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THIRD-PARTY GUARANTORS AND CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENT:
ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING PEACE

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Abstract

Civil wars tend to be more violent, last longer, and are more difficult to resolve than interstate wars. During the settlement process, civil war opponents face a security dilemma. In order to integrate actors after a civil war, one or both sides must disarm. When an actor begins disarmament, however, any ability to defend themselves from their opponent taking advantage of their new weakness is lost. Therefore, this study argues that the participation of third-party security guarantors assisting in the negotiation process makes a successful settlement more likely. When a third-party promises security to an actor in the process of disarmament, both opponents are more likely to honor the terms of a signed treaty. This much is known from past work. However, that past work only analyses civil wars during the Cold War era (1945-1990). This is a big limitation not only because it excludes many more recent civil wars from analysis, but also because the Cold War competition between the West and Soviet worlds heavily influenced civil war dynamics. I extend a previously existing dataset to include the newest Correlates of War data, bringing analysis up to 2007. I quantitatively determine whether the relationship between third-party guarantors and the success of civil war settlements persists in more recent times. Furthermore, my study investigates whether there is a unique role for Africa as a region especially prone to civil wars and less likely to have strong foreign supporters willing to guarantee peace agreements.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	iii
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Literature Review.....	3
III. Theory.....	7
IV. Research Design.....	15
V. Quantitative Results and Analysis.....	24
VI. Conclusion.....	30
Bibliography.....	32

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I. Introduction

Civil wars tend to last longer than interstate wars and are more difficult to resolve. Most civil wars end in total military defeat and the complete extermination or expulsion of the losing side. “In fact, civil war combatants almost always chose to return to war unless a third party stepped in to enforce or verify a post-treaty transition. If a third party assisted with implementation, negotiations almost always succeeded, regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not, these talks almost always failed” (Walter, 2002: 3). Not only was this finding significant in Barbara Walter’s 2002 study, but it also persists in this updated study which extends the analysis another 15 years: the same dynamics of civil war settlement were found.

It is important for policymakers to recognize the contrasts between civil wars and interstate wars, because these wars must be resolved very differently. In an interstate war actors can retreat behind their own borders, separate their militaries, and return to their own national governments whether the actors actually trust each other. Without this convenience in civil wars, actors must find alternative ways to integrate land, militaries, and government institutions, as well as work out harder issues of trust that interstate war actors do not deal with in such a direct manner. Unfortunately, there is no “one size fits all” solution to conflict settlement, but this study looks to offer empirically tested ways to reach successful civil war settlements.

Because of deep, underlying trust issues of civil war opponents, the settlement process is often disrupted by unwillingness to agree to treaty terms, which frequently leads to a return to combat. Successful settlement can only be attained when an opponent believes they can disarm and demobilize without being attacked by their enemy during this period of weakness. In order to gain this sense of security, third parties must provide

security guarantees to the actor in the process of disarmament. Although the actor must initially increase its vulnerability and lose a significant portion of its power, an outside security guarantee allows opponents to continue implementation of the final stages of a treaty.

This study examines the reasons why so many civil wars fail to end in successful settlements and why third-party security guarantees are necessary for implementation of settlements. By extending Walter's original data set fifteen more years, a significant amount of civil wars after the Cold War era are newly examined, ultimately illustrating that the significance of security guarantees appear to be more important with time. Finally, my study inspects the apparent lack of third-party guarantors across Africa. In general African civil wars are less likely to have a third-party guarantor and even less likely to achieve a successful settlement than civil wars in other regions of the world. This lack of interest in achieving and maintaining peace in Africa is examined more thoroughly later in the study.

The findings of this study ultimately explain the conditions under which peaceful negotiations succeed, leading to successful settlements. It also explains the type of security guarantee a third party must provide during the implementation phase of a peace treaty, and illuminates the reasons why policies that otherwise work in most civil war settlements must be modified to better fit negotiation problems in African civil wars. It is up to policymakers, however, to determine whether the benefit of peace is worth the necessary costs of military capabilities and manpower in order to provide security guarantees.

II. Literature Review

My theory of civil war settlement and third-party guarantors relies largely on Barbara Walter's research in *Committing to Peace* (2002). Walter believes external guarantors play a crucial role in ending civil wars, and "negotiations fail because civil war adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms. Only when an outside enforcer steps in to guarantee the terms do commitments to disarm and share political power become believable. Only then does cooperation become possible" (Walter, 1997: 336). Because of this credible commitment problem, Walter argues that actors in a civil war will be unlikely to disarm on their own, as they then lose any power to protect themselves from their opponent taking advantage of their new weakness. "Any attempt to end a civil war and unify the country also eliminates any ability to enforce and ensure the peace" (Walter, 1997: 338). In order to establish trust and ensure a lasting peace, negotiators must provide military capabilities adequate to punish either side were they to violate the treaty. As Walter found, "In many cases negotiations followed the same timetable: the political and economic issues were settled first, followed by the security arrangements. These were usually the final and most difficult issues to work out" (Walter, 1997: 359).

By updating Walter's data to 2007 with the Correlates of War data set, I hope to find her first hypothesis still significant. Her first hypothesis states, "the more willing an outside power is to guarantee the safety of the adversaries during the critical implementation phase, the more likely domestic opponents are to reach and execute a final deal" (Walter, 1997: 341). Walter finds that civil war settlements that involve a third-party guarantor have always resulted in a successful settlement. While her data set

does not include civil wars in the post-Cold War period, I expect the significance of a third-party guarantor will not change. Extraneous factors that positively influenced the success of negotiations included longer-than-average wars and greater than median battle deaths per population. I hope to see the same support in the updated data set as well.

Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie examine the influence of third-party negotiators in “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management” (*American Journal of Political Science*, 2003). Hartzell and Hoddie suggest that, “third parties are called upon to ‘guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept’” (Hartzell, 2003: 322). They test two relevant hypotheses: “(H5) ...settlements that call for third-party enforcement are more likely to produce a durable peace than those that make no provision for enforcement by third-party actors” and “(H6) ...civil war settlements negotiated since the end of the Cold War are more likely to foster a durable peace than those negotiated during the Cold War” (Hartzell, 2003: 322). Like Walter, Hartzell and Hoddie believe successful negotiated settlements are also dependent on the type of issue, testing “(H7) ...negotiated settlements are more likely to foster an enduring peace when the issue at stake in the conflict is politico-economic rather than identity based” (Hartzell, 2003: 323).

Their results suggest their hypotheses are correct, finding “the presence of a third-party enforcer decreases the likelihood of settlement failure by 83%” (Hartzell, 2003: 327). Because Hartzell and Hoddie’s data set extends past the Cold War and through 1998, and many of their findings support Walter’s earlier claims, I can expect also to see these same results when the data set is extended to 2007. With a large portion of civil

wars occurring during the 1990s, I anticipate that my findings will reinforce Hartzell and Hoddie's.

In the study "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process" (*Journal of Peace Research*, 2008) Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce argue, "intervention by third parties is central to the civil war process, a process that is characterized by the duration of hostilities and the type of outcome" (Balch-Lindsay, et al. 2008: 345). Two important hypotheses the authors consider include, "H3: Balanced third-party intervention increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, while decreasing the likelihood of military victory by either combatant" and "H4: A balanced intervention decreases the likelihood of government military victory, opposition military victory, and negotiated settlement occurring" (Balch-Lindsay, et al. 2008: 350). While this intervention may positively affect the outcome of a civil war, it considers interventions during the civil war, unlike third-party guarantors who become involved only after opponents have begun the peace process and signal willingness to end the war.

The authors' results are not relevant to Walter's findings, therefore, as they find, "balanced intervention appears to encourage the 'lock-in' of a civil war and increase the risk of the conflict continuing" (Balch-Lindsay, et al. 2008: 359). In contrast to Balch-Lindsay et al.'s emphasis on military interventions during civil wars, Walter's research and my replication and extension focuses on the role of third parties during the peace process – those that intervene once a settlement process has been started by actors in the civil war. As is clear from Walter's and my results, post-war interference is much more pacifying than interventions during wars.

Focusing on conflicts with multiple actors in “Veto Players and Civil War Duration” (*American Journal of Political Science*, 2006), Cunningham argues, “conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult” (Cunningham, 2006: 875). Overall, Cunningham’s findings demonstrate that commitment approaches to civil war settlement were positive and significant. “In particular, Walter’s (2002) argument that international guarantees make resolving wars easier receives support. The coefficient on the international guarantee variable is large and positive, indicating that guarantees shorten wars substantially” (Cunningham, 2006: 889).

Based on the various studies pertaining to third-party negotiations in civil war settlement, a useful framework has been established for understanding the effect third-party negotiations have on successful settlements. More often than not, a significant and positive relationship is found between these two variables, and I expect to find the same results when studying the dataset I updated to include the latest COW wars from 1990 to 2007.

III. Theory

When opponents in a civil war decide to begin a settlement process, a crucial aspect of that successful peace process is disarmament. Although peace cannot be reached without one side putting down their arms, there is difficulty trusting the other opponent to refrain from taking advantage of the weakness of those laying down the arms. This creates a tension between opponents that interferes with successful peace talks. “Knowing they will enter a period of intense vulnerability, neither side can convince the other that they will nobly resist a treaty’s temptations or naively fulfill its terms. And so, unable to enforce the agreement or survive exploitation, they avoid cooperation and continue to fight” (Walter, 1997: 337).

Walter points out that settlement between states and within states is significantly different, and thus the success rate of interstate settlements cannot be compared to those of civil wars. States have many strategies which offer incentives for the opponents not to attack, including military defenses, external alliances, trade relationships, and economic coercion (Walter, 1997). In civil wars, however, these strategies are not available because both opponents are part of the same political entity. Actors in civil wars cannot maintain their own militaries or define their own borders when coexisting in one state. Demobilization of armies can cause even further problems. “Demobilized soldiers poorly integrated into the economy, and therefore disaffected, constitute a pool of potential recruits for a subsequent military challenge to the state” (Collier, 1994: 348). In the immediate post-civil war period opposing actors must integrate their militaries and share political power. This seemingly impossible task often leads to breakdowns in the settlement process, with little to no trust found between opponents. “Thus the single

most detrimental condition operating against cooperation is that civil war adversaries cannot maintain independent armed forces if they decide to reconcile” (Walter, 1997: 338).

This paradoxical dilemma, as explained by Walter, suggests, “Any attempt to end a civil war and unify the country also eliminates any ability to enforce and ensure the peace” (Walter, 1997: 338). In most instances this problem guarantees that no peace treaty will be signed, as concern for security and hypersensitivity to violations distracts from the peace process. Seen in China, “[t]he distrust of the leaders of both the Nationalist and Communist Parties for each other proved too deep-seated to permit final agreement, notwithstanding temporary truces and apparently promising negotiations” (Walter, 1997: 339). With this level of distrust actors choose to maintain their military capabilities in case of conflict renewal rather than disarm and risk being unable to defend themselves. In these situations continued fighting becomes an attractive alternative to settlement.

Previous approaches to successful civil war settlement have suggested implementing step-by-step processes on the path to disarmament. Actors could integrate their militaries one step at a time until an equal balance is obtained or agree to remain armed until government and security institutions are integrated. In a situation where one actor holds most of the political power and the other military power, this balance of strength could keep the settlement process peaceful (Walter, 1997). Walter argues, however, that step-by-step processes will ultimately fail if designed by the actors themselves. Actors find it difficult to convince their opponents to agree to any plan that involves disarming or could result in any type of attack, no matter the severity. Likewise,

actors are unable to credibly use institutions to project a promise of “effective protection or neutral enforcement during the transition” (Walter, 1997: 340). With a country newly transitioning to democracy, it takes a substantial amount of time to establish strong, neutral political institutions.

The process that will lead to a successful settlement, therefore, must engage a third-party guarantor. “Third parties can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept... they can ensure that the payoffs from cheating on a civil war agreement no longer exceed the payoffs from faithfully executing its terms” (Walter, 1997: 340). Based on Walter’s model, a guarantee must fulfill three conditions in order to be considered successful. The outside state acting as a guarantor must have a self-interest in establishing peace, whether that be “old colonial ties, strategic interests, economic investments, or alliance loyalties” (Walter, 1997: 340). The guarantor must also be willing to use their military capabilities to promote peace and punish those that violate the treaty. The fact that the guarantor must have military strength outweighing both actors is illustrated in many instances, such as Syria in Lebanon, Britain in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia in Sudan, or the United States in Dominican Republic. Finally, the guarantor must be capable of signaling resolve. Forcing states to reveal their true preferences, as well as enhancing the credibility of their promises, only helps lead all sides to a successful settlement (Walter, 1997).

Based on this credible commitment theory, suggesting that both actors must have strong incentives for trusting each other, the first hypothesis becomes clear: (H1) the more willing a third-party guarantor is to use military power to ensure the peace, the more likely civil war opponents are to reach a successful settlement that maintains the

peace. Without a neutral third-party guarantor, actors in a civil war have little reason to trust each other. The more military force with which a guarantor is willing to back their authority, the greater the incentives for actors to reach agreements and abide by treaty terms.

In her analysis Walter controls for variables representing various other theories of civil war settlement. She presents two competing schools of thought, illustrating significant differences between interstate wars and civil wars, and controls for additional reasons that civil wars may be settled. Unlike interstate wars, civil wars tend to last longer and have a greater risk of restarting after initial attempts at peace. The rationalist school believes “negotiated settlements are so rare because the benefits of winning a civil war are so much greater. A decisive win would not only give the victor full control of the state, it would also permanently eliminate a rival for limited resources. Decisive victory, therefore, offers both immediate and long-term returns for which adversaries are willing to incur far greater costs” (Walter, 1997: 342). This leads us to the first control variable, cost of war. As the costs of winning a civil war increases; opponents are more likely to reach successful settlements. Civil wars in general are extremely costly, and as the duration of the conflict increases and the number of casualties rises, actors will find it more favorable to participate in negotiations and abide by their terms.

When a decisive victory cannot be achieved, opponents must rely on power-sharing institutions to achieve a lasting peace. This ultimately helps aid in the highly fragile negotiation process as “developing wide-ranging power-sharing institutions effectively addresses security concerns associated with post-civil war conditions and assures contending groups that they are in a position to influence decision-making

processes in the future” (Hartzell, 2003: 319). This argument is supported by Walter, stating, “the better able the factions are at preventing the full concentration of political, military, and territorial power into the hands of a single administration, the more enforceable and credible promises to share power will be” (Walter, 2002: 31). This leads to the control variable power-sharing pacts, because signing and implementing settlements are more likely when it includes a power-sharing pact for the first post-war government.

Mediation is also argued to be an important tool in successful negotiations. “It was found that a mediator intervenes because of its interest in the conflict or in obtaining an outcome, and it can play three roles-communicator, formulator, manipulator-in accomplishing its objectives” (Introduction, Zartman, 27). With this influence over the outcome of a conflict, it is critical that mediators be knowledgeable and qualified. Therefore, successful settlements are more likely when the mediator is more skilled and experienced. Finally, because the ideational school views civil wars as emotional and valued-laden conflicts, I control for civil wars fought over issues related to the identity of the actors, as these wars are expected to be more difficult to resolve than those fought over strictly political and economic reasons.

Walter examines civil wars exclusively from 1940 to 1992, thus excluding the majority of conflicts occurring in the post-Cold War time period. “Until the end of the Cold War became manifest, the prevailing tendency was to see regional conflicts as actual or potential extensions of the Cold War strategic rivalries of the superpowers, their proxy confrontation in developing countries, and their transfer of weaponry and war technologies to those countries” (Introduction, Zartman, 27). Many states were victims

of this type of warfare, especially across Africa where weak states had little other choice. As relatively poor countries, they needed the superpowers' support and financial aid to protect them. After the end of the Cold War, however, there was a sharp rise in civil wars during the 1990s, indicating the absence of financial and military support by large superpowers does not affect opponents' willingness to engage in conflict. In that regard the settlement of civil wars is still highly crucial, and third-party guarantors are still actively involved. The role of the United States and Russia during the Cold War focused primarily on initiation and duration of conflict, therefore (H2) the likelihood of successful settlements by an outside power guarantor is no different in the post-Cold War era than in the period between 1940 and 1990.

Throughout history Africa has received considerably less attention than other parts of the world. There are many arguments about why this may be, but often it comes down to a lack of relevance by economic power. After centuries of being taken advantage of, first with the slave trade and second with the colonial era, African states find themselves at a considerable disadvantage compared to the rest of the world. "Africa contains the largest number of the least-developed and poorest countries in the world; at the same time it is the arena for some of the world's worst conflicts (Preface, Obasanjo, xiv). With decades of instability it has been difficult for African states to establish strong political and economic institutions. Because of this irrelevance, data are often less available, and when available, are often of much poorer quality. Finally, data often are available only for legally-recognized states, more uncommon in Africa than anywhere else, so information could be missing for a large portion of important actors

working outside established states (Lemke, 2003). Lemke finds that “there is evidence that data quality varies directly with the wealth of the country the data describe” (Lemke, 2003: 121). This lack of data will therefore lead to difficulties when trying to negotiate successful settlements, as third-party guarantors must make decisions with a lack of quality information. Without quality information, there is less incentive for third-party guarantors to help in civil war negotiations because of the high probability that they will fail. Therefore, (H3) outside power guarantors will be less likely to participate in the settlement process of civil wars in Africa.

As previously mentioned, “international relations research is challenged by the fact that in Africa official states are not the only important actors” (Lemke, 2003: 129). This complexity makes it difficult to enforce the terms of a treaty on actors that are not held responsible to a state or its judicial process. An important component of modern day Africa, “insurgency movements may be characterized as the most significant new actors in West Africa’s diplomacy since colonialism” (Lemke, 2003: 130). Not only do unofficial actors complicate the conflict, but the involvement of neighboring states also plays a role. “Internally based insurgencies frequently build ties with neighboring states to gain access to safe havens and military resources, thereby adding an interstate dimension to a conflict that originated in local grievances. The complex interweaving of conflicts in a region may have important policy consequences” (Introduction, Zartman, 7). This makes successful settlements increasingly more difficult for third-party guarantors, leading to the argument: (H4) settlements involving an outside power guarantor in African civil wars are less likely to be successful than in other regions of the

world. This hypothesis is supported by the large volume of civil wars that have occurred in Africa during the post-World War II period.

By replicating Walter's data set with the addition of post-Cold War civil wars up until 2007, I will see if the same variables are still significant and have the same effect on the settlement of civil wars with third-party guarantors. Adding in the anomaly of African civil wars as a variable for additional consideration, I hope to show that successful settlements are more difficult in this under-researched and under-thought of continent.

IV. Research Design

Cases

I use every COW civil war between 1940 and 2007 to test the competing hypotheses. This span of time produced a large enough data set to allow for multivariate regression analysis. By beginning in 1940 and extending until 2007, I allow for civil wars that occur before and after the Cold War. Walter's original study included the pre-Cold War civil wars, but only extended to 1992, a mere two years past the end of the Cold War (Walter, 2002). Thus, my new data set will permit a much better test of the effect of the Cold War's end on civil war settlements.

The list of cases was chosen based on the coding criteria of the Correlates of War (COW) project. To be included in the data set, a conflict had to (1) occur within a generally recognized boundary, (2) generate at least one thousand battle deaths per year, (3) involve the national government as a principal agent, and (4) experience effective resistance from both the rebels and the government. There were 105 conflicts that met these criteria for the time frame of my study.

Critics of the COW data set argue that the coding criteria are far too broad and therefore include many small-scale conflicts that should not receive distinction as a civil war (Pillar 1983; Stedman 1991; Licklider 1993). In Walter's (2002) study, she controls for this criticism by constructing two case lists for testing, "one generated by COW's broad definition of civil war, and one that excluded questionable or borderline cases" (Walter, 2002: 49). The excluded cases included ones in which fewer than fifteen hundred total deaths occurred or were restricted to a very small percentage of the population. "The competing hypotheses were then tested against both lists. Since no significant differences were found, the broader list of cases was used in all subsequent

analysis” (Walter, 2002: 49). Because Walter found the broader COW list to be substantively the same as the allegedly more valid list, I also included all civil wars as coded by COW up until 2007.

Also like Walter, I do not drop the death threshold below 1000 deaths per year, as some critics may suggest be done, in order to maintain consistency across studies. I intend to stay as consistent with Walter’s measurements as possible, so that I can fairly retest her original hypotheses with updated information. In that regard Walter slightly modifies the list of civil wars provided by the Correlates of War data set, which I keep unchanged. According to COW coding criteria, a civil war is terminated once the number of deaths per year falls below one thousand in a twelve-month period. If fighting resumes in the thirteenth month, then a new civil war is coded. Walter, however, does not continue coding “in order to avoid biasing the data with multiple observations of long-standing stop-and-go wars. Instead, the Civil War Resolution Data Set records recurrent civil wars (such as the war in Laos) as a single, continuous case” (Walter, 2002: 50). For reference purposes these combined wars are noted by their multiple COW number designations in my data set. Additionally, Walter has coded some civil wars that no longer appear in the recently revised and updated COW data set. I have left these cases in my study, as Walter’s outcomes were produced including them. In terms of referencing, they were given a ‘0’ instead of the designated COW number in the dataset I use.

Coding the Variables

Dependent variables

A single categorical variable was created to measure the dependent variable for hypotheses one, two, and four. This variable “Peace Process” includes four possible ways civil wars are peacefully resolved, which were then coded based on the farthest stage negotiations reached. The four possible ways to reach a peaceful solution included no negotiations, a formal attempt to negotiate, a signed bargain, and a successfully implemented settlement. This was coded in the following manner:

- 0 No Negotiation
- 1 Active Negotiations
- 2 Signed Bargain
- 3 Successful Implementation

Whether negotiations occurred were based on three criteria as proposed by Walter: “(1) the leaders or representatives of each of the main fighting factions met in face-to-face talks, (2) these individuals were willing to discuss both a cease-fire *and* a political solution to the war, and (3) their respective factions had the capabilities to continue the war if talks broke down” (Walter, 2002: 51). An outcome was deemed a “Signed Bargain” if an agreed upon plan included both political and military solutions, and if the agreement included more than simple terms for a cease-fire. For the wars I added to Walter’s original dataset, data about agreements were found in the Uppsala Conflict Database. Finally, an outcome was coded as a successful implementation when the signed bargain ended violence for at least five years and combatants made honest efforts to execute the terms of the agreement. An “honest effort” was considered to be any settlement where one part of the political agreement was installed and at least partial demobilization occurred (Walter, 2002). When analyzing this dependent variable, I

recode it such that “successful settlements” equal one, and all other outcomes equal zero. In this way I am studying not how large negotiations were, but rather whether the process ended with a successful settlement.

For my third hypothesis (H3: outside power guarantors will be less likely to participate in the settlement process of civil wars in Africa), the dependent variable is the presence of a third-party guarantor, coded dichotomously (and described in the next section).

Independent Variables

For the first, second and fourth hypotheses the presence of a third-party guarantor is the independent variable. “Third-party security guarantees were defined as any implicit or explicit promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries during the treaty implementation period” (Walter, 1997: 345). This was usually given in the form of a written agreement, but did not always need to be. Again, the presence of third-party guarantors is coded dichotomously.

If a third party was present in a civil war settlement process, then the amount of military force they were willing to provide was also measured. It is expected that when a third-party guarantor promises more security, it will positively affect the likelihood of a successful settlement. The strength of a guarantor’s promise is measured as a categorical variable focused on the size of the verification or enforcement force:

- 0 No security guarantee
- 1 Promise to protect but mandate and force not defined
- 2 Willingness to deploy a small verification mission of under 500 observers
- 3 Willingness to send a large verification mission of at least 500 observers
- 4 Willingness to send a small peacekeeping force of under 5,000 armed soldiers
- 5 Willingness to send a large peacekeeping force of at least 5,000 armed soldiers

In order to code civil wars that occur before and after the Cold War, I coded civil wars as occurring during the Cold War if they began after 1945 and ended by 1989. The end date was chosen based on the official acknowledgement of the Malta Summit as the end of the Cold War. Because the Malta Summit took place in December of 1989, any civil war beginning in or before 1989 is considered to have occurred during the Cold War.

Civil wars occurring in Africa were coded simply as a dummy variable in the following manner:

- 0 Non-African state
- 1 African state

This allows me to illustrate clearly whether third parties are less likely to help in the settlement process when civil wars occur in Africa, or if there is a different underlying pattern.

Control Variables

In my attempt to examine the significance of third-party guarantors on the successful settlement of civil wars, I control for varying hypotheses as to why civil war settlements may be successful. I use many of the same control variables Walter (2002) uses in order to effectively replicate her study. The cost of war was measured using two indicators: the duration of war (measured in months), and the magnitude of war (measured in battle deaths per one thousand population). “These indicators were seen as good yardsticks since domestic factions adjust their estimates on the likely costs of war as

they obtain new information on the progress of battle” (Walter, 1997: 347). Data for these indicators were obtained from the Correlates of War data set through 2007.

When the domestic stakes over which opponents fight are easily divisible, the more likely both parties are to negotiate a settlement. I measured divisibility of domestic stakes in two ways: “(1) whether the stated goals of the rebels at the beginning of the war were limited or total, (2) whether the rebels were interested in obtaining territorial control or political control” (Walter, 2002: 59). Limited goals meant that rebels wanted to obtain anything less than total control of the government. Therefore, goals were coded in the following manner:

- 0 Nontotal Goals
- 1 Total Goals

If the stated goals of the rebels included seceding from the original territory or demanding territorial autonomy, the war was coded as a territorial war. All civil wars were coded in the following manner:

- 0 Nonterritorial Goals
- 1 Territorial Goals

Like Walter, I expect the presence of power-sharing institutions makes successful settlement more likely, as former opponents can both hold positions of power in the post-war government. The promise of power-sharing pacts in the settlement process, therefore, positively influences the likelihood of a successful settlement. There are three types of power-sharing institutions that were measured, including political, military, and territorial pacts. “If a settlement offered the combatants guaranteed positions in the new government at the level of cabinet or above, or a specific quota of power in at least one of

the main branches of government, that case was coded as having a ‘Political Pact’”

(Walter, 2002: 62-63). Political pacts were coded in the following manner:

- 0 No Political Pact
- 1 Political Pact

The promise of a military pact was based on whether rebels were guaranteed representation (usually as a quota stipulation) in the new state military. Therefore, military pacts were coded in the following manner:

- 0 No Military Pact
- 1 Military Pact

Finally, a settlement was considered to have a territorial power-sharing pact if it included some form of regional autonomy. Territorial pacts were coded in the following manner:

- 0 No Territorial Pact
- 1 Territorial Pact

Because the skill and experience of a mediator is extremely difficult to measure, for the sake of the study, mediation is measured as a dummy variable indicating simply whether a mediator was present. Mediation was coded in the following manner:

- 0 No Mediator
- 1 Mediator

Issues of identity are extremely difficult to settle in civil wars because opponents are less likely to compromise on these issues than on political or economic issues.

Ethnicity and religion are believed to be the most significant issues making it difficult to settle civil wars peacefully. “To test the effect of identity on the success or failure of negotiations, wars were classified based on whether a clear ethnic division existed

between the combatants” (Walter, 2002: 59). Consequently, wars were coded in the following manner:

- 0 Nonethnic Conflict
- 1 Ethnic Conflict

Similarly, wars were coded based on whether a clear religious division existed between combatants. Thus, wars were coded in the following manner:

- 0 Nonreligious Conflict
- 1 Religious Conflict

A measure of regime type was based on an overall democracy-autocracy scale commonly used in civil war literature. It assigns two scores (0-10) to every country: one based on a government’s autocratic features and one based on its democratic features. The incumbent government’s autocracy score is then subtracted from its democracy score to produce a net democracy number that ranges in value from very autocratic (-10) to very democratic (+10). These data were drawn from Polity IV.

“A second measure of democracy was used to isolate the effect of executive constraints on a leader’s decision to negotiate or fight” (Walter, 2002: 58). Coding the executive constraint variable was contingent on the degree of operational independence the chief executive of a country enjoyed during a civil war and was also taken from the Polity IV Data Set:

- 1 Unlimited Authority
- 2 Intermediate category
- 3 Slight to Moderate Limitations
- 4 Intermediate category
- 5 Substantial Limitations
- 6 Intermediate category
- 7 Executive Parity or Subordination

A leader was considered to have “Unlimited Authority” if they could easily ignore the Constitution and decisions made by the legislature, or if the legislature could be dismissed without reason. On the other end of the spectrum, a leader had “Executive Parity or Subordination” if they had equal or less authority over decisions than a subgroup or the legislature in the country (Walter, 2002).

Statistical technique

I use logistic regression models to analyze the multiple variables that affect civil war settlement processes, which allows me to explain statistically the significance of the peace process. This regression technique is appropriate when the dependent variable is categorical and can only take on values of zero and one. It estimates the influence of the independent variables on the probability the dependent variable will have a value of 1. Not only is logistic regression appropriate to my analysis because of the nature of my data, but also because it is the same technique used in the original studies (Walter, 1997, 2002).

V. Quantitative Results and Analyses

The quantitative analyses confirm that the presence of a third-party security guarantee significantly increases the likelihood that a civil war will end in a successful settlement. As table 1.1 illustrates, the positive relationship between the strength of a guarantee and the likelihood of a peaceful settlement is positive and significant. When the coefficient is at least twice the size of the standard error, this means the coefficient is significant at $p < 0.05\%$. This is true for all coefficients discussed below. This finding is important, as it reinforces Walter’s main argument that “third-party guarantees to protect combatants as they demobilize and power-sharing guarantees in the first postwar government ultimately determine whether groups will sign and implement settlements” (Walter, 2002: 19). With a larger data set over a longer period of time these findings still hold true.

Table 1.1 *Influence of security guarantees on peaceful settlements*

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Strength of guarantee	.56	.14
Constant	-2.45	
Pseudo R ²	.17	
X ²	15.53	

Note: N=104.

The strength of the relationship between presence of a third-party guarantee and successful settlement was next assessed controlling for various factors that could cause successful settlement to be more likely. As Walter (2002) predicted, the presence of power-sharing pacts in the first postwar government was found to be both positive and significant, as shown in table 1.2. Other factors, such as ethnic and religious division, show a negative relationship with peaceful settlement. While these findings were

predicted, they are not significant. The same case was found for the presence of a mediator. Although a mediator positively influenced the likelihood of successful settlement, the finding was not significant. The duration of a war was also found to be positive, and while it was also not significant, it was very close at $p = 0.13$. With the addition of several more civil wars, Walter's findings remain supported as the size and significance of the coefficient for strength of guarantee is nearly unchanged.

Table 1.2 *Factors affecting successful civil war settlements*

<i>Dependent Variables</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Strength of guarantee	.42	.18
Total goals	-.72	1.91
Territorial goals	-.47	2.07
Ethnic division	-.88	.78
Religious division	-.29	.77
Duration of war	.006	.004
War-related deaths	-.0006	.002
Power-sharing pacts	2.04	.90
Mediation	.17	.94
Constant	-2.83	
Pseudo R ²	.33	
X ²	29.35	

Note: N=102.

The Influence of the Cold War Era

My findings indicate that third-party guarantors were significantly more likely to be present in civil wars after the Cold War. Table 2 simply shows that 44% of the civil wars that end after the Cold War had third-party guarantors (23 of 52), but only 8% of the civil wars during the Cold War had third-party guarantors (4 of 50). This contradicts hypothesis two, which anticipates that the likelihood of a third-party guarantor being present is no different before or after the Cold War than it is during the Cold War. The

increased presence of third-party guarantors in the non-Cold War era, however, can possibly be explained by the nature of the Cold War itself. While many civil wars during the Cold War were fought as proxy wars between the great superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, outside guarantors were unlikely to embroil themselves in a conflict already involving these powers. The end of the Cold War also meant a significant decrease in the involvement of both the United State and the Soviet Union, therefore giving other states a better chance of successful settlement if they were to act as a third-party guarantor in a civil war. Ultimately, these results show that Walter’s original argument about the importance of third-party guarantors is becoming all the more relevant over time.

Table 2. *Influence of the Cold War on third party guarantees*

<i>Type of guarantee</i>	<i>Non-Cold War</i>	<i>Cold War</i>	<i>Row total</i>
No guarantee	29	46	75
Guarantee	23	4	27
Column total	52	50	102

Security Guarantees in African Civil Wars

As the results show in table 3.1, the strength of a third-party guarantee is not related to the probability of successful settlement in African civil wars. This suggests that if a third-party guarantor is present in an African civil war, a successful settlement is no more likely than if there were no third-party guarantor.

Table 3.1 *Influence of security guarantees on peaceful settlement in African civil wars*

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Strength of guarantee	.22	.28
Constant	-2.73	
Pseudo R ²	.03	
X ²	0.58	

Note: N=36.

Table 3.2 shows the same results as table 3.1 but controls for other characteristics of civil wars that could affect the likelihood of a successful settlement. None of the control variables are significant, thus further illustrating the lack of relationship between successful settlement in African civil wars and the strength of third-party guarantees.

Table 3.2 *Factors affecting successful settlements in African civil wars*

<i>Dependent Variables</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Strength of guarantee	.38	.36
Ethnic division	1.32	1.91
Religious division	.49	1.50
Duration of war	.015	.01
War-related deaths	.001	.003
Constant	-5.37	
Pseudo R ²	.18	
X ²	3.74	

Note: N=36.

Although the strength of a security guarantee makes successful settlements more likely, table 4 shows that African civil wars are less likely to experience successful settlement than are civil wars elsewhere, because the sign on the African civil war variable's coefficient is both negative and statistically significant.

Table 4. *Relationship between security guarantees and African civil wars*

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Strength of guarantee	.68	.17
African civil war	-1.74	.83
Constant	-2.19	
Pseudo R ²	.24	
X ²	21.05	

Note: N=104.

Finally, table 5 provides evidence suggesting a negative relationship between African civil wars and the presence of a third-party guarantor, although this finding was not significant. While many African civil wars involved third parties, the third parties were often other African states, the African Union, or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) rather than world superpowers, as found on the Uppsala Conflict Database. The identity of the third party guarantor is important, because the logic of my hypothesis is that external actors care less about Africa than about the rest of the world. There is nothing to suggest, however, that an African state would be unconcerned about African civil wars. Therefore, the dependent variable here takes on a value of one when a non-African third-party guarantor is present in an African civil war, or when any third-party guarantor is present in a non-African civil war. Strong statements about external states' disregard for Africa are not really possible with these results, because there is simply not enough variance to provide a significant explanation for the presence of third parties in African civil wars. I find no significant predictors with this version of the dependent variable.

Table 5 *Relationship between African civil wars and the presence of a Third Party Guarantor*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
African civil war	-.24	.51
Constant	-1.18	.29
Pseudo R ²	.002	
X ²	.23	

Note: N=104.

My hypothesis reflecting Walter’s original study was not only found to be true, but also continues to be strongly significant. While the end of the Cold War was not anticipated to change the likelihood of the presence of a third party guarantor, the results illustrated a significant increase in the presence of guarantees after the end of the Cold War. The anomaly of African civil wars and their lack of security guarantees were also supported, suggesting that, unlike in the rest of the world, the strength of a third-party guarantee does not increase the likelihood of successful settlements in African civil wars. Some restraint must be expressed about this last claim, however, as it depends on insignificant results which could be due to a lack of variation (shown by how much smaller the sample size is in Table 3.1), rather than to something fundamentally different in Africa.

VI. Conclusion

The presence of a third-party security guarantee is crucial in the process of civil war settlement. Over the past seven decades, civil wars were significantly more likely to reach successful settlements and maintain peace when a third-party guarantor was involved. This security guarantee allowed opponents in a civil war to disarm and demobilize without the fear of being attacked during this period of extreme weakness. Because trust is a considerable aspect of civil wars – as actors cannot retreat behind their own borders, keep their own army or rule their own government like in interstate wars – the presence of a third-party guarantor allows both actors to successfully implement the terms of a treaty. Most civil wars in the negotiation process often resume fighting because of the inability to effectively implement the terms of a treaty, therefore making it impossible to reach a peaceful solution that lasts a significant amount of time.

The end of the Cold War brought about many changes in the dynamics of civil war settlement. There was a sharp increase in the presence of third-party guarantors after 1989, suggesting that the presence of the United States and the Soviet Union in proxy wars during the Cold War discouraged external states from involving themselves in the civil war settlement process. However, civil wars in Africa, regardless of the year, are less likely to achieve successful settlements. External actors seem to have less interest in providing security guarantees for African civil wars, and often times the guarantee comes from another African state or African organization.

While my findings suggest external actors are not interested in providing security guarantees to African civil wars, there are many other factors that could make the

settlement of civil wars in Africa more difficult or dissuade third parties from becoming involved. In future studies factors such as level of development or the fractionalization of ethnic groups in African states should be controlled for. This would allow for a stronger argument as to why exactly African civil wars seem so less likely to achieve and maintain peace. Although I updated the original data set by fifteen years and added a substantial amount of civil wars, only with the continued research of civil wars will this study maintain significance and relevance in real-world civil war settlement processes. A stronger argument on the unique role of African civil wars could also be aided by the simple accumulation of more civil wars over time.

Through the successful replication of this study and its extension of past work, increased knowledge of effective civil war settlement may enable better decisions to be made on the part of governments and policymakers in order to successfully end civil wars. Civil wars with large security guarantees have been shown to increase the likelihood of peaceful settlements, a significant piece of evidence policymakers must taken into consideration when addressing the necessary measures to be taken in a civil war. While the use of military capabilities in an outside conflict is often avoided, the important effect these guarantees could have on achieving peace in civil wars around the world may be a crucial reason governments decide to absorb larger costs.

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Education

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Majors: International Politics, German

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Work Experience

Research and Policy Intern, Bridging Nations, Inc.

June 2011 – August 2011

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Supervisor: Ian Hamilton

Responsibilities:

- Responsible for establishing and growing an online forum of foreign policy related material
- Formulated innovative options to allow users better access to international policy topics
- Provided information for graduate courses related to policy for organization's online coursework

Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University

August 2010 – December 2010

University Park, PA

Program: Militarized Interstate Disputes

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Responsibilities:

- Conducted research on African conflicts occurring in 2003 in order to categorize and interpret data
- Participated at the data-development level as the first University to have students perform MID research

Residential Assistant, Pennsylvania State University

June 2010 – December 2010

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Responsibilities:

- Planned and coordinated educational, social justice, and diversity programs to promote a safe and positive living environment for students
- Mediated conflicts to establish a strong sense of community in the residence halls
- Provided campus resources to help students become more involved with the University

Grants Received

- Paterno Fellows Summer 2011 Internship Grant
- Department of Political Science Summer 2011 Internship Grant

Leadership and Honors

- Deans List, 5 semesters
- Vice President, Political Science Association, Fall 2010
- Treasurer, Political Science Association, Spring 2010

Community Service Involvement

- Peer Advisor, University Office of Global Programs, Fall 2011 and Spring 2012
- Operations Team Member, THON 2010
- 5K Volunteer, Special Olympics of Pennsylvania, Spring 2010
- Election Judge, 2008 Illinois Primary

International Education

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