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COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS VS. TARGETED SANCTIONS: ACHIEVING GOALS

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ABSTRACT

Comprehensive sanctions employ full trade embargoes against the target of sanctions and require wide-sweeping bans on trade, diplomatic relations, and or other relationships between target and sender. Targeted sanctions impose embargoes or restrictions on a person or on groups of specific people. This thesis addresses the use of both comprehensive and targeted sanctions in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia. The thesis concludes that comprehensive sanctions are more successful in achieving the sender’s goals than are targeted sanctions; especially in the areas of containing a target militarily and economically and toppling regimes.
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To paraphrase Kofi Annan, sanctions are a tool of coercion. In order to work, they must inflict or at least threaten pain upon the target state. Many scholars argue that targeted sanctions, (those that aim at specific people or groups of people instead of an entire state) can more readily coerce leaders to obey sanctions’ demands. Hufbauer et. al (1985) found that comprehensive sanctions that impose large costs upon an entire state are twice as effective at achieving senders’ goals. In this paper, I conduct four case studies ranging from the 1990s-2008 to determine whether comprehensive or targeted sanctions have been more effective in achieving those goals.

In their landmark study of 204 sanctions cases from 1914-1985, Hufbauer, Elliott and Schott calculated that the overall success rate of sanctions was 34% for that time period. Although Hufbauer, a recognized authority on sanctions, has written articles questioning the efficiency of sanctions, it must be emphasized that sanctions do not occur in a vacuum. Therefore it is fruitless to declare sanctions in and of themselves as in/effective. Similarly, asking simply “Do sanctions work?” is simplistic. Indeed, the type of sanction applied, the goals it is meant to achieve, and the surrounding political situation in which the sanctions are “sent” to any “target state” all affect the outcome of the sanction.

Of the factors demanding analysis in a sanctions episode, this paper focuses on cost to the target of sanctions. Specifically, this paper seeks to evaluate the differences between comprehensive sanctions (those that affect the country as a whole through import and export bans and other measures) and targeted sanctions (asset freezes of certain groups or individuals, arms embargoes outside of a comprehensive framework, and trade embargoes that ban specific

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items and target certain individuals rather than the state itself). This paper asks, “Ceteris paribus, are comprehensive sanctions more effective in fulfilling senders’ goals than are targeted sanctions?” Since the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) have the most data available on their sanction episodes, this paper will focus on sanctions in which the US or UN lead or took part in. In several of the case studies, issues of audience costs and international compliance are addressed.

In Hufbauer et. al’s study, the mean cost imposed by sanctions on targets was 2.4% of the targets’ GNP. Interestingly, of eight cases that cost the target over 5% of its GNP, six were at least partially successful: a success rate of 75%. That rate more than doubles the mean of 34%. In all cases where the sender imposed costs of 10% or more of the target’s GNP, sanctions contributed to a positive outcome as defined by the sender’s goals for the sanctions.4

However, conventional wisdom holds that such large sanctions have been rendered obsolete by globalization.5 As countries integrate themselves into the global economy, they expand their links with multitudes of trading partners. Such interconnectedness supposedly frustrates the ability of any one country to compel or deter another by use of economic coercion. This same interdependence simultaneously makes more states vulnerable to stoppages or embargoes imposed by crucial trading partners. The conventional wisdom is not entirely true, but globalization has certainly made it easier for states to evade sanctions against them by finding an outside supplier.

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5 O'Sullivan, Meghan L. Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Also, globalization gave many substate actors, as well as individual members of autocratic states, tools with which to create and maintain worldwide networks. Consequently, it also gave them greater power to influence global opinion and policy through violent and non-violent means. The expansion of sanctions against substate entities and individual actors “reflects the need to adopt tactics to counter new threats and actors in the post-cold war world.” Due to the U.S. experience with levying devastating sanctions against both the Iraqi government and its citizenry, there is increasing demand for use of smaller-scale, more accurate sanctions that target smaller substate actors and solely the leadership, not the citizenry, of a state.⁶

Such sanctions are known as “targeted” sanctions. Hufbauer et. al, O’Sullivan, and Drury⁷ all state that asset freezes, travel bans, and trade embargoes constitute targeted sanctions. Hufbauer et. al draws the exception between targeted sanctions and selective ones. Targeted sanctions are “aimed” at specific people or groups of people. Selective sanctions are aimed at certain groups or companies. Therefore, the travel ban on Slobodan Milosevic during the Kosovo Crisis constitutes a targeted sanction while the asset freeze against the Alevi foundation constitutes a selective sanction. For the purposes of this paper, sanctions against armed groups are termed targeted sanctions while Hufbauer et. al may argue that those constitute selective sanctions.

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When targeted sanctions were not part of a comprehensive embargo (a general sanctions package with the potential to be large) only five of twenty cases could be judged as partially successful.\(^8\) This success rate of 25% is less than that of 34% for economic sanctions in general during the twentieth century. It is important to note that, in two of the successful cases, the stated goal for the sanctions was “relatively limited” and “well defined.” According to Hufbauer and Oegg, targeted measures are most successful “when modest goals are sought.” Additionally, the average cost of targeted sanctions to the target was 2.39% of the target’s GNP. This cost is just .01% away from the average cost of all sanctions and therefore, targeted sanctions may not significantly reduce the impact on civilian populations enough to be heralded as a new solution.

Sanction Efficiency Literature and the Question of Comprehensive vs. Targeted Sanctions

Hufbauer et. al (1985) conduct the “first real empirical study evaluating the effectiveness of economic sanctions” within economic sanctions literature (Drury, 32). With 204 case studies of economic sanctions from 1914-1984, it is the most comprehensive and most widely cited piece of economic sanctions literature to date. Indeed, Hufbauer et. al’s data is the starting point from which many economic sanctions scholars derive their data and start their research.

The authors define economic sanctions as the “deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations.”\(^9\) Specifically, the

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\(^9\) Hufbauer, Gary C., and Barbara Oegg. "European Union as an Emerging Sender of Economic Sanctions."
authors seek to explain which characteristics of economic sanctions lead to the sender achieving its foreign policy goals. To be considered as such, these goals must “encompass changes the sender state explicitly or implicitly seeks in the target state’s political behavior.” We will adopt these definitions since they are widely accepted within the literature. We will address them, and the measurement of “success,” in greater detail later in this paper. Hufbauer et. al use the rest of their book to test their hypotheses. We will address those hypotheses most relevant to this paper.

This paper will address underlying hypotheses concerning several factors that significantly affect the success of a sanctions episode. A. Cooper Drury (2005) performs a logit analysis on Hufbauer et. al’s data and finds several characteristics that reach statistical significance in determining the outcome of sanctions episodes. Those characteristics include political / economic health of the target, pre-sanction trade between the sender and target, dollar cost to the target, and the year the sanctions were applied.

Many of Hufbauer et. al’s hypotheses are not addressed in this paper because Drury’s logit analysis found that just several of the testable hypotheses reached statistical significance in influencing sanctions’ outcomes. Also, the hypotheses that reach significance apply directly to my narrow focus while the insignificant hypotheses do not. Those relevant hypotheses build upon the urgency of the research question in this paper. While dollar cost to the target is hypothesized to affect the outcome of an episode, there are indeed several other factors that influence the outcome as well. Each factor must be considered in analyses of “big” and targeted sanctions’ effects upon a target. Consequently, all significant and relevant hypotheses will be addressed in detail below. The author will use those applicable hypotheses and assumptions as a

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10 The following hypotheses do not reach statistical significance: The size differential of GNP ratios between sender and target, prior friendly relations between sender and target, and the monetary and resource costs incurred by the sender of sanctions.
foundation for his specific issue of concern, comprehensive sanctions’ vs. targeted sanctions’ effectiveness.

The first significant hypothesis is that politically unstable and economically “distressed” targets capitulate in the face of sanctions more often than do strong targets. Indeed, Hufbauer et al claims that the “weakest go to the wall” and that it is best to “pick on the weak” and disadvantaged (Hufbauer et al, 81). In contrast, Galtung claims that economic sanctions could actually unify an oppressive government under its leader, thereby strengthening the regime and assisting political integration.\textsuperscript{11}

Eland qualifies Galtung’s statement and adds that, for Galtung to be correct, the target government must have total control over the media and communications within the state.\textsuperscript{12} Drury argues that having such wide control over a state’s institutions would indicate that the target government is not weak. Therefore, sanctions may unify a target that has control over at least domestic media and communications, but they are unlikely to assist one that is already suffering from extreme economic and political duress characterized by “acute problems exemplified by high unemployment, rampant inflation, and political turmoil bordering on chaos” akin to the situation in Chile at the time of Allende (Drury, 46).

In Drury’s logit analysis of Hufbauer et. al’s 204 sanctions cases, sanctions against a distressed target have a 66% probability of being at least partially successful while those against healthy targets have just a 38% chance of any success. Therefore, we adopt Drury’s hypothesis that the higher the level of duress, the more effective sanctions are likely to be (Drury, 35).


\textsuperscript{12} Cited in Drury, 2005.
Contrary to conventional wisdom and intuitive reasoning, multilateral cooperation makes sanctions less effective. Meanwhile, both Martin and Mastanduno claim that the positive effect multilateral cooperation should have on sanctions’ effectiveness is obviously true.\(^{13}\) Similarly, Mansfield claims that multilateral cooperation increases both the costs to the target and the size and power of the senders’ signal. However, Hufbauer states that too many chefs will assuredly “spoil the broth.” Likewise, Miers and Morgan claim that multilateral cooperation decreases sanctions effectiveness because of the bargaining difficulties that senders must deal with together.\(^ {14}\)

Drezner agrees with Hufbauer, but claims that enforcement issues between the primary and secondary senders are the main reason that multilateral sanctions fail. Secondary senders have incentives to circumvent the sanctions and supply the target with needed goods or economic tools.\(^ {15}\) Doxey agrees that too many states involved in the sender’s group will ruin chances for even partial successes.\(^ {16}\) Therefore, we accept Drury’s hypothesis that the greater level of inter-state cooperation with the sender, the less effective sanctions will be. However, the decrease in effectiveness may occur because of factors other than those suggested by the aforementioned scholars. Also, the involvement of an international institution (e.g. the U.N., IMF) or NGO can actually enhance sanctions’ effectiveness while inter-state cooperation decreases the effectiveness. Indeed, Drury’s analysis of 204 cases shows that the level of cooperation with the

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\(^{13}\) Cited in Drury, 2005.


\(^{16}\) Cited in Drury, 2005.
sender has a significant and inverse relationship with the effectiveness of the sanction. Unilateral sanctions have a 62% probability of being partially successful while multilateral sanctions score only a 37%.

The closeness and volume of the prior trade relationship between the sender and the target varies directly with sanction effectiveness. As hypothesized by Hufbauer and Drury, a closer relationship results in a greater chance of success. To measure this, Hufbauer combines both pre-sanction imports from and exports to the sender country into a single measure. However, Drury notes, these measures are very different and should not be combined. Greater imports to the target may mean that it is dependent upon the sender for specific goods. Unless those goods are unique to the sender, the target may be able to easily replace the supply from the sender, therefore indicating a close relationship which in reality is an expendable one.17

As an addition, this scholar argues that the uniqueness of the trade relationship (e.g. the sender is the target’s sole supplier of item x) also must be considered in this hypothesis. As expected, pre-sanction trade has a positive effect on sanction effectiveness in Drury’s logit analysis. As the trade increases from its 25th percentile to 75th percentile, the probability of at least a partial success increases from 45% to 58% (Drury, 2005).

The final hypothesis deals directly with the research question that the author is addressing. According to Drury, the hypothesis “first and foremost” in sanctions literature is that the more costly the sanctions are to the target, the more effective they should be. Indeed, in all cases where

the cost to the target state reached double digit percentages of its GDP (U.S. v. Iraq, Nigeria v. Biafra, U.S., Britain v. Iran, and U.N and Britain v. Rhodesia), sanctions contributed to a positive outcome. Of the sanctions episodes where the cost to the target was equal to or greater than 5% of the target’s GDP (UK v. Germany, UK and US v. Iran, US v. Kampuchea, Netherlands and US v. Suriname, S. Africa v. Lesotho, US v. Panama, US v. Iraq) six resulted in at least partial success (Hufbauer, 1985).

Normally, Drury adds, the economic cost to the target is expected to work as a direct form of pressure and, consequently, the cost is relative to the target’s economy, meaning that wealthier economies can withstand more and greater shocks than small economies. For example, an eight trillion dollar economy (like that of the U.S.) can more easily pay for $100 million a year (.001% of the total economy) in losses. Whereas a five billion dollar economy, like Haiti’s, would have much greater difficulty paying the same sum (2.0% of the total economy) (Drury, 38).

However, sanctions have symbolic as well as instrumental effects.\textsuperscript{18} That is, even if the losses to a target are small when compared with its GDP, a large absolute loss may be enough to constitute significant pressure against the target even despite the fact that its economy can withstand the sanctions. Drury asserts that both the relative and absolute costs to the target have to be assessed when examining sanction effectiveness. In sanction cases involving the sender’s national security interests, success will likely increase. National security issues are significantly associated with increased costs to the target. Similarly, the sender is anticipated to prosecute

security cases with more commitment than sanctions cases with other objectives. This study does not quantify this variable, but it will be addressed in relevant case studies.

As mentioned earlier, the sanctions literature has stressed multilateral cooperation both between coalitions of states as well as between states and international organizations. Most authors agree that international organizations mitigate bargaining and coordination problems between primary and secondary senders (Doxey, 1987, Drury, 497-510, O’Sullivan, Hufbauer et. al 1985). These organizations can work as transparent mediators to help carry out the sanctions more uniformly. Drury therefore hypothesizes that the involvement of an international organization will reduce the common problems of cooperation associated with multilateral sanctions and subsequently increase their effectiveness.

The year in which sanctions were applied is significant in that the pattern of declining effectiveness confirms Hufbauer et al.’s hypothesis that sanctions are becoming less effective with time. When sanctions deal with national security, they become less effective. Just as senders are more likely to pursue sanctions vigilantly in security cases, targets are more disposed to strongly resist the sender’s efforts. When international organizations get involved with sanctions, they significantly help sanctions become more effective. However, unilateral efforts still have the best probability of succeeding in sanctions at 63% (Drury, 2005).

The cost in absolute dollars to the target also reaches significance. Drury argues that the symbolic effect of economic sanctions, measured by the cost of sanctions in absolute dollars rather than by impact proportional to the GDP, need not cause actual economic pain against a target. That is, instead of a target capitulating because its economy will collapse under the sanctions, it surrenders because the dollar figure is perceived to be too large. Upon analysis, Drury found that the mean cost of sanctions regimes analyzed by Hufbauer et. al is only 2% of
the target’s GDP and that 61% of cases involve costs less than 1% GDP. These costs are “unpleasant, but clearly not crushing” (Drury, 38). However, Hufbauer et. al rates the overall success of his 204 cases of sanctions at 34%. Therefore, one may argue that sanctions have not been costly enough and that success is disproportionately seen in those sanctions costing the target 5% and more of its GDP. We will consider Drury’s absolute dollars versus GDP impact argument but will argue for now that as long as both costs are large, the measurement does not make a significant difference.

Meghan O’Sullivan (2003), a scholar of targeted sanctions, goes even further by arguing that economic impact upon a target is not sufficient to generate a foreign policy change, but may be a necessary condition.¹⁹ She argues that sanctions have psychological and political effects that are separate from plain economic impact upon a state. We will examine her arguments evaluating those other effects when comparing the impacts of big and targeted sanctions respectively.

From a review of the literature, we have concluded that:

- The more duress from which a target suffers, the more effective sanctions may be
- Multilateral cooperation between states only leads to failure, while cooperation between a state or group of states with an international organization is more likely to succeed
- Sanctions are declining in effectiveness over time
- The greater the cost to the target, the greater chance for success

Sanctions imposed to achieve national security goals will be more aggressively pursued by the sender and more aggressively resisted by the target. Therefore, the likelihood of success in national security cases is lower than the average. Additionally, we argue that using absolute dollars cost to the target is not significantly different from or superior to measuring the cost by GDP impact on the target.

The data collected in this paper correspond to the type of sanction levied, the characteristics of that sanction as defined by different independent variables, and the goals pursued by a particular sanction. The two types under examination are comprehensive sanctions, which are general and wide-ranging, and targeted sanctions. It is important to note that the percentage of GDP impact on the target state is a descriptor of the sanctions’ outcome. Indeed, when senders construct a sanctions package, they cannot know what percentage of GDP the sanctions will cost the target. Therefore, a metric by which to differentiate “comprehensive” from “targeted” will be used. Comprehensive sanctions are characterized by import and export bans directed against a state or government as a whole instead of against specific individuals. Targeted sanctions are those that explicitly mention and sanction specific groups or individuals. The data on measures used in different packages is derived from official Executive Orders, the Office of Financial Assets Control (OFAC) website, official UN sources, and scholars’ accounts.

When available, the independent variables that will be examined are as follows:

- Political / economic health of the target (duress)
- Pre-sanction trade between the sender and target
- Cost to the target as measured by GDP
- Presence of multilateral (intrastate) cooperation
- Presence of an NGO or international institution in sanction coalition

For most of the measurements, the data has already been collected and evaluated by previous scholars. For those variables for which the data has not been collected, a more detailed explanation of plans for data collection will be included.

Political / economic duress will be measured with Drury’s metric. “Strong and healthy” connotes a government in firm control even though dissent may be present while its economy experiences only the normal range of inflation, unemployment and similar ills. India during the nuclear nonproliferation campaign of 1970s and the USSR at the time of the Afghan invasion characterize “strong and healthy” states. States with “significant problems” have severe economic problems such as a foreign exchange crisis combined with significant internal dissent. A state with significant problems is exemplified by Ceylon under Prime Minister Bandaranaike. States with “acute problems” are exemplified by high unemployment, rampant inflation, and political turmoil bordering on chaos (Drury, 46). Chile at the time of Allende and Uganda in the later years of the Idi Amin regime had acute problems (Drury, 2005).

Data for this variable will be collected from scholars of the relevant regions as well as scholars of the sanctions episode itself. Also, secondary sources and country experts will be referenced for each case, after the model of Hufbauer et. al.

The data for pre-sanction trade between sender and target have already been collected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or sanctions’ scholars. The author will also search for other secondary sources dealing specifically with the sanctions episode at hand in order to find pre-sanction trade data.
Cost to the target in terms of its GDP is a popular metric and therefore is available in many secondary sources. For all other cases, data from the IMF will be used.

Multilateral cooperation will be measured in terms of compliance with the enforcement of sanctions packages. In this case, quantitative data may not be available or applicable. Therefore, qualitative data from sanction specific scholars will be addressed if the data are not already available within the literature.

The presence and level of involvement of NGOs or an international institution as a mediating body between sending parties will be evaluated through secondary literature as well.

To measure effectiveness itself, Hufbauer et al. used two four-point scales together. The first scale measures the policy achievement, judged against the foreign policy goals of the sender, and the second measures sanctions contribution to a positive outcome. Both scales are based on outside expert opinions related to each sanctions case and then multiplied together for the final evaluation of success. Hufbauer et al. do not address potential sanctions goals that are not discussed by experts on the case. Sanctions often have multiple purposes but Barber’s and Lindsey’s research of “secondary” or “tertiary” sanction goals clarify the seriously murky and unscientific nature of determining those goals (Barber, 376-384). Thus, Hufbauer’s investigation of primary goals is an efficient path to pursue (Drury, 44).

Success ratings can have the following values, ranging from 1 (complete failure) to 16 (complete success): 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 16. Hufbauer et al. considers a score of 9 or greater to be successful. The inclusion of the four-point scale which judges a sanction’s “contribution” to a positive outcome is problematic. Including the contribution of the sanctions as part of the measure of success is somewhat redundant. Drury notes that determining the factors that make
sanctions successful is the same thing as determining what contribution the sanctions made toward success. To solve this problem, Drury exclusively uses the policy result scale instead of using it in tandem with the contribution scale (Drury, 45).

The author will use his own scale based on achievement of primary goals. After conducting case studies, the author will determine whether or not the goals were achieved and whether or not Drury’s hypotheses were confirmed. The measures of independent and the dependent variable (success) are mostly qualitative in nature. Many of the secondary sources the author refers to above are already in his possession and do contain the necessary data. However, the IMF data does have the potential for pitfalls since it does not calculate exact GDP impact and instead shows the sheer amount of export and import trade after sanctions. From these figures, GDP can be calculated but to a less exact extent. Therefore, the author plans to find secondary scholarship that has already collected the data and if that is not an option, the author plans to use IMF data in conjunction with other sources to calculate GDP impact.

Since the other independent variables are also qualitative, the author will follow Hufbauer et. al’s guidelines and metrics as closely as possible. Hufbauer et. al used qualitative data also but is still regarded as the seminal work on economic sanctions. Therefore, by following their philosophy in a transparent fashion, the author hopes to reduce potential pitfalls since Hufbauer et. al is in many ways the most comprehensive work the literature has.

**Case Studies**

The following studies of sanctions levied against Iraq, Iran, and Syria are not meant to be exhaustive accounts of each sanctions episode nor the histories of each state. Rather, the case studies will help determine how the nature of the sanctions contributed to the achievement or
failure of the sender’s goals. Also, they will address whether the aforementioned hypotheses were confirmed or negated in each respective episode. Three instances of comprehensive sanctions and three instances of targeted sanctions will be analyzed. In Table 1.0, a “+” denotes that the sanctions helped achieve the relevant outcome. A “-” means that sanctions had no significant role in achieving the relevant goal. The works of Meghan O’Sullivan, one of the most prolific scholars of the Iraqi and Iranian sanctions episodes, are referenced extensively as they represent one of the most comprehensive accounts of those episodes.

**IRAQ: 1990-2000**  
**Goals and Achievements / Failures**

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<td>Change Behavior</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contain Economically</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contain Militarily</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Change</td>
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The U.S. and the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanctions against Iraq in response to the August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. aimed to force Saddam to abandon his pursuit of WMD, his support of terrorism, and to contain his regime militarily and economically. While toppling Saddam was not the U.S.’s primary goal, coups against Saddam were encouraged and funded by the U.S. during the sanctions episode.20

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Sanctions against Iraq were vilified both for failing to topple Saddam and for contributing to a devastating humanitarian crisis. Although Saddam remained in power, regime change was actually never a legislated goal of the U.S. or the U.N. The closest the U.S. came to making regime change an official goal was when President Clinton authorized Congress to spend $97 million in support of Iraqi opposition groups. While not an official or public goal, the U.S. did hope that increasing internal discord within Iraq would embolden opposition groups to challenge Saddam and, in fact, opposition groups did just that (O’Sullivan, 2003)\textsuperscript{21}. Saddam faced several coup attempts after the imposition of sanctions partly because the suffering caused by sanctions was too great for the general population to allow Saddam to remain in office.

Despite the criticism of sanctions against Iraq, they were quite successful in containing Saddam economically and militarily. Between 1990 and 1991, Iraq’s economy shrank by five-sixths (O’Sullivan, 2003). Because of its economic isolation, Iraq made just $70 billion from exports and imports between 1990 and 2000. In the absence of sanctions, Iraq was anticipated to make $435 billion from those sources of income (O’Sullivan, 2003). Due to such economic impact, Saddam was unable to purchase military items. From the beginning of his reign until the Gulf War, Iraq was in a near constant state of war and aggression with Iran and internal enemies. After the imposition of sanctions, this aggression nearly disappeared aside from Saddam massing troops along the Kuwaiti border in one instance (O’Sullivan, 139). Also, states stopped their attempts to sell Iraq nuclear materials after the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions against China, France, and Russia for attempting such deals.

While sanctions contained Saddam’s actions, it did not contain his regime’s nuclear ambitions. Throughout the entire duration of the sanctions episode, Saddam made every effort to circumvent U.N. nuclear regulations and to deceive inspectors.\textsuperscript{22} There was neither an increase nor a decrease in Iraq’s support for terrorism. Human rights abuses actually increased during the imposition sanctions. While they did frustrate Saddam’s efforts to realize his nuclear ambitions, sanctions failed to achieve perhaps the most crucial objective: eliminating his will for a nuclear program (O’Sullivan, 2003). Importantly, all of Drury’s hypotheses are negated except for the expected positive relationship between economic cost and sanctions’ success. As will be fully addressed in the following analysis, the large GDP impact of sanctions were crucial in achieving Saddam’s military and economic containment but failed to change his behavior (pursuit of WMD, support for terrorism, reduction of human rights abuses) and to change the regime.

**Important Legislation and Sanction Timeline**

Below is a timeline of important legislation and its effects on the composition of sanctions against Iraq:


**August 6, 1990:** UNSC Resolution 661\textsuperscript{23}

Total economic embargo and freezes on Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets abroad.

“All States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources”

**September 1, 1990:** Iraq placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism

Ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls on exports of dual-use items, ban on most forms of economic assistance, opposition to loans and aid from International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

**April 3, 1991:** UNSC Resolution 705

- Recognize UN-demarcated border with Kuwait
- “Destroy, remove, or render harmless” all chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 km.
- Not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons usable material
- Return all Kuwaiti property
- Stop support acts of international terrorism
- UN created the UN Special Commission to supervise and document Iraqi WMD disarmament
- UN reaffirmed import and export sanctions on Iraq
- UN requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect Iraq’s nuclear capabilities

**August 15 1991:** UNSC Resolution 705

Allows limited shipments of food and other humanitarian supplies to Iraq in exchange for oil. Iraq rejects this resolution as well as UNSC Resolution 712 which called for the establishment of an Oil-for-Food Program.

**October 23 1992:** Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act

Requires denial of application to export dual-use items to Iran and Iraq. Mandates sanctions against firms or people violating this Act.

\textsuperscript{23} O’Sullivan, Meghan. *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*. 2003
**November 26 1993**: Iraq formally accepts its obligations under UNSC Resolution 715 and agrees to cooperate with UNMOVIC monitoring of Iraq’s WMD program

**November 1994**: Iraq formally recognizes Kuwait’s border as called for by UNSC Resolution 687

**April 14 1995**: UNSC Resolution 986

- Allows Iraq to export $2 billion of oil every 180 days for food and humanitarian supplies.
- First Iraqi export of oil ships December 1996

**January 1996**: Iraq agrees to terms of UNSC Resolution 986 to establish the Oil for Food program.

**April 1996**: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

**August 1996**: Iraq enters city of Irbil to fight the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

**January-February 1998**

**August 5 1998**

- Iraq restricts UNMOVIC access to sites
- Iraq announces it will not cooperate with UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors

**October 31 1998**

- Iraq terminates cooperation with UNMOVIC and IAEA
- Iraqi Liberation Act signed. Calls for $97 million in aid to help Iraqi groups seeking to overthrow Saddam.

**December 17, 1999** UNSC Resolution 1284

- UNMOVIC is converted into the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC). States that if Iraq cooperates for 120 days, sanctions will be suspended for 120 days, renewable by UNSC if Iraq continues to cooperate.
- Lifts ceiling on amount of oil Iraq can

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**Historical Account**

The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 brought about a strategy change in U.S. foreign policy. President George H.W. Bush, who took office in 1989, began a program of limited engagement with Saddam Hussein by extending U.S. agricultural and trade credits to Iraq. However, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1990 resulted in a strong response from the U.S. President Bush imposed unilateral asset freezes on Iraq and Kuwait, immediately freezing $4.5 billion. Additionally, the U.S. suspended all economic interactions with Iraq.\textsuperscript{25}

Within the week, the UN passed Resolution 661 which imposed comprehensive economic, financial and military sanctions of Iraq and Kuwait (O’ Sullivan, 2003). In both UN Resolution 686 and 687, the UN provides Saddam with clear instructions on how to halt the

sanctions. According to the resolutions, Saddam must eliminate his WMD programs and missile delivery systems in order for sanctions to be lifted. To receive non-humanitarian goods, Saddam must submit to the UNSC periodic review of its compliance with previous resolutions.\textsuperscript{26}

From 1991-1993, Iraq allowed the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on its soil in order to inspect its nuclear facilities. However, Saddam invariably deceived or stalled inspectors. Also, Saddam rejected any and every UN resolution designed to ease the impact of sanctions on civilians. UNSC Resolution 705, the original Oil for Food Program (OF), was first passed and presented to Iraq in August, 1991. Saddam rejected the OF and actually cut off negotiations concerning it in October 1993. He claimed that UN control of the OF funds and the distribution of goods violated Iraq’s sovereignty (O’Sullivan, 2003). Importantly, Saddam did not even need to take care of his civilian population in order to stay in power. In face of severe economic hardship, Saddam had sufficient resources and power to distribute luxury items (palaces, mainly) among his elite (O’Sullivan, 2003). Since Saddam was a dictator and only needed elite support to stay in power, he refused the OF program and instead distributed goods among his own political coalition. As put forth in Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999, this was all Saddam needed to do to retain power.\textsuperscript{27}

From 1994-1998, however, Saddam’s faith in resistance faltered. On November 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1993, Iraq acknowledged its obligations to cooperate with UNSCOM and with weapons


inspections. This gesture convinced Russia that sanctions against Iraq should be lifted. France also hosted Iraq’s deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz in Paris in January 1995. According to American diplomats involved in the sanctions episode, both France’s and Russia’s pleas for lifting of sanctions held thinly disguised commercial interests. Indeed, Iraq set up “executory” oil deals with China, France and Russia. These deals were signed during the sanctions episode and were scheduled to begin once sanctions were lifted. It is clear that China, France, and Russia argued for the removal of sanctions in order to better their oil prospects in Iraq. Indeed, by January 5 2002 Chinese, French and Russian companies had been awarded over 200 billion barrels of Iraqi oil in contracts.  

Throughout 1998, Iraq continued to pursue a strategy of “selective cooperation against an overall background of intransigence” (O’Sullivan, 115). In August 1995, a key member of Saddam’s most important internal security body came forward with reams of secret documents concerning Saddam’s continuing efforts to acquire and produce WMD. Since this dampened Saddam’s international appeals for the lifting of sanctions, he decided to accept the OF program in 1996. Up until that point, Saddam refused to accept the OF program because it would remove his most important argument for the lifting of sanctions; the humanitarian crisis within Iraq (O’Sullivan, 2003).

Iraq also worked to strain consensus on the sanctions against it by provoking crises. Its deployment of tanks and artillery into Irbil is one instance. The U.S. launched cruise missiles against Iraqi antiaircraft sites in response to Saddam’s actions in Irbil. Meanwhile, Russia,

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France, and Arab states objected and claimed that Iraq’s actions within its own borders were its sovereign right (O’Sullivan, 2003). Iraq continued to refuse UNSCOM inspectors entry to sites and such crises had to be resolved by international intermediaries like Kofi Annan and Russia’s then foreign minister. France and Russia supported Iraq in its standoff over inspections in February. After the August 5th 1998 crisis when Iraq inhibited UNSCOM’s efforts yet again, those states were not as forceful in their support. Indeed, Russian and French interpretations of Iraq’s intransigence were “nearly identical to the American and British view,” (Truehart, A38).

Only a month later, Saddam’s continued refusal to allow inspections resulted in the U.S. and the UK executing a four-night bombing campaign named Operation Desert Fox. China, France, and Russia voiced indignation this time and violent demonstrations were held in several Arab countries. U.S. authorities claimed that the operation was a success since it helped retard Saddam’s WMD capabilities, but in reality, officials were unsure of the operation’s value because of the international backlash it caused. Although one cannot say with certainty that Saddam engineered this event, his strategy of selective cooperation and defection certainly was designed to frustrate the sanctions alliance between the U.S. and the UNSC. After Operation Desert Fox, the splits in the sanctions alliance were observable in alliance members’ statements. Also, weapons inspectors could not return to Iraq to carry out their duties because of Iraq’s efforts to stall them (O’Sullivan, 2003).


24
From 1998-2002, Congress grew more aggressive in its stance toward Iraq while President Clinton advocated a gentler approach. The UN stressed that sanctions should be reduced if Iraq complies with its disarmament provisions while U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in 1997 that sanctions would not be lifted as long as Saddam remained in power (O'Sullivan, 2003). While Clinton advocated a gentler approach and even explicitly linked U.S. demands of Iraq with UN resolutions, members of the UNSC grew frustrated with Congress’s advocacy of the use of unilateral force against Iraq (O'Sullivan, 2003). Chinese, French, and Russian ambitions to conclude oil deals with Iraq also added to an international eagerness to lift or at least lighten the sanctions.

In 1999, the source of conflict was not between the sanction alliance and Iraq but between members of the UNSC. The “diverging interests of the international community over Iraq and the laborious efforts made to strike compromises among them” represented the main difficulty for the enforcement and coordination of the sanction provisions (O'Sullivan, 120). It seems that the prospect of oil gains and disputes over stances toward Iraq were the driving forces behind conflict within the UNSC. *In fact, the prospect of oil gains is what drove the disputes about how to treat Iraq during the late 90s. China, France, and Russia were simultaneously disgusted with the U.S.’s policies, particularly its seemingly reckless military actions, and wanted to conclude their oil deals with Iraq.

In an effort to reconcile these conflicting views, UNSCOM was disbanded and replaced with the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC offered Iraq incentives to cooperate and demanded less cooperation. Even so, China, France, and Russia abstained from approving the resolution codifying UNMOVIC. Iraq rejected the resolution.
Shortly thereafter the U.S. and Britain expanded the Rules of Engagement for their fighter planes, increasing specifically pilots’ scope of targets if the pilots came under attack. This lead to almost daily bombing of Iraq and intensified accusations of U.S. soldiers killing Iraqi civilians deliberately (O’Sullivan, 2003).

In 2000, demand for Iraqi oil rose with global oil prices. Iraqi oil smugglers and the re-opening of the Syria-Iraq pipeline in November helped Iraq re-integrate itself into the regional economy. At the same time, Saddam’s efforts to portray himself as champion of the Palestinians increased and international support for sanctions weakened even further. After a decade of effective flight bans on Iraq, airlines from Egypt, France, Jordan, Russia, and Turkey re-opened routes to and from Baghdad International Airport. Although those bans were not mandatory, the “virtual ban” that had been in effect was lifted, thus signaling other states’ weariness of the sanctions (O’Sullivan, 2003).

Post-2000, states agreed to ship more civilian goods to Iraq. Colin Powell argued for more humanitarian and non-military items to be sent to Iraq. The September 11th attacks changed the international context of sanctions against Iraq and shortly thereafter the U.S. began to construct plans for the invasion of Iraq. By this point, war had replaced sanctions as the solution to the continuing Iraqi crisis. Sanctions become irrelevant after this point, so for the purposes of this paper analysis of their efficacy ends in 2000.
Sanctions Episode Analysis

Economic Impact

The economic impact of sanctions was devastating. The UNSC, including the U.S., imposed a “total economic embargo” and asset freezes on all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets abroad. Unlike targeted sanctions that may embargo only certain items or target specific individuals, the UNSC sanctions against Iraq “virtually terminated all legal, non-humanitarian trade” both military and civilian, between Iraq and the entire world (O’Sullivan, 125). Before the initiation of the Oil for Food Program in late 1996, Iraq imported and exported nearly nothing. Additionally, it defaulted on all its loans and its foreign credits and aid were reduced to minute amounts. Between 1990-1991, Iraq’s real GDP growth dropped to the -60th percentile. By 1993, it had again risen to the +20th percentile.

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Note that the growth by 1993 and after is entirely artificial until 1997. Iraq was critically damaged by its war with Iran which ended just two years before this sanctions episode. Therefore, any rebuilding it did was not a net positive gain. In 1997 however, Iraq saw real GDP growth because of the Oil for Food program.

Despite sanctions’ economic impact, the impact was magnified by the already dismal state of the Iraqi economy that existed before sanctions. Iraq suffered $130 billion in damage from the Iran war, was heavily indebted to IFIs, and all oil production and development was completely stalled. The per capita income at the end of the Iran war was $1500, compared to $4000 just eight years earlier. Iraq suffered 40% inflation prior to the imposition of sanctions.32

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Although Drury found that sanctions were successful almost twice as often when targets were economically distressed, Saddam did not submit in the face of increased economic hardship. Although some goals were accomplished, Saddam remained in power. Exactly what impact, if any, did the large economic impact of sanctions help the US and the UN achieve their goals?

Immediately after the imposition of sanctions, Saddam’s priorities changed because of the sanctions. He had to accomplish primarily two goals. First, he had to maintain and ration the existing food supply. Second, he had to protect his elites from sanctions. Saddam gave priority fuel to farmers, printed money for use on the black market, sold Iraq’s gold reserves, and began smuggling spare parts to maintain machinery. Politically, Saddam drained the marshes in the South in order to eliminate his opposition and he increased military salaries with newly printed, worthless money (O’Sullivan, 2003).

By 1995 Saddam was having trouble rationing the food supply. He enacted an Emergency Austerity Program. This program eliminated the printing of new money, restricted the black market, imposed higher taxes, and sold off state-owned property. As a result, the Iraqi dinar ended up declining even further while prices climbed higher. Consequently, Saddam imposed further measures. In late 1995, he decreased food rations and enacted a salary freeze.

A salary freeze ensured that the elite would not receive the amount of money or goods that they had grown accustomed to receiving. This presented a real danger to Saddam’s power. It follows that Saddam restarted negotiations with the UN about OF at the beginning of 1996, just a few months after imposing the risky salary freeze (O’Sullivan, 2003).

Although Saddam was able to avoid being toppled by the unhappy elite, the economic impact of sanctions forced him to re-order his entire economy as well as to make political changes within his regime.
Economic impact forced Saddam to concentrate on food and on satisfying his elite. Since the continuance of his reign depended on those two tasks, he was less able to act aggressively abroad and was thus largely confined to domestic issues with few exceptions.

After agreeing to OF, Iraq’s economy began to show true growth in 1997. Saddam was no longer busy with rationing and distributing food, so he focused on maximizing military expenditures and satisfying his elite (O’Sullivan, 2003). This shows that sanctions forced Saddam to focus on food distribution since his power depended on it. With OF effectively eliminating food and humanitarian embargoes, Saddam chose to maximize his military potential. Therefore, the economic impact of sanctions helped contain Saddam militarily. Although the measures that contained him were removed, they still constitute an effective use of sanctions for the period in which they were in place.

Saddam intensified his efforts on building economic contracts with China, France, and Russia in order to get sanctions lifted. The US and Britain accounted for just 7% of all Iraqi oil export contracts while China, France, and Russia accounted for 65%.33 Those countries would benefit most economically from the lifting of sanctions and, intuitively, were the most vocal advocates of lifting sanctions. Additionally, those same countries were the worst offenders in violating sanctions. China, France, and Russia even had secondary sanctions placed on them by the US for violating embargoes against Iraq. Those three countries also exported the most goods to Iraq under the OF program (O’Sullivan, 2003). China and Russia’s levels of exports to Iraq were similar, but France was the clear leader.

Political Impact

Although sanctions somewhat strengthened Saddam’s domestic power, sanctions ultimately reduced his influence both abroad and domestically. Saddam controlled all resources and smuggling networks and, because of the increased suffering within Iraq, civilians and elite alike became acutely aware of their dependence on Saddam. However, for the most part, sanctions had a significant negative impact on Saddam’s regime. His base of support narrowed considerably and multiple coup attempts and tribal rebellions attempted to kill and / or depose him.34

Despite all this, Saddam remained in power. No amount of suffering among his population could convince Saddam to concede to sanctions’ demands. The dictatorial nature of his regime, his previous aggression in stymieing opposition, and his refusal for five years to adopt the OF in the face of doubled infant mortality all indicated that Saddam would not relent. Nothing short of a real threat to his power, disapproval of his elite, made Saddam re-negotiate for the OF. Therefore we conclude that the only way to convince Saddam to submit to sanctions’ demands was by presenting a credible threat to his reign or by forcibly removing him from power. Sanctions, even those of the most robust and perfectly constructed nature, would not shake Saddam until his reign was facing certain doom.

This would lead us to believe that sanctions should have been designed to make the elite and Saddam himself suffer. In other words, we would believe that targeted sanctions aimed at Saddam and his coalition could have toppled the regime and succeeded where comprehensive sanctions failed. However, targeted sanctions bring with them smaller economic costs. As we

will address in the next section, large costs are what contained Saddam militarily and economically and the targeted sanctions in these case studies consistently fail at military containment. Additionally, targeted sanctions have half the success rate when they are not accompanied by a comprehensive package of sanctions. Therefore, the author does not accept that targeted sanctions could have been more effective without imposing a crippling economic cost on Iraq.

**Goals Achieved**

Sanctions contained Saddam’s regime militarily and economically. Up to $250 billion in oil revenue was kept out of Saddam’s regime. Although no exact figures exist regarding Iraqi military expenditures since the Gulf War, available estimates suggest a 3-10% decrease from 1988 levels. Iraq would have spent an estimated $21-$25 billion on military imports between 1991 and 2000 in the absence of sanctions (O’Sullivan, 2003).

Additionally, UN weapons inspections destroyed hundreds of missiles and warheads, tens of thousands of chemical munitions, and hundreds of tons of chemical weapons agents (O’Sullivan, 140). Export and import controls prevented Iraq from obtaining nuclear materials from abroad. As noted previously, Iraq was effectively “terminated” from the international market in addition to being contained militarily. Therefore, we conclude that sanctions contained Saddam economically and militarily.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contain Economically</th>
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<tr>
<td>Contain Militarily</td>
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32
Sanctions failed conspicuously at changing Saddam’s behavior. Saddam actively obstructed every effort at inspecting and reducing his WMD efforts. He persisted in attempts to buy gyroscopes for missile navigation and dual-use material for chemical and biological weapons. Additionally, he still supported Mujahidin e Khalq, a terrorist group tied to Iraq. Human rights suffered greatly under Saddam even during the sanctions episode (O’Sullivan, 2003). While Saddam’s capacity to act out militarily and integrate his country in the regional economy was diminished by sanctions, he persisted in the same dangerous behaviors that brought about the sanctions in the first place.

| Change Behavior | - |

**Conclusion**

Comprehensive sanctions effectively contained Iraq militarily and economically, but failed to topple Saddam and change his behavior. The economic impact of sanctions was integral in achieving the sender’s goals while multilateral cooperation was found to be a limiting factor in sanctions’ effectiveness. Indeed, the US actually imposed secondary sanctions on states that were supposed to be co-senders of the sanctions. Although UN organization was integral in the initial effectiveness of sanctions, the need for multilateral cooperation ultimately lead to some weaknesses in the embargoes. Drury hypothesized that multilateral action organized by an international body like the UN is more effective than multilateral action that is not. The UN did add great effectiveness to the initial period of sanctions, but ultimately states’ own interests prevailed over their adherence to the embargoes. Therefore, this constitutes a failure for multilateral cooperation.
Iraq was severely economically distressed before the imposition of sanctions, but contrary to Drury’s hypothesis, this did not contribute to success of the sanctions. Due to the totalitarian nature of Iraq at this time, Saddam was able to enrich himself and his elites in precisely the method outlined in Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1998. The U.S. was not a vital trade partner with Iraq before the imposition of sanctions yet was still able to exact very painful economic sanctions against it.

**IRAQ 1990-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>RESULT (+ confirmed, -negated or no impact)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State in economic distress will increase chances of sanctions success</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral Cooperation will reduce the effectiveness of sanctions</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prior trade between target and sender will increase target’s compliance with sanctions</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Cost will vary directly with sanctions’ success</td>
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</tbody>
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IRAQ: 1990-2000
Goals and Achievements / Failures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Achieved / Not Achieved</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change Behavior</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contain Economically</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contain Militarily</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Change</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

IRAN: 1992-2001
Goals and Achievements / Failures

| Change behavior       | -                        |
| Contain economically  | -                        |
| Contain militarily    | +                        |

U.S. sanctions against Iran date back to 1979. President Jimmy Carter froze $12 billion in Iranian assets and banned imports from Iran in response to its seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran. President Reagan also imposed sanctions against Iran and deemed it a major narcotics-trafficking country. However, Reagan’s sanctions duplicated those already in place. In 1992, the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act (IINPA) took new measures against exchange between the U.S. and Iran (O’Sullivan, 2003). We will begin our analysis with the passing of the IINPA since it represents the most recent change in the U.S. sanctions episode against Iran, pursues new goals as opposed to previous sanctions, and represents the type of sanctions still employed against Iran today.
Though U.S. sanctions against Iran are still in place today, targeted sanctions were added to the package on September 23, 2001. Therefore, we restrict this study to 1992-2000.

**Important Legislation and Sanction Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1992</strong>&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act: Several redundant measures and imposes sanctions against firms or people assisting Iran’s conventional weapons programs. Amended in 1996 to sanction any government helping Iran to acquire WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 15, 1995</td>
<td>EO 12957. Prohibits all U.S. involvement in development of Iran’s petroleum industry. Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, opposition to the Middle East peace process, and pursuit of WMD are cited as justifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6 1995</td>
<td>Virtually all economic transactions with Iran are banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6 1996: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)</td>
<td>Prohibits financial dealings with Iran and prohibits aid to countries providing Iran with military assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 5 1996: Iran-Libya Sanctions Act</td>
<td>Penalties against foreign firms investing over</td>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1997: EO 13059</td>
<td>Further restricts US exports to third countries when the goods are destined to reexport to Iran. Confirms virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran are banned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18, 1998</td>
<td>Clinton administration issues waiver to company Total and its minority partners for investment in Iran’s South Pars field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 23, 1998</td>
<td>Clinton vetoes Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act. Cites low standard of evidence that would require sanctions to be imposed and states that companies who do not know end user of their product could be sanctioned unjustly. States that Russia would be sanctioned under this act, but that Russia has cooperated with the U.S. on Iran sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1998, January 1999</td>
<td>Clinton sanctions ten Russian entities for alleged involvement in Iran’s missile development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1999</td>
<td>Clinton issues EO allowing export of food and</td>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>November 1999&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Clinton issues waiver to Boeing to provide spare parts for planes purchased by Iran before sanctions and that are still under warranty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14 2000: Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA)</td>
<td>Prohibits export of goods on banned list to any foreign entity found to have provided Iran with weapons technology in the past. Specifically bans “extraordinary” US payments to Russia for the International Space Station unless the President determines that Russia is not aiding Iran’s weapons program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 17, 2000</td>
<td>Lifting US sanctions on some non-oil exports including carpets, caviar, pistachios</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2001</td>
<td>Sanctions on North Korean company under INA for providing Iran with missile parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Sanctions imposed on North Korean company and two Chinese companies under INA for providing Iran with missile parts and chemical weapons components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 3, 2001</td>
<td>Congress reauthorizes ILSA for another five years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

May 9, 2002
Sanctions imposed on Moldovan, Armenian, and Chinese firms for selling weapons-related goods to Iran

November 22, 2005: Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005
The sanctions levied against Iran in 2000 are expanded to include Syria

Expanded mandatory sanctions against Iran and eliminated some tax incentives for oil companies looking to invest in Iran

Cites continued pursuit of WMD and the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate as reasons for sanctions.

*Portions of table taken directly from O’Sullivan, 2003

**Historical Account**

In 1992, U.S. influence in the Middle East was nearly at a zenith. The US successfully stopped Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and had imposed severe sanctions against Saddam Hussein. In this context, the US attempted to garner multilateral support for its new policy of containing both Iraq and Iran. The US sought to convince the European Troika to adopt restrictive policies against Iran. However, Europe’s deep economic ties with Iran and its more friendly diplomatic stance toward Iran impeded progress on multilateral cooperation (O’Sullivan, 2003).

Although these efforts did not stop Europe’s economic interactions with Iran, they did convince Germany and France to ban their companies from selling its light-water reactors.
In an effort to increase compliance with US-lead sanctions, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) legislation originally threatened sanctions against every foreign firm trading with Iran. However, due to European outrage, the Clinton administration significantly changed the terms of secondary sanctions against those firms. The new terms dictated that just two of six sanctions had to be imposed against such firms and only when the entity in question was investing over $20 million in Iran’s energy sector. Also, a presidential waiver could exempt states from sanctions if they promised to later impose sanctions against Iran.\(^38\)

The European Union actually forbade its companies from obeying ILSA legislation and threatened to take the matter to the World Trade Organization, arguing that US secondary sanctions violated the EU’s sovereignty. ILSA was originally championed by Senator D’Amato. Similarly, Congress sought even harsher sanctions against Iran throughout this period while President Clinton took a gentler stance. To assuage European anger and to leave open the possibility for reconciliation with Iran, Clinton designated an Iranian opposition group (Mujahidin e Khalq) as a terrorist organization and removed Iran from the list of major narcotics producing countries.

Even further, the U.S. removed the French company Total from ILSA sanctions in order to avoid a crisis with Europe. Food, medicine, and medical equipment exports to Iran, Libya, and Sudan were also approved by the U.S. Although some interpreted these moves as overtures to Iran, the majority of scholars claim that they were small actions taken at the behest of intense

agricultural lobbying and concern for a repeat of the Iraqi humanitarian crisis in Iran. Nevertheless, the U.S. needed to give more concessions before Iran would reconcile with it.

Despite later overtures to Iran, including a 1998 speech by Madeleine Albright calling for mutual understanding with the US and the lifting of import bans on carpets, caviar, and pistachios, Iran called for greater concessions from the U.S. Although Khatami did welcome earlier overtures, he claimed that “no concrete steps” had been taken to reconcile with Iran.³⁹ Hotly contested elections between a liberal President Khatami and conservative forces in Iran consumed the political agenda. In February 1999, Khatami was reelected, winning 60-70% of the popular vote and staffing Iran’s parliament (the Majlis) with more liberal supporters. This liberal victory led to a severe backlash from conservative forces in which the anti-U.S. line of rhetoric was strong and uncompromising.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed that even discussions of rapprochement with the U.S. would constitute “treason to the Iranian people” (Rubin, 2009).⁴⁰ This open hostility undermined policymakers who advocated gentler measures against Iran (O’Sullivan, 2003).


Sanctions Episode Analysis

From 1979 until the imposition of sanctions, Iran experienced high inflation and unemployment (O’Sullivan, 2003). Although US sanctions did have an impact on Iran’s economy, the difficulties Iran faced from war reconstruction and poor economic management must be considered when judging the effectiveness of sanctions. Iran’s efforts at war reconstruction, replenishing its stock of weapons, and rebuilding its industries more than quadrupled its international debt between 1989-1993. The government continued printing money to finance its deficit, subsidizing food and fuel, and supporting inefficient public enterprises (O’Sullivan, 2003).

Imports from the US constituted just 3% of Iran’s total imports and therefore, US sanctions did not deprive Iran from crucial goods or economic relationships. However, the US did account for nearly 20% of all Iran’s non-oil exports. Consequently, the ban on importing carpets, caviar, and pistachios into the US did do some immediate damage to Iranian trade (O’Sullivan 2003). However, Iran was able to divert this trade to different states and this softened the blow dealt by sanctions.

Indeed, Iran suffered costs of about one tenth of the expected $8 billion in damages expected from the removal of US trade with Iran. Once the US lifted its ban on importing those same items, there was no significant boost for the Iranian economy, thus showing that by the year 2000, the effects of reduced US trade had waned almost completely (O’Sullivan, 2003).

In contrast to the Iraqi sanctions episode, sanctions against Iran are characterized by trade bans that are not wholly enforced (e.g. they have many loopholes that allow trade to continue) and by the complete lifting of many bans throughout the episode. For example, the import ban on Iranian oil allowed US companies to ship it as long as it was directed to states other than the US. By 1994, American companies were reselling $4 billion of Iranian oil each year to third markets (O’Sullivan, 2003). This completely eliminated any impact that the import ban could have had on the Iranian oil industry.

As shown in the figure below, Asian countries purchased enough oil to eliminate the negative effects of losing US business. Like the other bans enacted by the US, sanctions against Iran’s oil industry had negative effects during the first few years of their imposition. However, as soon as Iran could find a new trading partner, damage from losing US business was rendered irrelevant. Although Iran was always able to find US allies who were ready and willing to supply it with oil and goods, its new trading partners exacted higher fees. Even so, these costs were only significant when Iran sought high-tech items. Although the US was expected to export over $2 billion to Iran between 1995-2001, sanctions only exacted a cost near one-tenth of that total. Throughout the sanctions episode, Iran adjusted by making Asian trade partners and shifting away from industrialized, Western countries. From 1986 to 2001, Iranian imports from Western countries dropped by 14% as trade with Asian countries increased.

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Sanctions’ effect on trade with Iran was insignificant. Although unilateral sanctions are statistically more successful than multilateral ones, US trade sanctions were a near total failure against Iran. Three factors led to these failures. First, the US did not follow its own sanctions against Iran. Unlike the example of Iraq, restrictions on both oil and non-oil imports from Iran were circumvented through loopholes. Additionally, several bans were totally lifted. Secondly, ILSA angered the European Union. Indeed, even the watered-down version of ILSA was entirely rejected by a defiant EU.
Iran’s trade with Asian countries reduced the effect of US trade sanctions. Iran’s oil enabled it to quickly make up for gaps in its trade. Had Iran not been an oil-rich country, sanctions may have been somewhat more effective. However, with so many loopholes and allowances, sanctions were hardly given a chance to succeed.

Perhaps sanctions’ biggest success was the World Bank’s suspension of aid to Iran. US pressure convinced the World Bank to suspend $847 in aid to development projects throughout Iran (O’Sullivan, 2003). Sanctions prevented Iran from securing funds from IFIs during its severe debt crises during the 90s.

While the US was unable to garner international cooperation, ILSA did discourage investors and firms from engaging in business with Iran. Between 1995 and 1996, the National Iranian Oil Company offered 11 total projects to foreign investors, yet none of those projects found investors because of threatened US sanctions. ILSA had quite powerful deterrent powers through 1997. But, the US issued waivers to a company violating ILSA in 1998. Shortly after, foreign firms began investing billions of dollars in Iranian oil development (O’Sullivan, 2003).

Despite ILSA’s eventual failure, it deterred investment in Iranian oil precisely when it was needed most. Iran received no relief during its major debt crises in the 1990s. Had major investors not been deterred by ILSA then, Iran would not have experienced suffering due to its debt. Although such suffering did not ultimately result in goal achievement, ILSA’s deterring capability was one of the more effective aspects of the sanctions episode.

Ultimately, US sanctions succeeded in containing Iran from IFI funding and did exacerbate the extant problems of debt and inflation within the Iranian economy.
However, due to loopholes in bans and the ability of Iran to find willing trade partners, sanctions succeeded in but few areas of economic containment and amounted to a preponderance of failures.

| Contain economically | - |

Politically, Iran actually expanded its trade and international ties under sanctions as evidenced by its increased interactions with Asian markets (O’Sullivan, 2003). Within Iran, sanctions strengthened the ruling regime. They were used by Iran’s leaders as an excuse for the poor economy. Sanctions further reduced the chance of any type of rapprochement between Iran and the US. As noted earlier, this gave conservative, anti-American voices more clout within Iran.

US bans on shipping military items to Iran were much more effective. Termination of US-Iran military trade led to losses of billions of dollars. The AEDPA deterred other states from supplying Iran with weapons for fear of being placed on the list of terrorist sponsors and subsequent elimination of aid. As shown in the following tables, traditional allies like China, North Korea, and Russia even curtailed their arms sales with Iran.
Additionally, total Iranian defense expenditures were reduced due to sanctions. In the figure below, expenditures reach a decade-low the year sanctions are imposed. Throughout the duration of sanctions, expenditures gradually grow because Iran’s economy improves due to its newfound Asian trading partners. However, sanctions still succeeded in deterring some critical trade partners from trading military items with Iran and reduced the amount of arms it received.
For these reasons, US sanctions achieved successful military containment of Iran.

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<tr>
<th>Contain militarily</th>
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</table>

Sanctions failed to curb Iran’s pursuit of WMD, support for terrorism, or opposition to the Middle East peace process. In a 1995 statement, President Rafsanjani claimed he would not obstruct the peace process. In 1998, President Khatami condemned terrorism in a televised interview with CNN. However, these statements were not matched with real decreases in terrorism or antagonism towards Israel. Indeed, in 1999 Khatami met with Hizballah and declared it a humanitarian organization fighting for the rights of Palestinians. In 2000 Khatami urged for an economic boycott of Israel and extended his full support to the Intifada. Worse yet,

Iran convened a conference of anti-Israel groups within the region in hopes of lending its support to the fight against Israel (O’Sullivan, 2003). In 2002, Iran was caught shipping fifty tons of arms to the Palestinian Authority. Coupled with suspicion of Iran’s involvement in the bombing of the Khobar Towers, Iran reduced neither its support for terrorism nor its opposition to the peace process.

**IRAN 1992-2000: Goals and Achievements / Failures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Behavior</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>RESULT (+, confirmed - , negated or no impact)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State in economic distress will increase chances of sanctions success</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Cooperation will reduce the effectiveness of sanctions</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior trade between target and sender will increase target’s compliance with sanctions. Absence of such prior trade or presence of small amounts of trade will not increase target’s compliance</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Cost will vary directly with sanctions’ success</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The information presented in the following case studies comes primarily from the Armed Conflict Database (ACD), a research project of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The ACD is led by Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk for the IISS. The ACD collects comprehensive information on each conflict from newspapers, governments, and media outlets on over 70 conflicts and terrorist movements worldwide. The information presented within the ACD is succinct and verifiable, as the information provided therein supports assessment of conflict trends.

The ACD is compiled by the IISS Defense Analysis Department which also publishes Military Balance. The database covers internal and international conflicts as well as terrorist activities. Categories of information offered include year-by-year analysis of conflicts, conflict status (e.g. internal, international), number of fatalities, weapons and ammunitions used, and humanitarian and economic costs including information on population displacement.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SYRIA 2003-2008</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contain Militarily</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In contrast to the sanctions against Iraq and Iran which sought to achieve goals within both respective regimes, the sanctions against Syria were aimed at achieving political goals within Lebanon. The sanctions case against Syria and its proxies in Lebanon differs from the comprehensive cases addressed previously in important ways. First, Syria’s sanctions are not intended to cause severe economic pain. Second, the sanctions do aim at changing a state’s behavior, but the undesirable behavior is carried out by Hizballah, a group that has much political clout and domestic backing within Lebanon.
It is important to understand that, although the US characterizes Hizballah as a terrorist organization, it is viewed as a legitimate political entity and a much-needed “resistance” that acts as a second army. Hizballah is simultaneously stronger than Lebanon’s military and political authority and independent of it.

These differences affect the analysis of sanctions in a few ways. Because the US was not imposing economic pain on Syria, graphs of imports and exports do not adequately explain the sanctions episode. Indeed, the US only amounted 6.9% of Syria’s imports before sanctions and just 2.19% in 2007, the final year for which this data is available.\(^{44}\) Note that the US only initially banned the export of dual use and military items to Syria, accounting for an even smaller amount of imports and exports. Due to the different nature of these sanctions, a more historical and interpretive analysis with fewer figures is necessary.

Shortly after the start of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, Syria proposed to help contain the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) guerrilla units within Lebanon. Syria was initially welcomed, but it maintained a presence until 2005, 15 years after the end of the Civil War and long after Yasser Arafat and the PLO departed Beirut in defeat.\(^{45}\) Throughout that period, Syria gained a hold on Lebanese politics and used deception, intimidation, and assassination to further its regional power.\(^{46}\) After being implicated in the 2005 assassination of


Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, protests as large as 1 million people strong forced Syria to withdraw its troops (numbered at over 20,000) from Lebanon.  

Even after leaving Lebanon, Syria still makes efforts to control Lebanese politics. Indeed, in 2005 Hizballah, widely recognized as a terrorist organization funded and trained by Syria and Iran, gained enough seats in Lebanon’s parliament to grant them veto power over its initiatives. Syrian intelligence services were also implicated in the 2005 assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri (Armed Conflict Database).

While the U.S. originally imposed sanctions against Syria in the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (SAA), the targeted sanctions employed in 2007 were the first of their kind. While the SAA cited Syria’s pursuit of Nuclear Chemical Biological and Radiological (NCBR) weapons and support for terrorism as justifications, the 2007 sanctions specifically targeted individuals interfering in Lebanon’s politics and undermining its democratic institutions through acts of terrorism. Importantly, Syria was also on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and consequently was banned from receiving dual-use exports from America.

The SAA addressed broader issues like Syria’s shipment of military equipment to insurgents in Iraq, but the 2007 sanctions were purely targeted and were not encapsulated in a

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<http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=976#2005>

comprehensive sanctions framework. We must still address the SAA because the ban on dual-use exports to Syria is reaffirmed. Importantly, it also outlines the U.S. goal of supporting the rule of law, democratic processes and institutions, and Lebanese sovereignty against Syria interference in Lebanon. While the SAA also includes a ban on exports to Syria, US exports to Syria actually increased for every year from 2003-2008 excluding 2005. Therefore, the single comprehensive export ban against Syria was ineffective and rife with exceptions. Nonetheless, we cannot disregard it entirely. The 2007 sanctions however were purely targeted sanctions. The goals of the 2007 targeted sanctions were more narrowly defined and sought uniformly to stop Syrian interference in Lebanese politics and to support Lebanese political processes and sovereignty.

Thus, the 2007 sanctions are effectively purely targeted ones. They target groups of individuals rather than against a state and its entire people. Also, these were the first targeted sanctions uniformly and directly targeting Syria’s use of terror in Lebanon instead of comprehensive sanctions meant to curb terrorism and a laundry-list of other undesirable behaviors. The goals of the 2007 sanctions are all to different degrees related to its terrorist and political efforts within Lebanon. Additionally, the export ban on dual-use items to Syria constitutes a targeted sanction since it only targets those who would do harm to the US goals. Therefore, they present an example of unadulterated targeted sanctions with a clear set of goals.


The sanctions against Syria do not contain as many confusing factors as do targeted sanctions within a comprehensive sanctions framework.

**Important Legislation and Sanctions Timeline***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May, 2003</td>
<td>• Syria closes Damascus offices of HAMAS, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• An increase in rocket attacks and covert activities by Hizballah is reported, but at the same time Syria and Iran restrict Hizballah from carrying out overt operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 2003</td>
<td>• Syria withdraws 5,000 troops from Lebanon leaving approximately 14,000 remaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 12, 2003: Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (SAA)</td>
<td>• Seeks to end “Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, and stop its development of weapons of mass destruction.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bans exports of dual-use items to Syria, reaffirms that Syria is on the U.S. List terrorism sponsors and subject to relevant trade restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Notes that Syria is on the U.S. List of Terror Sponsoring States. Names Hizballah, HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others as terrorist organizations supported by Syria and Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Refers to UNSC Resolutions banning all states from supporting terrorism and encouraging Lebanon’s sovereignty</td>
</tr>
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Dec 12, 2003: US SAA Demands

- Syria must declare its intent to withdraw all troops from Lebanon
- Stop transit of people and items to Iraq
- Lebanon must practice its sovereignty by sending its troops to South Lebanon, a stronghold of Syrian-supported Hizballah

January, 2004

Increasing clashes between Hizballah and Israeli troops. Israeli and Hizballah soldiers exchange fire over ten times by June.

May 6, 2004

UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Southern Lebanon, Staffan de Mistura, warned of an unprecedented escalation in hostilities and called for restraint from both sides as to avoid a renewed conflict. However, the following day, Hizbullah fired around 200 mortar shells and rockets at the Rowsat Allam outpost, prompting an equally heavy Israeli aerial counter-attack.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 22, 2004</td>
<td>Hizballah shells northern Israel in response to an Israeli assassination of a Hizballah general. The ability to shell that area of Israel reflects Hizballah’s growing ties with Syria and Iran according to the IISS Armed Conflict Database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 2004</td>
<td>Hassan Nasrallah re-elected for his fifth term as Hizballah Secretary General. Hizballah now holds 9 seats in the 128 seat parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 2004</td>
<td>Syria temporarily re-deploys 1,000 troops away from Beirut and closer to the Israeli and Lebanese border.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September, 2004</td>
<td>The CIA reports that Syria has prevented Hizballah’s political wing from operating in Damascus, yet is still supporting its terrorist and political functions in Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 14, 2005</td>
<td>The vocal anti-Syrian Prime Minister of Lebanon is assassinated in a car bomb attack. Syria was immediately blamed for the assassination. Protests of Syria’s presence in Lebanon and mass funeral processions in the</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 24, 2005</td>
<td>Walid Jumblatt, Druze leader of Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party, calls for Syria to draw an immediate timetable for its withdrawal from Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8, 2005</td>
<td>Counter demonstrations, led by Hizballah, in support of Syria’s presence in Lebanon number in the hundreds of thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 9, 2005</td>
<td>Anti-Syrian rallies are held in response, estimated to number 1 million people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2005</td>
<td>A series of bombings in anti-Syrian, pro-Christian villages take place. Syria is suspected of planning the bombings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2, 2005</td>
<td>Anti-Syrian journalist Samir Kassir is killed by a car-bomb detonated outside his home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 2005</td>
<td>Gebran Tunei, a prominent anti-Syrian journalist, is killed in a car bomb in Beirut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 25, 2005</td>
<td>UN Secretary General Kofi Annan calls for Syria to withdraw its troops and threatens</td>
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sanctions if it fails to do so.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 2005</td>
<td>Syrian President Bashar al-Assad promises a timetable for withdrawal within the week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26, 2005</td>
<td>Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20th, June 30th 2005</td>
<td>Pro-Syrian coalition in Lebanon falls and an anti-Syrian coalition government gains a majority of the 128 seat Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 12, 2006</td>
<td>Fighting between Israel and Hizballah begins. Lasts 34 days and takes the lives of 850 Lebanese and 160 Israelis. When deaths from exploded munitions are added in, the death toll reaches 1,026.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2006</td>
<td>Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s is pressured by the UN to obey UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) calling 'for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2006</td>
<td>The five Shi'ite ministers belonging to Hizbullah and Amal decide to boycott the coalition government in protest of PM</td>
</tr>
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Sinoira’s efforts to enforce UNSC Resolution 1559.

**February, 2007**

Hizbullah and the Christian Free Patriotic Union reached an agreement that Hizbullah had the right to retain arms until no Lebanese territory remained under occupation. This demand was stepped up towards the end of the year when thousands of Hizbullah supporters protested against the government and shut down central Beirut.

**February 3, 2007**

Hizballah agrees to re-enter the government.

The decision followed Siniora's statement that all future government decisions would be based on consensus and that Hizbullah 'would never be called by any name other than the resistance'. Such phrasing allowed Siniora and the government to sidestep international pressure regarding disarmament by ceasing to branding Hizbullah as a militia, thus avoiding making it a group in violation of UN

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March, 2007

Walid Jumblatt pushes for the disarmament of all Palestinian militias. Fatah al Islam, a Syrian backed Palestinian militia, rejects this. The Lebanon representative for Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) accepts falling under control of the Lebanese army.

May, 2007

Sinoira links disbanding of Hizballah to removal of Israeli troops from the Shebaa Farms. He claims that until all of Lebanon is under sovereign state authority, the question of militias cannot be addressed.

May, 2007

Intense fighting breaks out between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al Islam in Nahr al Bard Palestinian Refugee Camp. A total of 168 Lebanese soldiers, 226 Fatah al-Islam militants and 52 civilians died in the fighting, making this the worst internal violence witnessed in Lebanon for 17 years.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June, 2007</td>
<td>Minister of Parliament Walid Eido was killed by a car bomb in Beirut, along with his son, two bodyguards and six civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 2007</td>
<td>President Bush issues Executive Order 13441 which blocks the property and assets of persons or entities seeking “to undermine Lebanon’s legitimate and democratically elected government or democratic institutions, to contribute to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Lebanon, including through politically motivated violence and intimidation, to reassert Syrian control or contribute to Syrian interference in Lebanon, or to infringe upon or undermine Lebanese sovereignty [and to] contribute to political and economic instability” in the region”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Efforts to elect a new President are delayed 18 times due to lack of consensus within anti-Syrian coalitions and between anti and pro Syrian factions of government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

May, 2008 | The Pro-Hizballah head of security at Beirut International Airport is replaced. The government demands that Hizballah shut down its extensive communications network operating from the airport.

May, 2008 | Hizballah gunmen take control of West Beirut in response to government’s demands. The Lebanese army announced that the former head of airport security would be allowed to remain in his post, and Hizbullah's communications network would be left untouched.

July, 2008 | Leaders reach consensus and elect a new government. Hizballah has enough seats to exercise veto power


Sanctions against Syria generally failed to change its behavior and to contain it militarily. According to previously cited executive orders, the U.S. wanted to limit Syrian interference in Lebanese politics, to uphold Lebanon’s sovereignty and its democratic institutions, and to prevent the breakdown of the rule of law within Lebanon. All of these goals, and the obstacles to
achieving them, relate directly to Syria’s interference in Lebanon.

Syria exercised its influence in Lebanon in two ways. Both its military and political influence were exercised through Hizballah. First, Syria funded and trained Hizballah and used its troops to exert influence on the ground and to further its military objectives from Lebanon. Its principal military objectives were assassinating key rivals, fighting Israel, and becoming a complement or substitute for the Lebanese Army. Second, Syria used Hizballah’s presence within the Lebanese parliament to maintain its veto power over anti-Syrian coalitions and thus to prevent the passage of legislation opposing Syrian interests. Additionally, Hizballah’s military wing became strong enough that even Lebanon’s Prime Minister argued against its disbandment and even assented to its demands regarding Hizballah’s communications network when threatened with force.

Syria’s activities within Lebanon on both the political and military ends of the spectrum prevented the U.S. goals, laid out in E.O. 13441, from being achieved. Every time Syria conducted an assassination, fought a proxy battle through Fatah al Islam or Syrian intelligence agents, or conducted a Hizballah attack against Israel, Lebanon’s rule of law was undermined. Also, its sovereignty was challenged since Syria was implementing an unauthorized use of force to carry out its objectives in spite of Lebanese state and military authority. In efforts to maintain veto power within Lebanon’s government, Hizballah’s political wing helped delay elections while its military wing assassinated political figures that opposed Syrian influence. In this way, Syria undermined Lebanon’s democratic institutions and processes.

While analyzing this sanctions case, the author notes that the Israeli Air Force violated Lebanese airspace many times throughout the duration of sanctions. However, sanctions were
directed against Syrian interference and Syria’s breaches of Lebanese sovereignty. Therefore, the effects of Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, while present, are not analyzed due to the goals of U.S. sanctions.

Sanctions themselves did not achieve any of the goals they were intended to. However, direct pressure from the United Nations (whose Security Council adopted the same arms embargo against Syria) coupled with domestic pressure did result in Syria withdrawing its troops. This was a symbolic victory for the U.S. as well as the UN, but it was not entirely or even significantly attributable to sanctions but rather to international opprobrium (as evidenced by Arab leaders’ refusal to attend conferences in Damascus after Hariri’s assassination) and to massive civil disobedience. While this constituted a symbolic victory, Syria was still able to circumvent U.S. sanctions and ultimately carry out its interference in Lebanon successfully.

**Sanctions Episode Analysis**

**Economic Impact**

US sanctions against Syria did not seek to impose economic impacts against Syria. Instead, the US sought mainly political and military goals from their sanctions. However, there were some marginal economic impacts. In 2002, the U.S. constituted 6.9% of Syria’s imports according to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCTSD). While this does not constitute a close relationship or trade vital to the Syrian economy, it is still a significant amount of trade. According UNCTSD, exports from the US to Syria actually grew after the imposition of sanctions in 2003. From 2003-2008, US exports to Syria grew every year except in 2005.

From that information it is clear that the US did not intend, nor did it earnestly attempt, to impose economic costs on Syria.
The US did halt shipments of dual-use items to Syria, but the effects of that embargo are related to political and military realms.

**Military and Political Impact**

By “military impact” the author means impact on Syria’s ability to use force, mainly through Hizballah but including Fatah al Islam and agents of Syrian intelligence, in order to influence outcomes in Lebanon.

Through the duration of sanctions Syria actually reduced its formal military presence within Lebanon but exercised the use of force through Hizballah, Fatah al Islam, and presumably Syrian intelligence although this cannot be proven outright. However, there is consensus among the IISS Defense Analysis Department that Syrian intelligence was involved in the major assassinations during this period. Hizballah carried out assassinations, cross-border raids into Israel, and attacks on anti-Syrian politicians with seeming impunity. Syria’s military groups, but not its military, actually gained influence and clout by the end of the sanctions episode. Indeed, the group successfully challenged the Prime Minister and won the right to act as the “resistance” in defense of Lebanon. The following is a year-by-year analysis of Syria’s military victories and defeats within Lebanon.

At the beginning of the sanctions episode in 2003, Syria closed its Damascus offices of Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Additionally, Syria removed 4,000 of its regular army troops from Lebanon. Hizballah, however, did accelerate its military activities in 2003. This was done in direct contravention of the US goals of promoting Lebanese sovereignty, upholding the rule of law, and preventing Syrian interference.
Hizballah attained anti-aircraft guns in 2003 and conducted rocket attacks and border skirmishes against Israeli villages and soldiers, respectively. Hizballah killed an Israeli civilian in August by way of rocket attack. Importantly, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom demanded that Lebanon and Syria restrain Hizballah soldiers. It was known throughout the region that Lebanon was not in full control of its own territory and that Hizballah was a Syrian proxy.

Although Syria did close down at least a portion of its terrorist offices, it still funded and supported Hizballah, its main proxy. Hizballah’s militant activities, which undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty and the rule of law, increased during 2003. Therefore these closures did not help the US achieve its goals within Lebanon.

In 2004, Hizballah and Israel engaged in an “unprecedented” level of fighting according to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Southern Lebanon, Staffan de Mistura. The day following this declaration, Hizballah launched 200 rockets into Israel and the Israeli Air Force responded with an “equally heavy” counterattack. Hizballah “with the support of Iran and Syria, strived to assume a more leading role in the region” in 2004.⁵⁹

According to the CIA, arms supplies continued to flow to Hizballah from Syria despite isolated incidents of Lebanese troops catching arms smugglers in the act. Syria did stop Hizballah’s political wings from operating in Damascus, but the CIA concluded it still “continued to fund or transfer funds for Hizbullah attacks.” After Syrian President Bashar al-Assad refused a US demand to expel Palestinian militant groups, close down a dozen terrorist

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offices in Syria, and cut off support to Hizballah, the US imposed a total export ban aside from humanitarian items. However, as we have noted before, US exports to Syria increased every year of the sanctions episode except for 2005.

Those additional sanctions attributed to the international attention focused against Syria. But as will be addressed in the “political impact” section, UN pressure was the main reason for Syria’s relocation of 3,000 Syrian troops from Beirut to the outskirts of the Syrian-Lebanese border in September of 2004.

The year 2005 saw just 36 deaths within Lebanon as opposed to 75 in 2003. However, the Syrian-directed assassinations that took place in 2005 constituted both major failures and victories for US goals. On February 14, 2005 Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated by a car bomb that was driven into his motorcade. Syria was quickly blamed as the culprit. Although to this day it has not been entirely proven that Syria was responsible, international intelligence agencies (including those of the U.S., Jordan, and Libya) suspect Syria’s involvement and the UN has tried Syrian agents who were believed to be involved in the plot.

Up to 100,000 people attended Hariri’s funeral. On February 21, thousands of anti-Syrian protestors rallied in the streets and called for Syria’s total withdrawal from Lebanon. Walid Junblatt of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party also demanded a full withdrawal.

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Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah’s Secretary General, organized counter demonstrations numbering in the hundreds of thousands. However, eventually the anti-Syrian protestors mounted over 1 million protestors.

These massive protests attracted great international attention. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan demanded for Syria to withdraw all its troops and threatened sanctions if it failed to deliver. Al-Assad met with UN special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen on March 12th and promised to announce a timetable for total withdrawal within the week. The Syrian withdrawal was completed in April and confirmed by the UN in June.62

In this instance, Syria’s assassination of Hariri worked against it and resulted in increased international pressure and opprobrium from Arab states. The pro-Syrian government of Prime Minister Omar Karami collapsed just two weeks after Hariri’s assassination. In parliamentary elections from May 30th – June 20th, an anti-Syrian coalition took a majority of the 128 seat parliament. This constituted the biggest victory for US and UN interests since the start of the sanctions episode. As will be addressed later, this victory did not last.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Syria’s ability to commit acts of terrorism had not diminished because of sanctions. Indeed, it assassinated a head of state, perhaps the hardest target within all of Lebanon. Throughout the duration of sanctions, Hizballah consistently

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http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=976#2005
employed every type of weapons system that it owned.\textsuperscript{63} Massive protests, UN pressure, and the threat of additional UN sanctions however, did play a major role in forcing Syria to withdraw its regular army troops from Lebanon. The fact that, after years of defying international agreements regarding Syria’s presence in Lebanon, Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with the UN and delivered on his promise to withdraw shows a genuine desire to avoid the threatened consequences for his actions.\textsuperscript{64}

The Syrian withdrawal constitutes a change in behavior, but neither the US ban on dual-use exports nor the sanctions levied against specific individuals brought this change about. Indeed, sanctions failed to prevent Syria from assassinating Hariri in the first place. While 2005 constitutes a positive year for US and international goals, Lebanese backlash against the pro-Syrian government and the threat of additional UN sanctions deserve credit for that change, not the US sanctions already in place.

Beginning in 2006, Hizballah and Israel waged cross-border war against one another. The conflict lasted 34 days and resulted in deaths of 850 Lebanese and 160 Israelis. Following the official end of hostilities, casualties from the explosion of munitions pushed the total killed over the course of the year up to 1,026.

Prior to the 2006 outbreak of hostilities, the UN increased pressure on Lebanon’s new Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to obey UNSC Resolution 1559 which calls for the “disbanding


http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/report/dsp_weaponsTable.asp?aea

and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias,” including Hizballah. At this time the US and France were preparing a draft UNSC resolution explicitly making Hizballah’s disarmament a demand. Despite this international pressure, five Shia ministers belonging to the movements Hizballah and its originator Amal boycotted the government because of UN demands regarding UNSC resolution 1559.  

Hassan Nasrallah and the Shia ministers argued that Hizballah was not a militia, but rather a resistance movement dedicated to liberating Lebanon from Israel. Hizballah aligned with the Christian Free Patriotic Union in February, thereby adding to the boycott’s intensity and legitimacy. By the end of the year, thousands of Hizballah protestors blocked highways to downtown and “shut down central Beirut” (Inkster, Lebanon-Hizballah-Syria Annual Summary 2006).

The boycott ended on February 3rd when Siniora said that Hizballah “would never be called by any name other than the resistance.” Siniora thereby officially stated that Hizballah was not a militia but a resistance. This ensured that Hizballah’s existence would not be a violation of UNSC Resolution 1559 which called for the disarmament of militias only. Later during a visit to Washington D.C., Siniora linked Hizballah’s disbandment with the liberation of the Sheba Farms region of Lebanon. He claimed that as long as Lebanon did not have sovereignty over its entire territory that he would not be able to address the question of militias or resistances.  

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This represents a huge victory for Hizballah and Syria. Not only did Syria’s proxy effectively boycott the government, it also got the Prime Minister to argue its case abroad. Siniora used Hizballah’s disarmament as a bargaining chip for the withdrawal of Israel from the Sheba Farms, one of the primary goals of Hizballah itself. The government was paralyzed for two months because it challenged Hizballah’s existence. Pro-Syrian coalitions within the government saved Hizballah at the expense of Lebanon’s sovereignty and democratic processes.

After the 34 day war between Hizballah and Israel, thousands attended Nasrallah’s “divine victory” rally at which he celebrated Hizballah’s triumph over Israel. In response to disarmament efforts by the UN, Hizballah and the Christian Amal party again staged massive protests in central Beirut and brought the government “to a complete standstill.”

The year 2006 had the highest deaths within Lebanon at 1,026. Hizballah demonstrated its military prowess by defeating Israel. Its political abilities were put on display when its boycott and later protests shut down the government and when Siniora agreed not to disband it despite international outcry. The sheer volume of attacks (multiple volleys of hundreds of rockets) against Israel and military efficacy of Hizballah show that the group still had access to weapons sufficient for defeating Israel. Despite arms and dual-use embargoes, Hizballah still thrived militarily. Politically, its ministers within Lebanon’s government boycotted Parliament for two months and eventually had Siniora argue their case internationally. The events of 2006 represent a victory for Hizballah and Syria.

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In 2007 Lebanon experienced “the most serious outbreak of violence since the 1975–90 civil war.” The most important events in 2007 include fighting between Syrian-backed Fatah al Islam and Lebanon’s army, three high-profile assassinations of anti-Syrian figures, and the failure to elect a new president because of disagreements over Hizballah’s share of Parliament seats.

Fatah al Islam (FI) originally emerged in 2006 after separating from Fatah al Intifada, a pro-Syrian group of Palestinian militants that previously belonged to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah party. FI is allegedly affiliated to al Qaeda but Lebanese government officials have linked Syrian intelligence to the group. Following a police raid on an FI safehouse, FI militants attacked a Lebanese military post, killing 27 soldiers. FI militants took up shelter in the Nahr al Bard Palestinian refugee camp and the Army besieged FI’s positions. By the end of the fighting, 168 Lebanese soldiers, 226 FI militants and 52 civilians had been killed, making this instance Lebanon’s worst internal violence in 17 years.

While the links between FI and Syria are widely recognized but not definitively confirmed, the assassinations of 2007 do solidly reflect Syrian influence. In June, Minister of Parliament Walid Eido was killed along with his son, two bodyguards, and six civilians by a car bomb in Beirut. Antoine Ghenam, also a minister, was killed in the same fashion in September.

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“Both ministers were outspoken critics of Syria, and many in the Lebanese government accused Damascus of being involved” in the assassinations.\(^70\)

General Francois al Hajj, an Army general who was not anti-Syrian, was later assassinated in a secure area that also houses the presidential palace and the Ministry of Defense. It is doubted that Syrian agents had the resources necessary to carry out such a complex mission, but regardless of the culprit, this assassination illustrates how fractious Lebanese society was at this time. The Lebanese were partially ruled by a failing government that could not protect its own generals even in a relatively safe area. Also, the government was completely paralyzed by the actions of a Syrian proxy years prior. Although Syria may not have been responsible for al Hajj’s assassination, his murder represents the fragility of the Lebanese government and the limits of its weakened sovereignty.

In November, President Emile Lahhoud resigned because his term limits expired. Elections for a new presidential candidate failed several times before it was agreed that Suleiman would become the next president. However, pro and anti-Syrian factions within the government disagreed over how many seats Hizballah would be allotted. This conflict continued into 2008, ultimately ending in Hizballah maintaining veto power over the other coalitions in the government.\(^71\)

\(^{70}\) Inkster.

http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=1089#2007

\(^{71}\) Inkster.

http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=1089#2008
In 2008, the vote on presidential nomination was delayed 18 times. Additionally, two government ministers and an army commander were assassinated, although links to Syria are not definite. In May, the government replaced the pro-Hizballah head of security at Beirut airport. The government demanded that Hizballah shut down its private telecommunications network, which it used for command and control, that was housed within the airport. In response, Hizballah mounted battles against pro-government militias and succeeded in taking control of West Beirut after two days of skirmishes. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora described the Hizballah uprising as an “armed coup.” Siniora reneged on this statement later and re-instated the pro-Hizballah head of security at the airport, leaving their communications network intact. In essence, Lebanon’s head of state mounted a feeble opposition using pro-government militias and, when those were defeated, granted Hizballah its demands.

In July Lebanon experienced a political breakthrough. The Parliament agreed to the formation of a national unity government. This move was also widely supported by Western governments. Hizballah still retained enough seats to exercise veto power. In August, the Parliament issued a policy statement that recognized: “the right of the Lebanese government, its people and resistance groups to use all means possible to regain Israeli-occupied land. The reference to resistance groups was seen as implicitly including Hizbullah.” Five years after the

72 Inkster.
http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=1089#2008

73 Inkster.
http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=1089#2008
imposition of sanctions against Syria, Hizballah retained veto power over Lebanon’s government and grave violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty and rule of law were still being carried out.

In 2009 Saad Hariri (Rafik Hariri’s son) won parliamentary elections in June and met with Hizballah in November to form a national unity government. It was expected that the 30 seat Cabinet would be divided according to Lebanon’s confessional system, guaranteeing proportional representation for each religious group. Thus Hariri’s coalition would receive 15, Shia Hizballah would receive 10, and President Michel Suleiman, an independent, would receive 5. Thus, Hizballah’s veto power would be removed. Hizballah challenged this formula and delayed its approval for five months. President Suleiman eventually gave one of his five seats to Hizballah, giving the group 10+1 seats and a blocking third within the cabinet, ensuring that it would not be forced to disarm.74

Conclusion

Syria’s continued ability to ship weapons to Hizballah (as evidenced by its continued successful assassinations and the 2006 “Divine Victory” over Israel) is testimony to the fact that targeted sanctions did not sufficiently contain Syria’s Hizballah militarily. Also, Hizballah consistently was able to use each weapons system at its disposal from 2002 (before the imposition of sanctions) until 2008. In 2003, Syria did limit terrorist activities within Damascus but, according to the CIA, it continued to fund Hizballah’s activities within Lebanon. If sanctions aimed to curb terrorist activities in Damascus, then it could be argued that they succeeded. However, this was not the case. Hizballah’s political wing “shut down” the government with

74 Inkster.

http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=1089#2009
boycotts and massive protests twice.\textsuperscript{75} Once when Hizballah’s veto power was threatened and again when its military wing was in danger of being disbanded. Hizballah’s military wing shut down the government again when the Prime Minister himself ordered it to remove its communications network. After a show of force, the sovereign government of Lebanon gave in to Hizballah’s demands. In 2009, Hizballah still maintained veto power in Lebanon’s government and received 55\% of the popular vote, while Hariri’s coalition received just 45\%. Each time Syria’s capability to influence political outcomes within Lebanon was threatened, Hizballah successfully retained its full power. Syria’s ability to interfere in Lebanese politics through Hizballah was intact by the end of the sanctions episode.

In conclusion, Syria successfully supplied Hizballah militarily for the duration of sanctions. This enabled Hizballah to gain even more legitimacy in the eyes of the Lebanese and, indeed, in the eyes of its own Prime Minister who refused to disband Hizballah even after it challenged his military in an outright violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty. US sanctions sought to stop Syria from supporting terrorism by way of inhibiting its supply of Hizballah, stop Syrian interference and its “reassertion” thereof in Lebanese politics, to prevent the undermining of Lebanon’s sovereignty, and to stop the undermining of Lebanon’s democratic processes and institutions. \textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75} Inkster.

http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=166&YearID=1089#2008


By the end of the sanctions episode, Hizballah had become the most powerful military entity in Lebanon. Lebanon’s Prime Minister was assassinated in 2005 and assassinations continued for the duration of sanctions. Syria still maintained veto power in Lebanon’s government throughout the entire episode. Hizballah received more of the popular vote than Hariri’s coalition in the 2009 portioning of the Cabinet. Finally, Hizballah challenged the sovereignty of the regime continually and brought all democratic processes to a halt whenever it was in danger of losing authority.

| Change Behavior | - |

**SYRIA 2003-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>RESULT (+, confirmed - , negated or no impact)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State in economic distress will increase chances of sanctions success</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Cooperation will reduce the effectiveness of sanctions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior trade between target and sender will increase target’s compliance with sanctions. Absence of</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
such prior trade or presence of small amounts of trade will not increase target’s compliance

Economic Cost will vary directly with sanctions’ success +

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<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Liberia 2001-2004</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Change Behavior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change Regime</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contain Militarily</td>
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</table>

Shortly after Liberia’s civil war ended in 1996, Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected president of Liberia. Taylor’s rule was characterized by severe corruption and repression. This corruption and his execution of over 1,000 ethnic Krahn and his severe harassment of Mandingos lead to the formation of rebel groups in the late 90s. In February 2000, these groups united to form the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) group. By September 2000, Taylor formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to eliminate the LURD.
Due in part to the RUF’s notoriously gruesome tactics, sanctions were first implemented by the UN in 2001.\(^{77}\) The US implemented its own sanctions just a few months later and also employed the UN sanctions.\(^{78}\)

Since the US decided to implement UNSC Resolution 1343 in its Executive Order 13213 in 2001, both the US and the UN had the same goals in Liberia. These goals were to convince Taylor to stop his support for the RUF, to expel the RUF from his country, and to cease all import of rough diamonds into Liberia. Although it was not a formal part of the sanctions package, U.S. officials later claimed publicly that Taylor’s resignation was a prerequisite for achieving peace in the region. Thus, regime change did become a goal of the senders in the period of 2001-2004.

The sanctions were successful in changing parts of Taylor’s behavior. Almost immediately after the imposition of sanctions, Taylor grounded all Liberian aircraft and opened them to inspection. Also, he allowed inspectors to examine his finances and promised to resign should anything be found awry. However, throughout the sanctions episode the RUF continued its campaign and did not suffer shortages of weapons according to the UN. Ceasefires were violated and, according to a UN report, the political and societal groups represented at peace negotiations had little importance to the RUF.\(^{79}\) Similarly, the LURD and MODEL had no objectives aside from excluding Taylor from power totally. Peace was not their ultimate aim even while under arms embargoes from the UN and the US.\(^{80}\)

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\(^{80}\)
Also, the diamond trade continued. Ultimately though, Taylor did resign in 2003 and a peace treaty was signed between all factions that same year and this ended most major fighting. Therefore, the arms embargo itself did not contain Taylor militarily but if the sanctions had a large impact on the peace treaty, then one could argue that sanctions lead to a peace treaty which eliminated violent conflict from the region. We must now analyze the period from 2001-2004 to determine what effect, if any, sanctions had on the outcomes within Liberia.

**Important Legislation and Sanctions Composition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March 7, 2001: UNSC passes</th>
<th>Demands that Liberia:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resolution 1343</strong></td>
<td>• “immediately cease its support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• expel all RUF members from Liberia…and prohibit all RUF activities on its territory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• (b) cease all financial [] military support to the RUF, including all transfers of arms and ammunition, all military training and the provision of logistical and communications support, and take steps to ensure that no such support is provided from the territory of Liberia or by its nationals;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• (c) cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra</td>
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http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=158&YearID=587#2001
Leone rough diamonds which are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government of Sierra Leone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mar 7, 2001&lt;sup&gt;81&lt;/sup&gt;: Sanctions in UNSC Resolution 1343</th>
<th>Sanctions:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>freeze funds or financial resources or assets that directly or indirectly benefit the RUF</td>
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<td>grounds all Liberia-registered aircraft operating within UN jurisdiction until it updates its register of aircraft pursuant to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944</td>
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<td>Demands all states in the region prevent armed groups from using their territory to “prepare and commit” attacks on neighboring countries and to refrain from any potentially destabilizing action regarding Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>All States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply to Liberia of arms and related materiel of all types</td>
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<tr>
<td>all States shall prevent the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia;</td>
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<tr>
<td>All states must prevent entry into or transit through their territories of senior members of the Government of Liberia, its armed forces, their spouses and any individuals providing financial and military support to armed rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia, in particular the RUF in Sierra Leone, as designated</td>
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<tr>
<td>nothing …shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of Liberia to United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business or the participation of the Government of Liberia</td>
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May 24, 2001: Executive Order 13213
Adopts the UNSC sanctions against Liberia

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<tr>
<th>May 6, 2002: UNSC Resolution 1408</th>
<th>Lifts air ban on Liberia</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decides that Liberia has not</td>
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<td>expelled RUF members nor ceased</td>
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<td>its support for the RUF, and has not</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ceased imports of rough diamonds</td>
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<td></td>
<td>from Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Keeps in place remaining sanctions</td>
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<td>for another 12 months and claims</td>
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<td>they will be lifted when and if the</td>
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<td>reporting authority observes</td>
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<td>Liberia’s adherence to UN demands</td>
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May 6, 2003: UNSC Resolution
Extends sanctions for another 12 months

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Extends travel ban to LURD and other rebel groups

Claims UN will impose restrictions on the import of Liberian timber products starting in July 2003. Also erects a committee to monitor whether or not this causes negative socio-economic effects on Liberia’s people.

December 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2003\textsuperscript{83}: UNSC Resolution 1521

Applauds peace treaties signed by Liberia and the rebel groups.

Softens weapons ban and allows Liberian police and international forces to keep weapons. Keeps in place weapons bans on rebel groups, travel bans on people who represent a threat to peace, and bans on rough diamonds benefiting or impacting the Liberian economy.


Blocked all property and interests of senior members of former President Taylor’s regime and people who were involved in “depleting [Liberia’s] natural resources”
Bans importation of round logs or timber from sources involved directly or indirectly with the conflict or Taylor’s regime
Banned imports of rough diamonds from Liberia

Other portions taken from the UN and US legislation cited in the footnotes of this case study.

Similar to the Syrian sanctions episode, economic impact is neither a factor nor an intended outcome for this episode. Also, the government of former President Taylor will still not release official figures on numbers of war-related deaths and no hard data exists on arms imports since these transactions were illegal. Therefore, we will analyze the pace of the conflict throughout 2001-2004 as well as its intensity to gauge whether or not Taylor and the RUF were being contained militarily.

The civil war escalated in 2001 because of the formation of the anti-Taylor rebel group
known as LURD and Taylor’s consequent efforts to quash that group. While sanctions against Taylor “greatly disabled his military strength” The goal of sanctions was for Taylor to withdraw all support from the RUF and to weaken him if he did not comply.\(^\text{84}\) The intensification of the conflict in 2001 stands in contrast to the statement that Taylor was actually weakened that year. Indeed, no sanctions were levied against Taylor’s activities in the timber industry and this was a great source of income for him. Taylor was known to provide the RUF with funds from his timber enterprises.\(^\text{85}\)

Although Taylor did not adhere specifically to the demands outlined in the sanctions package, he did make other concessions. In 2001, he restored diplomatic relations with Guinea and Sierra Leone. Similarly, he began lobbying for a non-aggression pact between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.\(^\text{86}\)

Indeed, Taylor was quite vocal in the effect that sanctions had on his decision making process. According to a Washington Post article published four months before the imposition of sanctions, Taylor made several changes expressly because he was “facing a threat of


\(^{85}\) Inkster, Nigel. http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=158&YearID=587#2003  

\(^{86}\) Inkster, Nigel. http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=158&YearID=587#2001
Although his pledge to “sever all links with the RUF, both formal and informal” was not carried out, he did force token RUF officials to leave his territory. More important, Taylor agreed to allow the UN oversee Liberia’s diamond trade.  

Despite these overtures, a contemporaneous UN report claimed that Taylor and a “small coterie of officials and private businessmen around him” engage in “international criminal activity.” Specifically, “large amounts of the proceeds” of Taylor’s lumber industry “are used for extra-budgetary activities, including the acquisition of weapons.” Therefore, Taylor was certainly affected by sanctions in 2001, but not enough to actually change his domestic behavior regarding arms deals and support of the RUF. He did make some changes to his international behavior and this must be recognized when evaluating the efficacy of sanctions.

Great progress was made in 2001, mostly due to sanctions, in regional stability. Guinea no longer had to fear attacks from Liberia and visa versa because of the non-aggression pact. While peace was enhanced internationally, violence persisted in Liberia and indeed intensified in 2001. Fewer than 1,000 people were killed during this year, but the majority of the deaths were civilian. These resulted from government raids on suspected rebel bases within civilian villages.


http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=158&YearID=587#2001

89 Farah, Douglas. "Liberian Pledges to Cut Sierra Leone Rebel Ties; Facing Sanctions, Taylor Agrees to U.N. Demands."
The following year saw major victories by the LURD against Taylor’s forces. By April 2002, LURD forces were in Monrovia, the capital. Burkina Faso, France, Senegal, and Nigeria all agreed to oversee negotiations between Taylor and rebel forces at the Ouagadougou Peace Talks in July. Here, LURD announced that it was prepared to discuss a ceasefire with Taylor. Taylor rejected this on the grounds that negotiating with the LURD would lend legitimacy to its cause and subsequently boycotted the meeting.

Taylor called for a ceasefire just a month later after his Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) made significant victories, including capturing a top LURD commander and killing over 100 rebels in one battle. It seems that the calls for ceasefires were not brought about by a shortage of arms brought about by the sanctions. Rather, Taylor strategically boycotted and proposed ceasefires according to whether his security forces’ power was waning or waxing, respectively. During this time, the UN claimed that Taylor was still importing arms from Kyrgyzstan and Uganda and consequently extended existing sanctions on his regime on May 6, 2002. Therefore, Taylor was not militarily contained in this year, either.

Again, Taylor made lots of progress in international efforts at peace in 2002. To help enhance border security, Taylor met with members of the Mano River Union (MRU) to organize joint patrols of shared borders. However, UN inspectors monitoring Taylor’s compliance with sanctions were “appalled” by the destruction of Lofa, a town whose peaceful inhabitants were completely destroyed in a campaign against the rebels in the area.
Fighting in 2002 was characterized by fierce rebel advances that took the lives of many civilians and government reprisals that, with the exception of Lofa, did not kill as many civilians as the LURD efforts.  

On 30 October, 2003, a UN panel recommended that arms embargoes on both Liberia and the LURD should be maintained. The sanctions on the import of diamonds were extended and the travel bans on Liberian officials were maintained. The UN reported that LURD still receives funding from Guinea. Taylor filed a complaint at the UNSC about Guinea’s persistent funding of the rebel group.

Liberia was also violating the sanctions during this time. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed to send a panel to Liberia in order to determine if it still received military aid from neighboring states, used its territory to stage attacks, and if it still had links with RUF rebels in Sierra Leone. ECOWAS’ mission led to the extension of the arms embargo for another year. The crucial export ban on timber was also imposed against Liberia after this mission.

While LURD and the government held peace talks, another rebel group known as MODEL did not attend the talks. Although these peace talks do constitute a good sign for Liberia’s reconciliation, LURD entered the Western suburbs of Monrovia that same week. Approximately 400 people were killed that week (IISS). In the face of these massive killings,
France evacuated 535 people from the capital while the US deployed 39 troops to evacuate American citizens.\textsuperscript{91}

Representatives from 18 Liberian political parties attended the following peace talks held on June 10\textsuperscript{th}-11\textsuperscript{th}. Taylor agreed to attend the talks if the demand for his arrest was dropped. LURD claimed it would accept a ceasefire if Taylor resigned, but he refused to and the peace talks fizzled into a gridlock. US officials maintained that Taylor’s resignation was integral to achieving peace in the region. Although bans on timber exports were not imposed on 2003, those bans had the most potential for unseating Taylor since a large bulk of his funds depend on timber profits. Indeed, his deforestation efforts were quadruple sound deforestation processes. This illustrates his dependence on timber for revenue.\textsuperscript{92}

Fighting between LURD and government troops increased, with some estimates claiming that 700 people were killed in one major day of fighting. By August 2003, LURD and MODEL had reduced Taylor’s territorial control by two thirds.\textsuperscript{93} Under mounting international pressure, Taylor agreed to attend the August 18\textsuperscript{th} peace talks which were being held by ECOWAS. But before the peace conference he was charged with 17 counts of war crimes and other violations. On August 11\textsuperscript{th}, Taylor resigned his post as President.

\textsuperscript{91} Inkster, Nigel. http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=158&YearID=831#2003


In the weeks preceding his resignation, White House Secretary Ari Fleischer said that Taylor’s promises to leave were encouraging, but that “it’s important that it's more than words. It has to be deeds. He needs to leave so peace can be achieved.”

On August 18th, LURD, Model, 18 Liberian political parties, and the Government of Liberia all signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Liberian National Transition Government took office in October. After this point in time in the sanctions episode, massive multilateral activities in Liberia became a decisive characteristic in the sanctions package. The UN played a critical role in employing a disarmament program.

Firstly, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Liberia for Operations and Rule of Law, Souren Seraydarian, said that violators of the peace agreement would receive no amnesty for war crimes committed after 8 October. Jacques Klein, the head of UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) started the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) program in December.

Initially, former fighters walked out of DDRR meetings because they thought they would receive more restitution. This was resolved in just a few days when Klein decided to give the fighters increments of money up front rather than making them wait for a bigger lump sum. Before December 15, 12,000 of Taylor’s men were disarmed and 8,600 weapons were relinquished. An additional 2000 UN troops, along with approximately 200 Pakistani peacekeeping troops, arrived in Liberia in late December.

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By early April 2004, UNMIL had a presence in 13 of Liberia’s 15 counties. This widespread presence helped enforce the DDRR program. 27,000 small arms, 6.84 million pieces of ammunition, and 29,830 rounds of heavy ammunition were recovered. Because of Liberia’s porous borders and the duration of the conflict though, IISS says that this is an “alarmingly low” number of recovered weapons.

Despite this alarm, former Liberian warlords even signed an agreement to totally disband their military units on November 3rd, 2004.

In all, 27,000 small arms were recovered, along with 6.84m pieces of ammunition and 29,830 rounds of heavy ammunition (for mortars and rocket-propelled grenades). The total number of registered combatants was almost three times higher than the original estimate of 38,000. However, given Liberia’s porous borders and the duration and intensity of the civil war, the total quantity of weapons recovered was alarmingly low. As a sign of their sincerity and commitment to the peace plan, the former Liberian warlords met on 3 November to sign an agreement to disband their respective combat units and help pave the path towards reconstruction. The U.S. announced that it would allocate $50 million to help the DDRR program while Japan offered $3.64 million. Meanwhile, UNMIL continued to seize various weapons from within the civilian population.

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http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=158&YearID=831#2004
2004 also saw the signing of the Electoral Reform Law which laid a democratic basis in Liberia. This was aimed at eliminating corruption and preventing the possibility of a political figure coming into power through fraudulent means.

**Sanctions Episode Analysis**

This sanctions episode was simultaneously characterized by concentrated multilateral compliance as well as defection. The UN successfully organized UNMIL’s DDRR program and the US and Japan contributed lots of money to the reconciliation process within Liberia. Meanwhile, Guinea continued to supply the LURD and according to UN reports Liberia was still awash in arms during the sanctions episode.96

Defecting from arms embargoes is, as we have seen in all cases, common in sanctions episodes. Especially in the Syrian and Liberian cases, arms smuggling through neighboring countries was generally unmonitored. Perhaps UN peacekeeping troops could have been best used to monitor the Guinean-Liberian border to better ensure that arms would not enter Liberia.

The importation of diamonds persisted throughout the sanctions episode. So much so that additional targeted sanctions were imposed in 2007 against certain groups in Liberia for trading in diamonds. Aside from applying international pressure and conducting periodic visits from monitoring groups, hardly any discernible effort aimed at limiting Liberia’s ability to export diamonds was taken. As in the Syrian case, no border patrols were conducted and arms flowed

96 Inkster. 

http://acd.iiss.org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=158&YearID=831#2004
freely across Lebanon’s borders, similar to the situation in Liberia. Fatalities and fighting both increased from 2001-2003 until a peace agreement was reached. Arguably, Taylor’s presence was an impediment to signing the peace treaty. International efforts to force his resignation did have an effect on his decision, and therefore did help the peace process. However, sanctions did not achieve peace as was intended by its senders. Therefore, sanctions get credit for contributing to Taylor’s resignation but were ineffective in stopping the fighting through the targeted sanctions stipulated in the episode.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contain militarily (arms embargo)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Change Regime</td>
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Importantly, the long-awaited sanctions on Taylor’s timber industry came on August 18th, 2003. Taylor resigned before these sanctions were employed, but received warnings from the UN since July 2002 that sanctions may be placed on his timber industry. If those sanctions had been in place earlier, it is reasonable to believe that Taylor would have resigned shortly after their imposition. According to all sources, Taylor’s regime derived a large chunk of their arms funds from the timber industry. Also, diamonds were at least somewhat restricted, but trade in timber remained legal until the last year of sanctions. The ban on timber was the quintessential targeted sanction: one that targeted just the ruling coalition and detracted from their funds directly. Although it is impossible to say with certainty, I argue that the threat of timber sanctions contributed to Taylor finally agreeing to resign.

| Change Regime | + |
Throughout the entire sanctions episode, Taylor did not change any of the behaviors deemed undesirable by the sanctions package. He did, however, give in to international pressure and made several genuine efforts at securing regional peace with his neighbors. Internally though, where the sanctions focused, Taylor made no changes to his behavior.

| Change Behavior | - |

**LIBERIA 2001-2004**

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<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior trade between target and sender will increase target’s compliance with sanctions</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Cost will vary directly with sanctions’ success</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change Behavior</th>
<th>Change Regime (Lib and Iraq only)</th>
<th>Contain Economically</th>
<th>Contain Militarily</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive, Small Cost (Iran)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive, Large Cost (Iraq)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted (Syria)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted (Liberia)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOTHESIS</td>
<td>RESULT (+ confirmed, -negated, NA not applicable)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>State in economic distress will increase chances of sanctions success</td>
<td>- - - NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate Cooperation outside of international organization will reduce the effectiveness of sanctions</td>
<td>+ + - NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prior trade between target and sender will increase target’s compliance with sanctions</td>
<td>- + + -</td>
<td></td>
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<td>+ + + -</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

Upon analyzing the findings above, we conclude the following. Comprehensive sanctions that impose a large cost upon the target succeed in containing the target economically. Economic containment correlates to military containment since the financial impact prevents the target from buying arms and forces its leadership to direct its attention elsewhere, as in Iraq’s case.

In the case of Iran, comprehensive sanctions that impose a small cost fail to contain states economically but can still contain militarily. Initially then, it seems that comprehensive sanctions fail to change states’ behavior but succeed in economic and military containment.

Targeted sanctions fail to contain targets militarily and fail to change their behavior when not accompanied with consistent efforts, conducted by an international organization, to verify targets’ compliance. Targeted sanctions did however succeed in regime change when coupled with international pressure, multilateral cooperation through the UN, and targeted sanctions that aimed at the leaders’ ability to fund war (through timber profits) and its ability to wage war (arms embargoes). Importantly, arms embargoes failed when they were employed in comprehensive and targeted cases without additional measures to remove a crucial income generator (export and import bans on timber from Liberia, contrasted with the US’s continued purchase of Iranian and Iraqi oil) from the leadership’s control.

Comprehensive sanctions are better at containing targets militarily and economically while they fail to change targets’ behavior. Comprehensive sanctions failed to contain Iran economically because of gross defection from within the sanctions coalition. Due to a lack of monitoring and enforcement, these defections continued throughout the episode. Imposing secondary sanctions against those who defect, like in the Iraq case, certainly worked.
However, when the US tried to impose such sanctions against defectors in Iran’s case, members of the UNSC and other states were outraged because of the strict terms of ILSA and their own states’ connections to Iran.

The states that objected to ILSA sanctions against Iran’s partners were more involved with Iran’s trade than those parties who agreed to secondary sanctions against Iraq’s trading partners. If a target and another state are connected through trade when sanctions are levied against the target, its trading partner will likely object to or circumvent sanctions unless the target commits an egregious act (e.g. invasion of Kuwait) and is condemned nearly universally. While Iraq was condemned by nearly all states, the US and the United Kingdom were the only champions of sanctions against Iran while international support was mild.

Targeted sanctions fail to contain states economically and militarily and also fail to change states’ behavior. However, if they are coupled with efforts to monitor compliance and to target the leaders’ finances, targeted sanctions have the potential to topple regimes if they are aimed at commodities crucial to the leadership’s income. In order for sanctions on those crucial items to be effective, they must actually be enforced and monitored as was the case in Liberia. Although regime change was achieved in Liberia, its leader had already been granted asylum by the time he stepped down. Also, its leader voiced willingness to resign several times and was under severe pressure internationally. While the targeted sanctions certainly contributed to President Taylor’s resignation, those other factors also made resigning an attractive option.

Drury’s four hypotheses that reached significance in the 204 cases in Hufbauer et. al 1985 have a mixed record in this paper. No hypothesis receives the expected result for all four case studies.
The hypotheses regarding interstate cooperation and prior trade between sender and target all achieve the expected result twice while the hypothesis regarding economic cost does this in three out of four cases. The duress hypothesis, however, is never fulfilled. This leads the author to believe that, while intuitive, the effects of pre-existing economic duress within a target will vary on a case by case basis. As argued earlier, Saddam would undergo any amount of hardship before conceding to sanctions and therefore, duress did not greatly boost sanctions’ effectiveness. Out of all the hypotheses, pre-existing economic duress is the least likely to enhance sanctions’ impact against a target.

As O’Sullivan noted, sanction episodes are usually entirely too ambitious. Indeed, all the sanctions in this case study pursued at least two different goals and sometimes as many as four. Trying to carry out all these goals at the same time inevitably detracts from efforts to fulfill the other goals. Sanctions were never able to change the behavior of states. A change in behavior constitutes compellence which is more difficult to achieve relative to deterrence. Ceteris paribus, changes in behavior are therefore less likely to be accomplished than other goals.

Importantly, targeted sanctions have no better record of changing behavior than their comprehensive counterpart. Indeed, targeted sanctions succeeded in achieving just one goal of a total of five goals (20% success) while comprehensive sanctions accomplished three of seven goals (42.85% success). Also, the targeted sanctions used were in a relatively pure nature. They were not accompanied by total import or export bans (comprehensive) in either case. In contrast, the comprehensive case of Iran suffered from major defections and from a sender who regularly lifted pieces of the sanctions regime and made allowances for certain goods. Even in a less harshly enforced form, comprehensive sanctions were more effective.
In a recent interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamad ElBaradei voiced his opposition to comprehensive sanctions against Iran. He claimed that sanctions don’t “affect the regime” but do “empower[ ] hardliners and hurt[ ] the vulnerable and the poor.” Therefore, he goes on to recommend using “smart sanctions,” and recommends that senders “target the regime and not the people.”

Mr. El Baradei is correct in stating that hurting the regime is infinitely more desirable than hurting the people from a normative perspective. The ideal set of sanctions would be able to inflict enough pain solely upon the leadership in order to achieve the senders’ goals while avoiding undue harm to civilian populations. However, in the cases of Liberia and Syria, all armed factions had ready access to weapons and in the Syria case, were able to actually enhance their political power rather than simply maintaining it. Thus, targeted sanctions can serve great functions hypothetically, but in practice their record has been unimpressive. If new ways of implementing and enforcing targeted sanctions are devised, they could potentially become a mighty tool of political coercion.

One of the reasons that targeted sanctions failed in Syria is that they were difficult to enforce. No American troops, or any international force for that matter, monitored the Lebanese-Syrian border during the sanctions episode. Therefore, this inability to stop weapons from flowing into weak states cancels out some of the benefits of targeted sanctions. Peoples’ daily lives may not be affected as much while using them, but stopping weapons flows with only targeted sanctions has proven impossible in these four cases.

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97 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8612350.stm
Also, the partial autonomy of the Lebanese and Liberian governments made it even more difficult for targeted sanctions to have an effect. The militant groups challenging those governments, as well as the corruption and misery among their citizens, all helped facilitate the transfer of weapons into these states.

While one may consider Lebanon’s or Liberia’s partial autonomy as a unique case, the US and UN are increasingly levying sanctions against lesser developed states. Such targets are likely to share the same governmental weakness, or other similar traits, characteristic of such governments. President Taylor faced an armed domestic opposition that was funded and trained by international actors. Pockets of resistance existed within his country and the government had no control in those regions. Compare these aspects of the Liberian case to modern day sanction candidates Iran, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, to name just a few. All of those listed experience limited autonomy within their own states, similar to the Liberian and Lebanese governments addressed in this paper. While one case cannot exactly parallel another, there are great similarities between my cases of targeted sanctions and potential recipients thereof.

In the analysis of the Iraq case, the economic impact of sanctions prevented Saddam from purchasing weapons. Scholars like Drury correctly claim that sheer economic pain does not guarantee the success of a sanctions episode. However, the comprehensive sanctions levied against Iraq did force Saddam to rearrange his economic and domestic priorities. Thus, comprehensive sanctions effectively struck the leaderships’ resources without specifically targeting them. Since the sanctions were so massive, Iraq was virtually totally isolated from world trade. In effect, the comprehensive sanctions banned everything, targeted nothing, and therefore “hit” both the leaderships’ and the citizens’ resources.
O’Sullivan\textsuperscript{98} explains that Iraq was in total economic disarray before the imposition of sanctions. Further, Saddam rejected all aid to his civilian population until his own rule was imperiled in 1996 at which point he accepted the OF program for lack of options. Granted, the sanctions against Iraq certainly compounded the humanitarian crisis there and resulted in the deaths of many thousands. However, the claim that sanctions single-handedly lead to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq is false. Moreover, Iraq represents an extreme case of comprehensive sanctions which resulted in the economy shrinking by five-sixths. Indeed, the economic toll of comprehensive sanctions against Iran pale in comparison to Iraq.

We can conclude from the Iraq case that comprehensive sanctions have the potential to exacerbate humanitarian crises in states where those crises already exist. Also apparent is that comprehensive sanctions can achieve a massive economic impact when backed by nearly full international consensus and supported by an international organization. Importantly, such great economic impact effectively impacted the leadership as well as the people. All cases of targeted sanctions, with the exception of those on timber in Liberia, failed to affect its targets. Comprehensive sanctions, however, are capable of achieving targeted sanctions’ goals while the reverse is not true.

Due to their nature, targeted sanctions are appealing because they supposedly target leaders’ resources more accurately than comprehensive sanctions. However, in practice, targeted sanctions are implemented ineffectively (without monitoring or enforcement) and fail to achieve their goals. This is due in part to the targets of targeted sanctions: lesser developed countries in which the government is unable to exercise state-wide control. Comprehensive sanctions have a

better record of achieving goals and are, specifically, better at containing regimes economically and militarily. The findings of this paper are important because the US and members of the UN are currently contemplating imposing sanctions against Iran. Sanctions will continue to be implemented as the US and UN increasingly sanction less developed countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Should the same miscalculations be repeated in future sanctions episodes, the decision to use targeted sanctions as a panacea will be an ineffective and costly one.
Colin James McLafferty

EDUCATION:

Schreyer Honors College, The Pennsylvania State University
• Completed triple majors International Politics (National Security Concentration), International Studies, German Teaching.
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• Expected graduation date: 05/2011.

EXPERIENCE & ACHIEVEMENTS:

David L. Boren Scholar, National Security Education Program
• Awarded maximum amount from Department of Defense for excellence in National Security studies. Scholarship funded year abroad in advanced Arabic immersion program with Palestinian homestay in Amman, Jordan.

“Advanced Mid” Arabic Speaker on ACTFL Scale
• Earned above ranking after spending 8 months living with non-English speaking Palestinian family.

Middle Eastern Politics and Security Intern: Center for Strategic Studies, Jordan
• Completed internship at CSS Amman, Jordan. Wrote articles on political Islamist parties, their strategies, and their history. Articles may be included in forthcoming book.

Phi Beta Kappa Member
• The Pennsylvania State University Chapter

RESEARCH OF TERRORISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST:

Counterinsurgency Research
• Researched counterinsurgency tactics used worldwide as part of an honors option project.

Radicalism in Europe
• Completed 37 page paper concerning radicalization in immigrant Muslim communities within Europe. Studied Holy Qur’an in original Arabic script, counterterrorist and sociological literature, and radical clerics’ and organizations’ writings as background for research.

Liberalization in Jordan, OPEC 1973 Embargo
• Authored 16 and 18 page papers, in Arabic, and presented both papers to panel of University of Jordan faculty.