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ALL WHICH REMAINS LIES HERE:
MASS VIOLENCE AS A STRATEGY OF WAR

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ABSTRACT

The most heinous policies and unbelievable brutal tactics of governments have, for decades, been considered anomalies in the course of human history. Genocide, politicide, and mass murder – all of these and more are stains on human history. But these events are not aberrations, nor are they without their own terrible logic. Violence is a strategic choice, aimed to deter or eliminate a threat when enough information is present to act. Two cases in which the weapon chosen was violence against a civilian population, Cambodia and East Timor, demonstrate the chilling rationale behind selectively removing rebel leaders and removing civilians without consideration of affiliation. Ultimately, the decision to use violence against a population rests on how strongly the government is opposed. Violence is a strategy; an understanding of how and when it is deployed may someday lead to intervention, prevention, and eventually elimination of mass murder.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The specter of mass murder looms large behind the most tragic global events of the twentieth century: wars, famines, purges and disappearances number in the millions across continents and oceans, languages and religions, wealth and power. History will remember the legacy of the twentieth century as including the eradication of smallpox and polio, the invention of artificial organs and cancer treatments, the advent of global human rights and non-proliferation. However, this legacy is intertwined, as much as human history has ever been, with the stains of genocide, perpetrated by governments against their own people, for reasons which at first seem absurd. Could there be a logic to the murder of civilians? Will reasons emerge for slaughter? The frequency and style of mass murders are too large and numerous to ignore, but divining them is hardly an easy or pleasant task. The first step in preventing the worst crimes against humanity lies in understanding why and how they occur. The study of mass murder may well shed light on the nature of humanity's worst crimes. Breaking down the study of mass murder into categories of purposeful, selective violence against individuals singled out for removal and indiscriminate violence, or violence without regard to the individual's relationship to the offending party, separates mass violence into quantifiable, measurable methods offenders choose to achieve their aims. Why and how each category of violence is chosen is a relatively new and open field in the study of violence. What is clear is that mass murder is a choice, a strategic one at that; discovering the conditions under which each type of violence is selected will pay out dividends of insight into the dark strategy of murder.

If violence is truly a weapon in the hands of the powerful, the circumstances surrounding some of the most devastating and seemingly nonsensical violence of recent memory can demonstrate the rationale and conditions of mass violence. In Cambodia and East Timor, civilians were slaughtered en masse by governments struggling to maintain control; whether the threat to their stability was true (in East Timor) or entirely a fabrication of paranoia (Cambodia), the states chose to inflict violence against their own. The type of violence chosen, whether victims were selected to die because of their affiliation with rebel groups or simply because their town was forced to march to their own deaths, demonstrate the restraints the governments faced while executing their plans for control. Only when there is enough information present to identify a rebel or threat, and the cost of obtaining that information is lower than the potential cost by retaliation or armed resistance, will governments select out individuals. Otherwise, indiscriminate violence, against any and all without regard to potential retaliation or harm, will be the choice of government. The motives behind violence may seem irrational, and may indeed even be counterproductive; but the powerful can and do remove their own countrymen, and do so to achieve their own goals. Therefore, only a thorough examination of the nature of some of these violent events will produce the information necessary to parse out the darkest policies of government.

In the study below, I will summarize the literature about government violence against civilians and about mass murder more broadly. I will then introduce my own theoretical argument highlighting how the presence or absence of an effective insurgent opposition strongly influences government strategies when they kill large numbers of their own citizens. I then delve deeply into the histories of two mass killing events, in East Timor

and in Cambodia, to evaluate the empirical merit of my argument. In the end, I will consider how my work could be expanded, with an emphasis on what an analysis involving many more cases, including statistical estimation, could teach about mass murder of civilians.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Much of the previous literature on the study of genocide or mass violence focuses on the question of genocide as the ultimate goal of a government or rebel groups. The theorists assume that the destruction of a people is an end in and of itself, with the action of mass murder carried out to destroy with impunity. Indeed, some of the literature reads as though all leaders are simply awaiting their opportunity to lash out and murder, held in check only by institutional or power restraints to avoid slaughtering wholesale. We have to begin with the assumption that residents of a certain area are not any different, socially or mentally, than their more peaceful neighbors. Sociological and psychological understandings of how and why genocide can occur are not at stake here. While the authors point at goals, such as elimination of rival ethnic groups, the end is the mean in these cases; the genocide is the action and the result of a specific policy. This consideration, of elimination of a people as the goal, ignores the strategic use of mass killings to achieve further goals of the leaders in power. Genocide is a tactic, used to great effect, within and beyond civil wars not because of ethnic squabbling or racial purity, but to achieve definable military and political maneuvers in the paradigm of irregular warfare.

The question of when to expect a genocide or politicide is tricky at best. These events are not lightning strikes, but neither are they regularly occurring events, with strong

and clear preludes and indicators that, like a drop in atmospheric pressure, suggest violent changes. Rummel first argues that genocide is correlated with concentration of power (Rummel 1995, 5). Genocide onset is key to understanding the use of genocide as a tactic; it is the first consideration; an examination of the conditions under which it starts may shed light on the reason why it starts, continues, and persists. Rummel enthusiastically buys into the democratic peace theory, extending it to domestic policy: democracies will use violence less frequently against their own people than will authoritarian regimes (Rummel 1995, 4). Rummel references selectorate theory, although he does not mention it, in that he argues the more people with control over the levers of power, the smaller the chance a leader can enact the most destructive and distasteful policy (Rummel 1995, 4). The leaders will have to make their policies appeal to a broad base in a democracy, leaving brutal tactics to leaders with little electoral constraint. Pulling his argument together, Rummel concludes that the concentration of power in a very small number of hands proves to be the most likely regime type to commit mass murder (Rummel 1995, 25).

This is a fair start, but regime type cannot be the only indicator of genocide onset. Regime status can provide a background consideration, but as genocides are so infrequent, and plenty of authoritarian regimes do not experience mass murder events at all, a more immediate variable than regime type must be at play. Krain argues that states are not prone to genocide simply because of their status (political regime, economic status) (Krain 335). Instead, Krain predicts that there must be an opportunity to commit genocide or mass killings: the conditions must present a window of opportunity in a time of upheaval or shifting of power (Krain 335). These uneven and unstable times present opportunities without oversight or fear of reprisal to carry out acts of unmitigated violence against

civilians. Further, these opportunities shift quickly or may not be obvious from one moment to the next. A leader on the lookout for such an opportunity, however, may seize it when conditions are in flux. Krain argues that states are thus more likely to experience genocide when an inter-state war, civil war, or decolonization occurs (Krain 336). Genocides will also, according to Krain's predictions, be more severe in such turbulent times.

Interestingly, Krain also argues that ethnicity will increase the likelihood of genocide, but when the ethno-linguistic fractionalization is low, not high (Krain 337). He argues that a preponderance of power for one ethnic group is more threatening than parity of power between ethnicity groups. This hypothesis is not borne out in his statistical analyses, but ethnic difference as a decisive factor in genocide onset is a common theme.

In a similar vein, Besley and Persson examine political violence (they choose to examine both two-sided and one-sided violence, which includes mass civilian casualties) in an econometric analysis to determine repression onset, which varies in their study from jailings of dissidents to killing of civilians. They also are of the opinion, drawn from their rather excellent theoretical model, that the weakness of political and economic structure, specifically the lack of bureaucratic stability, is closely associated with one-sided violence. According to them, if government is left without strong checks and balances, all hell can and does break loose. Once more, the idea that political death is a shark swimming just offshore, waiting for a weak moment to strike, is ever-present even in a study from an unrelated field with totally different measurement and statistical analyses.

These studies show genocide as a phenomenon out of control by government or group, but at least one study moves genocide from passive occurrence to active choice.

Mass murder, as portrayed by and studied by Krain and Rummel, is a specter potentially waiting in the wings for the proper conditions (or, in Krain's case, "windows of opportunity"). I argue that environmental conditions are not the indicator for instances of mass murder. There must be more than opportunity, and this is what Goldstein and Pevehouse argue in their paper on reciprocity and bullying tactics in interventions. Although genocides and politicides do not necessarily occur if and only if 3rd party interventions take place in violent conflict, Goldstein and Pevehouse chose a case study of the effects of leadership response during 3rd party interventions. They escalate mass murder onset from being a window of opportunity to a conscious choice as retaliation. In Bosnia, the Goldstein and Pevehouse theory examined Serbian leadership reactions to American or NATO force action. If the outside forces exhibited hostile or forceful conditions, such as armed troop presence, in the course of action, Goldstein and Pevehouse predicted a bullying response towards Bosnia (which, in this case, included mass killings) as retaliation (Goldstein and Pevehouse 516). This triangle response of 3rd party action towards Serbia, Serbian reaction towards Bosnia, and Bosnian appeal to the 3rd party – is more geared towards examining intervention as prevention in civil wars rather than an indicator of genocide onset. But this model, because they chose to analyze a genocidal civil war in Bosnia, did present mass killing onset as one of the options for the bullying party (Goldstein and Pevehouse 527). The Goldstein and Pevehouse argument, therefore, demonstrates that genocide or mass killing can stem from an active retaliation measure in the course of civil war or conflict. A state representing the 2nd point in a triangle may choose to lash out at the third point in the triangle as a response to the action of the first point, the intervening body that is attempting to influence both parties in the conflict. In

this study Goldstein and Pevehouse introduce the idea of mass murder as a choice picked from an array of options available to leaders in times of conflict.

The previous works in the field of genocide, as illuminating and important as they have become, fail in the one crucial aspect: why and how do leaders choose when and under what conditions to use violence? Where is the difference between selecting out certain individuals to die, and setting a whole village ablaze without regard to political affiliation, race or class? These are very clear phenomena within genocide, but the previous literature does not specify these conditions and situations. These questions into the nature of selective violence can now be addressed, built on the foundation of these important but insufficient studies.

III. THEORY

If the rationale behind genocide is the problem, the question naturally shifts from “when will genocide occur?” to “when and why do leaders choose to use violence to achieve their ends”? Violence is a choice, and violence is a calculated decision. Those who study genocide, politicide, or mass murder by studying the structural conditions around it are missing the active, conscious decisions that go into the use and employment of violence against a population. In this way studies emphasizing structural conditions do not go far enough, deep enough, or close enough to violence against civilians because these studies view violence as an end unto itself, as a phenomenon, an event in human history alone and isolated from critical strategic decisions made by leaders in times of war and even in times of stability. Instead, mass violence and genocide must be seen as tactics, maneuvers

designed to obtain a goal. Violence is inherent to the system, and genocide is one manifestation of it.

Stathis Kalyvas revolutionized the way scholars understand the phenomenon of political violence during war and upheaval that might offer a new way to theorize about mass killing. He theorized that selective violence is a purposeful tactic in the course of a civil war to gain control over an area by targeting specific political supporters of the enemy, whereas indiscriminate violence (which I argue we should broaden to mass killings) is counterproductive and is not utilized by combatants in irregular civil warfare, for indiscriminate violence breeds discontent and may serve to recruit volunteers to the opponent's cause (Kalyvas 153). This selective violence model predicts that violence is inherent to civil wars, but selective violence is more productive and more likely to occur in a civil war rather than indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 153).

Kalyvas concerned his research with the question of process. He realized that mass killings were not the goal of government policy, but instead a tactic used in the course of bloodshed to achieve an end. He wondered why, in perfectly similar situations, governments choose to massacre civilians in one area while passing over another area without a scratch. There had to be more to mass killings than ethnic hatred, or old grudges, or even strategic murder of a group to eliminate a threat (Kalyvas 3). Violence seemed too random to understand. Kalyvas revealed that the violence is actually far more nuanced and useful to groups' aims than any of the base considerations of identity. Violence is a choice of governments to prevail, whatever that may be in terms of their policy.

Taking Kalyvas's idea of violence as a means to gain control over a territory, it

stands to reason that in a country where control is primarily held by the government; that is, where no civil war is occurring, instances of indiscriminate violence may be more likely to occur (genocide, politicide, or ethnocide), because absent an organized opposition force, there is no risk of spurring recruitment to it. This of course does not imply that all states not experiencing a civil war will see genocide, but when there are genocides or mass killings, they will not stem from civil war within the country. Where we see selective violence, we will most often find civil wars; where there is indiscriminate violence, we will generally not find a civil war. Most other work on mass killing disregards violence as a tactic in civil war and extrapolates the violence from the conflict itself to try to parcel out the cause of that violence. Examining the whole scope of political violence within inter-, intra-, and extra-state wars along with smaller acts of violence, and applying Kalyvas's argument of the inherent tactical efficiency of certain violence strategies as opposed to others, a sense of when and where the various types of violence are likely to occur may emerge.

Kalyvas's theory rests on the information dilemma of bargaining theory: that is, that war occurs because neither side knows enough about the other to come to a peaceful agreement before war. Indiscriminate violence is a tactic chosen when information is low (Kalyvas 148). When the rebels cannot be identified and denounced, therefore selected for removal, the government chooses to eliminate a whole group of people in hopes of catching some rebels within that larger mass murder (Kalyvas 148). There are a few reasons why indiscriminate violence is not the most efficient tactic to use in civil war, however. In this case, Kalyvas's theory takes into account two key variables on the ground, which are inter-related and mutually dependent: rebel strength and threat of retaliation (Kalyvas 153). He

argues that the stronger the threat of armed retaliation from the population, the less sense it makes for a government to use the tactic of indiscriminate retaliation (Kalyvas 153). Furthermore, the more control the rebel group has over the territory, the harder it is to strike with impunity and murder the people within, regardless of which side they support (Kalyvas 157).

Kalyvas comes to the conclusion that indiscriminate violence is better thought of as a mistake, one corrected once the government obtains enough information to correctly identify and target rebels for elimination (Kalyvas 171). He argues that indiscriminate violence is more prevalent at the onset of a conflict, until the two sides obtain more denunciations to ensure the rebels who will most affect the control of the territory are killed, along with their immediate supporters (Kalyvas 169). He argues that indiscriminate violence, or mass killings without proper identification of allegiance will fade away during the course of a civil war as intelligence sorts out the dangerous from the benign (Kalyvas 169). Therefore, indiscriminate violence is not the tactic of choice for the two sides in a war; it is rather a necessity in the course of strategic violence, used sparingly and quickly, until selective violence can be deployed against the opponents themselves.

Selective violence, on the other hand, requires more information to carry out, is more costly, and therefore the tactic of choice if and when the "opposition" is armed and dangerous enough to warrant targeting. Kalyvas also keys in on control of territory as a decisive factor for the choice of selective violence; the government has to use a scalpel to remove the insurgents when the ground is held by a strong opponent.

Kalyvas is not the only political scientist to consider genocide as a tactic of warfare, however. Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay also theorize about the nature of tactical

murder. The relationship between civilians and rebels is of particular interest to these scientists, who consider the support base for insurgency to be the rationale behind mass killings (Valentino et. al. 386). Cutting off insurgency entails removing the base of support. To kill the weed, one has to kill the root. Valentino et. al. theorize that genocide or mass killings are productive for government forces for several reasons; guerrilla or irregular forces are primarily offensive strike forces and cannot defend a static position, leaving a population adrift without threat of significant retaliation (Valentino et. al. 385). Governments do not rely as heavily on the food, resources, and shelter of a population to carry out their attacks, unlike guerrilla forces (Valentino et. al. 385). Self-sustaining and answerable only to the capital city, government forces are more mobile, less reliant on the population, and more detached physically and emotionally from the territory, the people, and their livelihoods (Valentino et. al. 385). The closer the civilians hold the insurgents, the more likely the use of mass murder to break the power and will of the rebels (Valentino et. al. 386).

However, Valentino et. al. seem to be operating under the mantra of “drastic times call for drastic measures.”. They point to mass killings as a tactic of last resort, of a government struggling with a well-armed and active insurgency that poses a grave threat (Valentino et. al. 384). Less well covered in the scope of their argument are the several genocides that happen outside the context of heated civil war – those that occur in periods of relative peace. According to Valentino et. al., the greater the threat by the rebels, the more likely the mass violence (Valentino et. al. 386). But what of those cases where the insurgency is weak, or even non-existent? My extension of Kalyvas’s argument, on the other hand, does provide explanations for mass killings under most any circumstance.

Violence is a tactic used not always as a last resort but often is the first choice when the situation calls for such tactics. It is not held in reserve until the government has no other choice but to kill. Violence is inherent to the conflict itself, and the various manifestations are a matter of strategy. This does not ignore the fact that, in cases of mass violence Kalyvas points instead to control of territory as determinant for which type of violence will be used (Kalyvas 113). The underpinnings for the strategic choice, then, differ between the two theories.

Therefore, in a case study, Kalyvas's argument of violence in civil war can be extended to areas not experiencing civil war to determine the nature of genocide in countries at peace. Indiscriminate violence will be the tactic of choice in those situations, whereas selective violence will aid the government in defeating rebels during civil war. Extending Valentino et. al.'s analysis hardly makes sense; if there are no rebels, how can a government cut off support to them? There must be a reason for violence in all types of conflict, even peace. Kalyvas did not explore all types of conflict in his original analysis, but his argument can and should apply to instances of civil war and of government-sponsored violence in times of peace as well.

This notion that indiscriminate violence has no merit in civil war, and is the least valuable choice of violence to obtain results in the course of a civil war, can be flipped on its head: it does have merit when the rebels are either unable to strike, or, as in cases of genocide during peace, non-existent. There is no military downside to murdering civilians as a tactic to obtain control when the chances of retaliation are slim to none. If the targeted group cannot fight back, the government does not have to accrue the costs of obtaining information on their targets to ensure they have selected the individuals who play a role in

the rebellion. Selective violence is the proper tactic to avoid the high costs of entering rebel territory and obtaining intelligence, but governments looking to exterminate a relatively benign population (one at peace, even) can avoid those costs by deploying indiscriminate violence to remove a threat, real or perceived, which the government is eager to be rid of; for strong or militaristic states, the threat could be rival (but unarmed and unsupported) political groups, ethnic minorities, or intellectuals, as in Communist China or the USSR. Whatever the targeted group, for whichever reason they are targeted for elimination, the threshold of information-gathering is low. Therefore, I expect to find governments at peace saving their information-gathering resources by selecting indiscriminate violence as a tactic in their campaigns against a selected group, whereas selective violence will be the most desirable tactic in civil wars against strong opposition.

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN

A decisive and thorough method for implementing the theory stated will include an examination of cases wherein selective violence was perpetrated against a population, and a case where selective violence was not present in the course of a large violent event; comparing and contrasting the two, the course of action, the ways in which victims were identified, and the roadblocks against violence will provide insight into the mass violence quandary. Identifying cases in which mass murders occur requires careful parsing through data of staggering inhuman conduct; however, not all of it can be considered genocide, politicide, or mass murder. Barbara Harff compiled one of the first lists of genocides, and her cases are split into two camps: genocide, or extermination of ethnic groups, and politicide, murder of political enemies. She argues that ideology drives the first

phenomenon, while what drives the second is strategy. However, both are defined as such: the promotion, execution, or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group (Harff 58). From her definition, she identified 37 cases in the post-World War II era to constitute a dataset of genocides (Harff 59). From here, finding similar yet contrasting cases remained elusive; genocides have occurred on every continent (save Australia) in the Cold War era, from Chile to Pakistan, from Europe to Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambodia and East Timor stood out, as both are in Southeast Asia, suffered their mass killings in the same time period of the mid-1970's, were recently decolonized by European powers, and suffered nearly the same magnitude of loss. On the other hand, Pol Pot was not waging a civil war, so to speak, within Cambodia, while the Timorese were fighting for their independence in a civil war against Indonesia. With a civil war on one hand, and relative stability on the other, this pair of cases can be expected to provide insight into the nature of strategic violence.

These two cases which illustrate the strategic choice of violence involve a struggle for control, a violent autocratic regime, and a gaping maw that consumed at least a quarter of the population of the respective countries. Cambodia and Timor-Leste in 1975 were in the grips of genocidal madness, churned by the turmoil of the Vietnam War and post-colonial bureaucratic breakdown and haunted by the specter of communism. These two areas suffered massive human loss at the hands of the respective governments, but the reasons behind the mass murders differ greatly. The Khmer Rouge, having recently gained control over the whole of Cambodia, wasted no time in sending operatives to systematically

remove citizens, torturing and murdering hundreds of thousands of peasants and intellectuals, urbanites and rural farmers, royal loyalists and communist alike in a bloodbath to fix into place through the most horrific methods a pure, egalitarian state. This lunacy remains one of the worst stains on human history imaginable, but at the same time, in the same geographic region, another mass killing spree was in effect. In Timor-Leste, a former Portuguese colony within the archipelago of Indonesia, the people of the island were stirring to action, to make their own state under the auspices of self-determination. Having never truly been a working part of the Indonesian state, Timor-Leste took the opportunity given by Portugal's crumbling authority to declare its independence. Indonesia under Suharto responded with unimaginable force, crushing Timor-Leste by murdering civilians in and around rebel strongholds.

Selective violence is tricky to identify, as governments carrying it out do not advertise their actions nor necessarily record them for official documentation. What can be identified, however, are several key documents that give away targeted violence. The enlistment roles of the rebel group, bounties put on the heads of individuals, arrests and torture of specific individuals, and evidence of news material in the suspect's possession, such as radio broadcasting and printed material of the rebel group, before the violence are clues to the targeting. Post-violence, the targeting is identifiable by finding obituaries identifying supporters, rebel radio broadcasts which mention the dead, mourning ceremonies held by the rebels, and government records indentifying those they had killed as the enemy. Of course, these identifiers can all be falsified; the government has a strong incentive to label all those they have killed as rebels, so cross-identification of the dead with the rebel groups' networks will clarify the individual's role, and the reason for his

death. The critical records in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor come from testimony and interviews, conducted by academics and intergovernmental organization members, such as United Nations investigators. These records, in some cases extensive, serve as this study's raw data. Although the mentioned primary sources to determine association between the act of murder and the intention behind it would be more precise and valuable, radio broadcasts were not usually transcribed, and translations into English for many of the other critical documents do not yet exist. Therefore, for these case studies, interviews of family members and survivors will paint the picture of when and how their families and associates were killed.

With the independent variable accounted for, the questions of how to measure territorial control, rebel strength, and threat of retaliation can be addressed. Control of territory is made clear through historical records, both governmental and rebel, as they plan battles and attacks in and around the front to break through. Examining troop movement, barracks, local support, and battles will demonstrate who controls which part of the country, and to what extent. For measuring the strength of the rebel movement in any given area, the qualifiers are much the same. The number of insurgents, armed and viable, in the territory, the number killed in action, and the local support illustrate the power of the rebels to ensure the government has to take precaution and plan carefully their acts of violence. Finally, the threat of retaliation is demonstrated by external support for the rebels, specifically other nations. If a neighbor or ally demonstrates support through institutional channels, such as proclamations, sanctions, participation in negotiations or round-tables to mitigate the civil war, or more overt actions, such as supplying the rebels with arms, food, or aid, or receiving refugees. If other nations become

involved, and prove willing to interfere, the government will want to prevent stirring the ire and risking intervention. These three variables (control of territory, rebel strength, and threat of retaliation) will condition the lengths governments have gone to in order to murder their own citizens by the thousands.

V. ANALYSIS

It is to these two cases, both in Southeast Asia in the 1970's, to which aspects of both selective and individual violence can be seen, interpreted, and understood to discover whether a barrier to selective violence exists. East Timor will reveal the situation on the ground in an active and popular rebellion, a civil war much like those Kalyvas included in his studies of selective violence; Cambodia, crushed beneath a totalitarian regime, suffered greatly under a genocide without a great deal of opposition to the Khmer Rouge. These two instances are explored further in an analysis of their mass murders.

The frayed endings of decolonization and bright dreams of independence sparked a hot and bloody war in Timor-Leste during the 1970's. The nation was in flux. Officially it was under control of General Suharto, a staunch anti-communist military dictator with strong Western support (Budiarjo and Liong 4). After Portugal suffered a coup in 1974 at the hands of a pro-democracy party, the nascent political parties of East Timor began to organize to pursue a course to independence. Seizing on Portugal's weakness, a political party known as Fretilin (*Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente*) consolidated around a platform of complete independence, as opposed to integration with Indonesia. In reaction to this integration of an independence movement came a swift rebuttal from Indonesia, the prelude for the civil war that would dominate the tiny island for the next seven years.

Selective violence in Dili

Mass killings were the operating plan from the moment boots hit the ground in the Indonesian invasion of Dili, December 1975. The killings at the *asistencia* building illustrate the type of warfare the Indonesians perpetrated against the Fretilin rebels: during the raid of Dili, civilians took refuge in the Portuguese government building, occupied by Fretilin guerrillas. The Fretilin defended the position, guarding the women and children, until ammunition ran out and the guerrillas fled (Commission 34). Upon taking control of the building with roughly 300 civilians, Indonesian troops ordered the men to exit and line up in rows before the soldiers, who then opened fire. The group consisted of as many as 80 men, who began to run as the soldiers mowed the lines with machine gun fire. The families of the men watched from the grounds (Commission 34).

During the Dili raid, citizens were promised amnesty if they turned themselves in to the Indonesian forces; they were not given asylum, but instead were murdered upon self-identifying as Apodeti (Budiarjo and Liong 12). The documented instances from CAVR support this assertion. The killings were sporadic but frequent, as soldiers taking over a corridor of the city would begin the mass killings as a way to ensure full control over the area before proceeding to the next; all citizens were rebels, and only removal could ensure that the rebel threat was eliminated during the invasion. Between 20,000 and 40,000 citizens of Dili were killed in the initial strike, December 1975 (Budiarjo and Liong 14).

After Dili: "Going to School"

Surrenders were the most effective trap the Indonesian troops used to kill civilians. Under threat of death, or the promise of allowances to visit relatives in captured territory, civilians would surrender themselves to Indonesian troops (Commission 7). As this was

interpreted to constitute a confession of rebellious activity, Indonesian soldiers would in a great many instances immediately kill the confessor (Commission 66). Fretilin members were identified by their confessions, by their identification cards, by their friends and relatives, and their locations when the Indonesian forces came to their area (hiding in the mountains) (Commission 71). In one instance, three Fretilin commanders surrendered, were given amnesty to join the Indonesian soldiers, and were subsequently “sent to school”, the popular euphemism for execution (Commission 67). This process occurred throughout the island during the peak of the conflict, as thousands of Fretilin supporters surrendered en masse from the mountains. (Commission 67). Upon surrendering, those surrendering took exams and were put through rigorous re-evaluation programs. Many did not survive, by accident or design (Commission 67).

The Commission found that much of the targeting occurred due to association with known Fretilin, usually family members, who were murdered to remove support for rebel activity (Budiarjo and Liong 124). The surrenders, plus these denunciations and associations, led to the murder of 18,600 individuals whose reason of death was catalogued and confirmed by the United Nations research project under the aegis of CAVR (Commission 5). Of the estimated 150,000 dead in East Timor, these accounts of the dead paint the picture of the kind of death they suffered, and the reasons they suffered it.

Control of Territory

The capital was invaded on December 7th, 1975, and quickly taken as paratroopers and marines stormed the seaside capital by ocean and air (Commission 34). Indonesian forces by August 1976 had control of several major towns, including Dili (the capital), yet did not have control of the countryside nor much control in the areas surrounding the cities

(Budiarjo and Liong 23). In August 1976, 150,000 Timorese lived in areas under Indonesian control, while 500,000 lived in Fretilin controlled areas (Budiarjo and Liong 24). Fretilin continued their guerrilla raids on the Indonesian territory, which made Indonesian control of the area tenuous at best. Normality proceeded during this first stage of the war: outside of Dili and Baucau, the largest bureaucratic centers, the countryside remained in Fretilin control (90% of the population lived under Fretilin). (Budiarjo and Liong 58). Fretilin's tactics were to hold the interior with permanent bases and strong positions along the countryside (Magalhaes 62). However, by September 1977 with military equipment lent from the United States, Indonesian forces launched full-scale attacks on villages in the western mountains, from their position of strength in West Timor (Budiarjo and Liong 28). No longer isolated in the major population centers, the western border provided a base from which to attack Fretilin supporters. Moreover, the increased military capacity allowed for air raids and sea excursions, greatly increasing the mobility of the Indonesian Army – to the detriment of the guerrilla forces, who were entirely bound to the ground. The Americans supplied OV-10 aircraft, and the British sold Suharto 8 Hawk helicopters. (Magalhaes 63).

In September 1978, Indonesian forces began the last stage of “encirclement and annihilation” by storming into the East sector, held by Fretilin from their stronghold in the Matabian Mountains. The Indonesian army pushed the Timorese in the East sector towards the Mountains from all sides, ordering the Fretilin supporters to surrender or be held prisoner (Budiarjo and Liong 32). The Indonesians would bomb a village from the air for days on end, then storm the weakened area and drive the villagers towards the east (Taylor 86). Thirty thousand villagers were held at the Matabian Mountain, with 60,000 to

the northwest in the Natarbora Plain; Indonesian soldiers had them surrounded from the west, the north and the east (Budiarjo and Liong 33). At this juncture, Indonesian priests sent from the Vatican reported on the massacres. "On 28 November 1978 on the mountain of Uadaboro, in the Matabia range in the Eastern part of the island of Timor approximately 500 persons were machine-gunned, including pregnant women, children of all ages, and adults and elderly people when they came to surrender, believing Indonesian propaganda. The same occurred in Taipo, where 300 persons were killed in the same way..." (Magalhaes 67). These mass murders were the rule, not the exception, to encirclement. In this operation, the guerrilla tactics of Fretilin could not make much of a difference, and the guerrillas retreated further and further up the mountain range until they too had been encircled.

'Operation Security'

This last push by the Indonesians, in the face of a refreshed and regrouped Fretilin, aimed to drive the entire remaining body of Fretilin and their families from the extreme edges of the island to the center, at Manatuto, for extermination (Budiarjo and Liong 41). From May until September, Indonesians rounded up Fretilin men and left their families to starve or be shot as they marched to the center of the island (Budiarjo and Liong 42). The strategy was only mildly successful, and yet the Indonesians managed to assume full control of the East sector by taking over the last Fretilin base in November 1978. This strategy, designed to make the citizens of East Timor act as human shields against the rebels as they swept through the countryside, actually facilitated the movement of Fretilin forces, as the rebels in the marches hid their comrades from location to location by marching alongside them, then disappearing into the night (Taylor 177). And yet,

hundreds if not thousands of men did not survive this death march from one end of the island to the other; in many cases they remained rebels to the end, refusing to kill a fellow countryman even under threat of being shot (Taylor 178).

Rebel strength

At the beginning of the war, Fretilin dominated the countryside. The independence fighters had near unanimous support from the population, and a great many men were mobilized as guerrilla fighters. By 1978, with the increase in Indonesian military might, the losses for the rebels were staggering. At a 1981 conference, Fretilin leaders took stock of the damage and recorded: 79% of the Supreme Command had been killed, with only 3 members of the Central Command remaining in the entire territory, 80% regular troop loss, and all communication, most military equipment, and outside support had been terminated (Budiarjo and Liong 67). The east sector was the strongest rebel territory. A slow resurgence built the numbers again, until they could present a threat against the Indonesian forces as guerrilla strikers in 1979, but a cease-fire was declared shortly thereafter and hostilities, for the main portion, died down to negligible levels through 1982 (Taylor 220).

In 1976, Fretilin boasted a regular army of 2,500, with 7,000 militia and a reserve guerrilla guard of 5,000, with a reserve base trained by the Portuguese numbering from 10,000-20,000 throughout the island (Kiernan 208). At this point, they were matched against an Indonesian force of 32,000. They had, however, inflicted casualties at twice the rate the Indonesians had against them; their dead and wounded numbered 5,000 to Indonesia's 10,000 in the fight to that point (Kiernan 208). The Fretilin were a strong adversary against the Indonesians, fighting a guerrilla war that inflicted heavy losses upon

the enemy, until the enemy was supplied with air and sea power that greatly overwhelmed the land-based rebels.

Threat of Retaliation

The United States was not keen to re-involve itself in Southeast Asia just after leaving Vietnam in humiliating defeat. Moreover, East Timor was of little consequence in the region, with a small population and few resources beyond oil, which was prohibitively expensive for transport even to Hawaii. Leaving the oil for the Australians, then, and ignoring humanitarian issues stemming from the invasion was Kissinger's plan for the region.

Suharto argued that the Fretilin, as leftists, were communists threatening rebellion on one of Indonesia's islands that belonged to the archipelago (Kiernan 2003, 204). Kissinger, in fact, labeled Fretilin (which has won its election in 1975 with a majority, edging UDT) "a communist government in the middle of Indonesia", confirming the US position that East Timor was under Communist threat and belonged to Indonesia by rights. Suharto took this as a green light to invade (Kiernan 2003, 204). The relationship between Suharto and Kissinger was beneficial; Kissinger relied on Suharto to control communist activity in his sphere and serve as an ally against North Vietnam, China, and the USSR with Indonesia's vast territorial sprawl and claims to oil. Indonesia had little to fear from the United States in pursuing whatever policy would work best against the leftist Fretilin; Kissinger gave the go-ahead in recently declassified memos detailing their exchanges (National Security Archives).

Australia proved a difficult partner to please, but ultimately remained in favor of unification between Indonesia and East Timor, due to oil in Timor Gap; Australia did not

have a chance of obtaining oil from Portugal or a Portuguese friendly nation in East Timor, and therefore supported a weak and disparate Indonesia against East Timor (Magalhaes 22) Questions over control of the Timor Gap, an oil-rich shallow water boundary between Australia and East Timor, drove Australia's support for a pliable Indonesian government in control of the seas, not the hostile Portuguese or Portuguese-aligned East Timorese, who were not as keen to allow oil exploration to their detriment. Portugal and Australia had long disputed the oil boundary between the nations, with negotiations stalling through 1971-1972. At the time of annexation, Portugal and Australia were still unresolved over access to oil in the Gap. With Indonesia picking up the reins for negotiations, anything less than full-throated support for integration would sorely hurt Australia's chances for oil production in the Gap (Magalhaes 115).

The Balibo 5 incident illustrated the lengths to which Australia went to bend to Indonesia's demands. 2 Australian camera crews were stationed in Balibo and had just filmed Indonesian forces napalming, firebombing, and using heavy artillery, even though these forces claimed that only the Timorese were attempting combat (Magalhaes 117). Shortly thereafter, Indonesian troops began firing upon Balibo, where the Australian house was clearly marked with flags. The Australians, drawn outside, were slaughtered even when identifying themselves as foreign nationals. Australia conducted a brief investigation, but never brought charges against Indonesia.

Portugal was keen to see their former colony independent; after all, they had held that territory against Indonesia and a colonial Dutch region for nearly 400 years, and still very much desired access to the Timor Gap and strategic interests in Southeast Asia.

However, the coup had effectively removed Portugal's ability to influence local politics, as

communications broke down and other former colonies, particularly Angola, demanded Portugal's attention as it too descended into civil war. Hampered by institutional breakdown, huge distances, lack of influence at the United Nations or within NATO, Portugal could do little but protest the treatment of their former colony.

Finally, in deference to another NATO ally, Britain took a similar line to the United States, recognizing that it was to every nation's advantage in the region to avoid a drawn-out regional war, particularly to give independence to a communist breakaway. Britain explicitly professed a promise of non-intervention, even if the situation were presented to the United Nations as a humanitarian case. Britain advocated a low profile in Indonesia, and covertly supplied Suharto with military supplies along with the United States (Magalhaes 61).

The Khmer Rouge and the Killing Fields, 1975-1979

Cambodia, a small backwater nation nestled in the former French Indochina, took its turn in the litany of horrors that embroiled Southeast Asia in the 1970's, becoming a battleground for the worst crimes against humanity in the context of relative peace. The Cambodian republic formed after the French took leave of their colony in 1953. Prince Sihanouk, the young and popular leader of Cambodia, negotiated a release with France that allowed Cambodia to become independent (Rummel 1994, 162). From there, Prince Sihanouk attempted to walk a balance between Western and Communist influences, to appease both the rural, undereducated leftist peasants with whom he was extremely popular, and the wealthy elite who were of the opinion he was too leftist and needed to build better relations with the United States (Rummel 1994, 167). During the 1960s,

moreover, communist Vietnam and the United States (fighting alongside the South Vietnamese) were engaged in the Vietnam (or, from the Vietnamese point of view, American) war. Cambodia's position was tenuous among the unstable Southeast Asian bloc; therefore, Sihanouk allied with China and established support for Vietnam through the clandestine network of the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Cook 42).

The upper-class elites of Cambodia were not supportive of this warming with communist nations. Lon Nol, the Army Chief General of Cambodia, staged a coup in 1970 and established the pro-Western Khmer Republic (Rummel 1994, 167). From opposition to this new regime arose the political prominence of the Khmer Rouge, the regime that would murder nearly a third of the entire country in just 4 short years, with whom Prince Sihanouk joined forces to regain control of Cambodia (Rummel 1994, 170). In alliance with the Khmer Republic, the United States began bombing the border region between Cambodia and Vietnam, driving those citizens whose homes were bombed and relatives murdered into the arms of the aligned Khmer Rouge and north Vietnamese, creating a bloc to challenge the nascent Khmer Republic (Rummel 1994, 171). Within 5 years, the Khmer Rouge had enough support and strength to overthrow the Khmer Republic and begin their reign of blood.

Violence

The Khmer Rouge numbered 14,000 active members of the political party, boasting an army of 68,000 upon their takeover of Phnom Penh (Rummel 1994, 175). This small ragtag band of teenage soldiers and communist sympathizers would give rise to a cruel national army bent on destroying the Khmer nation. The troops were disorganized, unsure of

command, and unsure of tactics in the first few days, but quickly found their footing to exert complete control under strict control of Pol Pot and his deputies (Vickery 132). From the moment the Khmer Rouge seized power, they began murdering hundreds of thousands of their own citizens in a type of bloodletting never matched on any scale. On April 24, 1975, a few days after seizing control of Phnom Penh, Pol Pot outlined an 8-point action plan to be carried out immediately (Kiernan 2008, 44).

1. Evacuate people from all towns
2. Abolish all markets
3. Abolish Lon Nol regime currency
4. Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice
5. Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders
6. Establish high-level cooperatives through out the country, with communal eating
7. Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population
8. Dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese border.

The Khmer Rouge began expelling residents from the cities, starting with Phnom Penh, into the countryside. On the very day of the takeover, April 16th, bewildered residents were forced out of their homes at gunpoint, told only that they were going to be away for a few days (Kiernan 1996, 42). Supporters, enemies, women and children all were swept out with minimal food and supplies, leaving anywhere from 40,000-280,000 dead on the roads (Rummel 1994, 180). They were expelled not because of political ideology or support for Lon Nol, but for being “urban”, “Western” and elitist. It was a condition of city life, not reserved for any one political party (Kiernan 1996, 52). From here, the Khmer Rouge moved in on anyone connected to the West by the most tenuous of threads – having an

education past grade school, or even wearing glasses, denoted intellectualism and Western ideology to the Khmer, who murdered with impunity (Rummel 1994, 184).

The Killing Fields

The systematic murder of refugees in the contested southwestern sector proved the Khmer Rouge had more of a stake in murder than in eliminating specific Western allies or true armed threats. Throughout the nation, ethnic minorities, peasants, intellectuals, and anyone who stepped out of line for completely arbitrary reasons were tortured, raped, or murdered by the CPK (Communist Party of Kampuchea) troops (Midlarsky 331). In the East, where food supplies were sufficient and people made a fair living under the horrible conditions, the purges and murders would come later in the reign of the Khmer Rouge (Kiernan 2008, 32). The consolidation of the southwest sections, however, was brutal and quick, the urban centers of population stripped of the former Western supporters, royalists, and minorities, especially the Muslim Cham and the Buddhist monks. Anywhere from 1.68 million (Kiernan's estimate) to 3.3 million were dumped into fields, into graves they had often dug themselves and lain down in the warm earth, more bodies to grind into the machinery of a communist regime hell-bent on destroying its own foundation.

Control of Territory

After takeover, the Khmer Rouge had control of nearly the entire nation, with some nebulous areas near the Vietnamese and Thai borders to the south. It was these sections that drew the attention of the Khmer Rouge, with whom the Vietnamese had been allied in the struggle against Western allies, the Khmer Republic. Consolidation of the eastern sectors proved a difficult task, as the eastern commanders did not take kindly to their new CPK overlords. Groups of soldiers loyal to Samhrin, a Vietnamese Communist who would

go on to rule a puppet Cambodia after Vietnam overthrew the CPK, resisted efforts to bring them in to the Khmer Rouge army (Kiernan 1996, 66). Groups of defectors, from “White Khmers”, Cham Muslim troops, to Vietnam sympathizers, hid in the borderlands between Vietnam and Cambodia, armed but few in number (Kiernan 1996, 66). The south and eastern sectors held many ethnic Thais, Vietnamese, and Chinese Cham, who were all selected by the CPK for “removal”. The story was similar for the Thai border regions, which held Lon Nol officials and some wealthy sea merchants, who were slaughtered without chance of amnesty upon full control of Cambodia by the CPK (Kiernan 1996, 77). These rebels were armed but few in number, only perhaps 5,000 at any point (Kiernan 1996, 76). Those who were not immediately executed fled to Thailand, across the border. In this way, the CPK consolidated their power in the fractured border territories.

Rebel Strength

Rebels were nearly non-existent against the Khmer Rouge; the Khmer Rouge’s grip on power was nearly complete, save for the borders which they constantly attacked. Many of the peasants were pleased at first with the triumph of the Khmer Rouge, believing in communism and support for fellow southeast Asian nations engaging with the same type of government. One area that never quite caught on in the same fashion, however, was the Vietnamese border region in the East. Not as heavily patrolled, with fewer documented killings, the Eastern region was, from 1975-early 1977, mostly self-governing, with old party members leading a less restrictive, more amicable life than was possible in new Khmer Rouge territories, such as the Southwest. However, the East was a fearful place for the CPK leaders, who considered the close ties with Vietnam their biggest threat.

Beginning in 1977, the Khmer Rouge began purging all government leaders,

schoolteachers, and low-ranking members of the government structure there as a means of re-asserting control and removing threats (Kiernan 2008, 77). Between 100,000 and 250,000 “Cambodian people with Vietnamese minds” were executed in the southeast, beginning in 1977 (Kiernan 2008, 77). The rebellion in the southeast which would spring Cambodia free was spurred by the murder of their fellow regional leaders; by 1978, the rebels in the area ready to make war against the capital numbered 7,000, with reinforcements and support in Vietnam numbering in the hundreds of thousands (Kiernan 2008 78). This group of rebels, collaborating with the Vietnamese government, would eventually overrun Cambodia and take over the government within a matter of days in 1979 (Midlarsky 313). This rebellion may not have happened with such strong support along the borders had the Khmer Rouge not purged most regional military leaders and civilian associates from their ranks. The new leader of one of the southeast districts began organizing rebels and made contact with the Vietnamese shortly after most of his cadres were removed to state prisons for execution; he made the overtures to Vietnam and cleared pathways across the border for them to invade (Kiernan 2008, 79). In this way, local Cambodians assisted the eventual victors, but their numbers were never great enough to pose a true threat to the Khmer. Only in collaboration with the Vietnamese did the rebels find movement against their CPK overlords. The border region with Vietnam, then, presented a differing situation as compared with the rest of the country. With Vietnamese support and a cause to rally around, Cambodian rebels in the Southeast became the targets the Khmer Rouge anticipated, and were eliminated as a result in the bloodiest purges of the entire reign. From this action came the Khmer’s eventual downfall, the Vietnamese, who collaborated with the Cambodians to overthrow the Khmer Rouge.

Threat of Retaliation

There was no threat at all of retaliation from China (Etcheson 18); Chinese-Khmer relations were very good, even in the face of the systematic murder of ethnic Muslim Cham people. In fact, China played Cambodia off of Vietnam to exert influence in the unstable region. China obviously did not care to criticize a fellow Communist regime that purged its own revolutionaries along with dissidents and minorities, as even hypocrisy has its limits. A strong spotlight on the killings would only spur investigation into the vast crimes perpetrated by the Chinese themselves.

The United States, for all of its interference in the region, posed little threat to Pol Pot as well. The US had just withdrawn from Vietnam; *realpolitick* was in full swing as Kissinger revealed he wanted China and Cambodia to play off of North Vietnam to keep the Vietcong in line after withdrawal, even in the face of mounting evidence of genocide (National Security Archives). Kissinger revealed his distaste for the Khmer Rouge, calling them “thugs” in a diplomatic meeting with top-level Thai officials, but declined to pursue any strategy against them, preferring Cambodia to continue playing its role as thorn in the side of a communist Vietnam (National Security Archives). The Thai officials appreciated this viewpoint, as they wanted no parts in an invasion into which the United States, if it did invade, would draw the Thais.

The Vietnamese relationship with the Khmer Rouge was complicated, to say the least. When the Khmer party was forming after the breakup of Indochina, the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists shared confidences and major power players between them, but held off on formal relations as Prince Sihanouk remained the official (and friendly) government head in Cambodia. However, once Sihanouk began removing ties between his

country and Vietnam, the Vietnamese communists began sending advisors to meet with Pol Pot to strengthen the Khmer Rouge (Cook 46). The Vietnamese did not wish to deal with the French-educated Pol Pot, whose bloodlust was evident from his rise in party leadership, but Vietnam was stuck with working with Pol Pot until they could infiltrate the Cambodians with enough Vietnamese communists to throw him out and take over (Cook 46). Pol Pot was wary of this union as well, but desperately needed Vietnamese aid if the Khmer Rouge were to grow (Cook 47). However, this shaky alliance fell to pieces as Pol Pot gained power as Sihanouk's protector and popular rebel against Lon Nol; in 1973, Vietnam and Cambodia parted ways officially as Pol Pot took over diplomatic relations as the official leader of Cambodia (Cook 53). From here, Vietnam would withdraw all forces and begin a fitful defense of their borders, enduring frequent attacks from Khmers until the Vietnamese snapped, invaded the territory, and overthrew the government (Cook 65).

Comparison of the Two Cases

So what does this evidence reveal? Gathering evidence on mass killings is incredibly difficult. No one will know why and how each person died, what information the offending party had to find and destroy, or why they were motivated to do so at all. What is clear is governments can and do kill with impunity, turning on citizens to prevent war or the war in their paranoid mind, to cleanse their countries of what they fear. What stops them from doing so is revealed in an analysis of the data.

The three variables examined, which are control of territory, rebel strength, and threat of retaliation, shed light on the checks against mass violence, and the reasons for proceeding with the violence. In East Timor, the worst fighting and instances of mass death occurred during rapid transitions between control of certain areas. When the Indonesians

were battling for control of Dili, they killed anyone and everyone who presented themselves as a rebel, carrying out the deadly mission to kill by pretending to offer amnesty. Hoping to drive out the rebels from the city, they killed a great many civilians and sent the capital rebels to the interior, from which they launched their attacks. Once the Indonesians had control of the city, though, the mass murders stopped there and moved out to the countryside, to pursue the enemy where they had retreated. The massacres followed a pattern: where the rebels were in hiding, the Indonesians murdered the civilians in hopes of drawing out the rebels, controlling the countryside to herd the rebels into areas for capture, or removing their base of support and forcing the armed rebels to flee. The killings happened in disputed territory: the entire island was, at least the start, in rebellion against Indonesia. Slowly, the Indonesians pushed in from the coast to the east to take control town by town, murder by murder, until East Timor was under near complete Indonesian control.

In contrast, Cambodian deaths were not a result of territorial battles, as battles rarely occurred at all. Upon taking Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge had near complete control of the nation. The deaths, many from starvation and disease, resulted from ideology and policy, not strategy, to bring the population in line with the prevailing Marxist design of government. There is little evidence as to how and why many of the millions who died were selected for death, but there remains little doubt that the Khmer Rouge had the territory well in hand, with little armed resistance, as few Khmer soldiers were killed in action or wounded either defending or advancing territorial claims. For the Khmer, the full control meant that they could kill without threat of retaliation from previous government

loyalists, or outside subversives. Within Kampuchea, indiscriminate violence with ideological or elimination aims proved the prevailing method of murder.

In terms of rebel strength, again in Cambodia the threat of armed resistance was minimal until the Khmer Rouge themselves built up the very resistance against themselves, stemming from their own brutality. In Cambodia, the rebellion in the Eastern zone was a direct result of the executions and purges of the citizens in the area, not the other way around. The regime was relatively mild in the area, and people did not suffer death from disease and starvation as they did in other zones. It was the suspicion of Vietnamese assistance that sent the Khmer Rouge into a frenzy, murdering hundreds of thousands in mass graves that now dot the region; over 19,000 mass graves exist in 4 eastern sectors alone, made in the last 2 years of Khmer Rouge rule (Cambodian Genocide Project).

The rebels in East Timor, on the other hand, were plentiful and well equipped, giving the Indonesians a difficult time until Indonesian firepower overwhelmed the guerrilla forces. Still, the selective violence, chosen on basis of surrender or self-identification with the rebels, occurred in areas of relative rebel strength: in Dili, where the rebels were based, soldiers swept in to select out the rebels for removal. In the mountainous zones, Indonesians proceeded with caution to surround and remove rebellious civilians, while the rebels waited in the hills to strike. The firepower of the rebels forced the Indonesians to select out known rebels for “annihilation”, in their words, to continue their campaign against Fretilin.

Interestingly, in both situation the threat of outside retaliation was minimal. For East Timor, their only benefactor was melting down in a coup and unable to provide any sort of military or financial backing to support the insurgency. They had the nominal

support of Portugal, but no way to truly access or make use of their support, especially in the face of complicity with Indonesia from the United States, Great Britain, and most damningly Australia, which was the closest major power and potential protector had it not been for the oil reserves beneath the ocean floor. Indonesia, with explicit promises from Henry Kissinger, was able to maneuver without fear of retribution, even murdering five Australian journalists while retaining Australia as an ally. In Cambodia the story was much the same: the United States had had enough of interference in Southeast Asia, and after the unlawful bombing of southern Cambodia just a few years prior, was dead-set against any further interaction with the nation. Cambodia had the tacit support of China, and the USSR preferred to stay away from another conflict in the region. Cambodia therefore had only Vietnam to fear, and yet Vietnam had no intentions of interfering until frequent Khmer Rouge invasions forced the Vietnamese hand to take over Cambodia.

Selective violence was a tactic selected in East Timor by the Indonesians; there is little to no evidence the same was chosen in Cambodia (except in the Vietnamese border region). Control of territory seemed the most telling trait of when selective violence was used, much as Stathis Kalyvas predicted; but the threat of retaliation was so low in both cases it could not serve as a barrier against the easier choice of indiscriminate violence. In East Timor, the information and incentives were available for selective violence; in Cambodia, neither was present.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The information available to examine Cambodia and East Timor is spotty, scattered, and difficult to obtain in any format; yet what is available paints a staggering picture of

governments engaged in the worst type of behavior, yet fearing no consequences or retribution. Although it is difficult to discern, evidence suggests that selective violence was chosen in some instances in East Timor, lending credibility to Kalyvas's theories. In contrast, Pol Pot's regime did not overcome such information barriers during their extermination campaigns. The Cambodian people suffered greatly, but not necessarily because their neighbors or identification cards gave them away as traitors to the state; unfortunately, many died of starvation, overwork, or the crime of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. For Cambodia, the question why may never be answered.

A curious occurrence that arose during the search for information was the source of the information regarding denunciations or reasons for death: in Cambodia, most evidence came from survivors' first-hand accounts of what befell their friends and relatives in interviews given years after the killing fields. In East Timor, much of the data were gathered on the ground, during conflict, from Roman Catholic priests observing the violence (Commission 67). The Catholic Church made plea upon plea for the Catholic community in East Timor, which was substantial in the ethnically diverse island. The Pope made a visit during the ceasefire in 1987 to observe humanitarian conditions (Taylor 155). A further corollary to this study would possibly include an examination of the Roman Catholic Church's involvement in the East Timor war of independence, and the clout the Church carried in the international arena on Timor's behalf. With such a weighty organization involved, Indonesia may have felt more compelled to treat their citizens more carefully.

Selective violence as a phenomenon remains, even with a closer examination of the violence in East Timor, relatively under-researched compared to the magnitude of

indiscriminate violence, its legacy and scope. To better understand selective violence committed for strategic gain, an examination of the “disappearances” which occurred throughout Latin America in the Cold War era would provide clues into the nature of selective violence in a state without an active rebellion. For instance, Chile under Pinochet was responsible for the deaths and torture of thousands of its own citizens, for political or paranoid reasons. In this situation, the denunciations could reveal a pattern of violence the state pursued to obtain its goal of maintaining power. Although on a much smaller scale than East Timor or Cambodia, Chile’s deliberate removal of certain citizens from its society is a curious case that could shed light on mass violence in other areas of the world. Similar torture states, such as Argentina, employed similar tactics; if enough data are gathered on the dead and “disappeared” to compare with larger-scale atrocities, a solid study with many samples from around the world in a similar time period could greatly extend the understanding of violence in civil wars and outside of civil wars in the Cold War.

An empirical analysis of selective violence would require a great deal of patience to combine, and careful selection to ensure accuracy, but would reveal a wealth of information about what types of regimes and what conditions will produce selective violence as opposed to indiscriminate violence. If the scope of violence is understood, the better states or international organizations will be able to intervene or provide incentives to stop future violence. The more that is known, the better, especially of acts of atrocities; only when data is gathered and patterns emerge can solutions be dreamt of, and implemented. If there is a threshold for selective violence, more than case studies must be researched to prove a difference between selective and indiscriminate; only thorough

empirical analysis can demonstrate correlations, patterns and relationships to illuminate the differences between selective and indiscriminate violence.

The rationale behind mass murder, however compelling, will never negate the absolute horror of the worst crimes against humanity. No effort to study genocide will diminish the awful stain suffered by hundreds of millions, make it less poignant, or less urgent. On the contrary: only when a thorough understanding of mass death is achieved will mankind ever say, “never again”. Violence has a pattern, logical and clear, but the decisions to use and destroy with violence remain clouded. If violence is a choice, then it can be discarded too. This understanding is a hopeful sign that evil does not control the power in this world, but rather the minds of men. If men are capable of great atrocities we are capable of understanding, reconciliation, and benevolence: all man needs are the right incentives.

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