

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE EFFECT OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR
EXTREME RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN EUROPE

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SPRING 2013

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for a baccalaureate degree
in International Politics
with honors in International Politics

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ABSTRACT

Extreme right-wing parties are on the rise in Europe. Academic scholarship has provided a number of explanations for this phenomenon. The objective of this thesis is to provide an alternative explanation and determine if terrorist attacks affect the electoral support for extreme right-wing parties in Europe. I hypothesize that terrorist attacks increase the electoral support for extreme right-wing parties. The research in this paper approaches this question through analysis of the percent voteshare gained by extreme right-wing parties in seven countries from 1993-2011. The multiple interrupted time series analysis shows terrorist attacks do not increase support for extreme right-wing parties, though there were mixed results about the effect of one attack, September 11, 2001.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Lowery and Dr. Casper for their help and guidance throughout this process. I would also like to thank the Schreyer Honors College and the Department of Political Science. Lastly, I am especially grateful for my family's support throughout my time at Penn State.

Introduction

Over the past few decades the electoral success of extreme right-wing political parties has varied from country to country throughout Europe. These parties tend to be nationalistic, often anti-immigration in their party platform. Through electoral success these political organizations have sought to gain influence over national policy making. Many academics have examined the possible causes for this rise in extreme right-wing party support, particularly looking at social and economic factors. In this paper, however, I will look at three Islamic extremist terrorist attacks as a possible additional explanation for the increasing popularity of extreme right-wing parties.

The rise of the extreme right-wing has important implications. There are concerns that extreme right-wing parties advocate violence. Since the 2011 attack carried out by an extreme right-wing individual fanatic in Norway, European governments and their constituents have grown increasingly concerned that extreme right-wing ideology may attract people who promote or condone the use of violence. By understanding what draws people to extreme ideologies, governments seek to provide greater security for their populations and to protect against future attacks. Should a government fail to ensure the security of its people, it loses its legitimacy.

Islamic extremists are frightening to many people in Europe and are generally viewed as “foreigners.” Extreme right-wing parties advocate closing national borders to immigrants/foreigners. This potential relationship impacts the shape of political responses

to terrorist attacks. I will look at the possibility that Islamic-extremist terrorism acts as a catalyst for political change. I hope to determine if fear of these types of terrorist attacks is a significant element in people's voting patterns. I am specifically focusing on such events because they were carried out by foreign elements and because extreme right-wing parties campaign actively against foreigners.

The examination of this issue will be approached through a multi-step process. A review of existing literature will be conducted in order to analyze previous findings and to help with the definition of what makes a right-wing party extreme. From there, I will look at the possible impact of recent terrorist attacks on extreme right wing party political success. In particular, I will examine the possibility that following each attack, there was greater political success for these extreme right wing parties. With the establishment of a number of new extremist parties in many European countries, it is likely that there is a rise in the success of these parties electorally. Through an interrupted time-series analysis, the effect of these possibilities can be quantitatively examined. The implications of the findings derive from the future potential success of these parties and the implementation of their anti-immigration policies. This could have a profound effect on the future of the European Union's political cohesion.

Literature Review

There are a number of different interpretations of the meaning for the term “extreme right,” with little consensus among scholars. The term itself is used primarily to convey that a party lies on the very far right of the political spectrum. There is no one type of extreme right-wing party, but rather many different types (Ignazi, 2003). In trying to classify an extreme right-wing party, many different scholars have proposed various features to help identify the ideology of the extreme right, ranging from xenophobia, to nationalism, to anti-democracy. There is no consensus on the required number of these features necessary for a party to be classified as extreme right (Mudde, 2000). Nonetheless, defining what makes a right-wing party extreme is an important part key to understanding the rise of these parties separate from the more traditional right-wing parties.

Different scholars provide their own definitions of what constitutes an extreme right-wing party. Mudde (1995) defines right-wing extremism according to five different features: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state. Ignazi defines extreme parties as having “the presence or absence of a fascist legacy and the acceptance or refusal of the political system” (Ignazi, 2003: 33). Many scholars have chosen to focus on one defining characteristic of an extreme right-wing party, such as xenophobia. These single-issue theses, however, profess an incomplete understanding of the political ideology of these groups. Extreme right-wing parties have broad political platforms on which they campaign (Merkel and Weinberg, 2003). Therefore, the most

encompassing definition, and the most appropriate, is one that combines a number of different factors.

Within the definitional family of extreme right-wing parties, there are subgroups that exist based upon differences in ideology. Ignazi (2003) divides the family into two subgroups, “traditional” and “post-industrial.” This division is based upon their incorporation of fascist ideology. The “traditional” subgroup is applied to those parties that inherit the fascist ideology from the interwar period. The “post-industrial” subgroup is focused not on fascist ideals, but rather dissatisfaction with the existing political system. Betz (2003) provides additional subgroup classifications. While he recognizes the fascist subgroup of parties, he also focuses on exclusionary populist and neo-liberal parties. Exclusionary populist parties believe in “a restrictive notion of citizenship, which holds that true democracy is based on a homogeneous community, that only long-standing citizens are full members of civil society, and that a society’s benefits should only accrue to them” (Betz, 2003: 77). These groups are populist in nature due to the belief that they represent the people and seek to radically reform the current political system. Betz’s neo-liberal classification focuses on the concept of economic nationalism and the belief that a country has the right to control its own economy. Not all European right-wing parties fit into these subcategories and many parties have party platforms that espouse a combination of beliefs from among these subgroups. Understanding the ideology or belief structures behind these parties will help to explain the rise of extreme right wing parties throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Numerous articles have been written recently about the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe. The authors try to determine the factors behind the increase in

popularity of these parties, attributing a number of political, socioeconomic, and demographic reasons. Artzheimer and Carter (2006) focus on the potential demographic factors influencing voting patterns in favor of the extreme right. They looked at age, education, and class and the propensity to vote for extreme right-wing parties. They found that young voters under the age of 25 were much more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties than any other age group. While they had hypothesized that voters with low levels of education were the most likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties, it was shown that people with middle-school diplomas were much more likely to vote for these parties. With regards to economic status/occupational status, voters who were self-employed or manual laborers were shown to be much more likely to support the extreme right than professionals. These results do not directly explain the increased popularity, but rather help to explain who is voting for extreme right-wing parties. The marginalized segments of the population thus represented are most affected by the other factors scholars have put forth to explain the rise of the extreme right.

Marginalized voters have increasingly given their support to extreme right-wing parties over the years. People are exhibiting more disenchantment with their country's political system and are dissatisfied with current or historical mainstream parties. Mainstream parties have marginalized and alienated some voters by trying to campaign on "catch-all" platforms, leaving estranged voters searching for other parties to express their perspective (Knigge, 1998). Other interpretations suggest that European extreme right-wing parties offer voters a return to tradition and a support for traditional values. While some scholars find this argument wanting, primarily because it can be seen more

as a result of difficult socio-economic times, it does help to explain how marginalized segments of society seek a new collective identity (Jackman and Volpert, 1998).

Many studies have been conducted on the effects of immigration and unemployment on the success of extreme right-wing parties. Golder (2003) proposed a number of arguments relating these factors and their effects on voteshare. He looked at these factors in respect to two political subgroups of the extreme right: populist parties and fascist parties. He found that unemployment on its own had no effect upon support for the extreme right, but when combined with a large immigrant population, populist parties received a larger portion of the vote. He also found that increased immigration helped populist parties no matter the level of societal unemployment. When looking at the inverse relationship, the effect of immigration on unemployment, Golder made reference to studies that showed no relationship. He noted, however, that in some circumstances immigration does not actually lead to or cause an increase in unemployment, but allow people to believe that it does (Golder, 2003: 438). This correlates to the Artzheimer and Carter (2006) article, in that young and manual laborers were believed most likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties, and experience the most unemployment. A combination of the above factors could help to explain why these parties have been experiencing a surge of support over the past couple of decades.

Another proposal put forth for the increased support of extreme right-wing parties is the polarization of national political discourse. Jackmon and Volpert (1996) looked at how a political party with no seats in government, can still be effective at promoting its agenda. They discussed how parties of the extreme right gain political legitimacy by getting their policies integrated into the national agenda. By adopting extreme positions,

they cause other parties to shift closer towards these positions in order to address the portion of the population sensitive/sympathetic to that extreme position on issues. As political discourse becomes more polarized between left and right, and right-wing parties shifting further right, extreme right-wing parties gain political legitimacy. As a result, some of the extreme positions these parties take, such as xenophobia, become less offensive.

A lesser amount of academic scholarship has focused on the potential effect of terrorism on elections. There has been no study on the effect of terrorism on the rise of extreme right-wing parties, but there has been research conducted that showed terrorism increased support for right-wing parties. Berribi and Klor (2008) conducted a study of the Israeli electorate's response to terrorist attacks. Their results showed that terrorism increased support for the right bloc of parties. Though terrorism is much more frequent in Israel than in Europe, it is still an important finding with great implications. One of the factors they examined was the turnout rate of voters after a terrorist attack. They found that the turnout rate of right-wing voters increased after an attack and left-wing voter turnout decreased. This result will be important to consider. They also looked at the effect of time on party support, specifically the amount of time that passed between an attack and the next election. They found that the greater the amount of time between the two events, the less impact the attack had on voters. This will be another important variable to consider when looking at the potential effect of terrorism on the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe.

Along those same lines, a study was conducted looking at the effect of the March 2004 Madrid terrorist bombings on the Spanish elections later that same year. Bali (2007)

did not focus as heavily upon support for the right or left, but rather looked at the turnout rates, the vote choice decision, and whether the bombings affected the vote. She found that people were more likely to turn out to vote after an attack and the attacks did greatly affect who they were voting for. In contrast to the results in the Israeli elections, the ruling right-wing party in Spain lost the 2004 election. In the aftermath of the attacks, the government was blamed for mishandling the situation. This is an important factor to look at when considering the polarization of voting after an attack. Terrorism seeks to instill fear. When a terrorist attack occurs, the government in power is often blamed. If people fear their government cannot protect them, they will likely vote for a political party they think can.

Research Design

Terrorist attacks inherently cause fear. These fears include fear for the loss of security, fear that another attack could happen. This is the true aim of terrorism, not only to cause the initial destruction and loss of life, but to create a lasting psychological effect in order to achieve an ultimate political goal, whatever it may be. In many instances, the psychological effect has a much greater impact and lasts much longer than the physical impact. Threat of a terrorist attack feeds peoples' desire for increased security. After attacks, people want assurances that these attacks will not happen again. They want a government that will not sacrifice the security of the country in order to remain politically viable. In many instances, terrorist threats are blamed on outsiders. For instance, some people see terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic extremists as a threat to their national identity (Butler, Panzer, and Lewis, 2003). The rise in extreme right-wing parties can be seen as a response to peoples' strong sense of security derived from a shared national identity and culture. A terrorist attack is an assault on a country's government, people, culture, etc to achieve a political result.

Mass immigration into Europe is increasingly seen in many countries as a threat to local populations. Some see globalization and integration as a failure because of the occurrence of terrorist attacks. In many countries, during the massive rebuilding effort after World War II, large-scale immigration was permitted to increase the local workforce and assist employers facing a labor shortage. Immigrants were seen as "guest workers" who would eventually return to their respective homelands (Messina, 2007).

This has not been the case in most instances, however, as immigrants remained in-country because the living conditions, even though not necessarily equal to the native populations, were still better than from where they had come. These immigrant populations are now seen by the extreme right as taking jobs that should be going to the local population and as a tax burden on the welfare state that characterizes most European countries. Many of the new extreme right wing party platforms include an anti-immigration component because they see immigration as a threat to collective national identity. The implications of this platform component are that in order to curb massive immigration, stricter border controls may be necessary, an issue conflicting with the European Union's free movement of people policies.

The null hypothesis is that terrorist attacks have no effect on the rise of extreme right wing political parties. In addition, after World War II and the defeat of fascism, extreme right wing parties were seen as *persona non grata*. The negative impact of communist ideology in Eastern Europe had eliminated these types of parties for a long time. But perhaps, after so many years distant from World War II, the ideology of the extreme right-wing has again attracted people to these types of parties. While not necessarily the same as in the past, these parties hold similar beliefs, and have begun to be seen not so negatively. It is possible that these parties are experiencing a resurgence due to the natural balancing of political ideologies. There is also the possibility that there is no effect because terrorist events have become frequent enough that they have created a constant background noise-like affect. Fear is already elevated to such a degree that individual events do not affect voting patterns.

I will use an interrupted time-series analysis to determine the effect of terrorism on electoral support for extreme right wing parties. Using the formula:


$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + e$$

where Y is the percent voteshare for extreme right wing parties; a is the intercept of the time-series or the value of the dependent variable when all independent variables are equal to zero; X_1 is a counter for years; b_{1-7} are the slope coefficients that will measure the unit change in the dependent variable, for each one unit of change in the independent variable; X_2 is the 9/11 attack dummy variable; X_3 is 9/11 attack count variable; X_4 is the Madrid bombing attack dummy variable; X_5 is the Madrid bombing attack count variable; X_6 is the London bombing attack dummy variable; X_7 is the attack count variable; and e is error.

When testing the hypothesis, there are a number of different possible outcomes. When looking at Figure 1, if terrorist attacks have no effect on the percent of votes gained in the election, then we would expect to see results similar to line *B*. This would mean that the slope coefficient for that attack is equal to zero. If terrorist attacks have a slight impact on the number of seats then results are likely to be similar to line *C*, meaning the slope coefficient shows slight significance. If terrorist attacks have an effect on the support gained by extreme right wing parties, then the percentage of the vote for the extreme right wing will increase significantly, as seen in line *D*, meaning that there was high statistical significant in the slope coefficient. These three possibilities all assume that the number of seats in legislature gained by extreme right wing parties is increasing. If the terrorist attack were to have a negative effect of the voteshare for extreme right wing parties, then

we would expect to see an outcome similar to line A, where the slope coefficient is negative.

Figure 1-1. Hypothetical Relationships between Terrorist Events and Voteshare.



Analysis

The three events I will be focusing on are the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, the March 2004 Madrid bombings, and the July 2005 London bombings. These three events were chosen based on their recent occurrence and they were carried out by Islamic extremists. The six countries whose political parties I will focus on are the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Germany. These countries were chosen based on their own experience with terrorist attacks and their established extreme right wing parties.

The United Kingdom and Sweden are similar cases in that the extreme right-wing parties existed for a number of years but gained very little in national elections. In the United Kingdom, I will be measuring the support for the British National Party (BNP). The party was established in April 1982 after its leader, John Tyndall, broke off from the National Front party. He sought to separate himself from the overt fascist ideology and focus more on a nationalist platform (Eatwell, 2004). The BNP had seen little national parliamentary success in the general elections, until the 2010 elections when they gained their first significant share of the vote. This case was chosen not only because of its established extreme right-wing party, but because of 2005 London bombings as well. Within Sweden there exists a rising culture of racism, xenophobia and extreme right-wing popularity second only to Germany (Widfeldt, 2004, 162). Extreme right-wing parties have been able to capitalize on this. The Sverigedemokraterna (the Sweden Democrats) were founded in Sweden in February 1988, with modest support at the local

levels but little support nationally. They gained their first significant portion of the national vote in 2010, gaining seats in parliament (Swedish far-right, 2010). I chose to include the Swedish case because of their rising xenophobia.

There is no significant extreme right-wing party in Spain today. After Francisco Franco's death in 1975, a rapid shift towards democracy created an unreceptive environment for those wishing to maintain the old right-wing regime's status quo. Radicalization of politics was looked upon with fear of a renewed civil war. Spain was experiencing an era of modernization that was hostile to the extreme right (Ignazi, 2003). Even though there is no extreme right-wing party in Spain, I chose this case because of the 2004 Madrid bombings.

In the Netherlands, the era after World War II greatly shaped the political landscape, seen through hostile environment towards collaborators. Due to this, there existed an ingrained resistance within the country to Nazi affiliated parties (Ignazi, 2003). Extreme right-wing parties have recently gained a foothold in the country though, due to the rise in the number of immigrants into the Netherlands. The Partij voor de Vrijheid (The Party for Freedom), led by Geert Wilders, established in 2005, espouses an anti-Islam agenda (Surge for Dutch, 2010). Similar to the Netherlands, Denmark's extreme right-wing party is a relative newcomer to the political scene. Though there were many forerunners to the Danish People's Party (the Progress Party), the party itself was only established in October 1995. Unlike the Partij voor de Vrijheid, however, the Danish People's Party campaigns on a more populist platform (Fennema, 2005). I have included this party because of its primarily populist over fascist platform.

France and Germany are also very similar cases in that they have well established extreme right-wing parties, the Front National (National Front) and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (The National Democratic Party of Germany) respectively. The Front National (FN) was established in 1972 during a period of post-industrialism and a shift towards nationalism counter to European integration. The FN experienced great electoral success in the 1980s and 1990s, promoting their anti-EU and anti-immigrant platform (Minkenberg and Shain, 2003). Germany's Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, though established in 1964, has, unlike the FN, seen little success in national elections. This can be attributed to a number of different factors, including Germany's Nazi history and the adoption of much of the typical right-wing issues by the mainstream parties (Karapin, 2002). I included both of these cases because of their well-established extreme right-wing parties.

Support for extreme right wing parties will be quantified as the percent of votes the parties received during parliamentary elections. I will be using the Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services European Election Database because it includes the results of parliamentary elections from 1990-2012. They provide the percent voteshare for each party in each individual country. This dataset was compiled using statistics reported by the election agencies of the respective country governments. I will look at data starting in 1993 and ending in 2011. Each country holds elections according to their own electoral system, so there are there will be a range of different election dates.

I quantified the terrorist attacks by creating two variables for each of the attacks, a dummy variable, which measures the effect in the short term, and a counter variable, which measures the effect in the long term.

Table 1 shows the results of the multiple-interrupted time-series analysis.¹

Looking at the cases of Denmark, France, and Germany, the support for extreme right-wing parties has been increasing over time. In Denmark after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York, support for the Danish People's Party increased in the short term, but showed no significance in the long run. Election results for the extreme right-wing party in Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) also showed a slight temporary effect to the 9/11 attacks. Germany also experienced a significant effect to the 2004 Madrid bombings. After the attack, the average vote increased by 1 percent. The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom did not experience any significant effect. This is understandable in Spain, as there exists no extreme right-wing party to gain votes. In Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, sufficient data did not exist. Since these parties had no/little electoral support before the terrorist attacks, I was not able to measure the impact of the attacks on voteshare.

While running these regressions, I ran into the issue of high correlation among my variables. In an effort to resolve the issue, I ran two different regressions, one with the dummy variables and one with the counter variables. Table 2 shows the regression using the dummy variables. In this model, Denmark, France, and Germany continued to see increased support for the extreme right-wing parties over time. The greatest gains were seen in Denmark, where the average vote increased by 0.91 percent each year. Similarly to Table 1, Table 2 also shows slight significance for the short term effect of the 9/11 bombings. After the attack, the average vote increased by 3.74 percent. The results of

¹ Tables can be found at the end of the paper

Table 1 were upheld by those of Table 2 with regards to the short term effect of the 2004 Madrid bombings in Germany. What had not been reported in Table 1, however, that became significant in the dummy variable regression, was the increase in support for the extreme right-wing party in the Netherlands (Partij voor de Vrijheid) after 9/11. While running this equation, the variables for the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks were too correlated to include in the regression model. Since the first election that the Partij voor de Vrijheid gained part of the voteshare was in 2006 (after all of the attacks occurred) it is difficult to understand how the 9/11 attacks would have a greater impact than the two other terrorist attacks.

Table 3 displays the results of the regression that uses the counter variables, measuring the long term effect of the attacks. Again, Denmark, France, and Germany all experienced an increase in the percent voteshare for their respective extreme right-wing parties over time. In France we see the first potential effect of the 2005 London attack, with an increase in support for the Front National by 8.42 percent each year. This result, however, has a very large variance inflation factors, meaning that there was a high level of correlation between the variables. This high correlation is also seen in Germany, where they seemed to have been effected by 2004 Madrid attack in the long run by a magnitude of 1 percent a year. According to Table 3, the Netherlands also felt the long term effects of the 2004 Madrid bombing, experiencing a 3.17 percent increase in voteshare each year. Looking at these findings, I cannot accept the hypothesis that extreme right-wing parties gain an increase in support after a terrorist attack, in both the short and long term. Though some significance was seen most frequently with regards to the 9/11 attack, the strongest variable in the regression was the trend over time. Many of the coefficients for

the different attack variables were actually negative, meaning a potential decrease in support for the extreme right-wing parties.

Before completely rejecting my hypothesis, though, I ran the regressions again looking to compare the different countries against each other. Similar to my earlier regressions, I experienced large correlation between the variables, so I ran the regression as a whole (Table 4) and separately by taking out the attack counters (Table 5) and the attack dummies (Table 6). Table 4 shows that the 9/11 attack in the long run had a significant impact on the voteshare for the extreme right-wing parties across all the cases, with a 1.73 percent increase each year. Table 5 shows that the 9/11 attack in the short term increased the voteshare by 3.31 percent each year across all of the countries. Table 6, like Table 4, also shows that the 9/11 terrorist attack had an effect in all countries. Each year on average the vote increased 1.16 percent. While these results do not completely support the hypothesis that terrorist attacks across the board increase support for extreme right-wing parties, it does show that one attack in particular did have an effect.

Conclusion

This paper utilized a multiple interrupted time series analysis to find an answer to the question, “Do terrorist attacks affect the electoral support for extreme right-wing parties?” Although extreme right-wing political parties are on the rise, the findings of this paper show that terrorist attacks do not consistently increase support for extreme right-wing parties. Of the seven countries examined, the only statistically significant result was for the control trend variable. The hypothesis cannot be completely rejected, however, as mixed results were produced. In a country comparison analysis, the 9/11 attack generated a significant effect in the short term. This could possibly be explained due to the scale of the attack. It is interesting to note that there was little significance shown for the 2004 Madrid attacks and the 2005 London attacks, both within Europe itself. I speculated that these attacks would have a greater effect because they directly affected the populations of these countries. In short, the occurrence of terrorist attacks is not a valuable measure for understanding the rise in support for extreme right-wing parties in Europe.

Many potential explanations for the rise in extreme right-wing parties have been given throughout the literature, ranging from immigration rates to unemployment rates, etc. (Knigge, 1998; Jackman and Volpert, 1996). Few studies have looked at the potential effects of terrorist attacks on political support. While a similar analysis using Israel as a case study showed significance in electoral support after a terrorist attack (Berrebi and Klor, 2008), the environment, the greater frequency of attacks, and higher level of

casualties could explain why these same results were not found in this analysis. Though the hypothesis was not supported by the findings, these results are still important because they show the future potential effect of another large-scale transnational terrorist attack, such as 9/11. It also helps to identify countries that feel the effects of terrorist attacks. This promotes further study into why this occurs particularly within effected countries.

The implications of these findings are that terrorist attacks on the whole are not a valuable measure for understanding the rise in extreme right-wing parties in Europe. On a public policy level, the implications of the rise of extreme right-wing parties are still important to look at, however, as they could have a significant effect on the future of the European Union. Many of the extreme right-wing parties advocate for the separation of their country from the European Union, or to a lesser extent, less involvement in the EU. It is also important to keep in mind that many of these parties have strong fascist components, which promote anti-immigration legislation that would undermine the free movement of peoples throughout the EU. On a political level, the implications of these findings are that governments should be cautious of the fear that terrorism spawns after an attack and how it affects people's support for the government in power. The ultimate implication of this analysis is that rival explanations are better suited to explain the rise of extreme right-wing parties.

There were several limitations in this multiple interrupted time series analysis. By looking at national elections, I was hampered by their infrequency. In many instances, there were only two or three elections during the time frame for this analysis. I was also limited by the data available, only finding data on election statistics dating back to the beginning of the 1990s. In the data I was able to accumulate, there were a number of

instances, as well, where the percentage of the vote for a particular extreme right-wing party was not given, but rather clumped into a category of “other” as the amount was so small. Another limitation was the recent establishment or ‘newness’ of these significant extreme right-wing parties in several countries, such as in the Netherlands. Further, even when these parties were established earlier than my time frame, they did not gain electoral success until very late into the time frame so that only one or two observations could be made.

Due to the limitations of this analysis, further study could be done with the benefit of a longer time period. A larger number of elections (observations) would provide greater accuracy and quality of measurement. While this analysis looked at national elections, further studies could go more in depth within a particular country and look at the success of extreme right-wing parties on a regional level. Extreme right-wing parties have been present in the regional level of politics much more often than in the national level. The potential for fringe parties to gain electoral success is potentially greater when they do not have to compete against well established parties. Further study could look at the effect of non-Islamic terrorist attacks. For example, attacks carried out by other organizations, such as the IRA in the United Kingdom or ETA in Spain and France, could have a significantly different effect than Islamic terrorist attacks. Whereas this analysis looked at the effect of terrorist attacks on political parties, further study could be done to look at how these extreme political parties and their rhetoric have the potential to themselves incite terrorism, such as the terrorist attacks in Norway.

Appendix

Table 1: The Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Percent Voteshare of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe									
		Dependent Variable: Percent Voteshare in National Parliamentary Elections							
Independent Variable		Denmark	France	Germany	Netherlands	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom	
Trend	Coefficient	1.32 ***	0.43 ***	0.04 ***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	Standard error	0.26	0.07	0.01	0.94	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	t-values	5.16	6.24	5.17	0.00	--	--	--	
9/11/2001 Attack (Dummy)	Coefficient	4.59 *	-4.70	0.16 #	0.00		5.70	1.90	
	Standard error	2.30	0.64	0.11	0.12		0.00	0.00	
	t-values	2.00	-7.30	1.51	0.00		--	--	
9/11/2001 Attack (Counter)	Coefficient	-1.32	-0.43	-0.04	1.43		0.00	0.00	
	Standard error	0.79	0.18	0.05	1.71		0.00	0.00	
	t-values	-1.68	-2.36	-0.93	0.84		--	--	
3/11/2004 Madrid Attack (Dummy)	Coefficient	1.25	-6.83	1.04 ***		0.00			
	Standard error	3.97	0.69	0.08		0.00			
	t-values	0.32	-9.90	12.94		--			
3/11/2004 Madrid Attack (Counter)	Coefficient	0.00	0.00	0.04		0.00			
	Standard error	2.46	0.24	0.05		0.00			
	t-values	0.00	0.00	0.90		--			
7/7/2005 London Attack (Dummy)	Coefficient	1.23							
	Standard error	2.41							
	t-values	0.51							
7/7/2005 London Attack (Counter)	Coefficient	-0.31							
	Standard error	2.41							
	t-values	-0.13							
Constant		-3.18	11.98 ***	-0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
R-Sq.		0.95	0.99	1.00	0.92		1.00	1.00	
#=p<0.10, ##=p<0.05, ###=p<0.01, one-tailed tests									
*=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01, two-tailed tests									
Observations=19									

Table 2: The Short Term Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Percent Voteshare

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable: Percent Voteshare in National Parliamentary Elections							
		Denmark	France	Germany	Netherlands	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Trend	Coefficient	0.91 ***	0.32 ***	0.04 ***	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Standard error	0.27	0.07	0.01	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00
	t-values	3.43	4.39	6.42	1.01	--	--	--
9/11/2001 Attack (Dummy)	Coefficient	3.74 *	-5.23	0.08 #	7.26 ***		5.70	1.90
	Standard error	2.02	0.63	0.06	2.23		0.00	0.00
	t-values	1.86	-8.35	1.42	3.25		--	--
3/11/2004 Madrid Attack (Dummy)	Coefficient	-1.49	-8.43	1.00 ***		0.00		
	Standard error	1.92	0.55	0.05				
	t-values	-0.78	-15.32	18.55		--		
7/7/2005 London Attack (Dummy)	Coefficient	-2.89						
	Standard error	1.93						
	t-values	-1.50						
Constant		-1.33	12.51 ***	-0.10	-1.34	0.00	0.00	0.00
R-Sq.		0.90	0.98	0.99	0.75		1.00	1.00

#=p<0.10, ##=p<0.05, ###=p<0.01, one-tailed tests

*=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01, two-tailed tests

Observations=19

Table 3: The Long Term Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Percent Voteshare

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable: Percent Voteshare in National Parliamentary Elections							
		Denmark	France	Germany	Netherlands	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Trend	Coefficient	1.52 ***	0.21 #	0.05 ***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Standard error	0.25	0.13	0.01	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00
	t-values	6.06	1.59	5.69	0.00	--	--	--
9/11/2001 Attack (Counter)	Coefficient	-0.26	-1.17	0.01	-0.98		1.90	0.63
	Standard error	0.64	0.33	0.03	0.76		0.00	0.00
	t-values	-0.41	-3.59	0.41	-1.28		--	--
3/11/2004 Madrid Attack (Counter)	Coefficient	-0.78	-7.47	1.00 ***^	3.17 **	0.00	1.90	0.63
	Standard error	0.91	1.95	0.08	1.11	0.00	0.00	0.00
	t-values	-0.86	-3.82	12.61	2.84	--	--	--
7/7/2005 London Attack (Counter)	Coefficient	-0.34	8.42 ***^	-1.02				
	Standard error	0.65	2.28	0.08				
	t-values	-0.51	3.69	-13.08				
Constant		-3.77	12.69 ***	-0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
R-Sq.		0.93	0.94	0.99	0.92		1.00	1.00

#=p<0.10, ##=p<0.05, ###=p<0.01, one-tailed tests

*=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01, two-tailed tests

^=presence of high variance inflation factors

Observations=19

Table 4: Country Comparison of the Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Voteshare

Dependent Variable: Percent Voteshare

Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-values Significance

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-values	Significance
Denmark	6.61	1.10	6.01	***
France	9.56	1.07	8.98	***
Germany	0.09	1.09	0.08	
Netherlands	1.97	1.01	1.95	**
Spain	0.41	1.14	0.36	
Sweden	0.40	0.98	0.41	
Trend	0.02	0.08	0.23	
9/11 Dummy	-1.79	1.91	-0.93	
9/11 Counter	1.73	0.54	3.22	***^
3/04 Dummy	-0.43	2.24	-0.19	
3/04 Counter	0.01	0.45	0.02	
7/05 Dummy	-2.53	2.56	-0.99	
7/05 Counter	-1.42	0.84	-1.70	
Constant	-0.44	1.00	-0.43	
R-Sq	0.71			

#=p<0.10, ##=p<0.05, ###=p<0.01, one-tailed tests

*=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01, two-tailed tests

^=presence of high variance inflation factors

Table 5: Country Comparison of Short Term Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Voteshare

		Dependent Variable: Percent Voteshare		
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-values	Significance
Denmark	6.85	1.14	6.03	***
France	9.19	1.10	8.39	***
Germany	-0.78	1.10	-0.71	
Netherlands	2.03	1.04	1.94	**
Spain	-0.22	1.16	-0.19	
Sweden	0.40	1.02	0.39	
Trend	0.03	0.08	0.28	
9/11 Dummy	3.31	1.12	2.96	***
3/04 Dummy	0.79	1.40	0.57	
7/05 Dummy	-1.07	1.54	-0.70	
Constant	-0.35	1.02	-0.34	
R-Sq	0.68			

#= $p < 0.10$, ##= $p < 0.05$, ###= $p < 0.01$, one-tailed tests

*= $p < 0.10$, **= $p < 0.05$, ***= $p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests

Table 6: Country Comparison of Long Term Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Voteshare

Dependent Variable: Percent Voteshare

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-values	Significance
Denmark	6.51	1.09	6.00	***
France	9.26	1.03	9.04	***
Germany	-0.54	1.02	-0.53	
Netherlands	1.77	1.01	1.76	*
Spain	0.28	1.11	0.25	
Sweden	0.40	0.98	0.41	
Trend	0.00	0.08	-0.01	
9/11 Counter	1.16	0.28	4.15	***
3/04 Counter	-0.03	0.28	-0.12	
7/05 Counter	-1.23	0.50	-2.49	
Constant	-0.20	0.98	-0.21	
R-Sq	0.70			

#=p<0.10, ##=p<0.05, ###=p<0.01, one-tailed tests

*=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01, two-tailed tests

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Honors and Awards

- Dean's List, six consecutive semesters
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- Liberal Arts Undergraduate Council, THON Chair
- Student Ambassador (Envoy) with the College of Liberal Arts-inaugural class
- Vice President of Global Ambassadors
- Pi Sigma Alpha, Political Science Honor Society, Member
- Penn State IFC/Pan-Hellenic Dance Marathon (THON) [largest run student philanthropy in the world to benefit children with pediatric cancer]
 - Donor and Alumni Relations Committee 2011-2012
 - Member, Rules & Regulations Committee 2010

Professional Experience

Department of Homeland Security, Summers 2009,2010
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
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- Provided program support for acquisitions to include research, requisition review and tracking, and maintenance of databases and timelines of agency resources.
- Part of a team that provided customer support to offices worldwide for the requisition of mission essential items
- Received training on agency's financial management system