WAR GUILT AND JAPANESE APOLOGY CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

Through a comparative study of Japan and Germany I will explain the political and historical factors that contributed to divergent modern day reputations related to the apologetic actions of both states. While the wartime atrocities committed by Japanese and Germans vary greatly in their scale, these two examples will be compared in order to explore the use of apology as a diplomatic tool for reestablishing and improving diplomatic relations. This analysis juxtaposes the postwar apologetic addresses given by official government leaders of each state and the Emperor of Japan, in order to highlight not only the historical truth, but as to uncover the way in which each state sought to atone for war guilt. The juxtaposition will shed light on the effects of apologetic addresses on a nation’s potential acceptance or denial of atrocities.

This paper focuses on the post-war period and the efforts made in both Japan and Germany since the war to remedy the past, and the extent to which it was seen as necessary to do so. This will involve a chronological study of reparations and public speeches year by year following the conclusion of World War II. This study will reveal a correlation between the timing of the apologetic addresses since the date of the war and its perceived legitimacy. Rhetoric and speaker will be analyzed, as they are important factors in the perceived sincerity of a diplomatic address. I will find a critical period in which apology is deemed to be no longer effective or acceptable by both the offender and victim. Further focus will be given to so-called radicals within each nation as to show the interaction of official apologetic addresses and expressions of denial.

Apologies and remorseful addresses are analyzed based upon rhetoric, context (time, speaker and place) and perceived level of self-contradiction, as well as their reception by a domestic and international audience. While there are individuals in both Japan and Germany who deny wartime atrocities, the Japanese addresses differ significantly with those of the Germans in the aforementioned criteria. I will counter the notion that Japan has not substantially apologized for wartime atrocities and explain why and how an international notion of their insincerity persists. Conclusions are then drawn based upon the similarities and differences of each apologetic address. This thesis concludes with generalizations regarding the effectiveness of international and domestic apologetic addresses throughout time and compares conclusions from the German and Japanese cases with those of other foreign nations urged by the international community to atone, through public addresses, for past war guilt.
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War Guilt and Japanese Apology Culture

In what has become an annual ritual surrounding the anniversary of Japan’s World War II surrender, media outlets around the world speculate about whether Japanese government leaders will worship at Yasukuni Shrine. This international attention is due to the fact that more than 2.5 million war dead, including Class-A war criminals, are enshrined there. Therefore, for many in the international community, especially those who suffered under Japanese aggression during the war, official yearly visits to the shrine have become a powerful symbol of Japanese failure to take responsibility for its wartime past. What impact has activity such as Yasukuni shrine visits had upon Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors? Japanese apologetic addresses, actions that attempt to counter notions of irresponsibility, shed light upon an answer to the question of the effect of Yasukuni.

Leading up to the 2010 address by Prime Minister Naoto Kan to the South Korean people, which commemorated the 65th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and offered apologetic remarks, there was much international speculation regarding the possibility of Kan’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine. Kan did not visit Yasukuni that year, shunning a visit in order to improve relations. However, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, over forty Japanese legislators and LDP party leader Sadakazu Tanigaki paid respects at Yasukuni days after Kan’s apology to South Korea. An article published in the South Korean newspaper Chosum Ilbo days before the visit, highlighted the detrimental effect of unclear Japanese policy upon the international community. The article states, “Noda has a far-right and militaristic view of history. He says there are no war criminals in Japan in the first place. It is very likely he will pay a visit to worship at Yasukuni Shrine.” Although Noda, then Finance Minister and member of Kan’s cabinet, did not visit the Shrine, the very possibility of Noda’s visit and Kan’s created international tension and accusations of Japanese insincerity. Given that Japan has apologized, why do their official government apologies consistently fall upon deaf ears in the popular view? The inconsistency amongst Japanese government officials to establish a unity of policy, e.g. by banning visitation outright, constantly creates an international reaction of doubt about the sincerity of Japanese apologetic statements. The actions of Japan during World War II included atrocities such as the Nanking Massacre and the use of “comfort women” for sexual slavery. An international audience considers the extent to which Japan has addressed these issues in the postwar period through apologetic statements insufficient. How then can Japan restore its name, separate itself from past misdeeds, define itself as new, and convey sincerity? The Yasukuni Shrine is one aspect of this complicated question, yet the controversial international reaction surrounding the Shrine reveals that denial, neglect and inconsistency are not viable options for Japan. What Japanese government officials address through statements must also be grounded in action.

On August 10th, 2010 Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan gave a statement of apology from Tokyo to the South Korean government and people. The address included the sentence “I

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would like to express once again our deep remorse and heartfelt apology."³ While the South Korean government explicitly stated that they “paid attention” to the apology, the reaction of South Korean citizens did not however, represent an attitude of forgiveness. The reaction from the group “Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan,” stated, “The Japanese government once again came out with more lip service.”³ Within days after the issuance of the address, not only did various groups within South Korea find fault with the Japanese apology, but citizens of China also perceived ulterior motives. “I can't figure out why Naoto Kan wouldn't apologize to China,” stated a blogger. “Japan's apology is designed to enhance the US-Japan-ROK alliance. It is even possible that the US urged Japan to make the apology,” stated another reader.”⁴

There remains a large discrepancy between general public opinion in both China and Korea and the official opinion of each nation’s respective government leaders. National leaders are largely responsible for the face of the country and have an unstated responsibility to present a positive image and show public appreciation toward a nation that takes diplomatic strides toward closer relations, no matter how small. In a statement following the 2010 address, South Korean government spokeswoman Kim Hee-jung stated, “We appreciate it that the apology focused on the Republic of Korea. We believe that the latest statement is a major step forward.”² The responsibility of leaders to present a positive image naturally softens public statements on behalf of the South Korean government, fostering a more generous approach, which leaves the citizens of both Korea and China as the most accurate gauge of public opinion. The public within China and Korea remains to be convinced and regardless of statements made on behalf of the Korean government, the public is the true marker of the effectiveness of conveyed Japanese sincerity. Choi Woon-do, a researcher at the Northeast Asian History Foundation commented, “Japan's apology was more sincere than before. But it's not yet at the level we can wholeheartedly embrace […].”⁵ Given that there have been numerous apologies given in a number of different ways by various figures within the Japanese government, how can we explain the persisting notion of Japanese insincerity amongst an international audience, specifically China and Korea?

Protests within Japan by Japanese that erupted in response to the issuance of an apologetic statement to the Korean government represent a hard-line segment of the population that is either completely unremorseful or places more value on Japan’s national pride than its international reputation. Right-wing criticism within the Japanese government was scathing and did little to reinforce the credibility of Japanese remorse. “Tabloid newspapers blasted the apology as “treasonous diplomacy,” while right-wing groups loudly protested in front of the prime minister’s residence in central Tokyo.”⁶ The public nature of the demonstrations showed the continually fractured nature of the domestic political climate within Japan. While the demonstrations were damaging, most if not all countries have radical political factions within

⁶ Fackler, “Japan Apologizes.”
them, including Germany (ex: neo-Nazi and skinhead organizations), which can unintentionally damage the perceived sincerity of a nation on an international level. Why then do neo-Nazi organizations garner little, if any, real credibility in Germany while right-wing groups within Japan that actively deny atrocities, such as the Nanking Massacre, hold importance in today’s Japan?

Jennifer Lind, in an article titled “The Perils of Apology,” argues that Japan must avoid making formal apologies due to the right-wing nationalist backlash that has resulted time after time. Lind argues that this backlash is the leading cause of the internationally perceived insincerity of Japanese apologetic addresses and overall remorse. In response to the right wing protests following the 2010 speech of Kan, Liu Jiangyong a Chinese professor of Japanese politics at Tsinghua University in Beijing referenced the apologetic address of former Prime Minister Koizumi, “This creates a credibility problem of Japan’s apology. Koizumi [apology] lacked sincerity. Some people in Japan oppose the apology. Different Japanese leaders have different historical views.”

Lind’s argument, that Japanese nationalistic backlash is inevitable therefore more apologetic addresses are detrimental toward perceived Japanese sincerity, is countered in an editorial reaction that appeared in the 2009 May/June issue of the publication “Foreign Affairs.” “To say that Japan should not apologize to the victims of its wartime atrocities to avoid a domestic nationalist backlash is akin to arguing that the police should not crack down on domestic violence because doing so might anger the abusers.”

Lind’s argument is indeed grounded in simple fact. Nationalist backlash within Japan does nothing to aid perceived sincerity amongst the citizens of the Asian region and more specifically those of China and Korea. Yet it would be faulty to assume that the reduction of nationalist backlash would eliminate perceived insincerity and that nationalist backlash stems only from a counter reaction by Japanese citizens to apologetic addresses. According to Liu, the fundamental problem with Japanese apology is not only the citizen’s nationalistic reaction to the apology, but also, and more importantly the inconsistency of Japanese governmental policy toward apologetic addresses. Whereas Chinese and Korean citizens are the relevant sources of perceived sincerity, the Japanese government and their consistency of remorseful addresses are the relevant sources of conveyed sincerity.

What remains clear is the level of mistrust surrounding the Japanese apology within the international community. Before an apology is even issued, there exists a notion that the Japanese government is issuing an address merely out of concealed self-serving political motives. An article from the publication Beijing News stated, “Japan's apology “was deliberately selective” and “Japan was using history as a tool for politics.” An apology to China is viewed by South Korea as a political ploy and vice versa. For the Japanese, it simply appears as if there is no winning path of action. An opinion poll that was published in China Daily spanning from 2005 until 2011 revealed just how poorly the international opinion of Japanese is amongst Chinese. In the first year of the poll, a mere 11.6 percent of Chinese citizens held a favorable opinion toward Japan. 2010 was a watermark year in the poll in which 38.3 percent of citizens

8 Lee, “Beijing Suspicious.”
stated that they had a favorable opinion of Japan. Although the poll varies from year to year, South Korean results differ little, with 90% of South Koreans stating a distrust of Japan.

While Asian nations, to whom the majority of Japanese apologetic addresses have been delivered, doubt the sincerity of the Japanese, to what extent does the entire international community doubt Japanese apologetic addresses? The Japanese culture regarding conflict and confrontation is vastly different than that of the “westernized” world. Common thought places Asian cultures as quiet and unlikely to confront grim realities.

A common hypothesis about what encouraged German contrition (and muted it in Japan) is cultural: for example, the view that certain cultures are more inclined than others to apologize. However, a crude cultural argument saying “Japan didn’t apologize because of its culture” and “West Germany apologized because of its culture” is clearly unsatisfying.

If a cultural explanation was valid, the post-war denial of the Nanking massacre and other war crimes could be easily explained. Japanese, because of their culture, would naturally deny atrocities. In reality, Japanese culture, while never uniform, can be considered more apologetic than its U.S. American counterpart, at least on an interpersonal level. In the book, *Japanese Apology Across Disciplines*, the author Naomi Sugimoto addresses Japanese apologies to one another in a sociological study. Various common social situations amongst Japanese are juxtaposed with the United States.

Sugimoto’s study included twelve situations in which an apology could be considered optional; examples include breaking a friend’s property, tardiness, inconveniencing another, miscommunication, forgetfulness, and owed debt. “Responses to the open-ended question revealed that Japanese included statements of remorse in their messages more often than did U.S. citizens in all 12 situations.” The author of this study argues that the Japanese are also more likely to compensate, request forgiveness and promise not to repeat the same offense than were U.S. citizens. Not only were Japanese more likely to apologize for their perceived offence and violation of cultural norms, but also more likely to follow through with a plan for making amends. “In general, more Japanese responses included remediation strategies than did U.S. American responses: (a) Japanese used direct offers of remediation more often; and (b) U.S. Americans used remediation inquiries (e.g., “Would you like me to buy you a new one?”) and conditional offers (e.g., “I’ll buy you a new one, *if you want*) more frequently.” The above disproves that the Japanese as a people, on an interpersonal level, do acknowledge their conduct as wrong. According to Sugimoto, Japanese people plan to address the aforementioned scenarios with a sense of honesty. It must be noted that interpersonal relationships are highly variable and

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13 Ibid., 98.
take strikingly different forms amongst all cultures. Applying this study to diplomatic relations would be hasty.

Several conclusions can be drawn from Lind’s assertion and Sugimoto’s study. There remains a prevalent notion or assertion that apology and reparation in the German and Japanese cases can be explained by a difference in culture and Japanese apologetic addresses have been perceived as less sincere. Sugimoto furthers this notion by proving through a limited social survey study that apology is readily given, at least in the case of Japanese interpersonal relations. This study is inapplicable at the international diplomatic level, yet it begs the question, why is there a notion amongst an international audience of the Japanese as hesitant to apologize, or moreover, have never apologized? Given their apologetic addresses at the international level, some of which are listed above, what then has affected the perceived legitimacy of both Japanese and German acknowledgement of committed atrocities and official apologies to the degree that the former has been labeled insufficient and the latter, sufficient? Why, if Chinese and Korean citizens expressly admit that Japan has indeed apologized, are apologies labeled as insincere?

The following three chapters outline the steps taken by both nations in the postwar period to atone for war guilt and then compare and contrast the differences of apologetic addresses to explain their international reception. Both Japan and Germany committed atrocities during the war, including the Holocaust and the Nanking Massacre, and international opinion necessitated that they show remorse for their action. The first two chapters trace the chronologies of apologetic addresses given by Japan and Germany to an international audience. The third chapter will directly compare the timelines of the previous two chapters so as to find similarities and differences that not only convey sincerity, but also result in a consensus of perceived sincerity. Apologetic addresses will be analyzed based upon rhetoric, context and perceived level of self-contradiction as to find which factor was most important in effectively conveying sincerity in the postwar period toward nations that were wronged by Japan and Germany during the war. Rhetoric, the first factor of analysis, includes the specific vocabulary used by governmental figures in their respective addresses and whether the language chosen by each figure conveys sincerity. Context, the second factor, includes the speaker, place and date of address. Speaker, place and date are all interrelated and will be analyzed individually, as well as in conjunction. Lastly, perceived level of self-contradiction means the extent to which leaders of Japan or Germany either contradicted themselves within a single given address or the statements of another governmental leader’s previous address.
Chapter 1

Japanese Apologetic Addresses since World War II: Ineffectual Remorse

In the following chapter I will trace the diplomatic action taken by Japan to address real and perceived war guilt. This chronology will seek to tabulate not only the number of apologies and addresses given but also the content and context of said events. Addresses will be broken down by decade so as to show the frequency of apology over time. Additionally, I will seek to find a critical period or breaking point at which apology is considered ‘too little too late.’ I will seek to break down the syntactic elements of each address. The purpose of this syntactic analysis is to gain a better understanding of the language of apology and how rhetoric affects a perceived sense of sincerity amongst those to whom the apology is addressed. Addresses given by the Japanese government or officials within the government will be analyzed based upon rhetoric, context and level of self-contradiction. These criteria are to be applied to all addresses given by the Japanese and later compared with the addresses of the Germans in order to show the differences within the criteria that have led to differing opinions from an international audience regarding the sincerity of each nation. Self-contradiction by Japanese officials has been the single most damaging factor, rendering Japanese apology ineffective.

Following the war, Emperor Hirohito was scheduled to meet with then U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, stating his wish to apologize to the United States for Japanese aggression and hostility. An aide to MacArthur, Lennox Tierney reported in a 2006 article that was published in the Salt Lake Tribune as to the exact sequence of events in which MacArthur refused to admit the Emperor of Japan into his office. Tierney states,

Toward the end of the occupation of his nation, Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced he would formally apologize to U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur for Japan's actions during World War II - including the Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. [...] Apology is a very important thing in Japan,” said Tierney. “With us, we don’t apologize unless we get caught with our hand in the cookie jar, but for the Japanese, there is a very strong sense of what an apology means.”

Although this apology was never given and the content of the prepared address remains a mystery, Tierney’s closing statement echoes the aforementioned finding of Sugimoto, in that apology, especially in interpersonal interactions, is of extreme importance in Japanese culture. Importance must be given to the simple fact that Hirohito was ready to apologize toward the end of U.S. occupation. This prepared apology along with an extensive list of others to be highlighted and analyzed below, disproves the popular notion that apology was simply never given. Apology was given although several factors have negatively influenced its perceived legitimacy and sincerity since the end of World War Two. These factors include but are not limited to, date of address given, speaker, specificity, rhetoric and perceived level of self-contradiction.

The 1950’s in Japan was a period of not only physical rebuilding within the country but also an attempt to economically rebuild Japan’s ties to the Asian region as a whole. The

Japanese government was at the forefront of this economic rebuilding with Official Development Assistance (ODA), yet the surrounding Asian nations affected by Japanese aggression during World War Two, did not always see attempts at rebuilding as pure and without selfish economic motivation. In the latter half of the decade, Prime Minister of Japan Kishi Nobusuke made a whirlwind tour of eight Asian and pacific nations in an attempt to re-establish relations and foster economic growth. “In all his travels Kishi has stressed three major themes: 1) Japan is sorry (for World War II), 2) Japan wants to help underdeveloped Asiatic nations with Japanese technical know-how, 3) Japan would be delighted to set up as the clearing house for a largely U.S.-financed $1 billion Asiatic development fund.”¹⁵ This tour was the first of its kind in the postwar period in that a government official personally traveled to each respective nation, giving addresses upon foreign territory. Each of the two speeches Kishi gave in Burma and Australia on his 1957 tour shows a particular focus.

We view with deep regret the vexation we caused to the people of Burma in the war just passed. In a desire to atone, if only partially, for the pain suffered, Japan is prepared to meet fully and with goodwill its obligations for wartime reparations. The Japan of today is not the Japan of the past but, as its Constitution indicates, is a peace-loving nation.¹⁶

The first apology, to the nation of Burma, uses vague language and makes no mention of Japanese misdeed. The English word, vexation, means the state of being annoyed or worried. It goes without saying that this is a translation from the original Japanese, it appears that the language directed at the Burmese people is euphemistic at best. The rhetoric chosen by Kishi and an unwillingness to define exactly what “Japan of the past” was, places more emphasis on a “New-Japan” that will not only never revert to military violence but also seek to write a new history altogether, as if old and new are two separate entities or nations, not related to one another. In this address as well as Kishi’s tour as a whole, a greater emphasis was placed upon reparation money as a way to settle debts. While this could never completely heal all wounds, it is not only a subtle admission of guilt from Japan but also a kind gesture. Cambodia and Laos were among nations that were extended hefty lump sums of money while Indonesia was provided with 230 million in cash, a cancellation of 170 million dollars in trade debt and 400 million in economic assistance.¹⁷

The apology to Australians was shorter, yet heartfelt in nature. In the same year, in an address to the Australian parliament, Kishi stated, “Notwithstanding the passage of time, it is my official duty and my personal desire to express to you our heartfelt sorrow for what occurred in the war.”¹⁸ Before his trip to Australia, Kishi was warned of the strong and remaining anti-Japanese sentiment in the country. Along with his short address to the parliament, Kishi laid a wreath at the Australian war memorial in Canberra. With the opening few words, Kishi admits that it has been some time since the ending of the war yet words of consolation can still be offered. He clarifies that the offering of such words is not only because his job description

demands such but that he as a Japanese citizen is fully capable of remorse and wishes to convey such emotions despite the risk of being placed in a potentially morally compromising position or sparking a debate. As with the last address, the word sorry and or the direct assumption of responsibility through the clarification of specific wrongs is never stated. The last segment of Kishi’s address to the Australian parliament simply states, “for what occurred in the war.” The ‘what’ is never clarified nor are either of the two belligerents to whom the ‘what’ is referring. Japan is never conveyed as an aggressor or Australia as a victim. There is more sense of commonality in purpose, as if an ally were addressing a former ally.

Kishi added a personal touch to his statement by noting the personal draw he felt to make a statement. In fact, the Japanese government had no hand in the apology, a circumstance that affected Japanese domestic understanding of the address. Interestingly enough, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs never documented Kishi’s remarks to foreign nations, leaving the domestic Japanese audience unaware of his true diplomatic actions abroad. While not known at the time, the issue of what specifically the Japanese government officially endorsed would become a hot button topic, and evidence for those critical and skeptical of the Japanese governments true official assumption of responsibility. In hindsight, these addresses seem less like a formally planned apology by the government and more like a half-hearted gesture by one man seeking to gain economic access for political gain. Whatever the true purpose, the overall international reaction to Kishi’s tour was overwhelmingly positive, making headlines in the New York Times and The Economist. Just as Kishi’s addresses were not state-sponsored, transcripts of what was said abroad were not sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the majority of Japanese were kept in the dark, believing that no apology of any sort was ever given. An article written in the Japan Echo by Fujita Yukihisa highlights this discrepancy:

Back home, Kishi himself revealed little about his references to the war, so the Japanese public was not fully informed of the impact his visit had in each country. […] The disparity in what was communicated to domestic and foreign audiences produced a perception gap in how Japan regards historical issues, a point that still needs to be addressed by today’s Japan.

The problem with the aforementioned perception gap is the perpetuation amongst Japanese that, with the government as their role model and legal representative, there comes little to no impetus to take on responsibility or admit wrongdoing. The miscommunication between the international and domestic communities would have grave repercussions for Japanese citizens who were often largely unaware of the official statements made abroad, thus leading them to assume the hard line position conveyed to them domestically. From an external perspective one is led to think of the Japanese government as deceptive toward its own people thus begging the question of how one could trust the addresses directed at an international audience.

A few years before Kishi’s whirlwind tour of Asian nations, Japan was invited to a conference at Bandung in which Asian and African nations were invited. The conference at Bandung had clear goals, some of which included the promotion of democracy and peace amongst those invited. While the Japanese prime minister was unable to attend, the director of the Economic Planning Board, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, spoke in his place. This address, given

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ten years after the conclusion of the war in the Pacific, addresses those attending the conference as neighbor nations, neglecting to specify upon which nations damages were inflicted. While Kishi spoke to each nation on an individual basis and Bandung provided no such platform, it is important to note that no formal statement was at this time given to China, arguably one of the nations upon which Japan inflicted the most damage. The rhetoric of this speech chooses to focus more upon Japan, attempting to evoke sympathy for the war-ravaged nation. Takasaki Tatsunosuke stated in his address at Bandung, “In World War II, Japan, I regret to say, inflicted damages upon her neighbor nations, but ended by bringing untold miseries upon herself.” In the first sentence, the terms ‘damages’ and ‘miseries’ are juxtaposed with each term referring to other Asian nations and Japan respectively. The imagery brought to mind is of a remorseful Japan if only because of the destruction they see right in front of them. The speaker stated further, “As the only people who have experienced the horrors of atomic bombs, we have no illusion whatever about the enormity of an attempt to solve international dispute by force.”21 The reference to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki almost suggests that Japan has already paid its debt simply by losing the war.

Many of the Asian nations addressed at Bandung were subject to visits by Kishi a mere two years later. In Kishi’s tour, he came with an olive branch, conveying the same message as at Bandung of a new and peaceful Japan. The peaceful Japan referred to at Bandung is indeed guaranteed by law in Japan’s new constitution, effective as of 1947. Chapter II, Article 9 entitled “Renunciation of War” outlaws the use of force and a standing military although a proxy purpose was quickly perceived by the Asian nations visited and addressed at Bandung.22 As listed above, Kishi stressed Japanese technical assistance and the management of a U.S. run development fund. This benevolence could be portrayed as contradictory and a mere guise through which the Japanese could extend their empire, if only economically. Because apologetic, or more aptly named, remorseful addresses were given at the same time that Japan sought to offer economic assistance; the sincerity of the former was mired in doubt.

Renewed Japanese relations with Korea and China

Upon conclusion of the 1950’s, it would be another half decade before the Japanese government made diplomatic stabs at reconciliation. A year after the 1964 Olympics, held in Tokyo, the Republic of Korea and Japan signed a treaty that was officially named the “Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.” Then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Etsusaburo Shiina, prefaced the signing of this agreement by saying, “In our two countries’ long history there have been unfortunate times, it is truly regrettable and we are deeply remorseful.” This single sentence was the resounding tagline applied to the signing of this treaty. A deep sense of shared responsibility is implied in Shiina’s statement along with euphemistic rhetoric. The long period of Japanese colonization of Korea can hardly be described as ‘unfortunate.’ Ignoring for a minute the statement given by Shiina, this treaty was groundbreaking in that it was the first diplomatic action involving Japan and one of the nations upon which Japan inflicted the most severe damages, Korea and China. Two nations that have in the present day most frequently accused Japan of insufficient compensation. The premise of the

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treaty revolves around this vague statement, “Considering the historical background of relationship between their peoples and their mutual desire for good neighborliness and for the normalization of their relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty […]” details are left out and the treaty assumes a tone of mutual cooperation. The “Treaty on Basic Relations” made all former colonial laws and agreements between the two nations null and void. It was seen as a point of reference in international relations and a document of legitimate legal authority. While not known to the Korean people until recently, more than promises of good neighborliness were provided with the “Treaty on Basic Relations.” Japan compensated Korea heavily although these funds never reached their ultimate destination, the people of Korea, but were instead used covertly by the government of Korea to stimulate the economy. Documents that were accidentally leaked in 2005 led to an outrage amongst Koreans who were rightfully supposed to be compensated decades before. After the Park administration received over 800 million dollars in reparation payments, no mention was ever made of this money to Korean citizens. “The administration used most of the grants for economic development, failing to provide adequate compensation to victims.” This article written in the Korean Herald in 2010 highlights yet another example of international and domestic level miscommunication. In one way or another, the people of Japan and Korea have been denied information or legal compensation, keeping them in the dark and fostering, in the case of Koreans, a sense of bitterness and hostility towards a Japan that was supposedly unwilling to admit to wrongdoing in the period of Korean colonization from 1910-1945 and too prideful and cheap to provide even the slightest bit of funding. If the Japanese government had made it policy to convey the full details of international events to a domestic audience, this miscommunication would have been stymied from the start when news of the reparations inevitably reached Korean citizens.

In the beginning of the 1970’s, almost thirty years after the conclusion of World War II and forty years since the start of the Japanese campaign in Manchuria, came a monumental diplomatic meeting between Japan and China entitled the “Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of People’s Republic of China.” This meeting of two nations was initiated by the Chinese and hosted in Beijing. The Prime Minister of Japan Kakuei Tanaka was in attendance, along with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and various other officials. The meeting lasted five days and was focused on the normalization of relations between the two nations after almost 30 years of polarized diplomacy. Prefacing the agreement, Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Masayoshi Ohira, made a joint statement that included an apology. A great emphasis was placed upon the minute size of the current break in relations in the larger span of time by appealing to the past and pointing toward the future. This method does however inadvertently understate the severity of wartime damage and Japanese hegemony. Acknowledgement of damage done is given, yet mention is also made of China’s appreciation of this acknowledgement, as if to make sure this diplomatic address does not go unappreciated or unnoticed. Tanaka and Ohira state,

Japan and China are neighboring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship.

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The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.\textsuperscript{25}

Below are four of the principles agreed upon by both nations:

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communiqué is issued.


3. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

4. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.\textsuperscript{26}

Without complete background context it is impossible to know whether every principle was drafted simultaneously and with joint effort by both nations or if China laid out specific criteria for Japan to simply sign. Although, according to Jennifer Lind's novel \textit{Sorry States}, the Chinese government specifically requested the apology itself.\textsuperscript{27} Responsibility for renewed diplomacy rested squarely on the shoulders of the Chinese due to their initiation of the "Joint Communiqué."

All nine tenets come directly from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website and are accessible to date. The first tenet emphasizes a termination of previous abnormal affairs as to suggest that former relations, rather the lack thereof, between both nations were intentionally planned due to a sense of mutual bitterness. The second tenet is included and relevant due to the differing nature of both governments. For a communist country such as China, recognition of governmental legitimacy by a capitalist Japan was of extreme importance. In the fourth tenet, the previous lack of diplomatic relations whatsoever, namely in the form of embassies and ambassadors, is made clear. 1972, therefore was a groundbreaking year in which international good neighborliness was not only fostered but also newly established. Principle number five is of utmost importance. While no reason is provided aside from a desire to remain friendly and forgive Japan, China refused current and future reparation payments. This situation is striking in its similarity to the Republic of Korea, in that, while reparations agreements are made clear in the text of the communiqué, it remains to be known to what extent the Chinese


\textsuperscript{26}MOFA, “Joint Communiqué.”

\textsuperscript{27}Lind, \textit{Sorry States}, 160.
people were informed of their government’s ready willingness to deny all reparation. Chinese citizens could conceivably to date, be frustrated with Japan’s alleged reluctance at repayment, but in reality, the government of China would be to blame. The obscurity of domestic affairs in both Korea and China is something that has undoubtedly affected international relation with Japan and still remains beyond control of the Japanese people or their government.

Another hallmark event in the chronology of relations between Japan and Korea that can be considered only the second expression of apology for war guilt by Japan toward Korea, came on September 6th 1984 from Emperor Hirohito himself. In the long history of Japanese diplomatic addresses toward other nations, this marks the single time that the emperor spoke publicly about his remorse. While the real political authority of the Japanese government lies with the Prime Minister, their tenure remains short, averaging only a few years before a new Prime Minister is chosen by the upper and lower House and appointed by the Emperor. Then Emperor Hirohito had limited, if any, legitimate governmental power. His role is mostly symbolic, yet highly important to the understanding of Japan. It was this exact symbolism that gave extreme weight to his 1984 address to President Chun Doo Hwan. As the surviving emperor of World War Two and the physical symbol for which many Japanese fought and died, taking the lives of enemy combatants and civilians with them, Hirohito was the corporeal symbol of Imperial Japan.

In this meeting between Japan and Korea, Emperor Hirohito made the first move by addressing President Chun. This proceeding attracted the attention of the international press and was of special concern not only to those citizens of the respective nations but also the Pacific region as a whole. The banquet for the Korean president marked the first time a President of Korea broached Japanese soil since the war. More importantly, in contrast with the previous communiqués between China and Korea, it was organized and created exclusively by the Japanese. Impetus by the Japanese suggested a sense of willingness toward cooperation and carries with it an assumption of culpability and responsibility. No light burden for Japan and certainly deserving of an international spotlight. An article published in Time eleven days after the meeting entitled “Ritual of Reconciliation” reads,

One question hung over the proceedings: Would Emperor Hirohito, symbol to many Koreans of a catalog of Japanese misdeeds, apologize for the brutal annexation of Korea in 1910 and the savage measures imposed during World War II, when Japan deliberately starved the Korean people and dispatched more than 1 million to Japan as forced laborers?

The answer to this question was, yes. Hirohito did speak to Chun, although the address given became a source of international uproar. Emperor Hirohito stated only, “It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century, and I believe it should not be repeated.” With this one sentence, the emperor cast doubt upon the Japanese government’s true sincerity. While unbeknownst to the citizens of Korea until 2005, Japan did provide outstanding reparations in the form of cash. This address was vague at best and could

29 “Ritual of Reconciliation,” Time 124, no. 12, September 17, 1984, 64, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.
30 Ibid., 64.
hardly be described as heartfelt. With the phrase, ‘an unfortunate past between us,’ mutual guilt is implied with the use of the collective ‘us.’ Hirohito also uses the personal ‘believe,’ which conveys a lack of security, an implied personal feeling rather than a guarantee as good as writing that aggression would never occur. Lastly, by using the modal ‘should,’ the emperor is merely suggesting that Japan ‘should’ not colonize Korea again, that it would be inadvisable. Hirohito seems more than begrudging to admit, in euphemistic terms, that the past has been less than ideal. While this statement could be interpreted with the critical lens I am applying, it must be taken with a grain of salt. Simply because of Hirohito’s position as the symbol of the State of Japan, his address, whether thorough or succinct, would have been critically analyzed. The Time article later states, “Diplomats will undoubtedly argue over whether Hirohito’s statement actually constituted an apology. But the display of Japanese contrition, later reinforced by an eloquent apology by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, clearly satisfied Chun.” Then Prime Minister Nakasone went beyond Hirohito’s address to state, “Japan brought to bear great sufferings upon your country and its people during the colonial period.” This was the distinct admission of guilt the Korean government and people were looking for, yet once again it lacked a remorseful element. For average Koreans, this certainly revealed nothing they were not already personally well aware of. “For President Chun, who is keen to warm up the cool relations between South Korea and Japan, this was ample. For the man on the Seoul omnibus, who is still strongly anti-Japanese, it may not have been.” Mimicking the discrepancy in the communication of the reparations agreement between Japan and Korea at the international and domestic levels, there remained a difference between the opinion of President Chun and popular domestic opinion.

The contrast between the depth and sincerity of Hirohito’s address and that of Nakasone’s provides an interesting opportunity to compare just how much importance is placed upon one government or public official versus another. Hirohito represents more than a government official. An article in The Economist that surfaced after the banquet for President Chun echoed the sentiment of not only Koreans but those aware of international events. The Economist article, an accurate reflection of international opinion, states, “In Japan it is the emperor’s comments that really matter, since prime ministers come and go. But Mr. Nakasone’s more generous words will count for inter-governmental harmony.” Only a year earlier, Prime Minister Nakasone visited Korea with a four billion dollar loan. While this was also warmly received by President Chun and responsible for ending a bitter period, this and the general apologies of the past came to an end in the 1980s.

**Specific Rhetoric as Counter Reaction**

From the beginning of the 1980s until the present day, the issue of apology and reparation has taken on a new dimension. Gone were the days of blanket apologies and vague treaties, due to the unplanned and sudden appearance of two specific and controversial issues. The 1980s saw the rise of what became labeled as the “Japanese textbook controversy.” As is the case in most countries, textbooks are revised to give a favorable view toward one’s own nation. In the United States this process also happens but normally through the free speech of a single author or group

31 “Ritual of Reconciliation,” 64.

of authors. In the case of Japan, the problem arose due to the overhead ministry responsible for censorship and distribution of texts to schools across the nation. In essence, the Japanese government has a direct say in the publishing of school texts. John K. Nelson, author of a “Tempest in a Textbook: A Report on the new Middle-School History Textbook in Japan” writes, “But in countries with a centralized, national curriculum (and this is the rule rather than the exception), textbooks are closely associated with the authority of the state and with furtherance of state agendas by educational institutions and curricula.” This direct say has also led to direct responsibility. Schools and their texts have become a hotbed issue due to their influential nature in educating students during the formative period of their lives when minds are susceptible to all opinions, radical or not. Foreign Asian nations had become worried that Japan would seek to, for lack of a better term, brainwash future generations by building an exaggerated sense of nationalism that ignores known truths. The textbook controversy, popularized by the long legal battle that pitted the Japanese government against the author Saburo Ienaga, changed the very nature of Japanese public addresses. Apologies began to shift toward specific and direct reconciliation due to the specific nature of the controversial historical details involved in the controversy.

Often ignored in the very textbooks that have become controversial, the Korean “comfort women” is another specific issue that has directly influenced the specificity of Japanese apology and placed a burner underneath the issue of war guilt. These women, mostly of Korean descent were labeled “comfort women” and legally handled by the Japanese government during the war as a way to curb rape and safely implement prostitution. While some details remain grey, what is clear is that the comfort women system was vast and has caused not only great shame for the many victims but become controversial in Korea as well as domestically in Japan. Apologies began to surface in the 1990s due to the newly found freedom of speech of many Korean women and the start of the Korean women’s movement. Controversy arose domestically when many right-wingers denied the oppressive element of the system.

The beginnings of the controversy, at least in the public spectrum, began in 1982 when international news caught hold of the Japanese Ministry of Education’s demand for more euphemistic or soft language when describing the military invasions of nations such as China. The life of Saburo Ienaga, on the other hand, had defined the extent of the controversy on a domestic level and began years before the international outcry of the 1980s. Ienaga is an author who, while attempting to publish a textbook in the 1950s, had his book banned and subsequently fought a losing court battle with the Japanese government. The opening lines on the first page of Ienaga’s work, The Pacific War, read as follows,

In Japan, the few opponents of an imperialistic war against China never had enough popular support to prevent the conflict and were easily silenced. A domestic political force capable of preventing aggression against China just did not exist. An understanding of the reasons for this abject slide into aggression

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must start with the Japanese view of China formed in the decades before the 1930s and with Japan’s policies toward China.34

While these lines do not strike the average reader as offensive or borderline derogatory toward the Japanese government, this is just one example of the style of writing that was oft stricken out and replaced with more euphemistic terms that sought to eliminate any culpability. Because Ienaga’s life and losing court battle became so publicized, more blame was placed upon the Japanese government for not only initial censorship but also an unwillingness to change despite the passage of almost fifty years from onset to conclusion.

Chinese outcry regarding the textbook controversy came to a peak in 1982 when the Japanese Ministry of Education made an effort to edit the language of public school textbooks. Issues included not only a change in rhetoric of some books but also the denial of Nanjing as a massacre. The Chinese reaction this time was overwhelming, most especially after Japanese officials publicly and generally scolded foreign countries for attempting to meddle in the domestic affairs of Japan.35 In an attempt to normalize relations with China on the eve of the ten-year anniversary of the Joint Communiqué, the Prime Minister of Japan made a public pledge in August of that year to resolve the issue.

On August 26th of 1982, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa made a specific statement regarding the “textbook controversy.” This document is available in its original text through the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is comprised of four succinct paragraphs. The first paragraph highlights the past suffering caused by Japan and specifically mentions the Republic of Korea and China as a definitive victim and Japan as the country whose acts created the “suffering.” The Japanese statement mentions the “Joint Communiqué of 1965” and the “remorse” that was confirmed with the signing of this agreement, offering however, no new statement of remorse. “These statements confirm Japan's remorse and determination which I stated above and this recognition has not changed at all to this day.” The second paragraph then delves into the issue at hand, the textbook controversy. Japan attempts to reassure the nations of China and Korea by stating that previous agreements, such as the communiqués, guarantee a historically honest and accurate educational system for Japanese students. “This spirit in the Japan-ROK Joint Communiqué and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué naturally should also be respected in Japan's school education and textbook authorization.” This statement, at the head of the second paragraph, while followed by a promise to attend to criticism, shows the contradictory nature of Japanese policy. The spirit referred to in these agreements, is one of reconciliation established in the previous communiqués. While there was a spirit of reconciliation in the aforementioned agreements, the exclusion of atrocities and alteration of language in Japanese textbooks did not reflect that spirit, and a tone is assumed in which foreign governments are not to doubt Japan’s commitment to previous agreements. “Recently, however, the Republic of Korea, China and others have been criticizing some descriptions in Japanese textbooks.” In the third paragraph, the Japanese government assures the international audience that action will be taken. “To this end, in relation to future authorization of textbooks, the Government will revise the Guideline for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook Authorization and


While reform is promised, no specific discussion of the historical inaccuracies within the texts is mentioned. The Japanese government does not specifically reprimand itself or others for the publication of historically inaccurate texts. The Japanese government will act not on its own accord for the sake of the proper education of its youth but only as to assuage an international outcry long after it has called for reform.

The first paragraph addresses the steps toward reconciliation made in the past with both Korea and China. The apologetic remarks of the past are reiterated as if to cast doubt on the reason why Japan is being questioned in the first place. No new statement of apology is given, nor is remorse shown for the deep distrust that censored textbook have caused abroad. To gain a sense of the serious implications of the textbook controversy, Chinese public opinion must be surveyed. Various citizens of China, when questioned in an array of public newspapers, were more than alarmed at this trend in Japanese censorship.

The Chinese lambasted Japan’s history education as “cherishing the spirit of Japanese militarism.” The books were said to “signal a very serious danger” that should be carefully watched: they represented “an attempt by some people to revive militarism because historically, Japanese militarist education began at primary school.”

The noticeable trend of Japanese government action regarding diplomatic discrepancies has been one of counteraction. Instead of taking the impetus, as was the example with the Japan-China Communiqué, the Japanese government was first invited by China and then kindly asked to apologize. In the case of the textbook controversy, it was not until international tension reached a peak that the Japanese thought to take governmental action and revise texts despite years of nagging vocalized discontent from citizens abroad. Because Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa issued these new tenets as a counter reaction, doubt was immediately cast as to the sincerity and longevity of these reforms.

A report that came out just a month after the address by the Chief Cabinet Secretary revealed that not only would the reforms lack in longevity, they were never to be instituted.

A final bizarre chapter in the incident began to unfold shortly after the diplomatic resolution was achieved. In early September, several magazines, doing their own investigations, revealed that, contrary to the worldwide impression that the Ministry of Education had compelled textbook authors to make changes in their new editions, in fact no such revision had occurred. The incident originated in the hasty and inaccurate reports of journalists covering the ministry.

Writers for both Asahi Shinbun and Sankei Shinbun had based their stories on a historical precedent set in the past and incorrectly reported. As can be imagined, all legitimacy was

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37 Lind, Sorry States, 161.
stripped from the Japanese government as the official address was only used to quell discontent. Practically speaking, it was a bald-faced lie. The extent to which Chinese citizens and citizens of the world found out about the contradicting report is not known, although the very fact that promised reforms were never intended to be implemented signaled a stubbornness from the Japanese government that would cause problems that would continue into the present day.

Just four years after the onset of the “textbook controversy,” controversy would again rise up. This time it was the Minister of Education himself, Masayuki Fujio, made deleterious remarks in regard to historical revision. The Minister attempted to deny the aggression of the Japanese in 1986 in a public statement; an obvious diplomatic blunder considering his position within the government. Nakasone rightfully put down this comment with a speech to the Japanese Diet. A copy of an FBIS transcript from September 17th 1986 is listed below:

In a speech at the Diet (parliament) yesterday, Nakasone said that it was not proper for former Education Minister Masayuki Fujio to whitewash Japanese militarists. He stressed that taking into consideration the overall national interests of Japan, the Japanese should conduct self-examination concerning their past and enhance their friendly relations with neighboring countries.39

This statement by Nakasone was, at that time, necessary to dispel more negative sentiment toward Japan and the perceived threat of Japan as a rise-again militarist state. The fact remains that, although Nakasone handled the issue promptly and with poise by firing Fujio, the then Minister of Education still held considerably radical views. This is yet another example of counter reaction by the Japanese government, fighting to control damage well after it has been done. Although hindsight is always 20/20, considering the great international stress put on the Ministry of Education, one would think great care would be taken in appointing a politically moderate minister or at a bare minimum a radical one who vows to remain quiet. The perpetuation of the textbook controversy at the hands of the government and not simply radical right wing party members is yet another example of conveyed insincerity that casts doubt upon the genuine nature of Japanese remorse.

The textbook controversy has been taken up with renewed vigor in the 21st century by right wing interest groups within the Japanese citizenry. The “Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks” is at the forefront of this cause amongst several other groups. The year 2000 marked an attempt to have their new textbook published, one that was arguably the most radical yet. John K. Nelson highlighted the radical nature of the new textbook in a 2002 article titled “Tempest in a Textbook: A Report on the New Middle-School History Textbook in Japan.” The text sought to convince readers of the Japanese role in World War Two as one of self-defense and managed to delete all mention of comfort women and Nanking. Over 515,000 copies sold in the first two months after the book’s publication since the sale of the book was unrestricted even before official voting consensus had been reached. While still a relatively small number of books compared with the number of Japanese students nationwide, the lack of laws governing sales exposed one of many loopholes that allowed radical right wing opinion to develop.

When several regional education committees announced on July 12 their early decisions in favor of adopting the textbook, it appeared that the Reform Society was close to victory. But after thirty local school boards in Tochigi Prefecture defied the regional board’s recommendation, other districts followed suit nationwide, with at least 532 out of 542 school districts voting against adoption.\(^{40}\)

The eventual number of schools voting against the new textbook is inspiring, if only superficial. The fact that this deceptive literature has the breathing room to be published in the first place allows for the furthering of a conservative counter history that is detrimental not only for general historic accuracy but also certainly, as shown above, for international rapport.

The overall significance of the textbook controversy extends beyond simple debates over censorship and rhetoric. Joshua Fogel, author of *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography* gives two reasons of deeper significance:

First, Japanese conservatives could openly speak of Japan’s war in Asia as a war to liberate Asian countries from Western colonialism, a view that directly contradicted China’s stance that the war had been one of aggression and colonization. […] Second, Chinese celebrated war anniversaries and talked of atrocities in the public media as China, too, engaged in a more open discussion of the war and its effects on China.\(^{41}\)

The textbook controversy along with various texts exclusions of the true detail of the Nanking massacre led to a massive upsurge in the quest for research to prove the extent of Japanese brutality toward civilians. Once the brutality of the Japanese was proven beyond a doubt and still excluded from texts, accountability was once again demanded, yet to the chagrin of many researchers, never included.

This controversy was a botched opportunity for the Japanese to take the initiative in many respects. By actually implementing the reforms the government so promised in the 1982 address and understanding the international pressure surrounding them, the Japanese missed an opportunity to show an understanding of the danger of denial and to demonstrate progress toward an official government sanctioned policy of acceptance of known truths. By appointing a responsible Minister of Education and working to curtail the devastating and increasingly influential efforts of right wing writers and associations of the same caliber as the “Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks,” the government could have backed up remorseful statements with action. The textbook controversy exemplified the uphill battle being fought by the Japanese government to constantly establish credibility.

In many ways, the 1990s became the decade of the “comfort women.” There were several reasons for the upsurge in discourse in this decade, most of which had more to do with coincidental events outside of Japanese government control. Sarah Soh, author of the article


entitled “Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Fund for “Comfort Women,”” cites several factors. South Korea’s entry into the UN in 1991 and a general political process of democratization in the country led to a newly found freedom of speech. The landmark court case of former comfort woman Kim Hak-sun in 1991 lit a fire under the issue, testing the mettle of Japanese diplomacy. The Japanese government would have had yet another opportunity to show its sincerity by apologizing, if it had not already dropped the ball by neglecting to do so preemptively. A January 1992 report by a Japanese Professor named Yoshimi Yoshiaki proved the existence of not only the comfort system but the direct role of the Imperialist Japanese government at that time. This report and his finding of official government documents at the National Institute for Defense Studies Library in Tokyo not only lent unquestionable legitimacy to the issue but also implicated the Japanese government as complicit yet unwilling to assume responsibility despite the passing of fifty years.

Japanese governmental reaction to this report was initially very swift. A transcription of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs report dated July 6th, 1992 from Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato reveals the exact details of the Japanese governmental inquiry of the “comfort women” issue and the extent of Japanese involvement. The inquiry, initiated in December 1991, listed specifically what Japanese soldiers were responsible for.

That is, the inquiry has revealed that the Government had been involved in the establishment of comfort stations, the control of those who recruited comfort women, the construction and reinforcement of comfort facilities, the management and surveillance of comfort stations, the hygiene maintenance in comfort stations and among comfort women, and the issuance of identification as well as other documents to those who were related to comfort stations.

More information about each individual step of the “comfort women” process was available in more detail upon request. Upon analysis of the third paragraph, this statement can be viewed as unprecedented within the greater span of Japanese apologetic addresses given in the postwar period. The rhetoric utilized and the use of the term “apology,” shows attempts to convey sincerity. The concluding paragraph seeks to portray not only the speaker, but Japan as a whole as a humble nation willing to learn what can and should be done; a nation that would in the following years after this speech, conform to international standards of perceived acceptable compensation. The concluding paragraph included the following remark from Koichi Kato: “As I listen to many people, I feel truly grieved for this issue. By listening to the opinions of people from various directions, I would like to consider sincerely in what way we can express our feelings to those who suffered such hardship.”

This heartfelt report from the Chief Cabinet Secretary is one of the first instances in Japanese history where not only an apology was offered


but also specific details as to the government’s responsibility were listed. The specificity and listing of the exact extent of Japanese misdeed was necessary to convey sincerity to an international audience.

A second and third address from the Ministry would be given in the 1990s. The first of which came in the following year from yet another Chief Cabinet Secretary which reconfirmed the findings of Japanese guilt and the militaries undeniable responsibility in ‘coercing’ said “comfort women” and reiterated yet another heartfelt apology. This first address in 1993 was referred to as the “Kono Statement,” and is often cited as the baseline of Japanese acceptance of “comfort women.” The second address came some years later in 1998 from then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto expressing remorse, complicity and an introduction to the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF). Ignoring the fact that this outpouring of sympathy to Koichi Kato’s July 1992 address and to evidence brought forth by sources outside of the Japanese government was indeed the first time the Japanese government officially recognized the issue. One would be surprised to find out that former “comfort women” and ordinary citizens simply denied that the Japanese government apologized formally for this issue. What could have possibly transcended from the time these heart felt addresses were given by officials within the government and the 2010 news article in the Taipei Times that quoted President of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou as saying that Japan has never issued a formal apology?

A start to this discrepancy of opinion began with the very founding of the Asian Women’s Fund, the same fund discussed by Prime Minister Hashimoto. Controversy over the fund came about in regards to the technicalities in financial funding. Sarah Soh describes the fund as an “NPO” or a National Public Organization. The AWF was an “NPO” fund that was technically under the control of the government yet financed in part by the public. This classification removed the Japanese government from direct financial responsibility and although they donated allotted sums to the fund, the government was immune to lawsuits in the process. This posed a problem for many victims in that they felt a lack of legitimacy. While funds were being provided by caring Japanese citizens and admittedly by the government, and because it was not wholly government run, doubt was immediately cast upon the AWF. The foundation of the Asian Women’s Fund was arguably one of the most far-reaching measures taken by the Japanese government since the end of World War II. This fund was not responsible for blanket reparations payments or economic development assistance, but rather was a sincere admission of guilt and a step toward progress. The procedure and exact purpose of the fund is described below.

The mission of the Fund has evolved to implement actions in four categories that combine civil activities and government programmes: (1) delivery to each survivor-applicant of the atonement money (two million yen) from the fund donated by the Japanese people, accompanied by letters of apology from the prime minister and the Fund’s president, (which makes the payment from the Fund appear as individual compensations in practice); (2) implementation of

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government programmes of medical and social welfare for individual survivors (the amount of which vary between 1.2 and 3 million yen reflecting the living costs in the countries concerned); (3) compilation of materials on comfort women for the historical record; and (4) initiation and support of activities (such as conferences and workshops) that address contemporary issues of violence against women.\(^\text{46}\)

The description of the fund reveals that the fund was not simply a blank check to remediate past wrongs but was of a much more personal nature. The inclusion of two personalized letters does indeed show the function of the fund as an “NPO” but also shows genuine sincerity. A transcript of one of these AWF letters from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is listed below.

Dear Madam,

On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the Government and the people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the former wartime comfort women, I wish to express my feelings as well.

The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.

As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our responsibilities for the future.

I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.

Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and other forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women.

Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of you will find peace for the rest of your lives.\(^\text{47}\)

The personalized letter was then signed by the Prime Minister with the greeting “Respectfully yours.” The closing lines and offers of prayer mark Koizumi as more than a governmental leader, giving him a humanistic element much needed when dealing with such a sensitive issue. While this level of sincerity seems to silence claims of outright governmental unwillingness to formally apologize, where does the remaining evidence, stating that a formal apology is lacking,

\(^{46}\) Soh, “Japan’s Fund for ‘Comfort Women,’” 223.

come from? Opinion polls of the remorse, or lack thereof of Japanese citizens provides one lead as to the possible reasoning for doubt about the formality and sincerity of the statements of apology given in 1992, 1993 and 1998. When former Japanese soldiers were interviewed as to their thoughts about the “comfort women,” their response is listed below:

Even after several years of intense feminist and international human rights activism, many Japanese do not define the comfort women system as sex slavery or as a war crime. In opinion surveys conducted in 1998 and 1999, more than two-thirds of Japanese military veterans replied that Japan should neither apologize nor compensate comfort women survivors because they were paid for their service.48

This two-thirds majority is not surprising for several reasons. First, it is not unusual for veterans of all nationalities to hold more conservative opinions of former foreign soldiers and citizens that were once seen as combatants. This is merely evidence of a conservative older generation still embedded within society. What is more striking is the remaining strength of this more conservative mentality in the modern day against generations that arguably saw no combat. The grounds of a counter organization to the AWF casts doubt upon the sincerity of an even larger section of the Japanese populace. Around the time the AWF was established, more specifically in August 1995, a fund under the name “Citizens’ Fund to Realize Postwar Compensation” or “Citizens Fund” attempted to block all AWF fundraising efforts. As discussed above, the AWF was supported by charitable donations from Japanese citizens and the grassroots founding of the “Citizens Fund” was proof enough to the international community that Japan could not and would not galvanize complete public sympathy toward victims of unspeakable atrocities. Articles published by the “Citizens Fund” shamelessly aired in the Korean paper Dong-A Ilbo and The New York Times.49

21st Century Denial

While this right wing sentiment lent little credibility to the sincerity of Japanese apology, it still represented only a small segment of the citizenry and did not directly reflect on the Japanese government. Furthermore, in 2007, one single event would permanently change the face of the Japanese government in the eyes of many who were already skeptical, simply reaffirming their doubts. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, declared that on March 1st of 2007 that the Japanese government had no role in coercing the roughly 200,000 “comfort women.” Abe is recorded as stating, “The fact is, there is no evidence to prove there was coercion.” The public debate amongst those subscribing to this statement revolves around the phrase “coercion,” following a belief that these women were mere willing prostitutes. The date of March 1st, while potentially coincidental, is also the date on which Koreans remember and celebrate anti-Japanese protests of 1919.50 This statement went against the “Kono statement” of 1993 in which the culpability of the Japanese government in administration of comfort women was not only proven beyond a doubt but admitted by the government and apologized for. For the international community, Abe’s statement was not one that slipped under the radar. Protests erupted in

49 Ibid., 217.
several Asian nations and the government was urged on behalf of MOFA to make a formal apology.\textsuperscript{51} It was this devastating back and forth between apology and denial that created deep skepticism abroad. How could a Japanese Prime Minister in a position of responsibility make such an ignorant and politically devastating statement?

While Shinzo Abe’s initial intentions may never be fully realized one thing is for sure, the effects were devastating. Abe later clarified, under immense domestic and international political pressure that his statement was incorrect and also misinterpreted. So great was this international action that in an April 5th teleconference with United States President George W. Bush, Abe said the following:

Prime Minister Abe stated that just to be sure, he would like to clarify his views on the issue of “comfort women”, adding that he was aware that, since the submission of a draft resolution concerning this issue to the US House of Representatives, the media had provided various reports and that his true intentions and remarks had not been reported accurately. The Prime Minister then explained that he had been following the consistent position of the Japanese government, which was represented by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Statement, and that he sympathized from the bottom of his heart with the former “comfort women” who suffered hardships. He also mentioned that he had expressed his apologies over the extremely painful situations into which they were placed.\textsuperscript{52}

This statement to President Bush is yet another example of Japanese counter reaction or, a diplomatic effort put forth merely to placate international uproar. President Bush was at least superficially convinced, stating that, “[…] he appreciated Prime Minister's candor and that he trusted Prime Minister Abe and believed in Japanese people's compassion for the former ‘comfort women’.”\textsuperscript{53} The confusion surrounding Japanese remorse stretched so deep as to not only warrant a mention to the President of the United States, but also be discussed and summarized in a seven-page report of a session of the United States Congress from that same year.

This year, Prime Minister Abe denied the existence of sexual slave camps. Then he retracted his statement because of pressure from leaders of the Asia-Pacific region. Now he says he “respects” the finding of the Kono report of 1993. What does this mean?\textsuperscript{54}

The summary of this session resulted in a statement in which an equally confused United States government demanded that the government of Japan take a series of measures to clarify its position.

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\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as ‘comfort women’, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II.\(^{55}\)

With this summarized statement of action given in the U.S. Congress, it was made clear exactly what the Japanese government had failed to do. The 2010 statements made by Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou accusing the Japanese government of never issuing a formal apology now seem to have complete legitimacy. The government had indeed formally apologized and supported a system of personal reparation, yet simultaneously destroyed this work with a later denial. Abe’s statement was the action of a single individual, but an individual who was not only a high governmental leader but a representation of current Japanese political policy. It is and was this exact lack of uniformity of action across the Japanese government that has caused continued controversy both domestically and internationally. A lack of any law defining historical truth and outlawing denial has gravely affected Japanese politics. A question and answer session with Deputy Press Secretary Tomohiko Taniguchi on March 9th, 2007 in which questions were asked regarding the recent denial of Prime Minister Abe revealed a further unwillingness to clarify the Japanese position. A majority of the questions asked were deflected with denial or never answered. The initial intent of the interview was to clear the air regarding Abe’s statements but it did little to reassure international doubts of sincerity and showed inconsistency amongst the officials within the Japanese government.

The courts of Japan, responsible for the ruling and testimonies of many former comfort women, are yet another example in which this lack of uniformity has been made clear. The inaction of the Japanese government has created confusion and discrepancy amongst not only international, but also domestic actors. Without a formal law from Tokyo outlawing either the continued denial of previous atrocities or establishing a sanctioned agenda, this inconsistency is sure to continue. In 1998, a local Japanese court ruled in favor of three Korean citizens who were formerly forced into the role of “comfort women.” The local judge then made a statement admonishing the national government.

In handing down the ruling, Judge Hideaki Chikashita of the Yamaguchi District Court in southern Japan said that Tokyo had neglected to fulfill its legal duty to repair the anguish suffered by the so-called “comfort women,” who were forced to work in brothels for Japan's former Imperial Army.\(^{56}\)

The ruling of Judge Hideaki Chikashita shows to those outside Japan that there is a gross inconsistency within the country. His ruling is an admission of the culpability of the Japanese and mirrors the exact belief of many foreign nations that the Japanese government did not officially apologize. This 1998 ruling came long before the 2007 contradictory statement from Prime Minister Abe. The inconsistent position between right and left wing politicians and local

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\(^{55}\) U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 21357.

and national governmental levels are fault lines that cast doubt on the official sincerity and true belief of Japan. These fault lines enable international actors to repeatedly and successfully label Japan as insincere and their statements as inadequate. Without a single cohesive and encompassing policy in place, damaging statements made by public officials will continue to crop up. Just weeks ago, in February of 2012, the Japanese Mayor of the sister city to Nanjing, Nagoya, denied the outright factual truth that Chinese civilians were massacred. Nanjing then suspended its relationship with Nagoya and urged the Mayor to apologize and rescind his comments. The Mayor, under no obligation to an overhead national Japanese law, took the opposite pattern and challenged the citizens of Nanjing. “There are many opinions about the so-called Nanjing incident,” he told reporters, using the Japanese term for the killings in December 1937. “I have said I want to have a debate with people from Nanjing.” While yet to be seen, there has been no official action taken by the Japanese government to force Takashi Kawamura to apologize and acquiesce with the Kono Statement.

Rhetoric and speaker can therefore be seen as far less important for perceived legitimacy than consistency. The aforementioned critical period, when apology is considered too little too late, is inapplicable to the Japanese situation. In light of the timeline, it is apparent that Japan, in various ways, sought to reestablish relations and apologize profusely. Their international reaction was, in comparison to Germany, comparable if not even more comprehensive. The most damaging factor to perceived sincerity is then not related to a critical period but rather contradiction and the lack of a single policy, enforced by law, from the national Japanese government.

Chapter 2

German Apologetic Addresses since World War II: Specific Rhetoric and the Futility of Denial

It is often the case in Japan that addresses and apologies are directly compared with those of Germany solely for the purpose of establishing the various shortcomings of Japan’s efforts. It is the opinion of many citizens of the international community, and more specifically those of Asian nations, that Japan has either insufficiently apologized or refused to apologize. While a direct comparison and analysis of both Japan and Germany will come in the third chapter, the following chapter will seek only to reveal the diplomatic course taken by Germany in the post-war and chronologically track addresses that confront wartime conduct or directly apologize for war crimes. As before, addresses will be analyzed upon the basis of rhetoric, context and a perceived level of self-contradiction.

A Galvanized Domestic Audience

Just a few years after the war, Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of the western section of a divided Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), made a series of speeches starting in 1948 that would define the very path of West Germany and a reunited Germany in the modern day. In 1948 at the second Christian Democratic Union (CDU) convention, Adenauer touched upon the Nazi past of Germany in relation to the dangers of the future. Adenauer, a member of the CDU party, contrasted the godless Nazi past with the Christian ideology of his party. He stated that although other parties had Christians, the ideology of his party would be based primarily upon individuality and personal freedom. An excerpt from his speech at the convention attempts to establish a clean break with Germany’s Nazi past. “National Socialism was not the first to spread the ideas to the German people that might is more important than right and that the individual is nothing and the state is everything. In addition we find that with the rise of socialism a new false doctrine emerged, the false doctrine of the collective.”

Chancellor Adenauer, while admitting the negative effects of National Socialism, addressed only the damage done to German citizens in a general nature. His address had ulterior motives and was by no means a direct apology to citizens of foreign nations but a cunning domestic political move. The collective doctrine, mentioned several times in this address, refers not only to the negative Nazi past but also warns of a collectivist communist bloc in the East. Only years after World War II, the Cold War became a premier political issue and one in which a capitalist West Germany would vie for any perceived political advantage. Adenauer, by juxtaposing the individualist and moral doctrine of his party with the collectivist and godless doctrine of the National Socialists, was able to define his person and party as unrelated to Nazi war guilt. The extent to which these ulterior motives were perceived by an international citizenry is unclear, although this address made clear the destructive nature of National Socialism on the German people and the intent of those in the post-war period to stray from the negative effects of perceived complicity.

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The postwar period in West Germany was one in which the National Socialist past was often avoided as a source of shame, discussed minimally with the post-war generation of children. The Nürnberg trials were in many ways seen as the definitive step in which the worst of the Nazi era were sentenced to death or prison and responsible for taking the collective German guilt with them. The question of guilt and where exactly it fell would be a haunting notion for Germans in the post-war era. This issue was domestically pertinent and one of the focal points of Adenauer's inaugural speech given to the Bundestag in 1949. Excerpts from this speech are included below.

Adenauer touches on several points in this speech worthy of deeper analysis. The first of which is the unwillingness of individual German citizens to confront their own level of involvement. This self-confrontation and finger pointing at one another was most abrasive on the domestic level. Adenauer, by stating that personal blame and blockage of former members of the Nazi party from public office at an inauguration in front of the entire Bundestag, would, and did receive immense support from all parties, “[…] we must no longer distinguish between two classes of people in Germany: those who are politically beyond reproach and those who are reproachable. This distinction must disappear as soon as possible!”50 The initial paragraph would then make it appear as if Germany was, within four years of the conclusion of World War II, already sufficiently beyond the past. The speech, however, does not end there. Adenauer then defines Nazi war guilt as something to be handled not from a bottom-up interpersonal level but a top-down governmental position.

Ladies and gentlemen, the fears that have been raised particularly in the foreign press about radical right activities in Germany are surely greatly exaggerated. I greatly regret that by circulating the offensive speeches of certain personalities, the new reports of German and foreign newspapers have attributed an importance to them that they have never had in Germany.59 This top-down approach would use, as stated in the address, the powers explicitly granted to the state to ensure the continuation of a democracy. This speech is significant not only because of its timing, coming just years after the war but also for its public and bipartisan nature. Given in front of the Bundestag, home to all German parties, Adenauer assured not only the domestic but also the international community that while he was at the helm, radical ideology had no foothold in party politics. The address, while lacking an apology, manages to touch upon the subject of denial and the main war crime, the Holocaust. Acknowledgement of the insecurity of the international stage toward Germany is granted. An admission of past anti-Semitism is utilized to show how a continuation of this ideology would be foolhardy and insulting to victims but also to post-war Germans committed to rebuilding their international reputation. “We consider it shameful and really unbelievable that after everything that has happened in the National Socialist period that there could still be people in Germany who persecute or despise Jews because they are Jews.”50 By calling out anti-Semites, Adenauer attempts to marginalize this group and cast them as not only separate from a modern Germany but as a definitive minority. The following paragraph mentions the intention of West Germany to join the European Union and reintegrate

59 Stackeberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 397-399.
themselves in peaceful European politics. By stating that Germany belongs with the Western-European world alludes to the civility of a postwar Germany, as if to state that they have been sufficiently socially groomed as to sit amongst such high caliber nations. The last paragraph is a humble attempt to thank the United States for mercifully managing West Germany, at least in comparison with the settlement of Eastern Germany by the Soviets. This statement also alludes to the positive nature of capitalism and the commitment of West Germany to move toward democracy, peace and mutual international cooperation.

In an address to the CDU party in 1952, Adenauer chose to address the issue of specific responsibility toward Jews. This address was an admission of the depth of German culpability and a proposed political path that should be taken in order to properly restore international relations not solely with Israel but with all international actors. Moral, political and economic grounds were listed as justification for proposed reparation payments as if to clarify to domestic actors that any other course would not benefit Germany to the same extent. This justification also reveals that in no way was complete agreement from the CDU guaranteed, but resistance toward direct reparation payments was, at least from Adenauer’s point of view, to be expected.

This speech by Adenauer is one of the most telling, detailing the extent of atrocities committed by Germans during the war. The address admits guilt, stating that not only were Jews killed but also profit was made off of these horrifying crimes. “[...] It is absolutely true that Germany, the Federal Republic, does not have any legal obligations with regard to the Republic of Israel, but the Federal Republic does have great moral obligations.” The extent of the concentration camp system is not specified, however, the admission of guilt is then followed by a distinct plan of action, informing domestic and international actors that the German government’s words are sincere, if only because they are backed financially. “Whoever speaks must also act. Words are cheap. But words must be followed by actions.” The West German government understands the potential repercussions of only speaking about remorse. The Chancellor then clarifies the consequences of self-contradiction and most especially self-contradiction between rhetoric and true action. The West German leadership’s recognition of the dangers of denial and a lack of uniformity are keen. An admission of guilt and a proposed reparation plan must be followed through with since they have already been publicly announced. Adenauer is well aware of the danger of perceived contradiction within the German government. “I hope that the cabinet will not make things difficult for me. If the cabinet did cause problems, it would be a foreign policy disaster of the first order. It would not only be a political disaster, it would also strongly impede all our efforts to acquire foreign credit again.” It appears here as if the most detrimental diplomatic action would be to publicly reveal the political disparity between citizens and between members of government. Adenauer states, “Therefore I ask you, if the matter turns out as I hope, and if opposition also arises in our own ranks, nonetheless to reflect on my words and to help people really appreciate that the settlement with the Jews is morally, politically, and economically an absolute necessity.” A politically unified approach can then be considered the only approach. The rhetoric of this address lacks an apologetic tone yet maintains a business-like candor that acknowledges the possibility of resistance and emphasizes the importance of unity and the consequences of a lack thereof.

Stackleberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 400-401.
In the same year, President of West Germany, Theodor Heuss, made a groundbreaking step by physically visiting a concentration camp. The President was no longer able to speak in generalities, but instead forced to confront atrocities first hand at the exact location where thousands of Jews were either worked to death or killed. Heuss spoke to the concentration camp system as a whole and the extent to which average Germans knew of this system, a question that unrelentingly hounded citizens and was the subject of much historical debate. Bergen-Belsen, the camp at which President Heuss spoke in 1952, is significant not only for its dedication of a monument of remembrance but also for its location within the very heart of Germany. Heuss stated that Bergen-Belsen is a camp often ignored when contrasted with likes of Dachau, yet one that cannot and should never be ignored.

President Heuss made several very important statements in his address at Belsen. The first paragraph clarified the German duty toward historical confrontation and contrasted it with the cowardice required to massacre innocent people. This shows a marked effort to define the past as one of cowardly collectivist thought and the present and future as a brave new period of openness and truth. Regarding the occasion to speak at Bergen-Belsen, Heuss stated, “For a refusal or an excuse would have seemed cowardly to me [...].” Heuss made it clear that refusal to speak on behalf of the victims of Belsen was indeed an option; it was one that should never be taken by German citizens or politicians in the future. The second paragraph seeks to highlight the dangers of denial. “Anyone who wanted to gloss over or trivialize these crimes or even justify them by referring to the misuse of so-called “reasons of state” would simply be insolent.” It is then made the unofficial policy of the German government to label doubters and deniers as fools and detrimental to the overall good of humanity, but more specifically the German future. The concluding paragraphs speak to the collective guilt of the German citizenry and once again reinforce the weakness of denial and its detrimental effect for the victims and the international reputation of Germans. “[...] Belsen was missing from my list of terror and shame and Auschwitz too. This remark is not meant to be a crutch for those who like to say: We knew nothing about all that. We did know about these things.” The question of anti-Semitism as a uniquely German problem was hotly debated and in need of disproving in the postwar period. “They will never, they can never forget what was done to them; the Germans must never forget what was done by people of their nationality in these shameful years.”61 Because anti-Semitism has been labeled as a uniquely German problem, Heuss emphasized the unique nature of the German responsibility to remember. The greatest emphasis of this address at Belsen was then placed upon the importance of remembrance and the dangers of denial with special attention given to the use of the collective ‘we’ and multiple references to the shared responsibility of every German, regardless of age. While this address lacked explicit remorseful rhetoric, the specificity and location of the speech, at the very site of atrocities, was a sincere acknowledgement of guilt. 1952 was a year in which both the Chancellor and the President of West Germany displayed a consistency in their respective addresses and set a precedent for German policy in the future.

As evidenced in the 1948 speech given by Konrad Adenauer, the politics of the cold war had a deep and inseparable relationship with German apology, affecting the perception of apologetic addresses and often rendering them as tools of propaganda. Just as Adenauer assailed the collectivist mentality of his Eastern counterpart in earlier speeches, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Otto Grotewohl, reciprocated ten years later in 1958 at the

61 Stackleberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 401-402.
dedication of a memorial at Buchenwald. Grotewohl juxtaposed assumed West Germany policy with the anti-fascists, for whom he dedicated this memorial, therefore asserting that East Germany had done more to shed its National Socialist past.

Glory and honor to their memory! Glory and honor to the heroic anti-fascist fighters, whom we shall never forget, for they are immortal.

In one part of Germany the great idea of the anti-fascist fighters has been realized and a peaceful state has been created, by which other peoples will never again be threatened. Today two German states stand before the world. One has learned from the mistakes of German history. It has learned good and right lessons. It is the German Democratic Republic—a state of peace and socialism.

But the West German state is a refuge of reactionaries in which militarists and fascists have attained power once again; the state’s aggressive character is revealed in its reactionary actions.62

The address successfully established East Germany as separated from its National Socialist past, having defined itself as a peaceful government with an ideology that is opposite of fascism, at least politically. Grotewohl creates two subjects in his address, anti-fascists and the West German state. It is then made clear that because West Germany is not celebrating the triumph of anti-fascist fighters, a renewed fascism continues. The references to militarism are related to the West German states entrance into NATO and political polarization against communism. The single flaw with this address stems from its neglect of the Jewish victims, arguably the ones most heavily persecuted at Buchenwald. The significance of choosing to ignore Jewish victims cannot be understated. The use of generalities would be, in these addresses, the defining factor between East and West German reparation statements. Evidence of anti-Semitism and general fear of foreigners, Ausländerfeindlichkeit, in modern day East and West Germany suggests the wide reaching effect of rhetoric and specificity of subject matter. Although the country is reunited, the former East Germany is home to lingering anti-Semitic beliefs and attitudes even in the modern day; beliefs that have little to no stronghold in the western half of the country. A reunited Germany proves the discrepancy in xenophobia can be drawn back to the diplomatic handling of addresses by both nations to confront wartime atrocities. West Germany chose to confront atrocities head on, detailing the exact extent of damage done to specific victims such as the Jews. The West German state contrasted itself with that of East Germany but not for the purpose of actively ignoring specific victims.

Brandt’s Precedent: A Picture Seen Round the World

Twenty-five years after the conclusion of fighting, West Germany sought to patch up relations with one of the most damaged nations in world history. Poland was the site of the 1970 “Treaty of Warsaw” in which Germany agreed to maintain the geographic borders agreed upon in the Potsdam conference and normalize relations. Leading up to the “Treaty of Warsaw,” there remained a concern amongst the Polish that the Germans would actively seek to renego on the territorial agreement, granting Poland a territorial boundary along the Odor River, as highlighted in the Potsdam Conference of 1945. A conservative backlash from members within his party

62 Stackleberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 405-406.
greeted Brandt when news of his choice to uphold the existing border reached home. This backlash proved to Poland that their initial concerns were indeed founded. The November signing of this treaty was followed by the famous visit to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Memorial in December by Willy Brandt.

The opening paragraph to the “Treaty of Warsaw” uses a tone of mutual cooperation in which it is made clear that both West Germany and Poland are to play an equal role in reestablishing relations. It appears as if the entire address was written simultaneously with cooperation from both sides and little to no clarification is given as to Germany’s culpability in inflicting “heavy sufferings.”

The People's Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany, considering that 25 years have passed since the end of the Second World War, the first victim of which was Poland and which brought about heavy sufferings to nations of Europe [...] 

While the war itself is given as the only cause for victims, the first and fourth articles of the treaty are the crux of the territorial agreement between the two nations. West Germany, according to this treaty, agreed to uphold the original territorial boundaries laid out in the 1945 Potsdam Agreement at the conclusion of the Second World War. Article II clarifies this by stating, “They confirm the inviolability of their existing borders, now and in future, and they mutually obligate themselves for unreserved respect of their territorial integrity.” While the “Treaty of Warsaw” did little to address any level of remorse from the German side, a deeper and more important point was raised. Due to the fact that Germany upheld the territorial boundaries agreed upon at the end of the Second World War, the Polish government and people perceived no level of self-contradiction.

Although Willy Brandt was the sole signer of this treaty, he was greeted with a conservative backlash amongst members of his CDU party upon his return home. Members of Brandt’s party were unhappy, citing the fourth article of the treaty as evidence to the contrary of the second. The fourth article states, “The present Agreement does not concern bilateral or multilateral international agreements previously concluded by the parties or concerning them.” Conservative members were of the impression that the treaty would have no effect upon international agreements such as the Potsdam Agreement and therefore would hold no international weight allowing for later border reform. The most important factor affecting the perceived sincerity of Brandt’s signing was that the domestic political controversy surrounding the treaty was kept amongst West German politicians rather than being directed toward the international political spectrum. Regardless of a controversy of domestic opinion, official German policy would uphold the Potsdam Agreement, therefore conveying a strongly conciliatory and consistent policy toward foreign nations from 1945 to the present day. What this treaty lacked in heartfelt rhetoric, it made up for with its ratification and German willingness to uphold past policy. This action was much greater than words and was a sign to all foreign nations. Poland, the most devastatingly affected by past German territorial expansion, was the perfect site for a show of remorse. Regardless of changes in West German political office, a policy of reconciliation could be counted upon. In regards to the importance of consistency of policy, Brandt wrote in his memoirs, “[...] it was important for us to establish that, as with the other Eastern treaties, the validity of treaties concluded earlier was unaffected and that no international agreements were jeopardized.” Brandt also noted a conversation he had with
French President de Gaulle in which he stated, “(borders) must be less divisive and less hurtful.” It is then clear that Brandt fully understood the importance of territory, amongst all nations and not just Poland, as the physical representation of a change in policy and as the ultimate way by which a state conveys sincerity and trust in the future of relations.

An excerpt from Willy Brandt’s memoir *My Life in Politics* published in 1992 highlighted the events after his December 1970 visit to the Warsaw. The reason for reports following his December 1970 visit had, however, little to do with the “Warsaw Treaty” of a month before and everything to do with the iconic pictures of him kneeling in front of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Memorial. Brandt once again met conservative opposition for this maneuver upon his arrival home in Germany, with more conservative members of his party stating that the gesture was overdone. While Brandt dropping to his knees did not directly constitute an apology, it caught the attention of the international press. Cliché as it is, a picture says a thousand words and this single action by the Chancellor of West Germany spoke volumes on an occasion when words failed him. Interviews with Willy Brandt were granted due to his kneeling at the statue in Warsaw. In Brandt’s memoirs, despite domestic criticism, Brandt did not contradict his initial action yet reinforced his opinion and delved deeper into his motivations for doing so. Brandt then clarified the harm caused to Jews by the Germans, a subject that was inherently lacking in the “Treaty of Warsaw” just a month before. “Who can name all the Jews from Poland, and other parts of Europe, who were annihilated in Auschwitz alone? The memory of six million murder victims lay along my road to Warsaw […].” The horrors of the concentration camp were brought up and more specifically, the worst of all camps, Auschwitz. While Brandt did not apologize on behalf of Germany, he detailed the personal struggle of traveling to Poland and the challenges of reconciliation under such grave circumstances. “I had not planned anything (kneeling), but I had left Wilanow Castle, where I was staying, with a feeling that I must express the exceptional significance of the ghetto memorial. From the bottom of the abyss of German history, under the burden of millions of victims of murder, I did what human beings do when speech fails them.”

A survey in an issue of the popular German weekly publication, *Der Spiegel*, pictured Brandt on his knees and asked the question of whether or not his doing so was appropriate (Dürfte Brandt knien?). In response to this survey, nearly half of all West Germans, 48%, voted that Brandt’s kneeling was exaggerated. The polarization of German opinion is proof of a harsh political atmosphere in which Brandt had little personal incentive to so sternly back up his claims, faced with the very real threat of losing political support. A vote of no confidence followed two years later and although it did not ultimately result in Brandt’s dismissal from office it proved just how vulnerable his tenure in office was. A gesture of this nature was indeed a risk taken on behalf of attempts at conveyed sincerity. Brandt’s term in office then became one of political consistency in which reconciliation was placed in front of personal gain despite a predictable conservative backlash. While direct apology with remorseful rhetoric such as ‘sorry’ or ‘apologize’ was never given, the kneeling conveyed sincerity to the international community with an established trust that Germany would never stray from non-expansion and reflection. An interview directly following Brandt’s kneeling at Warsaw included a description of his actions

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64 Ibid., 409-410.
that made international news, “Then he who does not need to kneel knelt, on behalf of all who do not need to kneel but do not—because they dare not, or cannot, or cannot dare to kneel.” Brandt’s visit to Warsaw was proof of an overhead government consistently following an agenda of reconciliation and setting the example by which citizens and politicians openly discuss specific atrocities. As apology, by definition, is the acknowledgement of misdeed, the kneeling in Warsaw was the ultimate physical symbol of apologetic sentiment. Brandt’s government sponsored biography website chronicles the history of his term in office and highlights the significance of the kneeling, “Es steht für einen Politiker und Staatsmann, der weit über sein Land hinaus moralische Maßstäbe setzt” (It [the kneeling] stood for a politician and statesman who was well past the moral standards set by his land). The international publicity following Brandt’s visit to Poland was outstanding and showed the power of a senior politician in steering foreign policy in the face of domestic opposition as to convey sincerity.

Dangers of Contradiction: Germans Watching Germans

While strong national policy by the West German government and its leaders such as Adenauer and Brandt were sufficient to assuage international doubt and suppress the popularity of domestic radical conservatism, the 1980s marked a decade in which historical revisionism would cast doubt upon Germanys sincerity. The German historian Ernst Nolte, author of a revisionist text The European Civil War, 1917-1945: National Socialism und Bolschevism, had the outline of his book printed in the German newspaper Frankurter Allgemeine in 1986. The text set off a war in the German media between various historians and academics. The controversial nature of the article stemmed from Nolte’s relabeling of the Holocaust and the Nazi period as a whole. The crux of Nolte’s argument, or at least the controversial issue, was his comparison of the Holocaust with other genocidal events. The author attempted to strip the Holocaust of its unique label, a label that oft defined the way in which Jews were exterminated as solely a German problem. Nolte states,

The attention devoted to the “Final Solution” diverts attention from important facts about the National Socialist period, such as, for example, the killing of “life unworthy of living” and the treatment of Russian prisoners of war. But above all it diverts attention from crucial questions of the present- for example, questions about the existence of “unborn life” or the reality of “genocide” yesterday in Vietnam and today in Afghanistan.

Not only did Nolte attempt to marginalize the impact of the Holocaust in his paper, he also sought to justify the necessity, at least in Hitler’s mind, of genocide as a counter measure to a tangible threat against the National Socialist government. This therefore construed Germany as the defensive power burdened with fighting off an offensive threat. This was, as proved by the reaction in the press, no small assumption.

Sociologist Jürgen Habermas and Historian Hans Mommsen wrote response articles to Nolte’s publication in which they analyzed rhetoric and provided counter arguments to Nolte’s. The response by both authors was swift and decisive. Alfred Dregger, a parliamentary leader of

66 Stackleberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 410.
68 Stackleberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 415.
the CDU/CSU spoke in 1986 about the limited extent that Germans knew about the genocidal aspect of the Final Solution. Mommsen and others considered Dregger’s remarks egregious. A 1987 article written by Mommsen entitled “Reappraisal and repression: The Third Reich in West German historical consciousness,” highlighted the trends of historical reflection on National Socialism. In it he noted the extent to which rebuilding national pride in Germany was not only a difficult task, but also a topic that should be handled with the utmost caution. Jürgen Habermas openly criticized both Nolte and Dregger for their revisionism in favor of renewed German national identity. Unlike previous politicians, Dregger’s statements were a contradiction. Historian Mommsen stated, “He preferred to regard the Third Reich as a system of domination forced on Germany by Hitler and a small band of criminals.” While many in Germany were not instantly honest with the National Socialist past, the counter statements by Mommsen and Habermas was proof of a larger trend within Germany. The Historian’s Debate, Historikerstreit, is evidence of critical segment within the German population that has and will continue to challenge historical inaccuracy. Although Dregger’s statement came from a position of authority within the government and was indeed contradictory to past German governmental policy, the fact remains that German citizens were the first to challenge both Nolte and Dregger. Domestic criticism of damaging conservative views has been essential in Germany, helping to counter the perceived legitimacy of these views from an international perspective. Germany’s international reputation for sincerity has been reinforced by these challenges to right wing viewpoints. Without the initial reaction of West German academics and citizens, non-Germans would have taken up criticism toward Nolte and Dregger, citizens who likely would have successfully labeled all Germans as subscribers to these philosophies. The Historian’s Debate was then a crucial period in the German history of the 1980s in which renewed conservatism, revisionist histories and perceived self-contradiction were stymied.

The following decade, the 1990s, saw another surge in renewed conservatism and extreme right wing beliefs that were once again countered by other Germans, relegating those with right wing beliefs to a marginalized section of society both metaphorically and literally as to show the hardened and consistent stance of the German government and its citizens. Statistics from the Federal Ministry of the Interior reported a 54% increase in right wing violence from 1991 to 1992. Although these acts were deemed as random and localized, the German government addressed the matters promptly. The report from the Federal Ministry of the Interior includes several stern notes renouncing the legitimacy of right wing violence. The report states, Instigation of hate against foreigners and violence against the lives, health, or property of people living in our country, regardless of whether they are Germans or foreigners, must be resolutely condemned. We Germans know from the painful part of our history that extremism, hate, and violence have always led to disaster. [...] In conclusion, I would like to emphasize: the Federal Government-together with other governmental authorities- will resolutely continue its

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70 Stackleberg and Winkle, The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, 430.
71 Ibid., 434.
measures against right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism, and hostility to foreigners.\textsuperscript{72}

The report not only addresses the historical sensitivity of the matter at hand but also cites the authority of the central government and the obedience of the local governments in following the policy of honesty and confrontation against hostility. Although the speaker is anonymous, the article cites the exact reported figures of violence and the government’s reaction to date, which includes increased police presence and investigative teams. The report also mentions the overwhelming reaction of the German citizenry as if to clarify that this is not merely semantics from the government but a black and white issue where the majority condemn extreme violence against foreigners.

August 1992 marked the date on which a series of riots against foreigners broke out in Germany. The Rostock riots of 1992 marked the worst racial violence in Germany since the conclusion of the war and although there were no casualties, the inaction of police and bystanders was heavily scrutinized following the conclusion two days later.\textsuperscript{73} November 1992 saw a counter reaction in the form of a series of vigils and protest marches against xenophobic violence in which all of the major cities within Germany including Berlin, Munich, Dresden, Hamburg, Dortmund, Frankfurt, Hannover, Stuttgart, Essen and Kiel were overtaken with protesters. German government estimates state that roughly three million citizens from 1992 to 1993 were active in demonstrating against right wing violence.\textsuperscript{74} This counter reaction by German citizens of their own volition dwarfed the culprits responsible for right wing violence in the early 1990s. A simple show of support by the citizenry proves the difference in supporters and protesters of right wing violence. The protest movement following the Rostock riots of 1992 was evidence to the international community that Germany was indeed sincere and that right wing extremists were a marginalized and unsponsored group. After all, silent condemnation without active resistance echoes of not only culpability but also exact methods through which Nazis exacted heinous crimes.

Just as a majority of the German citizenry took responsibility by publicly condemning the Rostock riots and other right wing violence during the 1990s, the trend continued into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. An article that appeared in \textit{Die Zeit}, a major German newspaper, told the story of Germans who were part of the “Courage Project.” This project involved the recruitment of German college students to tour schools in Saxony, a former East German state in order to dissuade right wing sentiment and reeducate citizens as to the truth about foreigners.\textsuperscript{75} The German government funded this project and the German Federation of Labor (DGB) paid volunteers. The article, while focusing on an inspirational story, also assumed a tone of condemnation toward radical right wing xenophobia. This is then a sign that the German press chooses to not only focus on stories that condemn xenophobia, yet also holds this opinion themselves.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Maryellen Fullerton, \textit{Germany for Germans: Xenophobia and Racist Violence in Germany} (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), 79.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Stackleberg and Winkle, \textit{The Nazi Germany Sourcebook}, 437-439.
\end{itemize}
Remorseful Rhetoric: Decades of Delay

German apology, had until the 21st century, appeared less apologetic and remorse filled than one would first assume. Specific apology with rhetoric that mentioned “sorry” or “remorse” was curiously lacking from the scope of historical German addresses. Germany had established consistency and unity of political policy at the national and local level and the respective chancellors of the West German government had given various addresses, yet specifically apologetic rhetoric was still missing. Assuming the perceived sincerity of German apology, this then begs the question of the true significance of apologetic rhetoric and its effect upon perceived sincerity.

Riding a trend of apologies in the 1990s and 21st century by all nations, the year 2000 marked one of the first rhetorically precise apologies (“sorry”, “remorse”, “regret” etc.) from the German government. President Johannes Rau, on a trip to Israel addressed the parliament and gave words of consolation and apology regarding the Holocaust and damage done to the Jewish people. This trip marked the first occurrence in which a German president spoke in the Jewish Parliament. In what is often referred to as the Knesset speech, Rau stated:

With the people of Israel watching, I bow in humility before those murdered, before those who don't have graves where I could ask them for forgiveness. I am asking for forgiveness for what Germans have done, for myself and my generation, for the sake of our children and grandchildren, whose future I would like to see alongside the children of Israel.\(^\text{76}\)

While Rau addressed the specifics of the Holocaust and the large number of victims, the significant sentence that contained apologetic rhetoric is the second sentence in which Rau specifically asks for forgiveness. This shows that the German people know they have seriously wronged many nations in the past, specifically Israel. The international knowledge of Germany’s acceptance of atrocities, as grounded in undeniable truth, was vital toward perceived sincerity. Another address that utilized apologetic rhetoric came five years later from Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In an address to the Russian nation, Schröder stated,

We apologize to you for the pain inflicted at the hands of the Germans. The Russian people paid a higher price in terms of human suffering than any other people in the fight for victory against Hitler’s Germany. This price included the loss of 27 million lives, and uncountable destruction.\(^\text{77}\)

Schröder’s address, like Rau’s, included the specifics of destruction inflicted by the Nazi German state yet also made an unprecedented move by specifically utilizing the word “apologize.”

German apology in the 21st century does continue a trend of uninterrupted consistency and sincerity although the late rise of apologetic rhetoric remains curious. This places German


apologetic rhetoric at roughly sixty years after the conclusion of World War II, calling into question the notion of a critical period when apology is considered too little too late. The comparison of Japanese and German addresses in the following chapter will highlight the differences in order to explain the power of German apology and perceived insincerity of Japanese apology.
Chapter 3
Domestic and International Reception of Apologetic Addresses, a Juxtaposition: Rhetoric, Context and Perceived Self-contradiction

Iris Chang’s novel, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of WWII* set off an international controversy regarding not only Japanese conduct during the war but also the actions of the Japanese government and citizenry after the war. While her work brought attention to the issue of reparation, controversy arose surrounding her direct comparison of Nanking with the Holocaust. Iris Chang attempted to draw direct similarities and noted the differences with the Holocaust both in scale, number of victims and methodology. There are several problems that arise when one attempts to compare another genocidal event with the Holocaust. Due to the magnitude of the Holocaust, it becomes a baseline for any comparison concerning genocide and is not something that can simply be used to contrast other events. David MacDonald, author of “Forgetting and Denying: Iris Chang, the Holocaust and the Challenge of Nanking,” clarifies the deceptive nature of her labeling Nanking as an Asian Holocaust. MacDonald argues, due to the ubiquitous nature of the Holocaust, whether conscious or subconscious in historical memory, a direct comparison leads to a deceptive mental framework in which the perpetrators of Nanking are unintentionally assimilated with characters of Nazi Germany, “[...] the Holocaust and its elements help to ‘sell’ and package the atrocity, with Nazi-like persecutors, Jew-like victims, and Schindler-like bystanders.”78 Chang and MacDonald provide evidence as to the danger that arises when writing a textual analysis that compares genocidal acts.

Just as direct comparison of Nanking and the Holocaust is misleading, Japanese and German attempts to acknowledge and make amends through apology for wartime atrocities must be understood through a lens by which official addresses are analyzed individually. While the differing social situations of both nations, Germany as a divided nation and Japan as united, have undoubtedly had an effect upon apologetic statements and actions, two constants must be considered. Individuals from both nations following WWII were guilty of war crimes and within years of the wars conclusion, international sentiment determined that reparation and apology was the just course of action. Although the comfort women and the Nanking Massacre cannot and should not be compared directly with the Holocaust, relevance can be drawn from the simple fact that it was seen necessary by an international audience for Japan and Germany to apologize for respective atrocities committed. Several criteria will ensure the analysis of apologetic addresses remains focused and balanced, only comparing addresses upon the criteria aforementioned in the previous two chronology chapters. The criteria will be as follows: Date of address, rhetoric and vocabulary within address, date and rhetoric in conjunction, speaker, and finally contradiction or the inability to establish a uniform foreign policy regarding apology.

While the first initial attempt at an apologetic address came from the Japanese, it was never delivered. Hirohito’s attempt to apologize to General MacArthur was shut down and therefore, cannot be factored into the greater timeline, yet should be remembered as an attempt at interpersonal apology directly following the war. The Germans then made the first steps toward addresses that confronted war atrocities in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the years following

the war, Adenauer gave direct speeches to his CDU/CSU party and to the Bundestag in 1948, 1949 and 1951, the addresses were specific and contained outright admissions of guilt, highlighting the dangers of denying the existence of atrocities. While Japan was first to visit foreign nations and utilized remorseful diction, the addresses were nowhere near as specific as Germany’s and did not include direct and clear admissions of guilt. The 1960s was a decade of limited contrition in Japan. The 1970s however was a defining decade for Germany. Both Japan and Germany addressed the issue of war guilt; however Willy Brandt’s actions in Warsaw made historical news in comparison to the “Joint Communiqué” that was initiated by the Chinese. While the 1970s was a decade of contrition for the German government, the 1980s resulted in a conservative backlash from parties within both nations. The way in which that backlash was handled by both respective governments differed, however. Academics and political figures alike never outright denied atrocities yet sought to cast doubt upon the historical interpretation of such events. In what became known as the Historian’s Debate, German citizens held one another responsible before international attention was drawn to the issue. The Japanese textbook controversy, exploded in international news when remarks made by the Minister of Education, Fujio, denied the extent of atrocities. Even though Fujio was fired, the events were damaging in that his statement was made to an international audience before other members within the Japanese government could effectively censor it. The 1990s and 2000s included addresses by both nations and specific apologetic remarks, although Japanese self-contradiction, the denial by some politicians of known truths, cast doubt upon Japanese sincerity that never affected the German side.

Analyzed solely upon date of address, it appears as if both nations have addressed the issue of postwar guilt and reparations. The timelines provide evidence at a survey level through which conclusions can be drawn. Without looking at the content of the addresses, the sheer number of such high-level official addresses, given not once, but multiple times under different circumstances, is evidence of both nations’ attempts to effectively apologize. While the Germans addressed the issue nearly a decade earlier, the Japanese have apologized more frequently. It would be hasty to assume that the sheer number of addresses is significant. After all, in the case of both the Germans and the Japanese, addresses were often given to make up for self-contradiction, denial and insincerity at the domestic level on the part of either citizens or other government officials.

The rhetoric of these apologetic speeches can provide the contextual significance not evident by simply noting the date. Unlike in the previous chapters, where each speech was analyzed individually, a greater overview of addresses throughout time shows the overall trend in word choice and whether or not specificity and sincerity increased or decreased with time. In the case of the Japanese, official rhetoric remained relatively consistent up until the present day. Starting with Kishi’s address, words such as “regret” and “atone” were utilized, setting a precedent through which apologetic rhetoric was incorporated into addresses. Shiina, then Prime Minister of Japan in the 1960s, stated a shared “remorse” in the 1965 “Treaty on Basic Relations” although it did not mention specific damages and utilized the pronoun “we,” as if to mask responsibility. The decades following contained more statements of expressed remorse from the Japanese that failed to explicitly state for what or to whom exactly the government was apologizing. The 1980s was a decade in which the Japanese would apologize on a more specific level, yet only as a counter reaction when provoked to correct the false statements made by other governmental officials. The statements made by Japanese Prime Ministers in the 1990s
regarding “comfort women” were very specific and contained remorseful vocabulary such as “apology.” The 21st century saw two addresses by Japanese officials regarding doubt about the accuracy of Japanese atrocities as expressed by Prime Minister Abe and Mayor Takashi Kawamura of the Japanese sister city to Nanking. These addresses were, however, only given in order to cast doubt upon the historical accuracy of atrocities. In summary, the Japanese efforts to apologize to Korea and China, as well as various other Asian nations, followed a distinct course in the post war period: addresses were filled with remorseful references yet remained unspecified. If specifics were mentioned, it was usually as a response to statements made by other Japanese officials that were politically counterproductive and offensive to the international community.

The German case differed in many regards, especially the extent to which remorseful rhetoric was utilized. The addresses by Adenauer directly following the war revolved more around confronting the government’s top down role in redefining a new Germany. Specifics were utilized, namely speaking directly about the deep diplomatic importance of confronting the Holocaust and specifically the persecution of Jews. Although the rhetoric was not remorseful, action such as financial reparation was given in order to convey remorse. The 1952 address at Bergen-Belsen did not include a specific apology on behalf of the Germans, yet it spoke to the perils of denial and contradiction at a very specific level, mentioning several concentration camps and the extent of German knowledge of them. The actions of Willy Brandt, his Kniefall in Warsaw in 1970, did not include an apology for atrocities and were, according to his words, spontaneous. While Brandt never apologized, his Kniefall reached a worldwide audience and gave him the opportunity, despite conservative pressure, to convey authentic, heartfelt remorse and candid acknowledgement. The “Historians Debate,” the period in the 1980s during which intellectuals debated the proper way to handle German war guilt, did not result in an apologetic address yet showed the extent to which Germans were willing to challenge right wing viewpoints of other Germans—whether politicians or intellectuals. The government reaction to right wing violence in the 1990s continued a trend of top down government responsibility for denouncing right wing activity and the destruction caused by these beliefs. An overarching view of German apology from the end of WWII until the conclusion of the 20th century shows limited evidence as to the extent of German knowledge of them. 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government did not, however, begin using apologetic rhetoric until roughly sixty years after the conclusion of the war while Japan, in contrast, began expressing remorse, sorrow and regret starting just ten years after the end of World War II. What then did Germany do differently to effectively convey sincerity?

Judging by the aforementioned reaction to Hirohito’s vague statement made in the 1980s, which spoke of a regrettable history between Japan and Korea that should not be repeated, it is not only what is said that conveys sincerity but also who, and in what context, the address was delivered. One of the most important factors relating to context, in the case of German and Japanese efforts to apologize, was the geographic location of the official address and more specifically whether or not the address was delivered on foreign soil, or in some cases, at the exact location where genocidal atrocities were committed. Sincerity can indeed be conveyed without words. An analysis of the speaker and place of address shows glaring and vital differences in the German and Japanese attempts at reparation.

At first it appears as if high governmental figures within both governments have spoken on the topic. In the Japanese case, the Prime Ministers, who are the leaders and highest members of the Japanese governments, have been the most outspoken in expressing heartfelt remorseful rhetoric throughout the course of the postwar period. Other figures responsible for postwar apologetic statements include the Emperor Hirohito, several Chief Cabinet Secretaries and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic figures most responsible for addresses regarding war guilt on the German side included several Chancellors (ex: Adenauer, Brandt, Schröder etc.) and the then President of Germany. While figures on both sides appear to be reputable heads of state capable of making an address that is deemed legitimate, there remain several differences in the ways in which they delivered the addresses. On the Japanese side, starting in the 1950s, there was insecurity regarding the stability of prime ministers. Since the conclusion of the Second World War there have been over thirty Prime Ministers of Japan, a figure that, for the international community, is harder to keep track of than the less comprehensive list of German chancellors. The sheer number, while a product of the Japanese political system, decreases the political weight of a specific minister’s address amongst an international community. This makes it more difficult to formulate long-term opinions regarding governmental leaders; their short tenure makes the formulation of a strong opinion more difficult. The international community does not identify efforts to apologize with a specific individual. While the position of prime minister remains at the peak of Japanese political power, the emperor was and still is the very symbol of Japan. The case of Hirohito is then potentially significant. Not only does Hirohito take away from the legitimacy of the apologetic statements of various prime ministers, his position, seen by some in the international community as the true reflection of Japanese sincerity, also places an extreme expectation upon his reaction to all events, most especially postwar recovery and compensation, as the representative of the spirit of Japan. Yet another influential factor was Hirohito’s involvement in World War II. His term during the war, and continued role thereafter marks no break in Japanese history, therefore blurring the line between wartime government and postwar government. For those Asian nations wronged by Japan, specifically China and Korea, apology from Hirohito was considered the official stamp of Japanese sincerity. The prime ministers of the day were merely short-term political figures rather than national symbols who had lived through the events in question. Focusing in on all factors in conjunction, Hirohito’s address in 1984 then preceded many of those given by prime ministers, cabinet secretaries and ministers of foreign affairs, although it came nearly forty years
after the conclusion of the war and lacked the remorseful rhetoric present in statements made by other governmental figures.

Addresses given by Japanese politicians remain controversial while German addresses were not put into question. Two figures were active in the German case, thus simplifying the personification of apology and lending it a human face and therefore legitimacy. Chancellorship is a position in Western and reunited Germany that is the center and helm of political power. The President of Germany holds a position, yet political power is limited and the role is restricted. The impetus to make speeches regarding war guilt then lies with the Chancellor of Germany. In contrast to the Japanese prime ministerial role, chancellorship within Germany is far more consistent. Only eight chancellors have served since the conclusion of the war, making them recognizable figures of authority and responsibility. Weight placed upon the statements of a chancellor is then considered to be truly representative of a government’s priorities and spirit because of their status as the head of government and their time of tenure.

The geographic location of apologetic addresses had an incredible secondary effect upon the respective nations that were addressed. While rhetoric and speaker were obvious factors affecting perceived sincerity, the symbolic effect of location, especially with regard to the site of a memorial or genocidal act, cannot be overstated. The inclusion of a geographic location within the name of a speech often speaks to the occasion without necessarily needing to clarify the content of the speech (Ex: Warschauer Kneifall). The location deepens the significance and existentially proves the historical truth of an issue and enhances international perceptions of authenticity. Japanese addresses in the postwar period deeply lacked significant and memorable geographic locations. With the exception of Kishi’s statements made on foreign soil, during a wreath laying ceremony at an Australian war memorial, a majority of statements were issued through impersonal press releases and completely lacked a geographic location. Kishi’s wreath laying at an Australian war shrine was met with an outstanding international reception yet addresses at significant locations did not continue. The 1972 communiqué between Japan and China was held in Beijing, the capital of China. The Chinese requested an apology as a precondition to the conference, showing a lack of Japanese impetus toward remorse.

German addresses, while occasionally given to a completely domestic audience, differed in several important ways. The first speeches given by Konrad Adenauer were given in the Bundestag and in front of his CDU/CSU party. The timing and the content of Adenauer’s domestic speeches gave the geographic location of Bonn, the heart of the West German government, a greater significance. The specificity of Adenauer’s speeches was intense: mentioning the negative war crimes of the past, the fears of the international community, obligation toward financial reparation and the governments responsibility in enforcing the truth. Adenauer’s choice of speaking to his own people in order to create a single doctrine of postwar reparation would create a significant precedent for Germany in future decades. The choice by Adenauer to first confront his own government before seeking to ever apologize to a foreign audience indirectly conveyed to the international community that Germany was galvanized and already accepted the extraordinary extent of German war guilt. By touching on reports of radical right and left wing groups, Adenauer confided in his fellow politicians by saying that unity of policy was an absolute necessity in order to show that he was not alone in his belief that these groups were weak and their claims unfounded. The German addresses given at Belsen and Warsaw are memorable for their location and willingness to openly confront painful truths.
Belsen is significant for its location on German soil and the undeniable evidence it provides of German atrocities. Rather than ignore the existence of German atrocities, the German government not only erected a memorial, but President Heuss also denounced denial and self-justification as foolish, making mention of the extent of the concentration camp system as a whole and the knowledge of its presence amongst wartime Germans as an indisputable fact.

The most noteworthy German address given in the post war period did not contain a single word. The Warschauer Kniefall became one of the most iconic images of German remorse and war guilt. The 1970 kneeling of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt was significant for its international circulation and geographic location. Warsaw is associated with not only the Ghetto Uprising, to which the monument was dedicated, but also, as the capital of Poland, the epicenter of the concentration camp system, German aggression and military devastation. Brandt’s gesture at Warsaw, due to its spontaneous and heartfelt nature, showed the devastating effect of the German past on all nationalities, but especially highlighted the Polish suffering and the use of Poland as a land for the Final Solution. Because Brandt’s gesture was unplanned and came about due only to an overwhelming sense of responsibility, the gesture was perceived as extremely sincere. The circulation of the photo in the international press conveyed German willingness to address Poland and the controversial nature of the photo amongst a domestic audience allowed Brandt to explain the gesture and defend the importance of unity in German policy. While almost half of Brandt’s constituency labeled the gesture as exaggerated, the photo set the stage for future German politicians to confront war guilt first hand and be celebrated for it abroad. This was further evidenced by Willy Brandt’s winning TIME magazine Man of the Year award and receiving a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to reestablish peaceful relations. In contrast, the Japanese press release format, often written and prepared by anonymous government employees and merely stated by an official at an unknown time and location, could only pale in comparison to a gesture such as Brandt’s.

The lack of clarity amongst the domestic Japanese audience as to official government policy is in part due to the lack of a geographically significant address. Kishi’s wreath laying is the only visit to a foreign war shrine by a Japanese Prime Minister, yet his visit remains unknown amongst Japanese. The lack of unity in policy and clarity of government policy fosters an atmosphere in which contradiction thrives. Brandt’s Kniefall led to an acceptable way within the German government to internationally show a sincere admission of guilt and remorse. The Ostpolitik of his administration led to the establishment of relations with eastern European countries and the acceptability of internationally expressed remorse in the future such as Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s initiation of a visit to the Bitburg war cemetery with Ronald Reagan.

The domestic efforts of Adenauer and international efforts of Brandt to confront truths and establish a consistent international agenda known to domestic audiences alike almost fully eliminated contradiction. When contradiction did arise, it was not considered legitimate by foreign audiences. Perceived self-contradiction amongst a foreign audience regarding Germany and Japan is either confirmed or debunked first and foremost with policy established in public addresses. Although time has been proven to be an irrelevant factor in perceived sincerity, the specific rhetoric of German addresses, significance of chancellorship, and primacy of meaningful geographic location have led to little self-contradiction in the German government and citizenry. Self-contradiction is then one of the most damaging factors affecting perceived sincerity. It is then not remorseful rhetoric, but specificity of rhetoric that remains significant when attempting
to convey sincerity. The specificity of an apology, as with an address given at the scene of a war crime by a known figure, leaves less room for misinterpretation by either domestic or foreign audiences.

Lind argues in her article “The Perils of Apology,”79 that more apology is linked to less perceived sincerity. It is not remorseful apology itself that is damaging but instead remorseful apology that is later perceived as insincere because it is contradictory. Remorseful apology is acceptable, no matter how late, as in the German case with 21st century remorseful rhetoric, so long as specificity of rhetoric from top-down important government figures reduces the possibility of contradiction through denial. Official denial is the most damaging of all, as in the Japanese cases of Prime Minister Abe and the mayor of Nagoya, a sister city of Nanking, both of which ended up casting doubt upon years of attempted reconciliation. A lack of specific rhetoric and self-confrontation is a double-edged sword, often leading to attempts at denial. After an outcry by foreign nations at attempted denial, questions arise as to why specific rhetoric was never utilized. This reaction/counter reaction process has become familiar to the Japanese government and people and until openness toward discourse regarding war guilt and an acknowledgement of foreign fear of a radical-right renewal is seen, perceived sincerity will remain low. While the selfish and contradictory nature of Japanese economic reparations in the postwar period cannot be reversed, Japan and Tokyo for that matter can change the perceived legitimacy of outright denial through apologetic addresses that include the aforementioned criteria necessary to convey sincerity. Denial is more devastating than other forms of self-contradiction and will inevitably always exist, as it does in the German case, yet it need not be perceived as legitimate, as it is in the Japanese case.

Conclusion

On the forty-seventh anniversary of the attacks on Pearl Harbor, December 7th 1988, then Mayor of Nagasaki, Moto-shima Hitoshi spoke on the issue of Emperor Hirohito’s war guilt. Moto-shima simply stated, “Having been a soldier myself involved in military education, I do believe that the emperor bore responsibility for the war.”80 The Japanese reaction to Mayor Moto-shima’s statement included a violent defense of the ailing Emperor Hirohito. Right-wing groups within Japan called for the retraction of Moto-shima’s remarks and when he refused, agreeing only to step down as mayor, the same groups that called for his retraction paraded through the streets, this time calling for his death. Moto-shima was eventually shot in the back by a right-wing extremist; the shot nearly took his life. Ian Buruma, author of the book *The Wages of Guilt*, compares the domestic reaction to Moto-shima’s statement with the speech given to the Bundestag by Phillip Jenninger, President of Germany’s Bundestag, in November of the same year on the fiftieth anniversary of *Kristallnacht*. Jenninger made a speech that specifically listed the horrifying extent of German atrocities yet simultaneously tried to frame his parent’s generation, the Nazi generation, as one that could be understood given the social and historical context. Jenninger, in reference to the emergence of Hitler’s regime, stated, “For the Germans who saw the Weimar Republic mostly as a sequence of foreign policy humiliations, all this (Hitler’s economic and political successes) must have seemed like a miracle.”81 The German reaction to Jenninger’s speech was scathing. Remarks by various members of the Bundestag stated that his speech was shameful, catastrophic and marked a black day in German history.

Although Moto-shima and Jenninger both resigned, the German domestic reaction to the address given at the Bundestag shamed Jenninger for even attempting to label the Nazi generation as understandable despite his explicit description of the extent of German atrocities and war guilt. The public domestic reaction of Germans was therefore scathing, like the Japanese, albeit for different reasons. Japanese public reaction attempted to hush up criticism of the wartime government while German public reaction utilized the speech as an opportunity to define themselves as completely independent from the wartime government. What’s more, Buruma’s phone conversation with an Australian citizen living in Japan revealed the prevalent nature of culture as an explanation for the differing reactions to Moto-shima and Jenninger. The Australian stated, “It’s perfectly clear that Moto-shima does not understand Japanese culture.” Buruma, states that he verbally agreed with the man on the phone. “The Germans, riddled with guilt, feel the need to confess their sins, to unburden their guilt and be forgiven; the Japanese wish to remain silent and, above all, wish others to remain silent too, for the point is not guilt in the eyes of God, but public shame, embarrassment [...]” Buruma states that each leader had broken the rules of their respective cultures.82

Buruma’s phone conversation with the nameless Australian highlights the ease with which a country’s approach toward apologetic statements can be dismissed by claiming culture as the single determining factor. Although Buruma agreed with this notion during his phone

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81 Ibid., 240.

82 Ibid., 252.
conversation, he later admits the similarities between all cultures. “As far as most people are concerned, however, the difference between nations is less wide than many might imagine. When directly confronted with unpleasant truths, Japanese react pretty much like Germans. Most either turn away or beat their breasts.”

If the Japanese truly wished to remain silent because of the public shame and embarrassment described above, governmental officials would have simply never issued apologetic statements, despite an international demand for them.

Alexis Dudden, author of Trouble Apologies Among Japan, Korea and the United States, states that the question “Why can’t Japan be more like Germany,” has come to haunt the Japanese. Indeed it was this very question and notion that spurred the writing of this paper. Germany has been described as the great apologizer, making Japanese apology, no matter how extensive, appear insufficient or insincere. This notion has little to do with the extent of Japanese apology since they have consistently made official apologetic statements. It is instead grounded in several other factors.

The anti-denial laws in the European Union, laws that made the denial of the Holocaust punishable by a three-year jail sentence, were passed on April 19th 2007. West German laws that came immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War preceded even these laws. “Immediately after World War II the German Parliament passed laws against the dissemination of Nazi materials, or advocacy of a return to the Nazi regime. Consequently, attacks on the Holocaust, be they verbal or in print, brought quick criminal charges, fines and/or imprisonment.”

The EU laws of the modern day have been influenced by a strong German government precedent to confront denial as a threat to perceived sincerity. This German precedent stems from the very first addresses given by Adenauer in which specificity of rhetoric and the dangers of self-contradiction were presented to fellow party members in the form of official addresses to the Bundestag. An attitude of openness was established and an international trust developed by first showing domestic change through domestic addresses. Change from the inside out and not the other way around, would create a shift from the atrocities of the past that would require no initial outside pressure to instigate apologetic addresses.

What then could Japan do to convey sincere remorse? A comparison between Japan and Germany does not necessarily mean that Japan must be more like Germany on a cultural level, as culture is an irrelevant factor in conveying remorse. Specific actions could change international perceptions that the Japanese have not recognized their responsibility for wartime atrocities. The Japanese government, by establishing a course of public policy in which specificity of rhetoric amongst government officials is utilized and denial of atrocities reinforced through law, would prevent self-contradiction. As the most damaging factor in conveyed and perceived sincerity amongst an international audience, denial can be stymied through action and not merely rhetoric. Official governmental action, including addresses given at the exact site of atrocities, will dictate the future of Japanese sincerity. Clarity could be presented to a domestic and international audience through official addresses that leave no room for denial. An address by the Japanese

84 Dudden, Troubled Apologies, 39.
86 Ibid., 103.
Prime Minster at Nanking, commemorating the victims, is one potential example of the necessary course that Japan should take. An official memorial speech at Nanking or the erection of a monument to the “comfort women” at the site of a former comfort station, for example, might provide the concrete proof necessary to counter the statements or actions of Japanese nationals that contradict official statements of apology. This style of specific onsite commemoration would no doubt result in a political backlash within Japan, exactly as Willy Brandt’s *Warschauer Kniefall* did in Germany in 1970. Brandt however, braved the conservative backlash and created a precedent as to the appropriate way by which one can convey remorse. Official statements given by German officials were permanently affected by Brandt’s actions in Warsaw, allowing future leaders to speak more openly knowing that conservative backlash can and must be braved.

Despite the efforts of Brandt and various other German politicians, the notion of Germany as the great apologizer and as the perfect case, is not without fault and international criticism. Recently, German poet and novelist Günter Grass wrote a poem, published April 5th, 2012, opposing the nuclear policy of Israel and its opposition to all Iranian military expansion. The poem criticized Israel’s policy as an inevitable danger to the rest of the world. In the poem, Grass mentioned the inherent danger of opposing Israel’s political policy. This was due strictly to his German nationality. Despite acknowledging his nationality within the poem, the domestic and international reaction has been scathing. An article that appeared in the German newspaper *Die Zeit* on April 6th 2012 published the comments of anti-Nazi activist and German citizen Beate Klarsfeld. *Die Zeit* states, “Mit seinem Israel-Gedicht spiele er ‘antisemitische Musik’. Es sei mit einer Hitler-Rede vergleichbar.”87 (With his poem about Israel, Grass plays an ‘anti-Semitic tune’. It [the poem] is comparable with a speech from Hitler). Just days after the publication of Klarsfeld’s reaction, on April 8th 2012, the Israeli government placed an indefinite ban upon Grass’ entry into the country.

The reaction by other Germans, such as Beate Klarsfeld, is not atypical in the span of postwar German history. Germans have often held one another accountable, an action that has helped convey sincere remorse to the international community. What is unprecedented is Israel’s action against Grass. What does Israel’s reaction mean for German international relations, apology and international relations and for Japan’s apologies? In all three cases, the poem published by Grass is evidence of one essential truth. There is no perfect apology. If Germany was truly the great apologizer, having done everything right to prove its sincerity, the poem would not have prompted such a harsh international reaction. The scathing international reaction is evidence of the divide created by atrocities and proof that a nation may never be able to completely atone for past misdeeds. For Japan, the poem by Grass should not deter further apologetic addresses, but serve as a realistic symbol through which it is understood that apology can only go so far. Accusations will haunt Japan and its citizens, just as they haunt Germany’s. Japan, therefore, must look toward the future with a sense of honesty, not only in their acknowledgement of historical events but also in their understanding of both the necessity for, and the limits of apology.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Education:
2008-2012 The Pennsylvania State University: Class of 2012
  Location: University Park, PA, 16802
  Degree: Bachelor of Arts
  Major: History and German
  Minor: Political Science
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  Degree: High School Diploma

Work Experience:
2010-2011 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA): 8601 Adelphi Road, Hyattsville, MD 20783
  Job Title: Civilian Processing
  Job Duties: Member of Holocaust Records Project responsible for organizing, processing, and preserving delicate files according to an Archival System. Data Entry and Series Management.

2011 Kita Seestern Kindergarten: Am See 11
  Gundelfingen Germany 79194
  Job Title: Intern
  Job Duties: Responsible for supervision of kindergarten children and morning lesson instruction.

2008 Norristown Area High School: 1900 Eagle Drive
  Norristown, PA 19401
  Job Title: Intern
  Job Duties: Responsible for supervision and instruction of History students. Observation of teacher at classroom, departmental and school-wide level.

Achievements and Activities:
2011-Present THON, Rules and Regulations Committee
  • Security Leader: responsible for learning and teaching R&R members all security protocols and subsequent delegation of responsibility to the committee during THON weekend

2008-Present Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity
  • Assistant Recruitment Chair and Alumni Relations for Fall 2009
  • Head Recruitment Chair and Alumni Relations for Spring 2010
  • Pledge Master for Fall 2010 and Pledge Educator for Fall 2011

1997-Present Boy Scouts: Eagle Scout, Senior Patrol Leader
  • Led Troop of 45 members on 9 different camping trips and planned 30 meetings to teach younger boys outdoor skills and life skills.
  • Directed and led 100 hour personal service project at the Church of the Savior
  • Inducted into Order of the Arrow, Scouting’s Honor Society.