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OPPORTUNITY AND THREAT CUES IN EDUCATION REFORM PROTESTS OF CHILE
AND MEXICO (1990-2013)

KATHERINE I. MILLIKEN
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Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Mark Anner
Associate Professor of Labor Studies and Employment Relations, and Political Science.
Thesis Supervisor

Michael Berkman
Professor of Political Science
Honors Adviser

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College.

ABSTRACT

This study will attempt to bring together social movement theory and education reform, bridged by students as political actors evaluating the cues presented by their political context, in an attempt to answer the question: why does student protest activity related to education reform occur when it does? I propose that student movements for education reform mobilize in response to events that are perceived as political opportunities or threats (two sides of the same coin). Student protests are a distinct feature of Latin American domestic politics, and education reform issues reflect and affect not only central domestic concerns, but also these students' experience and development as political actors. By focusing on protest activity surrounding education reform, we can examine these behaviors and, to some extent, their effect on the political system. This study will rely heavily on political opportunity theory, and attempt to correct for some of the main criticisms of the field through method. Opportunity and threat event cues will be defined and tested in the context of two Latin American democracies of similar legal arrangement, economic standing, and history of student activism, with the goals of determining whether such cues consistently prompt student protest activity related to education reform, whether both opportunity and threat cues prompt protest activity, and whether specific event cues are answered more consistently than others. Results suggest that both threat and opportunity cues are answered, but that the cues cannot account for all protest activity, even within the few protest cycles selected for study; case studies also refute the proposal that any specific event cue is answered consistently across protest cycles cases and country cases. Variation between results by country and possible explanations will also be discussed, especially in regard to differentiation by threat and opportunity.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The notoriously dry cold of winter had already swept over the city when the streets of Santiago exploded in June 2006. What followed was to be the largest protest movement in Chile since the end of the military dictatorship some 16 years before. What cause should drive so many thousands to march? It was education. Throughout modern history, students have gained a well-earned reputation for disruptive politics, particularly since the restless year of 1968. In Latin America, the 1990s marked a period of transition for many countries—an end to many dictatorships and, for many, a rough transition through neoliberal economic policies. In this domestically tumultuous period, Mexico and Chile stand out as cases in which students attempted to voice their concerns over education reform by means of protest in response to the opportunities and threats laid before them by the political system.

In this study, I will attempt to bring together social movement theory and education reform, bridged by students as political actors evaluating the cues presented by their political context. I will attempt to answer the question: why does student protest activity related to education reform occur when it does? I propose that student movements for education reform mobilize in response to events that are perceived as political opportunities or threats (two sides of the same coin). The argument relies on the students' understanding that mobilization at a certain moment promises to further their interests in education reform, while inaction at other moments will be costly to their interests. These opportunities and threats, for the sake of this study, will be defined as event cues that can prompt protest activity or be ignored. Their ability to affect mobilization will be analyzed and discussed at length.

When scholars began to consider social movement studies in the 1950s, social movements were seen only as a radical form of behavior among highly marginalized and extreme sectors of society.¹ However, following the protest wave of the 1960s and the finding that “social unrest sometimes led to concessions from government,” it became clear that protest is a rational choice for groups “poorly positioned to make claims on government using conventional means.”² Students have long been vocal participants of the political process; it goes to reason that they should raise their voices all the louder on the issues that affect them most closely, especially when educational reform decisions are made at the national level. As relatively unestablished members of their constituencies, students lack the institutional access that more senior and established members of the population may have at their disposal, making protest an appealing route for voicing student political concerns.

I will attempt to analyze the timing of student mobilization through the lens of political opportunity theory, one of the main branches of social movement theory. Political opportunity theory recognizes that social movements do not take place in a vacuum, and focuses on the opportunities presented by a political environment as a key factor in mobilization. Despite decades of research, large questions remain in this field, and thus impede a thorough understanding of how political actors respond to opportunities and threats presented by the political context in which they operate. Further exploration and evaluation of this theoretical branch would constitute a contribution to the field of social movement studies, however small. Furthermore, student protests are a distinct feature of Latin American domestic politics, and education reform issues not only reflect and affect central domestic concerns but also these students’ experience and development as political actors. By focusing on protest activity surrounding education reform, we are able to examine these behaviors and, to some extent, their effect on the political

¹ Meyer, David S., “Protest and Political Opportunities,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): 127, *JSTOR*, accessed December 3, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737688>.

² Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities,” 127.

system. The timing of student protest activity can effectively set the national political discussion for a time, yielding to students a level of influence that would otherwise be unattainable.

In this analysis, I will attempt to introduce key components of political opportunity as a major branch of social movement studies, and examine the critiques of this theory. I will evaluate and discuss the theoretical challenges of political opportunity and attempt to integrate threat into the theory, as the inverse of opportunity but an equally compelling cue for action. Having developed the theory more fully, I will consider it in the context of two relatively young Latin American democracies with distinct statuses attached to their education systems. In order to evaluate the theory of cues, several event cues will be defined and tested across a series of protest cycle cases from Mexico and Chile, and subsequently evaluated for consistency.

Chapter 2 will begin with a review of the literature briefly introducing four main branches of social movement theory, followed by a review of foundational political opportunity theory works and critiques, and several studies that have employed the theory. At the end of Chapter 2, a variant of the theory dependent on opportunity and threat *cues* will be introduced and explained thoroughly. In Chapter 3, I will explain the use of Mexico and Chile as country cases in this analysis, based on their similarity except in their respective governments' willingness to engage in conversation surrounding education reform. I will then walk through the methodology of this study, which is based on coding news articles gathered in LexisNexis for protest event data. Five generic event cues are identified as independent variables and considered alongside the protest event data from four protest cycles in Mexico and Chile (grouped and selected from all protest data gathered) to determine whether protest events seem to respond to a) cues, b) both opportunity and threat cues, and c) specific cues consistently. The four protest cycles are detailed and evaluated in terms of the delineated cues in Chapter 4. Results suggest that protest activity related to education reform in Chile and Mexico do respond to both opportunity and threat cues, although these cues (at least national-level cues as described in this analysis) cannot account for *all* protest activity. Furthermore, no one event cue consistently prompted protest activity in all cases.

Chapter 5 will further discuss results, and open the discussion to consider consistency as the consistent response of protest activity to threat cues versus opportunity cues. Chapter 6 will conclude the analysis with a discussion of limitations and opportunities for future research.

Chapter 2

Political Opportunity and Threat

Social movement theories

Protest activity is an unconventional method of interest representation for those who lack institutional access or other more conventional routes to power—a useful political strategy for the less advantaged. The causes and influencing factors of movement mobilization have been under debate since protest was first widely accepted as rational political behavior in the 1960s.³ The primary battle has been waged among four key theories: grievances, tactical framing, resource mobilization, and political opportunity. The theory surrounding grievances (“strain theory”) proposes that “dire social conditions are likely to generate discontent and motivation for collection actors to challenge and change a given state of affairs.”⁴ Tactical or strategic framing theory asserts that mobilization is an effect of the way that social actors discursively frame their grievances.⁵ Resource mobilization theory, by contrast, proposes an economic model to explain mobilization. McCarthy and Zald’s foundational work theoretically traces the growth, decline, or change of social movements as a result of factors of resource mobilization like control of money, labor, and legitimacy through constituent and adherent groups; essentially, it is a more

³ Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities,” 127.

⁴ Salinas, Daniel and Pablo Fraser, “Educational Opportunity and Contentious Politics: The 2011 Chilean Student Movement,” *Berkeley Review of Education* 3, 1 (2012): 24, accessed March 11, 2014, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/60g9j416>

⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

functional approach to understanding social movements than is offered by the other main branches.⁶

Although the foundational works for each of these four approaches tend to advocate one among all others—a trend that was maintained for some time in the field—many more recent scholars have attempted to integrate or at least control for factors related to each of the four branches.^{7 8}

Tarrow has even gone so far as to employ social movement approaches to analyses of what he calls “contentious politics”—“what happens when collective actors join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the claims of those they claim to represent.”⁹ He details this theoretical framework thoroughly in *Power in Movement*. This broadened approach suggests that even a combination of the four more traditional and divided branches of theory may not be enough to accurately account for mobilization.

⁶ McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” *American Journal of Sociology*, 82, 6 (May 1977): 1212-1241. Accessed March 11, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777934>.

⁷ Almeida, Paul D., “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings,” *American Journal of Sociology* 109, 2 (2003): 345-400, accessed March 8, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/378395>.

⁸ Inclan, María de la Luz, “From the *¡Ya Basta!* to the *Caracoles*: Zapatista Mobilization under Transitional Conditions,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 113, 5 (2008): 1316-1350, accessed March 9, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/525508>.

⁹ Tarrow, Sidney G., *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4, <http://books.google.com/books?id=zpeVVfesY2AC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

Political opportunity to date

Political opportunity theory seeks to understand the role that context plays in mobilization and its outcomes. When social movements first came to the foreground, scholars focused first on questions of rationality and eventually resources, and considered questions like the “free rider” problem presented by collective action.¹⁰ Meyer suggests that political opportunity theory developed as a “corrective” to such theories, which “effectively considered the context in which strategizing takes place as a constant.”¹¹

Having established this common goal of reintroducing the effect of a changing environment to social movement studies, though, scholars became somewhat more divergent in their considerations. Tilly considers opportunity as the “likelihood that challengers will enhance their interests or extend existing benefits if they act collectively.”¹² Tilly’s contributions to the field also include the classic curvilinear relationship that he finds between political opportunity and protest activity.¹³ This relationship suggests that greater levels of protest activity are likely to be observed in environments where political opportunities are neither so high that more conventional routes to influence are readily available, nor so low that protesters need fear repression or serious consequences. Theoretically, the relationship describes a clean and predictable relationship. However, both terminology and definitions have shifted among the multitudinous studies conducted on the basis of political opportunity theory, a criticism that will be discussed further in this section.

One potential issue with the foundations and subsequent works on political opportunity theory is that they are based on studies conducted in well-established Western democracies. Several more recent social movement scholars have questioned whether Tilly’s curvilinear relationship holds true under different regimes, such as the authoritarian environments that dominated much of Central America during

¹⁰ Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities,” 127.

¹¹ Ibid., 127.

¹² Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention,” 347.

¹³ Tilly, Charles, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1977).

the latter half of the twentieth century.^{14 15} Thus the robustness of the theory is called into question: are political actors likely to respond to their unique political contexts in the same way—evaluate opportunities and threats in the same way—in political contexts that are vastly different from the ones in which this theory was shaped?

Almeida examines two cycles of protest in authoritarian El Salvador, which he characterizes as responding first to an opening of the government (opportunity) and secondly to repression (threat).¹⁶ Almeida links these two protest cycles through the development and maintenance of what he calls “organizational infrastructure,” a resource that develops throughout the first wave of protest, and enables the second wave to occur under conditions that would normally discourage collective action (state repression as threat). He thus challenges the traditional model by suggesting that state repression, which at least by Tilly’s 1978 prediction should constitute an environment lacking political opportunity and discourage protest activity, can in fact encourage mobilization (although this outcome is contingent upon a resource stipulation).

Inclan begins her study of Zapatista protest with a similar challenge to the norm, proposing that Tilly’s curvilinear relationship does not function in transitioning democracies.¹⁷ As one example from the study, Inclan observes that as the general political environment of Mexico opened up to the Zapatistas, protest activity actually decreased because the shifting environment “[held] out the promise of more institutional channels for the social movement’s demands.”¹⁸ Conversely, higher levels of protest activity seemed to occur in the absence of openings and under more repressive circumstances. This defies the curvilinear prediction, which would align increased opportunity (starting from a position of fairly severe

¹⁴ Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention.”

¹⁵ Inclan, “From the *¡Ya Basta!*”

¹⁶ Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention,” 354.

¹⁷ Inclan, “From the *¡Ya Basta!*,” 1318.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1326.

repression) with increased protest activity, and repression (threat, low levels of opportunity) with lower levels of protest.¹⁹ Inclan launches into an extensive discussion of causes at different levels, in her attempt to comb out theoretical knots; in this discussion, she finds that local factors seem to have the greatest effect on movement behavior, and entertains the idea that the democratization process occurring only as high as the electoral level may have confounded the traditional curvilinear relationship, which seems to be better suited for explaining results of institutional change.²⁰

As previously mentioned, a key criticism of political opportunity theory has been the tendency of scholars to supplement the definition rather than to refine it.²¹ The result, in some cases, has been to encourage researchers to first identify an instance of mobilization—or whatever their dependent variable may be—and then to search for the political opportunity to which it must be responding.²² More succinctly, political opportunity theory is often framed in such a way that it cannot be proven incorrect: “most studies employing political opportunity concepts do not test the theory but instead start with a presumption that some element of the theory can be helpful in explaining a case.”²³ Meyer further asserts that we should be able to spot examples where the theory does not function; there ought to be instances in which an opportunity is present and the dependent variable does not appear.²⁴ In other words, the theory must be falsifiable.

Because the dependent variable in question varies in form and scale according to the study, it is reasonable that the political context being considered as political opportunity should also vary in form and scale. However, there has been some debate concerning political opportunity in the long-term and short-

¹⁹ Ibid., 1343.

²⁰ Inclan, “From the *¡Ya Basta!*,” 1345.

²¹ Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities,” 135.

²² Ibid., 135.

²³ Ibid., 132.

²⁴ Ibid., 135.

term. Rootes raises the question of temporality in reference to political opportunity structures; he deems only more stable structures to be true opportunity structures, and criticizes several prominent studies in the field for choosing dependent variables that he considers to be temporary or contingent features.²⁵

Amenta and Young approach a similar temporal question in their attempt to conceptualize political opportunities and the forms they may take in the long-, middle-, and short-term.²⁶ Drawing the basis for their arguments from Western democratic examples, they assemble a series of theoretical arguments and hypotheses. Amenta and Young look to institutional frameworks in the long term; the qualities that they attribute to such frameworks include decentralization and division of powers in the central government, winner-take-all electoral systems, direct electoral procedures, expanding or restricted political rights, and democratic participation.²⁷ In the middle-term, Amenta and Young turn their attention to the quality of state bureaucracies, and finally in the short-term they consider policy itself.²⁸ Thus, although their hypotheses are broad—and each warrants testing—they peg specific political opportunities as institutional features, behaviors, and actions that they anticipate will prompt specific challenger behaviors. This analysis of student protest activity surrounding education reform will focus primarily on short-term activity (protest activity itself) as a result of short-term cues; however, this occurs in a comparative context, with the understanding that more long-term institutional qualities are controlled and the policy area (education) is set. That is to say, the long-term opportunity structures such as division of power within the government are given and considered similar enough in the two country cases to not

²⁵ Rootes, C.A., “Political Opportunity Structures: promise, problems and prospects,” *La Lettre de la maison Française d’Oxford* 10 (1991): 1-4, accessed October 31, 2014.

²⁶ Amenta, Edwin and Young, Michael P., “Democratic States and Social Movements: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses,” *Social Problems* 46, 2 (May 1999): 153-168, accessed March 11, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3097250>.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 156-159.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 161-163.

affect the variation in short-term activity on which this study focuses. Similarly, the policy focus that Amenta and Young suggest for considering opportunity structures in the short-term is also somewhat accounted for by this analysis' focus on education reform, although the policy activity in this issue area will be explored in terms of cues.

Theory

This study aims, in part, to introduce threat as a piece in a variant of political opportunity theory. Especially given the context of young democracies, it is proposed that student movements will respond to both opportunities and threats presented by the political system. While opportunity is conceptualized as the “likelihood that challengers will enhance their interests or extend existing benefits if they act collectively,” threat will be portrayed in this study as the likelihood that a group will (must) act to protect its interests.²⁹ In other words, the cost of not acting is greater than the cost of acting. Threat, in this context, is political threat, not repression or police brutality. The two are considered as opposites in the sense that one is answered in order to promote interests and the other is answered in order to protect interests. However, they will be referred to together as opportunity or threat *cues*. It should be noted that these are relatively short-term cues, and are considered as cues for protest activity, not necessarily the formation of a movement or organization—short-term cue and short-term response. This distinction of short-term cues and responses is based partially on Amenta and Young’s attempt to relate various opportunities that they categorize as long-, middle-, and short-term to challenger behaviors that are similarly divided among long-, middle-, and short-term.³⁰

The group in question, students, operate outside of the government, but tend to be well-informed and politically active. Both countries in question also have histories of politically active student

²⁹ Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention,” 347.

³⁰ Amenta and Young, “Democratic States and Social Movements.”

movements. Because these student populations have histories of political activism, we can reasonably anticipate continued activism through protest, given the proper conditions in the political environment—conditions which I propose are set by both opportunity and threat cues that the students observe in that political environment.

Furthermore, the political context of a young democracy may condition groups to be more sensitive to threat cues than would be the case in other contexts. On the one hand, there may be a certain fear of the country backsliding toward authoritarianism or at least to a position less favorable to student interests than the current condition, so that any event perceived as harmful to student interests is likely to spark opposition by the most effective means available (protest). On the other hand, the student populations of these young democracies are young enough to not have fully experienced the repression of authoritarian regimes, so that threats—political or otherwise—are not considered as seriously as they would have been by earlier generations. This theoretical validation of threat as a reasonable cue for protest, and its alignment with more traditional, if short-term, opportunity cues, generates the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: *Student protest activity related to education reform responds to both opportunity and threat cues.*

One of the major criticisms of political opportunity theory is that scholars have tended to identify protest activity first and then look for the opportunities or threats to which they respond, with the assumption that at least some part of the theory is correct.³¹ This study will attempt to correct this bias to some degree by defining specific events that are hypothesized to serve as opportunities or threats across cases. Among those that will be considered are: presidential elections, change of presidential administration, change in the balance of power in the legislature (following elections), announcements by

³¹ Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," 135.

the executive or Education Ministry regarding reform , and issue-specific legislative activity (discussion in legislature or passage through the legislature). Having defined these events as potential threat/opportunity events, we are then able to compare when these events occur with when protest activity occurs. Judging by the proximity of these events, we can then at least begin to consider the possibility of a causal relationship. If there does not seem to be a correlation, however, then we must conclude that the protest events in question did not occur in response to opportunity or threat cues, at least as defined here as discrete events. These expectations are summarized in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b: Student protest activity related to education reform responds to opportunity and threat cues that can be identified as specific types of events (i.e., elections, administration change, announcement of reform, passage of legislation, etc.).

Furthermore, given defined cues, we can test a third corollary to the hypothesis, that:

Hypothesis 1c: Student protest activity related to education reform will consistently respond to a/several specific event cue(s) (i.e., elections, administration change, announcement of reform, passage of legislation, etc.).

In terms of “relative closeness” of events, one must also be wary of measurement issues. In a quantitative study, the researcher would likely place lags on the cue events. For the purpose of this study, we will consider the window of opportunity/threat presented by an election year to extend through the entire calendar year preceding the election, because the presidential election is a regular event that can be anticipated by all interested parties and candidates are generally announced several months beforehand. The effects of administration change would be expected within the first few months of the administration taking office; in reality, a reaction to administration change would be a reaction to the election outcomes,

because bureaucratic delay would likely impede the implementation of any legislation for some time past the date of the actual change. We would anticipate the passage, discussion, or announcement of legislation or reform initiatives to elicit more immediate protest reactions when applied, because the changes associated with these activities are both direct and urgent.

Chapter 3

Research Design

Chile and Mexico as country cases

The political organization of both Mexico and Chile is rooted in their history as former Spanish colonies and their independence in the early nineteenth century. The heavily populated capitals of Mexico and Chile are typical of several Latin American countries, due to long histories of political and cultural concentration in these cities beginning in the colonial period.³² This trend of political centralization has continued in both Mexico and Chile. The Mexican government has faced demands for greater decentralization and autonomy in the states; it is, in fact, the largest and most highly populated country in Latin America, save Brazil.³³ Despite the geographic, social, and economic diversity of this vast territory, the political and legal dominance of the D.F. in Mexico's daily and political life is evidenced by the shared Civil Code that served as the state code for the Federal District and the federal code for the country until 2000 (each state has its own state Civil Code, although the code of each of the 31 states mirrored the federal code at least until the end of the PRI's domination of Mexican politics in 2000).³⁴ In Chile, centralization has been an accepted and resented part of public life throughout its history. Through the 1990s, roughly forty percent of the population lived in the Santiago area, which remains the primary center of political activity (the ministries, supreme court executive office

³² Hamilton, Nora, *Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Evolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press: 2011), 7.

³³ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁴ Vargas, Jorge A., "Mexico and its Legal System," Legal research, February 27, 2008. Law Library Resource Xchange, LLC, <http://www.llrx.com/mexicolegalsystem.htm>.

buildings).³⁵ The legislature remains in nearby Valparaíso, where it has resided (however inconveniently) since the dictatorship.³⁶ Aside from being political centers, Santiago, Chile and Mexico City, Mexico are also homes to each country's most prominent universities, which tend to be centers for student protest activity.

The colonial legacy carries over into the legal structure as well. Both Mexico and Chile are governed by civil law, deriving from the continental tradition of the Napoleonic Code; the law is contained in statutes, as opposed to the prominence of case law and custom in common law systems like that of the United States of America.^{37 38} All laws and decrees in Mexico are constitutionally required to be published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación*, which is now available online and updated daily.³⁹ Chile is similarly obligated to publish all laws and decrees in the *Diario Oficial de la República de Chile*, which has been produced on a daily basis (Monday to Saturday) with few exceptions since 1877.⁴⁰

Both Mexico and Chile are republics, and stand on the foundations of an executive power lead by a president, a bicameral legislature, and a judicial power.^{41 42} The Mexican government remains firmly

³⁵ Loveman, Brian, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 16.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

³⁷ Morales, Guillermo and De Groote, Patricio, "Chile," *International Financial Law Review*, April 1996, ProQuest (233208555).

³⁸ Vargas, "Mexico and its Legal System."

³⁹ "Diario Oficial de la Federación," Secretaría de Gobernación, accessed January 8, 2015. http://www.dof.gob.mx/faqs_detalle.php?faqs=104.

⁴⁰ "Quiénes somos?," *Diario Oficial de la República de Chile*, Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública. Accessed January 9, 2015. <http://www.interior.gob.cl/>.

⁴¹ "Chile", in *Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 2012*, edited by Karen Ellicott, vol.1. (Detroit: Gale, 2011), 458. Gale Virtual Reference Library. (GALE|CX1956700048).

⁴² Vargas, "Mexico and its Legal System."

rooted in the Constitution of 1917, which was written and ratified following the Revolution (1910-1917); the document has been amended nearly 500 times.⁴³ Chile's current constitution dates to the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, and was ratified by plebiscite in 1980.⁴⁴ Although the maintenance of this constitution is controversial in some circles, and current president Michelle Bachelet (among others) discussed changing the constitution before and during the 2013 presidential campaign, the constitution of 1980 remains in effect, having been amended in 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2005.^{45 46}

Party representation

Although election practices vary between Mexico and Chile—particularly in the legislature—these methods and their outcomes tend to disfavor certain smaller interests, and especially the more left-wing groups with which the student movements have generally identified during the period of study. In Chile, the representatives of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies are elected through a binomial system related to coalition slates.⁴⁷ Two Senate and two Deputy seats are apportioned to each electoral district, and each of the coalitions may run two candidates for each position.⁴⁸ The two largest coalitions, Concertación and Alianza, generally split the seats in a given electoral district.⁴⁹ The result is that it is extremely difficult for the winning coalition to win both seats in a district, which only occurs if the “if

⁴³ Vargas, “Mexico and its Legal System.”

⁴⁴ “Chile”, in *Countries of the World and Their Leaders*, 458.

⁴⁵ Collyns, Dan and Watts, Jonathan, “Bachelet pledges radical constitutional reforms after winning Chilean election,” *The Guardian*, December 16, 2013, accessed January 1, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/16/chile-president-elect-michelle-bachelet-election-reforms>.

⁴⁶ “Chile”, in *Countries of the World and Their Leaders*, 458.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 458.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 458.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 458.

the leading ticket out-polls the second-place coalition by a margin of more than 2-to-1.”⁵⁰ The system has been criticized for excluding parties that are not a part of one of the main coalitions (the Communist Party being the most prominent example), but a serious attempt to alter the system had not been made until early 2015. The Federal Congress of Mexico is divided between the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Senators. The Chamber of Deputies houses 500 representatives, but perhaps the most interesting note is that their method of election is divided.⁵¹ Three hundred of these deputies are chosen by simple majority votes (single member districts, plurality vote), while the remaining 200 are chosen through proportional representation.⁵² The electoral method itself is not as clearly biased as the Chilean system, but in viewing election results for the period under discussion, it becomes clear that the PRI has maintained a strong presence in the legislature particularly through the majority seats, while small parties only seem to gain seats in the Chamber of Deputies through proportional representation.⁵³ These smaller interests benefit from the system in that they are able to gain seats in the legislature, but one has to question the real clout of these groups when the ruling party and perhaps two top competitors maintain a firm grip over the chamber. Under these conditions, students that feel that their interests are either not being represented by the parties in power or are overwhelmingly silenced by opposition might reasonably seek less conventional approaches of interest representation than the party system and the legislature.

History of student activism

Both Chile and Mexico have a long history of student political activism through protest activity. The causes advocated by such movements vary, but both countries fostered pro-democratic student movements during their authoritarian periods. Mexico’s student activists were particularly active during

⁵⁰ Ibid., 458.

⁵¹ Vargas, “Mexico and its Legal System.”

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ “PARLINE database on national parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, accessed March 10, 2015, <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>.

the 1960s. A landmark movement was that of 1968, which, despite being ideologically split among radical and moderate groups and among ‘philosophers’ and pragmatists, issued six primary demands that focused on political freedoms and just punishment for those guilty of inflicting harm on demonstrators and other citizens (i.e., police brutality).⁵⁴ The notorious climax of the movement occurred when soldiers and police fired on a massive protest in Tlatelolco Square.⁵⁵ The Student Federation of Chile (FECH) united all universities in Chile and was a leader of student political activity throughout the twentieth century, although its relation to both organized political parties and university governments shifted over the course of the century and in relation to the political situation of the day; Bonilla and Glazer detail Chilean student politics during three periods of student activism throughout the twentieth century, each of which was lead by students at the University of Chile.⁵⁶ The first of these three was active from 1918 through 1922, and involved the FECH in first years of existence when its focus rested primarily in studying and aiding in the solution to national problems, which led to frequent work alongside workers (in social undertakings as well as protest activity) and socialist tones to the works that the published.⁵⁷ The second period, Bonilla and Glazer claim, lasted from 1936 to 1940, and is a period during which national politics became strongly divided to the right and left, and the FECH itself not only divided along similar political lines, but also became a prize to be won by parties.⁵⁸ By the third period in 1956-1957, the FECH began to withdraw somewhat from national politics and focus firstly on the interests of its members in university issues, although it did nonetheless reclaim its title as a spearhead of popular protest (albeit halfheartedly, according to Bonilla).⁵⁹ However varied the levels of activity may be among

⁵⁴ Hamilton, “Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Evolution,” 88-89.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁵⁶ Bonilla, Frank and Glazer, Myron, *Student Politics in Chile*, (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1970), 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 39-40 and 45.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 160 and 166.

these periods, the descriptions further support the assertion that Chile had already had a long and relatively consistent history of student activism through formal organization activity and through protest (at least among university students) before the period examined in this analysis.

Economic standing

Mexico and Chile are the only Latin American members of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).⁶⁰ Mexico was the first of the two to be admitted; Chile formally applied for membership to the OECD in 1995, and, following a “Roadmap to Accession” that was approved by the OECD in 2007, it was formally invited to join in 2009.⁶¹ The OECD counts 34 countries among its membership, with others connected through “enhanced engagement” programs—resulting in a community that accounts for 80% of world trade and investment.⁶² Membership today is dependent upon compliance with the organizations principles and purposes, which involve efficient use of resources and general orientation for economic growth and development.⁶³ OECD membership implies a certain economic standing in the modern world economy, and the fact that both Mexico and Chile are member states suggests that both have passed that threshold, and can be considered economic peers.

Both countries also struggle to some extent with a sizeable disparity of wealth. The GINI index is used to measure that disparity, or “the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.”⁶⁴ In the year 2000, the World Bank recorded the GINI coefficient for Chile as 55.2, while

⁶⁰ “Chile”, in *Countries of the World and Their Leaders*, 458.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 458.

⁶² “History,” OECD, accessed January 4, 2015, <http://www.oecd.org/about/history/>.

⁶³ “Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,” OECD, originally published December 14, 1960, accessed January 4, 2015, <http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-operationanddevelopment.htm>.

⁶⁴ “Data,” The World Bank, accessed February 6, 2015, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.

the coefficient for Mexico is 51.9.⁶⁵ This figure has decreased in both states over the past fifteen years, but remained at 50.8 for Chile when last recorded in 2011, and 48.1 for Mexico when last recorded in 2012.⁶⁶

These data suggest that despite the differences in geography, resources, and population between Mexico and Chile, they stand in similar positions economically. If student protest activity surrounding education reform issues is rooted in general economic positions either in relation to the world economy or in relation to different factions within the domestic economy, then we would expect to see similar behaviors in Mexico and Chile. Thus, the divergent behaviors that we do observe cannot be entirely attributed to economic conditions. Of course, one cannot completely rule out the possibility of more case-specific details affecting results without delving into them further, but the chosen indicators were selected for their particular relevance to the education issues at hand.

The idea of a ‘democratic’ education arises at the center of the discussion taking place in the protests that will be examined here. This idea of democracy is stretched in several directions, including definition as universal access, and good and equal quality. Thus the disparity of economic resources among the domestic population—as captured by the GINI coefficient—is a factor to consider because it contributes to disparities within the education system. This will be explored further below, especially in relation to the ‘municipalization’ of the Chilean education system. Furthermore, both Mexico and Chile underwent a process of liberalization in the latter half of the twentieth century, which appears to have met resistance for the effects that it has had on the education systems in both Mexico and Chile. Liberalization was famously introduced in Chile by the Pinochet regime, while the “pro-reform technobureaucracy” of the PRI instituted trade liberalization in Mexico in the mid 1980s in order to join the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).⁶⁷ Examples of the effect that economic liberalization

⁶⁵ “Data,” The World Bank, accessed February 6, 2015, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Hamilton, “Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Evolution,” 115.

and subsequent globalization have had on education include the privatization of education in Chile and deepening of socioeconomic divisions in society and in education, and the modernization of curricula at the Normal Schools in Mexico to include computer science and English.

Divergent cases: conversation initiated from above

What distinguishes Mexico and Chile, then, is the population's perception of the education system and, by extension, the government's willingness to engage in conversation on the education system. The Mexican education system carries the legacy of the revered 1910 Mexican Revolution. The Constitution of 1917 guarantees a free, non-religious education through secondary school, although many have critiqued this constitutional material to be "aspirational" or "programmatically."⁶⁸ Although higher level education is not referenced in the constitution, the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) is also endowed with national identity—it is *la máxima casa de estudios*, the nation's university—which has been interpreted with various repercussions for practice (university autonomy and expectation of free education) and fiercely defended.⁶⁹

By the 1990s, Chile had lived nearly two decades with an economy governed by neoliberal policy that had been instituted in the 1970s by the very visible hand of a military government. These market policies had filtered into the public sector and affected education. Following the return to democracy in 1990, little was done to reform the heavily privatized and decentralized education system. In fact, the Organic Education Law which came into effect in 1990 instituted curricular decentralization, or the "ability of educational centers to plan and apply their own curriculum" as reported by the Chilean

⁶⁸ Vargas, "Mexican and its Legal System."

⁶⁹ Rhoads, Robert A. and Mina, Liliana, "The Student Strike at the National Autonomous University of Mexico: A Political Analysis," *Comparative Education Review*, 45, 3 (August 2001): 336-337, accessed October 21, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/447675>.

embassy.⁷⁰ It remains divided between public schools managed at the municipal level, and subsidized and unsubsidized private schools.⁷¹ This tripartite system which remains in effect through secondary school places huge funding responsibilities on municipalities, resulting in huge quality disparities despite government material and technical contributions to municipal and subsidized private schools.⁷² At the university level, costs are extremely high—with tuition fees exceeding those of all other OECD as a percentage of gross domestic product per capita—and born primarily by students and their families (up to 79.3% of expenditures).⁷³ In summary, the education system itself is saturated with the legacy of the dictatorship, and perhaps for this reason, the government has been more willing to engage in conversation with student interests than has the Mexican government—it must prove that it is devoted to the democratic cause by showing willingness to reform the education system. This willingness results in more frequent initial opportunity cues at the national level in Chile—with the conversation itself generating opportunity and threat cues in turn—while the Mexican government has less reason to attempt education reform and meets impediments when it attempts to initiate conversation, resulting in fewer cues being issued at the national level.

Methodology

In this study I have attempted to use mixed methods in order to detail the movements of interest as accurately as possible; for this reason, the study moves from large *n* considerations to detailed case

⁷⁰ “Education,” *Chile: Embassy of Chile, Washington DC*, 2005, accessed April 7, 2015, <http://www.chile-usa.org/education.html>.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Downie, Andrew, “In Chile, Students’ Anger at Tuition Debt Fuels Protests and a National Debate,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 16, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hotttopics/lnacademic>.

studies. This movement toward focus on specific cases is as much as result of intention as the insufficiency of large n data. As will be discussed below, the case study approach included a review of 96 protest events, which were coded from twenty-three years of major newspaper articles.

Dependent variable: protest activity

I first consulted the *Global Database for Events, Language, and Tone* (GDELT) in an attempt to gather quantifiable data related to student protest events on education reform; however, those terms proved somewhat too specific. GDELT sifts through thousands of media sources per day and codes events based on noun and verb phrases, among other data; however, it captures little information related to the subject of protests (the most descriptive codes specifying subject only as deep as “demonstration for policy change,” without specification of a policy).⁷⁴ Thus, although the user is able to extract data based on actor codes (initiator and target) and action/event, there is no way to definitively narrow the field to only include education-related protests that may ‘target’ both the government (at any level, coded and ‘government’) and the Education Ministry (coded as ‘education’, along with students, teachers, and schools). The information gathered from extractions that included students as primary actors, protesting against the government or ‘education’ were considered as a guide of trends, and a starting base for further research regarding protest activity; however, the lack of confirmable data relating to the issue area of interest discouraged the use of GDELT as an exhaustive resource for protest event data.

The alternative source of protest data that this analysis relies upon is a limited database compiled through a thorough search of LexisNexis Academic (News Sources). To construct said database, I searched the terms “student protest AND [Chile / Mexico],” year by year, for each year from 1990 to

⁷⁴ Schrod, Philip A. “CAMEO Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Event and Actor Codebook,” Event Data Project, March 2012, <http://data.gdeltproject.org/documentation/CAMEO.Manual.1.1b3.pdf>.

2013. The dates for each search were set at 01/01/xx – 12/31/xx. The sources included in the search through the available advanced settings on LexisNexis were: newspapers, major world publications, magazines, wire services, business and industry news, university newspapers, and U.S. newspapers. This includes all options except blogs, which were considered less credible news sources. With the exception of blogs, though, I decided that it was worth the effort to survey excess material rather than discriminate and risk overlooking an event, having already experienced difficulty with finding relevant results in general internet searches.

In surveying the collection of articles retrieved by each country and year search, the headline was the primary guide of whether or not the article was worth further review. In cases where there was any doubt that an article would be relevant or not, it was reviewed. Basic data were collected on each protest event noted in the retrieved articles, although certain data were sometimes unavailable. In these cases, the space in question was left blank, unless otherwise noted in the category description listed here.

The key determinant for noting a protest event was a date (noted as year/mo/dy) noted in an article. In most cases that I coded, information was available in the LexisNexis sources to pinpoint a day for the event in question; in some cases, however, an event occurred over several days or within a given week—for which I provided the range of dates over or during which the event occurred—or it is only noted as occurring during a given month, in which case the ‘day’ portion of the date code was noted as ‘00’. I attempted to avoid double-listing events by comparing data from different articles which indicated the same event date to confirm whether or not they addressed the same event. Often, several news sources reported the same event and recorded the same data (i.e., location, number of arrests, police action); if there was new information provided for a previously coded event, that information was added to the original listing and a note was made regarding the multiple sources.

Location data was also gathered for each event, although in some cases articles would provide information only as specific as “across Chile.” More frequently, a city is listed as the location of interest,

and rarely a more specific location. The case of the strike at the Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM) is an exception to this rule, as the campus itself was the center of activity.

Where available, the number of participants was coded, although these are generally loose estimates, and vary depending on the party that reported the attendance. For example, during a protest in Santiago, Chile on April 11, 2013, organizers reported 150,000 in attendance, officials reported 80,000, and the local media split the difference and reported 120,000. Whatever information the article reported was coded, even in cases where multiple estimates were provided, or a phrase like “thousands” was employed. In some cases, the number of arrests was provided in addition to or in place of general attendance. Although this may serve as an indicator of higher or lower attendance to some extent—following the assumption that larger protests will result in higher arrest rates, similar to the way in which Salinas and Fraser interpret police arrest figures in one year relative to previous years—they are more useful, in this case, to gauge the disruptiveness of protest events.⁷⁵ I could not rely upon an untested direct relationship between arrest numbers and attendance to estimate missing information.

Leaders and participants of the protest event were coded as reported in newspaper articles; this resulted in large gaps of information and many cases in which participants were simply referred to as ‘students’, and in which ‘student leaders’ are mentioned but not identified with any groups. In such cases, ‘student leaders’ were not coded unless they were identified as being involved with a particular organization, because the title of ‘student leader’ lends no further information to the case other to identify an individual and their student status.

Student protest tactics are coded as listed in the newspaper articles, and are often described simply as ‘demonstration’ or ‘occupied school’; the category aims to capture the primary tactics of the protesters. This category was also used to record whether protesters turned to violence as a ‘tactic’ (in many cases, a small subset of protesters became violent toward the end of an event), and other relevant information concerning protester behavior during the event. The dataset codes for authority reaction to

⁷⁵ Salinas and Fraser, “Educational Opportunity and Contentious Politics,” 21.

protest activity as well, although it refers primarily to police tactics surrounding the protest event rather than action by elites in response to the protest activity. Like the arrest data, then, this is more useful as a loose indicator of disruptiveness than of the interplay between protest activity and political activity among the elite (this information would generally not be available in the news sources referenced to create this database of protest activity, as the sources tend to report protest information on the day of or the day after the protest event, while elite responses are likely to take time and the relationship to protest activity would likely need to be inferred).

The demands of the protesters, if specified in the source articles, were coded under “cause”. This includes specific and general demands of the protesters, as well as primary complaints, depending on which was emphasized by the source. This raises the concern that source bias may play a disproportionate role in determining our interpretation of the event; however, as these demands or complaints are generally well-advertised by the protesters during the events as well as by university-based student organizations that frequently act as the leaders of the protest activity, it can be assumed that the news sources had reliable references for the stories they carried. As previously mentioned, there were also many events on which multiple articles were written, and these articles generally validate the others’ claims—although one article may go into further detail on the issues at hand than another.

Other relevant information—particularly regarding the timing of the protest event—was recorded under the “Miscellaneous Information” category; relevant information included, for instance, that protests had been in progress for three weeks at the time of this event, or that the event was staged three days prior to presidential primary elections, or that the national government had recently made an offer to appease student demands. This information was judged to be important in understanding either the individual event itself, or in later constructing a chronology of events that could be employed to understand protest activity as a response to cues.




Figure 1: Annual event counts, student protest activity related to education reform (Mexico and Chile)

Figure 1 displays the annual event counts of student protest events related to education reform in Mexico and Chile, with years displayed across the x-axis and the number of protest events on the y-axis. The annual protest event count for Mexico is represented by the blue line and the annual protest event count for Chile is represented by the red line. In Mexico, the event count is relatively low throughout the (1990-2013) period, with peaks of activity in the years 1999 and 2012, and lower levels of activity in 1992, 2000-2003, and in 2011. Chile also maintains low event counts through 2005, but experiences enormous spikes of activity in 2006 and 2011, along with reduced activity in the following years: (2007-2008), (2012-2013).

The low annual event counts in both Mexico and Chile for much of the period studied suggests that protest surrounding education reform is not extremely common in any given year. However, when it does occur, it appears to have the potential to escalate (in terms of number of events) quickly, at least in Chile. Some of the low numbers in both Mexico and Chile may be explained by the fact that this figure relies upon an event count rather than the number of days of protest; one event may last 300 days but be considered one event while ten events may last only ten days together. The graph is a basic visualization

of the dataset that I personally compiled from news sources, so reporting bias based on protest tactics may also come into play, as discussed below. The limitations of the source and the researcher may also be evident in the limited scope of the dataset.

In comparing the protest activity trends in Mexico and Chile, it is interesting to note that in both countries, there seems to be a low peak of activity around the year 2000, and a more significant peak in the 2011-2012 period. This analysis will focus on domestic cues for mobilization, but it may be interesting to later consider whether these alignments occur purely through coincidence or if there is a larger international trend or cue at play when we see significant protest activity in Mexico and Chile coincide; this may be an interesting topic for future study.

Coding for threat and opportunity

The “cause” and “miscellaneous information” categories best indicate to what a protest event is responding, without referring to other records of events. It is upon these categories that the classification of threat and opportunity cues are first based. The coding of these cues is later revised when other sources were consulted for information on cue events. When articles reported that students “protested” an event, it was interpreted that said event was perceived as a threat and thus elicited a negative response via protest; the protest event was then considered threat-initiated, at least to the extent that any event could be considered a cue before the tests have been completed. Opportunity-initiated events were defined more tentatively. Many articles reported that students protested in favor of certain reforms, and these cases were likely to be related to perceived opportunities. However, the general reform demands of the student movements are largely consistent within a cycle of protest activity, and are likely to be mentioned even in individual cases where a threat event prompts the protest event. Here, the miscellaneous information is likely to be especially pertinent to the judgment. If the article indicates that a protest occurred in anticipation of an event such as an election or a congressional vote *without* any indication of a threatening

factor, it was coded as an opportunity, because activity before such an event would hypothetically allow students to exert some degree of influence over the event and its outcome.

Some protest events are double-coded for threat and opportunity. The news source articles provide enough information that the environment surrounding many of the coded protest events can be read as an opportunity or a threat, particularly in cases where there is clear interaction between the student movements of interest and political elites. Once a dialogue has been opened—especially between students and political powers, but also simply within the public—there is an opportunity for the student movement to promote their interests to a relatively receptive audience; however, that window of opportunity may be relatively short and the end of that span via legislation or repression signifies an end to discussion and thus, threat. A delay in action by elites may also be perceived as a threat, even while the window of discussion remains open. In situations such as these, it follows that the protest event be coded both as threat-initiated and opportunity-initiated. In future research, it may be possible to create some means of weighting threat and opportunity factors, but as this study focuses firstly on whether student movements respond to both opportunity and threat cues and secondly, whether they are responsive to specific cues, it is unnecessary to rule out either the opportunity or threat factor when both are present. Furthermore, although we may begin to explore whether student protest is more responsive to threat or opportunity, it would still be premature to eliminate either factor without deeper theoretical work.

In this analysis, individual protest events were coded for threat or opportunity or both, regardless of whether they took place as part of a protest cycle or seemingly independent of a cycle. In the analysis which follows, though, I examine protest cycle cases in relation to opportunity and threat cues. In the context of the protest cycle, emphasis is placed on the cue and corresponding protest event that is judged to be the initiation of the protest cycle (the first chronologically); this initiating pair provides the primary reasoning for considering a cycle as a whole ‘opportunity-initiated’ or ‘threat-initiated.’ The label can be reconsidered, though, in agreement with the share of opportunity-cued and threat-cued protest events of

which the cycle is comprised. This will be explored in greater detail in the discussion section (Chapter 5) which follows the case studies and main analysis. Cues and protest events that occur during the protest cycle are coded as individual events, but because they do take place in the context of the protest cycle, they are considered part of the conversation already in progress. In other words, they ride the momentum of the cycle, and the cues therefore carry less weight as a prompt for action than cues that initiate the cycle.

Notes on LexisNexis as a source

This survey of LexisNexis only includes English language news articles; this includes the articles issued by news services such as Xinhua General News Service, Agence France Presse, or Deutsche Presse-Agentur. Brief searches of Spanish language terms in the system returned few relevant results. Although alternative Spanish language results would be expected to publish more articles pertaining to the protest events in question, major news sources such as those previously mentioned are assumed to report information if not as frequently, at least as accurately as would domestic sources. I make no claims that this methodology produces an exhaustive collection of protest event data for the period in question; however, I do claim that the major international news sources included in the LexisNexis search at least capture the major trends in activity.

In the media, there is also a clear bias toward reporting disruptive events over more passive events, particularly in regard to protest events. This necessitates the substantive reading of articles, because information can be gleaned through reading that is lost in simpler coding, or event or article counts. One issue that arises with article and event counts based on news sources which are available through LexisNexis, for instance, is that one event driven by passive tactics may last several days but only receive media attention on one day and thus be underrepresented in analysis. To draw examples from the data collection, a student strike at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City lasted

nearly ten months but was only reported by news sources in three articles that were captured in the LexisNexis search. By comparison, several street demonstrations in Santiago, Chile which lasted less than one day were reported by several articles, often with emphasis in the headline or in the body of the article on the number of arrests or clashes between protesters and police. This leads us to conclude that substantive reading of news sources is a more accurate approach to understanding these student protests than employing large n quantitative data which lack detail; it also allows for the effective grouping of events into cycles of protest activity, as will be done to create case studies.

Independent variables: opportunity and threat cues

The following generic events will be characterized as cues, to be considered in the context of four case studies.

Presidential Elections

The drama of an election year and the amount of policy discussion which takes place in anticipation of elections may also allow a movement to place its issue at the forefront of discussion. This would constitute an opportunity for students.

Administration changes

Administration changes include the regular changes in the presidency, as well as the more irregular changes in the Education Ministry. It is hypothesized that these shifts would be perceived by students as opportunities for action, because a new administration may be expected to be more responsive to student demands than previous administrations had been. This effect would be enhanced in instances when students have reason to expect favorable practices based on campaign promises, party affiliation, or biographical details of the new office-holder. Irregular changes in the office of Education Minister, such

as occurred several times in Chile, would also be expected to be read at opportunities because of the promise that the new officeholder may be “someone we can work with.”

However, administration changes could also be perceived as threats when, for instance, a candidate of a right-wing party is elected to the presidency; left-wing student movements may, in that case, anticipate legislation that disfavors their interests. This prediction relates to the elections which brought Sebastian Piñera into office as the first right-wing president in Chile since the end of the dictatorship (2010), and Enrique Peña Nieto to office (2012) as the first PRI president since the party lost its grip on the office in 2000. Based on the students on positions, we would expect these new administrations to be considered threats.

Balance of Parties in Legislature

Both Chile and Mexico are partially governed by a bicameral legislature that generates and must approve legislation. Shifts in the balance among political parties within the two houses of the legislature would functionally affect the ability of one party to advance or pass legislation. If we assume that student interests, broadly represented, tend to lean toward one end of the political spectrum at a given time, and that some political parties—by virtue of their ideology or own interests—may be more responsive to student demands than other, then one would expect that students would be sensitive to shifts in the balance of seats among parties in the legislature. As a result, such shifts are hypothesized to generate cues for protest activity.

Given the lag in bureaucratic activity, though, it is reasonable to predict that changes in legislation or bureaucratic practice that occur as a result of changes in party seats would not be implemented for several months after the shift of party balance. The time at which the balance actually shifts is, in that sense, a precursor of future activity. Perhaps, then, students would be more likely to respond to a perceived threat or opportunity when it is presented as actual legislation.

Issue-specific legislative activity (discussion, voting, passage)

Discussion of education reform in the legislature would signal that a reform process has already begun but that the opportunity to influence the eventual legislation still exists. The extension of this window could signify an opportunity or threat for student groups depending on their interests. Once the discussion has been opened within the government, student groups may choose to launch or continue protest activity as an indirect means of lobbying or interest representation; in this case, the discussion in the legislature would be perceived as an opportunity for the groups to promote their interests. Alternatively, the discussion may be perceived as a threat if the student group opposes reforms. The opening of discussion within the government may also increase the stakes for interested student groups because the beginning of a discussion directed toward legislation not only presents opportunities for student groups to voice their interests, but for other interested groups to do the same. Thus, a reform discussion within the legislature could also constitute a threat because it grants other interested parties—perhaps with better access to the legislature by conventional routes—to enter and influence the discussion as well.

Announcement of reform proposals by executive

In both Mexico and Chile, the legislature is the primary law-making branch of the government. However, announcements by the president or by other figures on behalf of the presidential administration can be taken as serious proposals for reform, if not an announcement of initiatives already in progress. Because these types of announcements are likely to come directly from the head of state, they tend to be well-reported, and are likely to be perceived as urgent cues.

Chapter 4

Protest cycle cases

From the dataset assembled (See Appendix for event counts by country), several groupings of events were condensed into protest cycle cases. This allows us to examine a dialogue between the government and students that consists of perceived cues and protest responses, rather than focusing on individual episodes. This approach also forces us to consider the momentum of a protest cycle as a factor affecting protest timing, which may be overlooked if event cues and protest events were chosen at random. Cues and responses that occur within a cycle will be noted and considered, but the analysis will emphasize cues that initiate the protest cycle, because the cycle itself may account for much of the event timing thereafter.

Four protest cycle cases were selected to be detailed more closely. Two cases each come from Mexico and Chile. However, they were selected based on variation in the scale of their cues and the responding scale of activity. The event cues that are detailed in this study are focused on the national level—presidential elections and action in the national legislature, for example; cycles which respond exclusively to local level cues or to other identifiable cues that are not accounted for by the array of cues chosen for this study immediately refute the hypothesis (1b). In some instances, these cues appear similar to the hypothesized cues but occur at the local level. Nonetheless, these cases are considered examples of protest activity that do not align with the specified event cues in order to maintain methodological consistency. If information regarding other cues became apparent during research, though, it is acknowledged in an effort to accurately portray the protest cycle case.

The cases selected represent variation in the scale of the initiating cue—national level versus limited scope—and the scale of the reacting protest activity, once again depending on whether it occurs at

the national level or was limited to one group or geographic region. The “Chilean Winter” that began in Chile in 2011 represents a case in which a national level cue prompts a national level protest reaction, which also included a majority of the student population. By contrast, the so-called Penguin Revolution that occurred in Chile in 2006—a precursor to the “Chilean Winter” in many ways—is a case in which a national level cue initiates protest activity that is limited primarily to one group, in this case, high school students. The curriculum and funding protests in Mexico’s Normal Schools—colleges for teachers-in-training—also represent a case in which a national level cue is only answered by protest activity within a limited group, which is isolated geographically and in terms of the student population. This will bring us to a discussion about the group-based perception and acceptance of event cues as such. The final case, the 1999-2000 strike at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, represents an instance in which limited and localized cues are answered only by a segment of the national student population. No case was found in this limited dataset that represents a localized cue initiating protest activity at a national scale. Such a case would likely commence in a local area and then escalate until it included all student groups nationally; however, it would appear that an education-specific issue salient enough to initiate such activity did not arise in a localized setting during the period studied. These distinctions are illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: National vs. Limited cues and responses – protest cycle case selection

| | National level cue | Limited cue |
|--------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| National response | “Chilean Winter” (2011) | |
| Limited response | “Penguin Revolution” (2006) <i>Normalista</i> protests (2002-2012, intermittent) | Strike at UNAM (1999-2000) |

In Table 1, the independent cues are displayed across the top of the table, distinguished as national level cues and limited cues. Similarly, the dependent protest responses are distinguished as national response

and limited response, displayed along the left side of the table. The cases, as described above, are placed in the table according to the cue level that they answer and the protest scale that they represent.

With these distinctions, it becomes clear that the cases from Chile are both initiated by national level cues, while the reaction varies in scale. In Mexico, on the other hand, the scale of protest activity remains limited, but the initiating cues occur at both the local and national levels. Each case will be described briefly, with attention to trends in protest behavior and event cues; each will then include a section evaluating the opportunity and threat cues noted in the case and laid out for this study (whether they are present or not). The cases are ordered chronologically: the strike at the UNAM (1999-2000), the Penguin Revolution (2006), the Chilean Winter (2011-2013), and the normalista protests (intermittently 2002-2012, emphasis on 2012).

Case I: Strike at the UNAM (1999-2000)

The National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) was established in 1910 as the National University of Mexico.⁷⁶ As of the year 2000, the university counted over 270,000 students among its student body.⁷⁷ The campus is located in Mexico City.

Since its inception, the UNAM has been considered *la máxima casa de los estudios*, which is to say, the nation's university.⁷⁸ Tuition for the university was set at approximately US \$0.02 in 1948, and

⁷⁶ Guerra, Alfonso Rangel, *Systems of Higher Education: Mexico*, (New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1978), "Introduction."

⁷⁷ Welch, Mackenzie, "Mexican students defend public education at UNAM, 1999," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Swarthmore College, December 4, 2012, accessed March 23, 2015, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mexican-students-defend-public-education-unam-1999>.

⁷⁸ Rhoads and Mina, "The Student Strike," 336.

had not been raised since then when the conflicts of 1999 arose.⁷⁹ The university had attempted to raise tuition several times during the intervening period, but appear to have met fierce opposition by the student body each time. One such event occurred in 1992, when the university proposed to raise tuition to US\$670; students responded with non-violent demonstration and occupation of campus buildings.⁸⁰ At that time, the administration stated that it was “still open to new ideas on the tuition increase.”⁸¹ One might consider the 1999-2000 UNAM strike as a continuation of this behavior, at least at the initiation of the conflict.

In March 1999, the administration of the UNAM announced its plan to raise tuition from the several cents that it had been since 1948 (commonly reported as US\$0.06, but other sources report US\$0.02) to US\$136.⁸² This fee could be escaped with documentation that a student cannot afford to pay. The university had been faced with financial troubles for several years; it simply could not support its massive student body with its range of programs on the budget provided it by the national government without any significant revenue being generated by tuition. However, it should be questioned whether this proposed tuition hike would even have alleviated the university’s problems, because university estimates, as reported by the Associated Press demonstrated, that at least 70% of students at UNAM could not afford the tuition and therefore would be exempt from the fee with proper documentation.⁸³

⁷⁹ Preston, Julia, “University Officials Yield to Student Strike in Mexico,” *The New York Times*, June 8, 1999, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

⁸⁰ “Students Close U. of Mexico to Protest Tuition Increase,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, July 8, 1992, A35, ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Garza, Adolfo, “Mexican students protest proposed tuition hike,” *The Associated Press*, March 11, 1999, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

The matter came to a head in mid-April, 1999, when the prolonged strike began at the UNAM.⁸⁴ The students shut down the university. Strikers blocked traffic around the university on March 11 when the protests began, and would do so on several other occasions throughout the course of the actual strike, in addition to occupying university buildings. As the strike continued, the anti-fee mood developed into a broader call for “democratic education for all,” at least within certain circles.⁸⁵ Among other groups, frustration grew as the strike continued.⁸⁶

As early as late April, anti-strike protests by students were launched on campus, although they were much less extensive affairs than the demonstrations and campus occupation maintained by student strikers.⁸⁷ By early June, the university officially approved a tuition proposal by the university president, Barnes; the proposal established new *voluntary* fees for the university.⁸⁸ These counter protests represented the opposition that strikers faced from within their own ranks, as well as from residents of Mexico City, who appear to have lost patience with the disruptions early in the strike, according to conservative sources.⁸⁹ Sporadic clashes between strikers and anti-strikers proved more newsworthy than general dissent, though. On October 6, for instance, one international news source reported that a group

⁸⁴ Preston, Julia, “University Officials Yield to Student Strike in Mexico,” *The New York Times*, June 8, 1999, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

⁸⁵ “Fee hike sparks Mexican strike,” *The Australian*, April 28, 1999, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

⁸⁶ Garza, Adolfo, “Six-month university strike frustrates many in Mexico,” *The Associated Press and Local Wire*, October 20, 1999, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

⁸⁷ “Fee hike sparks Mexican strike.”

⁸⁸ Garza, “Six-month university strike.”

⁸⁹ Tricks, Henry. "Radical Student Protest Unnerves Mexico UNIVERSITY OCCUPATION NINE-WEEK DEMONSTRATION WIDELY CONDEMNED STRIKERS RESIST PEACE MOVES:" *Financial Times*, Jun 26, 1999. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/248722893?accountid=13158>.

of 200 anti-strike students peacefully took the university's National Education department.⁹⁰ The demanded that the authorities aid them in reopening the university. A small scuffle between the anti-strikers and a similarly sized group of strikers ensued, after which the anti-strike group abandoned their post.⁹¹ By this time, the strikers demands had expanded even further, to include university rector Barnes' resignation and an end to entrance exams for the university.⁹²

The strike widened its breadth in late October. Strikers continued occupy all major buildings on campus and maintained barricades around campus, but on October 18, finally forced the full or partial closings of many university research centers, which had been spared up to this point.⁹³ According to Rhoads and Mina, approximately 30% of all university research in Mexico is completed through the UNAM.⁹⁴ Thus, this development in the strike not only further impaired normal activity at and around the university, but also threatened to damage the university's reputation. The demands of the protesters expanded yet again, now reported as a call for the elimination of tuition altogether, and for the cancellation of recent reforms that tightened time limits for achieving a degree and which also raised the grades required for the automatic matriculation into undergraduate programs that students of UNAM prep schools are granted.⁹⁵ The strikers that remained at this point, which were a significantly smaller and on the whole more radical group than those which began in March insisted that the constitutional guarantee of free education which covers grade schools should also extend to the university level.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Moser, Patrick, "Strikers lose, then regain control of Mexico City university," Agence France Presse, October 6, 1999, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Rhoads and Mina "The Student Strike," 336.

⁹⁵ Garza, "Six-month university strike."

⁹⁶ Ibid.

It should be noted that, because of the university's autonomous status, the Mexican police could not enter campus unless their presence was requested by the university. As a result, small scuffles such as that which passed in October appear to have occurred without official response. Furthermore, the university and the police were hesitant to respond with force because of the precedent of the 1968 massacre in Tlatelolco Square.⁹⁷ On that occasion, a student-led protest preceding the Olympic Games was brutally interrupted by officially sanctioned gunfire, resulting in hundreds of dead and wounded (the government reported 37 dead while other estimates suggest 200 to 400 dead).⁹⁸ The event remained controversial into the twentieth century, at which point the responsibility of certain political figures was still being debated. In 1999, the "nation's university" had already stepped further onto the national stage than its even its reputation would normally permit, and both the university administration and politicians aimed to avoid the controversy which would attend any forceful police action—for a time.

After several months of strike, university president Francisco Barnes resigned from his post. It was not until February 6, 2000 that police stormed the campus of UNAM to put an end to the strike. The General Strike Council (CGH) commemorated the day with protest a year later.⁹⁹

Evaluating opportunities and threats

Mexico did not hold elections for the presidency nor for the legislature in 1998 or 1999, so we can easily conclude that neither presidential elections, nor change in the balance of parties in the legislature, nor a change of administration at the national level was a cue for protest activity in this case. Neither was any significant education-related legislation proposed or discussed at the national level

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Hamilton, "Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Evolution," 91.

⁹⁹ "Mexican students stage protests to mark police raid," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 6, 2001, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hotttopics/lnacademic>.

directly before the strike began to serve as either opportunity or threat. In this case, then, we can also eliminate the possibility of issue-specific legislative activity as a cue.

When considering the initiation of the protest activity, it stands to reason that a protest which only involved students of a particular university can be traced back to a university-specific cue. All sources appear to be in agreement that the strike was mounted in response to the proposed tuition hike. One issue that arises with defining the fee hike as a cue, though, is that it calls for the same deductive reasoning that is so often criticized as a part of political opportunity theory.¹⁰⁰ The tuition hike might be viewed as ‘legislation’ to some extent, but the scale certainly does not align with that of the other cases. It is a local level cue. History has shown that the students of UNAM are consistently sensitive to this cue—the proposal of fee hikes—and that protest frequently prompts the desired white flag from the university administration.

Case II: The “Penguin Revolution” (2006)

Following a victory in the presidential elections of 2005, Michele Bachelet entered office in March 2006. Within three months of her inauguration, Bachelet’s administration faced its first major challenge.

On May 18, secondary-school and university students demonstrated across Chile, demanding cheaper student tickets on public transportation and the elimination of university entrance exam fees.¹⁰¹ This is the first report of student protest in a cycle that would earn the title of the “Penguin Revolution,” named for the black and white school uniforms of the secondary school student who led the movement.

¹⁰⁰ Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities.”

¹⁰¹ “More than 700 arrested in student protests in Chile,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 19, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

Although the protesters received the support of the public and occasionally of other groups, this cycle is considered to be a limited response to the national level cues that have been delineated. The cycle began in full force at the end of May 2006, which was marked by massive demonstrations in Santiago and across Chile. In a study of education policy-making under the dominant Concertación (Coalition for Democracy), Burton suggests that student discontent at the beginning of this cycle of protest can be summarized as “material concerns”—disparities between policy aims and results, cost of university entrance exams, and transport fares—although it developed into a broader criticism of the education system as the protests progressed.¹⁰² Thus, although the demands for cheaper transportation and the elimination of the fees for university entrance exams remained priorities, the demands began to shift to reforming the education system as a whole, and gaining a role for students in the reform process.¹⁰³

Chile’s education system is a fractured system made up of municipally-funded public schools and both unsubsidized and government-subsidized private schools. This fragmentation, many students would complain, result in disparities in the quality of education received and reinforce socioeconomic inequalities. Performance results have been poorest in the municipal public schools, which were attended by 64% of students as of 2003.¹⁰⁴

Protest activity continued through June and July, with some minor activity in August. Protests were led and carried out by high school students, with the general support of the public. Students employed a limited range of protest tactics, mostly marches downtown in Santiago or in other major

¹⁰² Burton, Guy, “Hegemony and Frustration: Education Policy Making in Chile under the Concertación, 1990-2010,” *Latin American Perspectives* 39 (2012): 43, accessed October 15, 2014, doi: 10.1177/0094582X12439048.

¹⁰³ Jordan, Pav, “800,000 students march in Chile protests,” *The Irish Times*, June 3, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/Inacademic>.

¹⁰⁴ *Chile: Education*. New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit N.A., Incorporated, 2003. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/466260168?accountid=13158>.

cities. These demonstrations frequently devolved into isolated clashes between rock-throwing protesters and police, to the point that headlines about such clashes appear to be routine. In some cases, such as a series of demonstrations held of June 5, other interested groups joined the secondary school students in protest; in this instance, university students and unions joined, supporting the students and voicing their own demands to be included in the reform discussion.¹⁰⁵ The following day, bureaucrats in the Education Ministry itself shut down the ministry for the day in order to join the protests.¹⁰⁶

During this same period, Bachelet attempted to address the situation in a variety of ways. On June 1, she pledged an increase in the education budget that was equivalent to US\$200 million; she further pledged that her administration would study reform to the education law.¹⁰⁷ On June 5, she urged Congress to focus on a series of education reforms, which she considered to be a matter above party politics. On June 7, she appointed a 60-member advisory panel to discuss such reforms.¹⁰⁸ Further, on July 14, she replaced the ministers of education, economy, and the interior. These moves did not placate the protesters as well as intended, however, as regular protests continued throughout the winter months.

Protest activity appears to have decreased through August and September. On September 8, Bachelet reaffirmed an increased education budget for good measure, now stated to be over \$US330 million.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, another flurry of protest activity occurred in October 2006. This time, there were isolated cases of students seizing schools in addition to the usual marches and demonstrations. The

¹⁰⁵ Quilodran, Federico, "Chilean student protests gain wider support amid scattered clashes," Associated Press International, June 6, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Quilodran, Federico, "Chile's Bachelet moves to defuse students protests," The Associated Press, June 7, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

¹⁰⁹ Gallardo, Eduardo. "Bachelet announces steep increase in Chile's education spending," Associated Press International, September 8, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

demands remained the same, but this time students acknowledged and protested the slow pace of progress toward reform.¹¹⁰ Protest activity ceased by the end of October.

The issues raised during the Penguin Revolution do not seem to have been raised via protest again until April 2008, when students protested the new General Law of Education.¹¹¹ The student critique at that point was that the new law did not go far enough in reforming the system, and in fact failed to even address their structural concerns with the system.¹¹² Protests occurred in April and June 2008, following the approval of the law in the Chamber of Deputies.¹¹³

Evaluating Opportunities and Threats

At least at the point of initiation, this case appears to respond to the change of presidential administration that brought Bachelet into office in early 2006. Especially if we consider the May 18 protest event to be the absolute start of the protest cycle, this cue is most applicable to the case. Bachelet comes from Concertación, the center-left coalition that had held the presidency since the end of the dictatorship, and even her Socialist Party ties do not represent much of a diversion to the left; she also served as Minister of Health (2000-2002) and Minister of Defense (2002-2004) under President Lagos.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ “Chilean high school students take over schools in renewed protests,” Associated Press International, October 10, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹¹¹ “More students detained in Chile as protest continues,” Xinhua General News Service, June 3, 2008, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹¹² Estrada, Daniela, “CHILE: Teachers and Students Fight New Education Law,” *Inter Press Service News Agency*, April 3, 2009, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/04/chile-teachers-and-students-fight-new-education-law/>.

¹¹³ “Chilean students occupy UNICEF, UNESCO buildings to protest new education law,” Xinhua General News Service, June 20, 2008, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹¹⁴ Navia, Patricio, “Bachelet’s Election in Chile: The 2006 Presidential Contest,” *ReVista Harvard Review of Latin America* (Spring/Summer 2006), accessed April 7, 2015, <http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/bachelets-election-chile>.

Despite this continuity with the previous presidency, however, Bachelet's presidency appears to have been perceived as a unique opportunity.¹¹⁵ Her status as the country's first female president seems to have contributed strongly to this perception.¹¹⁶ The balance of parties in the legislature did not shift dramatically during the 2005 elections, so we would not anticipate it to act as a strong cue to student protesters (see appendix A).

Once the protest cycle had begun, Bachelet's administration attempted to deal with the unrest in a proactive fashion, so that a dialogue was opened between protesters and government. This dialogue created an entirely new array of cues. As previously mentioned, the momentum of the protest cycle itself is likely to affect the timing of protest events during the cycle, so threat and opportunity cues cannot be considered in isolation. However, the cue-generating dialogue between the government and students still merits discussion. Announcements by the president appear to have elicited protest responses on a regular basis; for example, Bachelet announced an increase in education funding at the start of June, and urged Congress to act on reform promises within the same week; these events coincide with the earlier stages of the protest cycle. The formation of the advisory council may be classified as both a presidential announcement and a quasi-legislative discussion, as it was formed by the executive as a step toward education reform legislation. This, too, appeared in the first week of June; this is one moment in which we see an opportunity for students to assert themselves to and within the government, but also a threat to student interests as the *extent* to which student interests would be addressed came into question, and as other interests entered the discussion. It is impossible to separate these executive announcements and the beginning of legislative discussions as distinct cues chronologically. All of these events occurred during

¹¹⁵ Navarro, Lygia, "A post-dictatorship generation of angry schoolkids reintroduces Chile to street politics," Associated Press International, July 5, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹¹⁶ Navia, Patricio, "Bachelet's Election in Chile: The 2006 Presidential Contest," *ReVista Harvard Reveiw of Latin America* (Spring/Summer 2006), accessed April 7, 2015, <http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/bachelets-election-chile>.

one week, which was also particularly heavy with protest activity. They cannot be eliminated from consideration as valid cues, but—as much because of this ambiguity as for methodological concerns—neither can we conclusively choose any one event from this cluster as the primary cue for the heavy protest activity of early June 2006.

Although the cycle is to some extent self-sustaining once begun, it is still worth noting in this case that protest sometimes occurs because progress in the legislature is moving too slowly. In other words, protesters perceive a threat cue that is the absence of action. Within the confines of this study, we must consider this an example of protest activity occurring without one of the previously defined event cues; for future consideration, however, this suggests that the lack of a desired event may be perceived as a cue at certain moments. If enough time has passed without demands being met, protesters may become concerned that the government will not maintain its commitment to reform or perhaps that the protesters' part in the discussion is being minimalized or eliminated, representing a threat to their interests. In such a situation, it is more costly not to protest than to renew protest efforts in the hope of pressing the group's demands upon the non-responsive, slow-moving, or wavering government. This appears to have occurred in October 2006, when Chilean high school students seized five schools in Santiago to protest the slow pace of progress and the council's work.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ "Chilean high school students take over schools in renewed protests," Associated Press International, October 10, 2006, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

Case III: The “Chilean Winter” (April 2011-2013)

In December 2010, Education Minister Joaquin Lavin announced that the administration would begin a revolution in higher education; he apparently did not anticipate that the students would start the job for him.¹¹⁸

In May 2011, university students launched the largest protest movement in Chile since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship.¹¹⁹ Students boycotted classes and began holding demonstrations in the capital. In the months that followed, protest events would occur in Santiago on a nearly weekly basis, and throughout the country somewhat less regularly. Articles available through LexisNexis count over 30 dateable protest events throughout the year and mention many others.

Students officially presented reform demands in a letter to Education Minister Joaquin Lavin on May 21, but they quickly turned to the streets to make their demands.¹²⁰ Students announced plans to occupy schools in mid-June.¹²¹ Piñera would eventually propose to criminalize such occupations, but by that time the situation would be well beyond the president’s control. Demonstrations, marches through the capital, and long-term boycotts of classes became commonplace throughout the winter, disrupting traffic and daily life in Santiago. Piñera’s government, increasingly impatient with unrest, responded with several proposals to meet student demands for education reform.

In contrast to the ‘Penguin Revolution’ of 2006, which focused its demands primarily on reform of the secondary school system and its ‘municipalization’ of costs, the student movement of 2011 and the following years first targeted the higher education system. As was frequently advertised in pieces

¹¹⁸ Downie, Andrew, “In Chile, Students’ Anger at Tuition Debt Fuels Protests and a National Debate,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 16, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹¹⁹ Radia, Rakhee, “In Focus: Politics: THE PROTESTS,” *The Observer (England)*, October 9, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

published by major world news sources, the financial burden of higher education is placed squarely in the hands of students and their families, who fund as much as 79.3% of expenditures.¹²² Furthermore, tuition costs exceed those of universities in any country in the Americas excluding the United States. Like the privatization issues of the secondary education system, the for-profit arrangement of higher education in Chile also stems from Pinochet-era legislation. The demands of the 2006 movement seem to have been added to the list of demands as the protests continued, though; this may account for the universal appeal of the 2011 movement. The demands advertised during the protests were often generalized to a common slogan: free, high-quality, public education.¹²³ Demands would sometimes include goals as broad as a complete overhaul of the education system, while at other times demands were as specific as loan specifications.

The presidential administration offered its first active response to the protest activity in the first week of July, when an aide publically stated that the government would not restrict profits in higher education, as was demanded by the students on the streets.¹²⁴ The following day, July 5, Piñera outlined his plan for the equivalent of a US\$4 billion fund devoted to student loans.¹²⁵

¹²² Downie, Andrew, "In Chile, Students' Anger at Tuition Debt Fuels Protests and a National Debate," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 16, 2011. <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹²³ Vergara, Eva, "Pressure grows as Chile student leader opens talks," Associated Press Online, October 6, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹²⁴ "Chile not to limit profits in higher education despite protests: official," Xinhua General News Service, July 4, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹²⁵ Radia, Rakhee, "In Focus: Politics: THE PROTESTS," *The Observer (England)*, October 9, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

At this point, over 40 students throughout the country had taken to hunger strikes, and demonstration continued.¹²⁶ Within a week, a group of high school students would peacefully storm the UNICEF offices in Santiago, urging the international community to mediate the conflict between the students and government.¹²⁷ On July 14, in spite of a government-issued ban on protest activity, at least 30,000 people marched in Santiago.¹²⁸ By July, it was clear that the government had lost control over the situation; the student movement was a disruptive force to be reckoned with, and therefore had to be admitted into the policy discussion. In the same month, Education Minister Joaquin Lavin stepped down from his position and was replaced by Felipe Bulnes.¹²⁹

The student protests in Chile quickly attracted worldwide attention, which added fuel to the fire in turn. By late October, the United Nations had suggested to the Chilean government, including, for example, that the issue at hand be handled with a human rights approach, “as education is a core human right.”¹³⁰ As a result of police conduct during the protest events, there were also concerns regarding police brutality (nearly every major march in Santiago appears to have concluded in clashes between police and small groups of protesters).¹³¹ Meanwhile, the students’ creativity in protest also attracted

¹²⁶ Quilodran, Federico, “Clashes, disruptions as strike begins in Chile,” Associated Press Online, August 25, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹²⁷ “Chilean high school students seize UN offices, demand international mediation,” Xinhua General News Service, July 9, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹²⁸ CNN, “Dozens arrested as students protest Chile’s education policies,” CNN Wire, July 15, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹²⁹ Quilodran, Federico, “Chile protests claim another education minister,” Associated Press, December 30, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹³⁰ “Chile need human rights approach to education policies,” India Blooms News Service, October 22, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹³¹ “Chile’s past haunts protests over rights,” UPI, November 3, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

positive attention. Although traditional marches and demonstrations through the capital and other major cities remained the norm during the period of protest, other tactics included: a 1,800 hour marathon around the presidential palace, during which at least one person was always jogging and carrying a flag which read “Free Education Now”; a kiss-in festival; and a dramatic and tensely followed hunger strike by over 40 high school students throughout the country.^{132 133 134}

Evaluating opportunities, threats, and reception of cues

What designates the 2011 movement as unique in regard to opportunities and threats, though, is the continuous dialogue between students and government throughout the period of protest, resulting in an environment of rapidly shifting opportunities and threats. Commentators have suggested several possible ‘triggers’ for the initiation of protests in May 2011. Chief among them is the announcement of Education Minister Joaquin Lavin in December 2010 that the administration would launch a ‘revolution’ in higher education. This would likely have been interpreted by student leaders as an opportunity for action. Once the dialogue had been opened, however, reading opportunities and threats appears to have become more difficult.

The dialogue between government and student representatives appears to have begun as early as October, more than five months after protests began, but negotiations broke down multiple times. The government refused to “give in” to student demands for a free university education, as stated by Treasury

¹³² “Chile protestors lap up support by jogging around palace,” Agence France Presse, August 13, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/inacademic>.

¹³³ “Student protest turns into lovefest,” UPI, September 2, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/inacademic>.

¹³⁴ Quilodran, Federico, “Clashes, disruptions as strike begins in Chile,” Associated Press Online, August 25, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/inacademic>.

minister Felipe Larrain on October 19.¹³⁵ Meanwhile, students refused to cease protests without their demands being met. Thus, nearly every advance in negotiations between students and government or within Congress, or announcement by the president, held the potential to either allow students a greater voice in creating legislation, or to end discussion and pass legislation that did not meet students demands but nonetheless ended the period of negotiation and opportunity.

While the beginning of any new presidency might be perceived as an opportunity, the entrance of Piñera's administration in March 2010 would more likely be perceived as a threat, given the student movement's left-leaning preference throughout the 2000's, and the fact that this administration change marked the beginning of Chile's first right-wing presidency since the end of the dictatorship in 1990. However, the database captured no student protest events for education reform throughout the year 2010. This lack of activity suggests that students did not perceive the simple change of presidential administration was not perceived as either opportunity or threat. This potential opportunity was either not taken or not perceived as opportunity by the student movements. Perhaps the simple fact that the new president had won the popular election was enough to convince student leaders that the movement would not receive popular support, which would render the opportunity factor null; alternatively, the change of administration may not have been perceived as threat because a substantial bureaucratic delay may be anticipated before any legislative changes would take place. Furthermore the elections were fair and open, so in the context of this stable democracy, there would be no reason to protest election results and the consequent taking of office, particularly in the context of post-dictatorship Chile.

The threat of a new oppositional presidential administration may have also been neutralized to some extent because of the slow pace of legislation in Chile as a result of coalitional politics and barriers put in place during the dictatorship. Elections for the legislature were also held late in 2009; at that time, 18 of 38 elected senatorial seats were up for election, along with all 120 seats in the Chamber of

¹³⁵ "Violence continues in Chile student protests," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 19, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hotttopics/lnacademic>.

Deputies.¹³⁶ The results of the elections for the legislature gave the Coalition for Change (CC) a slight plurality in the Chamber of Deputies (48.3%) and the center-left Concertación (Coalition for Democracy, CPD) only slightly less with 47.5%; in the Senate, it is the CPD that maintained plurality with 50% of the elected seats while the CC held 42.1% of elected seats following elections (see appendix A for more data regarding coalition representation in the legislature).¹³⁷ These results prescribed future debate and gridlock, as is the natural and sometimes outcome of the binomial arrangement in Chile. Perhaps because this balance of coalitions is the norm of Chilean politics—and the shift between the powers represented by the two major coalitions—is so slight that this shift is unlikely to constitute a significant change in the political environment, and therefore does not represent a plausible opportunity or threat for any particular interest in Chile.

In summary, this protest cycle appears to have been unresponsive to changes in presidential administration or the slight shifts of balance in the legislature, unless we were to create some sort of lag to takes the administrative change of 2010 in to account. A more accurate approach would consider the actual legislation passed by the new administrations as a distinct type of cue. The volley of proposals and discussions initiated by the government in an attempt to quell the protests is dizzying, from June onward. As was the case with such executive announcements and legislative activity during the 2006 Penguin Revolution, each of these cues has the potential to act either as an opportunity or as a threat based on the opportunity to contribute to and influence the discussion and the threat of that window closing or of opposing parties influencing the discussion.

¹³⁶ “PARLINE database on national parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, accessed March 10, 2015, <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>.

¹³⁷ “PARLINE database on national parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Case IV: Normalistas protest modernization (2002-2012, intermittent)

The Normal schools were founded after the 1910 revolution with the intent of calming unrest in rural and indigenous areas.¹³⁸ The Normal schools continue to train teachers in rural and urban areas of Mexico, although it is the rural Normal schools that quickly gained a reputation for their political enthusiasm.¹³⁹ During the Cardenas administration, teachers were considered “agents of the revolution,” and that status appears to have stuck, at least among the teachers themselves.¹⁴⁰ Teachers, in fact, occupied a favored position during the entirety of the PRI’s seventy-one year period in power. The main teachers’ union, the National Union of educational Workers (SNTE), was founded in 1943 and benefitted from the classic corporatist structure instituted by the ruling party, which would become the PRI; under PRI rule, the SNTE exercised almost complete control over the teaching profession.¹⁴¹ Despite the emergence of a challenger group, the Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (CNTE), and despite having shifted its support to the PAN in the 2000 presidential elections, the SNTE maintains its strength nationally.¹⁴² The system arranged by the SNTE and PRI during the majority of the twentieth century became the norm, and teachers now appear to be averse to dramatic change, such as the reforms launched by Peña Nieto. However, the individuals that we see protesting in these cases are not full teachers, but training for the profession. Thus, the students of the normal schools, known as *normalistas*, are not only sensitive to issues that affect their own education, but also to several issues that promise to affect their careers after graduation.

¹³⁸ Agren, David, “ ‘Normalistas’ fight changes in Mexican education,” *Gannett News Service*, December 7, 2012, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Hamilton, *Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Evolution*, 50.

¹⁴¹ Levinson, Bradley A. “Education reform sparks teacher protest in Mexico,” *Kappan*, May 2014, 49, accessed via pdk.sagepub.com.

¹⁴² Ibid., 50.

This wave of protest activity is something of a curiosity among the group, because it is not entirely continuous. However, it was considered worth noting because it is a curiosity; it was limited to a specific student group, although not limited to one school or organization, and the grievances and demands remain relatively constant among events regardless of other discrete data.

The geographic regions where the Normal schools seem to protest most frequently are the central and southern states of Mexico: Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacan in particular. During the 1990-2013 period explored in this study, the first instance of Normal school protest that was deemed worthy of news coverage appeared in Cuernavaca (state of Morelos) in late May 2002.¹⁴³ At that time, students from 15 teachers colleges gathered to occupy the Morelos state legislature, where they held 20 state deputies hostage within the legislature for fifteen hours.¹⁴⁴ There had been unrest in the area for over two weeks at this point, with hundreds of students demonstrating at the nearby Emiliano Zapata School campus.¹⁴⁵ The students who occupied the legislature demanded that the deputies of the chamber agree to lobby the Morelos state legislature on their behalf in order to secure more scholarships for aspiring teachers.¹⁴⁶

The next instance of protest activity captured by this dataset did not take place until December 2011, when students at the Ayotzinapa normal school blocked roads with their protests, which were finally broken up by police on December 12.¹⁴⁷ In this instance, protesters had called for funding to increase enrollment and improve conditions at their college.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Alonso, Oswald, "Students take local legislators hostage in southern Mexico state to demand scholarships," Associated Press International, May 29, 2002, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Pastrana, Daniela, "MEXICO: No protection for activists," Inter Press Service, December 14, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

In neither of these cases do we see elections, national administration change, or major action in the national legislature to even be considered as opportunities or threats to which these protest events would respond. Thus, this should be considered an instance in which protest occurs without identifiable cues, at least at the level which this study has focused. It is certainly possible that the protest activity responds to a cue at a more local level, but this was not evident in the news sources studied or outside research. If we are to test the hypothesis with event cues that are as consistent as possible, and are unable to identify such a cue in this case or any other, then we cannot disprove the null hypothesis that the student protest activity does not respond to an event cue.

The normal school protest activity changed tone dramatically in 2012. The shift is profound enough that the previous two events and those which follow could easily be divided into separate groupings. While the first two protest events mentioned called for increased financial resources for the normal schools, those which took place in 2012 and into 2013 focused primarily on curriculum debates at the schools. During his campaign for the presidency, the candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Enrique Peña Nieto, announced that he planned to “overhaul” the education system.¹⁴⁹ The reforms to be enacted would especially focus on modernizing the curricula of public schools and increasing teacher accountability. Although the prospect of these reforms prompted huge protest events among teacher groups, the student backlash appears to have been much more isolated.¹⁵⁰

The normal schools in the south-central state of Michoacan were a flashpoint for protest activity between October and December 2012. The first mention of protest in the news sources pulled by this dataset appears on October 15, which marks the day when police removed students from the buildings of

¹⁴⁹ Agren, David, “ ‘Normalistas’ fight changes in Mexican education,” Gannett News Service, December 7, 2012, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹⁵⁰ Levinson, “Education reform sparks teacher protest in Mexico,” 49.

rural teachers' colleges throughout Michoacan, which they had occupied for some time.¹⁵¹ Protests had been in progress in Morelia, the state capital of Michoacan, for nearly two weeks when a march devolved into chaos on October 16.¹⁵² ¹⁵³ Students had hijacked more than forty city buses toward the beginning of said protests, and set fire to 13 of them; homemade explosives, rocks, and firecrackers were also involved.¹⁵⁴ Bus hijackings occurred in nearby towns as well.¹⁵⁵

The normalistas acted in protest of a new curriculum for training teachers at their schools, which include the addition of computer science and English, and excluded indigenous-language courses.¹⁵⁶ Firstly, the logic behind protesting the 'modernization' of course offerings seems to relate to a question of necessity. The students at the normal schools of Michoacan generally train to teach in rural areas of the state; why, they questioned, should they teach computer skills and English to the rural children of Michoacan, who will most likely have no need for such skills.¹⁵⁷ It might also be interpreted as a backlash against globalization, to some degree. In regard to the exclusion of indigenous-language courses, one must understand that Michoacan is a state with a large indigenous population. One student was quoted as asking, "What do you do (with English) in these schools where the kids don't even speak

¹⁵¹ "Mass student protests rock C. Mexico due to curriculum change," Xinhua General News Service, October 17, 2012, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ "Students Protest in Mexico Turns Violent, 176 Arrested." *Businessline*, Oct 16, 2012, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1323127976?accountid=13158>.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ "Mass student protests rock C. Mexico due to curriculum change," Xinhua General News Service, October 17, 2012, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹⁵⁶ "Students Protest in Mexico Turns Violent, 176 Arrested." *Businessline*.

¹⁵⁷ Agren, David, " 'Normalistas' fight changes in Mexican education," Gannett News Service, December 7, 2012, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

Spanish?”¹⁵⁸ External debates and grievances in Mexican society appear to have fed into the normalista protests, if not unlike then at least more clearly than in other cases.

It must also be remembered that the students that responded so dramatically to Peña Nieto’s proposed reforms were in training to become teachers in rural Mexico. Thus, the changes to be implemented would not only affect them in an ideological sense—as represented by the curriculum debates—but also inconvenience them in their future professions by challenging teacher authority and other privileges long enjoyed by teachers. One practice which received particular criticism is job-selling upon retirement, which Peña Nieto pledged in his inaugural address to eliminate.¹⁵⁹ He further pledged to improve teacher evaluations.¹⁶⁰ Thus, the proposed reforms threaten the status of the normalistas’ future careers in addition to imposing curriculum changes from above. In light of the historical relationship between teachers’ unions and the PRI, Peña Nieto might also have been an unexpected initiator of this conflict.

In December, another wave of unrest in Michoacan caught the attention of the international press. Students (normalistas) occupied the city center of Morelia for several weeks in December.¹⁶¹ News sources also note that some protests have been ongoing for several months. The modernization of courses and strengthening of teacher evaluations and labor laws were once again noted among the contributing factors for the event.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Agren, David, “ ‘Normalistas’ fight changes in Mexican education,” Gannett News Service, December 7, 2012, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹⁶² Ibid.

Evaluating Opportunities and Threats

2012 was an presidential election year in Mexico; elections and the subsequent inaugurations occur during the same calendar year. Peña Nieto was elected to office on August 31, 2012, and officially took office on December 1st.¹⁶³ This may appear to represent a case in which we do see student protest in response to the election year cue, or the change of presidential administration in anticipation of future changes (favorable or unfavorable). Peña Nieto is also the first PRI candidate to win the presidency since this party lost its grip on the position in 2000; this might pose a threat in the same way that Sebastian Piñera posed a threat as the first right-wing president in post-dictatorial Chile. Conversely, the administration change might have been perceived as an opportunity considering the slightly privileged position enjoyed by the main teachers' union under the PRI. Yet although protest activity does occur following the election and the presidential inauguration, neither the party nor the candidate himself provokes protest. Rather, the specific announcement of education reform is more closely related to the protest activity at the rural normal schools. As previously noted, specific complaints about the modernization of courses were made clear during the protest events.

However, the protest activity of October and December responds to the pledges of a man who is *not yet in office* or has just entered office. However, Peña Nieto was elected on a platform that emphasized revival of the economy at least partially through renovation of the education system, so his winning the election in August 2012 would likely suggest to the normalistas that there is significant enough support for the reforms that they represent a true threat. By the same logic, we can consider these reform proposals at least as a valid announcement of education reform, if not the introduction of a legitimate policy discussion, since it was a key piece of Peña Nieto's platform. Protests did not occur until October, at which point Peña Nieto was president elect, and his statements could be considered statements by the legitimate executive, even if they were made before his official entrance to office. We

¹⁶³ Seelke, Clare Ribando, "Mexico's 2012 Election," *Congressional Research Service*, September 4, 2012, accessed March 30, 2015, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42548.pdf>

can at least tentatively conclude, then, that the normalista student protest activity is sensitive to threats in the form of executive announcements.

The wave of normalista protest activity also illustrates, then, a case in which a cue at the national level prompts an academically and geographically limited protest response. As previously noted, the proposed reforms caused outrage within the teaching community, but much more scarce opposition among students—except within the community of normalistas, particularly in the central and southern states.

Results and Analysis

At least to the extent that we can consider opportunity cues affective in predicting protest activity, this study supports the hypothesis (1a) that protest activity also responds to threat cues.

In the four cases presented here, though, no cue was consistently answered in all of cases; this suggests that protest response to national-level cues may be more strictly case-specific. In fact, if the cues originally set out are interpreted strictly, then the UNAM case immediately refutes the hypothesis (1b) because it only appears to respond to local (university-level) cues when the cues proposed in this study are all issued at the level of the national government. The most consistently answered event cue appears to be announcements by the executive regarding changes in the educational system. Different stages of legislative activity seem to affect protest response in Chile but not Mexico, and changes of executive administration only appear to prompt protest activity in the case of the Penguin Revolution. The election year cue only appears to affect the normalista case. These results are detailed below, case by case.

Table 2: Results of event cues analysis in four protest cycles

| Protest cycle case | Event cue | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | Presidential elections | Administration change | Change in balance of parties | Issue-specific legislative activity | Announcements by the executive |
| Strike at the UNAM | | | | <* | |
| Penguin Revolution | | X* | | X | X |
| Chilean Winter | | | | X | X* |
| Normalista protests (2012) | X | | | | X* |

X indicates that protest activity in the designated protest cycle correlates with the designated event cue.

< indicates that protest activity in the designated protest cycle correlates with a localized version of the designated event cue.

* indicates that the designated cue is judged to be the initial cue of the protest cycle.

Table 2 displays these results together. The protest cycle cases are listed along the left side of the table in chronological order, while the five event cues considered in this analysis are marked along the top of the table. Following the evaluation of opportunity and threat cues completed in each case study, an ‘X’ was placed in the table to mark the cues to which protest activity responded in each case study. The strike at the UNAM only appears to have responded to issue-specific ‘legislation’ at the local level, which was not specifically considered in this analysis; the space is marked with the symbol ‘<’ to signify this relationship and the fact that it falls outside the direct focus of the study. The Penguin Revolution cycle shows signs of responding to administration change, legislative activity, and announcements by the executive; as noted in the analysis, the change of presidential administration appears to have been the cue

which initiated the protest cycle, which is noted in the table by an asterisk. The Chilean Winter cycle responded more exclusively to legislative activity and announcements from the executive, and I judge that an announcement from Piñera's administration regarding education reform ("a revolution in higher education") initiated the protest cycle. The normalista protests of 2012 responded to the presidential elections and the discussion taking place therein, but more significantly they responded to the announcements and plans of executive-to-be, Peña Nieto; as a result, the announcement cue is marked as the initial cue of the cycle.

Notably, the balance of parties in the legislature does not appear to affect protest activity in any case, although we do not observe any dramatic shift of party balance near the selected cycle cases to actually prompt a reaction (see appendix A for data concerning party representation in the legislature). Furthermore, we do observe instances when there does not appear to be any cue, but protest activity does occur (i.e., the normalista protests demanding higher funding and better conditions at schools in 2002, which are excluded from Table 2). Events hypothesized to act as cues also pass without any signs of unrest (one significant example being the election and inauguration of Vicente Fox in Mexico, the first non-PRI president in over seventy years). Thus, we cannot eliminate the null hypothesis that protest events do not occur in response to event cues, or in other words that there are other factors at play which are responsible for the timing of protest activity.

These other factors might include factors related to other branches of social movement theory which were not accounted for in this study. For example, resource mobilization theory was not well-managed in this analysis. A resource mobilization approach would have attempted to better understand the role of existing student organizations in mobilization, as well as the time and financial resources available to student groups. Considering the vast differences between the active groups in the four case studies—high school students, university students from one university, university students from many universities, students from several loosely affiliated universities in one region—these material constraints may have played an important role in planning and executing protests. I have also considered how the

historic 'status' of the education system may affect government willingness to engage in conversation; I have not, however, paid much attention to how those same legacies may affect the way that students frame their own demands and appeal to the public. This, too, may affect the ability of students to effectively mobilize and gain the public audience that they seek through protest—not to mention the international audience that cycles like the Chilean Winter cycle gained.

Chapter 5

Discussion

One of the main purposes of this study has been to bring threat into the discussion of political opportunities. Although, to this point, we have asserted that opportunity and threat cues are essentially two sides of the same coin in terms of their ability to prompt protest activity, the discussion will now open to the distinction between threat and opportunity.

Another way of considering the consistency of response to cues is by questioning whether student movements consistently respond to opportunity cues or to threat cues. By coding protest events for threat and opportunity as described earlier, we cannot only support the hypothesis that protest events respond to both types of cues, but we can also note trends in cue-response and variation in the protest events by cue type. The results of this differentiation are shown in Figures 2 and 3 below.




Figure 2: Distribution of threat and opportunity cues: Mexico

It should be noted that there were only 17 protest events recorded for Mexico; the cues accounted for in Figure 2 are those that are answered by protest activity in Mexico, according to the gathered

LexisNexis data. The number of protest events is significantly higher in Chile (77 events) than in Mexico, in part because of the biases previously discussed (see Chapter 3, Methodology).




Figure 3: Distribution of threat and opportunity cues: Chile

The total 79 protest events recorded for Chile were reduced to 77 in Figure 3, because two events were judged to be too distant from the education reform issue area (took place in commemoration of the “Day of the Young Combatant” in Chile, when student unrest is always anticipated; similar to commemorations of the 1968 Tlatelolco Massacre in Mexico).¹⁶⁴ ¹⁶⁵ I also encountered a great deal of ambiguity in making these judgments, to the point that I originally counted the cues as 1) threat, 2) opportunity, 3) both opportunity and threat, 4) threat (ambiguous), 5) opportunity (ambiguous), and 6) both opportunity and threat (ambiguous). See appendix for a table of values showing these divisions. The ambiguity seems to stem partially from trying to judge events in a protest cycle by its apparent cue, and also from attempting to include all protest events and their assumed cues even in cases where no cue seems to be present. In

¹⁶⁴ “150 arrested in Chile student protest,” *Agence France Presse*, DATE, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

¹⁶⁵ “Rocks, tear gas mark Chile’s youth protests,” *Windsor Star (Ontario)*, DATE, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic>.

these cases, unfortunately, I relied upon the much-critiqued reverse reasoning to judge an inferred cue by the protest event observed; they account for many of the cases that I deemed ‘ambiguous.’ To create these two figures, however, I combined the counts for the more confirmed cue and the corresponding ‘ambiguous’ cue in order to simplify discussion (i.e., 25 opportunity cues and 9 opportunity ‘ambiguous’ cues were combined in the case of Chile to come up with the 34 opportunity cues shown in Figure 3).

As shown in Figure 2, the vast majority of cues answered in the case of Mexico are threats (76%), while 18% of the recorded cues were clearly opportunities, and 6% were simultaneously coded as threat and opportunity. Figure 3 demonstrates that the cues are more evenly divided among threat and opportunity in Chile; 44% of cues were coded as threat, 35% were coded as opportunity, and 21% were coded as both threat and opportunity. In both country cases, interestingly, threat cues do appear to be most commonly answered cues in general, if only by a slight lead as is the case in Chile. This suggests that not only are these student protest events responsive to both opportunity and threat cues, but that they may be *most* responsive to threat cues across country cases.

Certainly, a count of threat-initiated versus opportunity-initiated protest events suggests that student protest in Mexico is generally more sensitive to threat cues. This is especially true when considering the initiating cue of a cycle of protest. Furthermore, in both of the Mexican cases considered in this study, the initial cue perceived by student protesters was a threat. The strike at the UNAM was precipitated by the administration’s proposal to raise tuition, which—although not a decision issued at the level of the national government—was certainly perceived as a threat, and was met in the same way that such threats had been met in the past. In the case of the normalistas, Peña Nieto’s plans for reform to the education system was perceived as a threat to the students’ future career prospects and to the needs and interests of students in the area, and was thus met with fierce opposition. In Chile, there appears to be more variation between answered threat and opportunity cues than we see in Mexico. In many instances, there is also ambiguity as to whether the event cue to which a protest event responds is a perceived threat or opportunity. One example of such a moment occurred during the “Chilean Winter” cycle, when

Piñera's 21-point plan spurred further protest; this event functioned as an opportunity because it signified government willingness to concede to some student demands and the continuation of a period when students could affect substantial policy change through protest; however, this proposal also signified threat because it failed to address all student demands and the passage of the proposal would likely have signaled the end of the period of reform discussion.¹⁶⁶ In the Chilean protest cycle cases detailed in this study, the initiating cues appear to be either opportunities or ambiguous in type. If the 2006 "Penguin Revolution" responds simply to Bachelet's entrance to office, then there would be no reason to believe that failing to act collectively would damage student interests; rather, the change of administration likely signaled the possibility of a more receptive government audience for student demands—an opportunity. The initiation of the 2011 Chilean Winter is more ambiguous because the December 2010 announcement by Education Minister Lavin that the government would initiate a revolution in higher education would logically be considered an opportunity for students, but the delay in action that occurs between December 2010 and June 2011 when the protests come into full swing, may have been perceived as the threat that the government would not keep its word to begin reforms.

Future studies would do well to consider what characteristics of a domestic environment or of student movements themselves would condition a student protest group to be more sensitive to opportunity cues or to threat cues. However, one explanation may simply be that the cues that are issued in Mexico are more likely to be perceived as threats because the Mexican education system as it existed at the beginning of the period of interest was already tuned to student preferences (low tuition at the UNAM, limited curriculum and job assurances for teachers-in-training at the normal schools, education a constitutionally guaranteed right through secondary school), while the cues that arise in Chile are more likely to be perceived as opportunities because the education system is so entrenched in the legacy of the dictatorship that the slightest chance of reform is acted upon. This relates to the proposal put force in this

¹⁶⁶ Vergara, Eva, "Chile police, students clash in banned protests," Associated Press Online, August 5, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/lnacademic>.

study, that the key difference we observe in the experiences of Chile and Mexico is the government's willingness to engage in conversation over and initiate education reform, generating cues; by extension, then, that distinction may also effect the *type* of cues generated.

By comparing the UNAM strike cycle and the *normalista* protests from Mexico with one another and with the student protest cycles in Chile, we also highlight the idea that all opportunities and threats are conditional and based on perception. As scholars, we can attempt to define potential opportunities and threats to refine the study and decide whether opportunities have been taken or ignored and judge political opportunity theory and its variants. However, opportunity and threat are both based on perception, so what one group may perceive as a threat is insignificant to another group. For example, the threat perceived by the normalistas in Peña Nieto's reform proposals only prompted significant protest activity among that specific student population. Among other objectives, this study sought to eliminate such divisions to some degree by focusing exclusively on student protest activity; yet the divisions that exist even within this sector of the population reintroduce the ambiguity of perception as a factor to consider.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Through a carefully organized conceptualization of opportunity and threat cues, this analysis concludes that threat cues and opportunity cues are both viable signals for students to protect or enhance their interests through protest. Definition of specific, national-level event cues failed to capture all cues for protest activity, though; the study also failed to find consistent response to specific cues between cases.

Even though this study fails to find continuity in cue response in the comparative context, it does seem to support some degree of continuity within domestic environments, and in the way in which groups recognize the threat and opportunity cues based on their interests and position in the political system. For example, the protesters of the Chilean Winter cycle consistently responded to legislative activity and announcements from the executive as event cues, and consistently appear to have been spurred into action by the ambiguous cues that occur around negotiations. If certain student groups are, in fact, consistently responsive to certain cues within the political environment, then at least within a given environment protest activity can be anticipated to a point. Understanding these patterns of behavior may have implications for politicians, both in the sense that they are able to anticipate potential unrest, and in the sense that they might engage in more effective and efficient (and perhaps tame) dialogue with student groups by understanding their ‘triggers.’

The consistency of student protest activity in response to certain event cues may also yield some favorable policy outcomes for student interests. For example, the students of the UNAM repeatedly responded to the threat of tuition hikes throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and were thus able to stave off the increased fees at least until the moment of crisis in 1999. Perhaps, then, student

response to threat can effectively impede legislation. On the other hand, the Penguin Revolution protesters responded to opportunity and were consequently able to push their demands to the political forefront; however, the legislation which eventually resulted from this discussion fell far short of demands. Opportunity cues, then, may not present the ideal chance to make and receive demands, although they may allow the opening of a discussion if taken. This concept must be explored more thoroughly, but may yield useful lessons for students or other challenger groups seeking to voice their interests through the unconventional means of protest.

Despite its numerous limitations and shortcomings, this work is differentiated from the massive body of social movement and political opportunity literature by its integration of threat as a partner to opportunity, and its attempt to define event cues to be tested across different protest cycles and even countries. This comparative approach is not common among political opportunity studies, although it offers the possibility of searching for cues that are more generalizable than the case-specific opportunities more commonly arrived at. The analysis completed here also connects the education reform conversation with social movement theory in a way that emphasizes unconventional interest representation and the development of Latin American youth as political actors advocating issues that affect their present situation and their future prospects.

This analysis is admittedly limited in its scope and data collection, and thus cannot make conclusive claims beyond speculation. Available quantitative data failed to provide the relevant information to complete an accurate quantitative study, so that the analysis had to be based on personal research and qualitative study. This in itself is not a problem, but LexisNexis has serious limitations as the main source of protest data, namely that it only retrieves very specific articles based on the criteria entered, and primarily captures English language articles. Given greater time and resources, a more accurate study would utilize Spanish language articles in addition to major English news sources to track protest activity, and to confirm events through triangulation.

This analysis is also limited in its temporal scope. Although the 1990 boundary can be justified as the beginning of a period of domestic transition throughout Latin America, the end date of 2013 is based primarily on the availability of data. Since that boundary has passed, there have been notable developments in the issue areas considered here, which would likely feed back into the discussion with interesting effects. For instance, the binomial voting system that has long characterized the Chilean legislature is finally being disposed of, following votes in both houses of parliament in January 2015; the new system will rely more heavily on proportional representation, giving long-excluded small parties the chance to gain representation.¹⁶⁷ In Mexico, a student protest at the Ayotzinapa Normal School turned violent when the corrupt mayor called in allies from the local cartel to dispose of many of the protesters; the tragic disappearance of these students sparked national outrage and protest over government corruption.¹⁶⁸ Thus we see a localized protest activity escalate to the national stage, although the education focus is transformed into corruption charges; the event and its aftermath would nonetheless merit consideration in conjunction with the normal school activity examined in this study.

There ought to be more consideration of scale than was given in this study. A national level opportunity or threat that is widely perceived as such is more likely to prompt protest activity on a national scale, while localized or group-specific cues will only prompt activity within the group most affected. It is logical enough. Perhaps, then the most direct cause for the prolonged national strikes and protests in Chile and the lack of broad student movements for education reform in Mexico is that the Chilean government's willingness to discuss education plants the large-scale cues that prompt activity by the student population, whereas the lack of such government action in Mexico—perhaps driven by the

¹⁶⁷ "Electoral reform in Chile: Tie breaker," *The Economist*, February 14, 2015, accessed April 1, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21643216-new-voting-system-should-liven-up-politics-tie-breaker>.

¹⁶⁸ Al Jazeera Staff, "Dozens of students missing in Mexico after police fire on protest," *Al Jazeera America*, October 1, 2014, accessed October 10, 2014, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/1/guerrero-mexico-students.html>.

government's focus on economic and criminal problems—may explain the lack of large-scale activity to some extent. This, however, follows the line of thought that asserts the correctness of some variant of political opportunity theory.

Future studies would also benefit from a clearer consideration of the role of student organizations in protest activity such as that considered here. As previously mentioned, this would better account for resource mobilization theories than this analysis currently does. Although it is occasionally mentioned that the General Strike Council at the UNAM played a key part in maintaining the strike, or that the organizations stemming from the University of Chile historically led student movements in Santiago and continues to do so, it was not emphasized in the articles compiled to create the central dataset for this analysis and therefore is not considered carefully here. This variable would correlate with resource mobilization theories and its exclusion may remove a key detail from the study.

Considering these shortcomings, but understanding that this is a preliminary study at best, the next steps in continuing research should contribute to both the body of theory and to the available protest activity data. In the realm of theory, scale and temporality must be considered more closely in regard to cues and responses in order to eliminate some of the ambiguity in defining cues and in differentiating threats and opportunities, and to provide a more stable foundation for experimentation. More complete and easily accessible protest data for Latin America in particular would also enable more accurate studies and more reliable conclusions.

Appendix A

Additional Data Tables

Distribution of threat, opportunity, and ambiguous cues: Mexico and Chile

Table 3: Distribution of threat, opportunity, and ambiguous cues: Mexico and Chile

| | Mexico | | Chile | |
|---|--------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|
| | Number of events/answered cues | Percentage of all events/answered cues | Number of events/answered cues | Percentage of all events/answered cues |
| Threat (only) | 13 | 76.5% | 15 | 19.5% |
| Opportunity (only) | 1 | 5.9% | 25 | 32.5% |
| Both opportunity and threat | 1 | 5.9% | 26 | 33.8% |
| Threat (ambiguous) | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.3% |
| Opportunity (ambiguous) | 2 | 11.8% | 9 | 11.7% |
| Both opportunity and threat (ambiguous) | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.3% |
| Excluded | 0 | N/A | 2 | N/A |

As described in the main text, there was some ambiguity in coding threat and opportunity cues, which was simplified for the sake of discussion. In this table, those distinctions are maintained. The primacy of threat cues survived in Mexico, and there are actually more ambiguous opportunity cues than clear opportunity cues. In Chile, cues remain more evenly distributed among threat, opportunities, and double-coded cues, although the ambiguous opportunity cues, detract significantly from the opportunity cue count.

The ambiguity inherent to this process further reinforces the need for further theoretical work. However, it may also suggest that the previously displayed cue counts (Figure 2, Figure 3) are overly generous, detracting from the nuance of reading opportunity and threat and also insisting that a certain cue is at play when, in fact, no cue may be at play.

Party representation in the national legislatures of Mexico and Chile¹⁶⁹

Table 4: Party Representation in Mexico's Cámara de senadores

| Party | 1988 | | 1991 | | 1994 | | 1997 | | 2000 | | 2006 | | 2012 | |
|---|-----------------|---------------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| | Number of seats | Percentage of seats | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) | 60 | 93.8% | 61 | 95.3% | 95 | 74.8% | 76 | 59.4% | 58 | 45.3% | 33 | 25.8% | 52 | 40.6% |
| National Action Party (PAN) | - | - | 1 | 1.6% | 8 | 6.3% | 33 | 25.8% | - | - | 52 | 40.6% | 38 | 29.7% |
| Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) | 4 | 6.3% | 2 | 3.1% | 24 | 18.9% | 14 | 10.9% | - | - | 26 | 20.3% | 22 | 17.2% |
| <i>Formerly National Democratic Front</i> | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.8% | - | - | 4 | 3.1% | 5 | 3.9% |
| Labour Party (PT) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 0.8% | - | - | 6 | 4.7% | 9 | 7.0% |
| Green Party (PVEM) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | 4.7% | - | - |
| Convergence Party | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 0.8% | - | - |
| New Alliance Party | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Independents | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 2.3% | 0 | 0.0% | - | - | 2 | 1.6% |
| Alliance for Change* | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 53 | 41.4% | - | - | - | - |
| Alliance for Mexico** | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 17 | 13.3% | - | - | - | - |

*Alliance for Change in 2000 election is comprised of the PAN and Green Party.

**Alliance for Mexico in 2000 election is comprised of the PRD and Labour Party.

¹⁶⁹ “PARLINE database on national parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Table 5: Party representation in Mexico's Cámara de diputados

| Party | 1988 | | 1991 | | 1994 | | 1997 | | 2000 | | 2003 | | 2006 | | 2009 | | 2012 | |
|---|-----------------|---------------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| | Number of seats | Percentage of seats | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Institucional Revolutionary Party (PRI) | 260 | 52.0% | 320 | 64.0% | 300 | 60.0% | 238 | 47.6% | 211 | 42.2% | 222 | 44.4% | 104 | 20.8% | 237 | 47.4% | 212 | 42.4% |
| National Action Party (PAN) | 101 | 20.2% | 89 | 17.8% | 119 | 23.8% | 121 | 24.2% | - | - | 151 | 30.2% | 206 | 41.2% | 143 | 28.6% | 114 | 22.8% |
| (PRD), formerly National Democratic Front | 139 | 27.8% | 41 | 8.2% | 71 | 14.2% | 126 | 25.2% | - | - | 95 | 19.0% | 126 | 25.2% | 71 | 14.2% | 104 | 20.8% |
| Cardenista National Reconstruction Party | - | - | 23 | 4.6% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution | - | - | 15 | 3.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Popular Socialist Party (PPS) | - | - | 12 | 2.4% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Labour Party (PT) | - | - | - | - | 10 | 2.0% | 7 | 1.4% | - | - | 6 | 1.2% | 16 | 3.2% | 13 | 2.6% | 15 | 3.0% |
| Green Party (PVEM) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | 1.2% | - | - | 17 | 3.4% | 19 | 3.8% | 21 | 4.2% | 29 | 5.8% |
| Convergence Party | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 16 | 3.2% | 6 | 1.2% | - | - |
| New Alliance Party | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 9 | 1.8% | 9 | 1.8% | 10 | 2.0% |
| Social Democratic and Peasant Alternati | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4 | 0.8% | - | - | - | - |
| Citizens' Movement (MC) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Independents | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 0.4% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| "Other parties" | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | 9 | 1.8% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Alliance for Change* | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 221 | 44.2% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Alliance for Mexico** | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 68 | 13.6% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

* Alliance for Change in 2000 election is comprised of the PAN and Green Party.

** Alliance for Mexico in 2000 election is comprised of the PRD and Labour Party.

Table 6: Coalition representation in Chile's Senado

| Chile: Senado | 1989 | | 1993 | | 1997 | | 2001* | | 2005 | | 2009 | | 2013 | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| | Number of seats | Percentage of seats | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Coalition for Democracy (CPD) | 22 | 57.9% | 21 | 55.3% | 20 | 52.6% | (+9) | N/A | 20 | 52.6% | 19 | 50.0% | - | - |
| New Majority | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 21 | 55.3% |
| Democracy and Progress Pact | 16 | 42.1% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Union for Progress (UPC) | - | - | 17 | 44.7% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Union for Chile Pact (PUC) | - | - | - | - | 15 | 39.5% | (+9) | N/A | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Alliance for Chile (APC) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 17 | 44.7% | - | - | - | - |
| Coalition for Change (CC) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 16 | 42.1% | - | - |
| Alliance | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 16 | 42.1% |
| Chile 2000 | - | - | - | - | 1 | 2.6% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Left List | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Humanist Party | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Communist Party | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Pacific Independents | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 5.3% | - | - |
| Independents | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 2.6% | 1 | 2.6% | 1 | 2.6% |

*The Inter-Parliamentary Union database does not provide total seat information for the 2001 results; only provides the seats won in the election, when 18 of 38 senatorial seats were up for election.

Table 7: Coalition representation in Chile's Cámara de diputados

| Chile: Cámara de diputados | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|---------------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|--------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| Total seats by coalition following legislative elections, 1989-2013 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coalition | 1989 | | 1993 | | 1997 | | 2001 | | 2005 | | 2009 | | 2013 | |
| | Number of seats | Percentage of seats | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Coalition for Democracy (CPD) | 69 | 57.5% | 69 | 57.5% | 70 | 58.3% | 62 | 51.7% | 65 | 54.2% | 57 | 47.5% | - | - |
| New Majority | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 67 | 55.8% |
| Democracy and Progress Pact | 48 | 40.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Union for Progress (UPC) | - | - | 45 | 37.5% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Union for Chile Pact (PUC) | - | - | - | - | 47 | 39.2% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Alliance for Chile (APC) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 57 | 47.50% | 54 | 45.0% | - | - | - | - |
| Coalition for Change (CC) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 58 | 48.3% | - | - |
| Alliance | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 49 | 40.8% |
| Unity for Democracy | 2 | 1.7% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Chile 2000 | - | - | - | - | 1 | 0.8% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Left List | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Humanist Party | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Communist Party | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Clean Chile-Vote Happy | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 2.5% | - | - |
| Pactfree Independents | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 1.7% | - | - |
| Independents | 1 | 0.8% | 6 | 5.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.8% | 1 | 0.8% | - | - | 3 | 2.5% |
| "Chile can change, if you want it to" | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 0.8% |

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ACADEMIC VITA

Katherine I. Milliken

kim5211@psu.edu

Educational Experience

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

The Schreyer Honors College | College of the Liberal Arts

Expected Graduation: May 2015 | Bachelor of Arts in International Politics & Bachelor of Arts in Spanish

Honors: Phi Beta Kappa National Honors Society

International Experience

Santiago, Chile | Study Abroad

July 2013-December 2013

- Enrolled in courses at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Universidad Diego Portales, and through the Council on International Education Exchange (CIEE)
- Lived with a Chilean family throughout the entirety of the program
- Acquired proficiency in Spanish

Related Experience

Education & Community Outreach Intern

May 2014-August 2014

The Mann Center for the Performing Arts | Philadelphia, PA

- Independently booked and tracked reservations for 10 participatory workshops for children ages 4-13; coordinated payments to bus companies to transport these groups to the Mann Center concert venue
- Managed basic accounting within the Education Department, including writing check requests, tracking and documenting expenses in budgetary records, and distributing checks to their recipients
- Responded to patron and artist inquiries via phone and email, drafted and edited letters to artists and coordinators
- Designed concert programs, series (6) of four-page workshop study guides for elementary school-aged children

Intern

January 2013-April 2013

The Center for Global Studies, The Pennsylvania State University | University Park, PA

- Assisted in the execution of a conference of the Worldwide Universities Network (WUN) ("Geographies of Power: Justice, Revolution, and Cultural Imagination"), April 2013
- Created and implemented lesson plans for 2 after-school clubs at the Young Scholars of Central Pennsylvania Charter School (grades K-5)
- Wrote monthly newsletter articles and weekly blog posts pertaining to CGS's activities, along with resource documents to support other CGS-sponsored events at the university and throughout Centre County

Work Experience

Sales Associate

June 2012-August 2012 / May 2013-July 2013

Kid to Kid | Drexel Hill, PA

- Attended to all basic customer needs (questions about merchandise, the store's buying and selling process, etc.)
- Responsible for operating and securing a cash register containing amounts exceeding \$1000, daily

Activities

Fundraising Chair

August 2014-May 2015

The Penn State Thespians

- Designed and executed small-scale fundraising activities for the club (bake sales, concessions sales, etc.)
- Directed and Produced the club's cabaret fundraiser, Harmonies 2015
- Negotiated agreements with local businesses on the club's behalf (flower donations, performance space)