issue as a national issue.

Greece was repeatedly vocal in expressing their concern and interest in Cyprus. Joseph (1997) notes that the campaign for *enosis* and the revolt against the British in the 1950s was the extension of a movement extending back to the years of the Greek war of independence (1821-29) and the establishment of an independent Greek state. In other words, the Greek pro-*enosis* feelings were revitalized through the revolt against the British. Appealing to the United Nations in 1954 exemplified the Greek affinity with Cyprus and explicitly verbalized it in an explanatory memorandum in which Greece claimed, “Cyprus belongs to the Greek world; Cyprus is Greece itself…and because of this, the Greek government, fully aware of the responsibilities of the past, present, and future of the Hellenic nation called for the application of the principle of self-determination and the union of the island with Greece” (Joseph, 1997, 36). These appeals were based on the fact that eighty percent of the Cypriot population was comprised of ethnic Greeks who had a 300 year common history, shared ethnicity expressed in common language, culture and religion and expressed the desire to be unified with Greece.

Likewise, Turkey vocalized support for its ethnic brethren by intensifying the campaign for partition and taking measures against the Greek community in Turkey during the revolt against Britain. In the United Nations, Turkey refuted the Greek claims and argued the nation was pursuing a policy of territorial expansion under the guise of ethnic justification. The Turks upheld a position favoring partition as a viable solution, based on the fact that “Cyprus was an
island which had been part of Turkey for almost four hundred years, contained a large Turkish community, and was very important to Turkish security” (Joseph, 1997). Turkey supplied Turkish Cypriots with diplomatic support in addition to aiding the underground military organization known as the Turkish Defense Organization with arms and combat training in an effort to fight for partition (Joseph, 1997). Another important variable in this ethnic affinity was the geographic proximity of Turkey to Cyprus. Cyprus is only 44 miles south of Turkey and 250 miles east of the Greek island of Rhodes comparatively (James, 2002).

In reaction to the Greek appeal to the United Nations during the anti-colonial revolt, Turks also undertook massive anti-Greek demonstrations in Istanbul and other cities under slogans of “partition” and “Cyprus is Turkish” (Joseph, 1997). The demonstrations in Turkey were endorsed by the Turkish government and created a climate in which schools, churches, businesses and homes in the Greek community were subject to violent attacks. Members of the Greek community in Turkey also had their property confiscated and were subject to expulsion (Joseph, 1997). Turkish newspapers played a significant role in rallying mainland support for Cyprus by headlining alleged atrocities against the Turks in Cyprus. These examples of domestic outcry illustrate the strength of the ethnic relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Turkey.

The strength of the ethnic ties between the two Cypriot communities and their ethnic motherland did not falter during the 1963-64 Crisis. Upon the onset of the ethnic violence, Turkey asked the British and Greek forces to join the Turkish contingent already in Cyprus to separate the communities and stop the fighting (James, 2002). This proposal was based on the agreements outlined in the Treaty of Guarantee. When the British and Greeks originally decided against intervention, Turkey threatened to act alone. Once the situation in Cyprus began to
deteriorate for the Turkish Cypriots, who were pitted against a larger, better-equipped Greek Cypriot force, the Turkish Cypriots appealed to Turkey for military assistance. Turkey responded by moving troops, warships, and aircraft to the south coast and threatened to invade Cyprus (Joseph, 1997). As the prospect of a Turkish invasion seemed to be approaching, the Greek Cypriots made an appeal to Greece for military assistance. Greece criticized the Turkish government for its military preparations and claimed that if Turkey invaded Cyprus, Greece would do the same (James, 2002). In order to prevent such an invasion, a joint decision was made by President Makarios and the Greek Premier George Papandreou to secretly send approximately 10000 men and military equipment to Cyprus (Joseph, 1997). The infiltration of these troops onto the island caused severe fallout in Greek-Turkish relations, and the possibility of an interstate conflict between them became likely. This potential clash was thwarted in the final moments through the forceful intervention of United States President Lyndon B. Johnson, who insisted it was imperative that there be no war between NATO allies.

The internationalization of the Cyprus conflict undoubtedly made it a focal point of the Cold War in 1963-64. It presented a threat to regional stability, peace and security and became the interest of parties outside the jurisdiction of involvement. NATO in particular, had a special interest in containing the conflict and quelling the possibility of an intra-alliance war between Greece and Turkey (Joseph, 1997). The declaration of Cypriot independence essentially created a power vacuum. With the withdrawal of the British, Cyprus became up for grabs in super power politics. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had the interest and means to influence the development of the island. The United States had the option of using junior allies-Britain, Greece and Turkey-to safeguard Western interests, while the Soviet Union could use the powerful Greek Cypriot communist party (AKEL), to work in favor of communist interests (Joseph, 1997).
President Makarios had previously established a political alliance with AKEL before violence erupted and had friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The Cyprus crisis in 1963-64 presented the opportunity for either superpower to stake claim in the island and promote their ideologies. This threat led the United States to intervene and quell the likelihood of interstate conflict between NATO members, Greece and Turkey, by persuading Turkey out of an invasion of Cyprus.

The conflict in 1963-64 was ultimately alleviated by a cease fire brokered by British forces and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The internationalization of the Cypriot conflict was enhanced by the power vacuum created through the nation’s independence and the ethnic affinities between the Cypriot ethnic communities and their mainland brethren in Greece and Turkey. Domestic politics in both Greece and Turkey supported the cause of their respective Cypriot ethnic community. Strong sentiments were present in both countries throughout the Cypriot revolt against British colonial rule and came to a head in the 1963-64 conflict. Problems with the newly formed Cypriot constitution contributed to the conflict. The multitude of safeguards for the island’s Turkish Cypriot minority provided by the constitution inhibited the functioning of government. When these safeguards were challenged and later rejected, the Greek Cypriots enacted a plan that would provide for a unitary state governed by the Greek majority. Only then would they be able to achieve the ultimate goal of enosis. The plan called for a campaign of intimidation against the Turkish Cypriots which culminated in ethnic violence across the island. Turkey threatened to invade but was persuaded otherwise by the United States. A full third-party intervention had been averted, but periodic violence and civil unrest still rendered the island in a state of unrest.
The 1974 Crisis and Turkish Invasion

Following the large scale conflict in 1963-64, there was sporadic violence between the two Cypriot ethnic communities despite the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) from the end of 1964 to 1967. The former leader of EOKA, George Grivas, returned to the island from Greece to command the Cypriot Defense Forces, known as EOKA B, and administer attacks on Turkish Cypriot enclaves (Joseph, 1997). These attacks, in addition to the presence of more than 10,000 Greek troops on the island and the bombing of military targets by the Turkish air force in November of 1967, illustrate the ongoing festering conflict in Cyprus. This periodic unrest boiled over in 1974 leading to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus despite international concern.

A culmination of events leading up to the 1974 Crisis severely deteriorated already fragile Greek-Turkish relations. In 1968 the United Nations began to attempt to help mend the relationship between Greeks and Turks during cooperative negotiations concerning the revision of the Cypriot constitution (Dodd, 2002). During these negotiations it initially appeared that the Turkish government favored reconciling and opening better relations with Greece and Europe. This was evident because the Turkish government persuaded the Turkish Cypriots to consider making serious concessions in the discussion over the Cypriot constitution. They were persuaded to abandon their veto rights, but went against the advice of the Turkish Government and refused to give up central control of the Turkish Cypriot local government (Dodd, 2002). Overall the Turkish Cypriots would not agree to any final scheme for change in the constitution unless they were given concrete assurances that enosis would never be proclaimed. The Turkish side of the negotiations demanded that there had to be specific public assurance from the government of Cyprus and President Makarios personally that enosis had been firmly abandoned and would
never be sought again (Polyviou, 1980). But this demand was not possible for President Makarios to fulfill. The events following the end of these attempted negotiations must be conceptualized within the context of the domestic situations of Greece and Turkey. Both were in the midst of new governments with unyielding positions on the Cyprus issue.

President Makarios was faced with insistent demands for enosis by Greek Cypriot opponents who were being supported by a new, aggressive Greek military junta that came to power in Greece following a coup d’état in 1967 (Dodd, 2002; Polyviou, 1980). This military junta was comprised of right-wing military colonels who were both domestically unpopular and internationally isolated. They abandoned the policy of independence and self-determination for the Republic of Cyprus and sought enosis (Joseph, 1997). The overthrow of the Greek government by an extreme military junta ultimately marked the last phase in the relations between the Greek dictatorship and the Cypriot government. From this point the Greek Cypriot paramilitary group, EOKA B, headed by George Grivas would be the beneficiary of overt support from official Greek circles and the National Guard (Polyviou, 1980). The open support for EOKA B and the goal of enosis from Athens put a target on Cypriot President Makarios whose negotiations and policies favored independence and self-determination. A personal statement guaranteeing the abandonment of enosis from President Makarios would ensure his demise.

The struggles around these negotiations were also influenced by the ascent to power of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in Turkey in 1973, who proclaimed that Cyprus needed a federation, or a union characterized by self-governing states (Dodd, 2002). Under his leadership, Turkey strongly advocated for a federal system of government in Cyprus. This position was not a question of details or particular issues with constitutional reconstruction, but a fundamental tenet
of Turkish political philosophy (Polyviou, 1980). It was made clear that Turkey believed the best solution for Cyprus was a federal system and would not stand for any agreement that did not explicitly reflect this philosophy. It has been suggested by scholars (Dodd, 2002 & Polyviou, 1980), that Turkey chose to advocate this rigid platform precisely because of the deteriorating relations between the Greek military junta and President Makarios in Cyprus. They demonstrated that the relationship had entered a critical stage of hostility and confrontation and the overthrow of the Cyprus government loomed on the horizon. If such an overthrow did occur, it would leave the door open for a Turkish military intervention to settle the problem once and for all.

On 15 July 1974 a coup was staged against the Makarios government by the National Guard led by Greek army officers under orders from the mainland military junta in conjunction with EOKA B. The Cypriot President was able to escape an assassination attempt and immediately fled the country to seek refuge abroad (Polyviou, 1980). The coup ultimately brought an extremist pro-enosis puppet regime to power in Cyprus that was led by the new junta-implemented president, Nicos Sampson. He was particularly hated by the Turkish Cypriots for his notoriously vicious and remorselessness attacks on Turkish enclaves as a member of EOKA (Dodd, 2002). The obvious goal of the new puppet regime was to declare enosis, and the Turkish Government reacted swiftly. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit immediately flew to London to try to persuade the British Government to intervene in the ordeal (Dodd, 2002). The British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, was in constant contact with United States Secretary of State- Henry Kissinger, regarding the situation and chose to decline intervening to restore Cyprus to the state of the 1960 agreements (Dodd, 2002 & Joseph, 1997). It has been suggested that the United States declined to intervene because it was too involved in the Watergate affair to pay much attention to Cyprus (Dodd, 2002). Subsequently, Turkey began to plan for invasion.
While Turkey prepared for the invasion of Cyprus two days after the coup, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger dispatched the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Joseph Sisco to Turkey in an effort to convince them otherwise. Sisco realized the situation was out of control once he landed in Turkey. According to Joseph (1997), Sisco’s plane was forced to land on a military base because the central streets of Ankara and the airport had been engulfed by massive public demonstrations demanding the invasion of Cyprus. In response to popular public sentiment, military pressure and the exhortation of the Turkish press, the Turkish Government rejected all mediation efforts from the United States. In the refusal of mediation, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit cited earlier crises over Cyprus that resulted in Turkish humiliation and made it clear that Turkey was not in the “mood” to entertain pleas for compromise. In Kissinger’s own words, “Turkey was not interested in a negotiated solution; it was determined to settle scores” (Joseph, 1997, 52). The Turkish Government proceeded to invade Cyprus militarily on 20 July 1974.

Turkey justified the invasion on both legal and ethnic grounds. It argued that the Greek-endorsed coup d’état was a step towards annexation which was prohibited by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. In addition, the Treaty of Guarantee also established a responsibility and a right for Turkey to intervene and protect the Turkish Cypriots who were being directly threatened by the nationalist policies and behavior of the Greek junta (Joseph, 1997). Despite an attempted negotiated ceasefire between the two feuding ethnic communities on 22 July 1974, Turkish military forces continued operations.

During the invasion and its aftermath, thousands were killed and many more were displaced. According to the Minorities at Risk Project (2009), Greek Cypriot extremists of EOKA B, led by George Grivas, committed multiple atrocities against Turkish Cypriots. Most
notably was the Maratha, Santalaris and Aloda massacre. This massacre against Turkish Cypriots by EOKA B resulted in 126 total deaths. Overall the invasion amounted to approximately 2,500 Greek Cypriots, 500 Turkish-Cypriots and 500 Turkish soldiers killed (Cassia, 2009).

While the Greek military junta saw this conflict as another phase in the Greek-Turkish rivalry, they fell from power shortly after the Turkish invasion and civilian leaders were reinstated to positions in both Greece and Cyprus (MAR, 2009). The Greek multiparty government, which succeeded the military junta, effectively avoided an interstate war with Turkey by declining further military action, but they did not give up on the Greek Cypriots. According to Joseph (1997), the new civilian government was actually contemplating the dispatch of naval, air, and land forces to defend Cypriot Greeks, but the operation was discontinued on “military grounds.”

A second diplomatic effort was made by Britain to contain the conflict after the United States failed to prevent the Turkish invasion. A peace conference was held in Geneva between the two ethnic blocs, but broke down after two weeks of discussion (Joseph, 1997 & Polyviou, 1980). British mediators claimed that the discussions were characterized by sharp ethnic hostility and an asymmetrical power relationship in favor of Turkey. Indeed, Turkey had acquired significant bargaining power. The superiority of their bargaining power was due to two factors: it had already gained a substantial military advantage in Cyprus and both Greece and Cyprus were in a state of political and military confusion because of the recent changes in government (Joseph, 1997).

These diplomatic failures prompted Turkey to launch a second massive attack on Cyprus that ultimately established its complete control of thirty-seven percent of the island. This attack also brought about large-scale population transfers within the state. The Greek Cypriots living in
the north were forced to move to the south and Turkish Cypriots living in the south were transferred to the north (Polyviou, 1980). This physical separation of the two ethnic communities was demarcated by the “Attila line” that was heavily fortified by the Turkish forces. This de facto partition of the island eliminated any interaction between the two sides and would eventually contribute to the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriots in November 1983.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 was predicated on domestic politics within the context of an ongoing ethnic rivalry. Since the 1963-64 conflict, outside governments and the United Nations attempted to bring feuding parties together and broker a compromise over constitutional reform. The differing goals between the two ethnic blocs concerning the future of Cyprus; namely, *enosis* and partition made these negotiations impossible. While it appeared Turkey initially favored reconciling with Greece over the issue of Cyprus during the beginning of negotiations, the military coup in Greece brought forth a military junta specifically focused on *enosis*. Since the Turkish ethnic bloc could not be reassured that the goal of *enosis* would be abandoned in Cyprus, negotiations fell through. The overthrow of Cypriot President Makarios and instillation of a military regime in Cyprus provided the impetus and excuse for a full military intervention in Cyprus. The invasion resulted in the de facto partition of thirty-seven percent of northern Cyprus. The ramifications of this decision are still present today.

**Analysis**

Both the crisis of 1963-64 and the 1974 Turkish invasion present the opportunity to assess the influence of variables on the decision of potential third parties to intervene in ethnic civil war. The historical demographic legacy of the island of Cyprus presents the foundation for
the division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and establishes their affinity with the motherlands of Greece and Turkey. Ethnic affinity has undoubtedly played a role in facilitating the potential third party’s desire and decision to intervene. This section will use the previous case narratives to analyze the hypotheses developed in my theory section.

First, it should be noted that under the Treaty of Alliance, circa 1960, both Greece and Turkey had military contingencies of 950 and 650 troops respectively. These troops were commonly called into action throughout both the 1963-64 and 1974 conflicts. The existence of a contractually obliged force present in Cyprus to maintain order can be seen as an “ease of intervention.” If the troops are already on the ground they will be easier to deploy on assignment.

However, these troops will be disregarded in the conceptualization of an “intervention” for the case studies since they were already present on the island as a police force mandated by the Treaty of Alliance. In other words, they were a constant. For the purpose of this study, an intervention will be conceptualized as any military action that was implemented by either Greece or Turkey that was initiated during the specified conflict to influence the outcome.

The first hypothesis suggested that if the potential third party finds that their ethnic kin is winning the battle, they will be more likely to abstain from intervention. In the 1963-64 conflict Turkey approached Britain and Greece and suggested they intervene as the guarantors under the Treaty of Guarantee. When both parties chose not to, Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus. Originally, it was not in the best interest for Greece to intervene in the conflict. The conflict was led by a pro-enosis movement, which Greece supported, and the Greek Cypriots seemed to be winning the confrontation as the Turkish Cypriot government officials abandoned their positions and allowed the Greek Cypriot government officials to take control of the Cypriot government (James, 2002; Joseph 1997 & Dodd, 2002). However, once it became evident that the greater
force, Turkey, would invade the island, Greece elected to intervene on behalf of the Greek Cypriots by bolstering their forces with 1000 Greek troops and military equipment.

Although the Turkish Cypriots were undoubtedly losing the battle, they did not receive a military intervention from their ethnic kin brethren in Turkey. Turkey did threaten to invade the island, which likely would have caused Greece to intervene militarily. Perhaps the major reason Turkey chose not to invade Cyprus was because they were persuaded out of such an action by the United States and the interests of NATO. If Turkey invaded Cyprus on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, Greece vowed to do the same on behalf of the Greek Cypriots. This would have put two NATO allies at war in the midst of the Cold War. The consequences of an interstate war between Turkey and Greece would not only make the West look bad, but could potentially cause NATO’s south-eastern flank (Cyprus) to fall. This was a risk the United States was not willing to take, so President Lyndon B. Johnson intervened and talked Turkey out of invading. With consideration to the counterfactual, if the United States did not attempt to stop Turkey from invading, the Turks would have been much more likely to have launched a military invasion on behalf of their ethnic kin.

In the 1974 conflict the pro-enosis movement in Cyprus received overt support from the new military junta in Greece. Cypriot President Makarios advocated policies of constitutional reform and compromise focusing on self-determination and independence. This led to a disagreement between mainland Greece and Cyprus. Greece intervened by supplying EOKA B in an overthrow of the Makarios government. This was an interesting decision and can be analyzed as the decision of the pro-enosis government in Greece to intervene in Cyprus after coming to believe their interests and the interests of Greek Cypriots were in jeopardy. In other words, because the goal of enosis was in jeopardy, the Greek military junta chose to intervene.
However, once the Makarios government was overthrown the Turkish Government promptly invaded the island of Cyprus. The Turks cited both legal and ethnic justifications in this decision. Turkey argued that the Greek-endorsed coup d’état was a step towards annexation which was prohibited by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. In addition, the Treaty of Guarantee also established a responsibility and a right for Turkey to intervene and protect the Turkish Cypriots who were being directly threatened by the nationalist policies and behavior of the Greek junta (Joseph, 1997). Despite attempted mediation from the United States, Turkey refused to abstain from invasion this time. The immediate threat from EOKA B and the military junta presented a clear and present danger to the Turkish Cypriots which warranted an intervention from Turkey.

After the new military junta fell in Greece only days after the overthrow in Cyprus, the new civilian government was called upon by Greek Cypriots to intervene in Cyprus. The new civilian government considered dispatching naval, air and land forces, but ultimately discontinued the operation on “military grounds” (Joseph, 1997). Although it was clear that the Greek Cypriots were losing the battle, they did not experience an intervention from their ethnic kin. This may have been for multiple reasons. First, the recent fall of the military junta in Greece rendered the country in domestic unrest. Second, the comparative power capabilities of the Turkish military outweighed those of Greece. So with regard to domestic confusion and power capabilities the costs of an intervention may have outweighed the immediate benefits. Instead the Greeks settled for a brokered ceasefire.

Intuition suggests that potential third parties will not intervene in a civil war simply to do so. According to J. David Singer, “No nation has the resources to engage in serious efforts to influence a great many of the others at any given time” (1963, 423). The cases suggest that potential third party interveners will be inclined to intervene on behalf of their ethnic kin when
they are losing a battle, but other factors may prevent them from doing so. In 1963-64 Turkey was persuaded not to invade Cyprus when Turkish Cypriots were clearly being killed and losing the battle. Likewise, Greece was unable to bring a counter-invasion to fruition in 1974 on behalf of Greek Cypriots after the Turks invaded Cyprus. The way both conflicts unfolded suggests higher powers and power capabilities played a role in the decision making process to intervene; trumping ethnic affinity.

My second hypothesis anticipates that the neighboring ethnic group in power is more likely to intervene if the neighboring minority ethnic group suffers from mass killings. Since studies have shown an increase in the likelihood of an intervention in the case of a humanitarian crisis (Cooper & Berdal, 1993; Regan, 1998), it is possible that an ethnic civil war may distinguish itself as a “humanitarian crisis” to those that share an ethnic affinity with the marginalized group in conflict. This claim is supported by Saideman (2002), and Fearon and Laitin (2000), who assert that ethnic identity, by its nature creates feelings of loyalty, interest, and fear of extinction. It is precisely the fear of extinction that may bolster ethnic affinities and cause the populace of a potential intervener to advocate for intervention.

A legacy of mistrust, suspicion and fear shroud the two ethnic communities in Cyprus. It is also a small country with respect to population and size. Many groups throughout history have conquered the island. In 1963-64 the Turkish threat of invasion prompted Greece to bolster military forces and equipment. In 1974 the Turkish military chose to invade after the military junta overthrew the Makarios government. Both of these situations could have been perceived as a possible step towards mass killings but this cannot be known for sure. The public sentiment in both countries suggests that these decisions did not originate from a conscious fear of extinction or mass killings. Instead, strong ethnic ties brought both populations to treat matters concerning
their ethnic kin in Cyprus as domestic concerns. In other words, an attack on Greek or Turkish Cypriots was perceived in Greece or Turkey proper as an attack on the motherland as well. While there may not be any conclusive evidence directly indicating fear of extinction, both Greece and Turkey chose to intervene based on the threat of mass violence towards their ethnic kin.

My third hypothesis asserts that if the neighboring ethnic group in power has been unsuccessful in past interventions, intervention in subsequent conflicts is less likely. The information in the case studies has refuted this claim. The 1974 conflict experienced interventions despite the parties not having reached a desired outcome in 1963-64. In fact, the impetus for Turkey invading Cyprus in 1974 came from the fact that they had perceived themselves to be unsuccessful in 1963-64. US Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Joseph Sisco, travelled to Ankara to attempt to persuade Turkey out of invasion as the United States had in 1963-64. He witnessed massive public demonstrations calling for the invasion of Cyprus. Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit cited earlier crises over Cyprus that resulted in Turkish humiliation and made it clear that Turkey was not in the “mood” to entertain pleas for compromise. US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger claimed that “Turkey was not interested in a negotiated solution; it was determined to settle scores” (Joseph, 1997, 52).

Likewise, Greek public discourse saw the imminent confrontation between Greece and Turkey as another chapter in the Greek-Turkish rivalry. Based on the information provided, there is no evidence to suggest that the outcome of the 1963-64 conflict discouraged the possibility of intervention from the 1974 conflict. If anything it may have amplified the desire to intervene in Cyprus.
However, it must also be noted that Cyprus may be a special case when it comes to the third hypothesis because both Greece and Turkey are obligated to guarantee the continuation and maintenance of the Cypriot constitution as well as the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus as defined in the Treaty of Guarantee circa 1960 (Polyviou, 1980). This means that both Greece and Turkey have the right to intervene in the case of any change or disturbance of Cyprus’ status in order to restore the state of affairs created by the London and Zurich agreements. So, regardless of the outcome of the 1963-64 conflict, the Treaty of Guarantee holds both potential interveners legally bound to the prospect of intervening in Cyprus.

My final hypothesis suggests that weak potential third party interveners will be less likely to intervene. The strength of Greece and Turkey may be difficult to quantify, but information from the case studies can be used to estimate the strengths and weaknesses relative to the conflicts. First, the distance between the potential interveners and Cyprus is significant to the level of influence each may comparatively exert. At Cyprus’ nearest point, it is approximately 40 miles from Turkey. On the other hand, it is 500 miles from Greece’s island of Rhodes (Dodd, 2002). Turkey’s closer proximity potentially grants it a greater sphere of influence over Cyprus. Additionally, variables such as the size differential between Greece and Turkey may play a role.

The case studies illustrate that the most important developments of the conflicts concerned the domestic stability of the potential third parties. In 1974 the Turkish government led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit took a strict stance on the establishment of a federal system of government in Cyprus. The Turks took this strict stance because Greece had just been taken over by a military junta that advocated the policy of enosis rather than independence and self-determination. The Turkish bloc refused to make concessions and identified the relations between the new pro-enosis Greek military junta and President Makarios’ government as
threatening. The unstable relations culminated in a coup and Turkey responded with its invasion of Cyprus. Once the puppet regime in Cyprus and military junta in Greece fell, Greek policy was in utter disarray. The new civilian government made threats to invade and combat Turkey on behalf of their ethnic kin, but were unable to bring such an intervention to fruition because of recent domestic instability and confusion. Had there not been a coup in Greece giving way to an extreme, but poorly-supported military junta in Greece, it is conceivable that Turkey would not have invaded Cyprus. In the aftermath of the fall of the military junta, Turkey continued to occupy and hold land in northern Cyprus. Greek Cypriots appealed to their mainland brethren but there was no intervention to be had because of the weak state of Greece. Thus, Turkey ultimately capitalized on the relative weaknesses of the Greek state and ended up with immense bargaining power by controlling thirty-seven percent of the land and possessing a foothold in Cyprus.

Overall, the case studies have provided valuable information regarding the role of ethnic affinity, domestic politics, past interventions and potential intervener weakness in the decision to intervene in an ethnic civil war. The analysis finds that ethnic affinities mattered in Cyprus’ 1963-64 and 1974 conflicts. Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been linked with their motherlands Greece and Turkey ethnically for centuries and legally through the three treaties of Cypriot independence in 1960. Domestic politics played a significant role in strengthening the ethnic bond by making Cypriot issues domestic issues for both Greeks and Turks. While there may not be any conclusive evidence directly indicating fear of extinction, both Greece and Turkey chose to intervene based on the threat of mass violence towards their ethnic kin. Domestic politics also contributed to the Turkish desire to invade Cyprus in 1974 after an unsuccessful past intervention in 1963-64. The decision to intervene was also made with regards to the perceived strengths and
weaknesses of the potential interveners. Turkey invaded Cyprus when they could justify the action within the confines of the Treaty of Guarantee and continued to expand throughout northern Cyprus when the Greek military junta had collapsed and a state of confusion rendered the new Greek civilian government unable to militarily intervene on behalf of their ethnic kin.

**Conclusion**

This thesis has reinforced previous theories and offered some new ideas to consider in regards to the role of ethnic affinity in the decision making process to intervene. Mitchell (1970) argued that there were four factors that influence interventions: 1) the characteristics of the country in conflict, 2) the characteristics of the intervener, 3) the linkage patterns between the groups in the target and the intervener, and 4) the characteristics of the international system. These broad factors are present throughout the cases presented in the thesis.

First, the characteristics of Cyprus undoubtedly influenced Greek and Turkish decisions to intervene. The two Cypriot communities have a historical legacy of maintaining strong ethnic ties to their respective mainland brethren. Whether it was a consequence of the Ottoman Empire’s millet system or the British policy of divide and rule, the two communities favored their ethnic identities over a common collective Cypriot identity.

Second, both mainland countries adopted domestic Cypriot issues as their own national issues. An attack on Greek or Turkish Cypriots was perceived in Greece or Turkey proper as an attack on the motherland as well. This sentiment was demonstrated through public demonstration and government policy in both Greece and Turkey.

Third, the strongest linkage pattern between the Cypriot communities and their mainland brethren was originally thought to be ethnic affinity alone. However, since the independence of Cyprus from Britain was brokered between Greece and Turkey, they became contractually tied to
the domestic affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. The linkage of the three countries through the Treaty of Guarantee made outside intervention into Cypriot affairs not a question of “if” but rather of “when.”

Finally, the characteristics of the international system also heavily influenced the decision-making process of the potential third party interveners. In the 1963-64 crisis Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus on behalf of its ethnic kin, and was persuaded out of taking such action by US President Lyndon B. Johnson and the interests of NATO. If Turkey invaded Cyprus there is little doubt that Greece would not do the same on behalf of their ethnic kin. The prospect of a war between two NATO allies left too much to risk and was prevented through negotiations. Had the international system not been characterized by the Cold War it is plausible that Turkey would have taken immediate action and invaded Cyprus in 1963-64.

Furthermore, this thesis provides a fifth factor to be added to Mitchell’s (1970) original four. This factor is the linkage patterns between the potential third party interveners. The case studies illustrate a quarrelsome history between Greece and Turkey that contributed to the ethnic rivalry among the two Cypriot communities. Turkey refused to stand down from invading Cyprus in 1974 because the decision was supported by the public who viewed it as another page in the Greek-Turk rivalry. In other words, the rivalry between potential interveners also influenced the decision to intervene in civil war. Thus, the decision to intervene is based on strategic and domestic policies.

While the case studies provided useful information to assess how ethnic affinity influences potential third party interveners, future work must utilize more cases to compare and contrast the findings presented here in the Cyprus cases. The study of such cases could reaffirm the major influences on the decision to intervene or present another important aspect of the
decision-making process. Since research suggests that civil wars that experience interventions tend to be bloodier, longer and more likely to recur (Lemke & Thomas, 2010), it would be beneficial for both academics and policymakers to continue to question why some civil wars receive interventions while others do not.
Works Cited


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