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DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THE CASAMANCE CONFLICT AND THE SIERRA LEONE
CIVIL WAR

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ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a qualitative, comparative case study analysis detailing the Casamance Conflict in Senegal and the Sierra Leone Civil War. Through the exploration of theoretical, historical, and motivational implications of each rebellion, I aim to illustrate that the availability of lootable natural resources (specifically secondary diamond deposits) to those insurgent forces is correlated with the inclination of these insurgencies to engage in indiscriminate violent behavior. I elaborate on previously explored hypotheses that the accessibility of exploitable materials increases the likelihood rebel groups will mistreat the civilian population and that, conversely, rebel movements that are not endowed with lootable high-value minerals are more inclined to practice restraint in toward noncombatants. The logic behind these speculations is presented in the Hobbesian Theory of self interest: insurgencies already well endowed with resources have no need to appeal for grassroots support while, by contrast, rebels who cannot boast of access to said resources have an increased need for civilian cooperation due to the resources and recruits that these noncombatants can provide.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Theory	3
Literature Review	7
Research Design	13
<i>Case Justification</i>	12
Accounting for Regional Variation.....	13
Levels of Development.....	14
Homogeneity of Regime Type.....	14
ELF Scores.....	15
<i>Discussion of Independent and Dependent Variables</i>	16
Analysis	18
<i>Part One: Senegal and the Casamance Conflict</i>	19
Fundamental Summary and Historical Implications.....	20
Casamance and the Rebel Resource Curse.....	23
Non-Presence of High-Value Mineral Materials.....	27
<i>Part Two: The Sierra Leone Civil War</i>	29
Fundamental Summary and Historical Implications.....	30
Sierra Leone and the Rebel Resource Curse.....	35
Presence of High-Value Mineral Materials.....	36
<i>Part Three: Comparative Analysis</i>	38
Ideological versus Material Impulse.....	39
Motivations as Related to Incidence of Noncombatant Casualties.....	41
Conclusion	44
References	46

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Map of Senegal and the Surrounding Area.....	22
Figure 2. Map of Sierra Leone and the Surrounding Area	32

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. World Bank Development Indicators for Senegal and Sierra Leone.....	17
Table 2. Approximate Fatality Estimates: Casamance Conflict	26
Table 3. Approximate Fatality Estimates: Sierra Leone Civil War.....	36

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INTRODUCTION

What do blood diamonds, the resource curse, and Hobbesian theory have to do with the severity of civilian casualties that occur over the course of a civil conflict? Does material resource wealth influence the motivations and behaviors of insurgent groups? As global awareness about the wartime atrocities committed during West African civil wars has increased over recent decades, so has interest in exploring *why* such violations of human rights are prevalent in some cases but not in others. This thesis aims to discover the logic behind the incidence of indiscriminate violence committed by rebel forces against noncombatant populations and to understand what factors may or may not be correlated with said violent behavior. Through this thesis, individual self-interest, concern for short versus long-term gains, and ideological motivations are explored in relation to insurgencies' access to lootable resource materials.

Assessing the same assertions originally explored in empirical fashion by Jeremy Weinstein (2005) and further discussed in his book *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, I have found that my own dyadic case study largely supports the following complementary hypotheses: a) resource wealthy insurgency movements will be more likely to practice indiscriminate violence against civilians and, b) rebel movements that are considered "resource poor" will be more likely to attempt cooperation with and restraint among noncombatants.

In the sections to come I support the above claims using methodology dissimilar to Weinstein's original, empirical approach in his article, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." (2005). Using the qualitative method of comparative case study analysis, I compare and contrast two nations, Senegal and Sierra Leone, both of which have experienced

contemporary civil conflict and share a variety of similarities such as geographic location and level of economic development. The Theory section of this thesis centers on the application of the Hobbesian Theory of self-interest to Weinstein's hypotheses regarding the incidence of indiscriminate violence as correlated to exploitable natural resources.

The first portion of my analysis details the Senegalese separatist movement known as the Casamance Conflict. I assess and endorse my theory through the exploration of historical implications, combatant and civilian casualties, factors such as ethnic and geographic variation and finally, the non-presence of high-value mineral resources (specifically diamonds) within this region. Part Two assesses the Sierra Leone Civil War through similar lenses: the historical implications of the insurgency are covered, as well as insurgent ideology related to the "resource curse." In contrast to the Senegalese case, I discuss the repercussions of the prevalence of lootable secondary diamond deposits in Sierra Leone. Part Three of my Analysis considers all of the above variables and discusses the correlation between ideological motivations and resource poor rebel movements, and vice versa, material motivations and those insurgent groups that have a wealth of exploitable natural resources at their disposal.

THEORY

Hobbesian Theory maintains that human beings are ultimately selfish, placing paramount importance upon their own wellbeing. Such thinking is consistent with Jeremy Weinstein's theory regarding the connection between the occurrence of indiscriminate violence and insurgent movements in his book *Inside Rebellion*. The effects of natural resource incidence upon the existence and /or extent of said correlation have the propensity to generate an explanation upholding the greedy inclinations of the human race. This dimension of the Hobbesian Theory is closely examined and expounded upon by Weinstein's work which specifically aims to highlight the actions of rebel group members when left to their own devices. This broad analysis of human nature is whittled down to one particular lens: the motivations and behavior of said insurgent recruits for both "resource wealthy" or "resource poor" rebel organizations. (Kalyvas, 2007).

Weinstein argues that, whether it involves a resource endowed region or not, rebel movements are still composed of rational human beings looking out for their own self-interests. The enticing possibility of looting the natural wealth within the region experiencing civil conflict certainly aligns with this theory, as does rebellion as a result of the pursuit of upholding a particular ideal. Recruits in resource-poor insurgencies lacking in highly valued natural resources are not immune from the incentive to cater to their own self-interests. However, these insurgents need to commit themselves to certain ideological aspects of the rebellion in order to secure resources from the population and to attract an adequate supply of recruits to continue their fight. Conversely, rebel groups with natural resource endowment can, unfortunately, afford to mistreat the civilian population because they depend on funding via exploitation of readily available, high-value materials. Rebellions that occur in areas without this material wealth

depend more so on the goodwill of its residents; these insurgencies need grassroots support for resources and soldiers and are therefore less likely to commit indiscriminate and undisciplined acts of violence against the civilian population. Thus, Weinstein's hypotheses that I will be examining in two case studies differing from his own quantitative and field research, can be stated as:

H1: Resource wealthy insurgency movements will be more likely to practice indiscriminate violence against civilians.

And correspondingly,

H2: Resource poor rebel movements will be more likely to attempt cooperation and restraint among noncombatants. (Weinstein 2007)

While the logic supporting these hypotheses may seem sound, there has been much contention within the literature regarding natural resources and their effects upon the severity of a given civil war. Although there have been links between casualty rates and the presence of natural, lootable materials, results have been mixed and are by no means conclusive. In "Thirteen Cases" (2004), Michael Ross found that while resource wealth increased the casualty rates of two wars among his case studies, the existence of these materials had no effect in three wars and, perhaps more importantly, produced a mixed impact in eight of them. He also found that "resource battles and cooperative plunder" seem to be closely connected and that in eight of the cases where both occurred, he was unable to judge which of the two effects had the greater

impact. While this evidence does not necessarily refute Weinstein's hypotheses due to the varied results and lack of data on noncombatant deaths as a result of insurgent members, it does cast some doubt upon the Hobbesian Theory that supports Weinstein's work and its connection to indiscriminate violence due to a lack of discipline and dependency on civilian support.

Perhaps a more telling finding that is incongruous with the above hypotheses originates from an earlier research endeavor explored by Weinstein himself in his and MaCartan Humphrey's article, "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War," (2006). Through quantitative analysis, they were led to conclude (based on interviews conducted among former rebels exclusively in Sierra Leone) that a "strong relationship between the extent of combatant-community ties and patterns of abuse," could not be found. Although they state that it is perhaps possible that community ties still may have an effect, if not a high correlation with other factors regarding warring factions "[they] cannot reject the null that they do not matter at all." (p.443). They also find, surprisingly, that wealth distribution across Sierra Leone does not seem to be connected to incidence of abuse..

While such findings may seem to refute the hypotheses made by Weinstein above, they should not be seen as irrefutable evidence in contrast to said assertions. Although within Ross's "Thirteen Cases" there is a multitude of mixed results, the very fact that he was able to observe a close connection between resource battles and cooperative looting suggests that there is more research to be done about the factors causing this correlation. Ross's article also fails to effectively introduce the specific variable of *civilian* casualties. Herein lies an issue regarding the hypotheses that Weinstein, and I, are attempting to pursue: an *accurate* gauge of non-military/insurgent personnel has not yet been ascertained.

As for the contradiction apparent in Humphrey and Weinstein's 2006 work, the tentative conclusion they reached is a) solely applicable to Sierra Leone, b) acknowledges that non-correlation between wealth and abuse can most likely be contributed to lack of variation throughout the regions of the nation, and c) does not distinguish between selective and indiscriminate violence

Although I too am studying Sierra Leone, I am also attempting to test the hypotheses enumerated above within the context of a comparative case study. This introduces two sources of variation between Humphrey's and Weinstein's (2006) and my own research: a direct comparison of those factors connected to resource exploitation in Sierra Leone against those of Senegal *and* the utilization of a qualitative method (case studies) as opposed to the quantitative data Humphrey and Weinstein accrue and examine. While statistical analysis is an invaluable resource within the field of political science, Humphrey's and Weinstein's measures are simply too crude to provide a cohesive explanation of the subject matter. With regards to the aforementioned issue of lack of division between indiscriminate and selective violence, the researchers themselves state that "[i]n practice and even in theory, the distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence is blurred." (2006: 444).

LITERATURE REVIEW

While there is a wealth of material regarding the role of resources on civil war onset and duration, my research project is particularly interested in exploring how the presence, or non-presence, of lootable material goods such as diamonds impacts tactics utilized by insurgent forces within a region experiencing civil war and the degree to which the severity of civil war is affected by the availability of said material resources. Literature regarding the relationship between civil wars and natural resources is typically separated into several categories determining the specific area within conflict research that is to be studied. Factors such as onset, incidence, duration, and severity each imply distinct characteristics that are not necessarily related to one another. Although the aim of this particular research project is to examine resources in terms of severity, the literature below provides the groundwork necessary to comprehend fully the role of resources within the realm of intrastate conflict through multiple lenses.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) establish the essential groundwork for current research on the correlation between natural resources and the *outbreak* of civil war. They begin by using the expected utility theory of economics to represent the cost benefit analysis involved in insurgent motivations and their consequent likelihood to go to war. They find the relatively straightforward yet significant result that “the incentive for rebellion was increasing in the probability of victory, and in the gains conditional upon victory [...]” (1998:571). These economic incentives empirically support the relevance of insurgents’ need for financial assets which, through this thesis, I will be attempting to link directly to the exploitation of natural resources within an area of civil conflict. They assert that certain rebel groups utilize looted commodities in attempts to finance their insurgencies. Through the use of logistic regressions

over the years of 1960-1999, they attempt to predict the overall risk of civil war onset within each 5 year segment and find that accessibility of financing generates a considerable increase in intrastate conflict risk. These influxes in finance are interpreted as resulting from *opportunities* for exploitation of primary commodities. The feasibility of gaining access to natural resources within a given area, in turn, makes the very idea of rebellion simultaneously plausible and attractive. (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). “Civil wars occur where rebel organizations are financially viable” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006: 1). This statement is the essential idea behind Collier and Hoeffler’s research. Moving from onset to my concern about severity, I note that the relationship between the severity of a civil war and available natural resources cannot be explored without initial onset and its underlying causes.¹ It is through these factors that insurgent motivations can be explored, motivations that could correlate with the overall estimation of indiscriminant violence.

According to Michael Ross (2003), there are a variety of findings concerning the onset and length of conflict in areas experiencing civil conflict, particularly that the existence of oil in a specified region increases the duration of an existing conflict but is not correlated with the onset of civil war. Lootable commodities (e.g. diamonds and illicit drugs) are also found to correlate with the duration of war. Ross also concludes, however, that there is no observable link between *agricultural* commodities and civil war. Primary commodities, materials that include oil, non-fuel minerals and agricultural goods, were also found to have no robust link to civil war onset in Ross’s study.

With these same terms in mind, Ross concludes through a separate examination of 13 cases of civil war that there is strong evidence for the theory that resource capital does indeed seem to make conflict a) more likely, b) more lengthy and c) produce more casualties when it

¹ E.g.: whether the war was started due to ethnic divergence, political/economic grievance, separatist motives, etc.

does occur (2004). The analysis of these 13 cases, as well as research done by other academics (notably Collier and Hoeffler 1998), further indicates that commodities other than oil, non-fuel minerals and illicit drugs do not carry significant statistical weight and should not be included in the “primary commodities” variable, a finding that will be accepted as accurate for the purposes of this thesis.

Of the nine hypotheses suggested and explored in Ross’s 13 case studies, there are two assertions (in direct opposition to one another) that deal exclusively with the link between the occurrence of resources and the *severity* of civil war. Hypothesis 8 suggests that resource wealth tends to increase the casualty rate during a civil war by causing combatants to fight for resource-rich territory that would otherwise have little value, and conversely, hypothesis 9 predicts that resource wealth tends to decrease the casualty rate during a civil war by causing combatants to cooperate in resource exploitation. The direct contrast between hypotheses 8 and 9 leads me to believe that Ross is not being entirely falsifiable. This reservation aside however, through this thesis my aim is essentially to prove that chances for resource exploitation end in increased incidence of indiscriminate violence. Although this assertion does not necessarily refute hypothesis 9, it certainly does not seem that instances of disciplined cooperation in one arena would necessarily be paired with unselective violence toward noncombatants. This assumption however, could very well be proven wrong.

Ross also explores several other hypotheses that, although useful, do not add a significant dimension and are not wholly relevant to the hypothesis within my two case study reviews. The relevant findings of these hypotheses suggest through case observation that resource wealth is not consistently found to increase the severity of existing civil wars. Ross discovered that resource wealth heightened the casualty rate in two of the wars within the case

studies, had no effect in three wars, and had a mixed impact in eight of them. He also found that “resource battles and cooperative plunder” seem to be closely connected and that in eight of the cases where both occurred, he was unable to judge which of the two effects had the greater impact. “I hence infer that they at least partially offset each other and produced a “mixed” effect on the intensity of combat” (Ross, 2004: 29).

As previously observed in Ross’s articles, findings regarding *which* resource materials are most likely to coincide with civil war onset and duration are mixed and difficult to pinpoint. There is, however, a wealth of research supporting a claim that incidence of civil war is more closely linked with *lootable* resources. One particular project explores the bivariate relationship between diamonds and civil war incidence and onset (Lujala et. al 2005). By focusing on a singular resource type, diamonds, this model avoids the hairy question of what defines a certain resource as lootable and is able to measure systematically one prominent variable as an indicator of increased incidence of civil war onset. An important distinction is made within this article between what are defined as “primary” and “secondary” diamond deposits. Primary diamond reserves refer to those diamonds that are found in underground rock formations and are usually mined by large multinational corporations with the ability to provide the necessary infrastructure for such an endeavor, and which can afford the substantial investment costs/ hazards that accompany mining underground. Secondary diamond deposits, on the other hand, are much more accessible and therefore more easily looted because secondary diamonds are often found in riverbeds and can be sifted using a variety of inexpensive and readily available techniques.

The diamond article is structured around 5 separate hypotheses, but for the purposes of my research only the first two hypotheses and corresponding sub-hypotheses will receive attention. Lujala et. al (2005) first hypothesize that a country producing diamonds faces an

increased risk of civil war onset, further splicing this assertion into 2 auxiliary hypotheses that 1a) a country that produces secondary diamonds faces a higher risk of conflict onset, and that 1b) the production of primary diamonds does not affect the risk of conflict onset. Their second hypothesis states that countries with secondary diamond deposits tend to have an increased incidence of conflict. Lujala et. al (2005) were able to support these claims, finding that the presence of diamonds does indeed affect civil war incidence and that the actual geological form in which the diamond reserves are found is highly significant. As insinuated above, because secondary diamonds are so accessible, they are very easy to loot and subsequently exploit, thus providing rebel groups with finances to be utilized in prolonging their insurgencies and increasing the overall duration of the civil war. Primary diamonds fall underneath the category of “non-lootable” resources due to their relative inaccessibility given that rebel forces simply do not have the necessary technological resources to mine deep underground.

The last, perhaps most sobering, observation regarding the research made by Michael Ross in the studies above reminds us that any statistical correlation between said resources and observed conflict could, in fact, be completely spurious² or endogenous³.

² Two related variables mistaken to be causally linked but actually both caused by some third variable.

³ Derived internally, meaning that a causes b and b causes a.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Case Justification

As noted previously, this thesis is a qualitative, comparative case study that focuses on Sierra Leone and Senegal, the presence of lootable natural resources (specifically secondary diamond deposits), and how the occurrence of said materials influences the propensity of insurgent groups to engage in acts of indiscriminant violence over the course of civil conflict resulting in elevated levels of noncombatant casualties.

My cases were chose primarily because Sierra Leone is well endowed with secondary diamond deposits and Senegal, conversely, is not. The two nations have also experienced incidence of civil war within the past decades. Sierra Leone's history is compared and contrasted with Senegal's because they are similar a) regionally b) in level of development c) regime type and d) ethnically. Controlling for these factors allows for an increased degree of confidence when analyzing the specified variable of diamond presence and its possible correlation with incidence of undisciplined violence. The only outstanding factor that could not be controlled for is population size, as Sierra Leone has a considerably smaller number of citizens than does Senegal. Due to Senegal's significantly larger population, there are, very simply, more civilians to kill and mistreat. Consequently if, through my analysis, I find that Sierra Leone has a larger incidence of abused noncombatants, the legitimacy of my theory would be increased because not only would the violence coincide with diamond presence, but also the violence would be occurring in a country where there are fewer civilians to kill. These considerations imply that if all significant factors are accounted for, then prevalence of high-valued mineral materials is somehow related to a greater number of deaths even within a less populous region.

Accounting for Regional Variation

It is particularly important that two nations were chosen that are within close proximity to each other in order to maintain the homogeneity that is associated with geographically similar locations. For example, attempting a comparative case study of Sierra Leone and Belgium would not be as analytically useful because of the many variations (cultural, agricultural, economic etc.) distinguishing these very different states. Were I to find a substantial difference in behavior between these two states, it would be hard to attribute that difference to the presence of diamonds in only one of them, since they differ so much in so many other ways as well.

Further illustrating this point, a 2006 working study associated with the International Monetary

GDP (U.S. Dollars)	Income Level	Poverty Headcount	Life Expectancy	Urban Development	Labor & Social Protection	Private Sector	Literacy Rate
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Fund found that regional differences, specifically among Central and West African countries, were correlated with a significant amount of heterogeneity among proposed and existing monetary unions: the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). (Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2006). This proposed finding suggests that my assumption regarding these situational variations carries some legitimacy due to the geographic proximity of the states within the dyad. Although I am not specifically observing monetary unions within this thesis, this discovery highlights the degree of geographic variation that can be controlled for by choosing to study similarly situated nations.

Levels of Development

Senegal	\$12,954,023 2	lower- mid	50.8%	59	69%	10%	53.%	50%
Sierra Leone	\$1,905,015,04 5	lower	66.4%	47	24%	3.4%	58.%	41%

In terms of economic and social development, data gathered from the World Bank suggests that although these two nations have certain internal variations, their overall scores remain relatively on par. We must also take into account the vast difference in population between Sierra Leone (smaller) and Senegal (larger) while examining GDP; the larger the population, the bigger a country's working age population will be, affecting its level of production. This can also be applied to the significant variation found regarding Urban Development Scores⁴. Both nations range from lower to mid lower income levels and have similar scores for their respective private sectors⁵ and literacy rates⁶ as illustrated in the table below.

Table 1. World Bank Development Indicators for Senegal and Sierra Leone (World Bank, 2012).

Homogeneity of Regime Type

Senegal and Sierra Leone have also been reported to have similar average polity scores as recorded by The Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. "The Polity IV Project continues the Polity research tradition of coding the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis." (Polity IV Project). With Senegal averaging -2.233 and Sierra Leone, -3.184 throughout the years 1961-2010, the political regimes that govern each of the countries have, historically been categorized as Closed Anocracies. (Polity IV Project). Additionally, I will be analyzing the

⁴ Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban population with access)

⁵ Indicating merchandise trade as a percent of GDP

⁶ Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)

polity scores for the particular years of civil wars that I am studying in order to provide necessary background information regarding how these regimes may have affected the prevalence of noncombatant deaths.

ELF Scores

According to the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization scores (or ELF scores) of Sierra Leone and Senegal, there exists very little variation among the *number* of ethnic groups across two states. “The ELF measure is available for 129 countries and reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups.” (Posner, 2004: 849). These scores, .77 and .72 respectively, imply that variation in these conflicts cannot be attributed to ethnic differences since the two countries are virtually identical in their ELF scores. (Posner, 2004). The issue with this dataset however, is that it is outdated and does not actually include the years in which the states experienced the civil wars I have chosen to study. Yet another inaccuracy that could affect the legitimacy of such a measure is the fact that ethnicity cannot be defined in specific quantitative terms; ethnicity is a characteristic that each individual considers and determines for him (or her) self. Additionally, the *amount* of ethnic variation within a given society does not necessarily provide information regarding whether said variation results in the occurrence of civil conflict related to ethnic divergence.

Independent and Dependent Variables

Through my comparative case analyses, I am aiming to identify the effects of secondary diamond deposits on the incidence of indiscriminate. I am exploring these vis-à-vis complementary hypotheses whose variables are enumerated below:

H1: Resource wealthy insurgency movements will be more likely to practice indiscriminate violence against civilians.

Independent Variable: resource wealthy insurgency movements

Dependent Variable: indiscriminate violence committed against civilians

H2: Rebel movements that are considered “resource poor” will be more likely to attempt cooperation and restraint among noncombatants. (Weinstein, 2007).

Independent Variable: resource poor rebel movements

Dependent Variable: attempted cooperation and restraint among noncombatants.

The dependent variables of “indiscriminate violence” and “attempted cooperation and restraint” will be measured through any available data concerning both combatant *and* noncombatant casualties within the Casamance Conflict and the Sierra Leone Civil War. Because assigning a particular number to represent the number of deaths to occur throughout the span of a given conflict is always an imprecise approximation, I will further support my theory through including a summary of fundamental historical implications for each state, an application of relevant theories to my research of the case, as well as a deeper exploration pertaining to ideological versus material impulse as related to rebel recruitment and behavior. If I find a wealth of sources indicating that a rebel movement in either Senegal or Sierra Leone has committed atrocities such as mass murder against the resident noncombatant population, or in contrast, engages the civilian population in productive discourse and/or gains popular support, I will be confident in assessing whether my hypotheses has been validated.

For the purposes of these case studies, I will be defining Sierra Leone as the resource wealthy state and the Revolutionary United Front as its particular insurgent force due to the region's wealth of secondary diamond deposits (independent variable 1). Likewise, Senegal will be defined as the resource poor nation with the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance as its corresponding rebel group (independent variable 2) because, as Sierra Leone's antithesis, it is not endowed with lootable high-value mineral resources. (Lujala et. al, 2005).

ANALYSIS

The analysis portion of my research will focus on the variables present within a comparison of Senegal and Sierra Leone. My analysis is split into three distinct sections: one, detailing Senegal, the Casamance conflict and its implications while emphasizing the variables described in my Research Design and the second, repeating this process for the Sierra Leone Civil War. The third and final section compares and contrasts the two specified civil conflicts and determines if my previously presented theory is ultimately supported through these case study analyses. I aim to highlight, specifically, whether the presence of lootable natural resources (e.g. the presence or non-presence of diamonds) within these regions impacts the severity of civilian casualties and human rights violations committed by insurgent forces.

PART ONE: Senegal and the Casamance Conflict



Figure 1. Map of Senegal and the Surrounding Area (“Map: Senegal”).

Senegal, case number one, was chosen for analysis due to the existence of persistent civil conflict that it has been experiencing since December of 1982. This civil war is the longest running conflict in West Africa and its onset can be contributed to the secessionist motivations of the province of Casamance. The separatists within this region have cited insurmountable ethnic and economic divergences between the southern region of the nation, Casamance, and the northern portion of the state that includes the capital city of Dakar. The civil conflict, although longstanding, has failed to receive much international attention due primarily to the low levels of casualties that accumulate with each passing year, as well as a relative absence of human rights violations. (Evans, 2002).

Fundamental Summary and Historical Implications:

The nation of Senegal is inhabited by people from a large variety of ethnic groups, the majority of whom (43%) identify as Wolof, an ethnic faction that practices the Muslim religion. The geographic location of the region known as Casamance is particularly key to instances of conflict instigation because it is uniquely separated by another country, Gambia, (as shown in the map above) and is populated by an ethnic, Christian minority group known as the Diola which accounts for only 3% of the population. (Senegal- Ethnic Groups, 2012).

Casamance itself is separated into two different administrative groups based on geographic location: the Ziguinchor region to the west and the Kolda region (much larger), located in the east. Ziguinchor is further segmented into 3 departments: Ziguinchor and Oussouye, south of the Casamance River bordering Guinea Bissau, and Bignona, located in the north nearer to the Gambian border (Evans, 2007).

Casamance's geographic separation from the northern portion of the nation (notably, its capital city of Dakar), and its ethnic and religious distinction contribute to feelings of alienation and dissimilarity, both of which fostered secessionist sentiments within the region. Although Casamance is generally considered more ecologically endowed than the remainder of the country, residents of this area believe that the presence of these resources⁷ does not directly benefit them and are convinced that most remunerations end up going straight to the capital city and those regions surrounding it. (Uppsala Conflict Data Program).

The conflict known as the Casamance Conflict, was initiated by the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance (MFDC) which had started as a post World War II political representation of Casamance in the independence movements populating Africa throughout the

⁷ Refers more to agricultural and timber production; not lootable, high-valued mineral resources such as diamonds. (Ross, 2004)

1940s and 50s. The MFDC, at this point, was simply one of the many regional interest groups that peppered the nation throughout this transitional period. (Foucher, 2011)

Regionalism plays a significant role in the political makeup of Senegal. After Senegal and Mali won their independence from France in 1960, they formed a short-lived federation known as the French Sudan which ended two months after its inception. Senegal and the Gambia were also joined together in a confederation known as the Senegambian Confederation that began in 1982, ending with the Gambia's withdrawal in 1989. Sources of conflict instigation date back to the 1960s when, upon its newly won independence, leaders of Senegal promised Casamance political leaders they would be granted independence if they maintained a union with Senegal until 1980. When that promise was reneged upon after the mandated period ended, the MFDC organized a peaceful independence demonstration that was violently repressed by the national government. (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). Civil violence peaked in the 1990s as the MFDC and Casamance supporters waged guerrilla warfare upon government buildings. The conflict extended beyond intrastate warfare when the violence spread to the capital city of neighboring Guinea-Bissau, whose government is said to have been covertly supporting the Casamance separatist movement.

Although a peace agreement was signed in 2004 and the "end" of the conflict has been repeatedly announced, the fighting has not completely abated even to this day. The reasons behind the extended conflict could be attributed simply to the acceptable opportunity costs on both sides of the divergence: it does not take a significant amount of effort for the MFDC and its supporters to continue engaging in isolated guerrilla warfare, nor are these isolated attacks enough to instigate intense retaliation by the Senegalese government. (Foucher 2011).

It is important to recognize that although the MFDC, as a whole, is theoretically working toward the same goal, there is much fractionalization within its military wing, otherwise referred to as the “maquis.” Historically, the primary division of this maquis has been between the Northern and Southern Fronts (Front Sud versus Front Nord). Settlements were signed in Cacheu, New Guinea that aspired to merge the first ceasefire pact signed between the two forces under insurgent leader, Sidy Badji,. Abbe Diamacoune and his brother Bertrand, along with other rebels denounced this pact because it did not adequately address the MFDC’s primary concern: independence. This group became known as the Front Sud, or Southern Front. Badji and those supporters who were willing to compromise and cease combat with the Senegalese government in return for extended control of the Bignona department in the northwestern region of the nation, became the Front Nord. The two insurgent factions have experienced some internal squabbling especially in the late 1990s to early 2000s, leading to a situation that has been described as complexly subdivided and “particularly fluid” (Evans, 2004: 5).

The Casamance Conflict remains officially unresolved, however a recent presidential turnover has solidified Senegal’s position as one of the most democratic nations in West Africa. Even though casualties continue to be claimed by way of this civil conflict, the recent democratic triumph has occurred nevertheless. (Dixon, 2012). This occurrence, although positive for the Senegalese people, further deemphasizes the longstanding state of civil conflict caused by the secessionist movement in Casamance in the eyes of the international community.

Year	Intensity	Fatality Estimates	<i>Casamance and the Rebel Resource Curse</i>
2011	Minor	25	<p><i>Table 2. Approximate Fatality Estimates: Casamance Conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program)</i></p> <p>The Casamance Conflict remains largely unknown within the international community due to its relatively low numbers of casualties, especially compared to other West African conflicts. Although it is the longest running conflict in said region, it has not been overly scrutinized for the same allegations of gross human rights violations as have other civil wars in the region. (Evans, 2002).</p> <p>There have been approximately 5,000 deaths attributed to causes connected to the civil conflict. The utilization of land mines has also wounded/killed a minimum of 652 reported victims, and has seriously compromised the agricultural economy by diminishing investments in the internal infrastructure of the Ziguinchor region. Perhaps even more telling than the number of casualties is the sheer amount of displaced persons that has resulted from such long-term violence. The 1998 Senegalese census found that a total of 62,638 persons were, at that time, internally displaced with over 70% of this number reported to have been from the Ziguinchor region. An unspecified number of civilian deaths and incidences of torture were also reported as a result of insurgent forces. The magnitude, however, was listed in 1997 as measuring “tens” of civilian deaths in Casamance until 1998 when Amnesty International reported the existence of several mass graves in which noncombatants were buried in the region of Niaguis. In 1999,</p>
2003	Minor	39	
2001	Minor	33	
2000	Minor	47	
1998	Minor	242	
1997	Minor	319	
1995	Minor	299	
1993	Minor	233	
1992	Minor	78	
1990	Minor	58	

Amnesty International also alleged that MFDC rebels had tortured and murdered dozens of Senegalese noncombatants. (The above figures are from: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mfdc.htm>).

While there is no exact figure for the number of noncombatant casualties that have occurred in the Casamance Conflict over the past forty years, sporadic violence is still reported and the utilization of landmines by these rebel forces adds to the number of unknown civilian deaths caused by the insurgency. It is estimated that at its *peak*, approximately 200-300 people a year died from complications that were connected to the still unresolved Casamance Conflict. (Mané, 2011).

The above chart is provided by the Uppsala Conflict Database. It details the number of battle deaths that have occurred throughout the past few decades of conflict. Note that even throughout those years in which the most fatalities are recorded to have occurred, their intensity is still indicated as minor. For the purposes of this particular dataset, a “minor” intensity level refers to “at least 25 but less than 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year,” whereas had the intensity level been measured as “war,” it would imply that at least 1000 battle deaths were reported in one year. It is also worth noting that the fatality estimates solely denote battle deaths. Incidentally, for the purposes of this thesis, it will not be possible to utilize this method of measurement in order to assess noncombatant deaths. This table also illustrates that although the Casamance Conflict is sometimes referred to as a civil war, it is, by definition via the Uppsala database, only categorized as a conflict of minor intensity.

One of the more interesting facets of the Casamance situation is the unwavering dedication of the MFDC and its members to the pursuit of independence. This ideological

motive is an essential factor in the exploration of the relatively low casualty rates that have been reported over the span of approximately 30 years.

Turning to characteristics of the rebels themselves, the average age of the “maquisards”⁸ is 30-40 years of age; further pointing to the possibility that these insurgents could be fighting, primarily, for the ideological benefits of independence. As stated later on in this thesis, the average age of recruits to the RUF in Sierra Leone and other West African nations are generally younger. This difference is attributed either due to a) previously noted ideological concerns and/or b) bulk recruitment during periods of key conflict throughout the 1980s and 1990s (both voluntarily and involuntarily). Those who did join by their own wills likely did so for reasons of avenging previous attacks on their villages, perceived discrimination against them by their northern countrymen, and gatherings called “awareness meetings” that emphasized these feelings of estrangement from the central Senegalese government. Increasingly, there has been recruitment among the young age structure in Casamance, altering the demography of insurgent forces. Whereas the age group 30-40 years old was considered literate (the “first generation” maquisards), the majority of new recruits are illiterate and have joined for primarily familial reasons.⁹ While there are reports of under-age combatants in the maquis, the presence of insurgents below the age of 13 is not high (All facts in this paragraph are from Evans, 2007).

Although the ELF Scores reported in the Research Design section are similar for Senegal and Sierra Leone, this does not by any means indicate that ethnicity has no effect on the nature of either insurgency, nor can it indicate incidence of ethnic discrimination within a state. The insurgents involved in the MFDC’s maquis are overwhelmingly considered to be of the Diola

⁸Another term for “insurgents”: derivative of “maquis”

⁹This underscores the commitment of Casamance separatists to their revolutionary ideology; it is passed down from generation to generation.

ethnic group. Why the Diola ethnic group in particular? When asked this question during one of the MFDC “awareness meetings,” the response received reads, “The Diola, they are warriors. They are not afraid to fight . And they know how to keep secrets. [...] You take an oath for something. Once you have taken the oath, you are never going back.” (Foucher, 2011: 88). The Diola, while physically separated from the rest of the nation, also maintain fundamental cultural and religious divergences from the majority ethnic group, the Wolof¹⁰, because the Diola practice Christianity.

Although the MFDC has always stated that it has nationalist sentiments aimed at benefitting any and all residents of Casamance, it is quite clear what the ethnic majority is within the group. There has been incidence of some maquisards actually targeting non-Diola individuals for attack regardless of regional situation. The term “nationality” is also used relatively loosely within this context; the borders between the regions of Casamance, the Gambia, and Guinea Bissau can be considered permeable at best. As a result, there is, without doubt, a certain amount of spillover when it comes to those who are actually participants in the insurgent movement. A lot of the national variation within the MFDC can be attributed to the large volume of displaced peoples, as mentioned in earlier discussion. Although ethnic and national disparity can be observed within this particular rebel group, religion itself does not seem to have a considerable effect on the makeup of the insurgency or the reasons behind their willingness to pursue conflict. (Uppsala Conflict Database).

While the Casamance Conflict remains, to this day, officially unresolved, Senegal has very recently taken leaps forward in its stance as one of the few truly established democracies in West Africa. In a national election on 25 March 2012, President Abdoulaye Wade peacefully

¹⁰ The Wolof ethnic group practices the Muslim religion.

conceded the presidency to the legitimate victor, Macky Sall, the new leader of the Senegalese State. (Dixon, 2012). Despite the fact that Senegalese polity scores have averaged approximately -2.2 (Closed Anocracy), within the past few decades, even with the ongoing civil war, the nation has managed to pull itself out of the negatives, more recently scoring solid 7s, officially categorizing it as a democracy during the last two years of measurement (2009 and 2010) not even taking into account its recent display of democratic maturity. (Polity Project IV).

The implication of this positive development in Senegalese politics, for the purposes of my own interests, is that this may curtail further research into the Casamance Conflict. If international attention is placed upon the Senegalese for their democratic triumphs, global interests might shift from the possibility of exploring the ongoing civil conflict. As noted previously, the already globally obscure stance of the Casamance Conflict has left me at a want for data indicating a specific number of noncombatant deaths. The possibility of curtailed data collection regarding this issue due to shifts in its political structure could have negative repercussions upon further research as well.

Non-presence of High-Value Mineral Materials

The MFDC has been observed to utilize available material resources in order to establish and finance its insurgency attempts. In the past, the MFDC was able to garner much needed popular support through monetary incentive, or, as was mentioned in my literature review, by utilizing the agrarian market to offer membership cards for specified portions of rice. (Evans, 2004: 5). Continued pressure from the Senegalese government however, was successful in ultimately erasing this source of organized revenue from insurgent forces as the increased

magnitude of arrests made of suspected rebellion supporters forcibly halted systematic efforts to fundraise. Perhaps one of the most important facts to emphasize in this portion of the analysis is that Senegal, Casamance specifically, is *not* endowed with high-value mineral resources, *particularly* it does not have secondary diamond deposits (very unlike the situation in Sierra Leone which will be explored later). The MFDC and those attempting to fund the rebellion and secessionist movement have had to rely solely on the international trade of agricultural products such as cashews, timber, and the illicit exchange of marijuana to both the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. (Evans, 2004: 36).

PART TWO: The Sierra Leone Civil War



Figure 2. Map of Sierra Leone and Surrounding Area (“Sierra Leone: Map”).

The civil conflict in Sierra Leone was instigated by the Revolutionary United Front (otherwise referred to as the RUF), which precipitated an insurgency from the bordering nation of Liberia in 1991. The RUF then allied itself with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and managed to topple the standing national government of Sierra Leone in 1997. These conjoined forces established a short-term government of their own before they were eventually overthrown by an opposing alliance that had been loyal to the former government. This conflict, which is actually defined as a “war” throughout certain periods of the engagement,

is internationally notorious for the sheer number and nature of human rights violations that were committed against noncombatants. (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006).

Fundamental Summary and Historical Implications

The nation of Sierra Leone is located on the coast of West Africa and is inhabited by the peoples of two primary ethnic groups, the Temne, accounting for 35% of the population, and the Mende with 31%. (Sierra Leone- Ethnic Groups, 2012). It achieved its independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. Upon independence, the highly segmented structure of British colonial rule left the newly independent state with only the skeleton of a government that fractured into regional bases because the British government had run the colony through a patrimonial system that leaned heavily upon existing indigenous rule. (Uppsala Conflict Database).

Without the central force of colonial authority, the nation quickly splintered into various cliques of ruling elite, all of which were crippled by existing ethnic tensions and corruption due to selfish motivation. The availability of secondary diamond deposits within Sierra Leone did little to alleviate this system of inconsistent and unproductive governance. The ruling party, the All People's Congress (APC), instituted an autocratic, one party state in 1978 after a period of unsuccessful attempts at democracy and military coups. The institution of the APC as the governing head led the state into an even worse situation; along with its lackluster economic, industrial, and agricultural sectors, it now had little or no bureaucratic or democratic freedoms. These factors, unsurprisingly, led to an impoverished and frustrated population complete with a multitude of dissatisfied, angry and unemployed young adults. It is also worth noting that the

APC, disenchanted by previous years of military coups, kept its army small and frail so as to discourage any chance of political turnover. (Uppsala Conflict Database).

The Revolutionary United Front dared to make its first move through an invasion from Sierra Leone's neighboring state, Liberia¹¹, backed by Liberia's president, Charles Taylor. The RUF was led by Foday Sankhoh, who had once been a colonel in the army and had met Liberia's President Taylor while training in insurgency tactics in Libya in the 1980s. This primary outbreak of civil conflict into Sierra Leone was, at first, perceived to be a simple over-the-border extension of the ongoing episodes instigated by the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) in Liberia. The RUF proved very soon after that this was not a matter of international spillover. Rather, it was the beginnings of a brutal intrastate conflict. (Uppsala Conflict Database).

The intriguing fact remains that although the RUF never officially stated a well-defined ideological purpose for its rebellion, it nevertheless claimed that, "its aim was to overthrow the corrupt leaders of the government, liberate the country's peasantry and institute a multiparty democracy." (Uppsala Conflict Database). The ethical and moral connotations evident within these claims are nothing less than ironic due to the incredible atrocities the RUF went on to commit against the very people that it had originally claimed to wish to free from the clutches of the current ineffective and autocratic government. Interestingly enough, despite the sweeping declarations speaking to democracy and a stronger economic system, the Revolutionary United Front never legitimately adopted an official ideological purpose underpinning such wishes. From the beginning, however, its one main objective was clear: gain control of Sierra Leone and oust the All People's Congress from power.

¹¹ Liberia was also experiencing a significant amount of civil conflict during this period.

From the immediate outset of the RUF insurgency, Charles Taylor and the NPFL threw their resources into the movement, supplying them with arms and secure places to hide. Perhaps the most fascinating factor, for the purposes of my research, is the interaction between the state of Liberia and the RUF in terms of illegal diamond exchange. Libya was also a notable source of revenue for the RUF because the RUF's triumph fit in with Muammar al-Gaddafi's "vision of revolution in West Africa." (Uppsala Conflict Database). Assistance to the government of Sierra Leone was also provided throughout periods of the conflict by the Nigerian and Guinean governments, among others.

Through a series of coups and actions by political and military organizations that are not particularly relevant to the hypothesis of my research, the RUF continued to engage in spurts of astonishing violence even after Ahmed Tejan Kabbah¹² was reinstated as president in 1998. Most notable was its joint attempt with a military coup organized by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to avenge its expulsion from the capital, Freetown. The attack on the capital was codenamed, quite fittingly, "Operation No Living Thing." In this dramatic installment of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict, insurgent forces surprised Nigerian peacekeepers supporting the government and overtook the city, killing noncombatant citizens, raping women, and looting indiscriminately. Through much urging by the United Nations and other concerned states, Sierra Leone made certain concessions to the RUF in an effort to stem the blood flow resulting from its dissatisfaction. The RUF remained discontented and the conflict was not officially ended until a union of allied forces, primarily British, ultimately overwhelmed the

¹² Kabbah was the elected leader of Sierra Leone who had been ousted in 1996 by a combined effort of RUF forces and a newly formed military junta composed of rebellious soldiers, the AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council)

Year	Intensity	Fatality Estimates	rebel group in 2000 and it was officially defeated in January of 2002. (Uppsala Conflict Database).
2000	Minor	154	
<i>Sierra Leone and the Rebel Resource Curse</i>			
1999	War	1550	
<i>Table 3. Approximate Fatality Estimates: Sierra Leone Civil War (Uppsala Conflict Data Program).</i>			
1998	War	1864	
1997	Minor	320	Unlike the Casamance Conflict, Sierra Leone's Civil War has received a great deal of international attention due
1996	Minor	78	to the horrific atrocities against human rights that have been
1995	Minor	789	profiled by the media and global organizations in the past
1994	Minor	523	few decades. Due to this elevated, albeit morbid, interest in
1993	Minor	326	the fate of noncombatants at the hands of the RUF, there is
1992	Minor	179	much more evidence concerning the number of civilian
1991	Minor	397	deaths and mutilations that have occurred as a direct result of this civil conflict. It is approximated that 80,000 to

100,000 civilians died, or were killed throughout the period of 1991-2002, and that an estimated 30,000 civilians experienced brutal decapitation at the hands of combatant rebels. In addition, it is believed that at least 250,000 women fell victim to sexual assault during the war. (The above figures can be found at:

<http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20090707065955zg/nm-projects/africa-projects/humanitarian-intervention-exploring-the-number-of-civilian-casualties-in-conflict-zones-where/>).

These numbers stand in stark contrast to those illustrated in the above chart. Take note that the number of total fatalities only includes deaths occurring during incidences of armed conflict. Added together, these battle casualties number fewer than 6,200, indicating that *the*

number of combatant deaths is, in fact, vastly lower than the amount of noncombatant casualties, a finding extremely relevant to my hypothesis.

The Revolutionary United Front remains one of the most notable insurgency groups that routinely relied on brutality, cruelty and sheer terror as its most reliable form of maintaining control over both its own recruits and of the civilians it encountered. It is of further interest to note the high prevalence of child recruits into the RUF. The insurgency group has been accused of performing a number of twisted and inhuman tactics by and through the enlistment of young soldiers. It has been reported that these child recruits were often abducted and given tranquilizing and other addictive drugs in order to induce “bravery,” and to lessen their sensitivities. These under-age insurgents were forced to commit atrocities against their own families and communities; made to participate in the mass killings and torturing of their friends and relatives, child soldiers were shunned from their villages, decreasing the likelihood of defection. In addition to committing such heinous actions, the RUF also saw fit to place these children on the front lines of battle. As terrible as these conditions were, the fate of female children at the hands of the RUF was not preferable as these girls were often subjected to repeated sexual assault. (Harsch, 2005).

The demographic makeup of the Revolutionary United Front was primarily composed of young adult males who had been previously disillusioned by the lack of economic and social capital made available to them by the government. The group was originally composed of approximately 20-50 of these Sierra Leoneans who were taken to Liberia in order to learn the art of rebellion and follow in the bloody footsteps of Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. One of the most ironic facets of the Sierra Leone Civil War is the very makeup of the insurgency movement: its onset was instigated by the ineffectiveness and disorganization of the

Sierra Leonean government however, the structure of the rebel movement was disorganized itself. As mentioned above, the RUF was neither part of a secessionist movement nor was it a centralized force with any conception of how the government should be ruled once the current regime had been overthrown. In this way, the Revolutionary United Front remains a significant outlier among previously observed patterns of guerrilla warfare. Scholars Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana state that throughout the years of its active insurgency, “[the RUF] remained a bandit organization solely driven by the survivalist needs of its predominantly uneducated and alienated battle front and battle group commanders.” There was no occurrence of any significant grassroots support from the very people for which it had, in the beginning, claimed to fight. Significantly as well, and as stated above, there is no indication that any specific ethnic ties were associated with RUF membership. (All figures in the above paragraph are from: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm>).

Presence of High-Value Mineral Materials

Lack of organization, the persistence of patrimonialism as well as a systematic failure to properly govern a nation comprised of varying ethnic groups played a large role in Sierra Leone’s consequent failure to adequately allocate its large deposits of highly valued minerals, specifically diamonds. Its economic system proved incapable of turning this natural endowment into a resource that could allow the nation to grow in terms of capital flow, technological advancement, and a marketable trading economy. (Uppsala Conflict Database). Herein lies the

notion of the “resource curse”¹³: nations that rely upon a given natural resource to sustain their economies, thus weakening incentives to strengthen other aspects of their nation’s possible income sources. These natural resources therefore become a liability. The governments of regions rich in these profitable materials have little need to create quality infrastructure, provide social benefits, or work on the technological advancement of their respective nations. Instead they are tempted to lean on the material wealth already available to them which, in turn, leads to an underdeveloped economic structure. The resource curse is a perfect example of the Hobbesian Theory discussed earlier in my research: human beings are motivated by their *own* self-interests. Therefore if a given party automatically has access to certain benefits, why would it bother straining itself to develop group benefits in which all would share? Symptoms of this “curse” are observable throughout the autocratic ruling period of the one-partied All People’s Congress government that struggled to lead Sierra Leone from the late 1970s until 1991. The ineffectiveness of the government did nothing but instigate the civil conflict that ultimately resulted in the RUF insurgency. Ironically, the very material that can be traced to the ineffectiveness of the Sierra Leonean government helped to fund the rebels, who engaged in illicit trade of secondary diamonds to Liberia and the NPFL in exchange for arms and additional support. (Uppsala Conflict Database).

The first diamond was not discovered in Sierra Leone until 1930, with significant production not commencing until 1935. Contemporarily, Sierra Leonean diamonds are the second most highly valued gems in the world, lagging behind only Namibia. These stones tend to be even more highly coveted for their large size. The diamond deposits found in Sierra Leone

¹³ This applies to my thesis because it also speaks to the levels of organization apparent within a given insurgent group that is motivated/ financed by the availability of highly valued natural resources and how these shape the character and conduct of said groups.

are typically the secondary source¹⁴, alluvial variation that I have been focusing on throughout my research. There has been much exploitation of these diamond deposits, found specifically within the regions of Kono and Kenema, throughout the past thirty years. Not only have the Liberian ruling elite benefitted from the illicit diamond trade, terrorist organizations such as Al-Qua'eda have allegedly received these highly valued minerals from the RUF at only a small fraction of the legitimate market price.

The Revolutionary United Front was able to maintain its insurgency primarily through the production of \$25 - \$125 million diamonds for each year of its active rebellion. (Ross, 2002: 22). Liberia, especially, became a major customer for Sierra Leonean diamonds. A nation endowed with diamond resources itself, Liberia's high-volume illicit import of these high-valued gems in exchange for materials such as weapons and ammunition, made Liberia more or less of a safe haven for criminal activity as well as a stimulus and source of funds for war among other African nations, Sierra Leone included. (Uppsala Conflict Data Program).

¹⁴ Recall that "secondary" diamond deposits refer to those deposits easily accessible to non-industrial sects and are easily harvested using common tools and techniques.

PART THREE: Comparative Analysis

Ideological versus Material Impulse

Senegal's Casamance Conflict is a good illustration of Jeremy Weinstein's hypothesis in his article "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." (2005). Although the application of Weinstein's theory in this article is only indirectly related to the primary hypotheses of my research, it is important to note within this thesis because it highlights the various levels of organization within rebel groups; a variable that may be related to whether the incidence of lootable natural resources is related to the mistreatment of noncombatants. As has been repeatedly highlighted throughout the historical implications of Senegal's regional rifts and civil conflict, the maquis of the MFDC seems, through my observation, to be more concerned with the ideological prospect of secession in response to perceived social and economic variations and injustices. The bulk of insurgents have been and are involved in the waning, yet still raging battle for the independence of Casamance. Through those factors analyzed above, it is plausible to categorize the majority of maquisards as investors¹⁵ and not the low-commitment consumers¹⁶ who are attracted to a given rebel movement by the promise of short-term gains. (Weinstein 2005).

The legitimacy of this investor claim is all the more emphasized by the fact that the Casamance nationalist movement, mobilized by MFDC forces, has been centered upon the education and ideological schooling of its members. In his 2011 article, "On the Matter (and Materiality) of the Nation: Interpreting Casamance's Unresolved Separatist Struggle," Vincent

¹⁵ Those soldiers who Weinstein categorize as dedicated to the organization's cause and who look forward to long term gains to be had in the future.

¹⁶ Conversely, these recruits are categorized by Weinstein as not highly connected to the ideological movement behind a given insurgency and are hypothesized to be more likely to defect if short-term gains are not accessed.

Foucher does field research in which he garners feedback from both a current commander of the MFDC (the former) as well as a participant in the original demonstration that initiated the conflict back in 1982 (the latter):

Question: What got you interested in the MFDC?

Me, I am an agriculturalist, but I have education. I could have been someone else. But I am left here, and they take someone worthless. They sell my seat to that person. ...

Answer: There are people with Master's degrees who are just hanging around here, doing nothing [in Casamance]. In Senegal [i.e., in north Senegal], you will never see even the crassest of high school students hanging around.

Question: So what was it people said to mobilize?

[That] when we had signed to unite with Senegal, we had agreed that everything would be built twice, once in Senegal and once in Casamance. But we eventually saw that all the good things, the factories, there are none. [That] when there were people who had children who went to school and had successfully taken school exams, they [the authorities] always favored the [north] Senegalese ... [They do the same] in any service, in the army. So they left Casamance like this. So they built nothing here. In firms, in factories, it is always the [north] Senegalese who have the good jobs. They do this segregation.(Foucher, 2011: 90)

These feelings of discrimination and the high value placed on education displayed in the quotes illustrates the investor-like characteristics that have been prevalent throughout the MFDC's Casamance separatist conflict. For my purposes, this dedication to education and regional pride speaks to the high organizational levels within the MFDC which, in turn, is vastly different from the structure of Sierra Leone's insurgent force, the Revolutionary United Front.

As elaborated upon in previous sections, recruits to the RUF (the instigators of Sierra Leone's Civil War) had no legitimate commitment to any specified ideology, nor was there any tentative plan of action with regards to how the nation should be ruled in the event of victory. The RUF, under the initial guise of fighting for democratic and social welfare, was concerned with gaining control of Sierra Leone in order to benefit from the large number of secondary diamond deposits (or, for our purposes, lootable natural resources) found within the region. Recruits to the insurgency movement were uneducated at best, and in many cases, they were child soldiers abducted by RUF members and forced to participate in the many atrocities that occurred throughout the duration of the rebellion. It is clear, if only by process of elimination, that the majority of RUF motivations would be more likely to align with the *consumer* mindset described by Weinstein: these combatants, provided that they participated in the rebellion of their own free will, would have been motivated by the thirst for the material gains that could be exploited from the resource-rich state.

Motivations as Related to Incidence of Noncombatant Casualties

The stark contrast between the estimated number of civilian casualties in the Casamance Conflict versus the civil war in Sierra Leone is key to understanding how the motivational factors noted above affect the incidence of indiscriminate violence within these areas of conflict. 80,000 noncombatant deaths in Sierra Leone contrasted with the 5,000 combined that occurred as a result of the Casamance Conflict illustrates an extreme divergence in how these insurgencies were waged. The fact that the state that suffered the higher number of casualties has a significantly smaller population serves to further legitimize my theory. I return to the hypotheses set in motion by Weinstein (2007) and that I am exploring via this comparative case study:

H1: Resource wealthy insurgency movements will be more likely to practice indiscriminate violence against civilians.

H2: Rebel movements that are considered “resource poor” will be more likely to attempt cooperation and restraint among noncombatants.

Through the qualitative exploration of the conflicts in Senegal and Sierra Leone, the hypotheses are supported. The Hobbesian theory of self-interest seems to be appropriately highlighted through further analysis of this dyadic case work. For example, motivated by prospective material gains, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone was able to equip itself with the necessary resources to wage a decade long massacre with little or no ideological backing or popular support. The RUF, unlike Senegal’s Casamance rebels, did not have to appeal to normative concerns, nor did it have to appeal to a particular group identity. Both the prevalence of secondary diamond deposits and the greed for control of yet more played active

roles in the occurrence of atrocities against civilians. The availability of lootable natural resources gained the RUF support from outside states, particularly Liberia, which supplied the RUF with weaponry. Additionally, the diamonds provided the RUF with the means to coerce unwilling citizens into its insurgency force. Those citizens that it did not need were expendable and subjected to waves of indiscriminate violence, the intention of which was solely to terrorize and assert dominance over the constituent population. The resulting deaths of this decade long conflict ranged from 80,000- 100,000, with only approximately 6,200 of these as actual battle fatalities. (Humanitarian Intervention [...], 2009).

In direct contrast, we have the Casamance Conflict in Senegal, that has not managed to capture the international audience that Sierra Leone has maintained throughout the past few decades. Senegal's and Sierra Leone's conflicts seemed to be an excellent pair of cases to study due to the many similarities explored earlier in this thesis: both are former European colonies located on the west coast of Africa, both gained their independence in the early 1960s, they have similar average polity scores and their ELF scores are almost identical. Their overall levels of economic and social development, as detailed in the Research Design section, are similar, and any significant variation can be accounted for by the noteworthy difference in the sizes of their respective populations.

Because Senegal has a larger number of citizens, there is a greater opportunity to victimize its population. Interestingly enough, the opposite is observed. Sierra Leone, with its prevalence of lootable natural resources in the form of secondary diamonds has been shown, through the length of this research endeavor, to have experienced a much larger amount of total brutality. If the variation in population size skewed the results of the analysis, we would have

expected that skew to indicate that in Senegal's war a large number of noncombatant deaths occurred. However, this possibility was completely nullified because the number of casualties, specifically civilian, that resulted from the Sierra Leone Civil War by far outnumbered those of the still ongoing Casamance Conflict. Multiple sources cited the number of noncombatant deaths in Sierra Leone as a result of the RUF insurgency, however a distinct number assigned to Senegalese civilian casualties was nowhere to be found; while there seemed to be isolated accounts of civilian deaths due to land mines and rare incidences of insurgent mistreatment, the data on this figure was lacking as well. One possibility is that there are so few civilian fatalities in the Casamance conflict that no one is keeping track of them. As mentioned previously, I acknowledge that the assumption that the Casamance Conflict is a relatively unknown as compared to those civil conflicts infamous for their brutality could have skewed my own conjecture. We must remember that lack of data about fatalities does not necessarily imply lack of fatalities. But it is suggestive of that lack.

CONCLUSION

This thesis supplements existing research on the correlation between the availability of exploitable natural resources to insurgent groups and the incidence of indiscriminate violence they commit against noncombatant citizens. Through my own qualitative research of specific variables within each state in my case studies, I am able to conclude that the complementary hypotheses offered by Weinstein (2007) may be supported: In the cases of the Casamance Conflict (resource poor insurgency) and the Sierra Leone Civil War (resource wealthy insurgency), Sierra Leone displayed a significantly larger amount of noncombatant mistreatment whereas the Casamance Conflict saw less violence toward civilians and a higher inclination to cooperate.

I realize that my findings on civilian casualties, specifically those pertaining to the Casamance Conflict, are based largely on approximation. Lack of concrete data led me to focus on reported eyewitness accounts and a wealth of concurring sources. This guessing game is partially due to what I had earlier anticipated: there is no way to precisely measure something that is intrinsically difficult to define. I acknowledge that the line between civilian casualties as a result of actions of a particular insurgency group versus natural or other causes is blurry at best. Do we count only those directly murdered by rebel forces as casualties? Do those that die of injury-related infections caused by insurgents get tallied? What about deaths attributed to food scarcity due to rebel looting? Finally, there is the issue of delayed death as a result of landmines. Such is the nature of social science research: findings often depend on *how* a certain term is defined. This does not mean, however, that these findings are not useful and applicable resources.

The character of any civil conflict will always be inherently different from another due to variation in location, culture and period making it difficult to choose any two conflicts that will adequately illustrate a given hypothesis; there is always some amount of give and take when deciding which variables are the most important to control. Although I believe that the two cases I chose for the purposes of this thesis did a satisfactory job in challenging my hypotheses, it would be interesting to research cases that are both defined as either rebellions aiming to gain control of the government or secessionist movements with purely separatist intentions. There is no way to know, through this particular thesis, whether or not the *type* of insurgency could have affected the severity of civilian mistreatment; this would be a fascinating subject for further research.

I acknowledge that this thesis could be improved by a number of factors. The time constraint under which I was placed did not allow me to explore more than two specific cases to illustrate the proposed hypotheses. I understand that had I been able to introduce perhaps even two more states to analyze, I would be better able to state the legitimacy of my theory with more confidence. I also recognize that for the purposes of this thesis, I introduced a very narrow definition of “lootable natural resources,” with the sole commodity of secondary diamond deposits. Exploring further natural resource endowment through additional case studies would have been ideal. Field research and primary sources are other factors in which this thesis is lacking. In short, my thesis would have been further strengthened had I had more time and funding at my disposal.

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