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OIL EXTRACTION, HUMAN SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF THE NIGER DELTA

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of oil extraction practices employed by multinational corporations, on the state of human security and the potential for sustainable development in developing countries. Specifically, it examines the oil extraction strategies of the Royal Dutch Shell Company in The Niger Delta, of Nigeria. The objective is to investigate, if there is any connection between the oil extraction policies of the Royal Dutch Shell and the current human security and sustainable development concerns prevailing in the region.

Although political figures are frequently met with conflicting interests, those which ostensibly involve economic expansion are often prioritized at the expense of the nation's state of human security and sustainable development. Many scholars have explored the outcomes of this cost-benefit calculation with respect to the Nigerian Government and its relationship with Shell, which has established oil extraction sites throughout The Niger Delta that may have fostered adverse consequences for those living in the surrounding communities. Though several studies have focused on the alleged environmental degradation and workers' health conditions that are thought to be derived from such extraction practices, little research has been conducted to assess the ways in which such methods have affected the lives of those who inhabit areas in which extraction zones have been introduced. The study addresses this oversight within the extant literature.

The findings of the study confirmed our original hypothesis that prevailing evidence indicates a direct connection between the oil extraction policies of the Royal Dutch Shell and the human security and sustainable development concerns in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The study outlines several recommendations for the Nigerian government as well as for the Royal Dutch Shell Company in the efforts to resolve the problems created by the oil extraction policies and their effects on the people and the environment of the Niger Delta region.

Data collection for the study included library resources such as books, Internet sources, newspaper and journal articles, video documentaries, demographic surveys, statistical reports published by international organizations, and records and public statements released by Shell.

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Chapter 1

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is to examine the impact of oil extraction, by multinational corporations, on human security and sustainable development in the developing countries of Africa and elsewhere. Specifically, the study focuses on the oil extraction practices of the Royal Dutch Shell Company in The Niger Delta, of Nigeria. The objective is to investigate, if there is any connection between the oil extraction policies of the Royal Dutch Shell and the current human security and sustainable development concerns prevailing in the region.

Statement of the Problem

Political leaders are assiduously confronted with demands that, if achieved, are believed to produce a greater nation. These demands may be political, economic, cultural and religious, ethnic and tribal, or social, and are frequently pursued with the utmost ardor. However, these demands may oftentimes conflict, as the means by which to attain one may operate to denigrate and jeopardize the pursuit of another. This incompatibility shapes and strains the cost-benefit calculation seeking to balance economic expansion and social rights and human security within developing countries. Because national security is so intimately associated with, and regularly measured by, fiscal growth, such is often granted priority at the expense of human security, universal human rights, and enduring socioeconomic development. Illustrating this reality is the oil extraction that has transpired within The Niger Delta for more than five decades, as this endeavor, while being portrayed and promoted by the Royal Dutch Shell Company as a lucrative venture to be embraced by the Nigerian Government, may have produced negative consequences in the region.

While much of the existing literature focuses on the environmental degradation stemming from oil extraction practices in the region, little research has been conducted regarding the implications such ecological deprivation has had in generating a severe decline in the standard of living for the inhabitants of The Niger Delta. This study hopes to fill in the gap by addressing this oversight in the literature.

Background to the Problem

> Each person has the right *qua* being human and because liveable environment is essential for one to fulfil his/her human capacities. And given the danger to our environment today and hence the danger to the very possibility of human existence, access to a liveable environment must be conceived as a right which imposes upon everyone a correlative moral obligation to respect (Blackstone, 1973).

The right and access to land is one of the most basic and fundamental entitlements essential for a sustained and thriving existence for all human beings. It is from this root that all other basic needs—such as food, water, and shelter—are fulfilled. The plot of land upon which we construct our home is also the source of our security, in addition to our sense of self-sufficiency. The surrounding plots constitute the neighborhood, village, or community from which we formulate our identity, and join together with those plots which expand evermore outward to assemble the nation from which we profess our loyalty and within which we have the liberty to express our autonomy.

Land is also, however, the bearer of precious natural resources, which prove highly profitable to those corporations and countries dictating the terms of their extraction, export, and sale. According to Reed, "Non-renewable resources have long played a key role in the development of human civilization. . . . Over the last one hundred and fifty years the extraction and processing of non-renewable resources has provided the basis for the three industrial revolutions that have led to the modern economies of the developed world" (2002:199). Yet this

economic expansion and subsequent development was, and continues to be, one-sided. The socio-economic benefits that are being capitalized upon by the nations extracting such coveted natural resources are accrued at the expense of the socio-economic welfare—and wellbeing—of those nations from which such resources are extracted.

The various methods of extraction employed by the companies involved are implemented with little regard for the local communities, often posing a severe threat to the quality of life of the local people. For example, The Niger Delta, located in the Atlantic Coast of Southern Nigeria, is home to over six million people, though it is rapidly becoming an "ecological wasteland" as a result of gas flaring, bursting pipelines, oil spillages, and other negligent acts characteristic of the numerous oil companies present in the region, including the Royal Dutch Shell Company. According to Odoemene, "petrobusiness activities have caused severe environmental damage and climate change in [this region's] communities thus leading to massive destruction of farmlands, and wild and marine lives" (2011:123). Much of the extant literature regarding the crisis in The Niger Delta, as the above passage reflects, emphasizes rather exclusively the ecological degradation transpiring as a result of the oil extraction policies and methods employed by the oil corporations.

The objective of this study is to investigate the adverse effects, if any, of the environmental degradation and exploitation on the inhabitants of The Niger Delta. This will be accomplished through discussion and analysis of the social and economic underdevelopment, human security and sustainable development throughout the region.

Oil Extraction

Situated at the core of countless environmental dilemmas transpiring throughout the developing world, are the unchecked practices and policies executed by multinational

corporations (MNCs) aimed at one objective: oil extraction. To understand the impact that such ecological and climatic deterioration has upon the living conditions of those residing within communities neighboring the extraction sites, it is essential to first, understand the nature of oil extraction. The British historian and political essayist, Perry Anderson, famously noted the coveted nature of oil, stating "Blood may be thicker than water, but oil is thicker than both" (2001:30).

Similar to other resource extraction industries (REIs), the oil industry was initially based upon small-scale operations, which "exploited rich and easily accessible deposits" within the corporation's home nation (Reed, 2002:200). Technological and organizational developments realized throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, elicited structural shifts within such companies that resulted in "vertically integrated, capital intensive corporations characterized by oligopolistic control" (Reed, 2002:200). The introduction of drilling techniques, for example, enabled the exploitation of subterranean reserves, while advances in transportation made it possible for oil to be transferred over long distances. Such progressions gave way to the development of economies of scale, as well as to the geographic expansion of markets (Reed, 2002:200).

The commencement of the twentieth century was accompanied by transnational oil exploration. As Reed explains, "Procurement of raw materials operates on the basis of the 'least cost rule.' Because costs change over time and reserves are finite, it makes sense for firms to have a wide geographical spread of supplies (2002:201). Acting upon this logic, American oil companies first shifted incremental production from the United States to Mexico and Venezuela in the 1920s, maintaining such sites until the 1940s, at which point oil exploration and extraction was again relocated, this time to the Middle East (Reed, 2002:202). By displacing the site of

extraction from the national base of the corporation, oil companies discovered methods by which to boost national economic interests while simultaneously conducting transactions in a manner favorable to the interests of the domestic oil corporation. Promoting opportunities for firms abroad, western governments adopted "contradictory policies" and endorsed the economic prosperity of corporations even under "questionable circumstances" (Reed, 2002:202).

Nowhere can the effects of such "contradictory policies" and "questionable circumstances" be better illustrated than in The Niger Delta, which has served as the epicenter of oil exploration, exploitation, and production in Nigeria since 1958 (Eweje, 2006:34). This oil-rich region, however, has endured greater pressure from western nations and corporations, particularly by the Shell Oil Company, the American subsidiary to the Royal Dutch Shell Company, since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Watts maintains that "alternative non-Persian Gulf sources of oil-supply are central to American geostrategic interests in the period since 2001" (2007:27). Such is the geopolitical backdrop of the newest "scramble for Africa," which may be analogous to the contemporary scramble for oil.

As a commercial producer of petroleum, Africa arrived on the scene rather late. Oil production in Africa began in Egypt in 1910 and only in earnest in Libya and Algeria, under French and Italian auspices, in the 1930s and 1940s (Watts, 2007:33). There are now twelve prominent oil producers in Africa, dominated, in rank order of output, by Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Angola which collectively account for 85% of African output (Watts, 2007:33). Although North Africa dominated oil production upon the continent until the 1970s, the Gulf of Guinea has emerged to surpass this production and export, as such—constituted by the so-called West African "Gulf States"—has surfaced as a "strategic African supplier to an increasingly tight and volatile world oil market" (Watts, 2007:33).

According to Watts, "Nigeria is the jewel in the Gulf of Guinea crown," as it is the sixth

largest oil producing nation in the world (2007:34). Yet in spite of the fact that oil accounts for

over 90% of Nigeria's export earnings, while The Niger Delta provides more than "80 per cent

of Nigeria's income, 8 per cent of U.S. oil imports and 22 million tons of oil a year to the

European Union," deprivation and destitution are the only realities for those whom call The

Niger Delta home (Eweje, 2006:34). The Ogoni people of this region state that their community

has been "completely devastated by three decades of reckless oil exploitation or ecological

warfare by oil companies . . . An ecological war is highly lethal, the more so as it is

unconventional. It is omnicidal in effect. Human life, flora, fauna, the air, fall at its feet, and

finally, the land itself dies" (Eweje, 2006:35).

Such is the result of negligent extraction practices, including gas flaring, which is done to

eliminate waste gas which is otherwise not feasible to use or transport; high-pressure, above

ground pipelines; and oil spills. According to Eweje, "the World Bank estimates that gas flaring

in The Niger Delta releases some 35 million tonnes of carbon dioxide" into the air annually,

while approximately half of such is released by Shell alone (2006:39). Further, data recorded by

the Department of Petroleum Resources indicate that "between 1976 and 1996 a total of 4,836

incidents resulted in the spillage of 2,446,322 barrels of oil, of which an estimated 1,896,930

barrels were lost to the environment" (Eweje, 2006:42). A second calculation, founded upon oil

industry sources, estimated that in the 36 years between 1960 and 1996, more than 1.07 million

barrels of oil were spilled in The Niger Delta (Eweje, 2006:42). The environmental damage

withering the once biologically diverse region—though inconsequential to the MNCs responsible

for such, which frequently avoid granting compensation—are not free of dire social

consequences, operating to obstruct human development and jeopardize human security.

Human Security

The contemporary notion of human security has recently emerged as a multi-disciplinary lens through which to perceive and understand global vulnerabilities. First conceptualized within the United Nations Human Development Program's (UNDP) 1994 *Human Development Report,* human security as it is now defined "equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms" (UNDP, 1994). Thus, according to Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, the architect of this revised concept, the individual is the proper referent for security, as opposed to the conventional subject of the state, in which national security is accentuated. To acquire and preserve stability on a regional, national, and intercontinental level, the concept of human security maintains that a people-centered view of security must be granted priority, rather than a nation-centered view (Howe and Sims, 2011:335). According to the demarcation of human security afforded by the UNDP, human security encompasses, and is collectively comprised of, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security (UNDP, 1994). In this sense, human security is a multi-faceted paradigm, which is integrated within, as well as is informed by, a vast array of research fields, including development studies, international studies, strategic studies, and human rights (Howe and Sims, 2011:335). Weaving such disciplines, scholars, policymakers, and government officials and international leaders are to strive for global security, in which all are "free from fear and free from want" (UNDP, 1994).

The aim of human security is not only dismissed, but actively undermined throughout The Niger Delta, at the hands of those MNCs invested in the region's oil supply. Accompanied by the extraction of oil is the exploitation of people, from whom neither fear nor want is absent. Each of the above seven components of human security are deteriorating as a result of irresponsible oil extraction practices. As more land is polluted by oil spills, oil waste, and carbon

emissions precipitated by gas flaring, great expanses of soil diminish in nutrients and become less fertile while lakes, ponds, and streams indicate elevated levels of toxicity which have distorted the aquatic balance (Eweje, 2006:41). Consequently, farmlands and fisheries—upon which a large constituent of residents rely for economic survival and personal subsistence—have become wholly unproductive, bearing scant yields and contributing to the abject poverty that has engulfed the nine states which form The Niger Delta. Inhabitants of this region have endured a depreciation in quality of life as a result of the recorded decline in personal health and wellbeing, which is surmised to be a derivative of oil spillage. In a survey conducted by Akoroda, "an emergent trend of carcinogenic diseases in the Niger-Delta is traceable to the exposure of these people to the radioactive elements of gas flaring" (2000:26).

    With such a bleak horizon, many young residents of the Delta region migrate to urban metropolitan centers in search of greener pastures and greater opportunity. Further swelling the already bloated labor market, however, these individuals oftentimes realize that the urban sphere is not always the gateway to economic prosperity, and come to occupy "the makeshift shacks that . . . make up the sprawling slums in most of present-day Niger Delta" (Jike, 2004:693). Feeling marginalized and excluded from the consideration of political figures, the youth of The Niger Delta have resorted to "violence, activism, and rebelliousness" (Jike, 2004:694). Such developments have further weakened the state of human security within this region, as some youth outfits have organized "armed militia and constabulary wings, which extort money and collect dubious revenues from people," bodies which may be attributed to what Jike refers to as "a fervent desire to cultivate and to nurture ethnic nationalism on a level that will place them in reckoning among other ethnic groups in the sharing of the 'national cake'" (2004:694). This dangerous sense of alienation and powerlessness has resulted in the deterioration of social

equilibrium, creating a milieu marked by violence and resentment, as the elder now represents within the mind of the youth "an era that is best forgotten, an era that disemboweled enormous resources from the Niger-Delta region with very little to show for infrastructures, development, or collective self-upliftment" (Jike, 2004:696).

Sustainable Development

While oil corporations such as Shell conduct business transactions concerning exploration and extraction methods, in addition to the export and selling of this precious commodity, in a manner that maximizes the economic growth of not only the corporation itself but also its parent nation, the countries harboring the oil from which these corporations and their respective countries expand are granted little, if any, agency to effectively regulate corporate activities and "determine their own 'development' fate" (Reed, 2002:204). It is for this very reason that those economies of the western world have become "developed," whereas those of the nations throughout which extraction sites are established are deemed to be still "developing."

Relatively current transformations have firmly fixated the idea of economic globalization within the international psyche. Under this new regime, developing countries are liberalizing not only trade, but foreign investment as well, permitting new forms of joint ventures while also privatizing nationalized firms. In order to attract foreign investment, however, these nations are "increasingly being forced by competition by other developing countries to engage in regulatory bargaining," such as the offering of tax breaks and concessions in environmental regulation (Reed, 2002:205). The conclusion, however: the denial of public policy autonomy, triggering an "international race to the bottom" (Strange, 1996:4).

Such are the tenets of this structural organization which impede efforts to implement within the agenda of developing countries efforts to realize sustainable development. The

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discourse substantiating this term was formally introduced by the *World Conservation Strategy* (WCS) in 1980, and presented a "conservation-centered" approach to state development, in which environmental concerns assumed precedence over traditional attitudes toward development, such as industrialization (IUCN, 1980). The banner of "sustainable development" was granted further attention and sanctioning with the publication of the United Nations report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, otherwise known as the "Brundtland Commission." Printed in 1987, the document assessed that "the international economy must speed up world growth while respecting environmental constraints," stressing that "we must not succumb to the temptation to put the environment in one category and development in another, or to imagine that policy dealing with one does not deal with the other (WCED, 1987:43; Hawke, 1989:24). While the notion of sustainable development as provided by the WCS was conservation-centered, that offered by the Brundtland Commission was decidedly human-centered, emphasizing international equity and the fulfillment of basic needs throughout the developing world, while calling for a new lens through which to view the intersection of environment and development, one which "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987:43).

Yet the developments transpiring throughout The Niger Delta are by no stretch of the imagination "human-centered," as public policies and environmental regulations have failed time and again to protect and improve the welfare of those living in affected states and communities. As Jike posits, the unequivocal social, economic, and, thus, human underdevelopment of the region "cannot be understood independently of environmental problems that stem from a warped development initiative that roundly undermines the existential base of the Niger-Delta peoples" (2004:686). The resource upon which these people so heavily depend—their land—is dissipating

and degenerating at a precipitous rate. Once self-sufficient, reaping the fruits of the once thriving

environment, families are now unable to provide a life of stability and dignity for their children,

as soil toxicity has led to poor crop quality while water pollution has decimated fishing reserves

and clean drinking water. Unemployment has risen, just as the sentiments of ostracism,

restiveness, and defenselessness. Jike surveys the long list of dilemmas plaguing those of The

Niger Delta and inhibiting the road to sustainable development, accounting:

> Institutional structures in Nigeria have become considerably weak, and the leverage for popular
> control has been whittled down. The family has lost its preeminent status as a nurturant
> socialization institution. The political parties and institutions are a travesty of what they ought to
> be. . . Area boys, ethnic militia, and a stream of countercultures take hold and are firmly
> entrenched. The government of the day is bogged down with attempting to decipher the meaning
> of this chaotic condition rather than addressing the more fundamental issues of pervasive poverty
> and how to diversify the economy away from reliance on petroleum oil. The development
> dilemma is that the country has not been able to create resistant institutional structures to promote
> economic growth and address the yearning of the masses for food, water, light, shelter, and the
> bridging of the gulf of inequality between the haves and the have-nots (2004:698).

Because foreign oil companies fail to treat the environment within which they operate, as well as

those local residents inhabiting that environment, as they would in their parent countries, such

corporations approach the extraction of oil utilizing and exercising methods and practices which

irrefutably deny those native to The Niger Delta the resources to "meet the needs of the present."

Given this truth, there appears little possibility—in the absence of comprehensive legislative

modifications and regulatory policies that are respected and recognized—of successfully

satisfying the needs of today, much less to do so while ensuring the capacity of future

generations to do so tomorrow. This untenable situation is one that demands greater attention so

as to be properly addressed. The objective of this study, as stated above, is to contribute to the

body of literature, as regards The Niger Delta, by examining the oil extraction practices

employed by Shell within the region to ascertain whether or not any connections exist between

the Company's oil extraction policies and the current human security and sustainable development concerns of the region.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study can be measured in two ways. First, it contributes to the existing body of literature regarding oil extraction and its effects on human security and sustainable development, especially in Africa. Second, it will prove informative to governments confronted with unregulated oil extraction, particularly the Nigerian Government. The study is also important to environmental agencies, NGOs, the World Health Organization, and human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Finally, international organizations, such as the United Nations, as well as financial aid agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, will also benefit from the study.

Hypothesis

There is a connection between the oil extraction practices of The Royal Dutch Shell Company and the current environmental, human security, and sustainable development concerns in The Niger Delta.

Methodology- Data Collection

Data collection for the study will include books, Internet sources, newspaper and journal articles, demographic surveys, and statistical reports published by international organizations, including the Human Development Index published by the United Nations.

Research Questions

1. How are "human security" and "sustainable development" defined?

2. What regulations have been implemented by the Nigerian Government to guide oil extraction conducted by the Royal Dutch Shell Company, and how do the practices that fall within the parameters of these mandates affect local residents?

3. What economic impact does the oil extraction in The Niger Delta have with respect to Nigeria?

4. What, if any, symptoms of environmental degradation have manifested within The Niger Delta since the arrival of the Royal Dutch Shell Company? How have these indicators, if any, altered the quality of life for native inhabitants?

<center>**Chapter Two**</center>

<center>**Literature Review**</center>

Introduction

This chapter will survey the extant literature on oil extraction, human security, and sustainable development, respectively. The analysis and synthesis of the research published in reference to the above three areas of study will offer a comprehensive and relevant groundwork that will foster a foundational understanding, and serve as an impetus for the subsequent discussion concerning the case of The Niger Delta, specifically.

Oil Extraction

Oil is the most valuable commodity in world trade (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:589). An industry which has proven extraordinarily profitable for a selection of particular corporations and governments and, by extension, nations, it is noted that "roughly two billion dollars a day now change hands in worldwide petroleum transactions. It is the world's first trillion-dollar industry in terms of annual dollar sales" (Doyle, 1994:4). The rapacious demand for oil stems from the versatile array of purposes for which it is utilized in developed nations, including transportation, heating, electricity, and industrial applications (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:589). Satisfying such demand for various high-consumption countries and, thus, completing the circle that is the international oil market, are those nations endowed with oil reserves and dependent upon export earnings. Vital to economic viability, oil accounts for "upwards of 80% of total national exports for Libya, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela" (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:589). Yet while the countries constituting the demand side of this global contract extract and employ oil to satisfy the functionality it fosters so as to engender beneficial outcomes for its

citizenry, oil connotes for many individuals residing within nations comprising the supply side a product which functions only to generate injurious effects and beget the ultimate collapse of a once-secure way of life.

Due to the powerful implications oil wields both politically and economically, as well as the extreme wealth such denotes and affords to the favored players of the market, it is not unanticipated that it should be the topic upon which an extensive body of literature has been published. Yet the nature and position of previous analyses depends largely upon the stakeholders responsible for their publication. The National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) of the United States, for example, has produced several reports zealously sanctioning the expansion and increase of extraction sites, contending that the country is currently confronted by "the most serious energy shortage since the oil embargoes of the 1970s," which it attributes to "'overly burdensome' and 'often excessive and redundant' regulations that hinder new exploration and production of oil" (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:588). Other records released by multinational oil companies and other industry sources convey data with respect to the locations, production levels, technological challenges, and economics of oil extraction, production, and refining, though make no mention of the impact—whether positive or negative—such practices, challenges, and production levels manifest within the communities which lie in close proximity to extraction zones (Azar, 2004). Likewise, there exists a wide range of historical accounts objectively examining the series of political and economic developments that have transpired in oil extraction throughout the world (Clark & Reed, 1990; Sampson, 1975; Yergin, 1991). It is only throughout recent years that a number of reports have emerged and been consolidated to expose the adverse effects propagated by oil exploration, extraction, and production. The faultless illustration of extraction practices and the denial of deleterious consequences have been

utterly discredited, and it is now widely acknowledged and accepted that such practices do, in fact, cultivate detrimental repercussions within local communities.

Falling within the radar of scrutiny and, therefore, shaping the subject matter embodied within the extant literature, is the influence oil extraction proves to exercise upon the state of democratic governance, violence and conflict, and environmental degradation within those countries in which extraction takes place. As discussed above, transnational oil corporations responsible for extraction and processing have increasingly shifted their operations from developed to developing countries, precipitating an oil economy marked by greater concentration and a more capacious presence partially as a result of the geographic expansion of markets (Reed, 2002:200). This process of transnationalization, according to Reed, has been, in part, due to "the ability of corporate leaders to assert influence, both directly on foreign officials (to allow foreign investment under favourable conditions) and indirectly through home government officials" (2002:203). Such "influence" is derived from the oligopolistic structure of the oil industry and the size of individual oil firms, which Reed claims, "provide industry leaders with large amounts of resources to lobby government" (2002:203). Administrative officials representing the parent nation in which the corporation is founded also emphasize the economic and strategic importance of oil exports to sway those leaders of oil-producing countries, making them "particularly receptive to industry concerns" and willing to "provide opportunities for contact" (Reed, 2002:203).

Once contact has been established and extraction sites determined, however, many argue that the political democratization within developing countries—which Reed accounts as having heightened throughout the immediate post-World War II period—contracts and, in some instances, reverses. This reversal, though often dismissed or concealed, has come at the hands of

multinational oil firms themselves, which have, in various instances, been responsible for the overthrow of legitimate governments (Ashour, 1981:68). Such company-led coups typically occur after such governments profess their sovereignty over their country's natural resources, as was the case when the government of Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran chose to nationalize the holdings of British Petroleum, otherwise referred to as BP, in 1951 (Reed, 2002:210). After futilely exerting extreme economic pressure on the Mossadegh Government in the attempt to provoke the withdrawal of its policy, the British Government, accompanied by that of the United States, supported a coup in 1953 that led to the overthrow of Mossadegh, the return of the Shah, and the re-entry of foreign oil companies in Iran (Sampson, 1975:228). Oil extraction companies have, in a plethora of other cases, granted support for the continuation of non-democratic governments, including those instituted within the gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain (Reed, 2002:210). As Reed notes, "Most Western powers have shown little interest in promoting democratic reform and have largely ignored reports of human rights abuses in such countries unless it appears to be in their strategic or economic interests to take them up" (2002:210).

In light of the operations of oil corporations to endorse non-democratic regimes, Reed asserts that "increased political democracy is clearly welcomed" in oil-exporting nations, while Ross maintains that the "oil-impedes-democracy claim is both valid and statistically robust" (2001:356). Analyzing time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to explore the validity, generality, and causality of the impeding effect of oil upon democratic governance, Ross concludes that the three "causal mechanisms" associating oil extraction processes and authoritarianism are:

> a rentier effect, through which governments use low tax rates and high spending to dampen pressures for democracy; a repression effect, by which governments build up their internal security

forces to ward off democratic pressures; and a modernization effect, in which the failure of the population to move into industrial and service sector jobs renders them less likely to push for democracy (2001:356-7).

Ross stipulates that higher personal and corporate taxes are strongly associated with more democratic rule and, thus, government officials of oil-rich nations enact low domestic taxes so as to reduce demands among the domestic citizenry for government accountability.

This lack of administrative culpability to its own civilians has, despite high oil revenues, caused severe socio-economic underdevelopment. Modeling multinational oil companies, which inhibit "the ability of countries to effectively regulate corporate activities and determine their own 'development fate,'" the regime of many oil-exporting nations obstructs the agency of its citizens to regulate government activities and monetary mismanagement, to challenge corruption, and to insist transparency, ultimately perpetuating, and often exacerbating, human insecurity (Reed, 2002:204). This sentiment is echoed by Harshe, who points to the interactions between transnational oil firms, U.S.-led western states, and the oil-rich states of Nigeria, Chad, and Angola. Although facilitating the exploration and extraction of oil, as well as the growth of oil revenues, Harshe argues that "such revenues have either been deployed to strengthen the security-related apparatuses in the context of civil wars or they have been siphoned off by the corrupt ruling cliques in these countries. The oil booms have hardly contributed in alleviating poverty" (2003:117). This realistic application reflects the significance of the modernization effect encompassed within Ross's proposed causal mechanisms. The modernization theory, upon which this element is derivative, holds that "democracy is caused by a collection of social and cultural changes—including occupational specialization, urbanization, and higher levels of education—that in turn are caused by economic development" (Ross, 2001:336). Although this theory does not explicitly address the subject of resource wealth, it does, indeed, suggest, by example of Kuwait and Libya, that if economic growth fails to prompt social and cultural

transformation, it will also fail to elicit democratization, therefore, denoting authoritarian rule as an additional component to the "resource curse" (Ross, 2001:336). According to Watts, "Oil-dependent economies are, in spite of their vast resource wealth, some of the most sordid, chaotic, socially unjust, and inequitable of all political economies," lacking anything remotely similar to revenue transparency (2005:384).

Due to the fact that the demand present within developed countries for energy products is great and the cost of production for alternative sources of energy is high, oil revenues are, consequently, considerable and, thus, serve as a pronounced component of an oil exporting economy (Schliephake, 1977:9). Yet the governmental administration instituted within oil exporting nations, the argument continues, though ostensibly committed to promoting development, in actuality, fail to allocate incoming revenue to the social amenities that will, according to the modernization theory, foster more democratic, accountable, and, thus, effective, governance—validating the "paradox of plenty"—in order to allot funding for militaristic weapons and security efforts to "protect their own regimes and western oil interests," (Harshe, 2003:113). Ross suggests that various case studies throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia indicate that oil wealth compounded by authoritarianism may prove an environment conducive to repression. "Citizens in resource-rich states may want democracy as much as citizens elsewhere, but resource wealth may allow their governments to spend more on internal security and so block the population's democratic aspirations" (Ross, 2001:335). Governmentally imposed despotism has occurred throughout much of the Middle East through the vehicle of violence, as it is argued that the process of democratization has been obstructed, in some measure, as a result of the prevalence of the *mukhabarat* (national security) state (Ross, 2001:335). The 1990s oil boom in the Republic of Congo also led to a surge in revenue that was

utilized to "build up the armed forces and train a special presidential guard to help maintain order" (Ross, 2001:335). Likewise, the Indris Deby of Chad has utilized initial profits from their recently accrued oil revenue to purchase weapons worth $4.5 million to protect the security of its regime, as well as the oil company. Harshe observes that "arms traders, corrupt officialdom and oil companies seem to flourish in Chad at the cost of human rights" (2003:116).

Distributing sizeable portions of oil revenue to the swelling of military forces has, in addition to suppressing the demand for democracy among the populace, made such land more appealing to foreign oil extraction corporations, which prefer to concentrate investment in "secured enclaves" (Ferguson, 2005:378). Protected by both national and private armies and security forces, such territorial enclaves of oil extraction have yielded an increasing acceptance of "the idea that effective oil production and endemic violence can coexist" (Ferguson, 2005:379). Petro-violence is an enduring fixture within the Caspian basin, a repository of enormous petro-wealth which spans from the borders of Afghanistan to the Russian Caucuses. However, the states constituting this region—Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the southern Russian provinces—have, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, become a "zone of civil conflict and war" (Watts, 2005:382). According to Collier et al., "Countries with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita income that have remained dependent on primary commodities . . . face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict" (2003:53). Territorial control of oil-bearing lands act as the primary stimulus to separatist conflicts, including those which have occurred in Cabinda in Angola, Biafra in Nigeria, and Aceh in Indonesia (Watts, 2005:383). Using resource dependency as a way of conceptualizing rebellion, Collier concludes that "when the natural resource endowment is double the average of low-income countries, the risk of a war is 8%, and in oil-producing states, the risk that such a

war will be secessionist is 99.5%" (2003:61).

Yet while an ever-growing body of research, afforded by economists and political scientists, has charted the associative impact between oil dependency, democracy, and war, little attention has been directed to the manner in which such relations have contributed to the deterioration of life for those residing within oil-exporting developing countries. Autocratic governance has become particularly salient among indigenous groups and ethnic minorities whom are most vulnerable to oil-related violence as a result of their weak—if not non-existent—civil and political rights. Although referenced, the tyrannical acts characteristic of oil-exporting regimes exercised against local inhabitants and the blatant disregard for their welfare, have rarely been explicitly situated within, or conceived as, violations of universal human rights.

Oil wealth is often geographically concentrated and if, by chance, such converges within a region populated by native or ethnic minorities (as in Angola, Burma, Colombia, East Timor, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Nigeria), oil extraction may promote or exacerbate ethnic tensions, as federal, regional, and local actors compete for oil rights—as well as rights to a safe and healthful environment—allegedly validating the need for excessive military expenditures and the use of violence through internal security apparatuses, further undermining local autonomy. The formal and informal expropriation of lands, often by force, leaves many residents of local communities dispossessed, such as the U'wa of Colombia and Ecuador and the Ogoni of Nigeria's Niger Delta, whose plight will be elaborated upon at length below. Oil concessions have, likewise, been advertised as existing in the Republic of Sudan on "uninhabited land"—land, that is, which has been systematically rendered uninhabited by paramilitaries, which "drive off the residents" (Ferguson, 2005:379). This spatial marginalization operates to maintain the isolation of oil-extraction enclaves, which, as Ferguson notes, are "sharply walled off from their own national

societies" (2005:379).

This deliberate territorial compartmentalization has resulted in the worsening state of economic development and the ascending rate of impoverishment among civilians. While a limited body of empirical data exists to validate the claim that multinational oil extracting companies stimulate economic growth, alluding to Algeria and, to a lesser degree, Tunisia, few scholars are willing to assert that such promote economic development within the nations in which extractive practices are executed. In fact, Sachs and Warner have posited a strong correlation between resource dependency, corruption, and economic performance, finding that "one standard deviation increase in the ratio of natural resource exports to gross national product is associated with a decrease of just over 1% in the overall economic growth rate (irrespective of the endogeneity of corruption, commodity price variability, and trade liberalization)" (1995:12). Developing countries dependent upon oil as their primary export commodity are pressured to engage in regulatory bargaining in order to remain competitive in the market, thus offering tax breaks, relaxed worker and environmental regulations, and further liberalizing reforms which threaten the state purse (Reed, 2002:205).Thus:

> a ramshackle, decrepit dependency, propped up as a sovereign entity, grants to an oil company an exclusive right to explore and develop oil over a defined territory for extended—often indefinite—periods of time. The company, armed with full title to, and unfettered disposability of, all oil resources operates with total impunity, promising niggardly payments (royalties, rents, and taxes) to the host government (Watts, 2005:381).

Those residing in communities close in proximity to extraction sites, however, fare much worse—an unfortunate reality less frequently addressed within the assembly of analyses concerning the role oil extraction plays with respect to economic security. Though oil firms and their home governments desperately claim that their presence and operations in developing countries are in the best interest of, and even aid, native inhabitants by providing employment and offering leverage for reforms, statistical evidence proves otherwise. According to Ferguson,

"When capital is invested in spatially segregated extraction enclaves, the 'flow' of capital does not cover the globe, it connects discrete points on it" (2005:379). This truth is most clearly perceived through the case of oil extraction occurring off the coast of Angola, where "neither the oil nor most of the money it brings in ever touches Angolan soil" (Ferguson, 2005:378). As one of the world's leading oil exporters, producing some one million barrels per day, the Angolan state receives something on the order of $5 billion in oil revenue each year (Ferguson, 2005:378). Nonetheless, very little of this oil wealth "ever enters the wider society" (Gary & Karl, 2003:31). Thus, in spite of twenty-five years of booming oil production, Angolans today "are among the most desperately poor people on the planet," while the nation ranks at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index (Ferguson, 2005:378).

The indigenous and ethnic minorities who comprise the national populace and are, therefore, stakeholders in oil extraction practices, are frequently oppressed by a lack of institutional avenues through which they may actively contribute to the decisions affecting their lives. As a result, while oil wealth is often geographically concentrated, the benefits it engenders are diffused to all parties, with the exclusion of local inhabitants. Watts explains:

> Companies claim that they are not political and cannot intervene in ways that compromise national sovereignty; they claim that the lack of transparency is often imposed by state dictate; and they often claim ignorance or limited control over subsidiaries. States in turn are happy to blame private companies (with whom they operate contractually) in order to absolve themselves and to impose expectations (infrastructural development, community outreach) on companies that should be in part or whole their own responsibility; and in any case, they assert that it is their legitimate right to privatize and, hence, monopolize, a national resource (2005:392).

While multinational oil corporations and the administrative figureheads of the nations in which they are present may shift the responsibility upon one another, while concurrently collecting the monetary rewards of their actions, it is the people of these oil-exporting nations which endure prolonged hardship at the hands of the very actors—and victors—who dismiss, and abdicate themselves of any accountability.

As Ikein notes, "the extractive activities in host communities in a developing country continue to generate a dualistic character of unequal exchange and uneven development in the producing regions" (1990:113). This "unequal exchange and uneven development," while often political, social, and economic, is also, as the literature emphasizes, environmental. Echoing the ever-deviating fissure separating the nation extracting oil and the nation from which oil is being extraction, is a study conducted by Bunker examining the operations occurring in Brazil's Amazon region. Bunker observed that:

> when natural resources are extracted from one regional ecosystem to be transformed and consumed in another, the resource exporting region loses value that is in its physical environment. . . Extractive appropriation impoverishes the environment on which local populations depend both for their own reproduction and for the extraction of commodities for export (1985:22).

The geographical distribution of the extraction, manufacture and processing, and sale of oil enables multinational oil corporations to capitalize upon the unique advantages afforded by each particular country and to utilize such to their own ends so as to maximize their profit margins, which, of course, are transferred from the host country to the parent country of the corporation. The advantages characteristic of developing nations, as cited above, are the weak and pliable collection of regulations addressing extraction methods which are instituted, the wavering ability and will of governments to enforce such regulations, and the constricted capacity and accessibility of local communities to participate in decision-making and, thus, to demand the stringent recognition and preservation of such regulations. It is not infrequent, then, that "firms cause environmental damage through methods that are perfectly legal in the host (developing) country in which they are operating, but which would be illegal in their home (developed) country" (Reed, 2002:211).

Within the last two decades, the commitment to environmental conservation and preservation has become a highly scrutinized staple encompassed within the principles to which

transnational corporations are to conform as they conduct their activities within the global capitalist economy. Consequently, the grave cases of environmental degradation resulting from various oil extraction practices and corporate negligence, have come under international attack. As Epstein and Selber assert:

> Exploration usually involves moving heavy equipment into relatively pristine environmental areas, disrupting-- sometimes deforesting -- the habitat and allowing human encroachment. Air and ground transport vehicles require landing strips and new roads, further contributing to the fragmentation of habitats. . . Water used and contaminated during extraction, or 'produced water' as it is known in the industry, generally contains varying quantities of heavy metals, volatile aromatic hydrocarbons (such as benzene, toluene and xylene) and a vast array of other potentially toxic compounds. Produced water can be treated using a range of mitigation techniques including filtration, biological processes, and reverse osmosis before being reintroduced into the environment. But these methods entail a great deal of expense and seem to be employed selectively. Likewise, since certain geologic features commonly associated with the exploitation of oil are also associated with underground water systems, many extraction operations have the requisite preconditions for widespread contamination. Avoiding contamination of adjacent water supplies often requires a costly combination of fracture and hydro-geologic analyses; costs unlikely to be incurred except where environmental standards require these activities (2002:9-10).

As the literature cites, oil extraction induces the often extreme physical alteration of environments through processes of deforestation, chemical contamination of land and water, and long-term harm to animal populations (particularly migratory birds and marine mammals), which amass to engender the wholesale destruction of entire ecosystems.

The presence and establishment of such extraction sites are only the tip of the iceberg, however, as environmental despoliation is exacerbated by oil spills, blowouts, hydrocarbon releases, and gas flaring (Watts, 2005:388). "In 2002, the National Academy of Sciences estimated that 38,000 tons of petroleum hydrocarbons were released into the world's oceans each year during the 1990s as a result of oil operations," while emissions from drilling equipment, hydrocarbons escaping from wells, and the flaring of natural gas have comprehensively degraded air quality surrounding extraction zones (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:595). According to Epstein and Selber, large-scale oil spills, defined as spills of over 10 million gallons, have occurred almost every year since the 1960s" (2002:20). A large spill, however:

can do extensive damage to large areas of ocean (or land), smothering the small microorganisms that comprise the bottom of the food chain. In smaller spills, neighboring organisms often recolonize relatively quickly. But after a very large spill, recolonization and replenishment of microorganisms from surrounding areas can be greatly delayed. It is important to note that because of the effects of oil spills on vegetation, water and fish, the impacts of even small spills can send ripples into surrounding ecosystems (Epstein & Selber, 2002:22).

In Nigeria alone, more than 4,800 oil spills have occurred between 1970 and 2000, while the nation boasts the highest flaring rates in the world, constituting 12% of the world's total in 2002 (Watts, 2005:388). The highly pervasive oil activity and extreme laxity as regards preventative measures implemented to avoid widespread desecration have beget "an endless carpet of oil laid perpetually on the surface of the waters . . . destroying the vegetation and acquatic life that could once be found in abundance" (Jike, 2004:691). Such are the concerns upon which academic and scholarly light has been shed, as the literature reflecting the situation of The Niger Delta emphasizes the scientifically ecological aspect of the extraction methods occurring.

Yet while the trade-off between maximized oil revenue and environmental conservation has been addressed at length throughout the research conducted with respect to oil extraction, the trade-off that unfortunately exists—and that maximized oil revenue most often wins—between profit and human well-being, is rarely brought into the discourse. Increased productive capacity has not only materialized at the expense of environmental sustainability, but also by jeopardizing the welfare of those residing within local communities. "It is not just ownership but rather control over key stages of the oil chain that significantly influences who benefits and who pays the costs of oil development," according to Watts (2005:401). Because civilians—particularly those most vulnerable to the adverse impact of local extraction—are accorded limited opportunity to effectively engage in civic decision-making and contribute to the policies that determine the conditions under which such transnational oil corporations perform their activities, it is the people comprising communities on the perimeter of extraction cites which endure the

risks and suffer the negative implications of corporate practices, while companies stand the most to gain in terms of decreased costs.

Though the studies currently comprising the knowledge accrued in reference to oil extraction practices focus a great deal of concentration upon the environmental harm transpiring, few researchers have taken the steps to eke out the specific repercussions such damage proves to have upon the lives of the human populations established around these regions of extraction. As O'Rourke and Connolly note, "There are no good international data or comprehensive analyses of the distribution of human impacts from oil exploration, drilling, and extraction" (2003:596). In spite of the lack of research concerning the local inhabitants, however, Kretzmann and Wright report that indigenous groups in six continents and 39 countries "face an immediate to medium-term threat from new oil exploration" (1998:42). In the western Amazon alone, at least 50 indigenous groups live within oil concessions that are under exploration or preproduction. Beyond the Amazon, oil exploration, drilling, and extraction affect the Baka, Bakoli, and Ogoni of Africa; the Tavoyans, Mon, and Karen of Burma; and the Eastern Khanty peoples of Western Siberia (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:596). Yet while much is published on "deforestation, ecosystem destruction, chemical contamination of land and water, and long-term harm to animal populations (particularly migratory birds and marine mammals), little has been done to explicitly address how the above developments translate to procure the human insecurity and underdevelopment now plaguing entire communities.

It is acknowledged that in 1995, American oil corporations collectively produced 146 million barrels of drilling waste and 22 million barrels of associated wastes, which contain a range of toxins and chemicals. This waste is deposited in exposed waste pits which are known to pose a danger not only to aquifers, but also to animals and birds that "mistake the pits for water

holes and become coated with toxic wastes (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:595). Scholars have

not, however, extended this knowledge to make any connection between the presence of toxic

waste pits and the subsequent contamination of land, water, flora, and fauna, and the implications

such have upon human life. According to an article published by the National Concord editorial

in response to oil spills regularly occurring throughout The Niger Delta, "the people are

surrounded by a filthy and repugnant body of water which is most unsafe for human

consumption, and their major sources of protein permanently devastated" (Jike, 2004:691).

Yet surveys have not been conducted among local populations to determine the extent of water

and soil toxicity and how such has adversely affected fisheries and the yields of farmlands, upon

which local residents rely for both personal and economic sustenance.

This claim may be substantiated by examining the case of Chad, in which a pipeline

construction project worth $3.7 billion has been facilitated and funded by the World Bank since

2000. Under the project, 300 oil wells are being drilled and developed at the Doba basin of

Southern Chad, while the maximum production from these wells is estimated at 2,250,000

barrels a day (Harshe, 2003:115). Yet while considerable public attention has been drawn to the

adverse impact this pipeline will have on the "wild and plant life within this ecologically fragile

forest area," little information has been released exposing either the destruction of the Bakola

pygmy communities and traditional hunting areas or the indiscriminate killing committed by the

Idris Deby regime, which "massacred over 200 people from the oil producing region for

allegedly voicing their protest against the construction of the pipeline" (Harshe, 2003:115-6).

The multitude of non-violent health risks associated with oil extraction is also incredibly

well documented (Azar, 2004; Haight, 2004; Epstein & Selber, 2002). Among these acute and

chronic health risks are:

(1) Severe burns or skin and eye irritation from high levels of benzene and hydrogen sulfide fumes, which may lead to dermatitis, bronchitis, and chemically induced pneumonia; (2) headaches and mental disturbances from carbon-monoxide exposures; (3) chronic lung disease from long-term exposures to coke dust, silica, and hydrogen sulfide; (4) psychosis and peripheral neuropathies from exposures to lead alkyls used as gasoline additives; and (5) increased cancer risks from exposures to carcinogenic materials such as benzene, xylene, arsenic, and hexavalent chromium (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:605).

Despite such serious impacts, however, Burger notes, "There are remarkably few studies of the health responses of local people exposed in the months following a spill," much less records of health impacts of local residents who live in communities neighboring extraction cites which have not experienced a recent spill though whom have, nonetheless, been adversely influenced by the protracted presence and practices of such corporations (1997:179). In Joel Haight's article entitled, "Occupation Health Risks in Crude Oil and Natural Gas Extraction," which surveys the potential hazards to those working for oil extraction companies, he summarizes the potential risks fostered through "exposure to hydrogen sulfide, naturally occurring radioactive material, hydrocarbons, corrosion inhibitors, and solvents," though he structures the scope of his analysis to include only those with access to "interventions," including "the use of shielding, warning labels, and personal protective equipment such as gloves, coveralls, boots, and full-face air-purifying respirators" (2004:479). No mention, however, is made of any specific accounts of health conditions contracted by those living in communities neighboring extraction zones, whom are not furnished with protective or preventative equipment.

In November 1993, a Philadelphia law firm filed a $1.5 billion class action suit with 46 plaintiffs from the oil-producing Oriente region of Ecuador, on behalf of 30,000 Ecuadorian citizens, against Texaco Inc. In the words of an anthropologist with many years of research in the region, "Serious illnesses, water contamination, and ecological destruction attributed to the oil company—the consequences of 20 years of drilling—had endangered the lives of tens of thousands of people" (Watts, 2005:374). The extent of human suffering transpiring within local

communities is rarely realized, however, due to the scant literature that actually acknowledges—

through surveys, interviews, and the collection and analysis of empirical data—the condition of

the health, food supply, air, water, and soil quality, economic activity, and peace which

determines the standard of living among individuals residing in regions proximate to oil

extraction activities. If the livelihoods of such human beings are to be respected, preserved, and

improved upon and their dignity reaffirmed, it is integral that government officials, international

actors, policymakers, and representatives of oil companies reconceptualize the regulations

instituted within developing countries and the extent to which such are upheld. To do so,

however, will require a more profound body of knowledge that emphasizes *humanity* as the

referent of research. This notion of orienting focus toward people is the very premise upon which

the concept of "human security" is founded.

Human Security

Human security "is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was

not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced.

Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity"

(UNDP, 1994:3). Embodying one of the most recent paradigms to emerge within the arena of

international relations and security studies, human security, many scholars argue, is not only the

natural consequence of, but also the necessary and appropriate conceptualization to be adopted in

order to effectively respond to, the evolutionary shifts which have recently operated to

reorganize international affairs and institutional structures. As Mathews observes:

> The assumptions and institutions that have governed international relations in the postwar era
> [Cold War] are a poor fit with . . . new realities. Environmental strains that transcend national
> borders are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty,

previously rendered porous by the information and communication revolutions and the instantaneous global movement of financial capital. The once sharp dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is blurred, forcing governments to grapple in international forums with issues that were contentious enough in the domestic arena" (1989:162).

Thus, many contend, the newly globalized world of interconnected economies and strong political affiliations has created a transnational system in which the traditional notion of security—its connotation, policy formulation, and methods of preservation—is no longer relevant or adequate.

Though the discourse ensuing from the phrase "human security" most frequently cites its commencement into international forums and development politics as the 1994 *Human Development Report on Human Security*, drafted and championed by Mahbub ul Haq, its first conceptualization was actually expressed in June 1945, when the U.S. Secretary of State reported the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference:

> The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace . . . No Provisions that can be written into the charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs (Alkire, 2003:13).

The multidimensional nature of this "battle" was echoed in the series of volumes produced in the 1970s by the Club of Rome group on the "world problematique," an idea premised upon the belief that there is "a complex of problems troubling men of all nations" (Meadows et al.,1972:10). This multifarious and convoluted web of concerns were—as they are today— situated in the context of overarching global trends and forces which were thought to impinge upon the individual, with specific emphasis on "accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources, and a deteriorating environment" (Meadows et al., 1972:21). However, the assembly of prominent leaders, intellectuals, and academics comprising the Club of Rome group affirmed that "a state of global

equilibrium could be designed so that the basic material needs of each person . . . are satisfied, and each person has an equal opportunity to realize his individual human potential," so long as global development and, ultimately, global security, are envisaged and integrated within the international configuration in such a way that fundamental needs, opportunities, and dignity are not only "satisfied," but elevated and sustained (Meadows et al., 1972:23-4).

This transitioning perspective regarding development and security was further propagated by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt (Bajpai, 2000:6). In a 1980 publication entitled "North-South Report," Brandt explains that the common interest of humanity—that being dignified survival—"not only raises traditional questions of peace and war, but also how to overcome world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor," and may only be acquired and secured by a committed and determined "will to overcome dangerous tensions and to produce significant and useful results for nations and regions—but, first and foremost, for human beings—in all parts of the world" (9).

These precursors to human security thinking culminated with the end of the Cold War to produce an environment suitable for a true paradigm shift that would be more explicitly insinuated at the 1991 Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance, which referred to "challenges to security other than political rivalry and armaments" and to a "wider concept of security, which deals also with threats that stem from failures in development, environmental degradation, excessive population growth and movement, and lack of progress towards democracy" ("Common Responsibility in the 1990s," 1991:17-8).

Yet the truly overt, most well-cited debut of the modern human security perspective, as

noted above, is associated with the United Nations Development Program report of 1994.

Drafted by Dr. Mahbub Ul Haq, the document argues that:

> For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crimes, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world (UNDP, 1994:3).

Thus, the concept of human security would come to be equated with the "security of individuals, not just security of their nations," or, employing other language, "security of people, not just security of territory," in which the sense of stability and security achieved and sustained would be "reflected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country" (UNDP, 1994:1). Therefore, this innovative perception of human security not only encompasses the reality of whether individuals live in conflict or in peace, but also incorporates a sense of "personal choice and surety about the future and of personal efficacy and opportunity" (Bajpai, 2000:14). "[Human security] is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities" (UNDP, 1994:229).

This conceptualization—which is, significantly, human-oriented—is, according to Haq, jeopardized by several distinct factors that may be situated within and applied to the seven values of human security, which Bajpai outlines as:

> Threats to economic security: lack of productive and remunerative employment, precarious employment, absence of publicly financed safety nets; (2) Threats to food security: lack of food entitlements including insufficient access to assets, work, and assured incomes; (3) Threats to health security: infectious and parasitic diseases, diseases of the circulatory system and cancers, lack of safe water, air pollution, lack of access to health care facilities; (4) Threats to environmental security: declining water availability, water pollution, declining arable land, deforestation, desertification, air pollution, natural disasters; (5) Threats to personal security: violent crime, drug trafficking, violence and abuse of children and women; (6) Threats to community security: breakdown of the family, collapse of traditional languages and cultures, ethnic discrimination and strife, genocide and ethnic cleansing; (7) Threats to political security: government repression, systematic human rights violations, militarization (2000:15-6).

In addition to the localized threats summarized above, however, Haq also cites a number of "more global or transnational threats whose spread or effects go well beyond any given national boundaries," which amass to formulate an "unequal world order in which some states and elites dominate to the detriment of the vast mass of humanity" (Bajpai, 2000:11). This sentiment is later reiterated by Thomas, who writes that "Human insecurity is understood not as some inevitable occurrence but as a direct result of existing structures of power that determine who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not" (2000:4). This "world order," to which Haq refers, according to Bajpai, "is embodied in the prevailing conceptions and practices of development, the reliance on arms for security, the divide between North and South globally, and the increasing marginalization of global institutions" (2000:11).

The organizational and structural nature of the international schema—which, Haq deemed menacing to, and ultimately undermining, the welfare of the majority of the human race—may only be remedied, he asserted, through development as opposed to arms (1994:1). As Bajpai charts, Haq proposes five measures which he considers indispensable to give life to the new conception of security:

> (1) A human development conception with emphasis on equity, sustainability, and grassroots participation; (2) a peace dividend to underwrite the broader agenda of human security; (3) a new partnership between North and South based on 'justice, not charity' which emphasizes 'equitable access to global market opportunities' an economic restructuring; (4) a new framework of global governance built on reform of international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and United Nations; (5) and finally, a growing role for global civil society (2000:11-2).

In other words, the traditional demarcation of security, proving to be state-centric and, thus, focused on the "military defense of territory and the advancement of national interest," was and is not only an incongruous approach to the dilemmas afflicting masses of individuals throughout each populated continent, or to the atmosphere of the international domain, but had actually contributed to proliferating human *in*security.

The nation had originally been positioned as the referent of security due to its widely

accepted and institutionalized fundamental purpose: providing protection to its citizens.

However, as Axworthy explains, the capacity harbored by various states to afford such necessary

defense often falls under inspection due to "economic adversity," "globalization," and "bad

governance" (2001:19). "The state has, at times, come to be a major threat to its population's

rights and welfare—or has been incapable of restraining the warlords or paramilitaries—rather

than serving as the protector of its people" (Axworthy, 2001:19). This sentiment is reflected in

the words of Thomas and Tow, who maintain that "a 'secure state' untroubled by contested

territorial boundaries could still be inhabited by insecure people," as a result of the injuries and

violations committed against civilians—not by foreign enemies—but by the nations in which

they reside, which function, whether directly or indirectly, to endanger or deny the elements

compulsory to human security (2002:178). As a means to arrive at this same end, Bellamy and

McDonald allude to "the direct murder of citizens (as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda), their abuse of

citizens' human rights (as in China and South Africa), the redistribution of income away from

development needs towards militarism (as in Indian and Pakistan) or their material and rhetorical

support for a global economic order that makes some people very rich while impoverishing a

third of humanity (as in the USA and Japan) (2002:374).

With history serving as an evidentiary log detailing the innumerable accounts of state-

induced threats functioning to compromise the security of its populace, an ever-strengthening

argument has come to the fore proclaiming that international security as it is traditionally defined

"does not necessarily correlate with human security, and that an overemphasis upon statist

security can be to the detriment of human welfare needs" (Newman, 2001:240). It is for this very

reason that scholars posit that revised global political practices and, therefore, a more pervasive

and exhaustive experience of human security, are contingent upon a human security agenda that is endowed with the capacity to "interrogate, evaluate and criticize the practices that make people insecure in the first place" (Bellamy & McDonald, 2002:376). Recognizing this truth and anticipating its ramifications, Secretary General Kofi Annan observed at the opening of the 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly:

> State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the force of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them (Heinbecker, 2000:11).

Acknowledging that state sovereignty is not mutually exclusive to civilian autonomy and, by extension, addressing the fact that state security can and does exist in the absence of the security of the individual, Annan publicly and unequivocally conceded to the reality that "the citizens of states that are 'secure,' according to the traditional concept of security, can be perilously insecure" (Newman, 2001:240). This truth sparked within members of the international legal community, civil service, non-governmental sphere, humanitarian field, state figureheads, policymakers, and the constituents of relevant academia a demand for a reappraisal of the concept, delineation, and implications of security. From this mandate emerged a reorientation that shall seek to redress the prior "asymmetry of attention" as regards the notion of security (Newman, 2001:240).This amended model, which has inspired an ever-expanding body of study and research and a perpetually intensifying dialogue, has recently, though formally, assumed the identity of "*human* security."

The aspects and facets which assemble to formulate security, as well as the threats and overall conceptualization of such, as presented by Haq, have served as a launching pad from which nuanced variations have been devised and articulated to contribute to the ever-evolving

scope through which to perceive the objective of human security. Some scholars writing on the subject simply restate or revise the "laundry list" of elements or ingredients deemed equally necessary to coalesce in order to constitute human security (Paris, 2001:91). Jorge Nef, for example, develops a fivefold classification scheme, arguing that human security comprises (1) environmental, personal, physical, and food security, (2) economic security, (3) social security, including "freedom from discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity, or social status," (4) political security, and (5) cultural security, or "the set of psychological orientations of society geared to preserving and enhancing the ability to control uncertainty and fear" (1999:25). These various components, or "subsystems," are, according to Nef, interconnected and, hence, each one is linked to another by a collection of bridges: environment and economy are linked by resources; economy and society; by social forces; society and polity, by brokers and alliances; and politics and culture, by ideology. Yet juxtaposing this framework to that originally rendered by Haq, it becomes evident that Nef's work merely affords and employs an alternative value judgment system in relation to those elements which are to be permanently included under the umbrella of security. For instance, Nef appears to devaluate the significance of health security as an indicator of overall human security, denying such as its own, independent facet and rather consolidating it within the aspect of personal security.

Reed and Tehranian also recapitulate the notion that "security must be understood in terms of a complex layering from the most local and short-term to the most global and long-term human concerns (1999:36). Thus, they offer "a comprehensive analysis taking into account the whole spectrum of human security concerns," which they organize and divide into ten "overlapping and interwoven realms:" (1) physical security; (2) psychological security, which "hinges on establishing conditions fostering respectful, loving, and humane interpersonal

relations;" (3) gender security, maintaining that "equality and security for women ultimately spells equality and security for men;" (4) social security; (5) economic security; (6) cultural security; (7) communication security, which accentuates the importance of "freedom and balance in information flows;" (8) national security; (9) international security; and finally, (10) environmental security (1999:36;39;47). Multidimensional accounts of human security such as those above differ in emphases, yet remain within the rather narrow discipline of simply establishing the concept's demarcation in terms of organization, classification, and general nomenclature. However, readers will do well to note that the discussion provided by Reed and Tehranian is not proposed to assert a fixed definition of security that will serve as a compelling framework to orient policy drafting and implementation, but rather, to offer a "basis for agreement about what rules and guidelines might underpin local, regional, international, and global institutions that will allow for conflicting interpretations of priorities, values, interests, and policies without resort to violence, force, or coercion" (1999:36).

Other scholars, also working to ascertain and corroborate a feasible and coherent set of primacies, avoid presenting a multi-faceted catalogue of varying security components though continue to offer equally far-reaching, though perhaps abstract designations. The delineation to which Caroline Thomas allots the notion of human security is one such example. In her introduction to *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience*, she describes this security paradigm as "a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community can be realized" (1999:3). "Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of another" (Thomas & Wilkin, 1999:3). Sensing the impulse to relocate the security discourse "from the terrain of an international system composed of discrete territorial

units called sovereign states and to embed it in a global social structure composed of humanity in a capitalist world economy," Thomas reiterates and elaborates upon Haq's notion of requisite agency at the individual level, underscoring not only the fulfillment of material needs integral to human survival, but also the preservation of personal dignity and access to, and participation within, the democratic process, which, according to her, "incorporates personal autonomy, control over one's life, and unhindered participation in the life of the community" so as to engender the "emancipation from oppressive power structures—be they global, national, or local in origin and scope" (1999:3).

King and Murray, on the other hand, dismiss the various conflict-related or socially and governmentally egalitarian components of human security to focus solely upon monetary and material deprivation. "Security," they note, "is based on the risk of severe deprivation," and, consequently, "depends heavily on the concept of poverty" (2002:593). Therefore, "Years of Individual Human Security" is defined as "the expected number of years of life spent outside the state of generalized poverty" (King & Murray, 2002:595). Employing this conceptualization to measure human security in practice will therefore, according to King and Murray, necessitate the assessment and calculation of a set of domains that, when compounded, constitute individual well-being, each of which being represented by a selected, quantifiable indicator, so as to gauge the extent of pecuniary destitution. "This definition is forward looking: an individual's current security is a function of her or his future prospects. Most distinctively, human security is a function of the risk of being below a threshold of well-being, what we call a state of generalized poverty, rather than average levels of well-being" (King & Murray, 2002:606).

This contracted and more isolated characterization of human security and others like it— which contradict and, at times, undermine the notion of human security as a mosaic compiled

from an interdependent array of components—have been the target of criticism by scholars such

as Leaning and Arie, for example, who argue that "a narrow focus on material resources has

prevented analysts from identifying the true sources of vulnerability or resilience in a

population" (2000:4). To develop a more encompassing conceptual approach, their work, entitled

"Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and Transition," places greater focus

upon the psychological and social bases of community stability in the attempt to "engage the

recurring question of what makes conflict more likely in one place rather than another" and to

"explore the underlying conditions or factors that support constructive coping mechanisms in the

face of threats or hazards" (2000:6).

Conceptualizations painted with a thick brush such as that formulated by Leaning and

Arie have also fallen under censure, as one of the most frequent and debilitating critiques of

human security lies in the assessment that the elements which it envelopes are so expansive that,

as Paris notes, "it is difficult to determine what, if anything, might be excluded from the

definition of human security" (2001:90). Alkire elaborates upon this challenge:

> If the door is cracked, then many competing demands will come rushing in, and these demands
> will change continuously, as will people's own values. In such circumstances not only will
> decision-making be agonizing, it will also be very difficult to run a program with the kind of
> power and effectiveness that characterizes some national security initiatives and that must likewise
> characterize human security initiatives if they are to be worthwhile. The attraction of a narrow
> definition arises from the presumption that the number of conceptual elements in a definition
> corresponds to the breadth of the definition. When the channel is narrow, then the water will run
> swiftly and gain an incredible amount of energy and power that can be harnessed for important
> activities; if the channel is wide or if there are many tiny channels, then the water runs slowly and
> its energy is dissipated (2003:28).

According to Leaning and Arie, a precise definition of human security is integral to provide

proper, well-informed guidance so that the policies contrived and executed will most efficiently

and effectively "secure . . . survival" and "provide . . . protection from life threats" (2000:12).

Khong affords a slightly deviating, though complimentary perspective, observing that "the policy

rationale for securitizing any given issue . . . is to inform relevant audiences . . . that an issue has

priority and that it is high on the policymakers' agenda . . . A priority issue is thus one that gets special attention, better resources, and a higher chance of satisfactory resolution" (2001:232). However, the viability of human security becomes most profoundly scrutinized when intellectuals and specialists question "whether we get these positive payoffs when we securitize the individual or end up prioritizing everything and therefore nothing" (Khong, 2001:232).

Many contend that the drafters of the UNDP report, which serves as the most authoritative reference setting the tone for ancillary versions that have succeeded it, appear distinctly uninterested in formulating any definitional boundaries, but rather, commend the all-encompassing and integrative qualities of the human security concept as being a point of strength as opposed to a fault or limitation. To constrict the continuum of elements encapsulated within the human security designation would be to minimize the lens through which threats to such are detected and, therefore, risk overlooking possible entry points in which to grant resources to the development and preservation of security for the individual.

Others, however, argue to the contrary, positing that the components of human security as they are currently organized problematize the ability to focus on specific solutions to specific instances of turmoil. Though deeming the paradigm of human security a "unifying concept" for the assembly of "'middle power' states, development agencies, and NGOs," Paris argues that the power implicitly ingrained within the model is due to the fact that it "lacks precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspectives and objectives of all the members of the coalition. The term, in short, appears to be slippery by design. Cultivated ambiguity renders human security an effective campaign slogan, but it also diminishes the concept's usefulness as a guide for academic research or policymaking" (2001:88). This very concern for a fluid and accurate transition and translation from delineation to policy is also imparted by Owens and Arneil, who

state simply that human security "is too broad and vague a concept to be meaningful for policymakers, as it has come to entail such a wide range of different threats on one hand, while prescribing a diverse and sometimes incompatible set of policy solutions to resolve them on the other" (1999:2).

This vastness and opacity not only undermines the development and, thus, implementation, of effectual policies; the "extraordinarily expansive and vague" definitions allocated to and imposed upon human security, by extension, also weaken the practicality of ever establishing true security for anyone, as Khong alludes above (Paris, 2001:88). Because human security positions human beings as the fundamental referents of security, "it follows that we need to give priority to them by diverting resources from other nonsecurity areas in the hope of ameliorating or resolving these human security predicaments" (Khong, 2001:233). Yet Khong inquires: "Which of the above deserve priority attention and on what grounds? Is it not the case that, from the human security perspective, every threat to the well-being of every individual in every state is a security issue? Ironically, in making all individuals a priority, none actually benefits" (2001:232). "If human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing" (Paris, 2001: 93).

This sense of the abstract within this particular security discourse has also been condemned by Alkire, who boldly asserts that "If human security is to be a feasible agenda it must be narrower" (2003:14). This is the approach adopted by King and Murray as cited above, who offer a definition of human security that is intended to include only "essential" elements, which are distinguished as those which are "important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk" (2002:8). In this same vein, Bajpai proposes the construction of a "human security audit" that would include measures of "direct and indirect

threats to individual bodily safety and freedom," as well as indicators gauging societies'

"capacity to deal with these threats, namely, the fostering of norms, institutions, and . . .

representativeness in decision-making structures" (2000:19).

Yet while these projects and conceptualizations represent efforts to better operationalize

the concept of human security by determining more definite and marked delineations of the

paradigm, they are not free of imperfections. Paris criticizes that such definitions "identify

certain values as more important than others without providing a clear justification for doing so,"

analyzing King and Murray with particular severity for excluding indicators of violence from

their composite measure of human security and, thus, creating a "de facto distinction between

human security and physical security, thereby purging the most familiar connotation of

security—safety from violence—from their definition of human security" (2001:95). Thus, it

would appear that transforming human security from a disparate theory into a functional tool of

analysis requires prioritizing incorporated, tangible components and threat parameters in a

structured, coherent, and consistent manner against which relative security environments and

situations can be measured (Thomas & Tow, 2002:181).

According to Heinbecker, integrating a cogent human security dimension into the

international system and foreign affairs will also entail:

> (1) Elevating the concern for the safety or protection for people, of individual persons and their communities, particularly the most vulnerable segments of a population; (2) treating the safety of people as integral to achieving global peace and security; (3) addressing threats from both military and non-military sources (e.g. intrastate war, state failure, human rights violations, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking); (4) using new techniques and diplomatic tools in order to achieve our goals; and (5) recognizing the emergence of non-state actors as significant players in the international system (2000:13).

This passage ushers in the question of human security as it relates to, and is informed by, state

security, a matter on which much of the extant literature also concentrates. The recent and ever-

growing urge to broaden the focus of security beyond the level of the state and toward individual

human beings has led many to conclude that "the security of states is essential, but not sufficient, to fully ensure the safety and well-being of the world's people" (Axworthy, 2001:20). This inadequacy is echoed by Thomas and Tow, who assert that "traditional interpretations of security cannot fully meet the international security community's present needs" (2002:189). In spite of the insufficiency or incompetence characteristic of state security in the capacity to provide and protect the security of each individual citizen, however, many scholars and authorities ardently deny that the two conceptions should be at odds with one another. According to Heinbecker, "human security is not a substitute for or an alternative to national security. It is the other side of the coin" (2000:13). He does admit, however, that in several countries throughout the world, "the security forces intended to protect public safety are in fact the main threat to personal safety" (2000:14). Perhaps this truth, then, is the justification for those such as Thomas and Tow who posit that human security is "contrasted against" national security (2002:178).

This distinction or divergence, some contend, functions to undermine and even threaten national sovereignty, due to its proven insufficiency and, thus, the permeation of international intervention. Thomas and Tow explicate that the differentiation between human and state security "imposes constraints on state autonomy through the mobilization of international civil society to safeguard international norms and the sharing of power between state and non-state actors in a globalizing world" (2002:178). This sentiment is reiterated by Newman, who maintains that:

> There has been an internationalization of ethical standards that has increasingly impinged upon "national" laws and norms. In the context of various political, social, and technological processes, the boundary between the "national" and "international" is therefore increasingly blurred in a number of areas relating to governance and socioeconomic organization. Forms of government, human rights and gender equality, rights to development and education, have all become international issues. Democracy is no longer—if it ever was—an issue confined to territorially enclosed communities, in terms of its inputs, consequences, prospects, and limitations. . . people's expectations and attitudes toward governance and authority—expressed in many different forms— have arguably evolved (2001:241).

Human security—constituting more than the militaristic prevention of interstate invasion—transcends national borders. However, when human security—employing any of the definitions above—fails to exist on an *intrastate* level, it is widely held that both governmental and non-governmental forces may intercede, as Axworthy asserts that this paradigm:

> is beginning to effect change on the institutions and practice of global governance.
> In this interconnected world, our own security is increasingly indivisible from that of our neighbors—at home and abroad. Globalization has made individual human suffering an irrevocable universal concern. While governments continue to be important, global integration of world markets and instant communication have given a role and a profile to those in business, civil society, and NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (2001:20).

Others, however, express cause for unease at the ascendance of internationality, citing examples in which the increasingly pervasive level of the globalized market has functioned to disperse human insecurity, referencing the fatally high demand for diamonds and oil that have engendered bloodshed in Sierra Leone and Angola, respectively (Axworthy, 2001:20).

It is, indeed, fair, and even advisable, to be critical of international bodies; by the same token, however, as Newman affirms, "there is an ethical responsibility to reorient security around the individual in a redistributive sense, in the context of changes in political community and the emergence of transnational norms relating to human rights" (2001:240). The conceptualization of human security, as it is applied to the case of negligent oil extraction practices within The Niger Delta, does not cast this security paradigm in a dichotomous relationship with that of national security, speaking of them in "mutually-exclusive terms," and "pitting national sovereignty against human interests" (Heinbecker, 2000:11). State leaders, policymakers, and international organizations will do well to acknowledge the disparate populations over which national and human security currently operate. According to Alkire, "state agencies by definition have a different responsibility to the citizenry than they do to international populations at large" (2003:33). This is not to say, however, that a two-directional, reinforcing relationship does not

exist between the two concepts.

The most efficacious formulation of human security, and that which will be employed in the investigation of The Niger Delta, is one that—when recognized and ensured—provides an environment conducive to personal and generational welfare, and the utmost expression of humanity and dignity through the capacity to realize one's fullest potential. To assume analytical, measurable, and, thus, enforceable utility, however, necessitates a more concrete, tangible demarcation. Thus, human security may be deemed present within a society in which all individuals harness stable access to those needs, services, amenities, and rights—personal safety; clean, safe drinking water; fresh, nutritious food; shelter; clothing, tools, cookware, etc.; a healthy, sustained environment in which air and water quality is capable of supporting life systems; equitable, quality education; healthcare; reliable employment opportunities; and civil, political, ethnic, cultural, and religious rights—to a degree that is adequate and consistent, so as to nurture a community capable of promoting psychological and emotional wellbeing, and in which individuals are granted the liberty and personal agency to cultivate a life in which they and their family may thrive. The extent to which the above are considered necessary to, in fact, foster a society in which individuals may prosper is highly subjective, just as the definition of prosperity in and of itself is abstract and relative. However, this conceptualization is perhaps most susceptible to perception and interpretation when it is absent or lacking.

Human security may, therefore, exist only within a society in which human life is respected and deemed the most precious capital in which to invest. This investment, however, is one that must be made at all levels—community- and state-wide, nationally and internationally, as well as from all dimensions—governmental and non-governmental. Rather than advocating for human security's revision or reworking, and rather than juxtaposing such with the concept of

national security, it is advantageous to conceptualize the natural evolution which the notion of human security is presently enduring in a manner that may coexist with, and reinforce, the more traditional approach. This will be made possible if scholars, policymakers, national figureheads, and international organizations recognize that there, indeed, exists between state and human security a continuity, in which each serves to underpin and fortify the other in a cyclical relationship that may otherwise be conceived as a positive correlation. For human security to manifest itself within an assembly of individuals, freedom from want—the contemporary conceptualization—is necessary, but will only exist in conjunction with a freedom from fear—the conventional, state-centered conceptualization—as it will be less likely that citizens will be afforded the ability to secure material items sufficiently if their nation is being attacked and monetary resources are being allocated to increased militarization as opposed to the infrastructure requisite for the fostering of socioeconomic development. Likewise, freedom from fear will not be realized in an atmosphere devoid of the freedom from want, as deprivation is a stimulus for desperation which, in turn, serves as a catalyst for conflict, both inter- and intra-nationally.

Human security is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security, as Axworthy notes, "Peace and security—national, regional, and international—are possible only if they are derived from peoples' security" (2001:23). The reverse is equally true, however, as Alkire observes, ". . . protecting others' human security strengthens the security of national populations and thus would be in the self-interest of the nation-state" (2003:33). Still, irrespective of the multi-directionality of this correlation, stakeholders question the nature of the relationship linking the peace and security of societies at each level (micro and macro), to the

rate and quality of development generated and experienced by the constituents of such, as well as

the prospects of the future sustainability of such expansion and development.

Sustainable Development

> Sustainability . . . is a bit like security. It seeks to preserve a particular civilization, and offer a range of choices to future generations. It has long been recognized that security must be carefully constructed and balanced. A highly militarized state may be very secure, but the wrong kind of security can destroy the very values it is trying to preserve. So too, it is possible that the wrong definitions of sustainability can undermine the very values they are trying to sustain (Vos, 2007:339).

Countless parallels may be drawn between the paradigm and practice of human security and that

distinguishing sustainable development, as several scholars and policymakers even assert that

such phenomena are mutually reinforcing and positively correlated. Just as human security, the

concept of sustainable development ascended from an ostensibly abrupt shift in perception and

thinking on an international level. As Hopwood et al. note:

> For most of the last couple of hundred years the environment has been largely seen as external to humanity, mostly to be used and exploited, with a few special areas preserved as wilderness or parks . . . On the whole the relationship between people and the environment was conceived as humanity's triumph over nature. This Promethean view was that human knowledge and technology could overcome all obstacles including natural and environmental ones (2005:38).

With the Industrial Revolution transpiring throughout the Western Hemisphere, and the

emergence of capitalism and modern science, arose a sentiment that may be embodied within the

words of Francis Bacon, a pioneer of the scientific method, who maintains that "the world is

made for man, not man for the world" (Reid, 1995:12). This "arrogance of humanism," as

Ehrenfeld called it, precipitated the prioritization of economic expansion, marked by an increase

in productivity (1981:8). According to Reid, global industrial production has increased fifty

times since 1900, with some 80% of the increase occurring since 1950 (1995:4). To perceive this

unprecedented acceleration from another angle, the annual "product" of the global economy was

valued at $29,000 million in 1991—indicating that the international market produced "in a mere 17 days the equivalent of the entire annual global output in 1900" (Victor, 1991:211). This ballooning productivity has, inevitably, however, advanced a surge in the consumption of both renewable and nonrenewable resources, which have been both caused and compounded by "energy generation, industrial processes, transport, high-input agriculture and domestic consumption," which continue to make ever-inflating "demands on the capacities of the earth and the atmosphere to absorb CO_2, sulphur, NOX and methane emissions, CFCs, and a range of toxic chemicals . . . which threaten widespread endemic pollution" (Reid, 1995:4). Rao echoes this sentiment, commenting that "the race for resource exploitation and economic growth" coursing through nations after World War II, led to "rapid industrialization, deforestation, and urbanization," which, in turn, resulted in "significant effects on major components of the biosphere, namely the atmosphere, land cover, and biodiversity" (2000:7).

After decades of unchecked extraction and exploitation, and its subsequent social and ecological ramifications, a new way by which to perceive the environment—and humanity's role within, and obligation to, it—was spearheaded in 1987 by the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), a critical milestone in the evolution of environmental and developmental thinking. Though preceded by the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, this report, entitled *Our Common Future*, though popularly referred to as the Brundtland Report, signifies the introduction of sustainable development upon the global stage and within published literature, both on a sweeping scale. Serving as the groundwork upon which all ensuing delineations have been constructed, the Report characterizes this innovative approach as follows:

> Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
> compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two

key concepts: the concept of "needs," in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs (WCED, 1987:43).

The concept of sustainable development is often conceptualized and addressed within

contemporary discourse as concerning three interacting and interdependent domains—the social,

environmental, and economic. However, as Rao observes:

> . . . it is common that the debate on the issue during the last ten years is very substantially centered only around the intergenerational dimension. Most reports on the theme quote the first sentence, and make no mention of the attendant vital explanation and interpretation. Thus, those writings are possibly less than fair to the spirit of the original contributors. It is rather surprising that the poverty dimension is not well-examined in the literature even to the extent that it adversely contributes to quality of environment and to any measure of quality of life—present as well as future (2000:86).

Though the concept of sustainable development has emerged in response to the growing

awareness of the international links between mounting environmental problems, socioeconomic

matters involving poverty and inequity, and "concerns about a healthy future for humanity," we

still live in a society, and think within the confines of a particular worldview, in which economic

interests assume primacy over those of social justice (Hopwood et al., 2005:39). According to

Giddings et al., "The reality of life today is that the economy dominates environment and

society. The large global companies dominate decision making, including that of many

governments. Also international forums and organizations, heavily influenced by the large

corporations, take decisions without even the modest level of democratic control that exists in

national governments" (2002:190).

Yet it is generally accepted that those endorsing an economic-based perception of

sustainable development—usually governments and conglomerates—are those invested in

maintaining the "status quo," which is marked by the mantra, "produce more, consume more,"

contending that business is the driving force behind a future of sustainability, as such employs

the best means necessary to achieving this end, which comprise, "increased information, changing values, improved management techniques and new technology which all operate through the market" (Hopwood et al, 2005:42). Rao cites the theoretical perspective of Neoclassical economic equilibrium, which he summarizes as seeking:

> Non-declining human welfare or quality of human life; sustainable growth based on technical progress and substitution possibilities; optimizing environmental externalities; maintaining aggregate or sub-group-specific stocks of natural and economic capital with substantial reliance on market factors (possibly with specifications of legal and other institutional regulations); and the predominant role of individual enterprises (2000:84).

These objectives, however, do not require fundamental adjustments within society, nor do they call for the revision of decision-making processes or power relations, but only further economic growth (Rao, 2000:87). According to Simon and Kahn, the future will be "less polluted, more ecologically stable . . . and the world's people will be richer," only through the expansion of markets and technology (1984:1). Likewise, the definition of sustainable development as outlined by the British Government includes the aim of a "high level of economic growth," considered to be among the most prevalent indicators to measure progress toward a future of sustainability (Cited in Giddings et al., 2002). The narrowly economic designation of sustainable development posited by Pearce et al., is simply "a non-declining capital stock" (1990:34). The notion of development is stringently associated with the effect of growth, which necessitates economic expansion, thus perceived as the overarching solution and the quintessential path to development. The United Kingdom Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions argues that "to move towards more sustainable development, we need more growth not less" (Cited in Giddings et al., 2002).

"More growth," however, stimulates an insatiable hunger for profit maximization. In his work, "Sustainable Development: Is it Achievable within the Existing International Political Economy Context," Carvalho maintains that ". . . the globalized economy exert[s] pressure and

influence that reinforce international actors' traditional preoccupation with maximizing their

relative gains," postulating that "It is highly unlikely that, given the current context, international

actors would take positions that would increase their economic vulnerability or that would

undermine their relative position in the international system, in the name of sustainable

development, future generations, or environmental conservation" (2001:65). Yet while Hopwood

et al. argue that "most supporters of the status quo have a weak commitment to environmental

sustainability" (2005:43), many of those residing within the status quo camp claim that economic

expansion may be achieved in a manner that does not necessarily imply environmental

degradation, as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development affirms that "we can

have an open, vigorous and healthy trading system and achieve sustainable development" (1998).

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) urges fiscal alterations

to taxation and subsidies, as well as increased private ownership of resources in order to create a

monetary atmosphere conducive to sustainable development, while denying the weakening of

social and ecological stability as being among the repercussions (2001).

Some scholars also contend that those invested in preserving the status quo convey "little

concern for equity, justice or human well-being" (Alier, 2003:133). Reinforcing this argument is

Walker, who states:

> Accumulation is the main driving force of the world economy, along with its correlates, capital-
> capital competition and capital-labour exploitation. This is why it makes sense to speak of 'the
> capitalist system' rather than 'the global market.' The greatest economic myth of all is that the
> market has as its principal purpose the service of human needs rather than the aggrandisement of
> capitalists and their corporations (1999:278).

In support of this claim, Rees points out that the ambiguity of the Brundtland Report permits

businesses and governments to be in favor of sustainability without any fundamental challenge to

their present course, in turn, permitting capitalism to continue to put forward economic growth as

its "morally bankrupt solution" to poverty (1998:27). Among those initiating this preoccupation

with the escalation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and other indicators of fiscal increase was Beckerman, who boldly asserts that "A failure to maintain economic growth means continued poverty, deprivation, disease, squalor, degradation and slavery to soul-degrading toil for countless millions of the world's population" (1975:9). The premise of this declaration has been adopted, and is demonstrated, by The World Bank itself, which maintains that the "traditional elements of the strategy to foster growth—macroeconomic stability and market-friendly reforms—are essential for reducing poverty" (2000:vi). Sachs and Reid are also among those who deem economic expansion the cure to poverty, stating that "Poor people will circumvent environmental restrictions in their desperation for land, food, and sustenance," proving that "Environmental goals cannot be achieved without development," and thus, that poverty alleviation is contingent upon "economic growth" (2006:1002).

Lomborg also endorses an economically centered resolution that commences with expansion, stating that to improve the "environmental quality of the developing world, securing growth so as to lift these people out of hunger and poverty is of the utmost importance since . . . only when we are sufficiently rich can we start to . . . deal with environmental problems" (2001:238).This response is similar to the philosophy of the trickle-down theory so strongly advocated by those interested in maintaining the status quo, which states that, "if the economy grows, eventually all will benefit" (Dollar & Kraay, 2000:219). Yet despite the proven and *withstanding* increase in inequality under this theory, "inequity in wealth, power and education continues to be justified on the grounds that it will aid economic growth, which in turn will raise everyone's living standards" (Giddings et al., 2002:190).

Yet others argue that the conception and recognition of sustainable development challenges the beneficial efficacy of mainstream economic policy that so adamantly declares that

international opulence and human security and welfare may be realized through the escalation of global trade and industry. Among those criticizing the above market-centered motivations and policy agendas, Reid affirms that, for sustainable development to take root and prosper, there must be:

> . . . a reappraisal of such basic economic concepts as allocation, distribution and scale. The criteria for the optimal allocation of resources will be those of ecological efficiency rather than the considerations that determine optimality in neoclassical economics. The Pareto distribution will also have to be amended, for any sustainable system that meets needs will involve a reduction in consumption by those who exceed their share of natural capital and will make some people 'worse off' (1995:167).

The rise of sustainable development, many believe, indicates the acknowledgment that previous growth models that were once so heavily relied upon, have failed to eradicate poverty, both within and across borders, perpetuating the notion that "no trends, . . . no programmes or policies offer any real hope of narrowing the growing gap between rich and poor nations" (WCED, 1987:xi). Also conceding to the notion that instated economic strategies for growth have "damaged the environment upon which we depend," fostering a "downward spiral of poverty and environmental degradation," the Brundtland Report calls for "changing the quality of growth, meeting essential needs, merging environment and economics in decision making," with an emphasis on human development, and equitable participation in decisions accompanied by equal accessibility and receipt of benefits (WCED, 1987:49).

According to Moffatt, sustainable development "implies that we pass on to our heirs an overall asset base and productive capacity that is no worse, and presumably, better than our own" (1996:73). However, many scholars, including O'Riordan and Daly, consider this prevalent paradigm to be a "contradiction in terms" (1989:77), or "oxymoronic" (1993:267), positing that sustainability and development are mutually exclusive objectives and, thus, impossible to be entertained, practiced, and adequately attained maintained concomitantly. When development is

taken to be synonymous with growth in material consumption—which is frequently the case throughout contemporary western society and especially within the economically-based interpretation—the concept of sustainable development entails the act of sustaining the growth in material consumption, presumably for an indefinite period of time. However, this notion is problematic and its realization utterly impossible when acknowledging the general recognition that "ultimate limits [to usable resources] exist" (WCED, 1987:45). In light of this reality, Georgescu-Roegen, author of *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process*, considers:

> The reality that our system is finite and that no expenditure of energy is free confronts us with a moral decision at every point in the economic process, in planning and development and production. What do we need to make? What are the real long-term costs of production, and who is required to pay for them? What is truly in the interests of man, not in the present only, but as a continuing species? (1971:294).

The magnitude of consequence stemming from this "moral decision" was first recognized throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, as individuals of an ever-growing number experienced a shift in the understanding of humanity's "place on the planet" (Hopwood et al., 2005:40). Turning away from the view of dominance and control exerted by the human race over the globe upon which it roamed, Engels writes, "We by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but . . . we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst" (1950:12).

An outpouring of papers, documents, and reports cataloguing the adverse events transpiring throughout the world in response to the swelling of the global market—and the desperate procurement of resources to feed, bolster, and sustain such economic and productive extension—flooded the literature throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Langham & Edwards, 1969; d'Arge, 1971; Ruckelshaus, 1972), ultimately serving as the stimulus to the Stockholm Conference of 1972. Perhaps the most significant convention organized to conjoin and reconcile economic development with ecological conservation, this Conference established a series of

internationally-coordinated activities aimed first at "increasing knowledge of environmental trends and their effects on man and resources, and secondly, at protecting and improving the quality of the environment and the productivity of resources by integrated planning and management" (Sandbrook, 1983:206). A compilation of twenty-six principles was also produced which communicates the essential arguments of "human environmentalism," which Moffatt summarizes into five focal tenets:

> (1) Natural resources should be safeguarded and conserved, the earth's capacity to produce renewable resources should be maintained, and non-renewable resources should be shared; (2) Each country should establish its own standards of environmental management and exploit resources as they wish, without endangering other states. There should be international cooperation aimed at improving the environment; (3) Pollution should not exceed the capacity of the environment to clean itself, and oceanic pollution should be prevented; (4) Science, technology, education and research should all be used to promote environmental protection; (5) Development and environmental concern should go together, and less developed countries should be given every assistance and incentive to promote rational management (1996:9).

Such principles, which were highly encouraged to be implemented within and across national borders, gave rise to the concept of ecodevelopment, which came to be adopted as a planning theme by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Serving as a precursor to the notion of sustainable development, the delineation of ecodevelopment was marked by a concern "to conserve renewable resource, to pace or regulate the rate of exploitation of non-renewable resources and to control the discharge of residuals" (Riddell, 1981).

The wave of international attention upon which environmental protection and preservation was riding throughout the 1970s was only amplified by the 1987 Brundtland Report, which, as noted above, is mostly widely famed as the architect of the sustainable development paradigm. On the heels of this WCED publication trailed the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), popularly known as the Earth Summit, hosted at Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992. Attended by 118 heads of state—the largest turnout in the history of such forums—this event, as Rao remarks, was "a clear sign of the times: Societies all over the

planet perceived significant changes and problems in resources and environment, and pragmatic (rather than drastic) solutions—especially a few politically feasible ones—were in great demand" (2000:10).

From this Summit originated a "Rio Declaration" setting forth twenty-seven principles for sustainable development, in addition to an action plan known as "Agenda 21," which constituted a detailed volume of 40 chapters and approximately 800 pages. Although it was not a legally binding document, this "work plan" introduced within the conversation of sustainable development—which had previously been dominated by the severely dichotomous conflict juxtaposing the spheres of environment and economy—a greater orientation toward, and consideration of, the *human* actor—the most irreplaceable and sharply affected stakeholder of all. Directing focus upon newly envisaged aims regarding the control and assuage of poverty, demographic dynamics, and human health, Agenda 21 encompassed Environmental, Economic, Social, and Peace Principles, the first of which asserting that "Human beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature" (UNCED, 1992).

Deriving from the 1992 Earth Summit, which Redclift claims as having been "nothing less than the governance of the global system according to newly acknowledged sustainability principles," was an array of perspectives on sustainable development which approached the charge not from an economic stance, but rather from one of ecological risk—which many believe is being indisputably propagated and exponentially aggravated by unchanging, economically-driven policy formation (1992:36). According to Kothari, the status quo view, which "employs the language of sustainable development to continue with and justify business as usual," is leading western societies farther down the path of environmental exploitation and deterioration,

and further deviating such from a future of sustainability (1990:431). Among the

environmentally-rooted definitions of sustainable development is that afforded by Costanza et al,

which observes such as an endeavor to strike a relationship:

> . . . between dynamic human economic systems and larger dynamic, but normally slower-changing
> ecological systems, in which (a) human life can continue indefinitely, (b) human individuals can flourish,
> and (c) human cultures can develop; but in which effects of human activities remain within bounds, so as
> not to destroy the diversity, complexity, and function of the ecological life support system (1991: 8).

The characterization of this recently embraced term as it is presented by Colby depicts highly

environmental undertones, as it is deemed "A strategy which derives from natural processes of a

particular bioregion, leaving vast areas of intact, virgin locations" (Cited in Pawlowski, 2011).

Kozlowski and Hill reiterate this ecologically centered angle, classifying sustainable

development as "development which recognizes the priority of ecological requirements, which

must not be disturbed by civilizational growth or economic development" (1993:18). Hawken

describes a society marked by developmental sustainability as one in which "the demands placed

upon the environment by people and commerce can be met without reducing the capacity of the

environment to provide for future generations. It can also be expressed as . . . leave the world

better than you found it, take no more than you need, try not to harm life or the environment, and

make amends if you do" (1993:139).

The making of "amends" to those of the human race whom have been "harmed" as a

result of unsustainable development, unfortunately—and in spite of ever-increasing emphasis on

this topic within the international discussion—has and continues to be overlooked and largely

neglected. Many scholars maintain that the agenda prescribing the policies and programs that are

charged with the integration of sustainable strategies into national development plans is one of

capitalist motivations, which has not only called for the depletion of environments and

ecosystems, but also, by extension, the exploitation of human beings (Redclift, 1992; Giddings et

al., 2002; Hopwood et al., 2005).

Constituting the third and final sector of the three-ring model of sustainable development (accompanying the economy and the environment), is society. The social sphere, according to Giddings et al., "embraces the multitude of human actions and interactions that make up human life" (2002:191). This dimension of the paradigm of developmental sustainability was utterly absent from the discourse—and, thus, disregarded in policy-drafting and practice—until the International Union for Conservation of Nature's (IUCN) publication of *Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living*, in 1991. In seeking to "perfect and promote an ethic for living sustainably," this document accentuates the need to "understand and accept the consequence of being part of the great community of life and to become more conscious of the effects of our decisions on other societies and future generations" (IUCN, 1991:5). It continues that this ethic:

> . . . reflects the duty of care for other people and other forms of life, now and in the future. . . It means that development should not be at the expense of other groups or later generations. We should aim to share fairly the benefits and costs of resource use and environmental conservation among different communities and interest groups, among people who are poor and those who are affluent, and between our generation and those who will come after us. . . The real aim of development is to improve the quality of human life. It is a process that enables human beings to realize their potential, build self-confidence and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. Economic growth is an important component of development, but it cannot be a goal in itself, nor can it go on indefinitely. Although people differ in the goals that they would set for development, some are virtually universal. These include a long and healthy life, education, access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living, political freedom, guaranteed human rights, and freedom from violence. Development is real only if it makes our lives better in all these respects (9).

This human-oriented approach has functioned as a catalyst to facilitate the union of an enlarging assembly of government officials, policymakers, scholars, and activists who have released statements and vows such as that above, attempting to shift—or more equally distribute—the ostensible area of interest and concern regarding sustainable development away from those domains in which it has formerly resided. In 1994, the United States President's Council on Sustainable Development stated:

Our vision is of a life-sustaining earth. We are committed to the achievement of a dignified, peaceful, and equitable existence. We believe a sustainable United States will have an economy that equitably provides opportunities for satisfying livelihoods and a safe, healthy, high quality of life for current and future generations. Our nation will protect its environment, its natural resource base, and the functions and viability of natural systems on which all life depends (Cited in Pawlowski, 2011).

Defining sustainable development through this humanistic lens, Byrski affirms such to be "a model of durability, which would ensure a decent existence to all residents of the globe and prevent self-destruction of human civilization. The goal of such development is self-development of the individual and not civilizational development in itself" (Cited in Pawlowski, 2011). To achieve this developmental sustainability, Nieto maintains, requires the satisfaction and fulfillment of: "(1) cooperation between everyone concerned at the local, regional and national level; (2) redefining the relation between humans and nature and humans and other humans; (3) intergenerational equity; (4) redistribution of goods and opportunities at the global level; and (5) self-dependence of particular societies" (1997:43).

The ascendance of attention and concern for human beings has occurred in a context in which the wholly inequitable and socially unjust organization of the international system is becoming increasingly acknowledged and criticized. Chambers offers a compartmentalization of global affairs and relations, in which the peripheries are inhabited by an "unconnected scatter" of "powerless, low status and poor" people, whose skills and knowledge are "undervalued" by the "bearers of modernity" (1986:306). In a derisive allusion to "core priorities," Chambers refers to the attitudes and values of "core people" as "first thinking," while the belief systems and views of "periphery people" are relegated and dismissed as "last thinking" (1986:306). The gravest of all injuries, however, is committed when ". . . the core invasions of the rich North and of the rich in the South are appropriating and degrading resources on which the rural poor depend" (Chambers, 1992:215).

Capitalist economies of western states, however, are distinguished by a high propensity to "invade" and exploit the natural and human resources of these developing nations because, as Galtung asserts:

> The damage done to the weak is less visible. The weak are often far away, in remote corners of the world where misery and pollutants may accumulate and soil be depleted. In a similar vein, non-economic consequences such as the lack of challenge and lack of training ensuing from being merely the carrier of wood and water, the provider of raw materials and commodities, will not be taken into account because they fall outside the *intellectual* horizon—just as the weak are outside the *social* horizon and the remote corners outside the *geographic* horizon (1986:98).

Carvalho, reformulating and recapitulating this "justification," simply observes:

> Within the globalized world, there are mechanisms in place that ensure uneven development and dependency within the international system. From the world systems, dependent and uneven development perspectives, these historical processes and international division of labour have led to structural dependencies within the current international system where States operate according to their position in the centre, periphery or semi-periphery. Development (or lack of it) results from the subordination (economic and ecological) of the peripheral countries to the core, and of weak states to the stronger ones (2001:67).

The implications of this systematically hierarchical international scheme have proven bleak, not only for the prospects of sustainable development within countries unfavorably deemed "periphery," but also with respect to the majority of the world's population—those who live within those borders that have been economically, environmentally, and intellectually and socially marginalized. According to the World Conservation Strategy, ". . . the destructive impacts of the poor majority struggling to stay alive and an affluent minority consuming most of the world's resources are undermining the very means by which all people can survive and flourish" (IUCN, 1980).

The growing awareness of these inimical effects has elicited within some a "radical rethinking of our cultural assumptions—the underlying social commitments, many of which lie at the heart of industrial society" (Redclift, 1992:41). Reflecting and exhibiting this revision of perspective is the 1997 *Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities*, which states that "All people, given the necessary tools have a responsibility to make serious efforts to overcome

poverty, malnutrition, ignorance and inequality. They should promote sustainable development all over the world in order to assure dignity, freedom, security and justice for all people" (3). Thus, it appears as though the discourse on true developmental sustainability, as this document implies, is beginning to shed light upon the human-oriented perspective afforded by the social sector of this overarching paradigm, which has historically remained in the shadows of developmental thought. As issues of social justice, equity, human security, and lives marked by liberty and dignity edge their way to the fore, the most recent progression within the evolution of the sustainable development concept—the incorporation of a humanistic element—will become more distinctly etched in the scholastic and international forum.

Although—for the purposes of this review—the presentation of each of the three elements comprising sustainable development may have been addressed in a singular and isolated progression, it is essential that national leaders, intergovernmental organizations, and policymakers conceptualize the economy, environment, and society as interrelated forces. By aiming to bridge these three aspects in a balanced manner and to reconcile conflicting interests, the model most frequently illustrates the three rings, which are of equal size, in a symmetrical interconnection (Giddings et al., 2002:189). This representation has, however, come under severe criticism, as it "assumes the separation and even autonomy of the economy, society, and environment from each other," which "risks approaching and tackling issues of sustainable development in a compartmentalized manner" (Giddings et al., 2002:189). This sentiment is articulated by Munasinghe, who decries the fact that the majority of the literature discusses economic, environmental, and social issues in separation from one another, as those responsible for their publication align themselves with one perspective, to which they allocate the greatest priority (2009:40).

This sectoral approach, therefore, has the potential to undermine or disregard the fundamental associations binding these spheres and causing each to mutually impact the other, triggering assumptions that trade-offs may be made between such, and, in turn, threatening the sustainability of one and, by extension, all. This narrow and confined perception, reliant upon a solitary channel through which to navigate and attain developmental sustainability, "can divert attention from asking questions that are important to getting to the core of sustainable development such as those concerning the nature of our society, what the policy priorities are, how decisions are made and in whose interest" (Giddings et al., 2002:189-90). As Giddings asserts, "The wider social issues often fall off the sustainable development agenda" (2002:190).

Exemplifying this restrictive, and, consequently, debilitating, conceptualization are those fixated on market expansion who endorse the conservation of the status quo. Similarly, are those pledging full support and confidence in technological advancement, which, they believe, has the potential to dramatically increase energy efficiency and facilitate a shift from the utilization of fossil fuels to renewable resources (Solow, 1974; Flavin and Lenssen, 1994). "Deep ecologists," on the other hand, direct attention exclusively upon the manner in which "humans relate with the environment," contending that a transformation within this relationship is indispensable if mankind is to avoid a "mounting crisis and even a possible future collapse" (Hopwood, 2005:45). This perspective, however, places emphasis solely upon the environmental condition within this relationship, while "human needs come very much second" (Hopwood, 2005:45). In fact, in a critique of "deep ecology," Bradford unearths a trend towards racism and support for imperialism which underlie the precedence to which they allot nature (1989). "Socialist cornucopians," in contrast, prioritize the need for social transformation, as it is this, they argue, which will ultimately overpower and eradicate social and economic inequality (Hopwood,

2005:45). Some constituents of this faction only scantly address environmental issues, judging

that, once liberated from capitalist imprisonment, human skills and capacities will surmount all

challenges (Zazubrin, cited in Cock and Hopwood, 1996). Others, while acknowledging

environmental concerns, maintain that such can be attributed to the processes of capitalism and

will dissolve with the abolition of private ownership of the means of production (Grundmann,

1991).

In seeking to bypass or evade the adverse ramifications that are anticipated to be

produced by the perceptual and, therefore, theoretical and applicable limitations demonstrated by

the above coalitions, however, a new conceptualization has begun to emerge. This adapted model

is based upon the premise that, though the contemporary political reality assigns primacy to the

economy, which "largely treats the environment and society as a resource to be exploited," the

material reality is that "the economy is dependent on society and the environment" (Giddings et

al., 2002:191). The economy is a subset of society, and thus, as Giddings et al. asserts, "Without

society there can be no economy" (2002:191). Society, on the other hand, has and still does, for

some individuals throughout the world, exist in the absence of the economy (Giddings et al.,

2002:192). Human society is, however, constrained in that—though unreliant upon economics—

it does, in fact, depend heavily upon the environment, although, in contrast, the environment

would continue without society (Lovelock, 1988).

What many deem to be a more accurate presentation of the relationship between these

three components, therefore, is that in which "the economy is nested within society, which in

turn is nested within the environment," as the environment acts as the overarching domain in

which all else exists (Giddings et al., 2002:191). It is vital to understand, however, that "Placing

the economy in the centre does not mean that it should be seen as the hub around which the other

sectors and activities revolve. Rather it is a subset of the others and is dependent upon them"
(Giddings et al., 2002:191). Many scholars and policymakers prefer this "nested model" to the
"three-ring" model, arguing that the former encourages a conceptual outlook sympathetic to
integration and a more holistic approach, in which the most aspects, facets, causes, and
contributors of this complex and multifaceted paradigm are addressed to the most comprehensive
degree possible (Giddings et al., 2002:191)..

Occupying and endorsing this amalgamated, far-reaching methodology is Barbier, who
posits that sustainable development necessitates the inclusion of three systems: the biological
system—which encompasses issues such as biodiversity and biological production; the economic
system—which is accountable for satisfying fundamental human needs; and lastly, the cultural-
ethical system—focusing on matters such as social equity and the preservation of cultural
diversity (1987). Pawlowski extends the scope of consideration even wider, incorporating under
his umbrella of sustainable development the following:

> (1) Ethical plane (the issue of human responsibility for nature
> (2) Ecological plane (protection of both natural and artificial environment, also including spatial
> planning
> (3) Social plane (as social environments may also degrade)
> (4) Economic plane (taxes, subsidies and other economic instruments)
> (5) Technical plane (new technologies, saving resources)
> (6) legal plane (environmental law)
> (7) Political plan (formulates strategies of sustainable development as well as their introduction
> and control) (2011:45).

Haughton also presents a more aggregate approach, though situating such within the language of
equity, noting five principles upon which sustainable development is contingent. The first is
"intergenerational equity," or the "principle of futurity," followed by that of "intra-generational
equity," otherwise referred to as "social equity or social justice" (1999:235). The third principle
is that of "geographical equity," or "transfrontier responsibility," which requires that "local
policies are geared to resolving global as well as local environmental problems" (Haughton,

1999:236). Next, "procedural equity" holds that " regulatory and participatory systems should be devised and applied to ensure that all people are treated openly and fairly," and finally, the last principle of Haughton's framework, is "inter-species equity," which places the survival of other species "on an equal basis to the survival of humans" (Haughton, 1999:236).

Such conceptions of sustainable development, regarded as "inclusive, connected, equitable, prudent, and secure," are acclaimed by some, who believe that such "suggest implications that are applicable to a broad range of management theory" (Gladwin et al., 1995:896). Others, however, criticize these all-inclusive approaches—and the concept of sustainable development in general—pointing out that sustainability is "laden with so many definitions that it risks plunging into meaninglessness, at best, and becoming a catchphrase for demagogy, at worst" (Stiglitz, 2002:166). This concern is echoed by Giddings et al., who states that the term is "embraced by big business, governments, social reformers and environmental activists, all of which put their own interpretation on what sustainable development means . . . interpreting such to signify almost anything that anyone wants, so that beneath its covers lies a multitude of sins" (2002: 187-8). Marcuse further comments that "sustainability and social justice do not necessarily go hand in hand," with sustainability masking injustice or on the other hand social justice masking environmental damage (1998:104).

Some agree that the vast and varied reaches being covered by the enveloping discourse on sustainable development have engendered ambiguities, some of which operating to exacerbate the very dilemmas which developmental sustainability is ostensibly seeking to solve. Others condemn the lack of incontestable procedures established for operationalizing policy priorities. Lélé writes that the "absence of a clear theoretical and analytical framework . . . makes it difficult to determine whether the new policies will indeed foster an environmentally sound and

66

socially meaningful form of development" (1991:607). Proponents of definitional disparity and breadth, on the other hand, contend that those in opposition "fail to understand that conceptual ambiguities and competing decontestations are the staple of political argument," and assert that "Sustainable development was not formulated as either a logical construct or an operational maxim—but rather as a potentially unifying political meta-objective, with a suggestive normative core" (Meadowcroft, 2000:373).

> In the 1970s there was a fear that our major environmental problems would be associated with resource scarcities. At the beginning of the 21st century we are faced by another challenge: that the means we have used to overcome resource scarcity, including substitution of some natural resources, and 'cleaner' environmental products and services, may have contributed to the next generation of environmental problems (Redclift, 2005:213).

Although the solutions proposed and the measures implemented to tackle unsustainable development have changed—due to the transformations transpiring throughout the last four decades with respect to conceptualization and spheres of focus—the problems pervading the globe have not. The economic powers continue to manipulate the world market to their monetary and geographic advantage, forests continue to be cut down, and men, women, and children continue to be denied justice and their right to "life, liberty and security of person" (UDHR, 1948:Article 3). Though Vos designates sustainable development as a "journey, not a fixed destination," several questions remain unanswered (2007:336). As mere, abstract concepts, what do "sustainability" and "development" denote when applied to the international reality of a globalized context? (Lélé, 1991). *What* is to be sustained as societies strive for development? (Redclift, 2005). How may we define "needs" so as to adequately meet such, in a culturally sensitive manner that avoids imposing an ethnocentric perspective of what such needs should constitute?

In moving forward, it is imperative that individuals realize the time in which we live: in which growth in GDP for few presages a decline in quality of life for many; in which profit

maximization for a corporation sanctions pervasive impoverishment for a country, in spite of an increasing trend toward the notion of "corporate social responsibility" (Moon, 2007; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). Plotting the future course down which academics, policymakers, and government officials will travel—one which will lead to a destination of sustainable development—will not be uncomplicated. Some, arguing for a de-emphasis on the economy, assert that "there is a need for a shift in policy emphasis from growth to sustainability if environmental and social problems are to be adequately addressed" (Ekins, 1993:281). Others denounce such an approach as the very one-track mentality accountable for the perpetuation of the current state of international unsustainability, as Giddings et al. contend, "There is a need to overcome the barriers between disciplines to an interdisciplinary or even trans-disciplinary view of the world" (2002:195).

Prospects for the implementation, realization, and maintenance of developmental sustainability within The Niger Delta, as they are addressed below, will be surveyed and assessed through a social or humanistic lens. The concept of sustainable development is incontestably a severely convoluted web comprised of interacting and interrelated forces, which are all, to a degree, part and parcel of one another, offering numerous entry points from which to approach the project in order to generate progress. In light of this reality, the position of this study does, in fact, agree that a narrow, one-dimensional focus, in which all energy and resources are allocated to a single component of the sustainable development triune, will result in an inadequate policy agenda from which several critical areas of interest are absent. However, this study contends that, while priority has persistently been granted to the economic arena and, more recently, to that of the environment, the programs and policies instated to address such spheres have not proven wholly futile, but have, indeed, failed to cultivate acceptable outcomes.

This, it is maintained, is attributable to the fact that the true root of the problem that has

for so long impinged upon international advancement toward the realization of sustainable

development—that being abounding inequity—is being circumvented. Middleton and O'Keefe

affirm that "unless analyses of development begin not with the symptoms, environmental or

economic instability, but with the cause, social injustice, then no development can be

sustainable. We are arguing for a radical shift in the debate from concern with things to concern

with societies" (2001:16). In order to generate effectual policies and agreements targeting the

revision of economic organization and environmental management and usage, a fundamental

change in the way we perceive and respect human life must occur. For sustainability to emerge

as an enduring fixture within the development of nations the world over, the weapons we create

in the name of ethnocentric prejudices—unbalanced and discriminatory trade agreements and

export policies, regulation standards, waste and pollution circulation and disposal, and the like—

must be eradicated and exchanged for methods by which to conduct production and daily living

that are informed by, and exemplify, humanity's representation on all levels and forums—locally

to internationally, social justice, freedom and personal autonomy, respect, and dignity. Nieto

affirms that:

> Sustainable development requires, in addition, a redefinition of the predominant patterns of
> distribution of wealth, in such a manner that more equitable forms are adopted, which permit the
> satisfaction of the necessities of all persons, and particularly of the most disadvantaged. This
> implies the elimination of all unjust, illegal, and abusive forms of production and distribution of
> wealth, which produce and reproduce inequality and poverty among people all around the world
> (1997:3).

It is integral to the worldwide attainment and enactment of sustainable development tactics that

we cease to perceptually separate, compartmentalize, "other," and, thus, fissure humanity, as this

constructed partitioning has generated a disconnect that has given rise to global injustice. The

literature, funding, and public and political attention has, for the majority of years since the

notion of sustainable development was explicitly introduced, failed to adequately address the role played by individuals and human agency. This study, therefore, seeks to contribute to, and substantiate, this largely underdeveloped conceptualization. Redclift observes that "the torturous road to greater global responsibility and sustainable development . . . will not be built on the uncertain prediction of scientists. Rather, it is likely to be built on the daily lives of human subjects. . ." (1992:32). This study contends that it not only will be, but that it *ought* to be.

Conclusion

Although scant work has been published in which the above three elements—oil extraction, human security, and sustainable development—are placed in conversation with one another, the body of literature extant on each of the three topics of study individually is expansive, affording a complex, and often discordant, assembly of views and opinions, as well as strengths and weaknesses, limitations and assets. Oil extraction, many contemporary examinations implicitly suggest, has the potential to threaten and even undermine the quality of human security and sustainable development present within the region in question. Arguably the most precious and highly coveted commodity within the global market, oil lies at the source of many multinational corporations, and the relations they forge with governments of nations rich in this "black gold" (Jike, 2004:688). However, with a recent shift in focus has emerged a collection of studies casting light upon the adverse effects oil extraction proves to engender with respect to the nature of governance and the eruption of violent conflict, in addition to environmental degradation, indicating the channels through which this purely economic venture (for those multinational companies involved), may weaken and destabilize the level of human security preserved throughout the region in which extraction occurs. Yet while presenting data demonstrating the relationship between oil reserves—and, thus, an identity as an oil-exporting,

developing country—and the risk for conflict or the presence of corrupt, repressive governance, such work does not address the civilians whom are bearing the greatest hardship and vulnerable to the most severe threats. Similarly, while toxicology studies are done in degraded environments, measuring the extent to which the flora and fauna have been despoiled, connections fail to be drawn to those inhabitants whom rely upon this environment for subsistence and survival. While numbers are crunched and statistics are generated on a macro- or national level, little qualitative research has been conducted which places these affected citizens as the referent of focus.

Such focus is the very crux of the paradigm of human security, which many scholars attribute to the intensification of globalization, which has also spurred transnational oil trade. Transposing emphasis from national security and the protection of borders to human-oriented security and the protection of individuals both intra- and inter-nationally, human security, some maintain, is the necessary conceptualization to be adopted in order to combat a world order which has systematically been organized and structured so as to foster an unequal conservation of security, divided, through deliberate marginalization, between North and South, constituting the developed and the developing worlds. In response to the countless ancillary definitions and conditions succeeding that of human security presented by the *Human Development Report of Human Security* in 1994, much debate has transpired with respect to breadth and precision, and the implications such have for effective policy drafting and implementation. The trade-off between precision, clarity, and execution, versus far-reaching scope, ambiguity, and a lack of practical application occupies the majority of work published on the subject. However, it is asserted that state security, though not mutually exclusive or conflicting with regard to human security, is inadequate and must be accompanied and, thus, compounded by a security paradigm

in which human beings are the prioritized subject. Human security, it is noted, may only be a reality cohesively and consistently integrated within a socio-cultural and national fabric if all human life is equally respected and social justice recognized and upheld.

This human-oriented perception was surrendered and forfeited, however, in the name of exponential production, expansion, industrialization, urbanization, and bourgeoning capitalism—upon which the western society, culture, and economy was erected and through which it is now propelled. The consequences elicited by the means to these ends—notably the thorough environmental depletion—first came into serious question with the Brundtland Report published in 1987. Originally emphasizing the inter-generational sustainability of environmental resources, the concept of sustainable development has since expanded and diversified the areas of concentration, and is now most popularly represented as encompassing an economic and social sphere, as well. The newest development occurring within the sustainable development discourse is the rejection of the economy as a viable entry point in the achievement of sustainable development, as the organization of the international market—partitioned to dichotomize the core and periphery nations—has been purposefully structured as such to maintain uneven and imbalanced levels of development.

The approach incorporated within this study is one of humanistic concern, as it is believed that sustainable development will be realized only when this international compartmentalization ceases, thus abolishing the world order that has, and continues to precipitate global disparity, inequity, and hence, injustice. The literature surveyed, synthesized, and evaluated in reference to oil extraction, human security, and sustainable development serves to present a foundation providing a basic understanding that will function as a lens through

which to investigate and assess the specific events and developments that have amassed to

formulate the unique circumstance of The Niger Delta, discussed below.

Chapter Three

Case Study: The Niger Delta

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the socio-economic, environmental, and militaristic challenges undermining The Niger Delta region's potential to attain and afford human security and sustainable development for its inhabitants. It begins with a brief history of Nigeria, followed by an examination of the entrance and presence of the Royal Dutch Shell Company in the region (hereafter referred to as Shell). The chapter seeks to determine whether there exists a correlation between the humanistic and developmental concerns prevailing throughout the Delta region and the corporate practices being employed to facilitate oil extraction by Shell.

Brief History of Nigeria

Nigeria, located in West Africa, is composed of 36 states, with Abuja as its capital. Sharing its borders with Benin to the west, Cameroon to the east, Chad and Niger to the north, and the Gulf of Guinea to the south, this country spans 923,768 square kilometers. Nigeria is home to approximately 170,123,740 people, constituting the most populous country in Africa and the 7th highest in the world. Exemplified by these inhabitants is a rich and diverse tapestry of languages and ethnic identities. Colonized by the British, the officially recognized language of Nigeria is English, although over 500 additional languages are spoken, with Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani among the most prevalent (Falola, 2001:6). Though a rather strong sense of nationalism pervades this country, the borders of Nigeria also encompass more than 250 ethnic groups—such as the Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio, and Tiv—to which Nigerians also identify closely (Falola, 2001:8).

Encumbered under the colonization of England in 1914, the Federal Republic of Nigeria attained independence on October 1, 1960, marking the commencement of a six-year period of civilian administration that is commonly referred to as the First Republic. However, the Government was comprised of the Nigerian People's Congress (NPC), a party dominated by Northerners and those of the Islamic faith, the National Council of Nigeria, which was heavily constituted by those identifying themselves as Igbo and Christian, and the comparatively liberal Action Group (AG), which was largely dominated by the Yoruba, giving rise to sharp tensions on both a political and ethnic dimension (Osaghae, 1998:38).

1966 marked the commencement of a series of military coups only heightening inter-ethnic friction and hostility as "relations between the Igbo/Eastern government and the federal government/Northern region (inhabited by the Hausa and Fulani) deteriorated rapidly" (Osaghae, 1998:62). On May 27, 1967, the Eastern regional Consultative Assembly—alleging marginalization in the "federal power equation"—mandated a secessionist movement, and declared itself an independent state to be called the Republic of Biafra (Osaghae, 1998:65). Violence broke out between federal and Biafran forces on July 6, 1967, signaling the beginning of the Nigerian-Biafran War, otherwise known as the Nigerian Civil War which would last 30 months and result in three million displaced persons and refugees and the loss of between one and three million lives (Osaghae, 1998:68).

With the war's conclusion in 1970 came the oil boom that would endure for approximately a decade. Despite the efforts of the Dina Commission, which was established to review the system in which resource revenue was being allocated, returns from Nigeria's oil fostered "burgeoning federal financial might and centralisation" (Osaghae, 1998:72). Such was the nature of Nigerian governance throughout the latter portion of the twentieth century, as

conflicts, coups, and corruption ensued (Osaghae, 1998:76).

Following a string of self-proclaimed leaders—all of whom had taken power through military force—Nigeria reinstated a system of democracy in 1999, with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo and the drafting and adoption of a new Constitution, bringing to a close more than 33 years of military rule (Akhaine, 2011:651). The presidential elections held in both 2003 and 2007 are often condemned as irregular, unfair, and marred by violence and corruption. In spite of these challenges, however, Nigeria is currently experiencing its longest period of civilian rule since independence, while the general elections of April 2007 marked the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in the country's history (Akhaine, 2011:651).Today, the nation is governed by President Goodluck Jonathan, who was reelected to office in 2011 through a process which the international media reported as having run smoothly, with relatively little violence and fraudulence (Akhaine, 2011:649).

Nigeria still has its fair share of troubles and concerns, however. With an economy almost exclusively dependent upon its petroleum exports (which provide 95% of foreign exchange earnings), the country is highly vulnerable to shocks in world market prices. Though perceived as one of the wealthiest nations in Africa, with a real growth rate of 6.9%, roughly 70% of Nigerians live under the poverty line. This is compounded by the nation's population growth rate of 2.55%, which will eventually serve to exacerbate the swelling of the working-age cohort (15-64), already constituting 55.9% of the population, which will, in turn, engender an escalating unemployment rate (21%) (Akinbobola & Saibu, 2004:176). Such indicators prove a hotbed for insecurity and conflict, which frequently erupts between the nation's several ethnic groups, which fight for authority and control over the same resources.

History of Oil Discovery and Extraction in The Niger Delta

Referred to as the "Kuwait of West Africa," Nigeria has secured its position among the leading oil exporters within the contemporary global market (Ikein, 1990:1). Since the early 1990s, petroleum production has accounted for more than 25% of the nation's GDP, while oil exports have constituted over 95% of its total export earnings and about 75% of government revenue (Balouga, 2009:8). This monetary affluence and international identity would not be possible, however, if it was not for the presence of The Niger Delta, which is "a panoply of geographically contiguous area currently cutting across nine states in southern Nigeria, including Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers" (Odoemene, 2011:124). This Delta generates 98% of Nigeria's aggregate oil reserves and harbors an estimated 35 billion barrels, with roughly 2.1 million barrels being exported each day (Omotola, 2006:3).

The Nigerian oil industry began, however, with the first major oil expedition in the coastal region between what is now known as Lagos and Oktipupa—the present-day Ondo State of The Niger Delta—conducted by the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, a Nigerian subsidiary of a German company, between 1907 and 1914 (Frynas, 1999:9). After withdrawing upon the commencement of the First World War, the Corporation was not permitted to resume operations, as Nigeria's oil sector quickly became a British monopoly when the colonial Government of England specified in 1914 under the Mineral Oil Act Laws of Nigeria, Chapter 130, that "the power conferred upon the Governor General to grant licenses and leases for mineral oils shall be exercised subject to the condition that no lease or license shall be granted except to a British subject or to a British company" (Ikein, 1990:2).

Although most sources designate 1956 as the year in which the first discovery of oil was

made within The Niger Delta, others cite the initial drilling activities to have transpired in 1951 in a joint venture between the two major British oil companies, Shell and British Petroleum (BP), in the Oloibiri state, which lies approximately 90 kilometers west of what is present-day Port Harcourt (Frynas, 1999:9). Since this first discovery, the Niger Delta Basin has proven to be the most prolific producing area in Nigeria, containing seventy-eight oilfields, including the largest, Forcados Yorki (Khan, 1994:40).

The discovery of oil in commercial quantities throughout Oloibiri triggered the production of crude oil in December 1957, and prompted Shell-BP to expand its drilling activities between 1958 and 1960, which resulted in the unearthing of the Bomu oil field in the Ogoni state in 1958 (Frynas, 1999:9). This finding demarcated 1958 as the first year of oil exports from Nigeria, with documentation indicating the average daily crude oil production to be approximately 5,000 barrels (Khan, 1994:49). Although—from an international perspective— Nigeria's initial oil production was not substantial, crude oil exports began to comprise the majority of the nation's mineral exports at the time of the nation's independence in 1960 (Frynas, 1999:10). In this year, in fact, the country exported 847,000 tons of oil, compared to 10,000 tons of tin and 2,000 tons of columbite (Frynas, 1999:10). Accompanying this economic potential was a heightened governmental interest, and oil operations began to play an increasingly large role in government affairs (Khan, 1994:43).

Realizing the economic return that could be potentially collected from its oil reserves, the newly recognized Nigerian Government invested billions of dollars in the development of oil production, which elicited the "construction of the crude oil port and tanker terminal of Bonny in 1961 and the expansion of the pipeline system and transport; the completion of the trans-Niger pipeline in 1965 which essentially gave oil from mid-western fields access to the Bonny

terminal; and the coming onstream of twelve 'giant' discoveries, including the first offshore discovery, Okan in 1964" (Khan, 1994:50). Yet this rapid increase in exploration and development—largely the result of the additional contribution to drilling by newcomers (Tennessee in 1962 and American Overseas and Gulf in 1963)—came to a halt with the outbreak of the Biafran War in June, 1967 (Khan, 1994:45-6). Exploratory activity and extraction practices resumed in The Niger Delta with the war's end in 1970 and in 1971, Nigeria became the eleventh member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Nnadozie, 1995:19). This was not before the repeal of the 1914 Mineral Oil Act, however, which occurred in 1969 as a result of the Petroleum Decree, which vested the ownership and control of petroleum to the state government, calling for the "Nigerianization of the vital organs of the oil industry and the establishment of governmental control over oil operations" (Ikein, 1990:2-3). The Petroleum Decree also elicited the establishment of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation, which would later merge with the Nigerian Ministry of Petroleum Resources to form the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (Ikein, 1990:4).

As world oil prices were rising in the early years of the 1970s, Nigerian production levels increased with new oil companies "putting their first fields on stream" in the Delta, and "both the number of exploratory wells drilled and the success ratio of drilling" escalating (Khan, 1994:46). Crude oil reserves within the region increased from 9.3 billion barrels in 1970 to 20.2 barrels in 1975, which signaled the beginning of a decline in production, which accompanied the waning demand in the world market (Frynas, 1999:17).

With the exception of a brief recovery in 1978 and again in 1983, exploration and drilling activities throughout The Niger Delta continued to descend until 1986, conveying a decrease in reserves from roughly 20 billion barrels as noted for 1975 to 16.7 billion barrels in 1980 (Khan,

1994:46). A desperate endeavor to encourage exploration, however, triggered the 1977 "Buhari

Incentives," presented under Obasanjo's military regime, which cut the Petroleum Profit Tax

from 85% to 65.75% "until pre-production costs were amortized," leading to an expansion in

budgets for exploration in most oil-extracting multinational corporations (Khan, 1994:46). In a

further effort to stimulate the fading rate of exploration and production, and to "satisfy

discontented oil companies," the Nigerian Government increased official equity margins and

production cost allowances throughout The Niger Delta in July 1982 and again in February 1983,

creating financial terms that were dramatically more favorable to transnational corporations

(Frynas, 1999:17). Among these restructuring efforts, was the Memorandum of Understanding,

signed by each extraction company in 1991 for the period from 1990 to 1995 (Khan, 1994:48).

This fiscal revision was conceived and drafted in response to the goals established by the

Nigerian Government to "increase recoverable reserves to 20 billion barrels by the year 2000"

(Frynas, 1999:16). According to Khan:

> These government intentions essentially meant that interest would have to be reactivated in the remoter inland areas and deeper offshore. The government, therefore, had to respond to a situation where rising development costs were cutting into profit margins and where exploration in new areas was becoming more difficult and more expensive. To this end, changes were made in profit margins and production cost allowances depending on the extent of capital expenditure by the oil company on development. If total costs were kept low (below $2.50/barrel), then a minimum profit margin would be guaranteed at $2.30/barrel for equity production (after royalty and tax). If, however, average capital investment cost were equal to or exceeded $1.50/barrel in any one year, the notional profit margin would increase to $2.50/barrel and the allowance against tax for production costs would also increase to $3.50/barrel. The incentive for greater capital investment per barrel of production essentially meant that encouragement was being given to difficult production and exploration acreage where development is likely to be more capital intensive, and to investment in increasing the productive capacity of existing fields (Khan, 1994:48).

As profit margins and worldwide demand began ascending throughout the latter half of the 1980s

and early 1990s, oil discovery and production throughout The Niger Delta began to grow more

frequent and more lucrative—which experts in the field attribute to the concentration on

previously explored areas, enhanced recovery techniques and the development of innovative

extraction technologies, and new discoveries of oil reserves throughout the Delta (Khan, 1994:47).

By 1992, production increased to 1.85 million barrels per day, up from 1.8 million in January, 1990 (Khan, 1994:55). The centrality of oil to the economy of Nigeria was further proven in 1996, when 96.1% of the country's total export earnings were derived from the commodity of oil. Today, the fiscal regime of Nigeria is considered among the "most attractive to multinational oil corporations when compared with other countries of the world," as the government share of "'profit oil' may be as low as 20%, while some other comparable countries have a share of between 60% and 90%" (Frynas, 1999:21).

The ascending profit margins that the Nigerian Government has bestowed upon the transnational oil extracting corporations present within The Niger Delta have, through the recent decades, endured greater exploitation, as companies strive for the ever-increasing maximization of revenue, often seeking such through negligent practices. Such methods and processes, however, have often resulted in the corrosion of corporate relations with the surrounding communities in which they conduct the extraction of oil, which has the potential to undermine efforts to maximize returns. According to Watts, in March 2003, "all of the oil majors withdrew staff and closed operations," as a result of rising tensions between employees of those oil corporations present, and various ethnic communities, including the Ijaw, Urhobo, and Itsekiri (2008:53). This suspension of extraction processes resulted in a plummet in production, as output "dropped by 817,000 barrels per day," which is the equivalent of 40% of national production (Watts, 2008:62). The deterioration of The Niger Delta as a consequence of this extensive history of oil discovery and extraction is echoed by Ikelegbe, who asserts that "An economy of conflict has emerged, characterised by an intense, violent and bloody struggle for the appropriation of oil

resources and benefits from the oil economy and a thriving market of illegal trading and smuggling of arms, crude and refined oil" (2005:209). Various estimates are in circulation regarding the quantity of crude oil stolen by, or with the aid of, armed gangs and militias, with the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG) estimating the value at roughly 100,000 barrels of oil daily, appraised at approximately $2.8 million (Ikelegbe, 2005:209).

Despite the mounting tensions that have engendered hostility and violence between multinational corporations and local communities and which have resulted in an attenuation of oil produced and barrels exported, The Niger Delta continues to be heavily occupied by such oil-extracting companies. These transnational corporations that have historically been, and currently are, present throughout The Niger Delta, are discussed below.

Companies Involved in Oil Extraction

Due to the British monopolization of all oil operations transpiring throughout Nigeria, established and enacted by the Mineral Oil Act of 1914, the two dominant corporations in the nation, and specifically throughout The Niger Delta, were Shell and BP, both based in England (Frynas, 1999:11). Since the Act's enactment, the Shell-BP venture enjoyed exclusive concessions over the aggregate sum of Nigerian oil resources; yet in 1951, the original exploration license granted to the joined companies, which encompassed 357,000 square miles, was reduced to an area of 58,000 square miles in Southern Nigeria (Frynas, 1999:11). The region permissible to exploration by this venture was further contracted to 40,000 square miles, restricting Shell-BP solely to The Niger Delta, between 1955 and 1957 (Frynas, 1999:11). Yet as the land accessible to this British conglomerate progressively dwindled, concessions began to be bestowed upon a number of non-British oil corporations, which were restricted to areas

previously abandoned by Shell-BP (Frynas, 1999:11).

Opening the doors to the diversification of importers in the latter half of the 1950s, the British Government ushered in an onslaught of foreign oil companies, all of which eager to enter The Niger Delta as a result of the successes formerly achieved by Shell-BP (Frynas, 1999:11). According to Frynas, "Socony-Vacuum (later re-named Mobil) obtained its first oil exploration license in 1955, Tennessee (also known as Tenneco) in 1960, Gulf (later Chevron) in 1961, American Overseas (also known as Amoseas) in 1961, Agip in 1962, SAFRAP (later Elf) in 1962, Phillips in 1965 and Esso in 1965" (1999:11). These companies, as noted above, were constricted to the market niches left that had earlier been occupied by Shell-BP, the most important of which being the oil resources in Nigeria's offshore area (Frynas, 1999:11).

More expansive and, thus, comprehensive oil extraction occurred after 1963, when Texaco/California Asiatic made its first finding, which was quickly followed by that sponsored by Gulf, later renamed Chevron, which discovered the Okan oil field along The Niger Delta in 1964, the first commercial field to be found on Nigeria's continental shelf, which began to produce oil for export in 1965 (Frynas, 1999:12). Gulf therefore became an established company involved in offshore operations, and would remain the second largest oil extracting and producing corporation in Nigeria into the early years of the 1990s (Frynas, 1999:12).

Mobil also made its presence known within The Niger Delta in 1964, with the discovery of the Idaho field located offshore along the region's coast. Then, in April 1990, the corporation struck oil in a new offshore tract located along the southeastern coast of The Niger Delta near Camerooni waters, in a field known as Etoro-l, and again that August, in a field named Ekiko (Khan, 1994:47-8). These two findings augmented the oil reserves of The Niger Delta by 130 million barrels and secured the company as the second largest in the Delta in 1992, when it

surpassed Chevron (Frynas, 1999:12).

According to Khan, the corporations above were accompanied by the introduction of Ashland, British Gas, Pan Ocean, Sun, and Texaco, as well as the Nigerian companies NNPC, NPDC, and Dubri, to comprise fourteen oil-producing companies present within The Niger Delta in January, 1993 (1994:67). Of these, Shell, Elf, Mobil, Exxon, BP, and Statoil signed and agreed to the contracts which outlined production-sharing terms, a trend which would begin to replace the nearly exclusive reliance on joint-venture contracts which had been in existence since 1951 (Khan, 1994:75). The majority of these corporations constitute those most heavily present and, thus, producing the most oil, throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. According to the 1999 edition of *Petroleum Economist*, Texaco accounted for 3.1% of total crude oil production generated from The Niger Delta, compared with Elf's 5%, Agip's 6.7%, Chevron's 17.5%, and Mobil's share of roughly 25.0%, with collective efforts generating, on average, two million barrels of oil each day (Frynas, 1999:15).

Yet while these multinational corporations were, and still remain, the leading extractors of oil throughout The Niger Delta, Shell maintains the identity as the dominant force within the region and the principal player in the Nigerian oil industry overall, accounting for an estimated 39.6% of the Delta's oil production in 1999 (Frynas, 1999:15). This prominence has not been acquired free of challenges and arguable negligence, however, as Frynas speculates that "Shell's focus on, and prevailing control over, onshore areas throughout The Niger Delta, located close to human settlements, can explain why the company and its sub-contractors have been involved in significantly more local conflicts and litigation in Nigeria to-date than other oil companies" (1999:12). The Shell Company's entrance into The Niger Delta, as well as the series of events which have transpired to elicit such "local conflicts and litigation," is subsequently outlined.

Brief History of Shell in The Niger Delta

The Shell Petroleum Development Company, known within the commercialized economic sphere and throughout the scholarly literature simply as Shell, is a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, which itself was established with the merging of the Shell International Trading and Transportation Company and the Royal Dutch Oil Company following the outbreak of World War I (Omoweh, 2005:99). This merger, the consequence of an overconcentration of capital within the oil industry, enabled the joint interests of these corporations to foster the expansion of oil business "to the countries of the Third World" (Omoweh, 2005:99). Pooling their resources to amass a more affluent base upon which to draw, these two companies, combining to form the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, broadened their transnational identity by broadening their horizons to encompass within their collection of potential extraction sites developing countries, which were expected to generate higher returns on investments (Omoweh, 2005:99).

It was not until the close of the Second World War, however, that the ancillary Shell Petroleum Development Company established full-scale oil exploration, extraction, and exportation throughout Africa and particularly within Nigeria (Omoweh, 2005:102). It is important to note that the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies is comprised of holding companies, which "own shares between and among themselves, and in other associated companies"; servicing companies, which "provide advice and services on a broad range of issues on oil, gas and chemicals to other associated companies operating in various parts of the world"; and lastly, operating companies, which "explore and produce crude oil and natural gas" (Omoweh, 2005:104). The Shell Petroleum Development Company, which will subsequently be referred to as Shell, serves as the subsidiary of the operating companies that has been assigned

to, and is responsible for, the exploration and production of oil throughout Nigeria (Omoweh, 2005:105). Thus, this subsidiary Company also serves as a key player with respect to the recent developments—or deteriorations—occurring throughout The Niger Delta and, thus, functions as a prominent agent within the ensuing study.

The earliest origins of Shell as being present and active within The Niger Delta may be traced to the colonial period. As noted above, the Mineral Act of 1914 prohibited all non-British companies from executing any operations throughout the colony of Nigeria, ultimately securing the total sum of minerals, as well as crude oil, for England (Omoweh, 2005:107). It is this Act which also prompted the regulation of Shell's activities throughout the country as well as the eventual merger with Britain's primary petroleum producer, BP, to produce the Shell D'Arcy Oil Company in 1936 (Omoweh, 2005:107). This joint venture was granted license to conduct exploration throughout the entire landscape of what is present-day Nigeria, ensuring a British monopoly over oil exploration and subsequent production (Frynas1999:9). In 1951, Shell D'Arcy, renamed Shell-BP in 1956, began drilling activities in The Niger Delta, and discovered some 450 barrels of oil at the Akata-l well in 1953 (Frynas, 1999:9). According to Omoweh, however, who asserts that "BP's interest was mainly concerned with getting its share of crude oil produced, leaving Shell with actual exploration and production of crude oil," it can be argued that "although there was the Shell-BP which dominated the Nigerian petroleum industry, it was Shell Petroleum Development Company. . . that has continued to produce crude oil in the Niger Delta since 1956" (2005:108).

Resuming oil exploration after the close of World War II, Shell-BP drilled the first well at Ihuo in what is now Imo State, though found no oil (Omoweh, 2005:108). In 1956, however, the venture discovered oil in commercial quantities in the town of Oloibiri, located in the

present-day state of Bayelsa (Frynas, 1999:9). This finding, which generated eleven oil wells which, in turn, produced 3,000 barrels a day, assured all forces and actors involved within the global oil industry that The Niger Delta was, undoubtedly, "an oil-producing area" (Omoweh, 2005:109). This international reputation was confirmed in 1957, when Shell-BP drilled its first successful well in the Western Niger Delta at Erumukowharie—four kilometers from Ughelli in what is presently known as the Delta State (Omoweh, 2005:109). An extensive catalog of extraction sites were discovered, and wells drilled, throughout Ughelli communities, including those established in Afiesere, Umolo, Olomu, Uzere, Oleh, Aviara, Olomoro, and Kokori/Orogun, in addition to those discovered surrounding Bomadi and Burutu (Omoweh, 2005:109). Constituting one of the most oil-rich regions within The Niger Delta, Ughelli generated 4,000 barrels of oil each day by 1958, an output which would swell exponentially by 1992, at which time 58 oil wells were being consistently drilled by Shell alone (Omoweh, 1995:116).

Regardless of its miniscule production by contemporary standards, this output stimulated the initial export of crude oil, resulting in the first shipment of oil cargo to Europe from Nigeria in 1958 and establishing the British colony as an oil-exporting region (Omoweh, 2005:109). The processes of oil exploration, extraction, production, and export altered little with Nigeria's independence in October, 1960, as the state, like its predecessor, continues to retain the exclusive right to issue mineral and oil prospecting, and mining and extraction licenses (Omoweh, 2005:113). Yet while the young state did not prioritize investments in the oil sector immediately following independence, perceiving oil extraction to be a risky endeavor, Shell-BP did not necessarily need any active government backing, as this venture maintained the majority of oil licenses in 1960 (Frynas, 1999:15).

With the increasing emergence of state involvement, however, only came more favorable terms for the practices and transactions implemented and conducted by Shell-BP, despite "the pillage of [the Government's] own oil-producing areas in The Niger Delta," as Omoweh notes (2005:110). The continuing recognition of the Oil Pipeline Act of 1958—drafted and instated by Britain, whose only concern was not the preservation of Nigerian ecosystems and adequate living conditions for those within local communities, but rather the maximization of oil production— mandated that oil companies would obtain a legal permit empowering them to "lay oil pipelines linking up their various oil wells and fields across the Niger Delta, which, were then connected to their terminals from where crude oil is finally exported" (Omoweh, 2005:113). According to Omoweh, the perpetuation of this Act even after the country's independence, afforded Shell "the leeway to lay its pipelines across sacred sites and homes of the people who live in the Niger Delta" (2005:113).

The state-sanctioned autonomy bestowed upon Shell was reaffirmed in 1973, as the Nigerian Government, through what was then known as the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (now referred to as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, or NNPC), signed what is "erroneously believed to be a joint venture agreement, based on production-sharing," with the subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies (Omoweh, 1995:125). The nature of this transaction complicates its identity as a joint venture, as the Company remains wholly owned by its parent company, headquartered in Europe (Omoweh, 1995:125). The state has failed to fulfill its portion of both funding and manpower since 1973, but has instead conceded its alleged position as "senior partner" to Shell, which had split from BP, "through an understanding that shifted the entire cost of oil exploration and exploitation to the company" (Omoweh, 1995:125). The lack of involvement and, by extension, accountability assumed by the

Nigerian Government suggests, as Omoweh observes, that Shell has the liberty to continue "with its reckless operation knowing fully well that, as a company, it cannot be held liable for pollution and subsequent effects, nor for the payment of compensation" (1995:125).

The practices employed by Shell throughout the processes of oil exploration and extraction that take place throughout sites within The Niger Delta have proven problematic, as alluded to above. After obtaining the necessary license from the Nigerian Government, Shell contracts the tasks of geological and geochemical surveys, as well as geophysical and seismic operations to oil servicing companies (OSCs), which are virtually all foreign (Omoweh, 2005:117). Because these charges are supervised only minimally by Shell's field staff, "no consideration is given to the treatment of the harmful waste generated," such as chemicals and explosives that are generally deposited within the environment, "thereby posing danger to aquatic organisms, vegetation and even human beings" (Omoweh, 2005:117). According to Okonta and Douglas, these OSCs "operate with utmost disregard for the environment of the oil communities since they are merely contractors to Shell which the state and the people who live in the host areas recognize as the major oil operator. In other words, they owe no obligation to the state, Shell or the people" (2003:93).

Following the initial phases of exploration, then, are the processes of drilling and the laying of pipelines, which are also contracted out by Shell to OSCs such as Forex, Anadrill, and Key Drill, and Otis and Solus Schall, respectively (Omoweh, 2005:118). Although most agents and actors within the international oil industry recognize Shell's capacity to fulfill these processes, the rule of capitalism, Omoweh asserts, compels this subsidiary corporation to hire the best services from the best companies, though it is by this mode of operation "that the underdevelopment of the Delta can be partly located" (2005:118).

It would seem, however, that the modes of extraction and production instated and utilized by Shell throughout The Niger Delta are not only going unchecked by the Government of Nigeria, but that such are being encouraged and assisted, granted that the state's "overriding interest is how much funding it can raise from the operations," according to Okonta and Douglas (2003:41). The Land Use Decree ratified in 1978 vested in the Nigerian administration sole ownership of all lands upon which "oil is explored, produced, transported and stored" (Omoweh, 2005:115). This not only granted the Federal State the power to seize any land "needed for oil exploitation," but also "provided a buffer for Shell to be more reckless in its operations," as Boele et al. postulate that this partially explains how the subsidiary "can afford to flare gas day and night since its initial discovery of oil in the Niger Delta in 1956" (2001:76).

According to Frynas, Shell is exploiting the imbalance of such policies—imbalances which imply adverse impacts for extraction communities—to its monetary advantage, assured that the state, on account of its material interests, will not advance any decisive sanctions against the corporation (1993:30). Omoweh reiterates this sentiment, claiming that "Together, they both hide under the cloak of such an exploitative arrangement to wreak havoc on the Niger Delta" (Omoweh, 1995:125).

As rising profits received both by Shell and, in turn, the Government of Nigeria began to translate into more far-reaching corporate autonomy, the "negligent" practices employed by the Company, and the deleterious symptoms such engendered, began to provoke community protests (Frynas, 1999:46). Since the late 1980s, communities such as the Ijaw, Urhobo, and Isoko have expressed discontent with corporate activities, demanding increased representation and investment (Omoweh, 2005:75). Although Shell's presence has been highly controversial and heavily contested throughout the entirety of The Niger Delta, the greatest and most historical

resistance with which the Company and its operations have been met is that developed and progressed by the Ogoni people (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:75).

Shell began extracting oil from its first well in Ogoni, near the village of Kegbara Dere, in 1958 (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:75). This well quickly expanded to five large oil fields comprising ninety-six wells and five flow stations throughout Bomu, Korokjoro, Yorla, Bodo West, and Ebubu, producing 108,000 barrels of oil a day at its peak throughout the 1970s (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:75). The "insidious impact" of Shell's oil extraction activities was immediately recognized by the Ogoni people, as letters written by community leaders within Ogoniland described the multinational's operations as "seriously threatening the well-being, and even the very lives, of the Ogoni" (Nzidee, cited in Omoweh, 2005). Community protest escalated with the amplifying scope and breadth of environmental damages. Responding to a 1970 oil blowout in Well 11 in the Bori oil field, Ken Saro-Wiwa, who would become the spokesperson for the people of Ogoniland, laments, "Water sources were poisoned, the air was polluted, farmland devastated. I watched with absolute dismay as indigent citizens found neither succor nor help from Shell" (Saro-Wiwa, 1992:81).

Extraction practices were documented as being more remiss and, thus, capable of deteriorating the surrounding ecosystems, as Greenpeace comments on the Company's pipeline network throughout the Ogoni region in 1992, noting that "Shell's high-pressure pipelines pass aboveground through villages and crisscross over land that was once used for agricultural purposes, rendering it economically useless. Many pipelines also pass within meters of Ogoni homes" (Greenpeace International, cited in Omoweh, 2005). To this, corporate officials responded that the policy of burying pipelines was not adopted within the extraction zones of this area of the Delta because much of the terrain was swampland, which may increase the risk of

fractures and oil leaks (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:77). Shell representatives further claimed that the Company conducts regular and consistent reviews with respect to the position of pipelines and, in fact, reroutes these networks when they become hazardous, especially in areas where they "impact human habitation" (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:77). Yet the Ogoni dismiss this claim as "cheap propaganda," explaining that "their land is not marsh nor has Shell gone out of its way to reroute a single high-pressure pipeline it considers as hazardous" (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:77).

While being accused of "devastating" the environment through "specific acts of environmental irresponsibility," including "operational oil spills, gas flaring, acid rain, and poor waste management," the corporation did, in fact, acknowledge that environmental impacts were fostered, though officials sought to "put these into a wider context of over-population, over-farming, deforestation and industrialization" (Omoweh, 2005:77). As communal unrest mounted and protests intensified, Shell relied upon the protection of the Nigerian military, which exacerbated the erosion of Ogoni relations with the state government (Omoweh, 1995:129).

With the established Nigerian political system "having largely failed" the Ogoni, the peoples of this community launched in October 1990 the "Ogoni Bill of Rights," which asserted their right to "self-determination and articulated their demands for environmental, social and economic justice" (MOSOP, 1998). This proclamation served as a springboard to the establishment of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which issued a "demand notice" to Shell, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and Chevron in 1992, granting the companies thirty days to respond to a list of demands that included payment of compensation for past damage and impacts of extraction practices and production activities (Omoweh, 2005:79).

Failing to acknowledge these requests, Shell continued operations unaffected, and the

once-peaceful protests led by the Ogoni became charged with hostility and violence. Oil operations were frequently disturbed, often as a result of spontaneous protest, but also deliberately executed under the direction of MOSOP or the more radical National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) and the Ethnic Minorities Rights Organization of Africa (EMIROAF) (Frynas, 1999:47). A leaked governmental memorandum implying the collusion between Shell and the Nigerian military was reported on the front page of the U.K. newspaper *The Guardian*, revealing the state sentiment that "Shell operations will remain impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence" (Cited in Boele, 1995). The document also noted the need for "pressure on oil companies for prompt regular inputs as discussed," suggesting that Shell may have been paying the military authorities for the operations of Major Okuntimo's unit—the International Security Task Force—which was "well known for its brutality in Ogoni" (Vidal, 1995). According to Manby, "Human rights groups documented detentions, harassment, and extrajudicial executions of MOSOP activists, as well as security force involvement in promoting violent clashes between the Ogoni and neighboring ethnic groups" (2000:6).

Discontent surged among the Ogoni people, whom felt that Shell had demonstrated an "unwillingness to acknowledge the significance of MOSOP which now represents the bulk of the Ogoni community . . . Shell Nigeria has chosen to promote the existence of conservative Ogoni leaders, some of whom have benefited greatly from the Company's operations, instead of actively engaging MOSOP" (Boele, 1995:8). This dissatisfaction and the ensuing state violence committed against those residing within Ogoniland culminated in the climax of government-sanctioned force in 1995, when Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were executed for the charge of murdering four "conservative, pro-government chiefs" (Boele et al., 2001:80).

In his closing statement on November 10, Saro-Wiwa clearly identified the actor attributable for the "Ogoni crisis," affirming: "Shell is here on trial . . . The Company has ducked this particular trial, but its day will surely come and the lessons learnt here may prove useful to it for there is no doubt in my mind that the ecological war the Company has waged in the Delta will be called to question sooner rather than later" (Cited in Okonta & Douglas, 2003:128).

Although officially withdrawing from the Ogoni area of The Niger Delta in 1993, Shell was exposed for having recently been in negotiation for the import of arms for use by the Nigerian police (Manby, 2000:6-7). The Company acknowledged these negotiations, commenting that: "[We] cannot give an undertaking not to provide weapons in the future, as, due to the deteriorating security situation in The Niger Delta, we may want to see the weapons currently used by the Police who protect Shell people and property upgraded" (Cited in Okonta & Douglas, 2003:130). The target of severe international scrutiny and criticism, Shell has since been condemned as supporting a militaristic dictatorship and contributing to the murder of innocent civilians (Manby, 2000:7).

Thus, to salvage its reputation and resume oil extraction processes in the Ogoni region, Shell has, in the years after Saro-Wiwa's execution, affirmed its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and entered into dialogue with community leaders, as well as human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Pax Christi (Boele et al., 2001:82). In 1997, the corporation revised its 1976 "Statement of General Business Principles," explicitly referencing Shell's pledge to "support . . . fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of business," while also reiterating its responsibilities to society and its duty to "give proper regard to health, safety and the environment consistent with their commitment to contribute to sustainable development" (Cited in Okonta & Douglas, 2003:134). In realizing

these objectives, this multinational has established various dates by which to end gas disposal and cease gas flaring, bury all pipelines, and clean up all oil spills, though none of these vows has been fulfilled, within the Ogoni region nor throughout the other remaining areas of extraction throughout The Niger Delta (Boele et al., 2001:84). According to the President of MOSOP, Ledum Mitee, "Shell—the company that promised to balance principles with profit—has not made a single concession to help bring about the peace and reconciliation it says it wants to see. I have a simple question for the Directors of Shell: when will you balance principles with practice in Ogoni, and throughout the entirety of the Niger Delta" (Cited in Omotola, 2006).

From 1958 when drilling and extraction commenced within Ogoniland to 1993 when operations were suspended, Shell estimates that 634 million barrels of oil were produced and exported, valued at $5.2 billion in this region alone (Boele et al., 2001:76). It is no wonder, then, that the corporation should consider its activities throughout The Niger Delta to be its "largest and most complex exploration and production venture outside North America" (Cited in Watts, 2008). In spite of the strained relations Shell has harbored throughout the five decades in which it has maintained oil operations, the corporation currently controls over 70% of such activities in The Niger Delta (Omoweh, 2005:129).

Scholars, policymakers, and government officials alike, however, will do well to recognize that the Ogoni are just one of countless peoples throughout the Delta who have voiced concern and dissatisfaction with the perceived disregard for locally sustainable development, equitable distribution of oil wealth, and investments allotted to community development. Also among the extensive and consequential list of anxieties pervading residents of The Niger Delta is the widespread and comprehensive deterioration of the local environment and natural ecosystems that has advanced with the proliferation of oil extraction operations.

Impact of Oil Extraction Practices on the Environment and Sustainable Development

Prior to 1973, the year in which Shell signed the Joint Venture Agreement with the NNPC and, by extension, the Nigerian Government, the transnational oil corporation maintained open and consistent communication, and engaged in cooperative negotiation, directly with community members, including the chiefs and traditional rulers who represented the people residing within or around extraction sites (Omoweh, 1995:141). However, these leaders were stripped of their role as custodians of the communal land with the enactment of the 1978 Land Use Decree discussed above, which effectively conferred all land within Nigerian borders to the state government, though placing explicit emphasis upon land relevant to the nation's oil industry (Frynas, 2001:30). Section 28 of the Decree, for instance, stipulates that the state governor can revoke a right of occupancy for "overriding public interests," which include the "requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith" (Cited in Omoweh, 1995:132). Thus, harnessing the power to seize any land acreage on behalf of oil initiatives and operations, the post-colonial state restricts, and essentially denies, citizens' ownership claim to land on which oil is being prospected, mined, transported, and stored (Omoweh, 1995:133).

In effect, inhabitants of communities established within or surrounding oil extraction and production zones are perceived both by the Nigerian Government and Shell as squatters. Therefore, Omoweh states, "they have no right to complain about oil spillage and pollution," and their protests against such deleterious processes and their subsequent outcomes are not only futile, but logistically invalid, not only because they are granted no right or title to the land, but also because such consequences are regarded as "natural hazards to be expected in any oil production" (Omoweh, 1995:133). Such is the mentality that is assumed and exemplified by

Shell officials and representatives of the country's administration, who no longer feel any sense of accountability to those residing within local communities. This administrative approach governs the oil activities that are initiated and sustained throughout The Niger Delta (Omoweh, 1995).

This attitude also justifies the renunciation of the possibility of an "oil producing community," as the oil bearing region that is The Niger Delta is perceived not as a home in which human beings dwell, but rather, as a mere minefield (Omoweh, 2005:132). A minefield, however, "in the thinking of both Shell and the state, cannot be polluted" (Omoweh, 2005:132). Yet this outlook, many scholars maintain, is simply a constructed manipulation that facilitates and ameliorates the systematic and exhaustive exploitation of oil reserves, which, accordingly, minimizes production costs and, in turn, maximizes the revenue being generated and appropriated by the primary beneficiaries—among whom local residents are largely absent (Moffat & Lindén, 1995; Osaghae, 1995; Boele et al., 2001; Okonta & Douglas, 2003).

Pollution and successive, wholesale environmental degradation, are not only a tangible and objective reality throughout The Niger Delta, but occur and are reinforced within every stage of the oil production process, from exploration to export (Frynas, 1999:158). As briefly examined above, the tasks associated with exploratory activities are delegated to contractor OSCs, which—given the exploitative relationship over which Shell wields control—are "under no obligation to the host communities to be cautious in their operations," in spite of signing an agreement to adhere to the "principles of good oil field practice" as delineated within the Petroleum Act of 1969, which provides for the exploration of oil from territorial waters and the continental shelf of Nigeria (Omoweh, 1995:126). The initial phase of prospecting operations is the identification of an on-shore location spanning approximately 15 hectares on which to

conduct seismic reflection surveys, which employ geophysics to estimate the properties contained within the Earth's subsurface at the designated area and, thus, to determine whether oil is present and, if so, the volume or quantity available for extraction (Fränkl & Cordry, 1967:4).

The methods by which such assessments are performed—which involve the infiltration of roughly ten parties, composed of at least 400 laborers—are, however, extremely destructive and injurious to the surrounding terrain (Omoweh, 1995:126). Before any seismic investigations may even be carried out, significant expanses of land must be cleared, which entails far-reaching deforestation and, sequentially, an oftentimes considerable loss of biodiversity (Frynas, 1999:158). According to Moffat and Lindén, the preparations for these surveys are particularly detrimental in mangrove swamps, as "it takes two to three years for mangrove bushes to recover after their roots are cut into, while it may require 30 years or more for mangrove trees to be fully restored" (Frynas, 1999:158). Irrespective of the enduring impacts which this removal materializes, mangrove areas constituted approximately 62% of the land cleared under Shell's direction by 1995 (van Dessel, 1995:15).

Upon detecting a prospective area of land to be appraised, and after eliminating any existing flora and foliage, pipes are drilled into the crust of the Earth, some of which harboring strategically placed explosives (Omoweh, 2005:134). Next, "tramps," or cables are laid, usually in intervals not exceeding 200 meters, which connect the various points at which such explosives have been positioned (Omoweh, 1995:126). Finally, such explosives are detonated in order to expose and, therefore, gain access to the Earth's synclines—or layers—and ascertain whether such bear oil (Omoweh, 1995:126). If they do, it is upon such synclines that preliminary drilling commences (Omoweh, 2005:134).

The practices employed throughout these seismic evaluations elicit severe environmental

damage, as the detonation of explosives, as well as subsequent drilling, produce toxic chemicals such as Bentonite, soda ash, pipe lax, and EP-20, which are absorbed into the soil, waterways, and atmosphere (Omoweh, 1995:126). Likewise, the additional "untreated wastes" generated from such processes are simply "dumped on land and into swamps" (Omoweh, 2005:134). Shell, the NNPC, and the Nigerian Government have, throughout the past 30 years, received general complaints by the inhabitants of the oil-rich areas of Ughelli, Isoko, and Ethiope in Delta State, as well as Umuechem located in Rivers State, that "the sound generated from detonated explosives during exploration has caused earth tremor, disrupted the natural process of soil sedimentation, caused the flight of animals from the area, and violated some of the traditional rites observed by the indigenous people" (Omoweh, 2005:135).

As noted, these introductory practices often diminish the supply of sentiment retained throughout such sites, making the Delta more vulnerable to soil erosion and its ancillary effects, such as flooding, poor surface water quality, reduced vegetation, and damaged drainage networks (Moffat & Lindén, 1995:528-9). The environmental implications affiliated with drilling are also extremely damaging, as this activity requires a sizeable quantity of "mud," or drilling fluid, which comprises clay, an assembly of various chemicals, water, "cement slurry," and "other acid stimulations" (Frynas, 1999:160). When the mixture re-emerges to the surface of the ground, the waste is discharged and dissipates, resulting in the degradation of both land and water and effectively exterminating the living organisms found within such habitats (van Dessel, 1995:20-1). Yet this amalgam of harmful ingredients is inadequately managed, as it has been consistently documented that Shell, failing to treat this waste, merely discards such either directly on land or within marshes, or disposes such within pits that are not "cased," therefore, permitting this refuse to overflow and saturate the surrounding land and water systems,

particularly throughout the rainy season (Omoweh, 1995:128).

The most prominent concern stemming from exploratory activities—and that which has been most frequently expressed among local residents—however, is that of land pollution (Omoweh, 2005:135). In the Isoko community, where Shell accounts for 100% of the oil wells present and active, exploratory operations have claimed over 15,000 hectares of farmland, while making land adjacent to such immediate practices utterly infertile as a result of soil pollution and the consequent depletion of nutrients (Frynas, 1999:159). Those residing within the Umuechem region were met with the same fate, as Shell has polluted—and, thus, deemed unproductive—approximately 10,000 hectares of land previously utilized for agricultural produce, resulting not only in thoroughly degraded ecosystems, but also in the proliferation of food insecurity, which will be elaborated upon in the following section (Omoweh, 2005:135).

Yet while measures are taken throughout the process of oil exploration which prove detrimental to the sustainability and overall welfare of the environment characteristic of The Niger Delta, it is indisputable that "the most serious damage" is waged by the practices employed by Shell throughout the course of oil extraction and production (Frynas, 1999:158). Drilling, discussed above, is conducted on a larger, more intensive scale following any successful exploration, exacerbating the adverse impacts previously outlined and provoking the contestations of those residing throughout the oil-producing areas of Afiesere, Ufuoma, and Omavowve in Ughelli regions, as well as the Ogini, Olomoro, Owhe, and Uzere communities of Isokoland, all of which are occupied solely by Shell (Omoweh, 2005:137). Amassing the responses of several qualitative interviews conducted with members of such communities between 1987 and 1995, Omoweh presents this account of the pollution and degradation generated by drilling wastes:

> The swampy areas are particularly easily and badly polluted by the harmful drilling rubbish dumped by Shell. Save the crocodiles and alligators, among other reptiles that can crawl to land, the rest die from intoxication. Other members of the faunal family are also killed by pollution. The danger of polluting the swamp is that, the wastes can easily mix with water and kill organisms as the toxin spreads fast to other areas. At times, it can spread so fast that communities 40 kilometers away from the point of initial pollution are affected within 24 hours. On land, the vegetation is particularly destroyed. In fact, the process of pollution continues as the wastes immediately spread to unaffected areas after rainfall. Worst still, the wastes percolate into the soil, thereby prolonging soil infertility and land crisis across the area. Pollution has destroyed our means of livelihood (1995:137).

It is important to emphasize here, that The Niger Delta is home to more than six million people who depend upon agriculture and fishing for their survival (Rowell and Goodal, 1994). Despite this knowledge, however, the gradual corrosion of environmental landscapes is advanced throughout the process of drilling, as the dredged materials, which, as stated above, are negligently dispensed—in other words, simply transported—are usually "high in organic content and turn acidic in the process of oxidation," thus "destroying the ecology of the surrounding area" (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:70). However, as a portion of this mixture leaks into waterways and is, thus, dispersed and accumulated within various bodies of water, a propensity for elevated sedimentation within it leads to a substantial reduction in the penetration rate of sunlight, dramatically altering these ecosystems and threatening the aquatic life upon which inhabitants of The Niger Delta so heavily rely for both economic and personal subsistence (van Dessel, 1995).

The oil extracted through drilling, however, is originally amalgamated with "surplus combustible vapours," or gangue materials which are not serviceable or profitable and, therefore, extricated to produce pure crude oil (Hyne, 1984:42). The process by which such matter is extracted is referred to as gas flaring, in which "unwanted natural gas is burned off" and released, which concurrently protects vessels and pipes from over-pressuring, and, therefore, enables operations to be continuously sustained (Hyne, 1984:46). Shell officials explain the process as follows: "Gas that is produced as a by-product of the process of oil production is referred to as associated gas. Such gas is naturally dissolved in crude oil reservoirs under

reservoir conditions of high temperatures and pressures. But when the oil is produced and brought to the surface, the dissolved gas separates from the oil" ("People and the Environment," 2004:14). This process, however, produces more greenhouse-gas emissions than any other single source in Africa south of the Sahara, contributing to the release and emanation of carbon dioxide which has been linked to exacerbated air pollution, global warming, and acid rain (Inskeep, 2005). Although executives for Shell have reiterated the claim that gas "burns cleanly," a U.S. Energy Department official testified in 2002 that "flaring is generally unhealthy to humans and ecosystems" (Inskeep, 2005).

This is not only due to depreciating air quality, but also because "the heat generated from the gas flare, simultaneously desiccates the soil and turns the hitherto rain and mangrove forests into derived savannah" (Omoweh, 2005:140-1). Okonta and Douglas echo this point, observing that the preferred settings, as asserted by Shell, in which to establish bases for the corporation's flare sites include the mangroves, freshwater swamp forests, and lowland rainforests, to ensure that the stacks are of a sufficient distance from the areas in which oil wells are positioned so as to prevent fires (2003:71). Consequently, the once-dense and pervasive expanses of vegetation flourishing throughout The Niger Delta have, throughout the decades, rapidly become depleted as a result of the heat radiating from the unremitting flaring of gas (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:71). A common feature of such flaring zones, then, is "a Sahara Desert in the midst of a forest region" (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:68).

Yet flare stacks are not constructed exclusively within the less populated areas of marsh and forest, but appear throughout towns and villages as well, severely disrupting the extant way of life and eradicating the very staples upon which communal economies were formerly developed. According to Omoweh, "over 3,500 hectares of farmland and 600 rubber plantations

covering about 2,500 hectares of land were lost to Shell's gas flaring" throughout the Erhoike (Kokori) community in 1980 (2005:141). As the Company's detrimental practice persisted unchecked, an additional 3,000 hectares of land were lost, resulting in a total of 8,500 hectares squandered by 1996 as a direct consequent of gas flaring alone (Omoweh, 2005:141). Omoweh continues:

> Most of the rivulets and creeks of the Okpare River criss-crossing the entire swampy areas and the traditional fish ponds of the people, were severely polluted. Some of them have either been dried up or lost their natural capacity to retain most of the members of the flora family; palm trees, virtually all of which are wild, are particularly badly hit by gas flaring. Not only did most of them located within a radius of one kilometer from the flare point die, the few outside of this range that are still found at the time the author visited the area as of 1997, could no longer bear fruits due to the regular and intense heat from the flare. This has resulted in the drastic reduction in the production of palm oil in the area. In essence, two other means of livelihood of the people, that is, tapping rubber and palm trees, were severely destroyed (2005:141).

Yet despite the utter destitution which this extraction practice inflicts upon the residents of such oil-bearing regions—literally burning away the resources utilized to sustain societies—Shell has never, even temporarily, ceased the fuelling of those flare stacks erected in the regions of Eruomukowharie, Olomu, Afiersere, Erwreni, and Orogun in the thirty-six years since operations were initiated (Omoweh, 1995:129).

In its 2004 report entitled, "People and the Environment," Shell claims to have ceased flaring operations at a site located near the village of Odidi, which has endured far-reaching ecological degradation and economic deprivation as a result of such production activities (2004:14). However, according to Steve Inskeep, author of NPR article, "Gas Flaring Continues to Plague Nigeria," flare stacks were fully functional and activated in July, 2005 (2005). "Shortly after we witnessed flaring in progress," Inskeep reports, "we were detained for two hours by gunmen from the Shell facility, who demanded, unsuccessfully, that we surrender our tape and camera film. When we asked for an explanation from a Shell executive, Chris Findlayson, he said that the flaring we witnessed was a temporary situation made necessary by technical

problems" (2005).

Such nefarious modes of oil extraction and production—accountable for the undoing of entire communities—are frequently argued to be the outcome of state passivity, itself the consequence of legal and economic contradictions (Omoweh, 2005:139). With the instatement of the Gas Re-injection Act in 1979, the Nigerian Government sought generally to ban gas flaring activities, promulgating that all oil companies present within the country were obligated to submit a plan outlining oil production methods and gas utilization by 1980, while concomitantly outlawing all flaring operations after January, 1984, unless accorded "special permission" from the Minister of Petroleum Resources (Akinbami et al., 1996:321).

Although the original penalty for breaching this enactment involved forfeiture of concession, the state, in light of stakeholder complaints, reduced the punishment to fines considered remarkably low, and even more so by multinational, multibillion-dollar corporations such as Shell (Akinbami et al., 1996:321). According to Frynas, it was markedly more economical for companies to continue the processes of gas flaring "at an expense of 1 million US Dollars" as opposed to the $56 million it would cost to cease such monetarily efficient operations (1999:165). This charge, as introduced by the federal administration was, and remains, admittedly ineffectual in prohibiting the presence of gas flaring throughout the regions of The Niger Delta. However, these financial sanctions have proven even less consequential as a deterrent for Shell, which, as the "junior partner" of the joint venture in which the Company is engaged with NNPC and, by definition, the Nigerian Government, is only accountable for 20% of any fines accrued, while the remaining 80% are borne by the state itself (Omoweh, 2005:140).

As it would be irrefutably illogical to impose monetary reparations upon a joint partnership of which it is a participant, the Government of Nigeria permits the gas flaring

operations conducted by Shell to persist unchallenged and unimpeded, expediting the utter demise of The Niger Delta. In fact, of the 100 million cubic meters of gas flared annually by the oil companies present within the region, 70% is attributable to Shell, which, as noted above, "has been flaring gas day and night for over four decades" throughout extraction sites established within Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers States (Omoweh, 2005:140). The flaring operations incessantly transpiring throughout these particular states, however, exceed 70% of the total, being monopolized by Shell, as such is essentially the sole oil company overseeing oil extraction and production practices within these specific locations of the larger Delta area. Thus, it is fair to deduce that Shell is also essentially the sole producer of the 13 million tons of methane that are released into the atmosphere of Delta and Rivers States each year (Moffat and Lindén, 1995:529).

According to Moffat and Lindén, an estimated 35 million tons of carbon dioxide were emitted throughout The Niger Delta in 1994 as a product of gas flaring *alone* (1995:533). Of this, 24.5 million was reported to have been released by flare stacks belonging to Shell (1995:533). Unfortunately, however, this figure pales in comparison to that presented by The World Bank, which estimates Shell's 1994 gas flares to have ejected 39 million tons of carbon dioxide throughout the region (Cited in Moffat and Lindén, 1995). The extent to which this corporation has contributed to the generation and perpetuation of the adverse impacts affiliated with this practice can be more fully realized when we acknowledge the fact that Nigeria flares more gas than any other country in the world, while the overwhelming majority of that occurring within the nation's borders is confined to The Niger Delta (Moffat & Lindén, 1995:533).

Though gas flaring induces extremely detrimental processes, and exacerbates the ongoing deterioration of this oil-rich region, the most publicly recognized and disreputable practices

employed by Shell throughout the discovery and extraction of oil are those of negligence which bring about oil spillages. According to data published by The World Bank, the Delta and Rivers States alone were witness—and victim—to nearly 300 oil spills for every year between 1991 and 1993 (Cited in Frynas, 1999:165). The "key polluter": Shell, responsible for over 75%, or at least 675 oil spills over the course of three years (Frynas, 1999:165). The figures presented by Shell representatives prove more conservative, claiming that the Company was accountable for 190 spills in The Niger Delta each year from 1989 to 1995, losing, on average, 319,200 U.S. gallons of oil per year (Rowell et al., 2005:23). Irrespective of specific numbers, however, it has been documented that since 1970, there has not been one year in which Shell was not guilty of oil spillage within host communities throughout the Delta region (Omoweh, 2005:147).

As van Dessel maintains, oil spills throughout The Niger Delta are an undisputed fact, though their causes are often highly contested, as oil corporations frequently claim such to be the result of sabotage, while environmentalists and members of affected communities offer accusations of defective equipment (1995:18). After surveying the land and interviewing stakeholders residing in Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers States—those which have historically been the most afflicted by the spilling of the oil over which Shell assumes sole governance—Omoweh identifies ten possible causes, including "blowouts," which occur when crude oil is discharged uncontrollably from an oil well due to the failure of pressure control systems, "equipment failure, human error, engineering error, natural causes, sabotage, third party, and unknown" (2005:146). Of these potential sources, however, equipment failure is designated as the basis for 80% of Shell spillage cases reported from 1976 to 1980 (Omoweh, 2005:167).

This designation is substantiated by the widespread assertions that identify "the bulk of Shell's production facilities" as "deficient, inadequate, and flawed" (Okonta & Douglas,

2003:72). Garnering particular attention are the "rusty, obsolete, and poorly maintained" pipelines, which remain above-ground and, thus, are more vulnerable to burst (Frynas, 1999:166). According to Moffat and Lindén, countless pipelines and multifarious apparatuses and mechanisms necessary for oil production have not been replaced or, in some areas, even sufficiently preserved since they were first installed by Shell in the 1960s (1995:532). "The result has been an increase in the rate and volume of oil spills as Shell accelerates production activities, subjecting old and weary pipelines to pressure they are no longer able to handle. They crack and buckle, spewing oil into the surroundings" (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:66). J.P. van Dessel, former head of environmental studies for Shell operations in Nigeria, testified: "Wherever I went, I could see . . . that Shell's machinery and equipment were not working cleanly. They didn't satisfy their own standards, and they didn't satisfy international standards. Every Shell terrain I saw was polluted, every terminal I saw was contaminated" (van Dessel, 1995:5). Disgusted by Shell officials' "indifference" to this "ecological nightmare," van Dessel resigned in December 1994, two years after he took up his post (Okonta & Douglas, 1993:67).

Partially causing, and undeniably compounding, both the damaged nature and malfunction of pipes as well as the effects of subsequent oil spills, is the fact that such a large portion of these pipes are not buried below ground-level so as to remain somewhat protected, but rather, lie over and throughout the landscape, exposing networks to agents such as animals and weather, which may elicit the premature corrosion of such equipment. Omoweh asserts:

> Until an oil pipe bursts, Shell does not deem it necessary to carry out cathodic maintenance; most of the pipes are even laid bare on the ground, lying across the compounds of the inhabitants of the area, and over land that was once used for agricultural purposes, rendering it economically useless. Since the right-of-way granted by the state to Shell shields the company from any form of compensation and harassment, its (Shell) various oil and gas pipelines criss-cross the entire length and breadth of the region (1995:133).

This depiction captures the negligence permeating the corporate atmosphere which dictates the practices employed by Shell throughout the oil-bearing regions of The Niger Delta. Such "cynical indifference" has fostered the adoption of processes that are, and have, in fact, proven, conducive to the spillage of oil. In response to the widespread criticism that such faulty, uncovered, and, hence, bursting pipe networks have triggered, Shell executives have assured onlookers of the Company's commitment to "replace flow lines in swampy areas every ten to fifteen years" (Onkonta & Douglas, 1993:72). However, in 1994, the Environmental Resources Management, an environmental consultancy firm, was commissioned to examine the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Shell had conducted with respect to The Niger Delta (Onkonta & Douglas, 2003:65). The written report later presented by the firm states that while representatives of the Company emphasize the need for publicized endeavors as a "major mitigative measure," there is no "clear indication that an effective contingency plan, customized to account for specific local environmental sensitivities, in fact exists," adding that "there is little evidence that SPDC has been involved in the EIA process, that they acknowledge the potential impacts of their pipeline operations, and that they have taken ownership of the mitigation measures necessary to minimize potential impacts" (Cited in Okonta & Douglas, 2003:65).

Despite what appears to be a lack of genuine motivation for improvement, Shell executives continue to recount the efforts they have drafted in seeking less injurious methods of oil production. In its 2004 Annual Report, for example, the Company relates the focus that has been directed toward implementing "a long-term maintenance system for managing the integrity of SPDC's 3000 km of pipelines" ("People and the Environment," 2004:12). The document introduces the Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS), which emphasizes the importance of regularly monitoring pipelines and effectively completing in a timely manner any requisite

maintenance actions ("People and the Environment," 2004:12-3). The report also mandates that the condition of pipelines will determine the frequency of maintenance actions, as opposed to the Company's conventional system of preset intervals ("People and the Environment," 2004:12). Yet, although this newly integrated system involves the execution of "a suite of activities required . . . to deliver optimum life cycle performance," Shell, ironically, addresses a plan to expand its network to some "5,000 km of flowlines in the next two to three years," though never makes mention of what is perhaps the most crucial, not to mention sustainable, condition upon which "optimum" functionality is contingent: the submerging and, thus, concealing of pipelines underground ("People and the Environment," 2004:13).

Since 1976, oil spills directly produced by broken or bursting pipes have remained an annual occurrence for Shell, with approximately 8,000 barrels of oil lost to the environment in each episode (Omoweh, 1995:133). A pipe burst in the community of Ovwodokpokpo released an estimated 10,000 barrels in 1993, while just one year later, 12,000 barrels were free to percolate throughout the homes, farmlands, fisheries, and markets of Otu-Jeremi (Omoweh, 1995:133-4). Likewise, of the 600 cases of spillage recorded by Shell within the region of Isokoland between 1980 and 1993, 95% were identified as having been caused by ruptured flowlines, which ultimately emanated approximately 15 million barrels oil and prompted those of Uzere to address the ministerial committee commissioned to the area, attesting: ". . . most rivers in the communities have been confirmed to contain mercury and lead—two dangerous chemicals blacklisted worldwide as causes of human disorder and anaemia" (Cited in Omoweh, 2005:134).

Still, Shell downplays the depth and ubiquity of the pollution and its ancillary effects on the environment as such is engendered by the oil spills which occur so frequently throughout The Niger Delta (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:77). To displace culpability and, therefore, evade the duty

of sponsoring and carrying out measures requisite to abate the adverse consequences of spills, Shell habitually points to sabotage as the root of pipe bursts and subsequent leaks (Frynas, 1999:169). According Okonta and Douglas, the Company claimed that 60% of all spilled oil was directly caused by sabotage in 1992 (2003:78). Although admitting three years later that 75% "of spills in its operations in the Niger Delta was a result of old and corroded pipes," Shell representatives continued to insist that 69% of the spills taking place in Ogoniland between 1985 and 1993 were the result of deliberate sabotage enacted by members of the Ogoni community (Omoweh, 2005:147). Although this practice does, indeed, occur—as Omoweh suggests that Shell has lost a conservatively estimated average of 2.5 million barrels of crude oil each year since 1975 due to sabotage—many scholars and environmentalists speculate that the Corporation sharply overestimates the role such plays in the aggregate undesired release of oil (2005:146).

Nonetheless, this propensity continues, as Shell reported a total of 236 oil spill incidents in 2004, "comprising 157 sabotage and 79 controllable incidents," and added that "only three per cent of the volume of oil spilled in 2004 resulted from controllable incidents. The remaining 97 per cent was caused by wilful damage to facilities (sabotage)" ("People and the Environment," 2004:16). Although executives consistently acknowledge the Company's oftentimes inadequate or even nonexistent response to such spills, they point to "the denial of access to spill sites by some communities" as restricting their "ability to respond and clean up spills in good time" ("People and the Environment," 2004:16). Others, however, point to Shell's negligence, which many attribute to the Corporation's absent sense of accountability to, or partnership with, those residing within the communities of The Niger Delta that are so irreversibly harmed by the oil spills in particular, and the array of methods and practices employed throughout the extraction process, in general. Omoweh comments upon the attitude of insignificance and apathy

demonstrated by Shell, stating that "after any spillage, no attempts are made to clean up the oil mess" (1995:134). Okonta and Douglas reiterate the ostensible inconsequence of the environmental impacts derived from the Company's extraction and production practices, and the inaction stemming from such indifference, asserting: "As of this writing, pipes continue to burst, ruining lives, fishing creeks, and farmlands in the Niger Delta" (2003:72).

Many whom have witnessed the aftermath of ruptured pipelines, including oil-laden swamps and ponds, devastated farmlands, and the like, believe that "because it has the most debilitating effect, oil spillage appears to conclude the process of annihilation of the environment and economy of the host oil communities in The Niger Delta" (2005:144-6). The reality of the situation, however, is that there is no foreseeable conclusion to the "process of annihilation." In fact, "if anything, the pace of environmental pollution has accelerated, and will only continue to do so, as Shell intensifies its oil production and exploration activities in the area," elevating its production target from 800,000 to one million barrels of oil a day (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:64).

It would seem relatively apparent from this fact that the very root from which this environmental degradation has been cultivated and its growth exponentially expanded, is development. The ecological deterioration becoming increasingly manifested throughout The Niger Delta is not symptomatic of development that is sustainable, nor that which ensures the security of the human beings dwelling there, however. Rather, the development that is so fervently sought throughout this region has been conceived and approached in a manner that positions its attainment as inconsistent to, and in opposition with, the kind of development that may be preserved in order to guarantee lives marked by equality, justice, access to opportunity, the full recognition of individual autonomy and expression of agency, and, therefore, the personal conviction of one's dignity. The conception of development that has effectively elicited

invasive and far-reaching environmental destruction throughout the Delta and, thus, ironically precipitated the *underdevelopment* of local inhabitants, is one that has been constructed and imposed by the executives of Shell alone. The referent of development for this multibillion-dollar, multinational oil Corporation is not, however, humanity or the quality of human life, nor is it oil, the very commodity upon which such depends for its existence as a business. Rather, the subject around which Shell's notion of development revolves, is favorable economic returns or profit. Thus, to be successfully developing is, for this Company, to be maximizing revenue.

The end objective, then, is the accumulation of ever-increasing yields, and while such is situated and perceived as the very aim of development, the means undertaken by Shell to arrive at such are unrestricted. This system of prioritization, then, functions to allegedly justify, and even condone, the exploitation of environmental resources and geographical settings, as such are recognized not as affording the means to the ultimate end that *ought* to be human survival and prosperity, but instead, as the means to the distorted end that is fabricated and understood as cost-effectiveness and, in turn, the expansion of profit margins.

The perpetuation of the highly deleterious practices incorporated and performed by Shell throughout the exploration and extraction of oil would not be possible, however, if the object or purpose of development as regarded by the Government of Nigeria did not also deviate from the welfare of human beings. Through the denial of secure, legal property rights or any sense of entitlement to, or ownership of, citizen's ancestral lands, the state is itself manipulating and, in so doing, devaluing or debasing the significance of the environment with which The Niger Delta is endowed, as well as the inimitable and invaluable resources, traditions, livelihoods, cultures, and overall identity such contextualizes and imparts its inhabitants. The soil upon which Nigeria has been established is, or should be, a national resource and, thus, available and accessible to all

in order to be utilized in a manner that fulfills the needs of all constituents of the population. Yet by seizing exclusive possession of the land enveloped within the country's borders so as to essentially bestow its ownership upon Shell, therefore accommodating its burgeoning deprivation, those elected to lead the peoples of Nigeria have, in fact, illustrated a disregard for the genuine interest and investment in the development and enhancement of human lives.

Thus, individuals have been so far removed as the referent of development as it has been so eagerly pursued by both the Nigerian Government and Shell, that the Delta region is no longer perceived as a home in which families and communities establish a society and a culture through the relationship residents forge with the environment by which they are surrounded; instead, The Niger Delta has been conceptually and, in turn, physically reduced to a minefield from which vast quantities of wealth will be accrued and by which the corporate and governmentally instated developmental end will be achieved. Because this form of development, which is predicated upon the attainment of the greatest possible sum of economic returns, relies upon the discovery, extraction, production, and transport of oil, such is the agent toward which focus and concern is oriented. Thus, although this commodity is also merely the *means* to the ultimate end (profit) and not the end in itself, oil is deemed by the state and Shell alike the more expedient vehicle by which to arrive at maximal wealth and is, consequently, the subject of attention.

It is as a result of this mentality— entirely preoccupied with the realm of economics— that "The net effect of Shell's environment-destroying operations in the Niger Delta is an ecosystem so mangled, raped, and denuded that the area has been labeled the most endangered delta in the world" (Idoniboye-Obu, :16). It is also this mentality, and the oil extraction practices such endorses, which undermines the extreme need for, and significance of, sustainable development—and hence problematizing its pursuit and realization. This developmental

paradigm emphasizes the exercising of forethought and consideration, so as to conduct life and consumption in a manner that will ensure the preservation of the resources necessary to sustain future generations. The extraction practices implemented in the processes of oil production emit debris, chemicals, metals, and pollutants hazardous to all life into the very atmosphere, water, and land, from which life grows and upon which it depends.

Although, as the literature conveys, the objective of sustainable development is sought through polices that are either economically, environmentally, or socially driven, those wielding the authority and possessing the resources necessary to pursue this endeavor—primarily Nigerian heads of state—have not communicated or conveyed *any* intent to sponsor sustainable development initiatives through either the Nigerian economy or the environment, nor through society (Omoedene, 2011:132). Instead, the state under which those of The Niger Delta are governed continues to exploit these points of entry to the monetary advantage of a select few.

Yet the unsustainable practices of both Shell and the Government of Nigeria as regards the oil-bearing communities of the Delta constitute a microcosm reflective of the internationally recognized and employed tactics which are also highly untenable and severely injurious to those lacking sufficient political and economic resources. In his 1986 work, "Towards a New Economics: On the Theory and Practice of Self-Reliance," Galtung speaks of a worldwide "division of labour," with "the centre applying refined factors for the refined production of refined products and the periphery applying crude factors for the crude production of crude products, exchanging these with each other" (99). In a global system structured in this way, he notes:

> . . . the centre treats the periphery as an external sector of its own economy: as a place to fetch or use nature and dump pollutants; as a place to use cheap labour and dump excess labour from back home (a major function of colonialism); as a place to export excess, tied capital for specific investment purposes and from which to import profits, in a broad sense, as untied capital; as a place to carry out research projects that could not be done at home, while at the same time

important researchers trained at the expense of the periphery country; and as a place to administer, but not be administered by, issuing SOPs (standard operating procedures) from the centre (Galtung, 1986:99-100).

While we may ascribe Shell as well as the Nigerian State to the position or identity of the "centre," enacting widespread harm upon those cast outside the delineated borders of importance or consequence—those being the inhabitants of the Delta region, whom constitute the periphery—we may also conceive of the larger international systems that are at play to further facilitate the comprehensive underdevelopment of this region.

In 2002, at the Millennium Summit, the Millennium Development Goals were officially established—with a target date of 2015—in order to address "extreme poverty in its many dimensions-income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion-while promoting gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability. They are also basic human rights-the rights of each person on the planet to health, education, shelter, and security" (UN, 2000). Among the eight goals encompassed, as it is listed above, is to "ensure environmental sustainability" (UN, 2000). The inclusion of this concern within an agenda seeking global development is identified by the United Nations as "an explicit recognition by world leaders that environment is a crucial element of development. It is a recognition of the fact that without environmental sustainability there will be no long-lasting development" (2000).

Organized under this overarching goal are three "targets," including: "(1) Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources; (2) Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water; (3) Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020" (UN, 2000). Juxtaposing these aims and the ideal outcomes which they have been drafted and implemented to elicit, with the environmental realities occurring throughout The Niger Delta—in which these targets are in dire need of being met—may cause

one to wonder why international intervention within this "ecological wasteland" has remained utterly nonexistent (Omoedene, 2011:123).

Although Nigeria has not established environmental regulations in order to determine various emission limits and ensure an adequate standard for air, soil, and water quality, international bodies have been founded upon the implementation and recognition of these very provisions. The work pursued by UNEP, for example, encompasses, the assessment of global, regional, and national environmental conditions and trends, the development of national and international environmental instruments, and the "strengthening of institutions for the wise management of the environment" (UNEP, 2005). Yet UNEP has done little to intercede or provide any form of counsel or reprieve in The Niger Delta—a location in urgent need of relief from the comprehensive destruction that has engendered the utter demise of entire habitats and life forms.

As a transnational corporation headquartered in The Netherlands, with its registered office in London, the Royal Dutch Shell Company caters to developed nations of the western world. Such countries, then, have much to gain from inexpensively produced oil, such as that exported by internationally based subsidiaries such as SPDC. In the same vein, the citizens of these post-industrialized states are also faced with the inimical implications of oil that has been explored, extracted, and transported to destinations throughout the world in an environmentally sustainable manner. Perhaps this consideration—once again on premised upon entirely economic grounds—serves as the rationale underlying the indolence of west countries, which allegedly champion ecological conservation, instating within their own borders stringently enforced regulations monitoring corporate practices to ensure a safe, fertile, and pleasant environment in which their citizens may live and prosper, while concurrently discounting the degradation

occurring within nations geographically far and economically inconsequential to their own

interests.

To successfully acquire and maintain an environment in which sustainable development

thrives, according to Nieto, requires that "communities be self-sufficient, that people's control

over their own lives be increased, and that the social and cultural identity and decision-making

capacities of communities be maintained and strengthened" (1997:45). Living in a world entirely

devoid of this approach to development, the local peoples of The Niger Delta are repressed by

their government, the Shell Company, and the larger global context so as to remain bereft of the

opportunity to exercise personal autonomy and political freedoms, and to realize their individual

agency, thus, constraining these people in an unrelenting state of insecurity.

Impact of Oil Extraction Practices of Shell on Human Security

> The community has been devastated, as the oil has poisoned their water supply and fishing ponds, and is steadily killing the raffia palms that are the community's economic mainstay. Lacking any other alternative, the people of the village have been forced to drink polluted water for over one year, and the community leaders told us that many people had become ill in recent months and that some had died. The sight that greeted us when we finally arrived . . . was horrendous. A thick brownish film of crude oil stained the entire area, collecting in clumps along the shoreline and covering the surface of the still water. The humid air was thick with oil fumes (Fleshman, 2002:157).

The account presented above, which strives to capture the daily reality endured by those

residing within oil-bearing regions, therefore, conveys the many dimensions upon which human

security as it exists throughout the Delta is undermined and—through the perpetuation of the

current conditions elicited by Shell's extraction practices—ultimately made unattainable.

The most transparent factor articulated within the above quote, and that addressed at

length throughout the previous section operates in several ways to compromise the complete

enjoyment of human security. Among the elements consistently regarded as compulsory to

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ensure a life exhibiting overall human security, personal health constitutes one of the most directly influenced and immediately endangered by the manifestations of the environmental deterioration that is so wide-ranging throughout this region. As alluded to above, the practices exercised by Shell in the process of oil extraction generate the creation, emission, and unsound disposal of chemicals and toxins that have been found hazardous to healthy human development and functionality.

The extensive networks of lakes, ponds, and tributaries which permeate this vast floodplain—serving as the sole source of water utilized within surrounding communities—have become a dumping ground, operating as an ecological reservoir presently made to collect and retain the run-off sludge produced by drilling. The waste manufactured as a by-product of this practice, however, is charged with highly toxic chemical ingredients. According to Utvik, "the chemical composition of this discharge involves dispersed oil; dissolved hydrocarbons, including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene; organic acids; phenols; and various metals, such as barium, iron, chromium, mercury, and arsenic," creating mixtures were are very likely to be radioactive (1999:2595).

These are the contents present within the entirety of water systems located within the oil-producing region of The Niger Delta, as there are no channels left unaffected. Afforded no alternative, therefore, the residents of those communities established within oil-bearing areas continue to collect this highly contaminated water for domestic purposes such as cleaning, cooking, bathing, and even drinking (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:95). Exposure to, and, indeed, ingestion of, such metals, toxins, and chemical pollutants are now understood to cause severe bodily harm, including endocrine disruptions, and serious impairments with respect to both the nervous and immune systems (Carpenter et al., 2002:26).

The air quality demonstrated throughout The Niger Delta fares no better, however, as the atmosphere is inundated each day with hydrocarbons emitted from oil wells and flare stacks (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:595). According to research reports published by both chemists and those within the medical field, it is widely recognized within the discourse of corporate social responsibility that the emissions which are being absorbed into the surrounding environment are laden within materials that are attributable to a discernible decline in the health of those exposed to such through inhalation (Mehlman, 1992:239). Among the risks associated with, and derivative of, this contact, are adverse pulmonary reactions, including asthma, hypersensitivity pneumonitis, and interstitial pulmonary fibrosis, as well as various forms of cancer, as many of the noxious ingredients emanated from oil-producing equipment and machinery are carcinogenic (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003:595).

Although medical journals attest to the strong causation of such health insecurities by the emanation of such pollutants, the literature detailing the specific symptoms and concerns of those residing within oil-bearing areas of the Delta are virtually nonexistent. The records and testimonies which have, in fact, been documented throughout the region, such as those reported throughout Omoweh's field work in the region, however, indicate widespread bronchial complications which have led to severe respiratory problems not unlike those proven to be triggered and exacerbated by a chemically contaminated atmosphere (Omoweh, 1995:128). In addition to these manifestations of contracted illness, Omoweh also recounts cases of chronic headaches, dizziness, neurological underdevelopment among infants and children, physical abnormalities or malformations, and dermatologic conditions such as "keratotic facial and neck lesions, neoplastic change from exposure to oil and sunlight, and acquired perforating disease and calcinosis of the hands and fingers," infirmities procured by exposure to a chemical referred

to as pipe lax, which is released into the atmosphere, and surrounding land and water ecosystems by way of Shell's drilling operations (1995:128).

The conditions and diseases functioning to undermine the security of health as it is demonstrated among the Delta's inhabitants are directly correlated to, and occurring in conjunction with, the deterioration of water and air purity suggestive of the region's environmental insecurity. The degree to which health is threatened, however, is further advanced by the environmentally degrading practices employed by Shell responsible for effectively depleting surrounding vegetation, upon which communities members rely for the supply of medicinal plants and herbs (Omoweh, 1995:130). According to Omoweh, the region's forests "serve as the natural pharmaceutical gardens from which the native medical doctors collect most of their herbs," which are used to treat ailments such as "cough, sores, hypertension, camps, rheumatism, and headache," while also providing stimulants warranting proper blood flow and the functionality of the adrenal gland, necessary for kidney health (Omoweh, 1995:130). Although such vegetation is heavily depended upon to ensure the health and physical wellbeing of those occupying local communities, the same is being systematically annihilated with the forests in which it is found, conducted either through cutting and clearing—done to enable the exploration and transport of oil—or through scorching to the point of futility—done as a result of gas flaring, an integral phase within Shell's process of oil production.

Yet these direct effects are not the only means by which the health security of those residing within communities throughout The Niger Delta are jeopardized, as the depreciation in overall physical welfare is also indirectly affected and compounded by the mounting food insecurity, also derivative of the environmental degradation being introduced and accelerated as a result of the oil extraction practices being employed. As discussed previously, the dietary

intake of local residents consists almost entirely of the yields harvested from surrounding fisheries and farmlands. However, according to UNEP, dams located along the Niger River throughout the Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers States have experienced a sharp reduction in the stock of fish and shellfish since 1956, the year in which Shell began drilling operations in the Delta (Cited in Moffat and Lindén, 1995:530). Yet this decline has persisted, as records suggest that "catch per fisherman" in both Delta and Rivers States, "fell annually from a high of 1.88 tons in 1983 for both . . . to 1.26 tons and 0.7 tons in 1989" for Delta and Rivers States, respectively (Moffat and Lindén, 1995:529).

The lakes of Isokoland, located in Delta State, have, for decades, served as the most substantial food source for the neighboring communities. Reliance upon these freshwater ecosystems is no longer viable, however, as aquatic life has been comprehensively decimated and productivity, therefore, diminished (Jike, 2004:691). Omoweh conveys the extent of such losses, noting, ". . . mud fish and cat fish, two of the most common fishes caught in the area, have become extinct. The crustaceans have also been significantly decimated and, so too, has the population of crayfish/lobsters plummeted" (2005:147). Studies and samples taken of the marine life that does, in fact, remain within these aquatic habitats illustrate levels of toxicity that render them entirely unfit for human consumption, containing lead and mercury in quantities that, if ingested, are fatal (Odoemene, 2011:125).

The noxious waste permeating these invaluable bodies of water are most immediately occasioned by the negligent disposal of drilling sludge, as well as oil spills triggered by blowouts or bursting pipelines (Frynas, 1999:164). The grave repercussions these contaminants engender are not confined to immediately adjacent communities, however. "Because most of the chemicals used by Shell in its various processes are water-based, the depth and speed of pollution are so

high and fast, especially in the swampy areas of coastal regions, that within an average of twenty-four hours, over five communities are polluted" (Omoweh, 2005:128). The discharge of industrial effluents and the spillage of oil arising from Shell's cost-effective, though remiss, extraction practices have, thus, contaminated and distorted the aquatic balance of fisheries located within areas both near and distant to the extraction sites in which such processes are taking place. By extension, such methods also effectually precipitate the toxicity and devastation of that upon which the local populace rely as a significant source of protein, and, in turn, give rise to a state of food insecurity throughout whole communities across The Niger Delta.

Supplementing the sustenance found within lakes and streams of the region, and, therefore, expanding residents' nutritional base, is the produce harvested from agricultural pursuits. The originally lush and highly fertile environment of the Delta proved conducive to the cultivation of cassava, yam, and rice for small-scale subsistence and, consequently, vast stretches of farmland occupy local communities (Moffat and Lindén, 1995:530-1). The harvests of such foodstuffs, however, have experienced a drastic decline owing to the rise in soil toxicity and, in turn, the reduction of soil nutrients elicited by the tactics exercised throughout the phases of Shell oil production (Onkonta & Douglas, 2003:80). According to Jike, there is "a general concern among environmentalists that the quality of crops in the Niger Delta is rapidly deteriorating," arguing that the "quality, size, and shape of traditional staples such as cassava, yam, plantain, and so on are adversely affected by the continuing forage for oil without the requisite Environmental Impact Assessment" (2004:690).

Onkonta and Douglas echo these concerns, observing that "some of the palm trees throughout local communes no longer bear fruit as a result of oil-polluted soils. . . The people of Nembe lament that certain staples no longer thrive on Nembe soil. The red and white varieties of

cocoyam and the mammy yam known among the locals as 'Mercy' have become extinct. Local

varieties of rice have also been recording declining yields" (2003:80). Though the population of

The Niger Delta remains unabated, and, in fact, is considered to be increasing, the supply of safe,

uncontaminated agricultural produce is steadily waning, inducing insufficient crop reserves.

"Whole families, numbering about six thousand people in all, lost their food and cash crops after

Shell's dredgers passed" through the community of Okoroba, engendering severe food insecurity

which, throughout various periods, has bordered upon famine, provoking high rates of

malnutrition and related diseases (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:82). Such is the state in which

inhabitants of countless regions throughout the Delta found themselves, as Omoweh accounts the

"considerable hectares of farmland" lost to oil spillage throughout the Isoko area:

> As a minefield, Shell has never cleansed spilled crude oil, nor did it carry out post-spillage study to determine the extent of damage with the hope of restoring normalcy to . . . the people. A family of six squatted on 100 x 50 meters of marginal farmland as opposed to 500 x 200 meters of farmland before Shell began operation there. Not only that yield from such marginal land was estimated at about 300 tubers of cassava, which if processed into garri, could only sustain a family of six for ten days. Yellow yam, a specie of yam generally grown in the area, could no longer be planted as a result of soil pollution the same is true for cocoyam, and water yam, all of which are staple food of the people (2005:148-9).

The ever-shrinking quantity of arable land, as well as viable fisheries, evoked by the

depreciating health and abundance of the surrounding environment—a condition of insecurity to

which oil extraction practices are principally accountable—not only act to destabilize the

provision of dietary sustenance, but also to remove and deny the opportunity to secure

employment and economic security, as the residents of The Niger Delta are predominantly

fishermen and farmers (Omoweh, 2005:149). Odoemene observes:

> The people of the Niger Delta region are highly dependent on their environment (land, water and forest) for sustenance. They were attached to their environment and made their living from the use of its resources as farmers, fishermen, hunters and forest product gatherers. As a result of the environmental degradation and petrobusiness activities of Shell, the economic activities of the people were soon dislocated as the effects on farmlands, economic crops, creeks, lakes and rivers became so severe and devastating. Hence, the people could not engage in meaningful productive activities as they used to do. Due to this development, the dominant economic activity of the

people has become traditional agrarian trading, while very few are employed in the industries and/or in the civil service. This impaired capacity of the people due to a degraded and devastated environment is a major cause of poverty in the region (2011:128).

With the far-reaching expansion of environmental degradation and, in turn, the acute contraction of capital upon which local occupants have created and sustained a livelihood, arose the disruption and destabilization of the rural labor market, as "the majority of residents have been utterly displaced" (Omoweh, 2005:149). No longer capable of earning an adequate income as a result of the meager yields generated by the region's depleted environment, individuals flock to nearby cities such a Port Harcourt, fostering a precipitous rate of urbanization (Nnadozie, 1995:79).

Although migrating with the hope of attaining greater economic opportunity, the situation in which these individuals find themselves is equally as untenable as that existing throughout the Delta, as Jike notes them among the constituents of the urban slums (2004:693). These overcrowded living conditions, lacking proper sanitation and waste management, prove conducive to the transmission of infectious diseases as well as violence and crime, while providing few prospects for safe employment and adequate wages, perpetuating an existence of insecurity even beyond The Niger Delta (Jike, 2004:694).

The precarious economic situation currently impoverishing the area's inhabitants are not caused solely by the environmentally deleterious methods of extraction employed by Shell, but, to a lesser degree, by the mere presence of the Company. The arrival of this multinational corporation prompted the construction of road systems and various other infrastructure necessary to facilitate oil production, thereby "enhancing the movement of people and goods" (Nnadozie, 1995:77). The economic growth stimulated by oil revenue, as well as the ascending internal and external economic activities transpiring throughout the region, have increased the cost of living to the detriment of the local peoples (Odoemene, 2011:128). Despite the immense profit reaped

by both Shell and the Nigerian Government on account of the region's oil resources, "the

members of local communities remain in abject poverty, deprived of the basic needs of life"

Odoemene, 2011:128).

While transportation systems and communication technologies were developed

throughout the local communities, their purpose was not to serve as amenities by which to

initiate socio-economic development in the interest of the populace; rather the sole motivation

for this construction lay in enabling the most expedient and efficient production of oil (Okonta &

Douglas, 2003:111). According to Omoweh, "the infrastructure ostensibly integrated as social

amenities aimed at developing the area actually facilitated its exploitation" (1995:142). Shell

representatives claim to have expanded their "use of local contractors," thus, "creating jobs and

providing revenue for the local economy," asserting the Company's commitment to their

"contribution to the sustainable development of the Niger Delta region in particular and the

country in general," by vowing to "utilize Nigerian human and material resources and services . .

without compromising quality, health, safety and environmental standards" ("People and the

Environment," 2004:9).

In spite of the above statement, however, those foregoing urban migration to remain in

the Delta "have not been employed by Shell or its OSCs" (Omoweh, 2005:149). If "indigenes

are," however, granted a job under the Company's oil operations, "they are menial, low cadre

positions that often entail great danger and risk" (Odoemene, 2011:128). It is also appropriate to

note that few policies or programs have been implemented, or even drafted, by the state to

diversify and expand the economy, absorb the jobless, and, therefore, lower the rate of

unemployment and chronic destitution currently characteristic of this region. Indeed,

development reports indicate that 36.4% of those occupying The Niger Delta live below the

poverty line, while 70.2% of these individuals live on less than $1USD a day, leaving in the

absence of basic social amenities, and impinging upon the attainment of human security

(Balouga, 2009:10). The associative effects Shell oil production imposes to elicit economic

insecurity among local inhabitants is noted by Aaron:

> Oil has meant for the indigenes of the Niger Delta, wrenching poverty . . . State laws and policies as they relate to petroleum resources, expropriate the indigenous peoples of the Niger Delta of their 'right' to their natural resources . . . [T]he local economies of the Oil Producing Communities have collapsed. And they are not integrated into the oil economy of Nigeria . . . [T]he success of the oil economy has not promised their own capacities. It has not promoted their own self-reliance. It has not promoted the social engine of the society . . . the pace of development has left them (2006:194).

The socio-economic depravity engulfing the communities throughout this oil-bearing

expanse of Nigeria has created an unsustainable condition in which many individuals are

competing for incredibly scare resources, breeding ever-intensifying tensions, hostility, and

violent conflict, further denying the possibility of human security. According to Jike, "the

objective condition of social deprivation" so embedded throughout The Niger Delta "provides a

ready milieu for violence, activism, and rebelliousness" (2004:694). Bands have been formulated

under the aegis of recognized traditional organizations such as the Egbesu, Membutus, Ijaws,

Itsekiris, and Urhobo fronts which "pursue aims that run counter to the objectives of legal-

rational state structures" (Jike, 2004:694).

Among such groups is a growing influx of youth. Feeling disheartened and dejected by

the adversities by which they and their families are incessantly confronted, the youth comprising

these organizations have an ardent yearning to foster and promote ethnic nationalism so as to

effectively compete with, and defeat those among other ethnic groups vying for a share of the

"national cake" (Jike, 2004:694). To cultivate this authority and, in turn, assert control over

limited resources, some youth outfits have formed armed militia which extort money and amass

"suspicious revenue" from local residents (Jike, 2004:694). Accounting for such unlawful acts,

however, is a sense of the need to enact self-sufficiency "because the larger polity cannot place them in gainful employment. This is the collective sense of alienation that propels them to cut institutional corners to get even with the larger polity," irrespective of whether that also denotes injuring fellow citizens (Jike, 2004:694).

The perpetual disadvantage in which local communities are detained, therefore, has proven a springboard for the burgeoning of ethnic militia systems, contributing to the social disequilibrium that has gradually become ingrained throughout The Niger Delta (Watts, 2008:59). Though the populace of this region is marginalized and excluded from the benefits of oil, it is, however, projected to the confluence of several volatile flashpoints, at the heart of which lies oil (Watts, 200:57). Aside from militant youth movements, such crises is that of rule, as local governments have been entirely discounted and illegitimated intra-community, inter-ethnic and state violence culminating over the receipt and allocation of oil wealth.

Yet a prominent question surfacing frequently throughout the literature and international dialogue is that of the role played within such hostility by Shell and Nigerian authorities. Omotola presents the context informing this inquiry, arguing, "Basically, there are three contending stakeholders in the Nigerian oil sector. These are the oil-bearing communities, the oil companies and the Nigerian state. However, there is a sense in which these stakeholders can be reduced to two," as there has been a "collusion of two players—oil companies and the Nigerian state—against the oil-bearing communities" (2006:11). Because they are united by a common purpose, that being "capitalist expansionism and the appropriation of surplus value," the "line of demarcation between the oil trans-nationals and the Nigerian state has become increasingly blurred" (Omotola, 2006:11-8). Professor Okechukwu Ibeanu agrees, asserting that "there is little difference between Shell and the Nigerian state" (Cited in Omoweh, 2005:168).

As previously mentioned, Shell executives have, with respect to residents of oil-producing regions of the Delta, "acted violently with the active connivance of the Nigerian state" (Omotola, 2006:16). When community leaders of the Ogoni people failed to "persuade" the majority of MOSOP activists to "see reason" with Shell, a plan was devised involving security operatives stationed in Rivers State—and sanctioned by federal officials in Abuja—in order to "cause mayhem under the guise of communal clashes" (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:123). The plan was enacted and in July, 1993, Ogoni men, women, and children were "massacred" on the Andoni River by "uniformed men wielding automatic weapons" (Okonta & Douglas, 2003:123-4). A month later, another act of violence was committed against the Ogoni people, as Okonta and Douglas recount:

> The Ogoni market village of Kaa on the Andoni border was attacked by a troop of men using grenades, mortar shells, and automatic weapons. Two hundred and forty-seven people were slaughtered, and the community primary and secondary school buildings were set upon and destroyed. Even as this grisly carnage was going on, the Ogoni villages of Tenama and Tera'ue, again on the Andoni border, were ransacked and several people killed (2003:124).

The wealth accrued through oil production—irrespective of the adverse implications and insecurities they incite among local occupants—has become "a perfect conduit for corrupt government officials of successive administrations and petrobusiness executives to enrich themselves," doing so, however, through the violent repression of community members expressing resistance or contestation (Odoemene, 2011:126).

The state-sanctioned deployment of military troops, police units, and armaments have, therefore, become a regular element of the correspondence maintained between Nigerian leaders and Shell executives. On May 12, 1994, after the multiple attacks waged against residents of Ogoniland, a letter was delivered to the military administrator, Lieutenant Colonel Dauda Komo, on "the subject of law and order in Ogoni" and the continuity of Shell activities, which read, in part:

. . . division between the elitist Ogoni leadership exists . . . intra-communal/kingdom formulae alternative as discussed to apply; wasting operations during MOSOP and other gathers making constant military presence justifiable . . . deployment of 400 military personal . . . wasting operations coupled with psychological tactics of displacement/wasting as noted above . . . initial disbursement of 50 million naira [$500,000] a advanced allowances to officers and men for logistics to commence operations with immediate effect as agreed" (Cited in Okonta & Douglas, 2003:129).

The course of action assumed by the Government of Nigeria has not only permitted the causes of insecurity among its citizens to endure unabated for decades, but has participated in the facilitation of such origins and has, consequently, contributed to the "poverty, misery, and sorrow," afflicting the residents of The Niger Delta—in which 80% of the nation's wealth is produced—and impeding the possibility of human security (Odoemene, 2011:131). To allocate national resources and distribute the social amenities necessary to create an environment in which human security can, in fact, be attained, demonstrated, and enjoyed by all citizens equitably, would encroach upon, and diminish, the portion of this 80% which resides with the state. Thus, given their mutual aim of profit maximization, the Nigerian Government has opted to provide security for Shell employees and oil operations to the extreme detriment of the security exemplified by those in whose home the source of such profit exists.

Conclusion

The people of The Niger Delta have, for decades, remained fundamentally and comprehensively connected to the landscape in which they have established and developed their communities and ways of life, and from which they have acquired their economic, dietary, medicinal, and even religious and spiritual identity. Thus, the concept of environment encompasses the vast array of environmental resources upon which these inhabitants have drawn upon in order to sculpt the culture in which they raise each generation. The environment, including all elements ingrained within, and generated from, it are, as Omoweh explains,

"employed and managed to support the capacity of the people who live there, to reproduce themselves materially and spiritually" (2005:130).

This usage of land and environmental resources—as affording lives of sufficiency, comfort, and marked by a sense of accomplishment and individual agency—has been looked upon by the representatives of Shell and Nigerian administrators as profligate and uneconomical, and has, consequently, been entirely uprooted. The degradation of this environment, however, entails the inability of the resources it once abundantly afforded to experience natural renewal, which, in turn, incapacitates the peoples of The Niger Delta from regenerating, reviving, and sustaining themselves as well as the communities in which they live.

The inhabitants of The Niger Delta are not regarded as actors capable of contributing meaningfully to the nation's monetary expansion. This is evidenced by the fact that the very sources of economic subsistence prevalent throughout The Niger Delta—fisheries and farmland—are being depleted and utterly extinguished by an economic venture that is more profitable and worthy of investment.

The fate of the Gas Re-injection Act in 1979 clearly demonstrates the system of prioritization upheld by these incredibly influential actors. The ultimate end in which time, energy, policy, and resources are to be most heavily invested, and to which Shell executives and governmental officials are most committed within the context of The Niger Delta, is the maximization of revenue. To subject those inhabiting this region to a life marked by illness, food scarcity, and impoverishment, and to commit against them acts of unjustifiable violence is to deny any possibility for the emergence of an environment in which sustainable development and human security are respected and upheld and throughout which their existence is discernible.

Chapter 4

Summary, Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for Further Study

Summary

The purpose of the study was to examine the impact of oil extraction, by multinational corporations, on human security and sustainable development in the developing countries of Africa and elsewhere. Specifically, the study focused on the oil extraction policies of the Shell Petroleum Development Company, a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell Company, in The Niger Delta, of Nigeria.

The objective was to investigate, whether or not there exist any connection between the oil extraction policies of the Royal Dutch Shell and the current human security and sustainable development concerns prevailing in the region.

The study was carried out to fill the gap left by others regarding the implications that the environmental degradation stemming from oil extraction practices in the region have had in generating a severe decline in the standard of living for the inhabitants of The Niger Delta.

Data collection for the study employed library resources, including books, Internet sources, newspaper and journal articles, demographic surveys, statistical reports published by international organizations, and records and public statements released by Shell.

Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from the study are as follows:

1. It was discovered that there is no single universal definition for human security or sustainable development in the extant literature since each expert defines the term in his/her own way. This,

it was found, greatly affected the nature of policy formulation efforts and their implementation pertaining to the notions of human security and sustainable development across the globe.

2. The lack of a single universal definition of both human security and sustainable development also affected the achievement of the intended goals as proposed by the UN.

3. The findings of the study also confirmed the original hypothesis as stated in chapter 1, that there is a connection between the oil extraction practices of Shell and the current environmental, human security, and sustainable development concerns in The Niger Delta.

4. The ultimate goal of the Shell Oil Company is to maximize its profits, at the expense of human security and sustainable development in The Niger Delta region. This was evidenced in the way the Company extracts its oil from the region and its lack of concern regarding the many new diseases introduced into the region as a result of the chemicals used in the oil extraction strategies.

5. While there is a global push for sustainable development and human security, there appears to be an increase in corporate push for global consumption practices, which runs counter to the UN goals for the achievement of its Millennium development goals in the areas of sustainability and human security by 2015.

6. The root causes of the current situation in The Niger Delta include the desire for resource control, some degree of both state and individual autonomy, and more equitable economic development throughout Nigeria.

7. There is very little in print boldly discussing the realities prevailing in The Niger Delta as a result of Shell's oil extraction policies.

8. Shell's counter measures to fight those engaged in local rebellion against its destructive practices have divided the communities in the Delta region, resulting in conflicts and financial extortion by the youth.

9. The Nigerian Government is a direct accomplice to the destructive strategies and their effects on the Delta people, since the Government receives large amounts of monies from Shell.

Recommendations

Based on the research findings, it is suggested that:

1. The Nigerian Government needs to re-evaluate its relationship with Shell concerning oil extraction practices of the Shell Company and its effects on the inhabitants of The Niger Delta. The Government should remind itself of being in power to serve the needs and interest of its people – not the interests of Shell.

2. The social responsibilities of transnational companies should be clearly defined and enforced by an effective international body that includes Third World representatives.

3. The UN mandate regarding environmental preservation needs to be applied to transnational oil companies, such as Shell, that operate in Third World countries.

4. The Government of Nigeria should revise its policy of centralized land ownership. The ownership of property among the residents of The Niger Delta will not only provide a greater sense of security, but will also force the extraction practices of Shell to be relocated in areas more remote from human settlements and, thus, less likely to threaten the wellbeing of local residents than it's occurring at present.

5. The Government of Nigeria should also devise a policy framework to address the desires of the people of The Niger Delta. This requires fundamental constitutional amendments to concede a greater degree of autonomy to the states of the federation, particularly in terms of mining rights.

6. In order to eschew the violence and insecurity currently prevailing in The Niger Delta, a great deal of social mobilization is needed at all levels by the mass media and civil society to encourage more democratic means such as community consultation, discussion, and consensus building regarding the oil extraction policies and company and community rights in the region.

7. Youth empowerment programs are needed throughout The Niger Delta in order to prevent the rising numbers of youth militant groups. These agendas should provide youth forums and emphasize education, employment, and capacity building.

8. The prevalence of poverty has contributed to the present issue. There is a need to engage this through poverty eradication programs, while strengthening the involvement of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and granting the inhabitants of The Niger Delta greater political representation.

Implications for Further Study

1. The relationship between Shell and the Government of Nigeria, with reference to Shell's oil exploits in the country.

2. The measures taken by Shell to combat environmental disasters in The Niger Delta.

3. An examination of Shell's development projects for the communities of The Niger Delta since 1956.

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    drilling&_EXT_KNOVEL_DISPLAY_searchWithinBook=true&_EXT_KNOVEL_DIS

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