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ARE HABITUAL SUPPRESSORS BETTER AT LIMITING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEIR
FEELINGS OF DISGUST ALTER MORAL JUDGMENTS?

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ABSTRACT

People who suppress their feelings do so in order to not experience them. However, the literature is unclear as to whether suppression lessens or increases the impact of these suppressed feelings on judgment. To examine this issue, I tested whether and how individual differences in suppression may alter the degree to which feelings of disgust would enhance the severity of people's moral judgments. If suppression lessens the impact of disgust feeling, then people who are high in suppression should be less likely to make harsh moral judgments when they feel disgusted compare to those low in suppression (hypothesis 1). Second, if suppression results in people being ironically influenced by the feelings that they are trying to suppress, then people who are high in suppression should make harsher judgments when they feel disgusted compared to those who are low in suppression (hypothesis 2). In the experiment, 165 participants completed a measure of habitual suppression. Then, they read and imagined either five disgust sentences (experiment condition) or five neutral sentences (control condition). Finally, they completed a measure of moral judgment. The data indicated that neither disgust nor habitual suppression predicted morality. However, in support of the prediction that suppression would lessen the impact of disgust on moral judgments, disgust and suppression tended to interact. Specifically, when disgusted, people who chronically suppressed were less likely than those who tended not to suppress to harshly evaluate the moral dilemmas. The findings imply that habitual suppression could be effective in not only reducing felt feelings, but also not letting feelings influence people's judgments.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures	iii
List of Tables	iv
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Chapter 2 Method	7
Chapter 3 Results	10
Chapter 4 Discussion	13
Appendix A Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)	16
Appendix B Priming Manipulation: Disgust and Neutral Sentences	17
Appendix C Moral Dilemma Scenarios	18
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 21

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Interaction between priming condition and suppression. 11

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Descriptive statistics: Means, Standard Deviations and correlations among key variables 10

Chapter 1

Introduction

When experiencing negative emotions, people may try to suppress their emotions in order to not experience them and not be influenced by them. For instance, a server may choose to suppress anger when facing a rude customer. By engaging in suppression, people try to control their feelings and act like nothing has happened; however, the question lies in the consequences of suppression: Is suppression an effective regulation strategy in reducing the effect that negative feelings have on thought and action? The present study examines this issue by looking at whether people who tend to suppress their feelings, would be less or more influenced by their feelings of disgust when making moral judgments.

Suppression

People aim to achieve self-control with different regulation strategies (Alberts, Schneider, & Martijn, 2012). These regulation strategies can be broadly defined as *antecedent-focused* or *response-focused* (Gross & John, 2003). Antecedent-focused strategies are actions taken before an emotional response to change the nature of the experience, whereas response-focused are actions taken during or after an emotional response. When dealing with unpleasant emotions such as anger or disgust, people may choose suppression as a form of *response-focused* strategy to mitigate the influence of unwanted feeling.

Suppression refers to exert one's effort to avoid unwanted feelings or hide one's emotional expression while emotionally aroused (Grandey, Diefendorff, & Rupp, 2013). On one hand, suppressors show fewer signs of emotional experience and expressive behaviors which make them appear successful in controlling their emotions. According to Gross (1998), participants who were asked to suppress their emotions when watching a disgust-eliciting film exhibited less disgust expression than those who were asked not to suppress emotions. In this case, suppression was effective in reducing emotion-expressive behavior which implies successful control in disgust feeling. Another study found that attempt to suppress feelings of disgust resulted in people failing to report feelings of disgust after watching a disgust-eliciting film (Gross & Levenson, 1993). This finding implies that suppression is effective in reducing the negative emotional experience.

On the other hand, some evidence indicates that suppression may not be an effective regulation strategy. One study argued that suppression does not reduce negative feelings but left them linger and accumulate (Gross & John, 2003). It has been found that

suppressors were more likely to suffer from depressive symptoms, low self-esteem, and less life-satisfaction than non-suppressors (Cohen, Henik, & Moyal, 2012; Gross & John, 2003). Suppression is also cognitively challenging. As a *response-focused* strategy, suppression serves as a remedy for an already felt emotion. Therefore it requires one's repeated effort to manage the negative emotion as it continually arises. The limited strength model proposed by Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) suggests that repeated suppression may require mental resources which can lead to regulatory depletion (or ego depletion). For instance, Cohen, Henik, and Moyal (2012) examined the relation between suppression and executive control. They found that suppression was not associated with efficient ability of executive control that could reduce emotional interference, which implies that suppression may not be effective in minimizing the effect of felt emotions. Another study found that when participants stifled emotional responses to a funny or sad film clip, they later performed worse on an anagrams task (a task that asks participants to unscramble English words from some random letters) than those who did not suppress emotion responses. The given reason was that the initial self-control attempt used up all the energy for later attempts and therefore negatively impacted on the following self-control performance (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice, 1998).

One implication of this work is that the very emotion one tries to suppress may ultimately influence subsequent behavior. For instance, Svaldi, Tuschen-Caffier, Lackner, Zimmermann, and Naumann (2012) examined the effect of emotion regulation on the desire to overeat in restrained eaters. The study found that high-restrained eaters have a stronger desire to eat when asked to suppress emotion after watching an emotional-triggering film clip. The finding implies that suppression may result in a rebound effect by increasing the influence of avoided emotions, which can ultimately affect later performance. In another study, Hess, Beale, and Miles (2010) looked at whether people's evaluation of products from TV commercials is associated with their emotion regulation strategies. Their findings showed that people who reported use of expressive suppression were more likely to associate their product evaluation in the direction of mood induced by TV commercials. The underlying reason was that suppression requires cognitive resources, which in turn deteriorates later control for the experience related to the repressed emotions. Thus, the very act of trying to suppress an emotion may ironically result in that emotion being highly influential on the tasks that follow.

On the basis of previously discussed evidence, suppression is effective in eliminating emotion-expressive behaviors and self-reported disgust feelings. However, literature on suppression and disgust mainly focused on how suppression alters disgust feelings rather than on how those suppressed feelings may alter thought and action. Indeed, suppression depletes mental resources that could potentially lessen mental control. If so, then the very emotion that is being suppressed could have a strong influence on thoughts and action. Thus, in order to better understand the effect of habitual suppression in reducing negative feelings and bridge the gap of previous studies, the present study focused on whether people who habitually suppress their feelings of disgust are more or less likely to be influenced by these feelings after the suppression task is over. To do so, this study will examine how suppression alters the effect of disgust on moral judgments.

Disgust and Moral Judgments

Research indicates that disgust feelings alter moral judgments, such that people who

feel disgust are more likely to view questionable moral actions as being immoral. Feelings of disgust can be evoked by physically disgusting things such as filthy environment and rotten food, or socially inappropriate behaviors such as foul language and hypocrisy (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). People may want to suppress disgust feelings for it is both somatically and psychologically unpleasant. In addition, disgust feelings can be transferred to irrelevant thoughts and guide later behavior and judgment. For example, when disgust was evoked, people made harsher moral judgments than those in neutral state (e.g., Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). One explanation is that people may take into account disgust feelings, for such impure feelings alert them the boundary they should not cross (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). Therefore based on message of disgust feeling, people tend to view moral violation especially hideous. Another explanation is that people are prone to affective intuition, which can sometimes distort their judgments (Schnall et al., 2008).

Previous studies also examined factors that moderate the link between disgust and morality. For instance, one study examined Private Body Consciousness (PBC) or sensitivity to body feelings as a moderator, and found that after inducing disgust feeling, people who were high in PBC tended to judge more severely than those who were low in PBC (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Another study examined attention control as a moderator, which is defined as “the capacity to disengage attention from certain information” (Van Dillen, Van der Wal, & Van den Bos, 2012, p. 1223). The study found that disgust was less likely to result in severe moral judgments for people who had more attention control than those who had less attention control, because attention control disengages participants from irrelevant feelings when performing later tasks (Van Dillen et al., 2012). The idea of attention control is similar to that of suppression as both actions intent to keep people from irrelevant information or feelings. Therefore, suppression might work the same way as attentional control-- people who suppress disgust feelings could be less likely to make severe moral judgment.

Hypotheses

The study examines two possible consequences that suppression may have for how feelings of disgust might alter judgment. One possibility could be that people who suppress their feelings do so to be less influenced by them, thus suppression may decrease the role of disgust feelings in moral judgment. The other possibility could be that suppression depletes mental resources, thus it may create a rebound effect and ironically result in people being more influenced by their feelings.

The current study builds on previous work by examining whether individual differences in suppression moderate the effect of disgust on the severity of moral judgment. Based on two possible effects of suppression on the influence of emotions proposed earlier, this study will examine two competing hypotheses. Based on the premise that suppression may mitigate unwanted feelings and their influence, I predicted:

Hypothesis 1: Disgust will *decrease* the severity of moral judgments for people high in suppression than those who are low in suppression.

On the other hand, based on the premise that suppression may result in more influence of unwanted feeling, I also predicted:

Hypothesis 2: Disgust will *increase* the severity of moral judgments for people high in suppression than those who are low in suppression.

To test these competing hypotheses, I conducted an experiment in which I varied people's experiences of disgust. In the control condition in which disgust is not activated, I predict that both suppressors and nonsuppressors will not differ much in their moral judgments for there is no affect present to suppress. For disgust condition, if Hypothesis 1 is correct, I predict that suppression and disgust will interact such that if suppressors who experience disgust make less extreme moral judgments than nonsuppressors who experience disgust. On the other hand, if hypothesis 2 is correct, then suppressors who experience disgust will make more extreme moral judgments than nonsuppressors who experience disgust.

Chapter 2

Method

Participants

One hundred and sixty-five undergraduate students, including eighty-eight males and seventy-seven females, at the Pennsylvania State University participated in exchange for credit towards introductory psychology courses requirement.

Measures

Suppression. Gross and John's (2003) Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) was used to measure suppression (4 items, Cronbach's alpha = .78, a sample item was "I keep my emotions to myself"). All items were answered using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). See Appendix A.

Priming. Participants were randomly assigned to either a disgust or control condition. Following the methodology used by Van Dillen, Van der Wal, and Van den Bos, (2012), respondents in disgust condition were presented with five disgusting sentences and asked to imagine each of the disgusting activities. An example of disgusting sentences was "When Elise took a bite of her apple, she discovered there was a worm inside." In the control condition, participants imagined themselves engaging in five neutral activities. An example of neutral sentences was "Elise took a big bite of the apple she had brought for lunch." See Appendix B. Each sentence appeared for 30 seconds, and then the computer advanced to the next sentence.

Moral dilemma scenarios. Eight scenarios related to moral dilemmas were presented to participants after the priming task. Themes for moral dilemmas included justice violation and purity violation. An example of moral dilemmas was "Kim is taking a chemistry course and checks out the only class textbook from the library. She is supposed to return the book because another student needs to use it before the exam, but she doesn't get around to it. The other student isn't able to read the textbook before the exam. How wrong is Kim's behavior?" (see: Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G., & Jordan, A., 2008; Horberg, Oveis, , Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). Participants were asked to rate how wrong for certain behavior depicted in each scenario, using a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all wrong) to 7 (Extremely wrong). See Appendix C.

Procedure

The experiment took place in a room with nine computers. Upon arrival, participants were led to individual computer and received a brief introduction to the study. They were also told to carefully read instructions appeared on the screen before starting each task. After completing the consent form and demographics questions, participants were asked to complete the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) that accesses their tendency to

suppress emotions. Next, participants were randomly assigned to be presented with five disgusting sentences or the five neutral sentences. They were told that it was a study on imagination and they had to fully imagine themselves into those sentences because they could expect some questions about these sentences later in the study. After the sentence imagination part, participants read the eight scenarios related to various moral dilemmas, and rated the degree to which they thought each person's behavior was wrong. Then, participants rated the extent to which they felt *happy, joyous, pleasant, angry, mad, upset, revolted, disgusted, gross-out, neutral, indifferent, and emotionless* with a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). The average rating of *revolted, disgusted, and gross-out* was later computed and labeled as "average disgust mood score". For the manipulation check, participants were asked how disgusted they felt towards those five sentences ranging from 1(Not at all) to 7(Extremely). Finally, a positive mood manipulation was conducted, and participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Chapter 3

Results

Table 1 displays the descriptive data for all the key variables, including the correlations among them, their means and standard deviations. The data indicate that the variables were not highly correlated with one another. The only significant association was that people who reported feeling disgusted expressed harsher moral judgments.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations among key variables.

Measures	Mean	SD	1	2	3
1. Priming condition	0.50	0.50			
2. Average disgust mood	3.25	1.72	0.11		
3. Mean suppression score	3.52	1.17	-0.03	-0.03	
4. Mean morality score	5.54	0.65	-0.02	0.21*	-0.08

Note. * $p < .05$.

Prior to the main data analysis, the suppression scores were mean centered. Because the priming manipulation was a categorical variable, the disgust condition was coded as 1 and the control condition as 0. To determine whether the priming manipulation was effective at altering disgust, a regression analysis was conducted in which priming condition, suppression scores, and the interaction between them predicted respondents' reports of disgust towards disgust sentences. The results indicated that the disgust manipulation was effective. Respondents who received the disgust prime reported more disgust than those in the neutral condition ($b = -1.16$, $SE = .28$, $t(165) = 4.16$, $p < .001$).


To test my hypotheses, a regression analysis was conducted in which priming condition, suppression, and the interaction between them predicted mean morality scores. The data indicate that neither the priming manipulation ($b = -.04$, $SE = .10$, $t(165) = .35$, $p > .50$) nor suppression scores ($b = .02$, $SE = .06$, $t(165) = .41$, $p > .50$) predicted morality. However, as predicted there was a trend for an interaction between the priming condition and suppression ($b = -.15$, $SE = .09$, $t(165) = -1.71$, $p = .089$). As shown in Figure 1, suppression did not have an effect on morality scores at the neutral condition ($SE = .06$, $t(161) = .41$, $p = .685$), but had an effect on morality scores in disgust condition ($SE = .06$, $t(161) = -1.99$, $p = .048$). Supporting Hypothesis 1 that suppression would lessen the effect of the disgust primes on morality judgments, the data indicate that when feelings of disgust were activated, respondents who were high in suppression tend

— Low
Suppression
- - - Medium
Suppression

to have less severe moral judgment than those scored low in suppression.

In addition, a regression analysis was conducted in which priming condition, suppression, and the interaction between them on self-reported average disgust mood. The data indicate that none of these three variables-- priming manipulation ($b = -.03$, $SE = .02$, $t(165) = 1.40$, $p = .164$), suppression scores ($b = -.02$, $SE = .06$, $t(165) = -.41$, $p = .684$), and interaction between disgust priming and suppression ($b = .12$, SE

Figure 1. Interaction between priming condition and suppression on Morality Score



$b = .09$, $t(165) = 1.40$, $p = .163$) predicted average disgust mood. This suggests the ineffective design of measuring disgust mood (see discussion).

Chapter 4

Discussion

In this experiment, I tested whether suppression moderates the influence of disgust on moral judgment. The data revealed a noninsignificant trend, such that disgust feelings and suppression had an impact on moral judgments in a direction that supports Hypothesis 1. According to Figure 1, when experiencing disgust feeling, people scored high in suppression displayed less severe moral judgments than those who scored low in suppression. The result extends previous finding by showing that suppression can not only reduce emotion-expressive behaviors (Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1993), but can also potentially reduce the effect of negative emotion in later task performance. The finding is also consistent with the effect of attention control (Van Dillen, Van der Wal, & Van den Bos, 2012), which suggests that suppression can keep people from irrelevant feelings when performing later tasks, which then translate into less severity in moral judgments. On the other hand, the result is contrary to several studies that suggest suppression depletes mental resources and may in turn deteriorates control for later performance that are related to suppressed emotions (e.g., Cohen, Henik, & Moyal, 2012; Henik & Moyal, 2012; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). One explanation could be the rebound effect of suppression may not be apparent in the short-term, which then did not result in enhancing the effect of disgust on subsequent moral judgments. Another possibility was that people who habitually suppress are skilled at suppression, thus they are able to suppress emotions without ego depletion. That is, this rebound effect may occur if suppression was manipulated, rather than measured, such that less skilled people would have to try to alter their emotional reactions.

Results also indicate that disgust priming, suppression scores, and interaction between them did not predict participants' reported average disgust mood. This result might have occurred because the measure was at the end of the experiment. By placing the mood questionnaire at the end of the experiment, the disgust prime may wear off by the time participants completed the moral scenarios. As a result of the disgust feelings potentially being diminished due to time, individual differences in suppression did not alter self-reported feelings of disgust. Therefore, placing mood questionnaire at the end of the experiment could be one limitation of the study.

Another limitation of the study was self-reported suppression scores. When people reported whether they habitually suppress their emotions or not, they are consciously reflecting their own experience. However, how exactly they deal with their feelings when

engaging in certain task could be an unconscious process. Therefore, it is unclear whether subjective evaluation on the level of suppression can reflect the actual level of suppression when doing moral judgment tasks. In addition, it may be that people who habitually suppress are very skilled at the practice. Thus, they show no rebound effect because they have the attentional control and suppression is not as mentally taxing for them as it could be for someone who does not habitually suppress.

To address this concern, future research could manipulate suppression (e.g., instructing participants to suppress their feeling) and see if the manipulation interacts with a disgust manipulation to alter moral judgment ratings. If findings show significance, future research can also further examine if distraction eliminates people's ability to suppress by asking them to remember and recall three or six letter strings (e.g., BWM or AKNGOP) before and after reading moral scenarios. By manipulating letter strings, future research can test if participants' morality scores differ from those who have to remember and recall long letter strings compare to those who need to do that for short letter strings. Presumably, if suppression requires resources, people who have to recall the longer number would have a harder time suppressing their emotional reactions. Indeed, I am currently collecting data using such a paradigm.

In sum, this study focused on examining if suppression influences how disgust alters moral judgments. The data revealed a tendency that people who suppress emotions to be less influenced by their feelings of disgust when making moral judgment than those do not suppress emotions. That is, people who suppressed were also less likely to be influenced by their feelings than those who do not suppress. Keep in mind that suppression can have negative consequences on mental health. Hence, understanding if suppressing negative emotions can influence people's thought and behaviors can inform us if such emotion regulation strategy is worth to adopting. However, these data suggest that the strategy, at least in the short term, may not only be effective at reducing felt reactions, but also reducing the effects of those reactions.

Appendix A

Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)

Reappraisal factor

1. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I'm in.
2. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I'm thinking about the situation.
3. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I'm thinking about the situation.
4. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I'm thinking about.
5. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I'm thinking about.
6. When I'm faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me stay calm.

Suppression factor

7. I control my emotions by not expressing them.
8. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.
9. I keep my emotions to myself.
10. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.

Appendix B

Priming Manipulation: Disgust and Neutral Sentences

Disgust:

1. When Elise took a bite of her apple, she discovered there was a half of worm inside.
2. Gert accidentally stabbed himself in the finger when he tried to put bate on his fish hook.
3. When Monica lifted the lid of the pan, she found a cockroach inside.
4. When Peter picked up his cat, he discovered it was dead already.
5. Wendy normally changes her underwear once a week.

Neutral:

1. Elise took a big bite of the apple she had brought for lunch.
2. In the afternoon Gert went fishing at the stream near his house.
3. When Monica lifted the lid of the pan, she found potatoes inside.
4. When Peter picked up his cat, it started to purr.
5. Wendy normally does her laundry once a week.

Appendix C

Moral Judgment Scenarios

Scenario 1

Frank's dog was killed by a car in front of his house. Frank had heard that in China people occasionally eat dog meat, and he was curious what it tasted like. So he cut up the body and cooked it and ate it for dinner. How wrong is it for Frank to eat his dead dog for dinner?

Scenario 2

Your plane has crashed in the Himalayas. The only survivors are yourself, another man, and a young boy. The three of you travel for days, battling extreme cold and wind. Your only chance at survival is to find your way to a small village on the other side of the mountain, several days away. The boy has a broken leg and cannot move very quickly. His chances of surviving the journey are essentially zero. Without food, you and the other man will probably die as well. The other man suggests that you sacrifice the boy and eat his remains over the next few days. How wrong is it to kill this boy so that you and the other man may survive your journey to safety?

Scenario 3

You are walking down the street when you come across a wallet lying on the ground. You open the wallet and find that it contains several hundred dollars in cash as well as the owner's driver's license. From the credit cards and other items in the wallet it's very clear that the wallet's owner is wealthy. You, on the other hand, have been hit by hard times recently and could really use some extra money. You consider sending the wallet back to the owner without the cash, keeping the cash for yourself. How wrong is it for you to keep the money you found in the wallet in order to have more money for yourself?

Scenario 4

You have a friend who has been trying to find a job lately without much success. He figured that he would be more likely to get hired if he had a more impressive resume. He decided to put some false information on his resume in order to make it more impressive. By doing this he ultimately managed to get hired, beating out several candidates who were actually more qualified than he. How wrong was it for your friend to put false information on his resume in order to help him find employment?

Scenario 5

A brother and sister like to kiss each other on the mouth. When nobody is around, they find a secret hiding place and kiss each other on the mouth. How wrong is their behavior?

Scenario 6

Kim is taking a chemistry course and checks out the only class textbook from the library. She is supposed to return the book because another student needs to use it before the exam, but she doesn't get around to it. The other student isn't able to read the textbook before the exam. How wrong is Kim's behavior?

Scenario 7

Bob sometimes asks his friend Jack for small favors. Often, Bob decides to barge in and interrupt Jack's important work meetings to ask for the favors. Jack worries that his boss thinks less of him. How wrong is Bob's behavior?

Scenario 8

You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. How wrong is it for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen?

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Research Assistant

- Created a database for over 60 women CEOs from Fortune 500 to understand their reasons of selection and secession
- Organized annual reports and women CEOs' interview records for research analysis

Dr. Alica Grandey's Emotional Labor and Customer Services Psychology Research Lab

August 2012-January 2013

Research Assistant

- Reviewed extensive research and proposed a thesis for the effect of cultural value and emotion regulation on level of burnout
- Accurately entered 50 survey data for the Lionline employee study
- Practiced multivariate/descriptive statistics related to organizational psychology experiment

Dr. Karen Gasper's Feelings, Behaviors, and Information Processing Lab

January-May 2012

Research Assistant

- Set up computer-based questionnaires for psychology lab sessions
- Explained testing system to over 10 groups of participants and guided them through experiment session

WORK EXPERIENCE:

Career Services, University Park, PA

August 2013-Present

Mock Interviewer, Resume Reviewer, Career Resource Assistant

- Conducted mock interviews and provided students with constructive feedback for improvement
- Critiqued students' resumes with regards to content, format and concept
- Assisted students navigate on-line resources with job search and career exploration

Schreyer Honors College Career Development Office, University Park, PA

March 2013-Present

Project Management Assistant

- Accessed survey responses for honors college mentoring program and suggested improvement for mentoring relation
- Created and organized excel spreadsheets for 2012-2013 seniors' job placement based on survey responses
- Oversaw Alumni Day Career Event logistics and planning for schedule, registration process, and

supplies

- Generated career topics for discussion panels based on alumna's profession

Workplace Dispute Arbitration Council, Shenzhen, China
July-August 2012

Receptionist, Telephone Communicator, and Court Clerk

- Examined 10 work conflict cases with government officials
 - Collected and filed more than 20 lawsuits for companies and employees
 - Served as a liaison between companies and employees using phone calls
 - Listened to the court and observed conflict resolution processes
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ACTIVITIES:

Cross Cultural Encounters Organization, University Park, PA

February-May 2013

- Initiated a discussion on issues related to adjustment to another culture in a group of 10 international students
- Participated in cross-cultural discussion while raising awareness and acceptance of cultural differences

PNC Leadership Assessment Center, University Park, PA

October 2012

- Role-played a manager in a five hour simulation that involved prompt speeches, timed writing, and group discussion
 - Created a mission statement for merged companies and decided on employees' layoff and promotion based on job performance
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SKILLS:

- Computer: IBM SPSS Statistics Data Editor, Qualtrics, Mechanical Turk, Microsoft Office Suite
- Language: Fluent in Mandarin Chinese and English, proficient in Japanese