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THE UNLIKELY WEAPON:
UNMASKING THE CAUSE OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

State-sponsored terrorism is an understudied form of political violence. Although states can use war as a legitimate approach to punish their opponents, some countries solicit the assistance of international terrorist organizations. In this paper, the author uses several variables that could determine if a state appears on the US State Department's "State Sponsors of Terrorism" list or if Daniel Byman mentioned them as a state sponsor at the end of his book, *Deadly Connections* (2005). The author supposed that economically weak states were more likely to be state sponsors. Data were collected in a spreadsheet, and then analyzed through the statistics software Stata. The unit of measurement was a country-year. The analysis included all states and, to gather enough data, consisted of the years 1979-2005. GDP, GDP per capita and economic growth were invalid indicators of state sponsorship, as were military expenditures. This disproved the author's assumption that state-sponsored terrorism was a "weapon of the weak." States that had low Polity scores, indicating more authoritarian regimes, were more likely to appear on one of the lists. In addition, being a state in the Middle East and North Africa also meant a better chance of appearing on one of the lists.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

For centuries, states have coerced denizens of itself and neighboring lands through fear. These legitimate actors would threaten a population so that it could fulfill its domestic or foreign policy. However, a relatively recent strategy in global politics has allowed states to inflict terror against other states through a third-party. State-sponsored terrorism is the phenomenon where a state enlists the assistance of a terrorist organization to carry out violence against a target state. State-sponsored terrorism is peculiar because a state coordinates violence against a target state, both of which are legitimate actors, through the means of an illicit organization. However, the sponsoring state has the means to damage its rival through a legitimate war. Therefore, an alliance with terrorists, who are universally condemned for their attacks on noncombatants, may bring about more problems from the international community than the potential benefits that could arise. Nevertheless, state sponsorship has been a salient weapon for some countries since 1979, and those who do supply a terrorist organization tend to do so for many years.

The study of terrorism is a complex social science, and unfortunately for researchers, there is a dearth of material from which to explore. The lack of knowledge about terrorists' origins has led to many false conclusions among policymakers. For example, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the link between economic needs and terrorism "found its way into mainstream economic development and international security policy discussions while shaping debate on an array of issues

from African humanitarian aid to the reconstruction of Iraq” (Piazza 2006, 159). Two months after the attack, forty-one heads of state, as well as Secretary General Kofi Annan, spoke that international terrorism must be discussed with economic development and poverty before the United Nations General Assembly. Former US President Bill Clinton described terrorism as the “dark side of globalization” and then-President George W. Bush called for a united front against global poverty in 2002. “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Piazza 2006, 159-160). In spite of this mantra, there is no conclusive evidence that solving economic distress will alleviate the problem of terrorism. As Piazza (2006) notes, “there is no empirical evidence to support the crux of the ‘rooted-in-poverty’ thesis—popularized by world leaders, the media, and some scholars” (170).

While economic factors fail to explain terrorists’ behaviors, poverty can be an indicator of state-sided political violence. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin found that socioeconomic factors were statistically significant determinants of civil war and insurgency. Poverty directly correlates with violent domestic conflict because it is associated with “financially and bureaucratically weak states” (Piazza 2006, 163). Insurgents are successful in using this cleavage in recruitment. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin found that “weak states may be more prone to brutal, indiscriminate retaliation against populations where the insurgency is located” (Piazza 2006, 163). Other scholars found that poverty incited political violence in Iran, Africa and Latin America.

Hoffman (2006) writes that state-sponsored terrorism is a “deliberate instrument of foreign policy: a cost-effective means of waging war covertly, through the use of

surrogate warriors or "guns for hire" - terrorists" (258). The US State Department considers terrorism to be "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Terrorism 2011). There are two perpetrators in state-sponsored terrorism, the state and the terrorist organization. Piazza (2006) found that poor economic conditions were not conducive to instances of terrorism. However, states tend to be involved in brutal suppression of political opponents during insurgencies and civil wars. This thesis paper will explore why a state would decide to sponsor a terrorist organization. State sponsors are legitimate actors and do not have the same experiences as individuals who become terrorists. Quelling the actions of another state would be similar to governments who suppress insurgencies with indiscriminate violence. In addition, sponsoring a terrorist organization allows a state to wage an unconventional military campaign against a rival. This benefits the sponsor if the target state has a significant advantage to project power through trade or its military. Therefore, I hypothesize that states sponsor terrorists because they lack the capabilities to fight a conventional war against a rival. One can expect state sponsors to have diminutive economies and weak armed forces.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

As mentioned earlier, state-sponsored terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. Hoffman (2006) writes that state sponsorship emerged in November 1979, outside the US Embassy in Tehran. Although the perpetrators of the Iran hostage crisis claimed they were acting independently, the passing months revealed that Ayatollah Khomeini directed the situation to carry out his foreign policy with the United States. To other pariah states, this act of state-sponsored terrorism came off as inexpensive and “if executed properly, potentially risk-free means of anonymously attacking stronger enemies and thereby avoiding the threat of international punishment or reprisal” (Hoffman 2006, 258). The state and the group do not have to agree on ideology. The sponsor would merely enlist the terrorist organization as mercenaries.

Sponsored organizations do not operate under the same pressures as non-sponsored terrorist groups. Since sponsored organizations do not try to extend an ideology or win the hearts of locals, they will wreak greater carnage than their independent counterparts. These organizations also do not conduct attacks in order to garner publicity, for they are acting as “guns-for-hire” for their state sponsors. (Hoffman 2006, 259-261) However, since the sponsor is interested in exporting a foreign policy through terrorists, the sponsor could curtail the terrorists’ employment of weapons of mass destruction (Byman 2005, 52).

According to Byman (2005), states will sponsor a terrorist organization to “influence their neighbors, topple a hostile adversary regime, counter US hegemony, or achieve other means of state” (4). Other reasons for supporting terrorism include “to further their ideology; and to bolster their position at home” (36). Byman (2005) classified state sponsors of terrorism into six categories: strong supporters, weak supporters, lukewarm supporters, antagonistic supporters, passive supporters and unwilling hosts (15). Strong supporters are highly committed to the terrorist group and demonstrate their support by providing important resources. Weak supporters are unable to provide terrorists with many resources. While a lukewarm supporter may favor an organization for its cause, it does little to advance the terrorists directly. A state that attempts to control an organization is an antagonistic supporter. Byman (2005) calls states that fall within one of these four categories “active sponsors” (15). Passive supporters “turn a blind eye” to terrorist activities, and unwilling hosts are too weak to halt terrorists within their borders.

Byman (2005) also categorized types of support into six groups: “training and operations; money, arms and logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological direction; and (perhaps most importantly) sanctuary” (59). Training is the most common form of assistance. Money and diplomatic backing are important resources that a terrorist organization uses to recruit new members (61). State sponsors can also unite fractious organizations. For example, Iran united eight Afghan Shi’a groups into one guerilla organization in 1988 (63). Sanctuary greatly limits the probability that a target state will destroy a terrorist organization through a knockout blow or assassination.

After Hezbollah received Iranian assistance, the Lebanese organization transformed from “a rag-tag collection of fighters to one of the most formidable guerrilla and terrorist groups in history” (Byman 2005, 5). However, “many state-supported groups remain weak or ineffective. Still others have collapsed despite state backing because of their own incompetence or lack of appeal” (Byman 2005, 53).

Byman (2005) found that there were several difficulties for target states to stop state-sponsored terrorism. State sponsors anticipate punishment from other states or the international community, and will find alternate means to aid terrorists. Sponsors also see their efforts as more favorable to their interest than outright war or negotiations. Byman (2005) writes that outside efforts would not sway ideologically driven states. Lastly, the international community may not fully comprehend the position of the state sponsor (259-260).

Abadie (2004) explores the link between terrorism, economics and political freedom. Abadie (2004) states that he was unable “to find a significant association between terrorism and economic variables such as income once the effect of other country characteristics is taken into account” (9). He did find that terrorism was more likely to occur during regimes that were transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy than in regimes that were classified as either authoritarian or democratic (9). Abadie (2004) bases his research in part from Krueger and Laitin, who suggested “that among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich countries. Conversely, among countries with similar levels of civil

liberties, richer countries seem to be preferred targets for transnational terrorist attacks”

(1).

Unfortunately, state-sponsored terrorism is an understudied topic. “While the links between terrorist groups and their sponsors are self-evident, we rarely have direct causal connectivity or linkage between a recent terrorist outrage and the sponsoring state” (Roberts 1987, 258). Roberts (1987) attributes this to a decline in human intelligence collecting capabilities and the secretive nature of terrorists and state sponsors (258). As a result, my paper will not be able to completely measure every relationship of state-sponsored terrorism. Nevertheless, state-sponsored terrorism needs to be researched so that policymakers can develop better methods for fighting this menace.

Chapter 3

Data Collection

Despite the author's best efforts to find them, there are few resources that list state sponsors of terrorism. Many scholarly articles use case studies to explore state-sponsored terrorism. Furthermore, the US State Department was the only governmental agency worldwide that kept a list of state sponsors of terrorism. No international organization recorded state sponsors as well. It appears that most interest in state-sponsored terrorism falls on the terrorists' half of the problem. Due to this dearth, only two sources could be used for dependent variables. Furthermore, the US State Department list does not accurately list state sponsors for political purposes. For example, the United States never considered Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, whereas Byman (2005) recognized their support for terrorists in Kashmir. Since the State Department's list carries economic sanctions, the agency is unlikely to classify allies of the United States as state sponsors.

This paper measures data between 1979-2005. The US State Department began its "State Sponsors of Terrorism" list in 1979, which is why the author began his analysis in this year. He selected 2005 as the end date because that is when the State Department's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report ended. The unit being measured is a country-year. However, the countries will be bounded together through a prescribed number known as a Correlates of War (COW) code (Datasets 2007).

The first resource that the author used was the US State Department's "State Sponsors of Terrorism" (2010) list. The list, which began in 1979, "is a mechanism for isolating nations that use terrorism as a means of political expression" (Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999: Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism 2000). Eight countries have appeared on the list during its history: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, South Yemen, Sudan and Syria. Iraq and South Yemen were the only states of the eight that did not appear on the list in 2005. Syria is the only state that the State Department has classified as a State Sponsor of Terrorism continuously since the list's inception (State Sponsors of Terrorism 2010). A second list was created from the State Department's list. In this new catalog, any state that appeared on "State Sponsors of Terrorism" (2010) would be classified as state sponsor from 1979 to 2005. This would measure changes in economic growth and durability better than if states were only classified for years that the State Department designated them.

The other source of state sponsors of terrorism is Byman's (2005) *Deadly Connections*. At the end of his book, Byman (2005) assembled an appendix of "major terrorist groups" (319). He included dates of operation and state sponsorship. From these factors, the author compiled a third list to measure state sponsorship (319-339). Byman's (2005) list only includes states that are "active sponsors," not passive supporters or unwilling hosts. In all three lists, the author would code state sponsorship as a dichotomous variable. A "1" would indicate that a country-year was a sponsor of terrorism, and a "0" would mean that a country-year did not appear on the list.

The following factors will be used as independent variables to determine if they are statistically significant indicators of a state's decision to sponsor terrorism: economic development, military expenditures, democratization, durability of regime, CINC score and regions.

In order to measure economic development, the author selected three indicators: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita and GDP growth. The author found this data in the "World Development Indicators" (2011) from the World Bank. The author selected World Bank data because the organization is an authority in economic matters. GDP, GDP per capita and GDP growth were chosen because the author felt that they best represented the macroeconomic affairs of a country. The World Bank provided monetary data in constant 2000 US dollars.

The author also studied military development to see if that indicated an appearance on the State Department's or Byman's (2005) lists. In 2005, the US State Department published its last edition of the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report. WMEAT 2005 measured military expenditures from 1995 until 2005. In order to determine military development, the author used military expenditures and military expenditures per capita. The State Department gave the data in constant 2005 US dollars (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2005, 2005).

The Polity IV dataset measured how democratic or authoritarian regimes were. A Polity score would range from -10 (mostly authoritarian) to 10 (mostly democratic). The author also used durability, the years that a government has controlled a state, from the

Polity IV dataset (Data Page 2011). CINC score quantified the share of power that a state had in a year (Datasets 2007).

The author was also interested in seeing if state sponsors shared geographic regions. He divided the world in seven regions: Americas, Europe, Asia, Middle East and North Africa (Greater Middle East), sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Pacific/Indian Ocean Islands. If a state fell within a given region, it was coded with a “1.” A state that did not fall within a given region was coded with a “0.” For the Greater Middle East, the author made the decision that the easternmost state would be Iran. Turkey was also classified as a Middle Eastern state. Since Russia and the Caucus countries share more cultural ties with Europe than Asia, they were considered European states. Any country that is an island in the Indian Ocean, such as Sri Lanka, or the Pacific Ocean, such as Japan or Taiwan, was classified as such.

Chapter 4

Results and Discussion

The author used the software program, Stata, to run logistic regressions of the aforementioned variables. Among the independent variables, the author was looking for the sign of the coefficient, statistical significance across the three dependent variables and reliability across regression tables.

In the initial analysis, the author explored the effects that economic and military development had on a country's appearance on one of the three lists. These first results would reveal if state sponsorship of terrorism shared patterns similar to other forms of terrorism, or if sponsorship was more like civil wars and coups.

Table 1

Dep. Variable:	1		2		3	
	State Dept. List		EverStateList		Byman's State Sponsors	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
GDP (World Bank)	-4.76x10 ⁻¹²	(4.23x10 ⁻¹²)	-4.82x10 ⁻¹²	(4.20x10 ⁻¹²)	-1.68x10 ⁻¹²	(3.13x10 ⁻¹²)
GDP per capita (World Bank)	-.00024	(.0003127)	-.0002475	(.0003149)	-.0002863	(.0002219)
GDP growth (World Bank)	-.0096649	(.0155754)	.0050264	(.0084553)	-.0022365	(.0091105)
Mil. Expenditures (State Dep)	.0000859	(.0000653)	.000086	(.0000652)	.0000345	(.0000592)
MilExp per Capita (State Dep)	.0020856	(.0030772)	.0021396	(.003081)	.0026876	(.002084)
Constant	-2.86947	(.5003119)	-2.888506	(.5027843)	-2.370113	(.4003894)
n	1710		1710		1710	
Pseudo r ²	.0704		.0716		.0727	
Countries (clusters)	160		160		160	

Dependent Variable = Appearance on a List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

* = significance on the .05 level; ** = significance on the .01 level; *** = significance on the .000 level

Contrary to the researcher's hypothesis, GDP, GDP per capita and GDP growth all failed to indicate a state's presence on the State Department's or Byman's (2005) lists. Military expenditures and military expenditures per capita also did not correlate with state-sponsored terrorism. There are two findings that one can draw from these results. First, Piazza (2006) discredited terrorism as "rooted-in-poverty." Individuals do not become terrorists because they suffer from dire economic conditions. Likewise, states do not sponsor terrorist organizations because they lack economies to interact with other states in a conventional manner. Second, state-sponsored terrorism is not a "weapon-of-the-weak." A country does not sponsor a proscribed organization because it lacks the expenditures to raise a conventional military. Given these two results, the international community should not provide economic assistance or military aid to a state sponsor in order to have the state sponsor no longer support a terrorist organization. These efforts will prove to be futile and the state will continue to sponsor terrorists to carry out its foreign policy.

If military and economic development are not indicators of state-sponsored terrorism, than what is? In order to answer this question, the author decided to measure democratization with the military and economic variables. A positive coefficient would indicate that democracies are more likely to sponsor terrorism, while a negative coefficient would indicate authoritarian regimes sponsor terrorists.

Table 2

Dep. Variable:	1		2		3	
	State Dept. List		EverStateList		Byman's State Sponsors	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
GDP (World Bank)	-5.91e-12	(5.64e-12)	-5.91e-12	(5.64e-12)	-2.55e-14	(4.48e-12)
GDP per capita (World Bank)	-.0000163	(.000146)	-.0000163	(.000146)	-.0001753	(.0002776)
GDP growth (World Bank)	-.0099782	(.0134894)	-.0099782	(.0134894)	-.0134821	(.0126673)
Polity	-.2837349	(.1106008)*	-.2837349	(.1106008)**	-.1855156	(.0552011)**
Mil. Expenditures (State Dep)	.0001032	(.0000976)	.0001032	(.0000976)	-2.50e-06	(.0000898)
MilExp per Capita (State Dep)	-.0015144	(.0024237)	-.0015144	(.0024237)	.0009071	(.0030092)
Constant	-3.584002	(.7554211)	-3.584002	(.7554211)	-2.671187	(.4941126)
n	1575		1575		1575	
Pseudo r ²	.2574		.2574		.1948	
Countries (clusters)	151		151		151	

Dependent Variable = Appearance on a List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

* = significance on the .05 level; ** = significance on the .01 level; *** = significance on the .000 level

In this table, Polity score maintained statistical significance across three columns. A country's Polity score is inversely proportional to its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Therefore, one would expect an authoritarian regime to be involved with state-sponsored terrorism, not a democracy. Since terrorism is tantamount to war crimes and liberal principles embellish democracies, this finding should not come as a surprise.

Next, the author wanted to examine if geographic location could determine state-sponsored terrorism. A region with a positive coefficient would mean that the states in that area are more prone to support terrorist organizations. A negative value would show that region is not favorable for state sponsors. Through multiple regressions, only one region demonstrated that it had statistical significance in determining the appearance of state sponsors of terrorism.

Table 3

Dep. Variable:	1		2		3	
	State Dept. List		EverStateList		Byman's State Sponsors	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
GDP (World Bank)	-1.15e-11	(1.22e-11)	-1.15e-11	(1.22e-11)	1.45e-13	(5.88e-12)
GDP per capita (World Bank)	.0000122	(.0001332)	.0000122	(.0001332)	-.0003217	(.0003899)
GDP growth (World Bank)	.0048316	(.016089)	.0048316	(.016089)	.001686	(.0161738)
Polity	-.291139	(.1928553)	-.291139	(.1928553)	-.1130984	(.0724359)
Mil. Expenditures (State Dep)	.0002034	(.0001715)	.0002034	(.0001715)	7.07e-06	(.000115)
MilExp per Capita (State Dep)	-.0055682	(.0031491)	-.0055682	(.0031491)	-.0011171	(.0040425)
Middle East/N. Africa	3.613476	(1.318748)**	3.613476	(1.318748)**	4.618887	(1.207098)**
Constant	-4.996955	(1.296326)	-4.996955	(1.296326)	-4.192994	(1.180223)
n	1575		1575		1575	
Pseudo r ²	0.4794		0.4794		0.5451	
Countries (clusters)	151		151		151	

Dependent Variable = Appearance on a List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

* = significance on the .05 level; ** = significance on the .01 level; *** = significance on the .000 level

The Middle East and North Africa variable proves to be the greatest indicator that a state would be included on a sponsorship list. In the table above, the Greater Middle East is such a strong indicator of state-sponsored terrorism that it removes statistical significance from Polity. This result should not astonish anyone who looked at states that were usually listed as state sponsors of terrorism. The US State Department only included two states from outside the Greater Middle East, Cuba and North Korea, in its State Sponsors of Terrorism (2010). Most of Byman's (2005) state sponsors came from this region as well. No other region even showed an inverse relationship to state-sponsored terrorism.

After studying regions, the author wanted to test the significance of other variables, and to determine if Polity and the Greater Middle East were reliable indicators of state-sponsored terrorism.

Table 4

Dep. Variable:	1		2		3	
	State Dept. List		EverStateList		Byman's State Sponsors	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
GDP per capita (World Bank)	-.0000672	(.0001678)	-.0000672	(.0001678)	-.0001768	(.0002622)
Polity	-2.2553367	(.0858834)**	-2.2553367	(.0858834)**	-.1707784	(.0464996)***
MilExp per Capita (State Dep)	-.000699	(.0026524)	-.000699	(.0026524)	.0005921	(.0030058)
Durability	.0171963	(.0164633)	.0171963	(.0164633)	.0125432	(.0154928)
Constant	-3.867456	(.8415324)	-3.867456	(.8415324)	-2.893959	(.5910602)
n	1580		1580		1580	
Pseudo r ²	0.2704		0.2704		0.2036	
Countries (clusters)	151		151		151	

Dependent Variable = Appearance on a List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

* = significance on the .05 level; ** = significance on the .01 level; *** = significance on the .000 level

Once again, Polity proved to be a statistically significant indicator of state-sponsored terrorism. Authoritarian regimes were more likely to support terrorists than democracies. This contradicts Abadie's (2004) argument that transitional regimes, not authoritarian regimes or democracies, offered favorable conditions for terrorism.

Only in one regression analysis did a variable other than Polity or the Greater Middle East show statistical significance across the three dependent variables.

Table 5

Dep. Variable:	1		2		3	
	State Dept. List		EverStateList		Byman's State Sponsors	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
GDP per capita (World Bank)	-.0001727	(.0000547)**	-.0001759	(.00006)**	-.0001651	(.000074)*
GDP growth (World Bank)	-.004357	(.0147034)	.0001732	(.0102936)	.0196529	(.0071393)**
CINC	-3.528394	(10.11375)	-2.990905	(10.56321)	2.44063	(9.339099)
Durability	.0214761	(.0108957)*	.0156976	(.0123363)	.0064591	(.0155092)
Constant	-3.512096	(.5174609)	-3.165475	(.5524899)	-2.678049	(.4372831)
n	3624		3624		3624	
Pseudo r ²	0.0535		0.0480		0.0494	
Countries (clusters)	156		156		156	

Dependent Variable = Appearance on a List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

* = significance on the .05 level; ** = significance on the .01 level; *** = significance on the .000 level

According to this regression table, GDP per capita had an inverse relationship with state-sponsored terrorism. Sponsorship could more readily be found in countries with smaller GDPs per capita. However, no other result tables showed that GDP per capita experienced statistical significance. Since this measurement is unreliable, I do not claim that it supports my hypothesis.

The author chose to create a table comprised only of variables where statistical significance was displayed in at least one column.

Table 6

Dep. Variable:	1		2		3	
	State Dept. List		EverStateList		Byman's State Sponsors	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
GDP (World Bank)						
GDP per capita (World Bank)	-0.002431	(.0001545)	-0.002732	(.0001751)	-0.000558	(.000229)*
GDP growth (World Bank)	-0.0171983	(.0167553)	-0.0106035	(.0126412)	.0261685	(.0078358)**
Polity	-1.539817	(.0766505)*	-1.413639	(.0560308)*	-.0306907	(.03635)
CINC	2.829158	(13.89381)	1.957526	(14.84068)	11.0492	(9.106294)
Middle East/N. Africa	3.187543	(1.427678)*	3.409666	(1.459652)*	4.755643	(1.180964)***
Durability	.0110174	(.0134665)	.0039478	(.0166468)	.0077691	(.0220639)
Constant	-4.958409	(.9938381)	-4.610217	(.895893)	-4.300976	(1.33817)
n	3483		3483		3483	
Pseudo r ²	0.3620		0.3848		0.5132	
Countries (clusters)	155		155		155	

Dependent Variable = Appearance on a List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

* = significance on the .05 level; ** = significance on the .01 level; *** = significance on the .000 level

The Middle East and North Africa was once again the predominant indicator that a state would or would not sponsor a terrorist organization.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The connection between economic development and political violence is diverse. On one hand, coups and civil wars are more likely to occur when there are sour economic conditions. Meanwhile, there is no evidence that terrorism was rooted in poverty. State-sponsored terrorism sat in between these dueling camps of political research. Did state sponsorship align with other state-related forms of violence, or did it parallel other strands of terrorism? After running multiple regression tables, the author found that there was no link between economic development and state sponsorship. In addition, there was no indication that military expenditures were determinants of state-sponsored terrorism.

Only two independent variables influenced a state's appearance on one of the state sponsors list. First, states that reside within the Greater Middle East are the most likely to sponsor terrorist organizations. This is a peculiar occurrence for nowhere else are state sponsors of terrorism so proximate to each other. The next strongest indicator of state-sponsored terrorism is the Polity score. The more authoritarian that a state is, the more likely it will support terrorist organizations. This seems logical in that draconian governments are the least likely to respect human rights.

Therefore, what should the international community do with states that are sponsoring terrorist organizations? Economic aid will not stop them from supporting proscribed organizations. It seems that there is only one option to prevent a state from sponsoring terrorist organizations. Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa must be overhauled, and democracies must be set up in their place. During the

time of Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq, he provided sanctuary to terrorists who assailed Israel, Turkey and Iran. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Saddam Hussein's support for terrorist organizations evaporated (Terrorism Havens: Iraq 2005).

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ACADEMIC VITA

Douglas Dooling Jr.

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Education

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802

Expected B.A. with Honors in International Politics, National Security concentration, May 2013

Minors: Business and Liberal Arts, French and Francophone Studies

Paterno Liberal Arts Undergraduate Fellows Program

Research Experience

International Center for the Study of Terrorism

August – December 2010

- Read articles from the *Irish Times* about Irish Republican terrorists during “The Troubles”
- Collected information of nearly two-hundred fifty terrorists from these articles
- Summarized my findings in a thesis paper

May - August 2012

- Read the autobiographies of four terrorists
- Coded a word document and spreadsheet with given questions

Leadership/Activities

University Park Allocation Committee (UPAC)

- Nittany Allocation Team: August 2010 – April 2011. We allocated funds from the Student Activity Fee to clubs and organizations, and I assisted in developing new policies how UPAC should distribute the Student Activity Fee.

Political Science Association

- Webmaster: February – September 2011. I created a new website for the Political Science Association.

Life Link PSU

- Mentor: September 2010 – December 2011. I assisted college-age individuals with mental disabilities during their lunch hour.

Schreyer Honors College Founders Day

- Planning Committee: May – September 2011. I organized and set-up a celebration in memory of William Schreyer.

Schreyer Honors College Speaker Series

- Coordinating Committee: August 2011 – April 2012. I discussed which speakers should be brought to Penn State, developed press releases and served as an usher at the events. In October 2011, our speaker attracted two hundred more listeners than we had anticipated.

Onward State

- Staff Writer: August 2011 - present. I write articles for a blog and news site that covers Penn State. I usually write about university governance, and national and state politics.

The Power of Pink

- Member: August 2010 – April 2012. I supported breast cancer awareness by helping with fundraisers, setting up a 5K and stuffing gift bags for breast cancer survivors.
- Treasurer: May 2012 – present. In addition to the previously mentioned duties, I am responsible for tracking the group's finances and serving as a liaison between the club and the Student Activities office.

Honors and Awards

- College of the Liberal Arts Academic Scholarship (2011-2012 academic year, 2012-2013 academic year)
- Dean's List (Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010, Spring 2011, Fall 2011, Fall 2012 semesters)

Seminars

Explore Law

- Summer 2011. Explore Law was a weeklong experience at the Dickinson School of Law. At this program, undergraduates learned about law school admissions, how law school professors run their classes, and what one can do with a law degree.