THE U.S. HOMEGROWN THREAT: CREATING A UNIFORM PROFILE FOR HOMEGROWN TERRORISTS AFTER 9/11

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ABSTRACT

This report analyzes the motivating factors that radicalized homegrown terrorists to commit their attacks and move from the radical stage to the violent stage and looked to determine if a profile could be created for homegrown terrorists. The data set consisted of 63 offenders who participated in acts of homegrown terrorism between 2001 and 2013, and the offenders were coded through the use of a codebook. The codebook was used to record the characteristics of each offender and helped to systematically analyze the offenders through qualitative analysis. Data was taken from open source records such as newspapers, judicial records, and LexisNexis searches. These findings were compared among the overall group, and across various subgroups to determine radicalization factors and to try to create a uniform profile for homegrown terrorism. By completing this research, valuable data can be added to the literature of homegrown terrorism and researchers will be able to get a better grasp of what drives homegrown terrorists to radicalize and commit attacks, which will be beneficial for counterterrorism efforts.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Literature Review</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Homegrown Terrorism</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Homegrown-Terrorism has been studied</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Methodology</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Data/Data Collection</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Analysis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Profile (Group)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization Process</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious and Ideological Motivations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual Leaders</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War and Conflict</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and Training</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame of Radicalization</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks Variables</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Attacks were Carried Out</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Roles</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 Discussion</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6 Conclusion</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A Codebook</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B List of Offenders</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Breakdown of Terrorist Offenders ................................................................. 16
Figure 2 - Regions of Terrorist Offense ........................................................................ 19
Figure 3 - How Offenders were radicalized ................................................................. 20
Figure 4 - Breakdown of Terrorist Roles .................................................................... 30
Figure 5 - Terrorist Roles Venn diagram ................................................................. 31
Figure 6 - Criminal History ..................................................................................... 32
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Attacks ........................................................................................................................................28
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The terrorist attack by the Tsarnaev brothers, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan, showed how prominent homegrown terrorism is in the United States. Two pressure cooker bombs packed with shrapnel and other items exploded near the finish line of the Boston Marathon in April of 2013. Three individuals died and 260 other people were wounded. This case shows the difficulty law enforcement and government officials’ face in trying to detect cases of domestic terrorism; the Tsarnaev brothers were self-trained, used an al-Qaeda website to learn how to build their weapon, and had no known prior connections to a terrorist organization. The brothers spent months planning the attack, with no suspicious signs that indicated to government officials their plans (Cooper, Schmidt, & Schmitt, 2013). In regards to terrorism against the United States, the US intelligence and law enforcement communities have made great strides in stopping the threat of al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda has been reduced from a strong hierarchy that plans and executes attacks, to a decentralized and amorphous group; however, the government has still been relatively unsuccessful at diminishing the homegrown terrorist threat. (Mueller, 2006).

Currently, there is little to no data which is indicative of a uniform profile for homegrown terrorists that can be used to identify those who will commit an attack. This study seeks to determine if there is a “uniform profile” for terrorist offenders that could be easily identifiable. The research will also compare information across different terrorist subgroups to identify whether there are similarities and what differences that exist not only in regards to
demographics, but also motivations and radicalization factors. This research was done under the assumption that homegrown terrorists can be broken up into four groups that were determined by looking at cases the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) deals with on a regular basis: 1) Religious extremist subgroups, 2) White Supremacist subgroups, 3) Single Issue subgroup, and 4) Lone wolf subgroup. This research was also conducted under the assumption that there are similarities and differences among different subgroups radicalization processes and attack processes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005).

After the introduction of a literature review, where I will define homegrown terrorism and discuss how it has been studied by other researchers, I will address how I will study this data. The research encompassed 63 known offenders of terrorist acts within the United States who classify under one of the four subgroups mentioned above. I will code these offenders and record characteristics of each offender through the use of a codebook. This codebook (See Appendix A) is an analytical tool that will allow me to systematically use a qualitative analysis on the data to determine what factors were influential in driving people to commit their attacks, and if there are any commonalties or notable differences among the offenders.

Following this section will be an analysis of the offender’s data. I will look at the overall profile of the group and try to determine a profile for homegrown terrorists. I will also try to answer the questions of what factors were fundamental in the radicalization of each offender, and if there was any indication why specific targets were chosen. This information will also be compared among subgroups to look for similarities and differences among their radicalization and attack processes. My research will conclude with a recap of my findings, as well as challenges faced in data collection, and recommendations for future research.
In summary, this paper will focus primarily on looking at the radicalization process of these offenders and determine what caused them to develop a radical idea and then move to violent stage and commit their offense. My overarching goals are to improve the understanding of homegrown terrorists and how they radicalize. By conducting this research, I hope to give law enforcement and government official’s better insight to the growing problem of homegrown terrorism. From identifying what drives people to commit attacks against their home country, and identifying whom could be at risk for developing terrorist ideologies, I hope to help improve government counterterrorism efforts.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Defining Homegrown Terrorism

With the rise of homegrown threats such as attacks by the Tsarnaev brothers, and attacks by domestic terror groups, significant research has been devoted to the study of what causes people to participate in terrorist acts in their “home country.” The FBI is very keen on better understanding how to address the idea of why Americans are attacking Americans based on extremist or radical ideologies. That being said, much research on homegrown terrorists has focused on what drives people to want to participate in terrorism against their home country, and if there is some “uniform profile” that can be created to help law enforcement and government officials identify homegrown threats prematurely.

For example, Jerome Bjelopera and Mark Randol conducted a study that was published in a CRS Report for Congress in 2010. They looked at 22 “homegrown” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the US, citing reasons such as intermediaries, social networks, the internet and prison as helpful motivators to participating in terrorism (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010). Their study called “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat” defined homegrown threats as threats encompassing terrorist plots or activities perpetrated within the US or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. This research also makes an important distinction between “radicalization” and “violent extremism”, a distinction that is very important when considering homegrown terrorism. “Radicalization” describes the
process of acquiring and holding radical, extremist or jihadist beliefs, while “Violent Extremism” describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010).

Lorenzo Vidino’s article “Homegrown jihadist terrorism in the United States” took a more historical approach to homegrown terrorism, and looked at specific past cases to prove that homegrown networks of jihadist inspiration have long existed in the US and that this is not a new phenomenon. Since 9/11 many terrorist cells and sympathizers have been unhatched in the United States, but in general, the term homegrown has been reserved for domestic organizations such as white supremacist groups, eco-terrorist groups, and hate groups (Vidino, 2012). This literature also adds to the definition of “homegrown” by stating that “irrespective to their place of birth, the members spent most of their lives in the West, and that their radicalization took place in the West.”

That being said, there are various different types of active homegrown terrorism groups in the United States who have been studied. Jerome Bjelopera’s (2013) study, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress discusses what the Department of Justice calls “Domestic Terrorist Threats” and looks at the organizations who commit crimes in the United States in support of various ideologies including animal and environmental rights, white supremacy, and anti-abortion. His research looked at the various types of domestic groups that operate in the US, and had five discussion topics that he thought would help explain domestic terrorism significance for policy makers: level of activity, use of nontraditional tactics, exploitation of the internet, decentralized nature of the threat, and prison radicalization. He quotes the FBI, who defines these groups as those who do not simply operate in the homeland but also lack foreign direction (Bjelopera J. P., 2013). He also says “Homegrown Violent
Extremists” are not the same thing as domestic terror threats, using the definitions the FBI and DHS have created. According to FBI and DHS, they are two distinct categories of terrorist actors. Violent Extremists are persons of any citizenship who have lived or operated in the United States or its territories and has engaged or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. (Bjelopera J. P., 2013). Jim Lutz differentiates them in his 2010 report Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement. He says that because many of these groups are motivated by underlying personal issues such as hatred and fear of ethnic and religious minorities, and lack of definitive immigration laws or by events such as the election of an African-American president, that they are different from the typical Homegrown Violent Extremist (Lutz, 2010). This distinction is useful to note, as many scholars do not count domestic terror groups as homegrown actors, and associate them more with basic criminals, even though acts of domestic terrorism are second only to 9/11 in terms of causalities.

How Homegrown-Terrorism has been studied

Taking all these references, I am going to define Homegrown Terrorism as the act of committing violence against your home country (whether you are a citizen or not), in order to further a political goal or ideologically-motivated terrorist activity. Now that homegrown terrorism has been defined, it is important to see how it has been studied by various researchers
to identify any gaps in the literature. Since 2001, many studies have dedicated their time to looking at the Islamic-based homegrown terrorism threat the United States has faced. One study focused on studying the homegrown threat was prepared by Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt. In *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, prepared for the New York Police Department, Silber and Bhatt looked at various homegrown terrorist cases throughout the United States. The overall purpose of the study was to understand the drivers of the radicalization process in what they call “unremarkable” people. Their research concluded that the transformation from the radical to the violent stage is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge or desperation but instead most often the individual is looking for some sort of identity. They cite reasons such as the internet or the idea of a charismatic leader as some of the key drivers in the process of radicalization. They also note that there is no useful profile to assist law enforcement officials in early prediction of this phenomenon because all of the individuals studied came from different walks of life (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The NYPD report has received criticism because of its very limited scope, in which the report singled out Muslims and indicated that the only people worth watching were of Muslim heritage (German, 2013). Notwithstanding, Tomas Precht’s 2007 *Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe* followed the lines of Silber and Bhatt’s as well. His work, talks about four steps in the radicalization process: Pre-radicalization, conversion and identification, conviction and indoctrination, and action. (Precht, 2007). These four steps were evident in all the cases of the homegrown terrorists.

1. Pre-radicalisatiation: describes the many background factors that make individuals receptive to extremism.

2. Conversion and Identification: transformation in some way of the offender’s religious identity or behavior.
3. Conviction and Indoctrination: potential extremists begin to isolate themselves from their former life and identify further with the case of Radical Islam.

4. Action: offenders focus on actionable pursuits such as surveillance, planning, target selection and so forth.

Brian Michael Jenkin’s report *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001*, took a similar approach to the Silber and Precht studies. This study, organized for the RAND Organization, looked at 46 cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism. These cases ranged in severity, covering extreme cases where people traveled abroad to participate in training, to those who provided material support of terrorism. His study did basic statistical analysis on the types of people who were in these cases. His statistics showed that the offenders were predominantly male (only two were female) and that almost all were Muslims or converts to Islam. (Jenkins, 2010). He also looked at what types of attacks the “would-be” terrorists were going to execute. Finally, he also noted that most attacks tended to be “aspirational” more than operational, where “would-be” terrorists contemplated attacks on soft targets such as shopping malls and subways.

Jenkins’ work also cited Marc Sageman’s work *Understanding Terror Networks*, by noting that works like Sageman’s were integral in understanding what radicalizes people in the US, and understanding the process that enables us to trace the steps by which people evolve from an “ordinary” person to a radical recruit. Applying the same concepts of Sageman’s work, which requires researchers to trace back into the offender’s life to determine if there is any sort of definitive explanation that caused them to become terrorists, Jenkin’s work determined there is no identifiable what he calls “terrorist-prone” personality (Sageman, 2004). In this perspective, his work follows Silber and Bhatt’s which concluded that the transition from radical to terrorist
is often a matter of happenstance. Most of the defining factors depended on whom one meets in his or her lifetime, whether they be more-determined zealots or government-run confidential informants who could give terrorist offenders the means to perpetrate terrorism that they initially lacked.

Due to the relative success of studies by Silber and Jenkins, other researchers looked to address some gaps in their reports. People claimed that the case studies might not have been 100% representative and focus too much on the importance of Salafi-jihadi ideology. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman in their 2009 study *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S and U.K.* looked to provide answers to the gaps that many prior studies neglected. Their contention is the role religious ideology plays in radicalization process. Their study took a look at 177 individuals in the US and the UK who perpetrated an attack, attempted to do so, or illegally supported Islamic Terrorism. The study’s main goals were to establish the specific behavioral changes that these terrorist went through as they radicalized. To do so, they looked at their backgrounds and demographic information as well as analyzing overt acts and statements the terrorists made (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009).

Their study looked into the role of religious ideology and found that about 20% of the terrorists had some sort of spiritual mentor and just fewer than 40% cited religious motivation for their illegal actions. Over 40% of the same traveled abroad for training but on a different note, the study found very few links to prison radicalization. The study also, like its counterparts, determined that there was not a uniform profile for homegrown terrorists. The authors stated in their findings that civic projects that directly tackle the perception of a schism between Islam and the West might be one of the more effective methods to countering radicalization (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009).
It should be noted that not all literature has focused on the role of Islam in the radicalization of homegrown terrorists. Some other studies tried to take the empirical analytic approach to creating a profile of homegrown terrorists but instead looked at different groups, similar to Bjelopera’s 2013 study. One such study was done by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) in 2013. Called *An Overview of Bombing and Arson Attacks by Environmental and Animal Rights Extremists in the United States, 1995-2010*, it examined cases of attacks between 1995 and 2010 by the Environmental Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front. The researchers gathered information on what kind of attacks and targets these groups chose, as well as exploring the characteristics of the perpetrators. Their research found that 75% had some college experience and all (100%) were white. They hoped by analyzing this sort of data, they could help with policy and policing issues that arise with these types of groups. Their conclusions were that terrorism threats are dynamic and that law enforcement and government should consider the differences in the offender’s ideologies, structures, and criminal activities when making risk assessments and investigations (Chermak, Freilich, Duran, & Parkin, 2013).

One other study that was critical in the study of homegrown terrorism was John Horgan’s 2012 study with the International Center for the Study of Terrorism: *Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorism*. Dr. Horgan attempted to create a uniform profile of lone wolf terrorists in order to document what made them engage in terrorism and what their motivations were. His goal was to study what in their backgrounds caused them to engage in terrorism. Horgan analyzed 119 terrorist offenders and documented their characteristics in a codebook. This codebook documented information about the offenders including information such as demographics, event variables, and past criminal history. The codebook approach makes
it easier to document and analyze information on the offenders to find commonalties and links between them. Although no uniform profile could be determined, he did determine that in the time leading up to attacks, many others tended to know about the offender’s grievances and that their attacks were rarely sudden and impulsive. Despite the diversity of the offenders, there were distinguishable differences between their ideological subgroups and a wide range of activities tended to precede the actor’s plots (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2012).

While evident that there is no uniform profile that has been created in regards to homegrown terrorism, my study looks to add to this literature by focusing primarily on the comparison of the motivations and environmental factors among the same subgroups of homegrown terrorists (lone-wolf actors, domestic terror groups, or the radical Islamist extremists) that have been previously studied in isolation. To address this gap, I will look at offenders from each category and try to find commonalties between the subgroups. It is my opinion that while their overarching goals might be different, the fact that each offender decided to move from the radical to the violent stage may reflect certain similarities. By looking at these different offenders and using a codebook to document the characteristics of the offenders, it is my hope to be able to create a sort of profile for people who commit acts of terrorism in the United States. Such a determination will help law enforcement and government officials better predict when a terrorist attack will occur and help them identify those who might be more at risk to develop violent tendencies.
Chapter 3
Methodology

Scope of Data/Data Collection

This project relies on collecting and coding specific data encompassing a wide variety of demographical and case-specific variables related to domestic terrorist offenders. This data was used in the hopes of identifying preliminary or secondary factors that drive domestic terrorist offenders to move from the radical stage to the violent stage and commit a terrorist act. To be considered a terrorist act, the act had to be aimed at committing a “political, economic, or religious goal” as well as have evidence of intention to convey some message to a larger audience (Miller & Smarick, 2013). Dr. John Horgan described the unique difference between radicalization and violent radicalization, noting how not all people who become radicalized will ever become involved in terrorism, and that there is also evidence not all those who engage in violent behavior need to have radical views (Horgan, 2012). This paper hopes to also address this conundrum.

The data collected looked at 63 individuals who had been convicted of homegrown terrorism acts within the US. This research was taken from newspaper sources, Google searches, and LexisNexis searches, as well as online open-source judicial records. For the purpose of this paper, the definition of Homegrown Terrorism will be a modified version from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism which will be defined homegrown terrorism as “the act of committing violence against your home country of residence,
through the use of threatened or actual use of force and violence, by a perpetrator, in furtherance of political, social, economic, or religious goal” (START, 2009).

To get a more diverse population, this paper characterized individuals in one of four groups. These groups were determined by looking at common cases the FBI dealt with in their report for terrorism between 2002 and 2005 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005):

1) Religious/Islamist Extremist
2) White Supremacist
3) Anti-Government/Sovereign Citizen/Single Issue
4) Lone Wolf

The initial criterion for identifying offenders was the commission of a terrorist act between 2001 and 2013 while living in the United States. Although many terrorist offenders had actual places or people they targeted, offenders were also included who traveled abroad for training, or committed acts of material support for terrorism, due to the fact that this was in a sense, committing an act of violence against your home country. The time frame provided a temporal distribution that limited the number of cases while also avoiding biases of focusing on one time period or studying outliers and still providing sufficient data to use in the code. By ending the study in 2013 the research avoids chasing cases data as new cases emerge. Instead, it enables looking at cases in which there is enough information on the perpetrator to collect solid background information. It should also be noted that both Tsarnaev brothers was excluded from this research due to the complexity and rather unique aspects of their terrorist act.
Codebook

To collect the necessary data, the data is prioritized and collated in a codebook. This is, very similar to what Dr. John Horgan used in his 2012 study: *Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorism* (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2012). The data that will be put into the codebook about each offender will be taken from open-sources documents: newspaper articles, judicial documents, google searches, and LexisNexis Academic searches. By using a loose adaptation of this codebook, I can effectively document the characteristics of the offenders in the dataset. The codebook has seven sections:

1) **Affiliations**: examines what groups with which the offenders were affiliated.

2) **Demographics**: basic background information on the offender such as gender, age, and ethnicity.

3) **Crime History**: The offenders past criminal records, if any.

4) **Radicalization**: leading indicators of radical or violent behaviors as listed in the codebook and was either indicated by the terrorist themselves or indicated in their background gathered from court records or public documents. Examples include web-based material, friends, and religious groups/affiliations.

5) **Operational Variables**: what duties the offender actually carried out in regards to the attack.

6) **Attack Variables**: what were the incidentals of the actual attack?

7) **Sentencing**: Examines whether sentencing was congruent across different kind of terrorist acts.
Data Analysis

Data is analyzed using some basic statistical analysis and qualitative analytic techniques (such as coding the offenders, and analyzing for commonalities/differences) on the various variable sections of the codebook. This approach allows us to determine the definitive factors that can be applied across the various terrorist groups. The goal is to create some sort of uniform profile for those who committed violent acts against the US. The demographic data will be represented in bar graphs and pie charts to break down the demographics section and see what the general demographic was of offenders studied.

For the radicalization variables the approach is different and relies on qualitative analysis to see what drove people to commit the terrorist acts. This will require me to analyze the codebook for commonalities and differences among what I code. Additionally, it will be used to link information from other sections and determine whether their radicalization process had any connection to the attack target and their operational role in the attack.

By analyzing these factors, I should hopefully be able look at whether a common profile can be determined for these terrorist offenders. This will be useful for law enforcement and government officials to help them identify those prone to terrorist acts before they commit their attacks. I will also look at what factors people cited that drove them to commit their attack, and see what was most common for radicalizing people. This will be crucial in seeing how people are radicalized and what factors drive people to move from the radical stage to the violent stage.
Chapter 4
Analysis

Findings

This report analyzed 63 people who had participated in acts of domestic terrorism from September 11, 2001, through the end of 2013. These names were taken from a variety of open source resources. These names were the most prominent names that appeared upon searching for terrorist offenders in the US during that time frame. Of the 63 people analyzed, 38% were associated with a religious or Islamist movement, 29% were associated with a single issue group, 24% were classified as Lone Wolf terrorists, and only 10% were associated with a White Supremacist Movement (See Figure 1).

Figure 1 - Breakdown of Terrorist Offenders
Overall Profile (Group)

This study is important because it compares terrorists from varying ideologies or motivations. Seldom have researchers combined religious/Islamist terrorists with domestic issue terrorists like the white supremacists, and single issue groups. In terms of basic demographics, there is not much in common between groups to confidently describe a common profile. However, the groups do carry a common factor in that each of the members participated in a violent act in furtherance of a crime, whether it was attempting to blow up a building, providing material support to a terrorist organization, or traveling abroad to get training.

An analysis of the group as a whole did not give much insight into the existence of a “uniform profile” for those who participate in terrorist offenses in the US during this time frame. There were a lot of differences between sub groups, but there were a few commonalties between the groups as a whole. The group was 96% male, and in terms of ethnicity, the majority of the offenders were Caucasian (52%) or Middle Eastern (32%). For approximately 56% of the group, religion was either indicated or derived and 86% of those declared Islam as their religion. This tracked with what Mitchell Silber said about jihadism or jihadi-Salafi ideology being a key driver in motivating young people to commit attacks against their host country (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). It also seems to support the assumption that those motivated by religion want to make sure their religiosity is known.

With regard to other traits only 30% of the people had criminal records prior to their terrorist offense. Twenty-five (25) percent had completed some college courses and 19% had graduated high school. There was only an indication of around 3% of the sample population who had dropped out prior to finishing high school. This evidence is contrary to the common perception that those who participate in terrorism are uneducated. Around one third of the
offenders were married or in a committed relationship at the time of their offense while approximately a quarter were confirmed single or were divorced. Around a quarter of the offenders also had children (ranging from one to three total children).

Typically, a majority of offenders worked blue collar jobs, while 23% were unemployed and 21% worked the better paying, white collar jobs. The average age of the offender at time of offense was 32 years old, but the ages ranged from 18-67, showing that there were different times in each person’s life when they were radicalized. When looking at where people lived, most of the people resided in the Northeast or West regions of America (see Figure 2). There was a lot of disparity in regards to which subgroups perpetrated their attacks in what region, but a large portion of the religious/Islamist subgroup (16 out of the 25) hailed from the more heavily populated areas, mainly New York and California. It should also be noted that in terms of occupations, around half (37 out of 63 total) were reported to have an occupation at the time of offense.

These findings reiterate the idea that there is still is not a uniform profile for homegrown terrorists. Looking at research that has done similar demographic studies, there have been various indications that no profile exists. The data in this report is interesting in the fact that it shows overall, homegrown terrorists are typically educated, employed and come from more populated areas. This compares with other research on terrorism, where researchers like Marc Sageman and Mitchell Silber have cited similar findings. But while many of these people share similar characteristics, there is still not enough evidence to conclude a “uniform profile” and the transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of chance, depending on if that particular person has an accelerant that allows them actually commit their attack (Jenkins, 2010).
Radicalization Process

One key aspect of this report was to examine the radicalization process and try to identify what caused people to move from radicalization to violence. In all cases, each of the individuals took the next step to actually carrying out an attack, rather than just talking or thinking about it. In the radicalization part of the codebook, the research collated information and sought to determine how people were radicalized (if there was info available) and what caused them to commit a terrorist attack, regardless of success. This research was qualitative, and data was captured by reading newspaper articles and court documents, identifying what causes were cited for each offender’s radicalization. Once these causes were identified, assumptions were then made around the frequency of discussions that these were primary factors in violent radicalization.
Figure 3 - How Offenders were radicalized

Six factors were analyzed to determine what motivated radicalized people to either join a terrorist organization or commit their terrorist act:

1) Web – This section looked at whether the offenders used the web to further their radicalization or in some way decide to commit their attack. This included using email to correspond with foreign terrorists, or in some cases, talking to an FBI informant.

2) Friends – This section looked at whether friends or close relations drove people to radicalize and commit their terrorist act.

3) Ideological and Religious Affiliations – This section looked at if religious or ideological affiliations influenced the offender to commit their attack.

4) Gangs – This section looked at if gang affiliations led people to be radicalized.

5) Spiritual Leaders – This section looked at if spiritual leaders and their interpretation of religious dogma helped people to radicalize.
6) War – This section looked at whether war or wars in which the US participated in, caused people to commit their offense.

7) Other – This section looked at if there were any other aspects of their lives that people cited that could have led to their radicalization, which was not previously mentioned above.

Six people were omitted from this study (Charles Robert Barefoot Jr., Dennis Mahon, Glendon Scott Crawford, Hamid Hayat, Harrison David Burrows, and Joshua Stephen Demmitt), because there was no indication, available in various sources, that said why they committed their attacks. Looking at Figure 3, the offenders were mostly radicalized by the web at 47%, followed by friends at 33%, and religious groups at 30%. The other notable radicalization process was “other” at 25%.

Internet

Looking at the data, the offenders typically used the web in a wide variety of ways. A significant percentage of the offenders visited websites of the organization with who they were or wished to be associated with (i.e. jihadist websites or Environmental Liberation Front). They also visited online forums where they could chat with other people who shared their ideas. In many instances, these initial contacts with people through the chats and online forums, or by visiting websites helped to start the radicalization process. About one fourth of those radicalized by the web (27 total), visited websites of the terrorist organization with whom they affiliated and 23% communicated through an online forum. Email was also highly used, both in terms of
simple communications as well as communicating with recruiters, who influenced at least half of those radicalized by the web to join their terrorist organization, regardless of if they were actual recruiters or FBI undercover operatives.

Through the internet, terrorist recruiters are able to stretch beyond their physical boundaries and recruit without physical contact. This interaction increases the amount of instances where people could self-radicalize and use what the Rand Organization described in their 2013 study as an “echo chamber”: which was described as a place where people could “find their ideas supported and echoed by other like-minded individuals” (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013). The idea of an echo chamber seemed to be most prominent and accelerated the radicalization process in these individuals, giving plausibility to the idea that the internet was a catalyst for creating more opportunities for people to become violent (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013). It should also be noted that propaganda and videos were the least influential in terms of radicalizing people, where only twelve percent of those who were radicalized by the web cited videos or propaganda as factors that motivated them to commit their attack.

**Friends**

The next most prominent factor in the offender’s radicalization process came from close associations: friends and family. Looking at the offenders, 33% showed some indication that their radicalization process began with or was fueled by these close associates. In their 2012 study, The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) reiterated what the Rand Organization said about online chat forums and the “echo chamber” effect. The IACP discusses
how similarities in background, age and outlook create a dynamic that fosters an environment for terrorism (International Organization of Chiefs of Police, 2012). The report then goes further indicating that sharing a close association with someone who has the same radical views is a very easy way for people to get radicalized, whether it is family or friends (International Organization of Chiefs of Police, 2012). One perfect case study is that of Ryan Daniel Lewis, who in 2004 with three of his friends, attempted to place incendiary devices on three houses under construction in California in the name of the Environmental Liberation Front. His three friends, who had no prior instances or indications of radicalization, were convinced to commit the attack under his direction. Various other offenders cited similar stories, talking about how they radicalized through people they constantly saw and had contact with, like co-workers or close friends they were part of a group with.

Religious and Ideological Motivations

Religion and Ideology played a large part in terms of radicalization. For definition purposes, religious motivation occurred when an attack was motivated by God or some other religious deity. Ideological motivation occurred when the group’s ideas or systems of belief motivated the offender to attack. A good example of an ideological attack would be Walter Edmund Bond, who set a sheepskin factory ablaze in the name of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). He indicated that being part of ALF helped him radicalize and commit his attack. He felt that ALF’s propaganda showed how the group was accomplishing their goals, and he therefore wanted to model that success on his own. Seeing how prominent religion and ideology is becomes crucial to understanding how people radicalize and enforce the ideas of group think and
how people can distort the ideas of an organization to fit their mindset. Overall, 25% of the offenders cited ideology of the group as a motivating factor for them to commit their attack, compared with just 5% who claimed that they were radicalized by religious factors. This correlates with Randy Borum’s report for the University of South Florida, where he discusses how group ideologies lay the groundwork for the rationale offenders will use for their acts of terrorism. He cites injustice, identity, and belonging as the three motivational themes of ideological radicalization. Fifty eight percent of those who were motivated by ideology cited what Borum described as “identity foreclosure,” where the offenders adopted the roles and a set of ideas and values of a group without critical evaluation (Borum, 2004).

**Spiritual Leaders**

Although not many were radicalized strictly by religion, the role of a “Spiritual Leader” did play a role in some people’s radicalization. Typically, these spiritual leaders are those who are able to understand and interpret religious dogma. In regards to the data, only ten of the overall group was in some way motivated to commit their attack because of a spiritual leader. Of these ten people, 60% of them were radicalized by Anwar al-Awlaki, his preaching’s, or by his death. This shows the prominence of how influential a spiritual leader can be, seeing as how out of the 13 offenders who were converts to Islam (21% of total group), al-Awlaki alone contributed to the radicalization of three of them. While this may not seem like a lot, he did convert at least 23% percent of those who converts to Islam, showing how a spiritual leader can be a large factor in relation to people’s radicalization.
**War and Conflict**

In general, war was not a significant determining factor in terms radicalization, accounting for only 14% of the sample population. People cited they were unhappy with the fact that the US was at war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and this led them to want to fight back against what they thought was an unfair and unnecessary war. One offender even cited the Kashmir conflict as a reason for his motivation. There was no indication that any of the offenders felt the U.S. was at war with Islam, prompting them to fight back. This showed that these offenders were angry about the war itself and American policies, and not necessarily the idea that the U.S. was at war with their religion.

**Other**

The initial list created for what drove people to move from the radical stage to the violent stage and commit their terrorist acts was not an all-inclusive list. Many people had listed other reasons for their radicalization. For example, some people who committed these attacks were documented to have mental problems which could have led them to commit their attack. There were also a few cases of people who could not pay taxes or were homeless, leading them to become disenchanted with the government who they felt ruined their chance at the American dream, and contributed to their anti-government leanings. It should also be noted that gang association in terms of terrorist radicalization, which was initially thought to be an important factor, only was found in 3% of the sample. The common perception among terrorist researchers is that gangs are an important factor in radicalization, however there was no evidence in this sample to support that claim.
Travel and Training

Foreign travel is another important factor in the violent radicalization process of many offenders. Looking at the data collected, 22 out of the 63 offenders (35%) traveled abroad for training with 87% (19) being associated with the religious/Islamist sub-group and the other 13% being classified as a lone wolf. Looking at religion (assuming their religion was known), the Muslim religion was most prominent (81%) with the lone exception coming from Aaron Alexis who classified himself as a Buddhist. Of the 19 offenders who associated with religious groups, all but two went overseas to get training from Al-Qaeda or its associated movements (AQAM) (the other two groups providing training were the Taliban and Jammat al-Muslimeen). This shows the continued predominance of the al-Qaeda threat to the US, at least through 2013.

The average length of duration for people traveling abroad was around 6 months (197 days). This average was taken after removing the time Omar Shafik Hammami spent overseas: an offender who joined Al-Shabab and spent 7 years abroad. The most typical destinations were Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are the known areas of operation for AQAM. Overall, 82% of people traveled abroad to the Middle East, with one person traveling to Africa (Somalia), one to Europe, and one to Japan. The last person traveled to Guyana, a small country in South America. People typically made one trip, although there were those who traveled as much as ten times. Sixty-eight percent also received some sort of training that usually included firearms, explosives, or tactics training, compared with just 2 people (9%) who actually ended up fighting abroad.

With 35% of people traveling abroad and 2/3 of those receiving training of some sort, it is reasonable to see that foreign travel contributes to both radicalization and more pressingly, to violent radicalization. The fact that they can get the training abroad to commit an act here, and
with relative ease, is of concern for US law enforcement and policymakers, and needs to be addressed.

The religious and lone wolf sub-groups were just a section of the homegrown terrorists who got training. Overall, 32 percent of the sample population got training, including Sovereign Citizen/Anti-Government actors (20 percent of population who trained) and White Supremacist groups (5 percent of population who got training). The Single Issue and White Supremacist sub-groups had training sessions about the philosophies of the group, as well as how to make and use explosives. There were also instances of going to a shooting range to practice shooting, or getting weapons training from a weapons expert in the group. This data was gathered from eyewitness and offender testimonies from court documents and news sources.

**Time Frame of Radicalization**

The time frame from each offender’s initial radicalization to committing the attack also is interesting. The average time from initial radicalization to committing an attack was around 6 years. Initial radicalization was defined as the first time an offender gave indications that they had been indoctrinated, trained, or had exposure to some sort of radicalization factor described above (Defense Human Resource Activity). The time frame for radicalization ranged anywhere from 3 months to 24 years. This shows that the radicalization process varies and is dependent on the person. Regardless of the process, there is still a substantial time from what this research is defining as initial radicalization until the individual finally has the ability to commit an attack.
Attacks Variables

How Attacks were Carried Out

Table 1 - Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
<th>Religious/Islamist</th>
<th>White Supremacist</th>
<th>Single Issue</th>
<th>Lone Wolf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Use Facilities</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Spaces</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking a look at how attacks were carried out, and what the targets were, 46% of the attacks were aimed at people or public spaces (See Table 1). Many of the offenders cited the symbolic significance or relative ease of access to the target for their selection. Many places were open public-use spaces such as Times Square or shopping malls, which may be classified as “soft targets” but make a mass causality attack plausible. Among different subgroups, the religious sub-group targeted people or public spaces 57% of the time and also targeted forms of
transportation 21% of the time. They cited reasons similar to the group as a whole: the symbolic mass causality attack which is facilitated by attacking a soft target. The White Supremacist subgroup also targeted mostly people in their attacks (83%) however these attacks were usually more personal in nature and were almost always racial driven. This was substantially different from why the religious subgroup chose their targets.

The single issue sub group differed from the other subgroups because they tended to focus more on attacking specific buildings (61% of the time) that, in their opinion, were representative of their enemy. For example, pro-life extremists might target abortion clinics or ELF members might support attacks against construction sights they contend are disrupting the environment either because of location or the materials used in manufacturing. These groups shy away from people violence (although people were targeted 21% of the time in regards to this sub group), because these groups typically do not want to harm people, but rather destroy what goes against their group’s ideology.

The lone wolf subgroup also differed slightly from the other subgroups in regards to the targets they chose. Lone wolf terrorists tended to target the military or military outposts the most (50%), followed by public spaces and people at 21% each. They also cited symbolic significance as the reason for their attacks. Attacking government targets supported their claims about the injustices of American policy and that the US was waging war on the wrong enemies. It should be noted that 11 out of the 63 offenders did not have a target for their offense and were excluded from the analysis. Interestingly, only 6% of the offenders had targeted or attacked public infrastructure or SCADA systems, which were described as “increasingly at risk and vulnerable to internal or external threats (Francia, Thornton, & Dawson, 2012). This suggests this risk might
be overemphasized, and that the government and law enforcement might need to shift their focus in terms of what gets the most protection.

Terrorist Roles

Figure 4 - Breakdown of Terrorist Roles

Analysis of terrorist roles also shows the diversity of terrorist groups and how there is no unique profile for terrorist offenders. Looking at Figure 4, most of the offenders were involved in some aspect of either planning (60% of offenders) or executing (51% of offenders) an attack. However, there were only 25% of people who committed both planning and attack execution activities (See Figure 5). Planning activities typically included target selection, purchasing equipment, surveillance, and in some cases, research or financing for the plot. Since half the sample population were responsible for attack execution it is interesting to see that only 14 (or 44%) of them actually succeeded, resulting in 33 deaths (or an average of 6-7 deaths per attack).
and 43 wounded. This shows that in the time it takes for the offender to develop the plot and execute it, the attack was stopped 60% of the time. This gives a good indication that counterterrorism efforts in this country are effective, and the FBI has played a prominent role in stopping these attacks. It is of note in regards to casualties that these numbers are skewed slightly by the attacks of Aaron Alexis at the Washington Navy Yard that resulted in 12 deaths, Wade Michael Page, who shot 6 people in a Sikh temple, and Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 people at Fort Hood. Looking at these numbers however, around 90% of those killed came from just three attacks. This shows that typically, a majority of the attacks that were successful, did not result in any casualties, but mostly involved the destruction of buildings (63%). This gives an indication that the plots involving the murder of humans are harder to pull off, and there might be a need for increased security involving public buildings. It should also be noted that recruitment efforts were not prominent in what roles terrorists played, but one third of offenders did end up getting some form of training to further their plot.

Figure 5 - Terrorist Roles Venn diagram
Crime was thought to be an initial indicator for radicalization to violence. However, only 31% of the population (20 offenders’ total) had had a previous criminal record. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of the crimes. Misdemeanor crimes were most often cited, with personal and drug related crimes being the second most cited offense. Seven people were sentenced to prison time for their crimes, resulting in a wide range of sentences from 4 days to 5 years. People also typically only had one trip to prison, although there were 2 offenders who had two stints in prison.

Only three offenders claimed to have been radicalized in prison. As this is only 5% of the population, this sample does not support the conclusion that prison time or crime are good indicators of terrorism radicalization. Typically, other research has shown prison is an indicator for terrorist radicalization. A report published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence discuss how prisons are the one of the main recruitment
grounds for al-Qaeda, and that prisoner radicalization poses a threat of unknown magnitude to the security of the US (Neumann, 2010). Although the data does not back this conclusion, it is interesting to see how 4 out of 7 people who were in prison targeted people, military or public spaces, showing an inclination for civilian targets for those who have been in prison. Only 3 of those were successful, resulting in only one casualty.
Chapter 5
Discussion

Overall, analysis of data showed the difficulty in creating a uniform profile for terrorist offenders. A report done by Clark and Sophia Moskalenko for START discusses that there are various routes people take to actually participate in a terrorist group. They say it is difficult to accurately claim that a profile of individual characteristics exists that could identify the next terrorist (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014).

Another important discussion topic is the role of FBI sting operations and police intervention. The results showed 22 out of the 63 cases (35%) were stopped by an undercover FBI agent or FBI informant. A report done by the Human Rights Watch in 2014 discussed the fact that almost all of the high-profile cases of domestic terrorism were FBI sting operations and that overall 30% of cases involved an informant who played an active role in the plot (Human Rights Watch, 2014). It is of note to see that these numbers closely coincide with other research, implying the effective role of FBI informants in thwarting plots, as well as the implications of possible entrapment cases that could arise. This data also shows us that only one in three attacks are stopped by FBI sting operations and 23% of terrorist plots were reported as successful. This leaves about half that failed for some other reason, whether it was due to a lack of target and therefore the attack could not be successful (I.E. any case of an offender being charged with material support to terrorism) or because they failed due to their own incompetence.

Overall, the report presented here had seven main findings some of which corresponded with other researchers’ data:
1. There was no uniform profile for Homegrown Terrorists, but some small indicators do exist:
   a. Terrorist attacks remain male dominated.
   b. Terrorists were usually of Caucasian or Middle Eastern ethnicity.
   c. One third of offenders had a history of crime.
   d. Almost half had some sort of documented education beyond the middle school level.
   e. One third of offenders were married and one quarter had children.
   f. Sixty percent of people came from populated areas in the Northeast or Western US.
   g. Average age of offenders at time of offense was 32 years old.

2. In regards to the radicalization process, the web was the most influential in terrorism radicalization at 47%. The other prominent factor in each offender's radicalization came from close associations (friends and family), at 33%.
   a. Religious and Ideological Motivations was another notable radicalization process at 30%, and other factors like mental illness and anger with the government led to some form of radicalization.

3. In regards to targets, people were targeted most often at 29% of the time, followed by buildings at 21% and military and public spaces at 17%. Typically people, military, and public spaces were targeted for symbolic reasons, and buildings were targeted for ideological reasons.
   a. Religious/Islamist subgroups tended to target people and public spaces most often.
b. White Supremacist groups targeted mostly people in their attacks with a focus on ethnic differences.

c. Lone wolf actors targeted military personnel/ military installations most often.

d. Single Issue groups focused more on attacking specific buildings.

4. Most offenders typically had some role in attack planning or attack execution.

5. FBI Sting Operations accounted for 30% of thwarted cases.

6. 35% of sample population traveled for training.
   a. Almost all associated with the Muslim religion.
   b. Al-Qaeda was the predominant terrorist organization to whom people went for training.
   c. Average length of travel was six months.
   d. 68% of the 35% who traveled received training.

7. Crime/prison radicalization was not a good indicator for predicting terrorist radicalization.

Although there was no uniform profile for homegrown terrorists, there were some indicators that were found among all the subgroups. This data showed that typically, terrorist attacks remain male dominated and terrorists are usually of Caucasian and Middle Eastern ethnicity. Sixty percent of the offenders came from more populated areas in the Northeast or Western United States, around one third of the offenders were married, and only a quarter had children. Almost half were educated at the high school level and a quarter of them had college education as well, showing at how there is a common misconception that terrorists are uneducated. It is also of note that crime and prison time, which was indicated by many
researchers as a key driver in the radicalization of homegrown terrorists, only appeared in one third of the sample size, differing from other research in this regard.

Although the people who participate in these groups are vastly different in terms of economic status, religion, age, occupation and backgrounds, and there was no uniform profile that could be determined, this research did give insight on how people are radicalized. The Internet and close affiliations were two of the main factors which influenced people to commit acts of terrorism. This was crucial to adding to terrorist research because it shows how over the various subgroups, the radicalization process was the same, which is a useful avenue for future research. Law enforcement needs to heavily monitor internet forums that terrorists can use in order to stop what von Behr’s research described as the “echo chamber” (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013). These forums are an integral way for people to get support for their ideas and therefore law enforcement and government officials should monitor these sites and shut them down. Government officials should also monitor the close friends and family of terrorist offenders, because it is evident that having close relation to someone with radical ideas is an efficient way for individuals to become radicalized.

In regards to the methodology, more comprehensive research is needed to better understand how demographics and radicalization factors are similar and different among the subgroups. The sample size only consisted of 63 people, with a significant percentage being associated with Religious/Islamist terrorist organizations. To make these results statistically significant, I think it would be beneficial if there was a more appropriate sample size that included more people, and was more symmetrical in regards to terrorist offenders from each group. I also found that, while this data was useful in terms of looking for which factors radicalized people, it was not helpful in creating a uniform profile, due to the fact that there were
a lot of differences between the subgroups. It would be beneficial for future research to keep these subgroups separate when looking for a common profile, where in my data set I did not have enough offenders to accurately do that.

In addition, this research would also be beneficial if there were more people who worked on the data. This would help to increase the amount of sources that were looked at, as well as allow for the ability to create a checks and balances system to ensure accuracy of data. One of the greatest challenges I faced was sifting through various articles and sources, where I had to determine the credibility and reliability of each source. I also struggled on finding information on individuals from certain subgroupings (particularly the environmental and anti-abortion cases) where there were only local articles posted about the offenders, and sometimes court documents were impossible to find using regular web searches. This yields useful insight on the mechanics of terrorist data collection, and that data collection varies on different forms of terrorism. This data might have been more representative if this research was conducted in conjunction with law enforcement and judicial officials who can give access to the necessary documents.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

This paper makes a contribution to better understanding the similarities and differences between terrorist groups with different motivations in their radicalization and attack processes. From the study, I concluded there is no uniform profile for terrorists. This paper compared various radical groups that in terms of research are not often paired together. The subgroups included religious/Islamist terrorists, White Supremacist groups, single issue groups, and lone wolf actors.

Overall, the data was extremely helpful in regards to terrorist research. There was no uniform profile for terrorists, but there were some small indicators that were common among the groups. The web and who people associated with tended to be most influential in driving people to commit their attacks, while past criminal history was not a good indicator for predicting terrorist radicalization. In regards to actual attacks, buildings and public spaces were most commonly attacked, while most offenders were involved in the planning or attack execution phase. It should also be noted that FBI sting operations account for 30% of thwarted cases, and 35% of the sample population had some sort of training before their offense. The case of the Tsarnaev brothers illustrates the growing problem of homegrown terrorism, and this research should help law enforcement get a better grasp what causes people to commit these attacks, and should hopefully help stop them in the future.
Appendix A

Codebook

Section 1: Affiliations
With what type of group was the offender associated with?

[ ] Religious/Islamist Extremist
[ ] White Supremacist
[ ] Anti-Government/Sovereign Citizen/Single Issue
[ ] Lone Wolf

If the offender was affiliated with a religious group, were they affiliated with any of the following groups?

[ ] AQAM
[ ] Taliban
[ ] Al-Shabaab
[ ] Jammat al-Muslimeen
[ ] Other

If the offender was affiliated with al-Qaeda and its associated movements, what was their level of commitment?

[ ] AQ Directed
[ ] AQ Inspired

If the offender was affiliated with a white supremacist group, were they affiliated with any of the following groups?

[ ] Ku Klux Klan
[ ] World Church of the creator
[ ] Supreme White Alliance
[ ] Neo Nazi Group
[ ] White Aryan Resistance
[ ] Unknown

If the offender was affiliated with a single issue group, were they affiliated with any of the following groups?

[ ] Earth Liberation Front
[ ] Animal Liberation Front
[ ] Anti- Abortion
[ ] Sovereign Citizens
[ ] Anti-Government
[ ] Not Applicable

Section 2: Demographics
1.) Offenders Full Name:
2.) Gender
a. [ ] Male
b. [ ] Female

3.) Date of Birth:

4.) Age at Time of Terrorist Event:

5.) Country of Birth:
   a. [ ] United States
   b. [ ] Other

6.) Citizenship:
   a. [ ] Natural Born – U.S.
   b. [ ] Naturalized – U.S.

7.) Race:
   a. [ ] Asian
   b. [ ] Black
   c. [ ] Hispanic
   d. [ ] Middle Eastern
   e. [ ] Mixed
   f. [ ] White

8.) Religion:
   a. [ ] Buddhist
   b. [ ] Christian
   c. [ ] Jewish
   d. [ ] Muslim
      i. Were they converts to Islam?
         1. [ ] Yes
         2. [ ] No
   e. [ ] Unknown

9.) Marital Status:
   a. [ ] Divorced
   b. [ ] Married
   c. [ ] Relationship
   d. [ ] Single
   e. [ ] Unknown

10.) Number of Children:

11.) Other family members involved in terrorism:

12.) Place of residence:

13.) Region:
   a. [ ] Midwest
   b. [ ] Northeast
   c. [ ] Southeast
   d. [ ] Southwest
   e. [ ] West
   f. [ ] Not Applicable

14.) Highest Level of Education:
   a. [ ] College
   b. [ ] High School
   c. [ ] Middle School
42

15.) Occupation:

16.) Type of Occupation:
   a. [ ] Blue Collar
   b. [ ] Pink Collar
   c. [ ] Student
   d. [ ] White Collar
   e. [ ] Unemployed
   f. [ ] Unknown

17.) Military Experience:
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, for how long?
   b. [ ] No

Section 3: Crime History
1.) Did the offender have a past criminal record?
   a. [ ] Yes
   b. [ ] No

2.) Was it a personal crime?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, what kind:
   b. [ ] No

3.) Was it a property crime?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, what kind:
   b. [ ] No

4.) Was it an inchoate crime?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, what kind:
   b. [ ] No

5.) Was it a statutory crime?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, what kind:
   b. [ ] No

6.) Was it a drug crime?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, what kind:
   b. [ ] No

7.) Misdemeanor Crime?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, what kind:
   b. [ ] No

8.) Number of Trips to prison:
9.) Was this person sentenced to prison time as a result of the crime?
   a. [ ] Yes
Section 4: Radicalization

1.) How was the offender radicalized
   a. [ ] Web
      i. Notes:
   b. [ ] Friends
      i. Notes:
   c. [ ] Religious groups/affiliations
      i. Notes:
   d. [ ] Gangs
      i. Notes:
   e. [ ] Spiritual leader
      i. Notes:
   f. [ ] War
      i. Notes:
   g. [ ] Other
      i. Notes:

2.) Did the offender travel overseas for training?
   a. [ ] Yes
   b. [ ] No
   c. If yes:
      i. Length of stay:
      ii. Year of visit:
      iii. Location:
      iv. # of trips:
      v. Did they get training:
         1. Notes:
      vi. Did they actually fight:
         1. Notes:

3.) Were they radicalized in prison?
   a. [ ] Yes
   b. [ ] No

4.) What was the time frame from initial recruitment/radicalization to actually committing attack:

Section 5: Operational Variables

1.) With what was the offender charged:
   a. Planning activities:
      i. [ ] Yes
      1. Notes:
      ii. [ ] No
   b. Training activities:
      i. [ ] Yes
c. Surveillance activities:
   i. [ ] Yes
   1. Notes:
   ii. [ ] No

d. Recruitment Activities:
   i. [ ] Yes
   1. Notes:
   ii. [ ] No

e. Attack Execution:
   i. [ ] Yes
   1. Notes:
   ii. [ ] No

f. Material Support:
   i. [ ] Yes
   1. Notes:
   ii. [ ] No

Section 6: Attack Variables

1.) Target:

2.) Type of Target:
   a. [ ] Buildings
   b. [ ] Military
   c. [ ] People
   d. [ ] Public Spaces
   e. [ ] Public Use Facilities
   f. [ ] Transportation
   g. [ ] N/A

3.) Type of attack:
   a. [ ] Arson
   b. [ ] Explosive
   c. [ ] Radiological/Radioactive Attack
   d. [ ] Shooting
   e. [ ] Other:
   f. [ ] Not Applicable

4.) Was the attack successful?
   a. [ ] Yes
   b. [ ] No
   c. [ ] Not Applicable

5.) Did the focus of the attack change?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. Notes:
   b. [ ] No
   c. [ ] Unknown
   d. [ ] Not Applicable
6.) Was there any indication for why the target was chosen?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. Notes:
   b. [ ] No
   c. [ ] Unknown
   d. [ ] Not Applicable

7.) Were there any casualties?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. How many people killed:
      ii. How many people injured:
   b. [ ] No
   c. [ ] Not Applicable

8.) What was the outcome for the offender?
   a. [ ] Killed
   b. [ ] Captured
   c. [ ] Convicted
   d. [ ] Escaped

9.) Was this attack stopped because of an FBI Sting operation?
   a. [ ] Yes
   b. [ ] No

Section 7: Sentencing
1.) Was the offender sentenced?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, with what?
   b. [ ] No

2.) Were they sentenced with anyone else?
   a. [ ] Yes
      i. If so, how many:
   b. [ ] No

3.) How long are they imprisoned:
Appendix B

List of Offenders

Below is the list of offenders who were studied for this report, along with a brief description of their crime:

1. **Aaron Alexis (2013)** – responsible for shooting 12 people and injuring four others at the Washington Navy Yard. The attack ended when Alexis was killed by authorities.


3. **Ahmed Omar Abu Ali (2003)** – responsible for providing material support to al-Qaeda and for planning to assassinate former President George W. Bush.


5. **Anson Chi (2012)** – attempted to bomb a natural gas line in Plano Texas. The attack was unsuccessful after his homemade bomb detonated prematurely.

6. **Antonio Martinez (2010)** – attempted to kill federal officials by blowing up a military recruiting center. His attack was unsuccessful.

7. **Bobby Joe Rogers (2012)** – responsible for firebombing an abortion clinic in Florida after attending nearby anti-abortion protests.


9. **Carlos Leon Bledsoe (2009)** – responsible for a shooting attack at a military recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas. One person was killed and another was injured.

11. Colleen Larose (2009) – attempted to kill Swedish artist Lars Vilks after he depicted the head of Mohammad on a dog.


18. Devon Campbell Newman (2013) - plotted to abduct and torture police officers in the name of Sovereign Citizen Philosophy.


23. Faisal Shazad (2010) – drove a car full of explosives and incendiary devices to Times Square and attempted to detonate it.


25. Faysal Galab (2001) – member of the Lackawanna Six who traveled to Afghanistan to attend an al-Qaeda training camp.

26. Francis Grady (2012) – responsible for setting off a bomb in the Grand Chute Planned Parenthood clinic, causing damage to one of its exam rooms.


28. Grant Barnes (2007) – responsible for setting multiple Hummer sport utility vehicles ablaze in the name of ELF.


32. Iyman Faris (2002) – provided material support to al-Qaeda and looked into blowing up a New York bridge. He also attempted to buy equipment for al-Qaeda and traveled abroad to a training camp in Afghanistan.


38. Justin Carl Moose (2010) – used Facebook page to urge violence against abortion clinics and posted instructions on how to make explosives.


41. Marcos Alonso Zea (2011) - attempted to travel abroad to wage violent jihad and join members of AQAP/AAS.

42. Matthew Hale (2004) – solicited the murder of a federal judge who required him to change the name of his racist/neo-Nazi group due to trademark reasons.

44. **Michael Curtis Reynolds (2006)** – conspired with al-Qaeda to blow up oil and gas pipelines in the U.S., thus disrupting the U.S. economy.

45. **Mohamed Osmen Mohamud (2010)** – attempted to detonate a fake car bomb at the Portland Oregon Christmas Tree lighting.

46. **Mukhtar al-Bakri (2001)** – member of the Lackawanna Six who traveled to Afghanistan to attend an al-Qaeda training camp.

47. **Najibullah Zazi (2009)** – planned a suicide bomb attack on the subway system in New York City.


49. **Omar Shafik Hammami (2006)** – provided material support to al-Shabaab and eventually became a leader in the organization.

50. **Paul G. Rockwood Jr. (2010)** – prepared a hit-list of fifteen people who he felt were enemies of Islam.

51. **Raja Lahrasib Khan (2010)** – provided material support in the form of money to a terrorist leader in Pakistan.

52. **Russell Defreitas (2006)** – planned an attack on JFK Airport and JFK’s fuel tanks and pipelines.


54. **Sahim Alwan (2001)** – member of the Lackawanna Six who traveled to Afghanistan to attend an al-Qaeda training camp.
55. Sami Osmakac (2011) – planned to attack various locations in Tampa Bay, Florida with an assault rifle and explosives.


57. Shafal Mosed (2001) – member of the Lackawanna Six who traveled to Afghanistan to attend an al-Qaeda training camp.

58. Wade Michael Page (2012) – responsible for killing six people at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin. He was killed in a shootout with police.


60. Yahya Goba (2001) – member of the Lackawanna Six who traveled to Afghanistan to attend an al-Qaeda training camp.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


ACADEMIC VITA

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Education

The Pennsylvania State University (PSU) – University Park
College of Information Sciences and Technology (IST); Schreyer Honors College (BS) Security and Risk Analysis w/Minors in Arabic and Information, Sciences, and Technology

Select Employment History

International Center for the Study of Terrorism (ICST)
ICST Intern – January 2013 to June 2013
◆ Coded court documents (indictments, complaints, pleas, judgments, sentencing) on convicted members of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups to document sociodemographic factors, attack details, general and specific behaviors the offender engaged in, as well as sentencing details.
◆ Worked in leadership position by reconciling the codebooks for offenders coded by multiple individuals, translating multiple codebooks into a final codebook, and making judgment calls where the coders disagreed based upon my own interpretation of source documents.

Chester County (PA) Department of Emergency Services
Emergency Management Intern – May to August 2012
◆ Created/maintained databases relating to disaster and emergency response organizations impacting the County.
◆ Reviewed/updated Knowledge Center systems and user security settings. Performed risk assessments looking at how weather would affect critical infrastructure within the County.

Club Associations

Student Director of the Lab – Penn State Red Cell Analytics Lab
◆ Responsible for managing club activities focused on structured analytic techniques and red cell tactics.

Vice President – IST Student Government (Spring 2015)
◆ Responsible for overseeing student-involved committees and planning events.

Treasurer – Security and Risk Analysis Club
◆ Responsible for managing and delegating club funds.