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TERRORISM, DEMOCRACIES, AND PARTISANSHIP
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND INTRASTATE TERRORIST GROUPS

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Abstract

Research on how political parties affect conflict has so far ignored how left-wing and right-wing governments influence intrastate terrorism. I argue that in cases of intrastate terrorism, groups will attack right-wing governments more than left-wing governments. Groups ultimately want to obtain real concessions towards their ultimate goals. Consequently they have a desire to keep governments that are more willing to negotiate and make concessions (i.e. leftist parties) in power, while targeting more aggressive and less conciliatory (i.e. rightist parties) governments. Further, by engaging in more attacks against right governments, terrorist groups are sending costly signals to future governments that the group is capable of more than “cheap talk” and should be engaged with negotiations. Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Global Terrorism Database, and the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions I explore how intrastate terrorist groups react to left and right governments from 1989-2007. I find that left governments are more willing to sign agreements with these groups and are attacked less frequently relative to right governments by intrastate groups. These findings stand in contrast to research done on transnational terrorist groups, which found that these groups target left governments more than right governments.

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Section 1: Introduction

Most works on terrorism do one of three things: they focus on transnational terrorism (Koch and Cranmer 2007; Li 2005); do not make a major distinction between them (Richardson 2006); or acknowledge a distinction, but do not address them as inherently different (Dekmejian 2007). Most of this research has focused on transnational terrorism, but there is reason to believe that real differences exist between these types of terrorist groups, and as such there is a need to develop theories that apply specifically to these domestic groups. In addition there are unanswered questions regarding how the openness of regimes affects their susceptibility to terrorist attacks. I wish to expand on that research and look further into the effects of government partisanship and violence, by looking at intrastate violence rather than transnational. To that end, the questions I address are: What is the effect of government partisanship on intrastate terrorist violence and what is the effect of political parties and violence on government concessions to these groups?

It is reasonable to believe that government orientation matters more to these intrastate groups than it does to transnational groups. These internal groups are acting to achieve goals that only the government under attack can address (for example, territorial separation or regime change/reform). This stands in contrast to transnational groups like Al-Qaeda, whose primary objectives and targets span beyond the ability of any single government to enact. Further, intrastate groups are constrained by the actions of their state government in a way that transnational groups can avoid through relocation to weak or sympathetic states. Transnational groups can attack states with the benefit of retreating behind the borders of a sovereign nation, such that retaliation involves either an interstate dispute or cooperation among states, both of these actions are far more costly than using attacking intrastate groups (Salehyan 2007). For

example, to retaliate against Al-Qaeda, the United States invaded Afghanistan and has greatly increased its foreign aid to Pakistan, which is a far more costly action than the United Kingdom would have to take to retaliate against the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which requires no invasion force, and only a small deployment of forces and no violation of sovereignty. Because of this difference, the intrastate group needs to be aware of the reactions of the political parties in the country, and plan their attacks accordingly. Likewise, if I assume that the primary objective of these groups is to achieve their stated objective then it follows that they will try to influence governments in power to get concessions, and as such a rational group will anticipate the responses of different political parties and the supporters of those parties and adjust their level of violence accordingly.

Wade and Reiter (2007) identify two main schools of thought related to how regime types affect the incidence of terrorist attacks: the strategic school and the political access school, both discussed more below. The strategic school argues that political openness, freedom of the press, increased respect for civil rights, and constraints on the use of violence by governments all cause democratic governments to be more attractive targets for terrorism. In contrast, the political access school believes that the more inclusive and open a regime, the less reason groups have to engage in costly acts of terrorism. Rather in an open democratic regime, it is easier to engage in legitimate (i.e. non-violent) political participation.

My argument comes closer to the political access school, in that the reason that right governments are the targets of more attacks than left governments is because groups seek to cause dissatisfaction with hard-line right governments among moderate voters and hope to have them replaced with left governments, which are more likely to cut a deal. In addition to just raising discontent, I argue that the groups are using the attacks as part of the negotiation process.

These groups believe that they can get a better deal from left-leaning governments and so they put more of their efforts into attacks and less into negotiation when right governments are in power. Attacking right governments provides a signal to the public and to future governments that the group can inflict harm and is willing to do so. These signals are necessary for the group to be acknowledged as a political force, as without the costly signal of the attack, the government has no reason to act on groups which engage solely in “cheap talk” (Kydd and Walter 2006). Intrastate groups which engage in costly attacks have an incentive to do so against right governments which are less likely negotiate with them anyway, such a tactic is effective in signaling the group’s intentions and capabilities while at the same time undermining moderate support for the more hawkish government. I find support for this idea below, controlling for government capability, fractionalization, interstate war, a second civil conflict, and government structure.

My findings suggest that previous findings about transnational terrorism do not necessarily apply to intrastate violence from terrorist groups such as the FARC or the IRA. In cases of intrastate conflict, partisanship was a significant determinant of levels of intrastate violence committed by an organized group against the state government, but the trend was opposite of what is found in literature regarding transnational groups. Right governments are found to be the targets of significantly more domestic violence from an organized group than left governments. Domestic terrorism in democracy seems to fit very well into the framework of the political access school. It is my belief that the political access school fits well with these cases because these groups are focused on achieving their stated objectives. It is possible that the strategic school may find more support with transnational groups, for reasons discussed above, but I leave that question to future researchers.

The following section is a review of literature regarding terrorism and democracy and the roles of partisanship in military policy decisions. From this I derive my hypotheses regarding how political parties affect the calculations of rational terrorist groups. Section three of this paper outlines the data sources and data collection process, as well as statistical methods used to test my hypotheses. The next two sections are a discussion of the results of the statistical tests and a case study chosen to illustrate the findings. The last section offers my concluding thoughts on the research and recommendations for future research.

Section 2: Model and Literature Review

Framework

The interaction between left or right governments and domestic terrorist groups can be represented in game form, such that there are three players: Left Government, Right Government, and the Domestic Terrorist Group. The action profile for both types of governments is {Concede, Not Concede}, and for the group the profile is {Lots of Attacks, Few/No Attacks}. In this context, not concede can either be to engage in military retaliation against the group or simply ignore them. Figure 2.1, illustrates the game¹.

Figure 2.1: Game between Political Parties and a Terrorist Group

		Terrorist Group				Terrorist Group	
		Lots of Attacks	Few/No Attacks			Lots of Attacks	Few/No Attacks
Left Government	Concede	1,3	4,4	Right Government	Concede	1,3	3,4
	Not Concede	2,2	3,1		Not Concede	2,2	4,1

These payoffs in the game reflect the preferences that left and right governments have in dealing with domestic terrorist groups. The preferences for the terrorist group are the same when dealing with either kind of political party, in that they always prefer to get a deal rather than to a deal. If they get a deal, they would rather not have to engage in costly violence, and if they are not going to get a deal, then they prefer to engage in violence to make governments pay a cost for ignoring the group's demands. Further attacks can show future governments that the group is credible. Left governments always prefer to not be attacked, and they are okay with making a deal when they are not attacked. This is because left governments are more open to negotiation than right governments. If they are going to be attacked, then the government prefers not to

¹ The payoffs in figures 2.1 and 2.2 are created by me to reflect the differences between left and right governments

make a deal because then they are giving away concessions without the benefits of not being attacked. Likewise, there are high political costs if the government offers concessions but the terrorist group defects and engages in attacks. For right governments we see that they still prefer not to be attacked to be being attacked, but they would always rather not make a deal than make a deal. Figure 2.1 shows the games solved for Nash equilibria.

Figure 2.2: Nash Equilibria of the Game

		Terrorist Group				Terrorist Group	
		Lots of Attacks	Few/No Attacks			Lots of Attacks	Few/No Attacks
Left Government	Concede	1,3	<u>4,4</u>	Right Government	Concede	1,3	3,4
	Not Concede	<u>2,2</u>	3,1		Not Concede	<u>2,2</u>	4,1

In the interaction, between left governments and the groups there are two equilibria: (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) and (Concede, Few/No Attacks). The first equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the second, and as such both parties prefer the first equilibrium to the second. The inferior equilibrium could be the result when the group does not seem credible to the government, which is why it did not concede, which leads the group to engage in lots of attacks. Once the group has a history of attacks, then it may be more likely to enter into negotiations and arrive at the Pareto superior equilibrium of (Concede, Few/No Attacks)². For right governments, the dominant strategy is to not concede, which leads to the equilibrium (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks). This is consistent with the portrayal of right governments as more hawkish than their left counterparts. It is interesting to note, that this equilibrium is Pareto inferior to (Concede, Few/No Attacks), but right governments will always have the incentive to defect if an agreement

² Since the game above is a single-shot game, the effect of a history of attacks cannot be accounted for within the model. Future research needs to look at this interaction in the form of a repeated game to more fully explore this dynamic

is reached. As such, groups will react to the dominate strategy of the right governments and engage in violence. This works to the groups advantage, because when left governments come to power the history of violence suggests that the group is serious and worth negotiating with, and as such it may be easier to reach the equilibrium of (Concede, Few/No Attacks). In the next portion, I examine the literature regarding regimes characteristics and terrorist attacks.

Literature Review

There is a body of literature that addresses the question of whether or not democracies are more likely to be targeted by terrorist groups than autocracies (Li 2005; Wade and Reiter 2007). Two different schools of thought exist on this topic. Wade and Reiter define these as the “Political Access School” and the “Strategic School” (2007, 331). The political access school believes that more open governments are less vulnerable to terrorism than more restrictive regimes, whereas the strategic school believes that regime openness increases the vulnerability to terrorism. Both of these schools can be expanded on to frame our discussion of interactions between domestic terrorist groups and political parties within democracies. A more in-depth discussion of these schools follows.

Political Access School

The political access school theorizes that democracies should be targeted less by terrorist groups than non-democracies, because more venues for non-violent political expression exist. The theory posits that, given the option, groups will pursue non-violent forms of expression over violence, if the group believes that non-violent expression will bring about the desired results. As a result, if terrorist groups have reason to expect returns from non-violent measures then the group will embrace those measures rather than expend resources on violence (Eyerman 1998, 154). Therefore, there should be less violence in states with open democratic regimes. This

reasoning can be generalized from the differences between democracies and autocracies to the differences between political parties within democracies. Thus, in democracies, more hard-line governments are more attractive targets. As such, it is under more hawkish regimes that we should expect an increase in violence, because these regimes are more willing to engage in strong counterterrorism that would curb civil liberties and are less willing to make concessions.

The differences in hawkish (hard-line) and dovish (soft-line) parties is found to be correlated with the left-right differences in political parties. Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) argue that when left and right parties are defined based on their macroeconomic policy positions, there is still a strong relationship between the parties and their opinion on the use of military force. They find that left parties (Economic interventionists) are more “for-peace” and right parties (Economic non-interventionists) are more “pro-military” (1994, 40).

Forsberg (2007), in a study of intrastate violence in France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom from 1961-1998, argues that organized terrorist groups want to raise discontent with hard-line (right) governments and raise support for soft-line (left) governments. The theory is that a rational group would want to have soft-line governments in power in order to foster negotiations and bargaining because a group would prefer bargaining to fighting and would get a better bargain with a soft-line government. Forsberg predicts increased violence against right governments relative to left in order to encourage voters to elect soft-line governments. This fits with the above framework, as during periods of right-governance, groups are in the equilibrium of (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) and it is their hope that in raising discontent with the existing right government that a left government will be elected and there is a chance of arriving at the equilibrium of (Concede, Few/No Attacks).

Walsh and Piazza (2010) argue that states with greater protections on human rights and civil liberties will be attacked less than states with strict or harsh counterterrorism measures that reduce these rights. They argue that governments which respond with violence often strengthen the position of the terrorist group with moderates who feel alienated by the government response (2010, 556). Democratic states, especially more advanced democracies, that engage in counterterrorism policies that curb civil liberties, such as policies of indefinite detention, detention without trial, denial of council, or warrantless wiretapping, find themselves violating certain norms that undermine their support from moderate voters and strengthens the legitimacy of the terrorist groups' complaints. This argument explains differences between states with different histories of counterterrorism policies, but it can also explain the differences within states. The different political parties within a state have different opinions on counterterrorism policies, and as such groups can anticipate the types of counterterrorism responses their actions will provoke.

While not directly related to type of political party that controls the government, the literature regarding the structure of the democratic state is also applicable here. Powell (1982) finds that democracies with multiparty systems and more fractionalized legislatures are targeted less by domestic political violence. Enhanced representation seems to reduce violent behavior in political minority groups; violent behavior seems to be moderated by the prospect of being represented in official channels. In more restrictive systems, that either formally or informally restricts the number of political parties, these groups get frustrated by the lack of political representation, and seemingly have no legitimate methods available to address their political goals. As such, these groups would be more likely to resort to violence. Aksoy and Carter (2010) agree with Powell, in that Aksoy and Carter argue that terrorist group formation is less

likely to occur in more open regimes. The arguments from Aksoy and Carter and from Powell can be expanded and applied to the argument that more hard-line regimes are more likely to be targeted by these domestic terrorist groups. Hard-line regimes are less open to negotiation with these groups and as such, legitimate redress of political grievances is less likely under more hard-line political parties. Because they are less open to negotiations, the groups will behave as if the rules of the state are less open, and be more inclined to violence.

This expectation of the responses to terrorism is consistent with the strategy of provocation explained by Kydd and Walter (2006). Such a strategy is used by terrorist groups to erode support for the government it is targeting. The group attacks the government in a way such that the government responds in a manner that is viewed as overly oppressive or retaliatory. If successful, this strategy results in counterterrorism policies or violent retaliation from the government. This response in turn may raise the costs associated with future terrorist actions, but it reduces government support among moderate citizens who are less inclined to support these new policies or retaliation. This decline in support can further translate into sympathy for the group which benefits the organization. For example, the policies of internment and the direct deployment of the British Army that were used in the Northern Ireland conflict in the early 1970s in response to the Troubles are thought to have been a major failure. These policies viewed so negatively by moderate Republicans living in Northern Ireland, that they are believed to have expanded moderate support for the IRA's activities and to greatly increase its membership (O'Brien 1999, 54-55; Richardson 2006).

Overall these harsh counterterrorism policies and retaliatory violence, as mentioned above, are more associated with right-wing governments (Koch and Cranmer 2007). Likewise, these governments are perceived as more hawkish or hard-line, which means that groups know

that harsh retaliation is the likely response from right governments. If the group pursues a strategy of provocation, then it prefers to attack right-wing governments, such that it can get the biggest retaliation, however, that may not be the only reason to attack more hard-line governments. From this reasoning, I argue that the policies pursued by different political parties could affect the decisions of groups to engage in violence.

If the primary goal of intrastate groups is to reach the best negotiated settlement possible then it follows that these groups would prefer to negotiate with a more soft-line government. This theory fits with the idea that intrastate groups with a clear policy goal, such as a separatist group or a minority group seeking enhanced representation, would prefer to engage in non-violent action over costly terrorist violence. Groups would rather engage in legitimate forms of political participation, but when a more hard-line government is in power, the outcomes from such participation can be limited. When a more open regime comes to power, a more soft-line or dovish political party, perhaps, the groups are more likely to lower the level of violence and to try a shift into negotiations. The group is wants to enter into negotiations, and sees that it has a better chance of a legitimately engaging and negotiating with the soft-line parties. While these governments do not always have the electoral credibility or political capital to deliver a lasting peace, they do have the desire to enter into negotiations (Schultz 2005). As such it is reasonable to believe that terrorist groups which have clear, specific policy goals will prefer to negotiate with left governments over right governments. Violence against right governments can now serve additional purposes other than provocation.

If a group engages in increased violence against right-wing governments, it is with the expectation that the government will respond with retaliation and counterterrorism policies. If the group survives these attacks it can engage in an equilibrium of violence with the government.

This equilibrium of violence along with the costs imposed on the voting public in the form of reduced civil liberties will lead centrist voters who are not firm right-wing supporters to withdraw their support for the government and lead to the election of a left government. Further the raised conflict is a costly signal to the new left government that the group is capable of inflicting harm and is credibly informing the state that the group is willing to engage in violence. This costly signal is recognized by Kydd and Walter (2006) as necessary for weak groups who wish to influence a more powerful actor. Likewise, Fearon (1995) recognizes that in order for two sides to decide to negotiate and reach a bargain that both actors prefer to conflict then both the actors need to certain that the other is willing to fight. Given the power asymmetry between terrorist groups and state governments, the costly signal is very important for the weaker party, otherwise the stronger party has little incentive to engage in negotiations with the weaker party. Knowing that it needs to send these costly signals, that right governments are less likely to enter negotiations, and the benefits of provocation, I arrive at the following two hypotheses.

H1a: All else equal, in states experiencing intrastate terrorist conflict, democratic right governments will experience higher levels of violence than left governments.

H2a: All else equal, in democratic states experiencing intrastate terrorist conflict left governments are more likely to sign agreements with intrastate groups than right governments.

Strategic School

In contrast with the political access school is the strategic school that believes that the openness in democratic regimes actually increases the probability of violence rather than

diminishes it. This school believes that the openness of democratic regimes decreases the costs and increases the benefits of terrorism relative to more closed regimes. Democratic states are more restrained in their ability to respond violently to terror attacks and counterterrorism policies that restrict civil liberties are less tolerated in democratic states relative to autocracies.

Democratic states, due to a commitment to civil liberties, personal freedoms, and the rule of law, lower the costs of conducting terrorism, and as a result, we expect increased levels of terrorism relative to other types of states (Eyerman 1998, 154; Li 2005, 281). As with the political access school the literature on the strategic school can be expanded to explain how domestic terrorist groups respond to left and right political parties.

The finding that democracies are more likely to be targets for terrorism fits with the theory put forth by Kydd and Walter (2006). Kydd and Walter (2006) and Pape (2003) both expand on the strategic school by arguing that the openness of a democratic society makes it easier for violence to make an impact because of a free and open press. Democracies are thus more easily impacted by terrorist violence and more likely to make concessions, as they are more constrained in the use of force and strong counterterrorism policies than autocracies. Kydd and Walter (2006) and Koch and Cranmer (2007), expand on this general assumption to argue that partisanship should affect terrorist calculations. Kydd and Walter (2006) believe that while democracies are more prone to terrorism than autocracies; within democracies, left parties have supporters with lower tolerance for high cost counterterrorism and retaliatory violence. Thus, left voters would prefer their leaders to end terrorist violence through non-violent means. Kydd and Walter do not test this assessment; however other authors have considered this theory and tested parts of it.

One of the arguments about why left governments should be attacked more than right governments begins with the idea of the “Removal Threshold” expressed by Downs and Rocke (1994). According to their argument, an executive involved in conflict must be very conscious of the concerns of his or her domestic supporters, because as the human and economic costs of the conflict rise the constituency no longer wishes to continue the conflict and will act to remove the executive. The amount of costs that the constituency is willing to endure before it will remove the executive is called the removal threshold.

Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) expand on the removal threshold concept by theorizing that different parties have different removal thresholds. They believe that executives from left governments have a lower removal threshold than right governments. This difference is because the supporters that make up the winning coalitions of left parties would be far less supportive of force than the supporters that make up the winning coalitions of right parties, and would be more willing to defect than right voters over the use of force and the associated costs. In a study of eighteen parliamentary democracies, Palmer, et. al. found support for their hypothesis; they found left governments are less likely to engage in the use of force because of the higher removal risks they face. This finding is confirmed by both Arena and Palmer (2009) and Koch (2009).

Koch and Cranmer (2007) expand on this established difference in the removal costs for the use of force between parties by theorizing about its effects on terrorism. Koch and Cranmer theorized that because right parties have fewer constraints on the use of force than left parties they would have an increased ability to respond to terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups knowing that retaliation was more likely under periods of right governance than left would be less likely to attack right democracies. Likewise, because left governments are more constrained by their

lower removal threshold regarding force, terrorists would be more likely to attack them because there is a lower probability for retaliation. Koch and Cranmer used ITERATE³ data to study incidents of transnational terrorism in eighteen advanced democracies between the years 1975-1997 to test how transnational terrorist violence varies with government partisanship. Their findings supported their hypothesis.

Berrebi and Klor (2006) also examine how terrorist incidents vary with government partisanship. They examine how violent Palestinian groups, such as the Fatah and Hamas change their tactics in response to the political party in control of the Israeli government between 1990 and 2003. They argue that periods of relatively low violence are the result of Palestinian Authority (PA) suppressing Palestinian terrorists. This decrease in violence leads voters to elect a Labor (left) government, as during periods of lower violence they are more disposed to the peace process. However, once the left government is elected the PA feels the need to apply pressure on the Israeli government to get the best agreement it can, and to show the government that the group still has the capability to impose costs, in the form of increased violence. This violence in turn causes an increase in support for the opposition Likud (right) party. From this, Berrebi and Klor believe that violence increases support for the right party; and that, in the short-term, there is an increase in violence during left governance.

Using this line of thought, it is expected that because of the domestic political costs associated with the use of force, left governments are less likely to engage in force against domestic terrorist actions, and that rational terrorist groups have a high incentive to pressure left governments into making concessions. This can be thought of as “blackmail,” such that groups would have the power to remove uncooperative left governments through a major campaign of violence due to the differences in removal threshold between left (dovish) and right (hawkish)

³ “International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (Mickolus 1984).

parties. Further, terrorist groups will take advantage of the trends identified by Schultz (2005) that because of their dovish nature, left governments have a strong urge to end conflict quickly. Knowing that they have a low removal threshold regarding the use of force, left governments will want above all else to end a conflict quickly so that they can avoid force that will result in their expulsion from office.

The terrorist group would understand these trends and constraints and act accordingly, such that the group will increase violence during periods when the left party is in control of the government in order to extract concessions. Put simply, left governments want to retain power, and the only way to do that is to avoid violence and force because their supporters have little tolerance for the associated costs. Thus, in a situation with high levels of intrastate terrorism, I expect left leaders to be far more conciliatory to terrorist groups in order to retain power. Intrastate groups will know this vulnerability and exploit it for concessions. Likewise, with a right government in power, intrastate groups will reduce attacks in order to prevent retaliation and portray themselves as legitimate negotiating partners, so that voters will have reduced support for the right party. This strategic school line of reason leads to the following hypotheses which form the basis of this blackmail concept.

H1b: All else equal, in democratic states experiencing intrastate terrorist conflict, governments of the left will experience higher levels of violence than governments of the right.

H2b: All else equal, in democratic states experiencing intrastate terrorist conflict, left governments are more likely to sign agreements with terrorist groups than right governments.

H3: All else equal, in democratic states experiencing intrastate terrorist conflict, the level of violence will increase the probability of concessions.

This section has examined the previous research on how regime type influences terrorist groups. I formed two sets of hypotheses to test which of these schools is applicable to domestic terrorism within democracies. The next sections details the methodology used to test these hypotheses, followed by the section on quantitative results. After the quantitative results is an illustrative case study of the results, and then I offer my conclusions and suggestions for future research.

Section 3: Definitions and Research Design

For the purpose of this study, there are several key concepts that need to be defined and measured. These include: intrastate terrorism, democracy, and parties of left and right. My definition of terrorism is based on Enders and Sanders (1994) who defined terrorism as the “premeditated or threatened use of extra-normal violence or force to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through the intimidation of a large audience.” To this definition I add that terrorism is perpetrated by an organized group and occurs within a single recognized state, wherein the opposition group is based in that state and the government is the recognized government of that state. This caveat constrains the research to just the domestic conflicts mentioned in my research question. There is reason to make this distinction between intrastate and transnational terrorist groups, in that Aksoy and Carter (2010) found differences in the rationale for group formation on these levels.

The cases of intrastate terrorism come from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset for an “internal armed conflict” (Harbom and Wallenstein 2010; Harbom, Melander, and Wallenstein 2008). The dataset records all conflicts with more than twenty-five battle related deaths per year, which includes important intrastate conflicts such as Spain versus the ETA and the United Kingdom versus the IRA (Harbom 2010). The Dataset covers conflicts from 1946 through 2008. Only those cases coded as an “internal armed conflict [that] occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states” are used (Harbom 2010). Conflicts were eliminated if the non-government party was not a coherent group. For example a side listed only as “Kashmir Insurgents” or “Non-PLO Groups” were eliminated, but organized groups such as Fatah, and FARC are included. This is to eliminate non-unified actors, with the assumption that organized groups would engage in more strategic

behavior than unidentified insurgents. Also eliminated are those conflict-dyads that last only one dyad-year, this is done to eliminate any one-time events that are not organized terrorist incidents. Additionally, I decided to use only internal armed conflict rather than include “internationalized internal armed conflict” because internationalization refers to intervention from other states on the side of the government and/or the sub-state group. This leads to problems in assessing the interaction between the groups and the government as I believe that both sub-state and government actors would respond to the pressures of their international backer(s). By using only cases of internal intrastate conflicts I control for pressures from outside actors and still have variation in my cases. These criteria provide over 35 conflict-dyads and over 300 dyad-years for the time period of 1989 through 2007. They provide a good mixture in terms of geography, level of democracy, conflict duration, and age as a democracy, over a twenty-year time frame.

Bueno de Mesquita, Koch, and Siverson (2004) defined democracy based on the Polity IV dataset. The Polity IV dataset has a typical cutoff for democracy with a polity score of six (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Vreeland (2008) identified that some problems exist with using polity scores in studying domestic conflict, however, by using a lower polity score of 6, rather than 7, and by focusing on issues of low-level conflict rather than full civil war, I believe that I avoid the problems that he identified. After disaggregating the two components of the polity score identified by Vreeland, I found no new cases to add to my dataset.

The dyad-years used by the Uppsala data serve as my unit of analysis. Additional data points are added to fill in years during which Uppsala does not list the dyad, but the dyad resumes in the future. For example, in the dyad for the United Kingdom-PIRA, Uppsala stops recording the conflict in 1991, but I continue the conflict until the signing of the Good Friday in 1998. The reason for this is that conflicts may drop below the Uppsala inclusion requirements

but this might be part of the terrorist rational. These extra observations are added until either the group is defeated (through military or police action) or a treaty is signed that ends the conflict for at least five years. The status of conflict termination is determined through four sources: The Uppsala Conflict Termination Dataset codes for the cessation of intrastate conflict; The Uppsala Terms of Peace Dataset includes all agreements signed by government officials and terrorist groups and a variable that codes if the violence occurs in the conflict during the five years following the agreement; Jones and Libicki (2008) provide a list of known terrorist groups that includes the start and end dates for each group; and the Terrorist Organization Profiles, which is run by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism (START), and includes descriptions of individual terrorist groups, including years when the group goes inactive following agreements (Kreutz 2010; Harbom, Högladh, and Wallensteen 2006; Jones and Libicki 2008; START 2010b). These four sources combined ensure accuracy in the data regarding when the conflict ends for at least five years, and allows me to add in data points for years that the conflict is still occurring, but it is not included in the Dyadic Dataset.

Data on the number of attacks is retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD was created by START and the University of Maryland to be an extension of the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) database (LaFree and Dugan 2007). It continued many of the practices from the PGIS data and now covers the years 1970 through 2007. The dataset defines terrorism in a way consistent with the definition given above for terrorism, and the coders require that incidents be identified in two independent news sources before inclusion in the dataset, which enhances the validity over the original PGIS data (LaFree and Dugan 2007, 184). Using event counts of terrorist incidents per dyad-year, I am able to measure the number

of attacks per dyad-year and use them as dependent variable for hypothesis one, and an independent variable for hypothesis three.

The dependent variable in hypotheses two and three is concessions provided by the government. I measure the concessions made by the government party per dyad-year by recording if an official agreement was signed between the government and the group. The presence of an agreement, as measured by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Terms of Peace dataset, shows that a process has taken place and that concessions have been granted in some form, or else the terrorist group would not be willing to sign the agreement. For the purpose of this test, I do not care about the agreement's quality, or whether or not it is fully enforced. Concessions are coded as 1 if an agreement is signed that dyad-year and 0 otherwise. This shows that the government party has made public concessions to the terrorist party. Likewise, if public concessions on par with a signed agreement (such as a publically announced ceasefire) are recorded in the Terms of Peace data, then it is coded as a concession for that dyad-year.

Left-Right partisanship is the primary independent variable in the both hypotheses one and two. The measurement of this variable is based on the definitions in Koch and Cranmer (2007), Palmer, et. al. (2004), and Koch (2009). All three of these sources agree that the left-right divide is based on the economic and domestic policies pursued by the party to make the distinction. Left parties are defined by their focus on issues such as unemployment, welfare, and redistribution of resources. The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) defines the partisanship of the state's chief executive as left, right, or center based on these criteria (Beck, et. al. 2001). The dataset has been updated, since its original release and now includes over 150 regimes from the years 1975-2009. The primary dependent and independent variables, their data sources, and the hypothesized relationships are shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Summary of Primary Variables

Hypothesis	Dependent Variable	Data Source (Dependent)	Independent Variable	Data Source (Independent)
H1A and B	Attacks (Event Count)	Global Terrorism Database (GTD)	Political Party (Left-Right)	World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
H2A and B	Signed Agreements	Uppsala Terms of Peace Dataset	Political Party (Left-Right)	DPI
H3	Signed Agreements	Uppsala Terms of Peace Dataset	Attacks (Event Count)	GTD

The control variables included in both analyses are: government capability, interstate war, the existence of an additional domestic conflict, the goal of the terrorist group, and democratic institutions in the state, and a measure of fractionalization within the state. The measurement of government capability comes from Koch and Cranmer (2007) and Li and Schaub (2004). They measure government capability recording it has an annual composite measurement of a state's proportion of the world's total population, GDP per capita, GDP per unit of energy, military manpower, and military expenditures (Li and Schaub 2004, 242). These measurements are all taken from the World Bank Development Indicator Databank (World Bank 2010). The reason I control for this, is because I believe that it is likely that high capability governments of either the left or right will have increased resources to employ in counterterrorism, and as such will generally experience fewer attacks, and as a result have less reason to engage in negotiations.

Likewise if the government is involved in another conflict, either an interstate conflict or a second domestic conflict, during the dyad-year this could reduce the resources available for counterterrorism. Being involved in an interstate conflict means that the group is in a position where an individual attack may have a better return, because the government will be interested in quickly buying off the group in order to devote its resources into the interstate conflict, as such I expect that the existence of an interstate war in a given dyad will result in fewer attacks and a higher probability of an agreement. The same logic may apply to a second domestic conflict, as groups may free ride off each other's attacks in order to save scarce resources. However, the government may be less inclined to try and buy these groups off, as making concessions to one of two domestic terrorist groups may be seen as a signal to other present or future groups that violence works. Because of this I expect that the presence of additional intrastate conflict(s) will lead to fewer attacks per dyad year and a lower probability of concessions. Using the UDCP Dyadic Dataset, mentioned above, two dummy variables are included: one for interstate and one for a second domestic conflict. They are coded as 1 if present and 0 otherwise.

Following the theory outlined above I expect that fractionalization in government may also have an effect on this process, Koch (2009) argues that the removal costs of a fractionalized government are lower than majority governments. A majority government can more easily block a vote of no confidence or a call for early elections than a fractionalized government. The DPI measures fractionalization in the governing coalition, based on the proportions of the party(ies) in the coalition; fractionalization is based on the probability that any two people in the governing coalition picked at random, will be from different parties (Beck, et. al. 2001). The crafting of a peace agreement typically involves more players in the legislature and other branches of government, than counterterrorism policy. As a result, fractionalization in the legislature and

governing coalition is included as a control in this hypothesis, rather than just fractionalization in the governing coalition. Fractionalization is expected to reduce the probability of an agreement, because the controlling party will be less likely to seek out an agreement if it does not have a majority in the legislature. The controlling party is more constrained in situations of higher fractionalization, and as a result less likely to take risks such as making a controversial peace deal or negotiation decision.

An additional control included is the issue at stake in the conflict. If the group is fighting for territorial control, such as the IRA, it is coded as 1, but if the issue is policy related or related to the nature or structure of the government party, such as a Maoist group, it is coded as 0. The expectation is that conflicts based on territory will be easier to negotiate than the overthrow of the government, and therefore more likely to end with an agreement. This determination is taken from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset.

Additionally, there is reason to believe that the structure of the democracy can affect this process. Aksoy and Carter (2010) argue that the differences such as proportional representation versus majoritarian/plurality can affect the emergence of terrorist organizations. They find that proportional representation systems are less conducive to group formation and argue that this is due to the more inclusive nature of this system. The more inclusive nature of PR and mixed systems over majoritarian/plurality systems may also have an effect on the group's decision regarding the intensity of a terrorist campaign, as the more open system provides more opportunities for legitimate political interaction.

Because the dependent variable is measured as event count data, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate. A negative binomial regression is frequently used when a count of attacks is the dependent variable, as in the case of hypothesis one. The reason for using

the negative binomial regression over a Poisson regression is due in part to over dispersion, which makes the negative binomial a better fit for the data. In testing hypothesis two, logistic regression is used because the dependent variable is dichotomous.

In this section I explained the data and methodology that I used to test the hypotheses from section two. The conflict data comes from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset and the Terms of Peace Dataset, while attack data is taken from the GTD. Addition data comes from the World Bank DPI and Development Indicators, and other databases mentioned above. The next two sections are a discussion of the results of the statistical tests and a case study included to illustrate the findings. The last section offers my concluding thoughts on the research and recommendations for future research.

Section 4: Quantitative Results and Discussion

The results of the statistical analyses, shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, show the relationships that exist in the interactions between intrastate terrorist groups and state governments. The results show that left-wing governments are attacked less often than their right-wing counterparts, and that left-wing governments are more likely to sign an agreement with these groups. Further violence does not have a significant effect on the probability of signing an agreement, even when the variable is lagged. These results, all support the political access school over the strategic school. Putting them together offers a more complete picture of how these domestic terrorist groups react to different political parties and how political parties affect the decision to attack or negotiate.

Table 4.1 shows that, overall, governments of the right are attacked more often than governments of the left. The differences are significant between left and right governments, but there is no significant difference between center governments and either left or right governments. The coefficients show a clear pattern where violence decreases from right to center to left governments, with significant differences between right and left governments. This finding supports the political access school argument that the more open the government type or party, the less likely groups are to attack the government. Right-wing governments are believed to more likely to engage in harsh and controversial counterterrorism policies, such as military action, indefinite detention, or harsh curbs on civil liberties than left governments. As a result of these policies, terrorist groups have fewer avenues for legitimate political participation, and resort to violent behavior. Furthermore, a group engaged in a strategy of provocation will get better returns on this strategy by attacking right-wing governments, which will respond more aggressively than left-wing governments.

Table 4.1: Negative Binomial Regression Political Party of the Executive and Number of Intrastate Terrorist Attacks

	Model I	Model II
	Left and Center Compared to Right	Left and Right Compared to Center
Left	-0.64*** (0.23)	-0.25 (3.72)
Center	-0.39 (0.37)	---
Right	---	0.39 (0.37)
Government Capability	-0.13** (0.07)	-0.13** (0.07)
Government Fractionalization	-1.19** (0.48)	-1.19** (0.48)
Interstate War	-1.52*** (0.33)	-1.52*** (0.33)
Second Intrastate Conflict	-1.58*** (0.41)	-1.57*** (0.41)
Territorial Goal	-1.01*** (0.24)	-1.01*** (0.24)
Proportional Representation	0.36 (0.33)	0.36 (0.33)
Mixed System	-0.70* (0.41)	-0.70* (0.41)
Constant	6.26*** (0.48)	5.87*** (0.55)
N	337	337
χ^2	151.30	151.30
Log likelihood	-1116.89	-1116.89
*p<0.10 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01		
Data sources for this regression are identified in Section 3 of this paper		

Table 4.2 shows that left governments are more likely to sign agreements than right governments, but that number of attacks is not a significant factor in the signing of an agreement. Attacks are in these models because I believe that attacks done in the time directly before signing an agreement, the number of attacks would cease to be relevant in pressure the government towards the negotiating process, and would in fact spoil the peace process. Rather, the number of attacks in the time prior to the negotiating process (2-3 years before the formal process begins) are fresh enough in the mind of the government to apply pressure and establish credibility, but are not too recent to spoil the process. These results supply more support to the

Table 4.2: Logistic Regression Political Party and Probability of Signing an Agreement

	Model I	Model II	Model III
	Left and Center Compared to Right Attacks Lagged year-1	Left and Center Compared to Right Attacks Lagged year-2	Left and Center Compared to Right Attacks Lagged year-3
Left	1.17 (0.74)	1.63* (0.83)	2.76*** (1.01)
Center	0.38 (0.78)	1.28 (1.02)	1.47 (1.12)
Attacks (lagged year-1)	0.004 (0.004)	---	---
Attacks (lagged year-2)	---	0.005 (0.01)	---
Attacks (lagged year-3)	---	---	-0.008 (0.01)
Duration	0.05 (0.03)	0.09** (0.04)	0.136*** (0.05)
Fractionalization	-5.01** (2.22)	-7.87*** (3.07)	-9.94*** (3.45)
Government Capability	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.21)	0.69** (0.33)
Territorial Goal	0.84 (1.00)	2.87* (1.69)	1.13 (1.62)
Interstate War	-0.14 (1.25)	1.34 (1.63)	1.42 (1.44)
Second Intrastate Conflict	-0.74 (0.86)	-0.91 (1.28)	1.29 (1.54)
Proportional Representation	1.10 (0.91)	2.37 (1.53)	-1.28 (1.67)
Constant	-1.35 (1.68)	-3.17 (2.10)	-4.84* (2.40)
N=	303	270	241
$\chi^2=$	22.42	28.25	35.72
Log Likelihood	-57.07	-43.81	-35.56

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Data sources for this regression are identified in Section 3 of this paper

political access school. The coefficient for attacks is in a direction that means it has a positive effect on the probability of a signed agreement, which means that the groups that attacked more seem to be taken more seriously, but that the volume of attacks was not significant in pressuring the signing of an agreement. This means that the “blackmail” logic that was taken from the strategic school does not predict how the groups operate. Hypothesis three predicted that groups

would use the number of attacks to influence left governments into signing agreements. The logic was that left governments have supporters who are more violence-sensitive than right government supporters, and so the left would be more willing to buy-off the group with concessions rather than risk escalation. However, with the number of attacks being insignificant, this argument is rejected. Rather, the political access story provides a better understanding of how political parties and attacks factor into the strategy of these domestic terrorist groups.

The political access story begins with the finding that left governments are more likely to make agreements than right governments. This can be seen as an attempt to avoid the costs associated with military responses and crackdowns on civil liberties, because supporters of left governments are less willing to accept the costs of conflict, in terms of economic and human costs. As a result, left governments are forced to find alternatives to policies of violent reprisal or curbs on civil liberties. This means that one of the most acceptable tactics for left leaders is to try and buy off the group with some form of concessions, and try and move to the equilibrium of (Concede, Few/No Attacks). These concessions carry their own political costs, so left governments will not give them away to every group that forms within the state. In order for the left party to take the political risk associated with concessions, the group must be known as a serious political actor with the capability to inflict harm on the state. This explains why not all conflicts with terrorist groups or insurgencies are quickly settled by left executives buying off the group, and why the equilibrium of (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) also exists in the interaction between the groups and left governments. The group must first prove itself as a serious actor through a series of costly attacks. Once this credibility has been established through attacks on both types of governments, it is reasonable for the group to “tone-down” on the violence during periods of left government, so that it can get to the equilibrium of

concession. However, during this same time, if a right government comes to power, the group will return to the equilibrium of (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) so that it can maintain its credibility as a serious actor for the next left government that comes to power.

Groups will know that they have a better chance of getting a concession from a left government than from a right government, and as such will take strategic actions to attempt to ensure that left governments either stay in power or return to power. I do not pretend that voters make their vote choice solely on the issue of terrorism and violence, but it is reasonable to assume that the number of attacks factors into voters' choices. Groups know that right governments supporters are more tolerate of an equilibrium of violence than left government supporters, and as such they know that to cause the dissatisfaction needed to remove a right government, a lot of attacks are needed. This explains the differences in attacks between left targets and right targets. Groups believe that right governments will not cut a deal with them, under most circumstances, and the evidence shows that this is true. As a result, they attack left governments less in order to keep them in power, and right governments more in order to raise discontent with the government, as well as to send the signal to all future left governments that this group is serious about fighting. This costly signal is necessary in order for the group to get the attention of the government, and to let the government know that this group is worth the cost of a peace effort. Left governments are still attacked because the groups need to place pressure on these governments and create an incentive for the government to make concessions. However, this pressure needs to be limited to ensure that it does not get to the point where the government is removed from power, or the group spoils a deal by making it politically unfeasible for the government to engage in negotiations. Terrorist groups that want concessions have to

walk a fine line because they need to apply pressure to left governments without causing its replacement with a less tolerable right government.

This balancing act explains how the results of hypotheses one and two fit together. The interaction between intrastate terrorist groups and governments is a back-and-forth process where the groups consider the best way to get concessions. The goals of the group are important in understanding the strategy. If the groups engaged in attacks only because they wanted to get away with attacks and engage in as many attacks as possible (a group that was strictly interested in publicity) then it would be expected that left governments would be attacked more than right governments. However, given that intrastate groups have actual goals strategy is not so simple. Once the bargaining process and concessions are added into the equation and considered with the number of attacks and partisanship, then a more complete explanation emerges for why these groups attack right governments more than left. In addition to these primary variables, many of the control variables also are significant.

The variable for government capability moves in the direction predicted above. More capable governments are less likely to be attacked than less capable governments. This makes sense, because very capable governments have more resources to put into counterterrorism. States with less capability will be easier targets for getting concessions and have fewer resources for counterterrorism; as such it is reasonable to believe that the more powerful states will receive fewer overall attacks. Regarding concessions, government capability seems to have no significant effect on the probability of concessions in two of the three models, and in the third model, a more capable government is more likely to sign an agreement. This can be explained, as a more capable government has more leeway to make controversial policy decisions, like concessions, and be able to offer a better deal to the group than a weaker government.

Government fractionalization is also significant in predicting attacks. Government fractionalization had a negative coefficient that shows that as a government is more homogenous, more attacks are launched against it. An explanation for this is that making concessions is bad for weak fractionalized governments, and they will be reluctant to do it. If the government does make concessions, they may be unpopular, and a weak, multiparty coalition or minority government will not be in position to fend off an electoral challenge. Terrorist groups, knowing that such governments will not be in a position to offer concessions, thusly have no incentive to raise attacks or pressure against such governments.

The fractionalization variable in table 4.2 shows that as the government and legislature becomes more homogenous, it is more willing to sign agreements. This makes sense, because a strong government will be in a better position to accept the controversy of negotiating with terrorists and insurgencies. Weak governments will be unwilling to accept the risks of engaging in negotiations and making concessions.

An alternative explanation for the coefficients for fractionalization has to do with the number of veto-players in fractionalized versus homogenous governments. The more homogenous the government, the fewer veto players exist. This means that in these in governments with low fractionalization, more dramatic policy shifts can occur, such as major concessions to a terrorist group. In contrast, a large number of veto players limits the ability of the government to make controversial policy shifts, like conceding to these groups.

The two conflict coefficients are significant in predicting the number of attacks. The presence of a second conflict, either an interstate war or another intrastate conflict results in decreased attacks against the government, regardless of the political party in control. The decline in attacks which is associated with interstate war can be explained as the group seeking

to appeal to moderate citizens. If the group is undermining the war effort by engaging in attacks during an interstate war this action may be viewed negatively by moderate citizens, which may reduce the support the group gets from the public. This reduction in public support can cause the group to be viewed as extremists, and not worthy of negotiation. Likewise, the presence of a second intrastate conflict means that groups engage in fewer attacks. This can result from groups free riding on each other and allowing the second group to put the pressure on the government. Reducing attacks relative to other terrorist groups will allow this group to be seen as more moderate and thus a better partner for peace. The coefficient makes sense in this context. These two variables had no effect on significant effect on concessions.

The variable for territorial goals shows that conflicts based on territory have fewer attacks per dyad-year than conflicts based on regime change/reform. This is an interesting finding that is worthy of further study. Territorial conflicts were not significantly more likely to reach an agreement, but it is conceivable that governments will have an easier time ceding territory than ceding control of the state, or making reforms that may be unpopular to the citizens outside of the terrorist group.

The coefficient for duration is significant in two of three models for concessions. The coefficient shows that the longer a conflict lasts, the more likely it is the conflict will come to an agreement. This matches the prediction, in that it was predicted that as the costs of conflicts add-up and increase over time that the parties will be more willing to accept a negotiated solution.

Overall the results offer support for the political access school, which suggests that the more open a regime or political party is the less likely it is to be targeted by terrorist attacks. Groups want to engage in legitimate political methods. Consequently, in situations where they

have reason to believe there is a good chance of getting a negotiated settlement they reduce the number of attacks in which they engage. Periods of right government offer a low chance of reaching a settlement, relative to left governments. As a result of this trend groups increase their attacks during periods of right governance in order to raise discontent with right-wing leadership and to establish the group as a serious political actor so that they are credible negotiating partners for future left-wing leaders. Reduced attacks during left governance can help the left party retain popular support so that it has the political capital to engage in what may be controversial negotiations.

The following section offers the case of the United Kingdom and the Provisional Irish Republican Army to illustrate these quantitative findings. After the case study I offer my conclusions and suggestions for future research.

Section 5: Case Study, UK-IRA

The conflict between the United Kingdom and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, hereafter referred to as IRA) provides an illustration of how the change in political parties plays a role in the calculations of a domestic terrorist group. An examination of the conflict from 1969 through 2001 provides a look at how the terrorist tactics changed with political parties and some of the other factors that were accounted for in the preceding quantitative analysis. During this time period the violence rates were higher when the Conservative party is in power, notably under Thatcher and Major, which matches the expectations of the quantitative results. Further in line with the quantitative results, it was a Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair who was in power when the group that entered into the most promising and comprehensive peace talks, which finally led to a signed agreement. The story of the UK-IRA shows how these players interact with each other.

One advantage of examining this conflict is that it lasted several decades before coming to a negotiated settlement. During the time the conflict was active both the Labour (left) and Conservative (right) parties held the office of Prime Minister and controlled the government. The United Kingdom provides an example of a conflict where a highly capable and advanced democracy is dealing with a single case of domestic violence. The violence of groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army was occurring, but it never reached the level of the IRA and was frequently lumped together in the eyes of the British public. Further during this same time period Britain was involved in a couple different interstate conflicts (Argentina, Iraq, Afghanistan), but nothing that required mobilization of a significant proportion of their national resources.

While the conflicts between Irish republicans and unionists has a long history, the focus of this section is on the period of 1969 through 2001, which covers most of the “Troubles,” two peace processes, and the seeming end of the conflict. The reason for starting in 1969 is because that is when the British government of Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson first deployed troops into the region (Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchaga 2009, 28). This point marks the time when the United Kingdom took an active approach in the conflict and when the IRA would have to consider the party of the British Prime Minister their strategic calculus. Before direct rule, the IRA had to consider the Unionist government its main government (Dekmejian 2007). The Unionist government was ruled by a hard-line protestant majority which marginalized the Catholics (which were overwhelmingly Republicans) both politically and economically in the time prior to the troubles (Bew, et. al. 2009, 43). Both Powell (1982) and Walsh and Piazza (2010) believe that this marginalization will lead to an increase of political violence. Further, the results that were found in the previous section suggest that under the hard-line unionist regime in Belfast the Irish Republican movement should gain support and engage in increased levels of violence against the unionist government, and an equilibrium of (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) should prevail through this period. During the period starting with the institution of Direct Rule, it is expected that IRA violence will rise and fall based on the need to send costly signals, and that this need will change with the political party. In the end, it is expected that a dovish, left government will finally move the game from (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) to (Concede, Few/No Attacks). These predictions are borne out in IRA experience, beginning resurgence of the IRA among the Catholic population of Northern Ireland (Dekmejian 2007).

The modern conflict between Britain and the IRA began with this resurgence of the IRA in the late 1960s. Prime Minister Wilson, despite an earlier policy of non-intervention, deployed

troops in 1969 with the hope of maintaining order in Northern Ireland by having the troops act as a buffer between Republicans and Protestants (Bew, et. al. 2009, 28-30). The Wilson government fell in 1970 and he was replaced by Conservative party leader Edward Heath.

After the transition of power to the Heath government there was a noticeable increase in British activity in this region. The quantitative results predict that violence against British troops and the British government would increase under Heath's tenure. In the first year of the Heath government, British soldiers took an increased role in riot control and anti-rioting action. However, the new level of involvement was not beneficial to the British position. In the first month of Heath's government, the British Army began using tear gas against rioters, an event known as the "Rape of the Falls" by Irish Republicans (Bew, et. al. 2009). Also introduced during the Heath government was the policy of internment, wherein suspected IRA terrorists would be held without trial or bail, as well as a policy of house-to-house searching without warrants. The backlash against internment led to protests on the parts Republicans, which culminated in the "Bloody Sunday" incident where British troops opened fire on marching protesters, killing 14 civilians (Bew, et. al. 2009, 33). These incidents and seeming escalation of British force transformed the perception of the British Army from peacekeeper to occupation force, and drove many moderate Republicans to support the extremist views of the IRA. One IRA member said that internment and Bloody Sunday were the most effective recruiting tools the IRA had at its disposal during this time (Bew, et. al. 2009). On top of all of this, Heath abolished the local government in favor of direct rule, which made the British regime the sole governmental target of the IRA.

Violence during this period increased with 174 murders in 1971 and over 470 in 1972 (Bew, et. al. 2009, 28). These increasing numbers fit with the prediction of a violent equilibrium

and with the results from section four. The IRA was in full swing, and was benefiting from the hard-line policies of the conservative government. According to the army's own official report on the house to house searching concludes that "the search...convinced most moderate Catholics that the Army was pro-loyalist. The majority of the Catholic population became effectively nationalist, if they were not so already. The IRA gained significant support" (quoted in Bew, et. al. 2009, 33). There was a brief ceasefire while the Heath government attempted a brief negotiated settlement.

The quantitative results predict that the talks would not end in success. This prediction is born out as the peace-process collapsed and failed in no-small part because of hard-line positions from the Heath government. The demand by the Conservatives that unilateral IRA disarmament be a precondition for agreement was a major factor in the collapse of the agreement (Doyle and Guelke 2009, 19). From the perspective of the game, the equilibrium was maintained, and an effort by the right government to move from (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) to either (Concede, Few/No Attacks) or (Not Concede, Few/No Attacks) was unsuccessful. Also, in line with my argument is how key figures responded to this failed attempt. Martin McGuinness, one of the top leaders in the IRA came away from the negotiations with the belief that the British were "not yet in a position whereby we could do serious business" (Quoted in Bew et. al. 2009, 40). William Whitelaw, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the Heath government, believed that the meeting was a non-event, and that there was no reason to attempt to continue the negotiations. The IRA at this time concluded that the British did not yet view them as a credible group and so they decided to break the truce and return to violence with the "utmost ferocity and ruthlessness" (Quoted in Bew, et. al. 2009, 41). The leadership of the IRA had interacted with the British government and determined that the government was "not yet" ready to make the concession

they wanted. Rather than try and cut a deal with the Heath government at this time, the group decided that it was in their best interests to wait for a future government, and put their resources into more attacks to show the next government that the IRA was a credible actor that was willing to fight and had the capability to inflict harm.

After this return to the equilibrium of violence, the Heath government tried again and came up with the failed Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 (Bew et. al. 2009). Sunningdale was an attempt to end the problems in Northern Ireland without the inclusion of the IRA. The Heath government brokered an agreement with moderate segments of the population with the hope of isolating both hard-line Republicans and Unionists (Coogan 2002, 351). Sunningdale enhanced representation for moderate political parties in the Republican movement, but Sinn Féin and IRA were ignored by the agreement, and many Republicans, including moderates boycotted the referendum. This addressed some of the problems that started the Troubles, but not in a way that was meaningful for the IRA.

Harold Wilson and the Labour party returned to power in the election of 1974, and immediately backtracked on some of the hard-line positions of the previous government. The new government legalized Sinn Féin, ended internment, and re-entered into peace negotiations. The legalization of Sinn Féin was especially important, as during this time British intelligence suggested that higher ups in the IRA were seeking to meet their goals through political means, but were worried that anyone running under the banner of Sinn Féin would be prosecuted (Bew, et. al. 2009, 51). A ceasefire, which was declared in late 1974, was used by the IRA to take another stab at negotiating, this time with a more soft-line Labour Prime Minister. The IRA viewed British policy at this time as open to negotiation, with one top republican saying that “British policy...[is a] melting pot...It was back to the drawing board” (Quoted in Bew, et. al.

2009, 53). IRA officials believed that they could reach an acceptable deal with the Wilson government in 1974-6, because it seemed Wilson was willing to consider every solution on the table. Low levels of attacks continued during this ceasefire, but there was a definite decline in the number of attacks committed by the IRA as they tried to portray themselves as reasonable negotiating partners. Attacks from hard-line unionists however, soured any progress made by Wilson; in that Unionist bombings hastened the collapse of the power-sharing local government advocated by the Sunningdale Agreement, and the return of direct rule from London (Dekmejian 2007, 45). Talks continued during this period while a steady stream of violence carried on underneath. This steady violence going along with talks can be seen as a costly signal that the government cannot walk away from the talks. In this period, the Labour government was stuck in the suboptimal equilibrium of (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks), and could not move to the more efficient equilibrium. Although, there number of attacks was less than when the Conservative party ran the governments. As this period of Labour governments moved into premiership of James Callaghan attacks declined (Dekmejian 2007, 46). This decline in attacks during tenure of Labour Prime Ministers is consistent with the quantitative results, but after the collapse of the negotiations during the Wilson government, no new negotiations got started.

This lull in attacks did not last beyond the election of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The hard-line approach of Thatcher's government reinforced the equilibrium of violence. During the first couple years of the Thatcher government, two famous hunger strikes occurred in prisons containing IRA prisoners. The prisoner's demands were focused on higher recognition as political prisoners rather than as ordinary criminals, the response from Thatcher was to take a hard-line against these strikers (Bew, et. al. 2009, 89). Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams offered the assessment that "Margaret Thatcher...would definitely let men die"

(quoted in Bew, et. al. 2009, 89). The image of IRA soldiers starving to death while the Thatcher government watched greatly united both moderate and extreme Republicans against the British, especially when the lead striker, Bobby Sands, starved to death (Bew, et. al. 2009, 90). The idea that the British government would let the strikers die rather than give them any recognition that they may be political prisoners caused many moderate Republicans to join riots across Northern Ireland. Thatcher's policies had helped unite the Republican population solidly behind the IRA. Thatcher tried to curb the political rise of Sinn Féin and undermine moderate support for the IRA by reaching an agreement with the Republic of Ireland in 1985. The agreement was designed to have the Irish government crackdown on IRA activity on the Irish side of the border, and prevent IRA terrorists from using Irish soil as a safe haven to plan attacks. The agreement was designed to appeal to moderate Republicans who favored unification but through negotiation and elections rather than violence, although the agreement did not contain any direct provisions for future unification (Bew, et. al. 2009, 97-8). The Thatcher government had also hoped that the agreement would cut off a major advantage to the IRA and allow for a military victory, however this proved overly optimistic, as violence did escalate in the years following the agreement (Dekmejian 2007, 47). This escalation in violence relative to the tenure of James Callaghan is predicted by the quantitative results and the story fits with the discussion in sections two and four. The IRA knew that Thatcher had a strong desire to eliminate the IRA through force, and there was a tiny probability that she would ever sit at the negotiating table with the IRA or make serious peace offerings to the group. As such, the group preferred to attack and use their resources to send costly signals to the next Labour government, rather than not attack and let Thatcher pressure the group with military force. Her approach to the conflict was largely continued in the policies of her Conservative replacement John Major.

John Major replaced Thatcher as Prime Minister and as leader of the Conservative Party in 1990. While he was pressured by the United States to enter a peace process he stuck to his party line of demanding IRA disarmament prior to negotiating (Dekmejian 2007, 47). The IRA took this time to try and move forward with a political solution, and the government of John Major, while more open to negotiation than the Thatcher government, was still taking a relatively hard-line approach (Bew, et. al. 2009, 117). Talks that occurred during the IRA declared ceasefire in 1994 to 1996 failed in part due to the hard-line taken by John Major to appease his political supporters. Instead, the IRA used the time after to engage in several high profile attacks in order to raise discontent with the Major government and to reestablish the IRAs credibility as a group. These attacks were a series of costly signals to leaders of both the Labour and Conservative parties that the IRA still has the ability and the desire to inflict damage on the British government and people. The need for these signals ended with the election of Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair in May 1997.

During the first four months of Blair's time as Prime Minister the IRA entered into a new ceasefire and entered into all-party talks (Dekmejian 2007, 49). Blair's attitude was more conciliatory than Major's and he allowed the IRA to enter negotiations without first disarming, this more dovish approach allowed the IRA to finally enter into what it could perceive as good faith talks (Bew, et. al. 2009, 138-140). The IRA retained the threatened use of violence during this time, and the threat was perceived as credible given past actions taken under the Major regime, however the ceasefire held for the most part through the negotiations (Bew, et. al. 2009, 143). This time the Labour party arrived at the Pareto optimal equilibrium of (Concede, Few/No Attacks). The peace process came through and produced the Belfast Agreement, also called the Good Friday Agreement, which provided security guarantees for IRA disarmament and for a

power sharing in the local Northern Ireland government (Dekmejian 2007, 49). This was not the first preference for the IRA, but it did provide for enhanced political power a legitimate voice in the governance of the region. With this representation, Powell (1982) and Walsh and Piazza (2010) would expect the Republicans to pursue its primary goals through the new political systems as opposed to renewed violence. Likewise, because the agreement provided security guarantees to the IRA, the IRA could disarm securely without worrying about the British backtracking on the agreement and imposing a new settlement once the IRA is disarmed. While the IRA would have preferred Irish unification, the concessions offered were enough to successfully move the game from (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) to (Concede, Few/No Attacks). In the time since the agreement was signed, the IRA has begun the disarming process and Sinn Féin is engaged in the political system of Northern Ireland, and while splinter groups such as the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) have emerged, their support is limited to the most hard-line Republicans. The concessions from the Labour government of Tony Blair were sufficient to appease most of the Irish Republicans and move them from violence into more conventional politics.

This example, which follows the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1969 to 2001, shows how the actions of the state's chief executive can affect the calculations of domestic terrorist groups. Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2 show how the level of attacks committed by the IRA changed with the party that controlled the government. The table shows that the mean and median number of attacks against the Conservative party was much higher than those against the Labour party, and a two-tailed difference of means test shows that the difference in these means is significant at the 0.05 level. The IRA, using political party as a cue, altered its strategy




Table 5.2: Summary Statistics and Difference of Means Test of IRA Attacks by Party

	Attacks Against Left Governments per Dyad-Year	Attacks Against Right Governments Per Dyad-Year
Mean	48.92	88.96
Median	47	92.5
Variance	1751.72	3648.00
N=	12	24
Df	30	
t-stat	-2.31	
p-value two-tailed test	0.027	

Data from the Global Terrorism Database (Attacks) and World Bank DPI (Party)

to provoke right-wing leaders into taking controversial actions such as internment, warrantless searching, and military force so that moderate Republicans would be more willing to back the IRA against the state. Further attacks against right-wing governments gave the group the credibility to be taken as serious negotiating partners when the left-wing Prime Minister Tony Blair came to power. Blair knew that his supporters would rather engage in negotiations and grant some concessions to the IRA rather than tolerate more curbs on civil liberties that marginalized the Republican populations. Likewise, the IRA knew that it could engage in a

ceasefire but still have the credibility to threaten new attacks in order to enhance their bargaining position. The IRA was able to get major concessions, albeit not their top preferences, by understanding how different political parties would react to their actions. At the end of the conflict the IRA had gained sufficient concessions that it was willing to disengage from violence in favor of political power and the potential to eventually gain their top preference through the ballot box rather than bombings. This case fit the quantitative results very well, throughout the whole timeframe that was examined. The IRA responded to the changes in political parties and changed their behavior. Attacks increased in years where conservative governments, like Thatcher and Major, were in charge, and decreased when Labour leaders, like Callaghan and Blair, controlled the government. The case study matches the expectations of both the games and the quantitative analysis. Table 5.3, below, provides an overview of the major ceasefires/negotiations and their outcomes.

Table 5.3: Summary of Negotiations in the IRA Conflict

Event	Year	Party	Outcome	Notes
Truce/Negotiations	1972	Conservative	Failed after one meeting. Return to equilibrium of violence	Government did not take the group as fully credible, and IRA believed that the government was not ready to seriously negotiate.
Sunningdale Agreement	1973	Conservative	Failed. Return to equilibrium of violence	Government attempted to negotiate around the IRA by only dealing with moderate political parties in Northern Ireland. The agreement collapsed in about a year
Ceasefire/Negotiations	1974-6	Labour	Failed. Return to equilibrium of violence	Government was engaged in a long period of negotiation with IRA, and the IRA reduced attacks to try and get a deal. A deal seemed to be in sight for the IRA, but eventually fell through in part to do concerns of the implications of full British withdraw.
Ceasefire/Negotiations	1994-6	Conservative	Failed. Return to equilibrium of violence	Government stuck to a hard-line, insisting disarmament as a precondition for negotiations
Belfast Agreement	1997	Labour	Success. Equilibrium of Little/No Violence	The Belfast Agreement, also known as the Good Friday Agreement, is viewed as framework that concluded the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Section 6: Conclusions

The results from the previous two sections show that intrastate terrorists engage in a manner that is more consistent with the political access school than the strategic school. The quantitative results show that, in democracies, governments of the left are more likely to sign an agreement and less likely to be attacked less frequently than governments of the right. This finding is consistent with scholars approaching terrorism and domestic political violence from the political access approach, as they would believe that more inclusive, that is soft-line, regimes would be less targeted by domestic political violence.

Domestic terrorist groups calculate how to best achieve their goals, and the nature of the political parties in the government affects those calculations. Groups know that dovish (left-wing) parties are more likely to cut a deal with the group than a hawkish (right-wing) party. As such they adjust their strategies to increase the likelihood of getting that deal. When left governments are in power, there are two possible equilibrium that can happen, either (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks) or (Concede, Few/No Attacks). The former occurs when the group has not sent enough costly signals to the government player and thus the government has no incentive to enter negotiations. It knows that the group is threatening violence, but without a signal of the group's true capabilities and commitment, the government assumes that the group is engaging in cheap talk. Once enough costly signals have been sent, it is clear that group is committed and has the resources available to it to impose costs on the state. As such, the game will move to the later equilibrium. However, the group prefers to keep left governments in power and to try to achieve the equilibrium of (Concede, Few/No Attacks), and so it prefers to send the costly signals during periods of right government.

When right-wing parties are in power, groups know that the chances of getting an agreement are very much reduced relative to left governments. Because they know that right governments have a dominant strategy of not conceding, there is only one equilibrium in this game, and that is (Not Concede, Lots of Attacks). This outcome, while Pareto dominated by (Concede, Few/No Attacks) exists because right governments really do not want to cut a deal and groups are suspicious of that betrayal by the government party is a likely outcome given the right government's preferences. As such the violent equilibrium is maintained during right governments as groups use the chance to send costly signals to future left governments. Groups prefer to send these signals during periods of time when right governments are in power because it means that there is a good chance of entering into a peace process with the next left government if these signals are sent prior to the left government assuming power.

One of the contributions of this paper is that when my findings are viewed in conjunction with previous research on how terrorist groups adjust to political parties in democracy, clear differences emerge. Previous research found that transnational terrorist groups attack left governments more than right governments; this means that transnational groups are engaging in a different calculus than domestic groups. I believe that the reason for this difference is that domestic terrorist groups really want to achieve their primary objective, either territorial separation or regime change, and their goals can be granted by the government under attack. In contrast, transnational groups have goals that require major changes to multiple regimes or the international system, and it is beyond the ability of any signal government to enact these goals. It is also the case that domestic groups have more interaction with the government actor because it does not have the luxury of retreating into another sovereign state and internationalizing the conflict, as such the conflict becomes a direct two player game between the sitting government

and the group. Further research should be done to examine the differences between these two types of terrorist groups, and future terrorism scholars should make the distinction clear in their works going forward. Future works that try and distinguish between the Strategic and Political Access schools may benefit by looking for trends in intrastate and transnational terrorism separately.

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