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JURY DECISION MAKING: DECISION AND BIASES OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE PLEA AND DEFINING 'INSANITY'

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ABSTRACT

In the last few decades there has been a surge of research concerning jury decision making and jury bias. While there has been some research into jurors' opinions of the insanity defense plea, there has been little to no research into how well jurors' preconceived notions of the insanity defense plea overlap with the legal statutes and criteria of legal insanity. In order to assess how well mock jurors', or laypeoples', perceptions of legal insanity align with existing legal statutes, 59 undergraduate students read a scenario and answered a survey measuring their perceptions of legal insanity. The results indicated that there was a strong overlap of participants' unsolicited perceptions of legal insanity and the Irresistible Impulse Standard (IIS), the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) statute, the Durham Rule and a concept the author labels "the mental health professional" factor.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Following the controversial legal insanity trial and eventual acquittal of John W. Hinkley

Jr.'s attempted assassination of President Reagan, the American public's view of the insanity

defense plea grew increasingly more negative (Cutler, Morgan & Narby, 1992). After polling the

public following the Hinkley trial, Hans and Vidmar (1986) concluded that "there is a great deal

of negative feeling toward the insanity defense" (p. 198). The collective public backlash from the

verdict led to some states amending their legal statutes of insanity (i.e., the Not Guilty by Reason

of Insanity verdict changing to the Guilty but Mentally Ill) as well as the government editing the

Federal Rules of Evidence (i.e. Rule 704; see Rogers & Ewing, 1989). While these three events

can seem unconnected there is a link among them. The highly polarized trial and verdict of the

Hinkley case led to the public demanding that the legal system change the laws based on the

nation's collective opinion, for better or worse. For example, after the Hinkley trial the NGRI was

changed to the GBMI after the acquittal enraged the public. Hence the legal definition of insanity

is never fixed and can be amended to better parallel the public's perception of legal insanity.

Since the laws vary depending on the state, more research is needed in the specific area of jury

decision making and the insanity defense plea.

While the public demanded the legal system revise the criteria and statutes for insanity,

the process was a challenging one. To date, there is not one universal agreed upon legal definition

of insanity. Each state is able to decide upon the statute to be written into law within the state's

jurisdiction. At the present time, there are six to eight statutes used in the United States to define

legal insanity. The reason for this range is that some states have two definitions of legal insanity.

When that is the case, one definition is a default statute but a jury can elect to use the second definition for a particular trial. Some states have two definitions, others one and some states have abolished the insanity defense all together.

These differing approaches to legal insanity could arguably affect jurors' decision making process. The question this thesis attempts to answer is whether potential jurors have varying prototypes of legal insanity that contradict the existing statutes. Prototypes are defined in this study as "traditional, abstract feature sets that are operationally defined as lists of features" (Skeem & Golding, 2001). An example of one prototype of insanity for a juror could include features such as acts crazy, talks to self, and appears disheveled. Essentially, the prototype is a collection of various traits that represent a category. The prototype construct has been used in various empirical studies to analyze a person's cognitive representation of different categories, situations, or people (e.g. Brewer, Dull and Lui, 1981; Cohen, 1983). Therefore, the questions this study focused on revolved around prototypes potential jurors' have.

This study first described the legal statutes used for insanity and then categorized them into measureable components. Second, the components were written into a fictionalized assault case scenario. Accompanying this vignette was a survey designed to collect data about participants' preexisting prototypes of legal insanity based on the scenario. Thirdly, using the data from the survey, the author determined if there was any correlation between participants' prototypes and the criteria or statutes of legal insanity.

Empirical Support

Multiple studies have indicated that mock jurors often fail to follow the legal definitions of insanity when debating verdicts (Finkel, 1989; 1991, Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw, & Kock, 1985; Ogloff, 1991; Oglof, Schweighofer, Turnbull, & Whittemore, 1992; Simon, 1967; as cited in

Golding & Skeem, 2001). Researchers have also indicated that not only do jurors rely on their perceptions of insanity, but these conceptions are often linked with their own biases and attitudes about insanity (Skeem & Golding, 2001). Therefore, much of the published literature agrees that most jurors will not judge the validity of an insanity defense plea by the legal components but by their personal schema of legal insanity.

Cutler, Morgan and Narby (1992) conducted a study that examined survey participants' attitudes about the insanity defense ("Every sane individual is responsible for his every action") and participants' attitudes toward psychiatrists in terms of their expert testimony. The researchers provided a scenario for the participants to read that involved a man being charged with the first degree murder of his girlfriend. One significant factor in the scenario is that a psychiatrist, who testifies for the defendant, states that the defendant has a history of delusional paranoid disorder as well as alcohol abuse and during the crime may have suffered from alcoholic hallucinosis due to recent withdrawal (Cutler et al., 1992). The scenario also included testimony of a psychiatrist on the state's behalf. The testimony indicated that the defendant had a history of alcohol abuse and blackouts but that the expert witness did not believe he suffered from a major mental illness during the committing of the crime. However, the psychiatrist indicated that the defendant suffered from a type of paranoid disorder prior to the offense. Participants were then asked to issue a verdict of either Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) or Guilty (Cutler et al., 1992). The results of the study indicated that even with implied details in the scenario that the defendant suffered from a mental illness, 78% of participants issued a guilty verdict.

Another way to operationalize, or define something in terms of its measurement in the study, potential constructs of jurors' perceptions of the insanity defense plea is by providing prototypes (Smith, 1991, 1993; Smith & Studebaker, 1996). Smith's research indicated that jurors have psychological categories to represent crimes. Jurors' decision making process in this context involves selecting a verdict by the prototype-relevant categorization of the verdict in the context

of a cognition task. The cognition task involved asking participants to judge a defendant and issue a verdict. When deliberating a verdict, jurors were asked if the actions of the defendant on trial qualify as a component of the juror's crime category (Skeem & Golding, 2001). Crime categories are feature lists of each type of crime. For example, when participants listed features of a burglary, many said that type of crime is committed when the victim is not present (Smith, 1991). Skeem, Golding and Smith's data indicate that jurors select a verdict that best fits their prototype of a crime and that one important factor is jurors' perceptions of a defendant's psychologically driven behavior while on trial. For example, participants may change their verdict if a defendant talked to her/himself while the trial was in session. To conclude, it is possible that a juror on an insanity defense plea would have her/his verdict decision influenced by the defendant's exhibited behavior.

Research has also suggested that jurors have *naive conceptions*, or conceptions not based in evidence, of their personal crime prototypes that differ substantially from legal definitions (Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 9). These findings are relevant because if jurors have a prototype for particular crimes, they also have a prototype for insanity as a category. Jurors' personal prototypes for insanity can also differ from the legal definitions of insanity they are provided with at trial.

Skeem and Golding's study (2001) also attempted to operationalize the prototype of insanity as "traditional, abstract feature sets that are operationally defined as lists of features" that were generated by asking their participants to describe the typical member of a category (p. 13). For example, the researchers asked participants to list features of people s/he would consider legally insane. The researchers collected all of the answers participants gave. After interviewing their participants, the researchers analyzed their responses for common features, such as exhibited behavior or specific psychological disorders. The results of the study indicated that jurors' features for an insanity prototype were overall thoughtful, unexaggerated descriptions of

prototypes that were versatile (Skeem & Golding, 2001). As these were unsolicited interviews, the researchers did not list every prototype but offered examples of some in their results, such as that the legally insane should be kept in custody.

While studies have been conducted into jurors' perceptions and biases on the insanity defense plea as a verdict, to this date there has been no published research on how legal statutes of insanity interact with the personal prototypes jurors have. This is an important area of research because various studies have shown that jurors disregard the legal criteria of insanity and rely on their own personal prototype when rendering a verdict decision (Finkel, 1989, 1991, Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw, & Kock, 1985; Ogloff, 1991; Oglof et al., 1992; Simon, 1967; as cited in Golding & Skeem, 2001).

Current Study

The purpose of this study is to identify participants' perceptions of legal insanity and correlate those perceptions to existing legal statutes about insanity. First the author selected six legal statutes used to define insanity. The statutes were then operationalized into measurable components based on their definitions. A vignette was then designed along with a study that would be used to measure participants' prototypes of legal insanity. Participants' prototypes were designed based on components derived from existing legal statutes discussed in the measures section. The survey demonstrated the decision making process potential jurors' may use when determining what does and does not represent legal insanity based on a crime scenario. The results given from the survey were used to compare participants' prototypes with existing legal statutes. The comparison showed the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the current legal statutes. The hypothesis of this study was that there would be some parallels between legal statutes and the participants' prototypes of legal insanity.

To operationalize constructs of possible prototypes of legal insanity, the author selected six legal statutes and converted their criteria to measurable components to use in a survey given to participants (see Figure 1 for breakdown of components in the Results section). The survey used was a modified version of the Juror Bias Scale. The survey was used to determine how prototypes were constructed by the participants. The survey had a total of 14 questions relating to the components, half of which were cache questions. Cache questions are mirror questions of the first half asked in a negative way. The purpose of cache questions is to run statistical tests of a survey's reliability. In addition, three demography questions were asked at the end of the survey. The vignette accompanying the survey narrated a fictional assault case and subsequent trial. Along with standard descriptive statistics, two factor analyses were performed on the data.

Chapter 2

Methods

Methodology

Measures

In order to operationalize the construct of 'legal insanity' to assess participants' prototypes within the survey, the author selected six legal insanity statutes. Once the statutes were selected, the guidelines or legal principles were extracted into criteria or components. The six statutes used in this study were the Wild Beast Test, the M'Naughten Standard, the Irresistible Impulse Standard, the Durham Rule, the American-Law Institute Standard and the Guilty but Mentally Ill Standard.

The first statute was the Wild Beast test developed in the 1800s in England. The test argued that if a defendant was "bereft of sanity" and could not comprehend or understand the consequences of her/his behavior, "no more than in an infant, a brute, or a wild beast" s/he could not be held legally responsible for her/his criminal actions (Gray, 1971). Therefore one component or variable was created for this statute entitled *wild beast* ("An insane defendant would look and/or act crazy"). While the Wild Beast test is no longer used in contemporary courts, the author felt it was an important statute to include in the study because it was the first attempt by a legal system to define insanity. In addition, other statutes still in use today are based on it.

The second statute was the M'Naughten Standard, which was developed from the Wild Beast test. The M'Naughten Standard had three major components: (1) a mental illness was

present, (2) a legality of actions clause and, (3) a morality component (Gray, 1971). (1) Refers to a physical diagnosis or cognitive cause of a mental illness. A *cognitive* component was created to address the physical presence of a mental illness ("A mental illness means that something is wrong with the defendant's brain"). (2) Addresses whether a defendant understood the legal consequences of her/his actions. This clause was operationalized as a *legality* component in the data ("An insane person doesn't understand the rules of the law"). (3) Addresses whether a defendant understood the moral implications of her/his actions. The third part of the definition can be operationalized as a *morality* component in the data ("Insane people don't understand the difference between right and wrong."). Therefore the M'Naughten Standard is comprised of three components in the data and survey.

The third statute is the Irresistible Impulse Standard (IIS) which includes the *legality* and *morality* components of the M'Naughten Standard but added an impulse control aspect, meaning that if a defendant is unable to control her/his actions s/he is not able to be held criminally responsible. To operationalize this statute, a *volitional* component ("People who are insane can't control their actions; even if they know what they're doing is wrong.") was created along with the existing *morality* and *legality* components.

After the IIS, the Durham Rule was published. The Durham Rule states that a defendant cannot be found criminally responsible if an existing mental disease/defect caused or resulted in her/him committing an unlawful act. To operationalize the Durham there are three components. The first was a *cognitive* component to address the physical presence of a mental illness. The second was the *causality Durham* component ("Criminal insanity is only understandable if the person's mental illness directly caused them to commit a crime.") which measured the direct relationship between the presence of a mental illness and the cause of the crime. The third component measured the statute itself (*Durham*) ("If someone is in the recovery process, they are not insane"), much like the operationalized construct for the Wild Beast test.

The next standard was the American Law Institute (ALI), which is comprised of the *causality Durham* and *cognitive* components (Gray, 1971). Since this statute is made up of components already defined within other statutes, it does not require further elaboration.

The final statute being measured is the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI). Under the GBMI criteria, a defendant is considered criminally responsible for the crime but also entitled to treatment while institutionalized due to a mental illness. The GBMI, however, states that if a defendant becomes competent (i.e. the symptoms remit) the defendant is then required to fulfill the remainder of her/his correctional sentence in a typical correctional facility (Gray, 1971). Therefore, a final component, the *GBMI*, was created in order to measure this statute ("A person's only insane if the symptoms of their mental illness are still happening.").

All of the statutes and their operationalized components can be seen in Figure 1. To see the full legal definition of each statute refer to Appendix E.

The mental disorder paranoid schizophrenia was selected for the purpose of this vignette. Paranoid schizophrenia was selected because it is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The manual labeled it a mental illness rather than a learning disorder. It is not the purpose of this study to examine the specific prototypes participants have of what constitutes a mental illness. A mental illness was needed for the vignette, therefore, the author selected a disorder from the manual and specifically identified it in the vignette. The author made no other attempt to inhibit participants' perceptions of mental illness.

Figure 1 -- Operationalized Components of Legal Insanity

Legal Statutes	Measured Components							
	Legality	Morality	Volitional	Causality	GBMI	Durham	Wild Beast	Cognitive
Wild Beast							X	
GBMI					X			
M'Naughten Standard	X	X						X
Durham Rule				X		X		X
ALI Standard				X				X
Irresistible Impulse Standard (IIS)	X	X	X					

Data Analysis

Data was available from 59 participants; however, one participant did not identify gender on the survey. Preliminary descriptive and frequency analyses were run on the data to check for normal distribution. Once the data was found to be reliable, independent t-tests were conducted

among the test subjects and gender and age to try and account for possible differences in the answers on the survey.

The last data analyses were two factor analyses. The first, a confirmatory multiple factor analysis, was conducted on the data in order to assess how well participants' responses aligned with the six legal statutes. During this analysis, the number of factors produced to account for the variance in the responses was limited to six, which was the number of statutes used to operationalize the components in the survey. Factors is used in the context of this study to refer to the interaction of a component or multiple components together that account for the variance in the responses. The analysis was conducted to determine if all six statutes would account for the variance in participants' responses. The results could provide information about the validity of the statutes and the possible reason for participants' varied responses. Theoretically each statute would be accounted for in at least one of the factors in the confirmatory analysis.

The second factor analysis conducted was an exploratory analysis. In this analysis the author did not preset a number of factors to be produced by the analysis. This test was run to compare to the results of the first confirmatory factor analysis. While the first analysis attempted to account for the variance in the data by the number of statutes, this second analysis only looked at the factors produced with Eigenvalues $< .9$. The purpose of this analysis was to understand the psychological decision making process participants' use to determine legal insanity without limiting the factors to the number of legal statutes.

Participants

Participants were selected from a section from the fall 2014 course Introduction to Psychology at the Pennsylvania State University's Berks campus. The professor of the course selected a class period for students to participate in research studies being conducted by students

and faculty at the campus. For completing the survey, students were given 100% attendance for that day as they would for a typical class period. A total of 59 students completed the survey (37 males, 21 females, and one unidentified). All indicated they were between the ages of 17 and 30. There were 30 freshmen, 17 sophomores, 8 juniors, and 4 seniors.

Materials

Vignette

The scenario used in this study is based on a vignette used in Skeem and Golding's (2001) research. Golding and Skeem (2001) developed their scenario of a murder case to measure how potential jurors categorized insanity. Golding and Skeem's (2001) vignette depicted a mentally ill man on trial for the murder of his girlfriend and included testimony of mental health professionals for both the defense and state. This scenario was adapted to a physical assault case committed by a mentally ill man against a stranger. More details of the crime were submitted during the trial portion of the scenario with the victim able to testify. The scenario described the crime in "real time" and the subsequent trial which included witness testimony, expert testimony and physical evidence. Within the entire vignette, all of the operationalized components of legal statutes from Figure 1 were included so that each component and subsequent question in the survey would be available to obtain participants' preexisting prototypes. (See Appendix A for full vignette)

Juror Bias Scale

Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) developed a specific Likert scale (JBS) to measure two subscales of jury bias: the Probability of Commission (PC) subscale (8 out of 17 items) and the Reasonable Doubt (RD) subscale (9 out of 17 items). The PC measures the "subjective likelihood, given one's a priori beliefs and the evidence, that the defendant actually committed the crime" (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983, p. 426). The RD component subscale measures "the threshold of certainty deemed necessary for conviction" (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983, p. 426). Guilty convictions result, according to Kassin and Wrightsman, when a juror's PC estimate exceeds his/her RD criterion and the reverse is true for a 'Not Guilty' verdict.

The survey is based on Kassin and Wrightsman's (1983) JBS. The author designed her own scale based off of the JBS, but only had 14 questions. Seven questions directly addressed the components operationalzied in Figure 1, the other half were cache questions as discussed in measures. All of the questions were measured on a Likert-type scale with values from 0-7. Crombach's alpha, which measures the reliability of the survey, for the modified JBS was found to be .632. An additional three demography questions were added at the end of the survey. (See Appendix A for survey and Appendix B for the author's code book)

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Procedure

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Before the study could ethically be administered to participants, an Internal Review Board (IRB) submission was sent to Penn State's Office for Research Protections. The IRB proposal was submitted on May 3rd, 2013. The IRB number is 43094. The study was classified as an Exempt IRB. The IRB required an informed consent form, the survey, and an alternative assignment for participants' under the age of 18.

The study was administered during one class period of the Introduction to Psychology course at Penn State Berks on September 12, 2013. The students did not receive compensation for their participation. The course instructor planned a day for students to participate in campus research and instructed students that their attendance for the class period would be counted if they completed this study and another study conducted by a faculty member. Students were given an informed consent form and given the entire class period (75 minutes) to complete both surveys. After students completed the survey, they were given a debriefing statement (see Appendix C) and allowed to leave. Participants under the legal age of consent were given an alternative assignment. The alternative assignment was to read an article (*Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of Insanity Defense*, E. Silver, C. Cirincione, & H.J. Steadman) after which students answered three questions about the article (see Appendix D).

Chapter 3

Results

Standard descriptive and frequency statistical analyses were run on the data. Visual inspection of each item's histogram indicated that each item was normally distributed. All of the histograms for each survey question showed a bell curve distribution on the graphs. Inspection of the frequency output tables also indicated that each survey question had most participants' responses clustering in the middle of the Likert-scale.

The only component that was not normally distributed was the cognitive component. This component was skewed to the left, or had a negative skew. The mean for the cognitive component was 4.15 (SD=.71), compared to the means of the other components which ranged from 2.31 to 3.97. Analyzing the cognitive component's frequency output scale indicated that only four participants rated the component Neutral or lower on the Likert-scale. Thus the majority of the participants' responses (n=55) answered higher on the Likert-scale which caused the negative skew.

Independent t-tests were run for gender and age respectively along with the survey questions. No significant correlations were found for age or for gender among the components (p≥.05).

Confirmatory

A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the data to assess how well participants' responses aligned with the six legal statutes. Therefore, the number of factors accounting for the total variance was limited to six. In this analysis the cache questions of the components were not

included. The analysis produced a communalities table (Table 1), total variance explained (Table 2), and a component matrix (Table 3).

In the communalities output all of the questions had an extraction level greater than .8. The extraction levels indicate that all of the variance in participants' responses was accounted for by the six factor model.

Table 1 -- Confirmatory Communalities

Component	Extraction
Wild Beast	.990
Cognitive	.983
Legality	.876
Durham	.831
Morality	.830
Volitional	.939
Causality Durham	.988
GBMI	.840

In the Total Variance Explained output (Table 2) the Eigenvalues and percent variance are presented. Three components had values <1 and combined accounted for 63.85% of the variance in participants' responses. A fourth component accounted for an additional 11.94% of the total variance, therefore the author decided this component was important to note.

Table 2 -- Confirmatory Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.413	30.169	30.169
2	1.530	19.120	49.289
3	1.165	14.561	63.849
4	.956	11.944	75.794
5	.696	8.699	84.493
6	.518	6.472	90.965
7	.444	5.553	96.518
8	.279	3.482	100.000

The component matrix output for all six factors can be seen in Table 3. While there were eight total components, the number of factors produced was limited to six. This was done in order to assess whether the six factor model can account for the variance in the data. Therefore, each factor and its loadings will be addressed. For the purpose of this study, the author looked at loadings heavier than .6. In this section only the loadings and data are reported, each factor is elaborated on and implications drawn in the discussion section.

In the first factor three components loaded heavily: *legality, morality,* and *volitional*. Referring to Figure 1, it can be seen that all of these components match the criteria of the Irresistible Impulse Standard (IIS). Therefore the results indicate that the first factor is the IIS.

The second factor had the components *GBMI* and *Durham Rule*. It is important to note that on this factor the components *cognitive, legality, morality* and *causality durham* all loaded

negatively. While these four components negatively loaded, they did not load heavily. However it is important to note the relationships between the components.

The third factor included the *Wild Beast* component and the *cognitive* component. The author has labeled this factor the "mental health professional mindset" as it focuses on the behavior and psychological processes of mental illness. It is also important to note that in this factor every other component, aside from *Wild Beast* and *cognitive,* loaded negatively.

The fourth factor only had the *causality durham* component load heavily. However, the *Durham Rule* component did not load heavily or negatively. The components *wild beast, legality,* and *morality* did load negatively on this factor.

The fifth factor also only had one component load heavily: *volitional*. This component was the only one to load heavily on two factors (1 and 5). However it barely made the cut off at .604. The components *Wild Beast, legality, morality,* and *GBMI* loaded negatively.

The sixth factor had no components load heavily, but there was a mixture of positive and negative loadings.

Table 3 -- Confirmatory Component Matrix

	Components					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Wild Beast	.409	.139	.702	-.383	-.051	.402
Cognitive	.296	-.161	.732	.479	.055	-.317
Legality	.788	-.196	-.211	-.134	-.393	.008
Durham	.176	.840	-.083	.127	.232	.134
Morality	.856	-.023	-.142	-.121	-.162	-.189
Volitional	.681	.001	-.120	-.260	.604	-.169
Causality Durham	.508	-.327	-.221	.631	.125	.400
GBMI	.229	.795	-.033	.254	-.275	-.115

Exploratory

A second exploratory factor analysis was performed on the data. In this analysis, the number of factors produced was not limited by the number of statutes. Rather than seeing how a six factor model accounted for the variance in participants' responses, this second analysis analyzed the factors accounting for variance with no predetermined number. Essentially the first analysis accounted for variance with a six factor model determined by the number of statutes used while this second analysis accounted for the variance by only the number of factors the output determined. The analysis produced a communalities table (Table 4), total variance explained (Table 5), and a component matrix (Table 6).

In the communalities table (Table 4) all but the *volitional* and *causality durham* components had extraction levels higher than .6, accounting for most of the variance in the

model. As with the previous confirmatory analysis, only the numerical and output results are reported in this section. Further elaborations and implications of these results are in the discussion.

Table 4 -- Exploratory Communalities

Component	Extraction
Wild Beast	.679
Cognitive	.650
Legality	.703
Durham	.744
Morality	.753
Volitional	.479
Causality Durham	.414
GBMI	.686

The Eigenvalues and percent variance are accounted for in the total variance explained output (Table 5). For the purpose of this study, the author only looked at factors with an Eigenvalue greater than 1. Three factors had <1 and accounted for 63.85% of the variance. However upon further inspection of the Eigenvalues and cumulative percent of variance the fourth factor accounted for an additional 11.94%. Therefore, the author included it for further analysis, despite the Eigenvalue being 1<.

Table 5 -- Exploratory Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.413	30.169	30.169
2	1.530	19.120	49.289
3	1.165	14.561	63.849
4	.956	11.944	75.794
5	.696	8.699	84.493
6	.518	6.472	90.965
7	.444	5.553	96.518
8	.279	3.482	100.000

The last section of the exploratory factor analysis can be seen in Table 6. Using the Eigenvalues from Table 5, four factors were produced. For the purpose of this study, the author only looked at values greater than .6.

In the first factor *legality, morality* and the *volitional* component loaded heavily. Using Figure 1 as a reference, these loadings correlate with the Irresistible Impulse Standard (IIS). Therefore, it is most likely that the first factor is the IIS.

The second factor had two heavy loadings: the *GBMI* and the *Durham Rule*. The components *cognitive, legality* and *causality Durham* all loaded negatively. While these were not heavy loadings and, therefore, not significant to elaborate on in the discussion, the author felt it was important to make a note of the relationships in the data that the analysis produced.

The third factor had *Wild Beast* and *cognitive* components load heavily. The author has labeled this factor in the previous analyses, the "mental health professional mindset." All other components loaded negatively in this factor.

Only the *causality durham* loaded heavily in the fourth factor. In this factor the other components had a mixture of negative and positive loadings but none were heavy enough to be significant for further elaboration

Table 6 -- Exploratory Component Matrix

	Components			
	1	2	3	4
Wild Beast	.409	.139	.702	-.383
Cognitive	.296	-.161	.732	.479
Legality	.788	-.196	-.211	-.134
Durham	.176	.840	-.083	.127
Morality	.856	-.023	-.142	-.121
Volitional	.681	.001	-.120	-.260
Causality Durham	.508	-.327	-.221	.631
GBMI	.229	.795	-.033	.254

Chapter 4

Discussion

The results of the confirmatory analysis focused on the alignment between participants' perceptions of legal insanity gathered through the survey-vignette and the six legal statutes used to operationalize the components of legal insanity in the study. Six factors were produced from the analysis but only five had significant loadings from the components to warrant further discussion.

The IIS statute, as the first factor, could arguably be labeled the most aligned with participants' perception of insanity. Just this factor accounted for 30% of the variance in participants' responses. The IIS statute deems that an individual must not understand the legality of their crime, the morality of it, and be unable to physically control her/his impulses. The first factor and statute are identical as these three components loaded heavily in the analysis and are the criteria for the statute. Essentially, the IIS allows that if a defendant knew the moral (*morality* component) and legal implications (*legality* component) of her/his crime but were unable to control her/his impulses (*volitional* component) then s/he could be found legally insane. Therefore, with this first statute, potential jurors are more interested in the mental state of the defendant at the time of the crime, how it affected her/his understanding of the law and morality of his/her actions, rather than if the mental illness directly contributed to the crime. This is significant because it indicates that participants' perceptions of insanity are almost identical to the existing IIS statute. The results from the data suggest that the criteria of the IIS statute is similar to the perceptions and biases potential jurors' already have of legal insanity. The results of the analysis suggest that states should be encouraged to adopt the IIS as their legal

insanity statute because potential jurors are most likely to share a similar personal prototype of insanity. As other studies have shown that jurors disregard legal insanity statutes if they do not align with their own personal perceptions, these implications could affect verdict decisions for future defendants.

The second factor had two components load heavily. Interestingly both components had been designed to measure a statute as a whole rather than sub-components that make up criteria for a statute. While much of the published literature has found adverse public opinions of the GBMI, studies involving mock jurors found that they were most likely to select the GBMI rather than a straight guilty verdict (Poulson, Braithwaite, Brondino, & Wuensch, 1997). Unlike many of the NGRI statutes, the GBMI allows juries to mandate that offenders receive treatment while being held criminally responsible for their actions. In addition, the GBMI is also used for defendants who either cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions or lack appreciation for the consequence of their actions. This is a singular component of the GBMI because NGRI statutes, such as the M'Naughten or the ALI, require that a defendant satisfy both of those criteria.

The other component that loaded heavily on the factor was the Durham Rule. The Durham is a less specific guideline for legal insanity compared to many of the other statutes. The Durham Rule, sometimes referred to as the Product Rule, is a statute more concerned with the relationship between the occurrence of a crime and a mental illness (Gray, 1971). Essentially the Durham rule states that if the crime was a direct product of a mental illness then a defendant is legally insane. The only component included for this statute aside from *Durham Rule* is the *causality durham*. The Durham Rule does not have a legality, morality or any component of that nature.

Compared to the first factor identified as the IIS, the second (GBMI and the Durham Rule) is almost the complete opposite. Both the GBMI and the Durham Rule concern the direct

effect a mental illness has on the occurrence of a crime for a defendant to be considered legally insane. Essentially, both statutes are focused on how a mental illness itself contributed to the committing of a crime. For example, in the vignette the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. When he encountered the victim at the Minimart, he felt that the victim was following him and felt threatened. From the defendant's perspective, he was acting in self-defense and was not aware that his mental illness was causing paranoia where there was no indication of danger. Therefore, participants whose responses accounted for the second factor may have felt that if the defendant did not have a paranoid mental disorder, the crime would not have occurred. If their personal prototype aligned with the GBMI or Durham Rule, then this evidence parallels their perceptions of legal insanity. Therefore, the two factors, the IIS and GBMI/Durham Rule, can be compared on the basis of what their criteria determine is important about legal insanity. The IIS defines a defendant's ability to control her/his impulses as well as her/his appreciation of the legal and moral implications of her/his actions. The GBMI/Durham Rule, on the other hand, primarily focuses on the connection between the presence of a mental illness and a committed crime.

Items assessing *wild beast* and *cognitive* components loaded heavily on the third factor in the analysis. This meant that for participants the Wild Beast test and the cognitive component aligned significantly with their personal prototypes of legal insanity. The Wild Beast test states that if a defendant behaves like a wild animal, then s/he cannot be legally held responsible for their crimes because a sane individual would not behave in such a manner (Gary, 1971). The cognitive component mandates that a defendant's mental illness must have a biological or psychological cause. The participants whose responses accounted for this factor, therefore, required two major criteria to define someone as legally insane. Firstly, there had to be some behavioral or physical evidence of the mental illness. This would be the Wild Beast test component. Participants needed to see some outward sign of the mental illness. Secondly, the

participants also required a cerebral or psychological cause for the behavior. This is the cognitive component. Participants required, in this factor, that a defendant show some physical symptom of a diagnosed mental illness.

The author has labeled this factor as the "mental health professional mindset." The argument for this category is that potential jurors who work in the mental health field would have experience or exposure to either individuals with a mental illness or education about mental illness. The potential jurors in this career field would theoretically have more experience than others in identifying mental illnesses, which is typically done through behavioral observations and a diagnosis.

The fourth factor only had the *causality durham* component load heavily. Interestingly, it did not load on factor 2, which was where the *Durham Rule* component loaded heavily. Along with the *Durham Rule*, the *causality* component also assesses how a mental illness directly influences the committing of a crime. Therefore, the fourth factor (*causality*) is connected to the second (*Durham/GBMI*) because they are part of the same statute (the Durham Rule). This factor implies that laypeople focus on the connection between the causes of a crime and the presence of a mental illness. As two components (*Durham Rule* and *causality durham*) loaded heavily on two different factors, it is likely that participants view the influence a mental illness has on the committing of a crime as important in their prototypes. The implications of these findings indicate that the Durham Rule aligns mostly with the personal prototypes potential jurors have about legal insanity.

The fifth factor only had the *volitional* component load heavily. The only statute that has a volitional criterion is the IIS, whose components all loaded heavily on the first factor. Therefore the *volitional* component was the only component to load twice on two difference factors. This finding indicates that impulse control is very important to participants' personal prototypes of legal insanity. Much like the fourth factor which accounted for only one component of a statute

(*causality* and the Durham Rule), the fifth factor only accounts for a part of the IIS statute. Implications from these results suggest that there are strong parallels between the volitional aspect of the IIS and participants' personal prototypes of legal insanity.

The purpose of the second exploratory analysis was to measure the psychological decision making process participants were using to determine legal insanity without predetermining the number of factors. Four factors were found to account for 75% of the total variance in the data. They were identical to the first four factors found in the confirmatory analysis. The first factor is most likely the IIS because it contains the *legality, morality* and *volitional* components. The second factor had the *GBMI* and *Durham Rule* components load heavily. In the third factor, the *wild beast* and *cognitive* components loaded heavily. The fourth factor only had the *causality durham* component load heavily. These results are significant when compared to the first confirmatory analysis as the factors are exactly the same. The only notable difference between the results of the two analyses is that in the confirmatory analysis the six factor model accounted for more of the variation in responses than in the exploratory analyses. In terms of the factors produced, however, the results were identical. The implications of the results are that the statutes correlated to these factors (The IIS, GBMI/Durham, and the "mental health professional mindset") share many of the traits of potential jurors' prototypes of legal insanity.

The results from this study have indicated that there is some overlap between potential jurors' prototypes of legal insanity and the legal statutes used to define insanity in a court of law. While six statutes were selected, only the IIS, the GBMI, the Durham Rule and the Wild Beast test seemed to have any parallel to participants' prototypes. However, these statutes were not cleanly or exactly replicated in the factors produced from participants' responses. For example, the "mental health professional mindset" combines the Wild Beast test with the *cognitive* component used in the Durham Rule and ALI Standard. In addition to understanding which

statutes had validity in participants' prototypes, the research also suggested which statutes do *not* correspond to their prototypes (the M'Naughten Standard and the ALI).

The results from this study are primarily exploratory. To date, there have been no published studies examining the overlap between potential jurors' prototypes of legal insanity and existing legal statutes. The implications of this research suggest that statutes being revised or changed should reflect potential jurors' prototypes of legal insanity within the statutes. The findings in this study found that the IIS, GBMI, Durham Rule and the Wild Beast test all had some overlap with participants' surveyed opinions of what constitutes legal insanity. Therefore, the original hypothesis that there would be some parallels between participants' prototypes of legal insanity and the existing statutes was supported by the data.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

The findings from this study supported the hypothesis that there would be overlap between participants' personal prototypes of legal insanity and the existing legal statutes. However, not all of the statutes were accounted for in the factor analyses, specifically the M'Naughten and ALI standards were not found in any of the factors. The IIS, the GBMI, the Durham Rule and "the mental health professional mindset" made up of the *wild beast* and *cognitive* components were all found to overlap with participants' prototypes. That two statutes did not overlap on a factor could indicate that some statutes are more aligned with potential jurors' personal perceptions of legal insanity than others. The results provide exploratory topics for future research directions in jury decision making and insanity defense pleas.

As no other study has examined potential juror prototypes with measures composed of criteria from existing legal statutes, there were quite a few limitations in this study. Firstly the sample size was recruited from only one college level Introduction to Psychology course. A larger sample size in future research is needed to have a more representative sample population.

In addition to the sample size, the participants may have had some interfering biases because they were recruited from a psychology course. The participants' prototypes may not be considered "naïve" compared to other populations because they have had exposure to psychological concepts of mental illness (Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 9). This mindset may not be seen in other populations because it is a category particular to participants who have been exposed to psychology and mental illness. Testing the validity and reliability of the "mental

health professional mindset" could be the topic of future research. For example, would this same category be seen if this survey had been given to a class of engineers?

Another limitation of this study is that not all existing statutes were used in the survey. For example, the Moral Penal Code was not used in this study, but it is used in many states as the guideline for legal insanity. Therefore, some participants' prototypes may have parallels with this statute but were not seen in the data because it was not included. One topic for future research could be surveying mock jurors about how they might rank and rate the validity or accuracy of existing legal statutes compared to their personal conceptions of legal insanity. The results of such research could have interesting implications. For example, many of the statutes used today are not used in the same states or are unrelated to one another. Research in this area could compare data from participants of one state to other states. Further analyses could be run to compare participants' prototypes of different states to the existing legal statutes as well.

Only four out of the six statutes used in this study were found to have significant correlations with participants' personal prototypes of legal insanity. The results imply that only four statutes parallel participants' personal prototypes, which could affect future legal statutes about insanity. Participants indicated that various components affect their perception of legal insanity. Some of these include the *cognitive* component, meaning that participants required a presence of a mental illness; or the *Durham Rule* and *causality durham* components which require that there be a direct correlation between the presence of a mental illness and the cause of a crime. The author suggests that this research be used as a guideline for future projects. As this research was exploratory in nature, its purpose was to determine if there were topics worth pursuing further. The results have indicated that there is an abundance of possible research directions and potential implications to be discovered from this research.

Appendix A

Survey

<u>Directions:</u>

You are to play the part of a juror for a criminal trial. Please read the case described below involves a defendant who is raising the insanity defense. Please (1) carefully read the case description, then (2) complete the questions following the case description.

Scenario:

Albert Brown, age 32, often walked to the Minimart store which is two blocks south from the building he rented his apartment at. One evening, he had a few friends over to watch a baseball game on TV. At 6 PM, he walked to the Minimart to buy some more soda and chips for him and his friends. At 8 PM when he still had not returned Michael, one of his friends, went to the Minimart to see if Albert was still there. As Michael walked towards the front door of the Minimart, he described hearing some sounds coming from the lot behind the store. He described the sounds as someone moaning and metal cans or glass bottles being moved. Walking around to the back of the store, Michael found Albert lying on the ground with stab wounds to his chest and back as well as cuts on his hands and arms. Michael called 911 and in seven minutes an ambulance and police car arrived.

While Albert was being taken to the hospital, one of the police officers interviewed the clerk working at the Minimart. The clerk indicated that a local man

named Jim Smith had been loitering inside the store at the same time as Albert and left minutes after victim. The clerk also said that they heard sounds that sounded like a physical fight behind the store, but thought nothing of it because the Minimart shares the back lot with a bar and many of the patrons argue there. After interviewing the clerk, the police officer was informed that a bloody knife was found at the crime scene and fingerprints found later on the handle matched Jim Smith.

When the police searched for Jim, they found him at his mother's home still wearing the bloody clothes when he had attacked Albert. His room was littered with trash and Jim's mother indicated that he often stayed in his room for days on end talking to himself. At the police station, Jim was speaking incoherently and he was sent to the local hospital to be examined by a forensic psychologist. They reported that Jim suffered from paranoid schizophrenia which caused severe hallucinations.

At the trial, Albert testified that after leaving the Minimart he had accidently bumped shoulders with Jim as they passed one another. Albert also stated that Jim appeared to be panicked and told Albert to stop following him. He also said that Jim was sweating profusely, had problems speaking clearly and had rapid eye and head movements. Albert said that he also started to be afraid and tried to run around to the back lot of the store and started yelling for help. He said that was when Jim ran after him and started stabbing him. Once he fell to the ground, Jim warned him to stop following him, threw the knife away and left.

Including the forensic psychologist who examined Jim initially, the defense called in another mental health expert to testify. Both psychologists reported that Jim did not understand the legal consequences of his actions because he believed he was being

followed and felt threatened, and had acted in self-defense from his point of view. They also stated that Jim did not understand that his actions were morally wrong; he could not control his actions and that hallucinations and paranoia from his mental illness directly attributed to his illegal actions. The forensic psychologist testified that they believed Jim could control the symptoms of his mental illness with treatment while the other mental health professional testified they did not believe Jim could recover. During trial, Jim had strange mood swings and appeared to be arguing with his lawyers on various occasions.

<u>Questionnaire Directions:</u>

Please answer all of the following questions. Rate the characteristics most important to you about a defendant when giving a verdict for an insanity plea.

1. Even if the symptoms of a mental illness have been treated a person can still be considered insane.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

2. An insane defendant would look and/or act crazy.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

3. A mental illness means that something is wrong with the defendant's brain.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

4. An insane person doesn't understand the rules of the law.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly

Agree

5. If someone is in the recovery process, they are not insane

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly

Agree

6. Insane people don't understand the difference between right and wrong.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly

Agree

7. People who are insane can't control their actions; even if they know what they're doing is wrong.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly

Agree

8. Criminal insanity is only understandable if the person's mental illness directly caused them to commit a crime.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

9. Sane people behave rationally. (cache Q of wild beast test)

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

10. A person's only insane if the symptoms of their mental illness are still happening.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

11. A sane person's brain functions normally.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

12. People who aren't insane can control their actions even when they know right and wrong.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

13. Insane people do understand laws.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

14. Insane people do understand the difference between right and wrong.

Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree

Please continue to the demographic questions.

Demographic Questions

Please answer each question by circling your answer.

Gender:

Female   Male

Age (in years):

17-20   21-30   31-40   41 +

Year of college you are in currently:

Freshmen   Sophomore   Junior   Senior

Appendix B

Code Book

<u>Questionnaire Directions:</u>

Please answer all of the following questions. Rate the characteristics most
important to you about a defendant when giving a verdict for an insanity plea.

1. Even if the symptoms of a mental illness have been treated a person can
    still be considered insane. (cache Q of GBMI)

Strongly Disagree (4)   **Disagree (3)**   **Neutral (2)**   **Agree (1)**

Strongly Agree (0)

2. An insane defendant would look and/or act crazy. (wild beast)

Strongly Disagree (0)   **Disagree (1)**   **Neutral (2)**   **Agree (3)**

Strongly Agree (4)

3. A mental illness means that something is wrong with the defendant's
    brain. (cognitive)

Strongly Disagree   **Disagree**   **Neutral**   **Agree**

Strongly Agree

4. An insane person doesn't understand the rules of the law. (legality)

Strongly Disagree   **Disagree**   **Neutral**   **Agree**

Strongly Agree

5. If someone is in the recovery process, they are not insane (Durham Rule)

Strongly Disagree (4)   **Disagree (3)**   **Neutral (2)** **Agree (1)**

Strongly Agree (0)

6. Insane people don't understand the difference between right and wrong. (morality)

Strongly Disagree   **Disagree**   **Neutral**   **Agree**

Strongly Agree

7. People who are insane can't control their actions; even if they know what they're doing is wrong. (volitional)

Strongly Disagree   **Disagree**   **Neutral**   **Agree**

Strongly Agree

8. Criminal insanity is only understandable if the person's mental illness directly caused them to commit a crime. (causality, Durham rule)

Strongly Disagree   **Disagree**   **Neutral**   **Agree**   **Strongly Agree**

9. Sane people behave rationally. (cache Q of wild beast test)

Strongly Disagree (4) **Disagree (3)** **Neutral (2)** **Agree (1)**

Strongly Agree (0)

10. A person's only insane if the symptoms of their mental illness are still

happening. (GBMI)

Strongly Disagree **Disagree** **Neutral** **Agree**

Strongly Agree

11. A sane person's brain functions normally. (cache Q of cognitive)

Strongly Disagree (4) **Disagree (3)** **Neutral (2)** **Agree (1)**

Strongly Agree (0)

12. People who aren't insane can control their actions even when they know

right and wrong. (cache Q of volitional)

Strongly Disagree (4) **Disagree (3)** **Neutral (2)** **Agree (1)**

Strongly Agree (0)

13. Insane people do understand laws. (cache Q of legality)

Strongly Disagree (4) **Disagree (3)** **Neutral (2)** **Agree (1)**

Strongly Agree (0)

14. Insane people do understand the difference between right and wrong.

(cache Q for morality)

Strongly Disagree (4)   **Disagree (3)**   **Neutral (2)**   **Agree (1)**

Strongly Agree (0)

Please continue to the demographic questions.

<u>Demographic Questions</u>

Please answer each question by circling your answer.

Gender:

Female (1)   Male (2)

Age (in years):

17-20(1)   21-30 (2)   31-40 (3)   41 + (4)

Year of college you are in currently:

Freshmen (1)   Sophomore (2)   Junior (3)

Senior (4)

Appendix C

Debriefing Statement

Debriefing Statement for Forensic Psychology Research

The Pennsylvania State University, Berks Campus

Title of Project: Jury Decision Making:

Perceptions and Biases of the Insanity Defense Pleas and Defining 'Insanity'

Principal Investigator: Rachel H. Jensen

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Thank you for participating in this research on jury selection. The goal of this research is to gain a better understanding about how jurors perceptions and preconceived opinions about defendants using the insanity defense plea and the plea itself affect their decisions of how to legally define insanity. The hypothesis of this study is whether potential jurors define insanity in their decision making process by using the various legal definitions of insanity.

During the research you were asked to read a fake scenario about an assault that occurred where the defendant has claimed to be legally insane. The scenario had various aspects of different laws that define criminal insanity. The following 14 survey questions that followed the scenario were used to determine how each person defines insanity based on these various legal aspects. Analyzing the answers to these questions allows us to determine what legal statutes are more alike jurors actual thought process on the insanity defense plea.

If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact the principal investigator (Rachel Jensen) or the faculty advisor (Dr. Brenda Russell) with the information above. Contact either party will not affect the extra credit earned by participating in this research or the answers you provided on the survey.

Appendix D

Alternative Assignment

Name _____   Course _____

Directions: Please read the attached article and answer the following questions. When completed, please bring to the researcher.

1. What were the researchers studying?

2. What did the researchers hypothesize their results would be?

3. What were the researchers results?

Appendix E

Legal Statutes

Official Definitions of Legal Insanity Statutes	
The Wild Beast Test	"[defendant] totally deprived of his understanding and memory so as not to know what he [was] doing, no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast" (Feigl, 1995, p. 161).
M'Naughten Standard	"at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong" Queen, 1843).
Durham Rule	"... an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect" (Durham, 1954).
The Irresistible Impulse Standard (IIS)	"If then it is proved, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be, whether the disease existed to so high a degree, that for the time being it overwhelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner…acted from an irresistible and incontrollable impulse. If so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind directing it" (Commonwealth, 1844, p. 502).
The American Law Institute (ALI) Standard	"…as a result of a mental disease or defect, he [defendant] lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law" (Lockey & Bloom, 2007, p. 325).
Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI)	"A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill" (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1985).

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      Bachelor of Arts Degree in Applied Psychology
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AWARDS AND HONORS

Penn State Ambassador Grant, Ireland

Michael F. Serafino Award for best undergraduate poster at Society for Police and Criminal Psychology

Penn State Ambassador Grant, Ottawa

Young Investigator Award for the Division of Arts & Sciences

Penn State Ambassador Grant, Istanbul

Boscov Award, Fall 2011-Spring 2014

Dean's list recipient, Fall 2010, Fall 2011-Fall 2013

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Jensen, R. H. (2013, Sept). In Craig Bennell (Chair). '*not everyone is like rain man:' the lack of diagnostic police training on autism spectrum disorders*. Poster Society for police and criminal psychology, Ottawa, Canada.

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Russell, B., Hamel, J., Jensen, R., Williams, P., & Anderson, B. (2011,Nov). *Reliability and Validity of Defining Domestic Abuse in Police Manuals* Poster American Society of Criminology, Washington, DC.

RESEARCH

Research Independent Study -- *Penn State Berks, Reading, PA* **(January 2012-May 2012)**
- Internal law enforcement training about individuals with autism

Research Assistant – *Penn State Berks, Reading PA* **(January 2011-May 2011)**
- Collected data, coded and synthesized data on state police manuals with a focus on domestic violence topics (predominant aggressor laws, female abusers, gender roles)

Russell, B.L. (Ed.) (2013). Perceptions of Female Offenders: How Stereotypes and Social Norms Affect Criminal Justice Response. Springer, NY.

Russell, B.L. (in press.) Book Review – Reflections of a domestic violence prosecutor: Suggestions for reform. *Partner Abuse.*

INTERNSHIPS

Legal Intern – Berks Women in Crisis, *Reading, PA* **(January 2014-April 2014)**

Research Assistant – *Positive Resources, LLC, Belvidere, NJ* **(May 2013-September 2013)**

Research Intern – Penn State Berks, *Reading, PA* **(August 2013-December 2013)**

Research Intern -- Penn State Berks, *Reading PA* **(January 2013-April 2013)**

Greater Reading Mental Health Alliance, *Wyomissing, PA* **(August 2012-December2012)**

SERVICE

Opportunity House, *Reading, PA*

Take Back the Night – Penn State Berks, *Reading, PA*

Hawk Mountain, *Kempton, PA*

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Donegal & Dublin, Ireland -- 11/22/2013-11/27/2013, Embedded into course "Passages" (ENGL 300M)

Istanbul, Turkey -- 2/28/2013-3/08/2013, Embedded into course "Orientalism and the Other" (ENGL 297H)

MEMBERSHIP

American Psychological Association

American Society of Criminology

Schreyer Honors College of the Pennsylvania State University

Psi Kappa Psi

Penn State Berks Honors Club