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EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 1945-1952

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. occupation of Japan has been celebrated as a success since its termination in 1952. The success is generally viewed as a direct result of efficient and effective U.S. occupational policies, allowing for a theoretical replication of the results. With recent rifts in international relations, and the current occupations of both Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers have frequently turned to the strategies used in Japan in an attempt to reproduce success. The purpose of this paper, however, is to investigate the uniqueness of the Japanese situation, ultimately concluding that replicating success through similar policies is impossible. While many U.S. policies undoubtedly contributed to the ultimate success of the Japanese occupation, there were a large number of already existing or uncontrollable factors that also had a large impact on the occupation's ability to succeed.

This paper consists of three primary sections. In the first section, Initial Conditions, I will analyze the various influential factors that existed prior to the occupation's initiation, focusing primarily on the level of destruction of Japanese infrastructure post WWII, the large U.S. commitment in terms of resources, the liberal nature of the Japanese populace, the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the effects of the Korean War (1950-1953). While the Korean War began after the Occupation, it still serves as an example of an influential factor that laid beyond the scope of U.S. control. In the second section, Early Stages, I will discuss the methods through which the U.S. laid the foundation for the occupation. This section includes investigations into how the U.S. defined the occupations' goals, established legitimacy within the region, and gained the support of the Japanese populace. The majority of factors discussed in this section were under the complete control of the U.S., and should therefore be the focus of any current day occupational policy makers. The third section, Reforms, investigates changes that were made in

terms of Japanese governmental and social policies. This section is broken down into U.S. initiated reforms and jointly initiated reforms, the latter of which is essential to understanding the importance of preexisting factors. Special attention is paid to reforms for which support already existed among the Japanese populace, and how this support allowed for the efficiency and ultimate success of many of the changes. After thorough investigation of the numerous contributing variables, I will conclude that preexisting factors which the U.S. had no control over were just as important if not more important than U.S. policies in terms of the occupation's ability to succeed. I will close by suggesting how to use these findings in current and future occupational situations. Because of the uniqueness of this case, simply mimicking policies used in Japan in current-day occupations is not enough to ensure future successes.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

While a number of factors which lead to the occupation's success were U.S. instituted policies, a majority of these policies were either chosen because of, or influenced by, existing or uncontrollable variables. Therefore, utilizing the strategies of the Japanese occupation in Iraq, for example, does not guarantee the same results. By analyzing the combination of preexisting uncontrollable factors and these factors' influence on U.S. instituted policies it becomes evident that replicating the results of such policies in a current-day occupation is unfeasible. The example of success set in Japan should not be ignored, but must be differentiated as a unique case in the realm of occupational studies.

The occupation of Japan has been carefully evaluated by a number of prestigious political scientists, leading to a number of widely accepted theories. Mancur Olson, Jacek Kugler, and A.F.K. Organski have each asserted that countries which are defeated in war often subsequently celebrate high levels of economic growth (Kugler & Arbetman, 1989). This would suggest that Japan's defeat in WWII also had a large effect on the state's ability to grow economically during the occupation. Organski and Kugler referred to a defeated state's ability to recover quickly as "The Phoenix Factor" (1980) and offer several explanations for why this occurs, primarily domestic economic factors. The pair ultimately concluded that international factors are often inconsequential, and domestic factors should be the focus of studies concerning the Phoenix Factor (Kugler & Arbetman, 1989). Olson based his support for the Phoenix Factor on

“collective goods” theory, under which states whose distributional collations have been destroyed undergo increased levels of competition which result in economic growth (Kugler & Arbetman, 1989). Regardless of the theory’s accuracy, Japan’s loss of WWII, while still attributed to U.S. actions, can be viewed as separate from traditional occupational policies, not easily replicated, and therefore constitutes an additional outside factor which further differentiates the case of Japan.

In this paper I will demonstrate the importance of both U.S. policy and preexisting factors, ultimately concluding that both contributed to the success of the occupation of Japan. I will explore a number of policies and conditions which affected the outcome of the occupation, focusing on the abundance of factors which had a domestic origin. While the purpose of this paper is to uncover the level of difficulty of replicating success in current occupations by reinstating policies used in Japan, that is not to say that policies which were directly instilled and controlled by the U.S. should be overlooked when formulating policies to be used in the Middle East today. Many of the U.S. instituted policies had a huge impact on the level and rate of success, especially when combined with factors already domestically embedded.

Chapter 2

Initial Conditions

By the conclusion of WWII, Japan had suffered a total defeat by the hands of the United States. The United States' use of firebombing during the final months of WWII destroyed 67 Japanese cities, killing thousands and leaving even more homeless (Selden, 2007). U.S. strategic bombing essentially leveled the entire country. The use of the atomic bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima further crippled Japanese infrastructure, making the country dependent on foreign aid to rebuild. The Japanese government readily accepted this need for assistance, realizing it was necessary for Japan to move forward (Edelstein, 2004). The rebuilding of Japan included the reconstruction of destroyed factories, which were rebuilt to incorporate new technologies that had developed since their initial construction. In accordance with The Phoenix Factor, these new and efficient factories helped contribute economic growth within the region (Kugler & Arbetman, 1989). Higher efficiency increased the number of export goods, allowing Japan to expand trade profits. Without the aid of the U.S., however, factory reconstruction would have been near impossible. Japan's utter dependence on the U.S. to rebuild infrastructure created a unique environment and general support for U.S. intervention.

The Imperial Rescript and Termination of War, which was read over the radio on September 2, 1945 by Emperor Hirohito himself, announced the surrender of Japan and requested that all peoples support and help carry out policies as defined by the Allied Powers (Borton, 1947). Embedded within Japanese culture are notions of obedience and consensus (Tamamoto, 1995),

concepts which had been cultivated through the imperialistic educational system, state religion, and civic organizations (Passin, 1990). The combination of a high level of dependence on foreign aid, the support of the Emperor, and cultural importance of consensus and obedience, led to a surprisingly cooperative populace and low levels of resistance (Blakemore, 1947). Opinion polls conducted during the occupation showed high levels of approval and respect of the American occupiers (Scalapino, 1976), and many referred to General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, as the “new emperor,” praising him for his knowledge and skill (Tamamoto, 1995, p.6).

The level of U.S. commitment in the Japanese Occupation was vast in terms of the number of feet on the ground and the number of years allotted to the occupational effort. The official occupation lasted close to 7 years, yet many troops and other U.S. personnel remained after the occupations culmination. The initial U.S. force consisted of nearly 400,000 troops not including other human resources (Edelstein, 2004). In October 1945, 15 U.S. Army divisions had already been deployed to Japan (McGrath, 1956). “The U.S. presence in Japan was massive — including troops, civilian personnel, teachers, lawyers, engineers and missionaries — and lasted for about two decades” (Lehmann, 2004), and a division of the U.S. army remains in Japan to this day. The total number of U.S. occupational forces reached its peak, 354,675, in December, 1945, and was reduced to 148,828 in 1948, remaining at this level for the remainder of the occupation (McGrath, 1956). These numbers do not include the thousands of non-U.S. allied occupying soldiers which helped further stabilize the region. The massive commitment allotted the U.S. adequate time and manpower to see that the majority of occupational goals were met.

Prior to WWII, Japan was led by a strict imperial government. The empire of Japan was characterized by its instillation of extreme nationalism among the populace. The war time policy

consisted of winning the war at all costs, and citizens were encouraged to sacrifice everything for the war effort, including their own lives. The Imperial government had been willing to sacrifice millions of citizen, supporting such activities as kamikaze pilots and mass suicides.

War time policy had caused widespread famine and poverty. “The American victory meant the recovery of life thought to have been hopelessly lost. The occupiers became liberators, providers of a second chance at life” (Tamamoto, 1995, p. 7). The U.S. occupation, forcing the termination of the militaristic government, offered Japanese citizens and opportunity to regain their livelihood. Because of this the Japanese populace viewed the American’s as liberators, and a suppressed citizenry with previously manifested liberal ideas was liberated.

It is believed that a large portion of the Japanese population was in fact liberal, and quick to accept more moderate policies (More, 1979). The occupying forces rooted out militaristic extremists and instilled reforms (discussed in a following section) that helped strengthen the existing moderate populace (More, 1979). Ray A. Moore, a leading scholar of the U.S. occupation in Japan, went as far as to claim that democratic trends would have prevailed in the absence of any U.S. interventions (More, 1979). This strong liberal sentiment that resided within the population was a result of the harsh military rule they were forced to endure.

The existence of an outside threat also characterized the initial conditions of the occupation. The Soviet Union and the potential spread of communism were deemed dangerous by both the U.S. and Japan. It has been found that “when an occupied territory faces a commonly agreed upon external threat, an occupation is more likely to succeed” (Edelstein, 2004, p. 62). Japan, located in close proximity to China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, became strategically significant in terms of the U.S. policy of containment. In the same fashion, the U.S. became a valuable ally in terms of protection from the Soviet Union and the spread of communism

(Edelstein, 2004). This mutually beneficial relationship laid outside the scope of U.S. controlled occupation policies.

An additional outside factor that affected the success of the occupation was the eruption of the Korean War (1950-1953). Korea was removed from Japan's control and divided in half based on post WWII agreements. North Korea, with the support of China and the Soviet Union, wished to reunify the state and therefore engaged in conventional warfare with South Korea in 1950. Because the conflict increased the threat of the spread of communism in the region, the war became a primary concern of the United Nations which lent its support to South Korea. While North and South Korea became entrenched in warfare, the production and exportation of goods was no longer a priority for either state. The high levels of procurement demand which resulted allowed Japanese enterprises to grow while Korean industries focused on the war effort (Scalapino, 1976). The higher quantity of goods exported by Japan promoted economic growth substantially.

This artificial demand for goods created by the Korean War is a variable not included in the Phoenix Factor theory. The theory focuses on internal variables including the already discussed rebuilding of factories as well as adjustments in the organization and priorities of the labor force, but does not consider the possible outside effects other countries may have on the war-torn state's ability to regenerate its economy (Kugler & Arbetman, 1989). The conflict in Korea had a considerable effect on Japan's ability to generate economic growth, yet the war was neither a domestic variable, nor a factor that was directly controlled by either Japan or the United States. The Korean War represents an additional reason the U.S. occupation of Japan was successful independent from any U.S. instituted policy which could be replicated.

Of all of the initial conditions which lead to the success of the occupation, only one was under the direct result of U.S. occupational policy: the United States' decision to allocate a large amount of time and a huge number of troops to the occupation effort. Every other factor was in some way beyond the control of U.S. occupational policymakers. The traditional view of the occupation consists of a leveled Japan that was successfully rebuilt by the United States. Yet even among the initial conditions of the occupation it is obvious that success would not have been possible in the absence of domestic and other uncontrollable variables. The total destruction of Japanese infrastructure during WWII and the harsh military rule the Japanese populace was forced to endure set the stage for very little resistance to United States interventions post-war. The population was ripe for the adoption of liberal values even before the United States began instituting any reforms. International variables including the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the conflict in Korea had a great effect on the occupation's ability to succeed and the post war economic development in Japan. Both of these variables were also beyond the scope of U.S. occupational policy. Ultimately a solid foundation for success existed before the occupation began.

Chapter 3

Early Stages

During the early stages of the occupation the U.S. ensured three key components which contributed to success: defining goals, establishing legitimacy, attempting to guarantee withdraw, and winning the hearts and minds of the occupied populace (Edelstein, 2004). While a majority of factors that affected the establishment of these three components remained under U.S. control, a significant portion remained beyond the scope of U.S. policymakers.

Defining Goals

A number of official documents signed by the Allied forces and Japan clearly mapped out the goals of the occupation. The Potsdam Declaration, or Allied terms for Japanese surrender, was signed July 26, 1945 (Moore, 1979). The document included a number of key components including the Allies' intent to occupy Japanese territory, the demilitarization of the country, the establishment of democratic values including the freedom of speech and religion, and the Allies' intent to withdraw from Japan which was to become an independent state (Kumano, 2007). By signing the document, Japan essentially committed to the occupation and the goals proposed by the Allied forces (Moore, 1979).

The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan of August 29, 1945 stated that the primary objective of the occupation was to establish a secure government within Japan that would no longer serve as a threat to the U.S. or the world. This would be accomplished through the measures outlined in the Potsdam Declaration. The document also declared the authority of

the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, General MacArthur, over that of the Japanese government (United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 1945).

A third document, the Instrument of Surrender, signed September 2, 1945, required Japan's adherence to the Potsdam Declaration, and fulfillment of all of General MacArthur's orders, reasserting his power over the Japanese government and the Emperor, both of which were subject to his rule (Borton, 2).

The repetition found within these documents served to further solidify the basic goals of the occupation, making them clear and unambiguous (Moore, 1979). This early establishment of authority resulted in little resistance to U.S. instituted reforms. While specific goals, including various reforms targeted towards demilitarization and democratization fluctuated over the course of the occupation, due to the Soviet threat, the basic premise of the Occupation as outlined in these documents remained the same throughout the entire duration.

Establishing Legitimacy

The U.S. also took multiple steps to ensure their legitimacy in the region. First, a policy of indirect rule was established. "Indirect rule, such as the United States practiced in Japan...employs citizens of the occupied territory to fill vital roles in the occupation administrations" (Edelstein, 2004, p. 67) Instead of eradicating the existing governmental structure, which constitutes direct rule, occupying forces worked indirectly through the existing administrative structure (Borton, 1947). This choice was not solely based on the want for indirect rule, however, but by the need for it. There was a severe lack of language and cultural knowledge that would have been necessary for a direct takeover of the Japanese government (Edelstein, 2004). The United States was therefore "forced...to rely heavily on preexisting political,

bureaucratic, and social structures” (Edelstein, 2004, p. 67). This included the role of the Emperor, whose position of power remained unchanged until the adoption of the new constitution in 1947 (Edelstein, 2004). Japanese interpreters were also necessary when it came to any communication held between the two governments (Passin, 1990). The reliance on existing institutions and interpreters allowed for “much more Japanese influence in shaping Occupation measure than had originally been expected” (Passin, 1990, p. 109).

Another factor that resulted in the need for indirect rule was the United States’ commitment to a direct occupation of Germany (Willard-Foster, 2009). “The... skills needed for another direct occupation were in short supply, necessitating an indirect occupation” (Willard-Foster, 2009, p. 50). Despite the number soldiers and other personnel stationed in Japan, the German occupation caused a need for political assistance. While the decision to dedicate a high number of resources to the German occupation was made by U.S. policymakers, the situation still serves to further differentiate the Japanese occupation. Edelstein, a political scientist with specialized knowledge of military occupations, found through his 2004 study that occupations that utilize indirect rule succeed at a higher rate than those which utilize direct rule (Edelstein, 2004). In the case of Japan, however, there were uncontrollable factors that made indirect rule unavoidable.

The United States’ utilization of indirect rule casts a fair amount of doubt on Olson’s collective goods justification of the Phoenix Factor, for many of the political institutions responsible for distributing wealth were initially retained (Olson, 1982). Olson argued that distributional coalitions are often destroyed in defeated states, and the lack of structure in terms of distributing wealth improves economic performance through increased competition among sectors that are then equally as likely to receive capital (Kugler & Arbetman, 1989). In the case of Japan, however, the United States’ choice to utilize indirect rule left many second level

political operatives in place. The majority of prewar political and economic policies were retained until they were completely replaced with those set forth under the new democratic government established by The Constitution of 1947. Distributional coalitions in Japan were never completely absent during the post war period. Instead they were initially retained and eventually replaced. Therefore Olson's collective goods justification does not necessarily explain the economic growth celebrated in Japan after the war.

A second means of establishing legitimacy was creating the illusion of multilateralism (Borton, 1947). The U.S. had the intention of remaining in control of policies instituted in Japan, but at the same time ensured that the Occupation appeared to be a multinational effort. The creation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission was proposed by the United States in 1945, calling for the Chinese, British, Soviet, and U.S. governments to come together in the formulation of occupation policies (Borton, 1947). While the Soviets declined, the proposal was approved by the remaining states (Borton, 1947). A second commission was later created which integrated a total of eleven states, including the Soviet Union, that would all deliberate policies to be instituted in Japan (Borton, 1947). The development of these commissions made "the formulation of occupation policies for Japan an international responsibility" (Borton, 1947, p. 257), or so it would seem. Within the commissions the U.S. retained the right to veto, enabling the United States "to protect its direct relationship with General MacArthur and to prevent the Allies from approving a policy counter to American desires" (Borton, 1966, p. 209). The United States "monopolized every sphere of influence," and fellow Allied states were "powerless to act without United States' approval" (Kumano, 2007, p. 36). Edelstein's study of occupations also found that multilateralism led to higher rates of success (Edelstein, 2004). The U.S. was able to increase the chances of success by creating the illusion of multilateralism while avoiding the

difficulties of multiple influences on policy (Edelstein, 2004). The illusion of multilateralism was one of the few means of establishing legitimacy under complete control of the U.S.

Guaranteeing Withdrawal

While the credibility of guarantees to withdraw cannot be fully established until after the actual withdraw has taken place, the U.S. did take steps to prove to the Japanese government their intent to eventually hand over complete control in an attempt to further establish legitimacy. First, the Potsdam Declaration explicitly detailed the United State's intentions to withdraw and turn over complete sovereignty to the Japanese government after the goals of the occupation had been met (Kades, 1989). The establishment of indirect rule and multilateralism also suggested the United States' intention to eventually withdraw. By opting to establish indirect rule instead of eradicating the existing government, the U.S. made "occupied citizens more confident that they will indeed control their own futures" (Edelstein, 2004, p. 67). But the establishment of indirect rule was less of a choice and more of a necessity for the United States. Multilateralism in Japan made the U.S. subject to the criticisms of fellow Allied powers, as well as the U.N., all of which were not interested in creating an empire within the region. Therefore the "occupied population [could] be confident that [the] multilateral occupation [would], in fact, come to an end..." (Edelstein, 2004, p. 72). By creating the belief that withdraw would in fact take place, the occupation gained an increased level of support within Japan (Edelstein, 2004). An occupier's populace often grows weary of the amount of time and resources that are committed to the occupation, and therefore a guarantee of withdrawal allowed support to remain among U.S. citizens as well (Edelstein, 2004).

Winning the Hearts and Minds

The result of indirect rule and a guaranteed withdrawal was the United States' ability to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese populace. The U.S. took great strides to ensure the Japanese citizenry that their wants, needs, and best interests would be taken into account during policy formation. MacArthur acknowledged the fact that "reforms would have lasting power only if Japanese citizens understood them, embraced them, and passed them on to the next generation" (Kumano, 2007, p. 37). The United States' commitment to rebuilding Japan through the appropriation of monetary resources and manpower helped win over the Japanese people (Edelstein, 2004). The harshness of the previous military government, and the hope offered by the U.S. for a chance of liberation previously discussed also allowed the U.S. to gain the support of the Japanese (Tamamoto, 1995). The harsh living conditions the Japanese were forced to endure, completely outside of U.S. control, made the prospect of liberation appealing, lessening the time it took the U.S. to win over the hearts and minds of the Japanese population. The want for liberation and ultimate acceptance of U.S. intervention was based on domestic factors.

In comparison to the initial conditions of the occupation, the majority of decisions made during the early stages were under the direct control of the United States. The goals of the occupation were clearly defined by a number of documents approved by the Allied powers as well as Japan. The illusion of multilateralism as a tool for establishing legitimacy in the region was also a direct result of U.S. policy. The U. S. independently decided to make great strides to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese populace. An early stage variable which was not the direct result of U.S. policy, however, was the utilization of indirect rule. The lack of knowledge of Japanese language and culture, as well as the United States' commitment in Germany forced

occupational policy makers to adopt a strategy of indirect rule which undoubtedly contributed to the success of the occupation. Even during the early stages, success was a combination of controllable and uncontrollable factors.

Chapter 4

Reforms

U.S. Instituted Reforms

After laying the foundation for the occupation during the early stages, the United States began initiating various reforms. The primary reforms which the United States initiated included the destruction of the zaibatsu, educational reforms, the establishment of religious freedom, and the demilitarization of the country. Due to a lack of domestic support, however, many of these reforms were only partially successful or failed completely.

One of the first reforms initiated by the United States was the disassembling of the Japanese zaibatsu. Zaibatsu are large business conglomerates consisting of a “head” company which controls a number of smaller companies within the same industry. These companies work together in order to gain a monopoly over that particular industry. The zaibatsu essentially controlled the Japanese economy prior to WWII due to their close ties with political organizations. This led to political corruption and produced conditions unfavorable to the adoption of a market economy. Policies were put into place “to dissolve the zaibatsu and purge Japanese business leaders... [in order] to create a postwar economic world order favorable to the American economy and open to American trade” (Moore, 1979, p. 724). The United States targeted a number of predominate zaibatsu and successfully disassembled the companies. The U.S. failed to completely eradicate Japan of zaibatsu, however, and a number of the

conglomerates with strong ties to the government still exist today (Scalapino, 1976). Support for the dismantling of the zaibatsu was not strong among the Japanese due to the fact that many people worked within a zaibatsu and any restructuring would surely have affect their job. The Japanese strove to retain the system during the occupation, and to reinstate it after the occupation. The United States' failure to completely eliminate the conglomerates can be attributed to this lack of local support.

Reforming and decentralizing the educational system which had previously indoctrinated students with notions of extreme nationalism and submission to the state was another primary goal of the United States. To ensure the success of democracy in Japan the U.S. altered the educational system to promote democratic values and pacifism (Kumano, 2007). Rather than tailoring the curriculum for each student based on their academic abilities, as the old system had, the new system promoted the uniformity of success and educators were instructed to conform their lessons to the needs of the least intellectual student (Tamamoto, 1995). The growth of the educational system post WWII is often attributed to these U.S. instituted reforms. However, educational growth rates prior to the war mirrored those of Europe and were continuously increasing (Passin, 1990). The occupation may have amplified the speed of this growth, “but educational growth would have come inevitably in the natural course of events” (Passin, 1990, p. 122). While the reforms did succeed in the sense that the new system promoted democratic ideals, after the occupation the educational system quickly recentralized, the notorious college entrance exams were reestablished, and the elected school boards were disbanded (Passin, 1990). Educational reforms also found little resonance within the Japanese populace, and therefore ultimately failed. The majority of the prewar educational policies were reinstated.

Under imperialism the Japanese government had established State Shinto, requiring each family to be active within a local shrine, and Shinto ideals were included in the compulsory education curriculum. The United States' attempted to eliminate this form of social control and did so successfully by incorporating a freedom of religion clause into Japan's new constitution. The "disestablishment of State Shinto [and] the guarantee of religious freedom...[were] major achievements" of the occupation (Moore, 1979, p. 728). Apart from this, MacArthur himself made an effort to Christianize Japan by suppressing local religions and encouraging foreign missionaries (Moore, 1979). While the elimination of State Shinto succeeded, the MacArthur's goal of spreading Christianity failed based on the lack of Japanese support or interest in practicing religion or converting. Japan today has no predominate religion and the majority of people are nonreligious.

The demilitarization of Japan was one of the key and most significant goals set forth by the U.S. during the occupation, explicitly spelled out within the Potsdam Declaration (Moore, 1979). The U.S. and other allied powers wanted to ensure that Japan would no longer pose a threat by completely disarming the country. What seemed like an impossible task was actually accomplished quite swiftly due to the existing resistance to the military government resonating within the Japanese populace. The harsh military rule the Japanese people were forced to endure resulted in a resistance to and hatred for the military. The Japanese people were tired of going hungry and watching family and friends die in the name of a failing war effort. The renunciation of war as a sovereign right of the state, as declared in Article 9 of the Constitution of 1947, was therefore met with little resistance. The Japanese viewed this renunciation as a huge advancement in terms of international relations, making Japan more sophisticated than other countries which still resorted to violence. While issues surrounding Article 9 are debated to this

day, the majority of Japanese people continue to support the renunciation of war. Although the goal of demilitarization and the reforms that followed were formulated by and instituted by the U.S., the ultimate success can be attributed to the existing resistance to the military and the resulting support for demilitarization.

Joint Reforms

The majority of U.S. supported reforms which took place during the occupation had origins prior to WWII and therefore would have taken place regardless of the United States' intervention. These included the democratization of Japan, the adoption of the Constitution of 1947, land reforms, labor reforms, and the promotion of women's rights. While U.S. policies during the occupation may have increased the rate at which these reforms were implemented, they were in no way the exclusively result of U.S. interventions.

Another primary goal of the occupation was the democratization of Japan. What many people fail to realized, however, is that Japan was already on the road to democratization before the start of WWII. "Occupational reforms had relatively little to do with Japanese democracy, since Japan was already enroute to the new system" (Scalapino, 1976, p. 109). Japan's efficient and effective response to the newly established democratic policies proves the state's existing capabilities (Scalapino, 1976). Japan's first large step towards democratization took place in 1868 with the termination of the Tokogawa bakufu, the feudal regime established in the 1600's. The Tokogawa bakufu was replaced with an Emperor centric system during the Meiji restoration.

“The Meiji restoration began in 1868 with the overthrow of the ruling Tokugawa family by opposition clans who ‘restored’ governmental controls to the Emperor Meiji. This was followed by the re-establishment of a strong central government, the abolition of the feudal regime and the abandonment of the policy of isolation which secluded Japan for three hundred years” (Blakemore, 1947, p. 636).

The recentralization of governmental authority and the opening of the economy to international trade during the restoration served as huge strides towards the transition to democracy in Japan.

The adoption of democracy accelerated after the war and during the occupation due to a number of joint initiatives supported by both Japan and the U.S., the most notable being Emperor Hirohito’s renunciation of divinity (Kumano, 2007). Under the imperial government established during the Meiji restoration, the Emperor was seen as a divine figure and all sovereignty resided within him. Emperor Hirohito, in his New Year’s Day Address of 1946, stated: “The ties between us and our people...do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine.” The Emperor’s renunciation of divinity and the transfer of sovereign power from the Emperor to the people, as dictated by the Constitution of 1947, solidified the importance of the Emperor’s leadership in promoting democratic transformation. The importance of the Emperor’s role in changing the shape of Japanese politics was noted by MacArthur himself, who saw the Emperor’s support as a vital component of the transition (Kumano, 2007). Democratic values and practices quickly became incorporated into everyday Japanese life due to the accelerating effects U.S. policies had on existing initiatives (Tamamoto, 1995). The combination of U.S. policies, existing institutions, and public opinion allowed for the swift democratization of Japan.

One of the essential steps in establishing a working democracy in Japan was the creation and implementation of a new constitution. The goal of constitutional revision was put forth by the Potsdam Declaration and agreed to upon signage by Japan (Moore, 1979). There seemed to be little disagreement among either U.S. or Japanese policymakers that constitutional revisions were necessary (Moore, 1979). There was no attempt, however, to impose a governmental form that did not have the support and approval of the Japanese populace (Borton, 1947). The U.S. chose to work with Japanese policymakers through a series of compromises to ensure that any changes would be well received. The number of revisions quickly grew, and the creation of a completely new constitution became necessary. The Constitution of 1947 which was the result of a two year drafting process contained provisions which “are without a doubt some of the most advanced in the world in terms of liberal and democratic principles” (Moore, 1979, p. 727). The drafting process and final approval of the new constitution is another example of successful joint reform.

Initially the Japanese, aware of the necessity of constitutional changes, began drafting amendments to the Meiji Constitution. The Cabinet Committee was appointed to draft these amendments in October of 1945 (Blakemore, 1947). Throughout the drafting process numerous political and private groups promoted their desired changes (Blakemore, 1947). This committee, lead by State Minister Joji Matsumoto, released The Tentative Plan of the Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee in a Tokyo Newspaper that same year (Kades, 1989). After struggling to quickly translate the document, the U.S. rejected it based on the fact that not enough substantial changes were made and those that were made were too conservative (Kades, 1989). In February of 1946 MacArthur decided to abandon the revision effort and instead appointed General Courtney Whitney to oversee the drafting of an entirely new constitution

(Borton, 1966). The resulting draft was presented to the Japanese government, guaranteeing that adequate time be allotted for analyzing and approving the document “to be sure such acceptance represented the freely expressed will of the Japanese people as provided in the Potsdam Declaration” (Borton, 1966, p. 210). When presenting the document, Whitney emphasized that the Japanese were in no way required to adopt the draft, but the key principles reflected in the draft must remain if the U.S. were to grant approval (Kades, 1989). The draft was submitted on June 20, 1946 and was approved by the Lower House of the Japanese legislature a mere two months later (Borton, 1966). After a few minor changes were made, the House of Peers approved the document on October 6, 1946 (Borton, 1966). One such change was the Ashida Amendment, which reworded Article 9 to ensure the constitutionality of a defense force, therefore allowing Japan to be an active member of the United Nations (Kades, 1989). The U.S., under the “Provisions for Review of the New Japanese Constitution,” stated that after the constitution had been effective for a period of two years, both governments would reconvene and discuss any necessary amendments (Borton, 1966). No changes were made at this point, or at any time since the constitution became effective in 1947. This is because the “constitution accurately caught the spirit and aspirations of the Japanese people” (Kades, 1989, p. 243). While the U.S. had a much heavier influence over the provisions included in the new constitution, the two states worked together to produce a document that not only included the changes dictated by MacArthur, but would succeed based on its accurate representation of the will of the Japanese people.

A second jointly initiated change which took place during the occupation was land reform consisting of redistribution. The success of the land reforms are often deemed a direct result of U.S. policies, but the foundations for the reforms had been laid prior to WWII. Before the war there existed only a few wealthy land owners who would allow tenants to farm their land for a

fee. Plans had been drawn up before the war intending to increase farm ownership by reducing the incidence of tenancy (Passin, 1990). A law had been drafted prior to the war, but the approval process was put on hold while the government was forced to focus on the war effort (Passin, 1990). The U.S. simply brought these previously anticipated changes back to the forefront and helped facilitate their approval and implementation (Passin 1990). The desire for land reforms by both the U.S. and the Japanese undoubtedly contributed to their success.

The United States' effort to institute labor reforms was also assisted by existing efforts and public support. Modern trade unions had been established in Japan some fifty years prior to WWII, however, no laws solidifying the right to unionize existed until U.S. intervention (Passin, 1990). While unions existed prior to the war, their membership never exceeded 7% of the labor force (Passin, 1990). After the U.S. passed the Trade Union Act, however, the membership skyrocketed, totaling over 46% by 1949 (Passin, 1990). While "labor reform obviously had its natural constituency," it was facilitated greatly through U.S. efforts (Passin, 1990, p. 114). Without the previously established institutions, however, labor reform may not have been as successful or accomplished so quickly.

The last successful mutually initiated changes explored in this paper are those which increased women's rights in Japan. This was deemed a key component of the democratization of Japan and was therefore a primary goal of the United States. But "even the enfranchisement of women in... Japan was not simply an American idea (Passin, 1990, p. 114). The number of suffragist groups in Japan prior to the war was surprisingly high based on the male-dominated nature of society (Passin, 1990). These groups were supported by various Christian, liberal, and socialist organizations (Passin, 1990). The imperial government, however, repressed these groups, and they did not exercise a high level of influence until after occupational reforms. The

U.S. dictated the inclusion of Article 24 in the Constitution of 1947 which guaranteed equality of the sexes (Tamamoto, 1995). Due to the large existing support base, it is widely assumed that women would have eventually been enfranchised without any U.S. intervention (Passin, 1990).

Of the reforms that were U.S. initiated, ones for which support resonated within the Japanese populace were successful, while those which lacked the support of the Japanese often failed. The only reform initiated by the U.S. alone which succeeded was the demilitarization of Japan. The change was met with the strong support of the Japanese, however, which remains to this day. In comparison, all of the jointly initiated reforms were successful and have either remained unchanged or have continued to liberalize. This demonstrates the importance of existing reform efforts and the support of the occupied populace. Had these reforms not been previously initiated or not met with high levels of support, they may not have been successful, and certainly would not have succeeded as quickly.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The successful occupation of Japan was a complex process with numerous contributing factors. Success is often accredited to U.S. occupational policies. After careful analysis, however, it is evident that a majority of these contributing factors were not under the direct control of U.S. occupational policymakers. The effects of total defeat, existing resistance to the military government, the threat of the Soviet Union, and the Korean War cannot be overlooked when analyzing the reasons for success. These outside factors had a large effect on the success of Japanese occupation and the growth of the Japanese economy post WWII. The U.S. had the highest level of direct control in the early stages of the occupation during which time the goals of the occupation were clearly defined, an illusion of multilateralism was created, and great efforts were made to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people. But even during this time, decisions such as the use of indirect rule were also affected by outside factors. Before long the U.S. began initiating changes within the Japanese government and society. Reforms that were instituted by the U.S. that had no prior foundations or existing support among the Japanese generally failed, while those which had either already been initiated or had a solid base of support succeeded. Because steps had been taken in the direction of democratization, and reforms regarding land, labor, and women's rights had already been considered, they were able to easily succeed when further supported by the United States. The U.S. simply hastened reforms which were already in conception. Ultimate success was due to a complex combination of U.S. policies and preexisting factors.

The economic success celebrated by Japan post WWII has previously been explained by the Phoenix Factor and the effects explained by collective goods theory. These explanations fall short, however, failing to encompass all of the unique variables which attributed to the success in Japan. While the total defeat of Japan did result in the rebuilding and upgrading of Japanese factories and infrastructure, the Phoenix Factor fails to take into account any possible international effects, in this case the threat of the Soviet Union and the Korean War. The collective goods framework for the Phoenix Factor is also inadequate in this case due to the fact that distributional coalitions were never significantly weakened or removed. The case of post WWII Japan is much too complicated to be wholly explained by either of these theories.

Occupational policies used in Japan were frequently referenced during the formulation of the initial plans for the current day occupation of Iraq (Willard-Foster, 2009). If the success of the Japanese occupation was entirely based on U.S. occupational policies, then theoretically they same results could be replicated elsewhere. As this paper has shown, however, the case of Japan was extremely unique and many contributing factors which have previously been overlooked had an overwhelming effect on the occupation's ability to succeed. Many of the contributing factors actually laid entirely outside of the scope of U.S. occupational policy. After realizing the importance of outside factors, prior reform movements, and existing support for specific changes, it is evident that the simple replication of U.S. policies could never produce the same results in a different state. It does suggest, however, that recognizing and analyzing initial conditions in a state that is to be occupied, and tailoring policies to fit these conditions is an essential step in formulating occupational plans. States should also take advantage of the high level of control during the early stages, and ensure that key steps are taken such as establishing goals and winning the hearts and minds of the occupied populace. Finally, any reforms which are

instituted must be done so in coordination with the occupied nation if they are to succeed. While the occupation of Japan does not provide a blue print for how to carry out a successful occupation, it does provide us with many valuable lessons that should not be forgotten in the onset of future occupational endeavors.

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