

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

VETO PLAYERS AND POST-REGIME CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
CASE ANALYSIS OF GEORGIA, GREECE, AND THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO

K. CLAIRE GREENSMITH
SPRING 2015

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for baccalaureate degrees in International Politics and French and Francophone Studies
with honors in Political Science

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Sona N. Golder
Associate Professor, College of the Liberal Arts
Thesis Supervisor

Gretchen Casper
Associate Professor, College of the Liberal Arts
Honors Adviser

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College.

ABSTRACT

Following a regime change, political actors must decide to whom and how power within a new regime will be distributed. Oftentimes this discussion takes place between the political elite and other actors, known as veto players, whose agreement is needed to peacefully establish the new regime. This study argues that *who* is included in the discussion determines whether or not the state's new regime will experience conflict after its formation. Using a comparative case analysis of Georgia (1991-1995), Greece (1967-1973), and the Republic of Congo (1992-1995), the results of this study indicate that including all veto players in the negotiations to form the new regime improves the likelihood of that regime's durability.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	iii
LIST OF TABLES	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	V
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Chapter 2 Theory	3
The Actors Involved.....	3
Acceptance of Outcome	5
History of Conflict	7
Case Selection.....	8
Chapter 3 Case I: Georgia (1990-1995).....	14
Chapter 4 Case Study II: Greece (1967-1974).....	30
Chapter 5 Case Study III: The Republic of Congo (1992-1995)	47
Chapter 6 Conclusion.....	68
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	70

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5.1 Republic of Congo Districts, 199249

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Case Study Selection	9
Table 3.1 Georgia Veto Players, 1990-1992.....	20
Table 3.2 Georgia Veto Players, 1992-1993.....	23
Table 4.1 Greek Veto Players, 1967	34
Table 4.2 Greek Presidential Election Results, November 1974	41
Table 4.3 Greek Veto Players, 1974	42
Table 5.1 Republic of Congo Legislative Election Results, May 1992	50
Table 5.2 Republic of Congo Presidential Election Results, 1992	51
Table 5.3 Republic of Congo Veto Players, 1992.....	54
Table 5.4 Republic of Congo Legislative Election Results, June 1993	57
Table 5.5 Republic of Congo Veto Players, 1993-1994	59

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first and foremost like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Sona Golder, for her consistent guidance and support. Her suggestions while discussing my work were greatly appreciated, and my research would not have been complete without her insights. I would also like to thank my professor and second reader, Dr. Gretchen Casper. While ideas for this thesis were first being formulated, her advice shaped the dimensions of my work and encouraged me to explore my interests within political science. Their advice and encouragement made this thesis possible.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Why do post-regime change settlements deteriorate in some states and not others? During negotiations, what affects the longevity of the settlement among various parties in a state? It would seem logical for actors to negotiate, reach a mutually advantageous accord, and abide by the agreement following a regime transition. Greater political stability is linked to less civil violence and increased economic growth (Alesina et al., 1995). Yet, while a state's actors have incentives to avoid internal conflict by abiding by the peace settlement, this does not always happen.

Despite the cooperation and efforts of multiple parties within a state, dissatisfied actors may default from the agreement and cause conflict. Such was the case in the Republic of Congo following the country's first multiparty elections after thirty years as an authoritarian regime. Political actors failed to follow the constitution, actors mobilized, and war broke out in 1992. Negotiated settlements after regime changes, then, do not guarantee lasting peace and compromises between actors. Although they may stem from diplomatic intentions, negotiated agreements remain susceptible to future conflict.

Other cases, however, indicate that regime changes can occur with minimal intrastate conflict. Greece's transition from a parliamentary monarchy to a military junta (1967-1973) and subsequently to a democracy (1973-1974) is an example of this. Deposing the monarchy and thwarting its attempts of a counterrevolution, Giorgios Papadopoulos rose to power in 1967 and led the military junta until 1973, when his own government was overthrown and replaced his

chief military leader, Dimitrios Ioannidis. Ioannidis himself was ousted in 1974, at which point elections were held and Konstantinos Karamanlis led Greece's transition to a democracy. What is interesting about Greece's transitions is that, despite the numerous 'irregular' changes of power and regime type, at no point was there an outbreak of violence between intrastate actors. Conflict was limited, and in the end free elections endured. What, then, causes some transition settlements to be more durable than others?

In this paper, I aim to determine how the inclusion of veto players during regime formation impacts the resulting regime's durability. I argue that negotiated settlements are more successful when all veto players, or those who are capable of unilaterally continuing conflict, are included in the negotiations. I aim to do so by analyzing the players involved in regime formation following changes in leadership through a comparative case analysis. In addition to examining who was involved in the regime formation, I also consider how the change in leadership came about – whether it was a 'regular' or 'irregular' regime change. Analysis from the cases studies of Georgia (1991-1993), Greece (1967-1974), and the Republic of Congo (1991-1995) reveals that, to increase the likelihood of the new regime's stability, it is critical to include all veto players during the negotiated formation of the new regime.

Chapter 2

Theory

In this section, I present the key elements to my theoretical argument. The actors involved in negotiations, whether all actors accept the outcome, and a history of conflict all affect the success of negotiated settlements. I also discuss how my case selection strategy allows me to show how the level of success of different kinds of regime change *varies* in the *strategically* expected ways.

The Actors Involved

When examining negotiations among intrastate actors, a large amount of attention has been drawn to the role of third parties. Third parties, such as international states and institutions, facilitate communication between intrastate actors during peace negotiations and are often charged with solving the state's security dilemma in a power-sharing institution (Hartzell et al. 2003, 7). And while third parties acting as mediators may facilitate discussion, their commitment to peace following a negotiated settlement's conclusion is critical for maintaining peace. International actors can act as custodians of peace, deterring spoilers, or those who undermine attempts to achieve peace emerging from negotiations (Stedman 1997, 12). To sustain peace and deter or defeat spoilers, third parties must be willing to intervene and wield power to increase the cost for actors to reengage in conflict. In the absence of a third party guarantor, however, spoilers may be tempted to breach a peace agreement. In the absence of committed intervention by a third

party, combatants are just as likely to use an armistice as an opportunity to recover and rearm in preparation for a future fight (Toft 2006, 20). Moreover, some actors may not find third parties credible. Third parties, subject to domestic opinion and capabilities, may not always have the means or stake of interest to commit resources and incur the cost of engaging in another's conflict, especially if its commitment to intervention wanes over time (Stedman 1997, Greenhill 2007, Kenwick 2015). Negotiated peace settlements have also been found to be considerably more durable when they arise between disputants rather than in the presence of a third party intervener (Kenwick 2015, 21). Thus, while the presence of third parties can ameliorate communication and commitment problems among parties during a negotiation, their presence and effect is not always guaranteed. If this is the case, it is perhaps actors within the state who matter the most during peace negotiations.

Veto Players

If a state cannot rely on a third party to guarantee the durability of the peace agreement and yet it wishes to avoid future conflict, it should follow that all important actors are needed to comply and accept the terms of the new peace agreement. These important actors might also be referred to as 'veto players', or parties and actors whose support is required in order to change the status quo (Tsebelis 2000, Cunningham 2013). They are also assumed to be cohesive, or capable of avoiding fractionating during conflict, and viable, or capable of continuing conflict unilaterally against all other combatants and their agreements (Cunningham 2006, 879). And while veto players are capable of continuing unilateral conflict, this does not mean that they will choose to use their power. As Tsebelis writes, "if the veto power is rarely executed, it is because it rarely needs to be exercised. However, the veto power [of the player] is always available" (Tsebelis 1990, 141). In this sense, all veto players are what Stedman would refer to as potential civil war

spoilers, or those who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve peace emerging from negotiations.

Given that veto players have the capability to prevent all other parties from reaching a new status quo, it is crucial to have their support for a negotiated settlement in order to prevent its deterioration. This implies that all veto players must be involved in the bargaining process or have preferences that converge with other veto players. From this I predict that negotiations resulting from bargaining processes in which all veto players are included and agree upon the outcome are less likely to deteriorate because the veto players will value the cost of conflict as greater than their status quo position.

H1: Following a regime change, negotiations including all veto players are more likely to result in longer regime durability.

Since, by definition, veto players are capable of unilaterally preventing change from the status quo or continuing conflict, all veto players' support for a negotiation is necessary in order to sustain peace. Failure to include all veto players leaves a newly instated regime vulnerable to even a single veto player's dissatisfaction with the new status quo, prompting his decision to engage in conflict. In this way, I hypothesize that inclusion of all veto players in the regime transition's process will lead to greater settlement durability following the transition.

Acceptance of Outcome

Whether or not the negotiated settlement achieves and keeps the support of veto players depends largely on how they feel about the outcome, which is chiefly determined by how much their preferences differ from the new status quo. Actors are more likely to engage in conflict if

they perceive that they can improve their position and are more likely to do so the farther away their preferences are from the status quo (Zartman 2002). Having preferences that differ greatly from the status quo means that there is wider range of alternative outcomes that actors would be willing to accept. In other words, the farther the status quo is from what the group considers its most preferred outcome, the more possible outcomes there are that it would prefer to the status quo in order to improve its relative position. One way in which to achieve such a new outcome is through engaging in conflict. Dissatisfied groups take up arms when they feel they have exhausted conventional political channels to resolve their grievances, particularly if they desire to change the political system (Zartman 2002, 298). In such a case, the costs of conflict relative to expected payoffs of continued conventional political channels decrease, thereby incentivizing action involving arms. How is it, then, that designers of peace settlements can prevent this course of action from happening?

Just as actors may be more inclined to take up arms to change the status quo in their favor, so they may be hesitant to do so if they stand to lose ground. Examining the outcomes of military victories compared to negotiated settlements, Toft corroborates Cunningham's assertion that non-veto players should be excluded during negotiations. She finds that wars ended by negotiated settlement are three times more likely to reignite than those ended by military victory and suggests that fewer divisions of power among actors may contribute to increased settlement stability of military victories over negotiated settlements (Toft 2006, 13). Unlike military victories where parties adhere to the authority of a declared winner, negotiated outcomes lead to the survival of multiple actors who are organized enough to share power in a postwar government (Toft 2006, 29). Gaining less from a negotiated settlement may mean increasing the

incentive for actors to reengage in conflict. In this way, I predict that having fewer veto players and more post allocations will lead to greater regime settlement durability.

H2: Following a regime change, negotiations including solely veto players will result in greater regime durability than those that include non-veto players.

As previously mentioned, fewer actors involved in a bargaining process generally results in fewer bargaining constraints (Cunningham 2006, 891). Thus, players who receive more concessions, such as influential political appointments, while the new regime is being formed will have a higher satisfaction and be less likely to initiate conflict because the cost of doing so could mean the risk of losing their favorable position. In other words, the more actors gain from a new status quo, the more they stand to potentially lose by changing it. A greater political influence to veto player ratio therein raises the cost of conflict and should result in greater peace settlement durability.

History of Conflict

States with histories of conflict may be more prone to experience it in the future. Those that have experienced highly fatal interstate and intrastate wars have been found to have a correlated relationship with failed peace after negotiations (Hartzel et al. 2003). Furthermore, irregular regime changes, or occasions wherein a leader loses power through irregular means not prescribed by the state's constitution, such as a coup or violent overthrow, signal greater political opportunity structures to actors, or occasions where actors have the potential to gain greater political power.

Using the notion of political opportunity structure, Gleditsch et al. studied leaders' security of holding office in relation to prospects of civil conflict following irregular regime changes and found civil war onset to be "considerably more likely in instances [of] irregular transitions" (Gleditsch et al. 2010, 304). The results of their study indicate that irregular transitions signal state weakness, or political opportunity, which increases the risk of civil war through encouraging aggression from challengers against the regime

Harzfel et al.'s work suggests that states with a history of conflict are more likely to experience conflict in the future, and given Gleditsch et al.'s findings about civil war onset following irregular regime changes, this has important implications for my study. It is not the case that all regime changes are equal but rather that certain types of regime change, namely irregular regime change, leave states predisposed to failed regime durability in the future. Gleditsch et al. do not examine how the governments were formed following the change and, recalling Cunningham's findings, the role of veto players may have a significant impact on the likelihood of the new regime's stability. In this study, the type of regime change is taken into consideration, as is the bargaining power of veto players.

Case Selection

Given that states with a history of violence are more prone to future violence, in my comparative case analysis I examine regime changes that are both considered 'irregular', or that occur unconstitutionally, as well as 'regular', or transitions in government that occur as prescribed by the country's constitution. I also investigate cases in which conflict occurred as a result of irregular and regular regime changes and, for comparison, where no violence occurred

following an irregular regime change. I do not, however, examine a case in which a regular regime change resulted in no conflict. The results of such a case are not considered anomalous but are, rather, the expected outcome, and thus do not provide us with deviations from the status quo to help our understanding about veto players' importance during times of regime change. The following cases, however, do exemplify deviations from the expected pattern of regime change and I shall attempt to examine and explain how their outcomes relate to the veto player theorem using my hypotheses.

Table 2.1 Case Study Selection

	No Conflict	Conflict
Regular Transition		Republic of Congo (1992-1994)
Irregular Transition	Greece (1967-1974)	Georgia (1991-1995)

Irregular Transition, Conflict: Georgia 1991-1995:

The antithesis of the expected regime change pattern, Georgia (1991-1995) is a case wherein a successful military coup d'état resulted in intra state conflicts and spurred inter-ethnic wars. Since its independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, Georgia had experienced political and territorial tensions.¹ On May 26, 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected as independent Georgia's first president. His time in office, however, was short-lived. Gamsakhurdia was accused of authoritarian rule and suppression of ethnic minorities while

¹ Political tensions among the elite centered around control over military forces while territorial conflicts were rooted in ethnic groups' aspirations for independence, such as the conflict in South Ossetia.

economic conditions in Georgia continued to worsen (Areshidze 2007, 31).² In December 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was deposed by an anti-government coalition led by the Mkhedrioni (Horsemen) and the National Guard. A military council led by the chief of the Mkhedrioni, Jaba Ioseliani, and head of the National Guard, Tengiz Kitovani, subsequently took over while Gamsakhurdia and members of his government fled Georgia. Despite his exile, Gamsakhurdia continued to assert himself as Georgia's legitimate leader and his supporters, known as 'Zviadists', continued to clash with Georgia's new leaders until Gamsakhurdia's death on December 31, 1993 (Areshidze 2007, 31).

The conflict in Georgia from 1991 through 1993 is an example of an irregular transition that resulted in a civil war motivated by the struggle for political control. Until December 1993, when a deal struck between Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and the Soviet Union led to Soviet support and shifted the war in favor of the Georgian government, competing forces of the Georgian civil war had limited external influence and this allows us to examine the veto players within the state to see how their roles influenced the political events within Georgia (Coppietes 2005, 129).

Irregular Transition, No Conflict: Greece (1967-1974)

Until 1967, Greece's monarchy and parliament continuously competed for political influence until tensions came to a head during what is known as the Apostasia of 1965. King

² The conflict in South Ossetia over the region's autonomy began in November 1989 and lasted until January 1990. During this time, about 3,100 South Ossetians fought approximately 2,700 Georgian forces. Russian forces were accused of aiding the South Ossetians in an effort to gain political influence in Georgia by transferring arms and using artillery and un-marked aircrafts for reconnaissance and bombings (Splidsboel 2009, 18). In an effort to weaken Soviet influence in South Ossetia, Gamsakhurdia instated of Georgia. This meant that all-union enterprises in Georgia stopped receiving most of their supplies and a lack of energy resources forced much of Georgian industry to shut down blockades of Georgia goods, to which the Soviet Union responded by creating their own partial blockade (Armenia 1995, 197).

Constantine II called for the resignation of the prominent Center Union leader Prime Minister Papandreu and replaced him with another member of the Center Union. This led to increased political tensions and mounting strikes and protests (Koumoulides 1977, 86). On April 21, 1967 the Regime of Colonels, or a group of four Greek army colonels, seized power in a successful coup d'état. Strategically placing tanks, the colonels sealed Athens, surrounded the king's country palace in Tatoi, and arrested all leading politicians and conspirators. Approximately 10,000 arrests were made during the coup, yet the events on April 21, 1967 and those following it, including King Constantine II's failed counter-coup on December 13, 1967, successful coup by Ioannides, and transition of Greece to a parliamentary system, were bloodless (Ganser 2005, 221).³ The Greek military junta of 1967-1974 thus is an example in which, despite the irregular regime transition via a coup d'état, the state experienced minimal conflict afterwards. Certainly there were objections to the shifts in power, as seen by King Constantine II's counter coup attempt in December 1967, but these objections did not result in significant bloodshed. Based upon my first hypothesis, we would expect that all veto players in this scenario either accepted the regime change, either because their relative position improved because of it or they observed a reason compelling them to not intervene and prevent the change of the status quo.

Regular Transition, Conflict: The Republic of Congo (1992-1994)

Perhaps the least common scenario of all is when a regular regime transition is followed by intrastate conflict. Of the intrastate conflicts that have occurred since the Second World War, very few intrastate conflicts followed regular regime changes and even fewer that were political

³ There were no significant (23+) battle-related deaths involving armed forces from the military coup through the return to a parliamentary system in 1974 (UCDP/PRIIO 2014).

in nature (UCDP/PRIO 2014).⁴ In this study, in order to be considered a regular regime change followed by conflict, a transition must have occurred according to the rules of an agreed-upon constitution but then followed by an outbreak in violence. This is precisely what happened in the Republic of Congo in 1992.

Following months of civil unrest and demands for democracy, in 1991 the Republic of Congo began its transition to a multiparty state. After twenty years as an authoritarian regime, the Republic of Congo held its first round of multiparty elections in May 1992, the results of which indicated that Pascal Lissouba of the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) had a lead. Opposition parties disputed the results of the elections, claiming fraud and refusing to take part in re-run elections of parliament (Klein 1992). On August 21, 1993, Lissouba and the UPADS won the majority of votes in this election and, through a coalition with the rival Congolese Labor Party (PCT) led by former president Denis Sassou-Nguessou, Lissouba not only won the presidency but also controlled a majority in the National Assembly. A peaceful transition, however, was short-lived. Bernard Kolélas of the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI) advocated for a military solution to the political conflict (Weiss 1996,10). During the summer of 1993, violence between the government and opposition resulted in at least 30 deaths in Brazzaville. Meanwhile, the major political forces began to form their own militias (UCDP 2015).

On November 3, 1993 fighting broke out between the army, siding with Lissouba's government, and the Ninjas, or the armed militia group in support of MCDDI. Tenuous ceasefire

⁴ Using Uppsala Armed Conflict Database, I investigated the causes of and motivations for conflict in intrastate wars since World War II. Of the 76 of intrastate conflicts, only two were identified as rooted in political tensions, followed a regular regime transition and were not ongoing conflicts. These two cases included Costa Rica, following its first democratic elections in 1948, and the Republic of Congo following its transition to a multiparty system in 1992.

agreements were made between parties until early 1994, when both sides agreed to disarm their militias, integrate forces, and create an intervention force to maintain peace.

The Republic of Congo remained relatively peaceful until 1997, when government troops attempted to disarm the armed militia group of the PCT, known as the Cobras, led by former president Denis Sassou-Nguesso. This outbreak of conflict led to three years of civil war, the displacement of at least 200,000 people, and over 10,000 deaths (Global Security). Thus, in the case of the Republic of Congo, political conflict occurred despite the regular transition from an authoritarian government to a democracy. Despite negotiations and agreements, peace remained tenuous. If the aforementioned hypothesis holds, then we should expect to see one or veto players dissatisfied with the new status quo, causing conflict in the state.

Chapter 3

Case I: Georgia (1990-1995)

Georgia, 1990-1992

The conflict in Georgia began with the rise to power of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. In 1990, Gamsakhurdia was a charismatic leader and dissident who spoke directly to the pro-independence opposition movement for Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union. Widely honored and recognized by the strong nationalist movement, he moved naturally to a position of leadership as Georgia's Chairman of the Supreme Council in November 1990 (Armenia 1995, 166). His Round Table/Free Georgia coalition, meanwhile, had won a majority in the Supreme Soviet, Georgia's official parliamentary body, in October 1990 and Georgia's declaration of independence in April 1990 brought a surge of nationalism that got Gamsakhurdia elected as president in May 1991 (Armenia 1995, 166). Yet after the initial resounding approval from the Georgian population, Gamsakhurdia's regime was gradually seen as an incompetent government amidst fractured political elite, a sight that would ultimately lead to Gamsakhurdia's irregular removal from office (Areshidze 2007, 24).

Although initially Gamsakhurdia's decision to appoint prominent politician Tengiz Sigua as head of the new government was almost universally praised (Armenia 1995, 209), it soon became clear that his system of appointments was not sufficient enough to secure his regime. Georgia's new nationalists were not able to replace the well-entrenched patronage networks

based on personal trust with more modern, impersonal state bureaucracy. Gamsakhurdia placed individuals and personal associates in positions based upon loyalty and as a result placed inexperienced individuals in positions of great responsibility (Areshidze 2007, 21). Gamsakhurdia lacked a strong political team to help him govern. In the legislature, too, there was little political backing for Gamsakhurdia. The patronage networks, old cadres and urban intelligentsia that had brought him to power, were not represented in the legislature, and the inexperienced parliament was thus never in a position to halt the erosion of the state (Coppieters 2005, 102). Politics in Georgia remained dominated by personal rivalries, especially within the national movement, and Gamsakhurdia was too inept to unite such a divided national movement. As a result, little cohesion developed within the national movement and “nationalist mobilization had thus led to electoral victory, but did not create state unity” (Coppieters 2005, 102).

In addition to the lack of parliamentary cohesion, Gamsakhurdia was concerned with the armed opposition. While Gamsakhurdia’s Round Table/Free Georgia coalition had its own informal military unit, so, too, did several opposition factions within the Georgian National Congress, which had been legalized by the previous communist Supreme Soviet under pressure from the informal groups (Armenia 1995, 168). Among the informal groups was the Mkhedrioni (“Knights”) and the National Guard led by Java Ioseliani and Tengiz Kitovani, respectively.

The Mkhedrioni was a loose union of criminal groups and juvenile gangs from Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital, created in 1989 by Java Ioseliani to defend Georgia from Soviet oppression. Opposed to Gamsakhurdia since its establishment, the Mkhedrioni’s activities were funded from criminal dealings, such as extortion and racketeering. “Essentially, the Mkhedrioni was the weapons-bearing arm of successful businessmen-patriots who put their private army at the service of the state when it was waging war against secessionist minorities” (Coppieters 2005,

104). The National Guard, led by Tengiz Kitovani, was founded in 1990 with the intention of one day making it the state's armed force. However, it resisted incorporation into the state structure and refused to pledge loyalty to the president. Its funding, meanwhile, came from an almost nonexistent state budget and contributions from successful black-market entrepreneurs (Coppieters 2005, 105). By the spring of 1991 it boasted 12,000 men.

Throughout the summer of 1991 Gamsakhurdia's leadership style and policy decisions became increasingly erratic and authoritarian while his attitude toward became more strident. In an August 1991 interview, Gamsakhurdia addressed the opposition within Georgia, stating that the liberal group would "set (Georgia) on a path to anarchy" and calling the opposition "criminal" ("Interviewed" FBIS, 1991). In addition to his erratic actions, Gamsakhurdia lost greater credibility after the attempted coup against Gorbachev in Moscow in August 1991. Rather than condemning the coup, he told the Georgian National Guard to disband and become a part of the military police integrated into the Soviet Interior Ministry, a demotion for which Kitovani and his guardsmen would not forgive Gamsakhurdia. Instead, Kitovani led his troops in a rebellion against Gamsakhurdia by refusing to disarm and leading them out of Tbilisi. This effectively left Gamsakhurdia without a military force. At this time, too, a small but vocal parliamentary opposition to Gamsakhurdia began to organize, particularly after Gamsakhurdia's troops had forcibly dispersed a large opposition rally in Tbilis in September 1991. In August 1991 Tengiz Sigua resigned as prime minister, frustrated by Gamsakhurdia, and several of Gamsakhurdia's top supporters within the Round Table/Free Georgia bloc joined forces with the opposition in a coalition with Sigua and Kitovani. Collectively they called for Gamsakhurdia's resignation and new elections that very same year. Gamsakhurdia refused to meet these demands.

As Zürcher writes: “The coup against Gamsakhurdia, was also a consequence of division and state weakness. ... Gamsakhurdia did not subordinate the engineers of violence and the defection of the National Guard paved the way for his overthrow” (Coppeters 2005, 103). These engineers also included the Mkhedrioni, who by the end of 1991 were over 5,000 strong. Gamsakhurdia’s parliament had tried to outlaw these groups and order them to surrender their weapons, but to no avail. Instead, both the government and extraparliamentary opposition intensified the purchase and ‘liberation’ of large quantities of weapons, mostly from Soviet military units stationed in Georgia, including heavy artillery, tanks, helicopter gunships and armored personnel carriers (Armenia 1995, 170).

On December 22, 1991, 500 National Guardsmen and Mkhedrioni fighters besieged Gamsakhurdia and his supporters in the parliament building. At a meeting in Tbilisi less than a week before Gamsakhurdia fled, Kitovani rejected the notion that the Military Council was conducting a coup, saying:

“We were not conducting an active struggle against him until it became clear to world public opinion that Gamsakhurdia had instituted an authoritarian regime of personal dictatorship in Georgia. So, what this now can and should be described as is not a military coup, but the toppling of a dictatorship in the name of establishing democratic order” (Kocketkov 1992).

Unable to resist against the opposition, on January 6, 1992 President Zviad Gamsakhurdia fled in exile to Armenia and the opposition claimed victory.

Having removed and exiled Gamsakhurdia, Kitovani and Ioseliani assumed the role of supreme authority with Tengiz Sigua as the Military Council. All ‘state structures’ were to carry out the decisions of the Military Council until a new government could be formed under the republic (Sigua 1992). Yet, despite gaining control of the government in Tbilisi, the Military

Council lacked both the political legitimacy and the political savvy necessary to maintain its control (Areshidze 2007, 26). The nation's support remained divided.⁵ Gamsakhurdia continued to have substantial backing in Georgia, despite his absence. Support for the exiled president came especially from rural areas and his home region of Mingrelia in Western Georgia, where supporters viewed themselves as “victims of an illegal and unconstitutional putsch” and refused to participate in elections (Armenia 1995, 178).

Almost immediately after resuming his position as prime minister, Sigua started drafting a new election law to legitimize the next elected government and adopt a new electoral system, using single transferable vote, to prevent Gamsakhurdia from regaining power.⁶ Under pressure from other political elites, the Military Council chose to invite Eduard Shevardnadze to return to Georgia to take over the reins of power.

In March 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze returned to Georgia at the invitation of the Military Council and shortly thereafter the Military Council was reformed as the State Council Presidium, which included Shevardnadze, Ioseliani, Sigua, and Kitovani. Prior to Georgia's independence, Eduard Shevardnadze had been known in Georgia for his anti-corruption work and, until it collapsed in 1991, he had worked within the Soviet Union as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Shevardnadze “commanded a high reputation internationally and within Georgia, and was widely seen as a senior statesman who could lead Georgia out of civil war” (Coppieters 2005, 94). Unsurprisingly, Gamsakhurdia opposed the new member of the State Council Presidium and

⁵ Two days before Gamsakhurdia fled Tbilisi, Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs and the republican procurator's office were reported to have voiced support for the new Military Council while some areas of Georgia, such as Rustavi, continued to publicly state support for the president. (Sigua 1992).

⁶ This system guaranteed representation of small parties in parliament, making it difficult for any one figure to get a majority of popular votes to control the parliament.

continued to characterize Shevardnadze as an agent of Moscow in a neocommunist conspiracy against Georgia. Gamsakhurdia could not, however, erase Shevardnadze's personal prestige.

Veto Players, Georgia (1990-1992)

At the time of Gamsakhurdia's removal there were a number of informal militaries in Georgia, all of which were small in number and none of which were under one central authority. The largest of these forces was the National Guard, led by Tengiz Kitovani. The National Guard's role in the coup was critical to its success, though in all fewer than 500 fighters participated (Coppieters 2005, 100). Because so few fighters were needed to remove Gamsakhurdia from Tbilisi, it is conceivable that any one of the paramilitary forces could have acted as a veto player to remove the president. As the events unfolded, however, only the National Guard and Mkhedrioni would step forward and assume control over the state. Because other forces, aside from the Zviadists, did not act to either assume control of Georgia or overthrow the new Military Council and subsequent State Council Presidium, it can be inferred that these forces were either indifferent to the new regime or, more likely, were in support of Gamsakhurdia's approval and preferred the new regime. That the informal military units gradually joined ranks with the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni suggests they were in support of the new regime.

Table 3.1 Georgia Veto Players, 1990-1992

Veto Player	Leader	Size, # of men
Sachkhere Square	Beso Kutateladze	200-500
Imedi	Nodar Natadze (Popular Front)	200
‘Tetri Artsivi’	Ghia Kharkharashvili	120
National Guard	Tengiz Kitovani	12,000
Mkhedrioni	Java Ioseliani	500
Union of Afghans/Afghansti	Nodar Giorgadze	200
‘Tetri Georgi’	--	--
‘Zviadist’ Forces	Zviad Gamsakhurdia	--

Source: Small Arms Survey

Having stated the preferred outcomes of the identified veto players, it seems the Georgian Civil War (1991-1993) was inevitable given Gamsakhurdia’s opposition to the new regime, despite all others’ permissiveness. Based upon the first hypothesis, in order to prevent a civil war from occurring, Gamsakhurdia would have to be included in the negotiation process of forming the new regime. This, however, did not happen.

Georgia, 1992-1993

From the time of his return to Georgia, Shevardnadze used his great personal prestige and talent as a mediator to forge a viable political coalition, moving slowly and skillfully to strengthen his power base and piece back together Georgia’s statehood (Coppieters 2005, 103). Knowing that he needed allies, Shevardnadze promoted the Mkhedrioni to the status of a security

force under the Ministry of the Interior in March 1992 and equipped it with weapons from Soviet holdings within the state. Kitovani remained Georgia's minister of defense and Ioseliani's Mkhedrioni was tasked with organizing the war against Gamsakhurdia's supporters in Western Georgia. In this way both Kitovani and Ioseliani were placed in positions of power within Shevardnadze's government, which would enable him to continue creating his own government to legitimize his authority without facing political, and military, opposition (Coppoeters 2005, 126).

Having secured the approval of his counterparts, Shevardnadze's next objective was to legitimize his own power. He called for elections to be held as soon as possible, but a lack of political control postponed these until October 1992. Because of Shevardnadze's unparalleled respect and recognition within Georgia, the State Council acted to separate Shevardnadze from party politics by creating a powerful chairman of parliament post, which would also be contested in the October elections. Shevardnadze also avoided party affiliation in order to maintain his nonpartisan position, despite being wooed by the Democratic Union and other parties (Armenia 1995, 210). The Central Election Commission accepted every party that submitted an application for the elections and, consequently, no one party received a majority within the legislature. Meanwhile Shevardnadze won 96 percent of the 74 percent voter turnout. This allowed Shevardnadze "to exercise a great deal of influence over the political process after elections because he was the only individual who commanded the respect of the various groups" (Areshidze 2007, 35). International monitors from ten nations reported, with minor exceptions, the balloting was free and fair. Unsurprisingly, Gamsakhurdia declared that the results were rigged and invalid. In November 1992 the new parliament also ratified Shevardnadze's power as chief executive, supreme commander of the armed forces, and head of state. This ratification

along with the elections gave Shevardnadze the democratic and constitutional legitimacy that he had lacked during his assumption of power.

Having gained political legitimacy, Shevardnadze began forming his government while hoping to avoid the one-man rule imposed by Gamsakhurdia and keeping a firm grip on central power to prevent regional separatism that threatened Georgia. As the head of state, Shevardnadze appointed all senior military leaders, provincial officials and deputy prime ministers. Many appointees to top governmental posts, including several ministers, had held positions in the apparatus of the Georgian Communist Party and of those less than 10 percent were former communists and more than half came from opposition parties (Armenia 1995, 214). Perhaps most importantly for Shevardnadze was that the major parliamentary reform factions were not able to maintain a coalition to promote reform legislation so that Shevardnadze's radical opposition, a combination of several very small parties, was weakened by disunity (Armenia 1995, 215). Meanwhile a lack of dominant parties and a large number of independent deputies meant that Shevardnadze dominated parliamentary sessions. Although Shevardnadze was able to appease his political counterparts with positions of power while his potential political opposition remained weakened by disorganization, Shevardnadze continued to face opposition from the Zviadists.

In September 1993 Gamsakhurdia took advantage of the Abkhazia ethno-territorial conflict in western Georgia and rallied the enthusiastic but disorganized Mingrelians against the Georgian army. Along with Abkhazian troops, Gamsakhurdia forces took control of several towns in western Georgia, humiliating Shevardnadze and forcing the Georgian military to retreat. After his defeat, Shevardnadze was forced to appeal to Russia for military backing against Gamsakhurdia in mid-October 1993. In return for Russian weapons, supply-line security, and

technical assistance, Georgia was forced to become a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a regional organization of former Soviet Union states. Energized by Russian military backing, however, Georgian forces were able to counter Zviadist advances and end hostilities on the Mingrelian front. Sensing defeat, Gamsakhurdia committed suicide on December 31, 1993. Left without a unifying commander and facing against the now formidable Georgian military, the Zviadist forces dissolved and ceased to fight against the new regime.

Veto Players, Georgia 1992-1993

Table 3.2 Georgia Veto Players, 1992-1993

Veto Player	Leader	Size, # of men
National Guard	Tengiz Kitovani	12,000
Mkhedrioni	Jaba Ioseliani	2,500
Union of Afghans/Afghansti	Nodar Giorgadze	200
Zviadist Forces	Gamsakhurdia	2,200

Source: Small Arms Survey

Throughout the first two years of his leadership Shevardnadze moved to form a military force under central control. Paramilitary forces remained, however. By 1992 there was a clear political rivalry between Ioseliani and Kitovani amidst the Georgian government political hierarchy, though the two did not directly combat against one another. “Discipline problems in the ranks of both the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni and their ineffectiveness as fighting forces led the Georgian government to plan for a professional army. In April 1992, the State Council adopted a resolution form a unified force of up to 20,000 soldiers” (Armenia 1995, 226),

but by early 1993 Shevardnadze complained that a unified army had still not been created and in reality both the National Guard and Mkhedrioni retained their independence.

After Gamsakhurdia's exile, other informal military forces, such as the Imedi and 'Tetri Artsivi', gradually coalesced under the National Guard. In addition to its increasing number, throughout 1992 the National Guard had control over the arms trade, which added to its military strength (Demetrius 2002). Shevardnadze aimed to not only ally the National Guard with Georgia's fight against Gamsakhurdia and separatist forces, but also bring the National Guard under central control and in May 1992 designated National Guard leader Tengiz Kitovani as Georgia's minister of defense (Armenia 1995, 213). The National Guard remained under Kitovani's leadership until Shevardnadze replaced Kitovani with Ghia Kharkachishvili, former leader of the 'Tetri Artsivi', as minister of defense in May 1993. In the same month the National Guard was abolished as a separate force and battalions were integrated into the Eleventh Army Brigade, Georgia's first official attempt to create a central military force. Individual units continued to exist, however, with special guard status (Coppieters 2005, 126).

While Shevardnadze worked to bring the National Guard under central control, the Mkhedrioni remained separate from the process. Throughout 1992 the Mkhedrioni had control over lucrative sectors of the economy, such as the gasoline and tobacco trades (Coppieters 2005, 104), which increased funding to their activities. In September 1993 Ioseliani became in charge of enforcing the state of emergency, which gave him almost unchecked powers to detain people, and in November 1993 the New York Times reported that he was perhaps as powerful as Shevardnadze given Ioseliani's his massive funds and strength in arms (Bonner 1993). Unable to muster his own strong central force, in 1993 Shevardnadze tasked the parliamentary Mkhedrioni with addressing outside threats of national security, such as Gamsakhurdia's Zviadists in

Western Georgia, and therein further delayed his own efforts to consolidate a national military force.

The Union of Afghans, led by Nodar Giorgadze, remained a neutral force until late 1993, when Giorgadze was appointed as the new State Security Minister by Shevardnadze. At this point Giorgadze's force followed the Georgian government's agenda (Coppeters 2005, 127).

Throughout 1992 and 1993 political rivalries between the elite kept forces, such as the National Guard and the Mkehedrioni, from consolidating. Despite Shevardnadze's failed efforts to bring the separate veto players forces under central control, the continued existence of the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni was not the cause of conflict in Georgia. Kitovani and Ioseliani had themselves chosen Shevardnadze to lead Georgia and, until Shevardnadze skillfully disbanded the council in 1993, Kitovani and Ioseliani had enjoyed influential positions in government as deputy chairmen. It was former President Gamsakhurida whose opposition caused the conflict throughout Georgia. Although he had been ousted by the opposition in January 1992, his widespread support and ability to organize his sympathizers into military advances made him a threat to the newly instated regime (Bonner 1993). It was not until his defeat seemed imminent and he committed suicide that his forces, without a centralizing force, dissolved and ceased to be a viable veto player (Areshidze 2007, 28). It is no coincidence that the Georgian Civil War ended shortly thereafter.

My first hypothesis cannot be rejected because Gamsakhurdia was the only force that outwardly rejected Shevardnadze's government. Until May 1993, Kitovani and Ioseliani enjoyed positions of political power and maintained the support of their forces, giving them little cause to mobilize against the head of state they had chosen less than a year and a half before or even each other. It may be the case that their agendas were more aligned with each other rather than with

Gamsakhurdia's, which is why they fought against him rather than against each other. Kitovani opposed being removed from his governmental power base in May 1993 when the Council for National Security and Defense was disbanded by Shevardnadze, but at such as point in time Kharkharashvili had assumed control the National Guard, who had become the only person whom the guardsmen would obey (Coppieters 2005, 127). Ioseliani and the Mkhedrioni, meanwhile, had remained separate from the integration of armed forces under central control process and thus it can be argued that the loss of power from the council was not a considerable loss to Ioseliani. Thus, at the beginning of 1994, all veto player forces potentially threatening to Shevardnadze had been removed, which explains why the Georgian Civil War had officially ended. In this way, the negotiations for the new government after Gamsakhurdia's removal did not include the ousted president, which explains why there was no regime settlement durability.

Georgia, 1994-1995

With Gamsakhurdia gone and his Zviadist forces disbanded, Shevardnadze spent much of 1994 and 1995 trying to strengthen his authority and rein in informal militias. This would prove much easier than when he had first come in to power. By 1993 the main aim of the Mkhedrioni was to loot and plunder, and it was not even clear whether members of the group were still loyal to Ioseliani (Coppieters 2005, 109). No longer were they united by the common interest to protect Georgia from Soviet oppression. In 1994 the weakened Mkhedrioni was formally transformed into a Rescue Corps, in January 1995 seven hundred lightly-armed Mkhedrioni supporters were stopped by Georgian police from retaking Abkhazia, and in May 1995 the force was ordered to surrender its arms. Finally, in August 1995, Ioseliani was arrested after the Mkhedrioni were blamed for an assassination attempt on Shevardnadze. Gradually the once

formidable Mkhedrioni charged with protecting Georgia had been demoted, thwarted by the national police and stripped of power. Without a uniting cause, leader, or sufficient military strength, the Mkhedrioni ceased to be a veto player.

The National Guard, meanwhile, was slowly transformed into an army under Georgian democratic control. Officially abolished as a separate force and under the new leadership of Ghia Kharkharashvili, in May 1993 the National Guard became slowly integrated with other forces under central control. In May 1993 battalions from the National Guard were transformed into the Eleventh Army Brigade, which accelerated the formation of the First and the Second Army Corps (Coppieters 2005, 127). Creating and integrating the central army was slow and disorganized until the assassination attempt on Shevardnadze in 1995, at which point further defense and security reform took place. “Shevardnadze could now move the construction of the army in a direction of his choosing. No other politician or military chief around him had the power or influence to defy his will” (Coppieters 2005, 130). Additionally, in 1995 a newly adopted constitution granted civilian control of the armed forces and in the same year election laws were created on compulsory military service, state secrets and parliamentary oversight, all of which democratized the military. By the end of 1995, the military had been democratized and was under civilian control, ceasing its existence as a separate veto player.

In November 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections took place. According to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly report on parliamentary elections in Georgia, the 1995 elections were “generally well run on election day, and were not seriously marred by the other pre-election conditions [resulting from the crackdown on the opposition after the assassination attempt on Shevardnadze]” (OSCE 1996). Shevardnadze was reelected as president by 74 percent of participating voters and his party, the Union of Citizens of Georgia, won a majority in

parliament. The peaceful elections and peace post elections seem to indicate that not only the Georgian populace, but also the still-existent veto players within Georgia were satisfied with the new status quo.

In sum, the irregular transition with the removal of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia from office in January 1992 was unsurprisingly followed by a civil war within Georgia. The existence of the war can be explained by Gamsakhurida's opposition to the new status quo and his ability as a veto player to instigate conflict (Coppeters 2005, 120). During this time the other veto players within Georgia either remained neutral, coalesced with other veto players, or fought against the Zviadist forces. After the removal of Gamsakhurdia and the dissolution of his forces the military conflict ended. Politically the new head of state, Eduard Shevardnadze skillfully maneuvered to remove the remaining paramilitary forces and replace them with one armed force under central control (Coppeters 2005, 128). This process, however, was slow. Had Shevardnadze moved too quickly it is conceivable that Kitovani or Ioseliani, leaders of the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni, respectively, would have removed Shevardnadze (Areshidze 2007, 34). Instead, through official decrees and over time the military chiefs lost their influence and left Shevardnadze to construct the new military by his own right. Lastly, the sustained peace after Gamsakhurdia's death in late 1993 indicates that all veto players were satisfied with the new status quo. It is also important to note that over time the number of veto players in Georgia fell. Those not included in the negotiations to form the new government under Shevardnadze were thus not existent and not able to prevent the regime's stability. This is consistent with my first hypothesis.

Because there was conflict after President Gamsakhurdia was ousted, it cannot accurately be determined how long peace would have lasted in Georgia given who was involved in the

discussions of regime formation. It may be that, had Gamsakhurdia not been an aggressor, Georgia would have experienced a durable regime without political conflict. This seems a likely scenario given that political conflict ceased shortly after Gamsakhurdia's death, indicating that all other veto players accepted the new status quo, but this is merely conjecture and cannot provide evidence in support of this study's second hypothesis.

Chapter 4

Case Study II: Greece (1967-1974)

Greece, Prior to 1967

From 1952 until 1967 Greece had been a parliamentary democracy with a monarch as the head of state. In 1964, elections took place in which the Centre Union party received a majority, followed by the right-wing National Radical Union (ERE) and United Democratic Left (EDA) parties. King Constantine II ascended to the throne in 1964 and, though young, handsome, and spoke without a foreign accent unlike most of his predecessors, he was considered politically unsophisticated, if not completely inept (Koumoulides 1977, 206).

The army was also a powerful actor. In the summer of 1965, Prime Minister and leader of the Centre Union Georgios Papandreou decided to reorganize the Ministry of Defense, “filling sensitive posts with officers of his choice” (Koumoulides 1977, 207) and attempting to become the Minister of Defense. Right-wing press spread rumors that left-wing officers known as Apostasia, led by Georgios Papandreou’s son Andreas, intended to subvert armed forces and remove Greece from NATO and United States patronage. “It was this fear that the army was about to be removed from the influence of the palace and the political right, which had always considered it their own preserve, that led to a typical...palace-government confrontation” (Koumoulides 1977, 207). The impasse resulted in Georgios Papandreou’s resignation.

A series of caretaker governments followed and Constantine called for elections in May 1967. It was expected that a new coalition of moderates from the ERE and the EDA would

assume a parliamentary majority at the exclusion of right-wing hardliners of the ERE apostates led by Andreas Papandreou. These elections, however, would not take place.

Greece, 1967-1973

On April 21, 1967 right-wing army officers Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos and Colonels George Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos seized power in a coup d'état. Using the elements of surprise and confusion, by the next morning the 'generals' coup' had taken over Greece.

Their success was because they were able to strike quickly and effectively, first by making a series of strategic arrests. One of the first to be arrested was Lieutenant General Grigorios Spandidakis, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army. The colonels persuaded Spandidakis to join them, and with his support they moved forward. Over 10,000 people were arrested during the coup, including leading politicians, such as Prime Minister Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Georgios Papandreou, and all those who showed signs of resisting the junta (Coppoeters 2005, 126). With the army's support they sealed in Athens by strategically placing tanks, seized the main lines of communication, and gained control of the parliament and royal palace. By the next morning all of Greece was in the hands of the colonels (Koumoulides 1997, 87).

The events of April 21, 1967 would set the tone of the junta's rule. As Koumoulides writes, "The combined efforts of brute force, skill, considerable luck, and a divided opposition provided the junta with several years to prove that authoritarian rule rather than the traditionally turbulent parliamentary system could offer more effective, honest government" (Koumoulides 1977, 183). Supporters of the coup were predominantly officers from lower-class backgrounds

who had achieved status through career advancement in the armed forces. Fearful of losing their posts because of their involvement in right-wing conspiracies, the officers acted out of self-preservation (Greece 1995, 72). Their motivations were veiled, however, by the pretense that they had acted to save Greece from communist takeover and to defend Helleno-Christian civilization. As Lieutenant General Spandidakis stated less than a month following the coup, “Greece was in danger of falling to the lowest level of disgrace. Greece’s surrender to communism appeared certain. In view of the nature of its mission, the Greek Army watched the situation with sorrow. The army could no longer remain idle” (Spandidakis 1967).

Initially the colonels tried to rule through the King rather than deposing him. The King himself swore in the colonels as the legitimate government of Greece in December 1967, stating that he was certain they had acted in order to “save the nation” (Athens Radio, 1967). His support, however, did not go far as evidenced by his counter-coup attempt in December 1967. Although opposed to the junta, the King could do little to remove it. The king’s influence within the army “completely disappeared shortly after the April coup d’état” (Koumoulides 1977, 208) when the junta forced Constantine to retire several of his generals. The Church, too, lent little support. It had historically supported the royalist cause, but the junta had promised ecclesiastical leaders greater autonomy. “Consequently, when he decided to try to overthrow the Papadopoulos junta by a counter-coup in December 1967, he was so ineptly prepared and the coup so poorly executed that it was easily suppressed by troops loyal to Papadopoulos” (Koumoulides 1977, 208).

In 1968 the junta created a constitution to fix once and for all the distribution of power between the army, King, and extreme right wing politicians. Under the constitution the monarchy was to lose the ‘special relationship’ with the armed forces that had constituted its power in the

past (Koumoulides 1977, 89). Fundamental political powers would be given to the military without political accountability, such as the right to appoint the prime minister, dissolve parliament, and postpone elections. Additionally, Articles 129 and 132 of the constitution gave military professionals complete jurisdiction over civilian affairs. The head of the armed forces led a council with supreme authority on all questions pertaining to foreign policy, national defense and the expenditure on the armed forces. Political parties were outlawed and the minister of defense became a figurehead under the colonels. The junta had effectively taken control of all political power.

Veto Players, Greece 1967-1973

It is interesting that, although an irregular regime change, the coup was bloodless before, during, and after the transition. Certainly the swift and unexpected actions by the colonels on April 21, 1967 caught actors unprepared to counter the coup. The colonels' sweeping arrests of political leaders also left potential opposition disorganized and unable to counteract. The support of the armed forces can also explain why no violence took place. The early support of Lieutenant General Grigorios Spandidakis, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army, enabled the colonels' to execute their coup. In addition to the army's support the junta had the support of both the Royal Hellenic Air Force and the Royal Hellenic Navy, at least initially. Less than a week after the coup Spandidakis stated, "The Royal Navy...stands together with other armed forces by the side of the national government and supports with all its soul the effort for national restoration" (Spandidhakis 1967). The air force, too, expressed its support. On April 26, 1967 Air Force Chief of Staff Air Vice Marshal Andonakos stated, "Greece has been saved, and we have already united our efforts with those of the other brotherly branches of the armed forces to secure and

safeguard the prosperity, happiness, and tranquility of the Greek people...Long live the nation! Long live the King! Long live the Royal Hellenic Air Force!” (Andonakos 1967). It is important to note, however, that while Spandidakis announced that the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force had assisted the army “in brotherly cooperation” bringing the junta to power (Spandidhakis 1967) the navy and air force had not taken part in the junta’s coup. Despite the initial outward support to ‘save Greece’, there was widespread discontent amongst the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force against the junta (Pedaliu 2007, 192). The King, however, was unable to capitalize on this because he hoped that by cooperating with the junta he could have a moderating influence on the dictators.

Table 4.1 Greek Veto Players, 1967

Veto Player	Leader	Position
The Colonels	Papadopoulos, Makarezos, Patakos	Pro-junta
Hellenic Army	Grigorios Spandidakis	Pro-junta
Monarchy	Constantine II	Pro-monarchy
Hellenic Air Force	Georgios Antonakos	Pro-monarchy
Hellenic Navy	I. Dhedhes	Pro-monarchy

Unlike in the case of Georgia, the deposed king Constantine was not able to raise forces against the junta. His influence in the army was lost after the junta removed several of his officers from the army, and his support from the Church was weak after Prime Minister Papadopoulos had awarded it greater autonomy in 1969. Despite this, the King’s influence threatened the legitimacy of the junta. His opposition to the colonels led a large number of political elite to refuse their support for the junta (Kaloudis 2000, 42). Of the monarchy and the

colonels, the populace regarded the monarchy as the lesser of two evils (Koumoulides 1977, 206). Furthermore, the Royal Navy remained loyal to the King and had sworn since 1967 to overthrow the junta. This oath became action in May 1973 when the destroyer *Velos*, led by Nicholas Pappas, took advantage of a NATO exercise to mutiny. A series of repeated purges within the navy occurred, yet widespread disaffection for the junta remained among the officer corps. Thus, the monarchy continued to have an influence over the legitimacy of the junta, despite Constantine's exile in Italy. The junta's forces may have thwarted his counter-coup in 1967, but the King continued to have the support of the Royal Air Force and Navy while his opposition to the colonels weakened the legitimacy of the military dictatorship.

In addition to the monarchy, the Greek people rejected and refused to accept the military dictatorship. Resistance efforts were organized in Greece and internationally, and took the form of groups such as the Democratic Defense (DA), the Free Greeks, and the Patriotic Front (PAM). However, these groups and their movements were easily quelled by the secret police who sent the political dissidents to prison. Political parties, too, were unable to effectively organize. Throughout the dictatorship they remained divided and disorganized, and therein they did not develop into a veto player. The first significant political demonstration since the coup d'état took place in November 1973 when several hundred thousand Greeks attended the funeral of former Centre Union leader, Georgios Papandreou. Violent clashes between mourner and the military police at the funeral signaled the dictatorship's intent to counteract any opposition by the public.

Upon overtaking power, the colonels did not represent the interests or the personnel of any of the traditional political parties. It is also evident that they did not have amicable ties with either the monarchy or the Royal Air Force and Navy. Furthermore, the junta remained relatively unpopular among the Greek people. To bolster their legitimacy, the junta had sought to link its

regime to ancient Hellenic and Christian values and practices. After the naval mutiny in 1973, Papadopoulos held a rigged referendum that abolished the monarchy and made Papadopoulos president. On August 2, 1973 the new president then proclaimed that he would restore the parliamentary democracy and issued a selective amnesty for political crimes against the “revolution”. Despite these efforts to legitimize the military dictatorship, Danopoulos’ study finds that the junta failed because of the Colonels’ “inability to convince the Greek people that their regime’s intentions had been desirable, honest, clear cut and attainable” as well as a “lack of political sophistication” (Danopoulos 1983, 495).

Thus, the bloodless coup of 1967 can best be explained by the swift and unexpected actions of the colonels. This element of surprise, combined with thousands of strategic arrests, caught political parties off guard and left them divided and disorganized. This weakened their veto player strength. Initially, too, after seizing control of Greece in 1967 the military sought the cooperation of the monarchy, which may also explain why there was no violent conflict because the Royal Air Force and Navy remained loyal to the king. This would explain their initial acceptance of the new regime. In addition to this, the colonels had a large amount of support from the military police and army. Thus, initially the colonels had all veto player support for the new regime because they had either eliminated looming veto player threat or had worked with the veto players to gain their support.

Although supported by the military police and army, the military dictatorship eventually faced opposition from the monarchy, air force, navy, and Greek people. The junta’s legitimacy suffered as a result of this but did not immediately cause its downfall. Instead, by purging the armed forces of royalists and political dissidents, the junta removed the monarchy’s and political parties’ influences from its ranks. In this way the disorganized and weakened state of the

opposition against the junta explains why the irregular transition was bloodless. In this way the colonels weakened what would have been viable veto players. Papadopoulos' efforts would only go so far. As the populace continued to reject the junta, Papadopoulos maneuvered to gain their support by signaling steps toward a parliamentary democracy that, ironically enough, would mean losing the support of key figures of the political elite and ultimately lead to his removal.

Greece, November 25, 1973

In the early 1970s the credibility of the military regime began to rapidly diminish. Already unpopular with the Greek people, the regime faced greater disapproval as economic conditions began to worsen.⁷ Yet what ultimately led to the bloodless coup of 1973 were divisions among the political elite.

Having consolidated power and proclaimed himself president, by 1973 Papadopoulos had pushed aside Makarezos and Patakos and made himself “the undisputed ‘caudillo’ of Greece” (Danopolous 1983, 488). His soon after proclamation for a restored parliamentary democracy followed by his appointment of Spyros Markenzinis as prime minister alarmed political hard-liners, who feared that his attempts at democratization jeopardized the mission of the 1967 coup. “The military dictatorship started to disintegrate when important political elites began to withdraw their support and could no longer accept stability at any price” (Kaloudis 2000, 44).

In November 1973 university students demonstrated for academic freedom and in protest of the worsening economy at the Athens Polytechnic. In open defiance of the junta they set up a radio station and called upon the populace to demonstrate in the streets. The government responded with tanks to disperse the students, and the military police fired upon students and

⁷ The military dictatorship had favored large tourist enterprises, urban construction and shipowners. The energy crisis in 1973 caused a large Greek deficit and serious inflationary pressure within the Greek economy.

civilians, killing over thirty. This marked the terminal point of Papadopoulos' rule, and it exposed the regime's lack of control. Moreover it showed the public that resistance was not futile.

On November 25, 1973 Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis was able to capitalize on tensions against Papadopoulos by executing his own swift coup, catching Papadopoulos off-guard. Ioannidis' forces purged the military and police of Papadopoulos' supporters and arrested the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the chiefs of the army, navy and Athens police. Ioannides was not only the chief of Greece's feared military police (ESA), but also supervisor of the armed forces security. These two posts gave him absolute control over the armed forces (London Reuter 1974). Ioannidis had also for some time been the effective leader of the junta and his network was so large that the chances of failure were minimal (Greece 1995, 88). Once again the coup leaders announced they acted "to save the country from danger an chaos" and to prevent it from "being virtually dragged toward an electoral adventure" (New York Times, 26 Nov, 1973). Under these pretenses, tanks and ships surrounded Papadopoulos' villa early on November 25, 1973, putting him under house arrest and leaving Ioannidis to assume control of the dictatorship.

This, too, was a bloodless coup. Like the coup of 1967, Ioannidis' actions had caught the incumbent unawares and purging the military and police of Papadopoulos' supporters left potential rivals unable to react. It was also reported that all armed forces were behind the coup while the populace too, seemed initially happy that Papadopoulos had been deposed (New York Times 27 Nov., 1973). Furthermore, that Papadopoulos' regime had weakened the opposition through political repression and purges in the military only made it easier for Ioannidis to take over. The military and police had been purged of political dissidents, the monarchy had been

abolished, and the hard-liner political elite had ceased to support Papadopoulos. With control over the armed forces, it was all too easy for Ioannidis to execute the bloodless coup.

Greece, July 1974

Despite Ioannidis' efforts, the regime continued to lose credibility even after Papadopoulos had been deposed. Believing that a major nationalist cause would rally the people behind him, in 1974 Ioannidis induced a confrontation with Turkey over oil deposits in the Aegean Sea. "Ioannidis received little response when he called for full mobilization of the Greek military, which had already shown disaffection by scattered revolts. Thus the Cyprus crisis made clear that the regime's most fundamental base of support was crumbling" (Greece 1995, 73). Ultimately it was not direct pressure from public or resistance groups but developments within the armed forces that crumbled the military rule. Discredited and diplomatically isolated, Ioannidis' regime acceded to heavy pressure from fellow officers and exited on July 23, 1974, "hoping to avert national catastrophe through the creation of a civilian government under Constantine Karamanlis" (Koumoulides 1977, 199).

The removal of Ioannidis left President Phaedon Gizikis, a mere figurehead under the Ioannidis junta, as head of the republic. The navy chief and staff urged Gizikis to convoke a conference of leading politicians to set up a civilian government to replace the military junta. Included in this conference was the President of the Republic, Gen. Phaedon Gizikis; chiefs of the armed forces, the army, the navy and the air force; Andreas Galatsanos, Petros Arapakis, and Alexandros Papanicolaou, respectively; George Athanassiades-Novas, Petros Garoufalias, and Stefanos Stefanopoulos; former prime minister Markezinis, who had led the liberalization experiment in 1973 under Papadopoulos; representatives of the parliamentary right Panayotes

Kanellopoulos and Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza; conservative banker Xenophon Zolotas; and moderate representative of the pre-1967 Centre Union George Mavros. In this meeting Gizikis addressed the opposition leaders with a request to form a new cabinet on the night of July 23, 1974. While it is interesting to note who attended the conference, it is also important to consider who did not, such as a representative of the monarchy. The monarchy's influence had accordingly dissipated by this point.

The joint chiefs' meeting ultimately led President Gizikis to invite former Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, who had been in exile since his electoral defeat in 1963, to return to Greece and form a new civilian government. Karamanlis was acceptable to the military, to the anti-monarchist right, and to many in the center (Woodhouse 1985, 46), signaling an initial consensus among the political elite. His reputation, too, remained untarnished because he was not involved in the events that led to the 1967 coup d'état (Kaloudis 2000, 47).

Although his arrival was met with popular support, Karamanlis proceeded with caution while forming the new civilian government, many feared that Karamanlis might be assassinated in a new coup d'état. Immediately after being elected as interim Prime Minister Karamanlis formed a coalition government with Center Union leader George Mavros and swore in his cabinet, which included prominent political figures of the Right and Center. Noticeably not present in his cabinet were members of the traditional Left and members of the Center-Left who identified with Andreas Papandreou, whose radical PASOK party openly opposed European social democracy and whose ideology was "the direct antipodes to that of Karamanlis" (Pappas 2010). The composition of this cabinet signaled a shift from an uncompromising, anticommunist and hard-liner right to the Center-Right (Kaloudis 2000, 47). This government formed by

Karamanlis remained in office until November 1974, when it became legitimized by national elections and a referendum officially abolishing the monarchy.

Legitimizing Karamanlis' rule were the national elections and referendum held in late 1974. The elections were a clear victory for Karamanlis, whose record majority signaled he was given public approval to proceed with dismantling the junta. As a result Karamanlis kept his position as prime minister. In December 1974, 70 percent of voters rejected re-establishing the monarchy in a national referendum. "For the first time since 1924 no one contested the validity of the result" (Koumoulides 1977, 91).

Table 4.2 Greek Presidential Election Results, November 1974

Political Party	Leader	Percent Vote	Seats (of 300)
New Democracy (ND)	Constantine Karamanlis	54.37	220
Centre Union	George Mavros	20.42	60
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	Andreas Papandreou	13.58	12
United Left (EA)	Harilaos Florakis	9.47	8
National Democratic Union Union (DE)	Petros Garoufalias	1.10	--
Others	--	1.06	--

Source: The World Factbook

After the elections and referendum the new parliamentary democracy adopted a new constitution that included individual and social rights. In 1977, Karamanlis' New Democracy Party won a majority of seats in parliament and Karamanlis went on to serve as prime minister until 1980 (Kaloudis 2000, 50).

Veto Players, Greece 1974

In 1974 Greece underwent a quick and peaceful transition from a military junta to a parliamentary democracy. Although a regular transition followed by peace is the expected outcome, such a case does not always happen. Having said this, the peaceful transition to a parliamentary democracy under Karamanlis can be attributed to veto players' support and Karamanlis' conciliatory government formation and wariness of the army's reaction.

Karamanlis accepted his invitation from the conference to become the interim president under the conditions that all political forces would support his efforts and there would be no armed interference in Greek political life (Kaloudis 2000, 52). The lack of political impasse and military mobilization suggests that the conference members met those conditions. It makes sense that the military veto players would not move against the new president, as the leader of each armed forces branch was included in the conference that chose Karamanlis in the first place. In addition to military leaders' support, Karamanlis, like his junta predecessors, initiated purges within the military. Within two years after coming into power as many as 1,500 officers linked to the conspiracy of 1967 were dismissed or left the military under compulsorily retirement (Sotiropoulos 2010, 454).

Table 4.3 Greek Veto Players, 1974

Veto Player	Leader	Position
Hellenic Army	Galatsanos	Anti-junta
Hellenic Air Force	Papanicolaon	Anti-junta
Hellenic Navy	Arapakis	Anti-junta

No longer included among the veto players was the monarchy who, as seen by the junta's and new democracy's referendum, no longer held a strong influence among either the military or the public. Former dictator and leader of the feared military police (ESA), Ioannidis was also no longer a veto player. In addition to losing the support of the political elite and public, Ioannidis lost greater political influence when Karamanlis disbanded the ESA and court-martialed its leading members in 1974 (Duman 2006, 419).

In addition to having veto players' support, or at least acquiescent, the peaceful democratic transition can also be attributed to Karamanlis' conciliatory government formation. Immediately after being sworn in Karamanlis formed a cabinet that included established political figures from the Right and the Center,⁸ which was a sign of his elastic political ideologies and ability to compromise. Throughout his premiership, Karamanlis relied upon a small group of senior ministers that "was by no means ideologically coherent or politically harmonious" but "its members shared a strong personal commitment to Karamanlis" (Featherstone 2012, 532). Ideological differences among his cabinet members, then, were mitigated by their loyalty to the prime minister, which aided his efforts to peacefully transition Greece into a democracy. Parties not represented among his cabinet members also benefitted from his leadership. In August 1974 Karamanlis' newly-established government moved toward political pluralism by legalizing communist parties within the Greek political system. "This stance sowed the seeds of the learning process towards the consolidation of democracy in the Greek polity by bridging the gap...between the hitherto excluded Left and the privileged Right," and, by including the left,

⁸ Established political figures among Karamanlis' 1974 cabinet included Evangellos Averoff, Panagis Papaligouras, Konstantinos Papakonstantinou, and George Rallis. Each of these members was politically associated with the Right aside from Papakonstantinou, who was from the Center. In his cabinet Karamanlis also included George Alexander Mangakis, who was a socialist. Aside from representing multiple political ideologies, most all of these cabinet members had anti-junta credentials (Kaloudis 2000, p. 47).

avoided “what in the past would have been vociferous opposition” (Couloumbis 2003, 163). In this way political pluralism under Karamanlis enhanced the democratization process in Greece.

During the transition Karamanlis also took measure to avoid aggravating the military. As previously mentioned, there was fear that another coup by the military would take place after Karamanlis had assumed power. The populace, too, wished to see punitive action taken against the military, which was blamed for the autocracy. “Fearful that an outright purge would weaken the armed forces at a time when the country faced a threat from the east (Turkey), and/or produce a backlash from within the services, the government replaced the upper crust of the military leadership, dramatically increased budgetary appropriations for defense, and announced that ‘the careers of army officers shall be judged by their future behavior, not the past’” (Danopoulos 1983, 244). Karamanlis also appointed Evangellos Averoff and Ghikas as heads of the Ministries of Defense and Public Order, both of whom were widely respected within the armed forces (Dunman 2006, 413). Through his cautious cleansing and strategic appointment of ministers, Karamanlis avoided aggravating the military and thereby solidified his position while transitioning Greece into a democracy.

By forming a coalition government and avoiding policies that would aggravate veto players, such as the army, Karamanlis effectively maneuvered to keep all veto players in agreement with the new status quo and prevented players from having cause to mobilize against the newly-established government. From joint chief’s meeting in 1974 all veto players had agreed to appoint Karamanlis. All veto players were included in the negotiations and agreed to the beginning of the new democratic regime, and since there was no conflict following its implementation, the first hypothesis cannot be rejected.

What is interesting is that representatives who were not veto players were present for the negotiations. This would go against Cunningham's logic that all non-veto players be excluded from the negotiation process because it restricts the bargaining range and therein lead to fewer acceptable outcomes among players and lengthen the negotiation process. Why were protagonists from the Apostasia, a former prime minister from a failed dictator, and a banker included in a conference that would choose an interim president to lead Greece through a democratic transition? Including and getting the approval of prominent politician and Center Union leader George Mavros may have been to prevent a political impasse. Including such a varied parties may have also signaled to the public that choosing an interim president was done with the consensus of the political elite. Yet the conference convened, selected, and invited Karamanlis to return from exile in less than 48 hours (Koumoulides 1977, 89). At the time there could not have been great publicity. The political motivations for including non-veto players is not clear, and more research should be done to understand why they had a part in the decision.

Karamanlis successfully guided a peaceful democratic transition for Greece after 7 years of being under a military dictatorship. The coups by military leaders, too, had been relatively violence-free. This can be attributed to the junta's swift and unexpected actions and ability to weaken the opposition both politically and militarily. This included dismantling the monarchy by purging its supporters from the military and attempting to delegitimize it through a rigged referendum in 1973. Aside from the monarchy, from 1967 until 1974, most veto players supported Papadopoulos' leadership until he announced his intent to make the regime more democratic. Upon losing the support among the elite, Papadopoulos was removed by Ioannidis. In addition to surprising Papadopoulos, the bloodless nature of this coup is also attributable to its support among all veto players who were pleased to see Papadopoulos deposed. It became clear,

however, that the military dictatorship had lost the favor of the people and armed forces, and under pressure from the military Ioannidis resigned and left Greece its democratic transition under Karamanlis. It may be that the two preceding peaceful transitions may have set a precedent for the democratic transition to also be conflict-free, but the conference among leaders in July 1974 would suggest that this transition, too, had the support of all veto players. Furthermore, Karamanlis avoided provoking conflict by forming coalitions with other political parties and signaling to the military that his primary motivation was to move Greece forward rather than punishing its members. Thus, my hypothesis holds that all veto players were at least content with the political transitions as they occurred, which explains why there was minimal conflict in Greece from 1967 through 1974 despite the irregular transitions that took place.

Chapter 5

Case Study III: The Republic of Congo (1992-1995)

Republic of Congo, 1992

In the early 1990s, the Republic of Congo joined the democratization movement in Africa after twenty years of single-party politics. Mounting political pressure and demands for democracy led President Denis Sassou-Nguesso to allow a national conference in 1991 that would transform Congo into a multiparty system. This conference would ultimately appoint a transitional government, reshape executive powers, and set a timetable for multiparty elections. At least 1,100 delegates from labor unions, national institutions, and interest groups attended the conference, and over 70 political parties were represented (Clark 2008, 127). This large and varied attendance encouraged alliances among interest groups and, perhaps most importantly, “ethno-regional coalition making was tacitly dominating the genuine politics of the conference” (Clark 2008, 132). Among those who contested for leadership of the Transitional Government were André Milongo, a northerner from Pool, and Pascal Lissouba, a southerner from Niari. Milongo was narrowly elected as prime minister of the Transitional Government. As prime minister Milongo acted as head of government and, fearful of a coup d’état, the conference also made Milongo the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, accountable to the transitional parliament. And while Milongo was Supreme Commander of the armed forces, Gen. Raymond-Damas Ngollo and Col. Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko remained the country’s two senior military figures and retained their strong influence on the army. During the transition the army was charged with disarming the militias as much as possible and, although many arms remained

hidden, it “assured relatively peaceful proceedings at the beginning of the introduction of the multi-party system” (Dalo 1997, 181). After the national conference, Mokoko agreed to stay as military chief under transition government Prime Minister Milongo. A referendum was held in March 1992, in which 96 percent of voters approved the new constitution. To the rest of the world the conference had been a success. A New York Times article reported one Western business executive as saying, “The remarkable thing is that the revolution occurred without a single shot being fired. And if it can happen (in Congo), it can happen anywhere,” and President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo announced that he would hold a similar national conference, using Congo’s as a model (Noble 1991).

Congo’s multiparty elections began with municipal elections in May 1992 and legislative elections in June and July. From the outset voting patterns in the Republic of Congo reflected ethno-regional characteristics. Political campaigns played on ethno-regional identities to persuade voters and politicians came to be seen as the best hope for regional ethnic groups’ representation government (Clark 2008, 132). Former president and leader of the Congolese Party of Labor (PCT) Denis Sassou-Nguesso garnered political support from the northern Mbochi, Kouyou and Téké from the Plateaux region while Bernard Kolélas, leader of the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI), appealed to the Lari of Brazzaville and Pool region. Pascal Lissouba, leader of Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) and native of Nzabi, gained support from Niari, Bouenza and Nibolek regions (Clark 2008, 134). After two decades as a single-party state, Congo’s political leaders had now become the best opportunities for entho-regionals to be represented in government.

Figure 5.1 Republic of Congo Districts, 1992



Image, UN

From the legislative elections in June and July the UPADS won a plurality of seats in the National Assembly but failed to win an absolute majority in the National Assembly. Bernard Kolélas, leader of the MCDDI, which was second only to UPADS after the first round of legislative elections, rejected the results, claiming irregularities and citing lack of full distribution of voter's cards (Klein 1992). By forging a partnership with former president and leader of the PCT Denis Sassou-Nguessou, Lissouba and the UPADS won the second round of legislative elections.

Table 5.1 Republic of Congo Legislative Election Results, May 1992

Party	Number of Seats
UPADS	39
MCDDI	29
PCT	19
RDPS	9
RDD	5
UDS	3
UPSD	2
Other Parties	13
Independents	6
Total Seats	125

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013

In the presidential elections, too, ethno-regional patterns of voting were reflected. In the first round of elections Lissouba won the votes of three Nibolek regions by a margin of 80 percent and finished first in Kouilou as well. Kolélas won in the Pool region and narrowly had a plurality in Brazzaville. Sassou won the support of the northern regions of Liouala and Sangha as well as the Plateaux region (Clark 2008, 134). In August 1992 Pascal Lissouba, leader of the UPADS, became president. Thus through his alliance he not only assumed the presidency but also controlled a majority in the National Assembly.

Table 5.2 Republic of Congo Presidential Election Results, 1992

Candidate (Party)	% Votes, Round 1	% Votes, Round 2
Pascal Lissouba	35.97	61.32
Bernard Kolélas	20.37	38.68
Denis Sassou-Nguesso (PCT)	16.75	-
André Milongo (UDR)	10.20	-
Jean-Pierre Thystère Tchicaya (RDPS)	5.80	-
David Charles Ganao (UFD)	2.87	-
Others	8.04	-

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013

As per his presidential powers under the constitution, in September 1992 Lissouba announced the formation of his first government. Lissouba's cabinet included a mix of ethnic groups, and appointed northerner Stéphane Bongho-Nouarra from Ouessou as prime minister (Clark 2008, 168). The PCT, however, received only three minor cabinet posts, the ministries of agriculture, education, and commerce. Slighted, the PCT began cooperating with the URD (Union for Democratic Renewal) bloc, which was a coalition of seven political parties, including the MCDDI and RDPS (Rally for Democratic and Social Progress). By September 30, 1992 the URD and PCT had signed official documents confirming their alliance, thereby shifting the parliamentary majority to a new political bloc (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013).

Under the Republic of Congo's constitution, the president was charged with appointing a prime minister from the parliamentary majority and, given the shifts in political alliances, Lissouba was expected to accept the resignation of Prime Minister Bongho-Nouarra and select a

new prime minister from the URD-PCT bloc. Instead, Lissouba's supporters claimed that there was no majority in Parliament, noting that the presidential movement's bloc had a plurality. As Ambroise Noumazalaye, then General Secretary of the PCT, stated, "The agreement between the two parties is null and void. The UPADS is behaving like a single party and is being arrogant in negotiations about power sharing" (Globe Sept. 1992). After the PCT had "turned its back on the coalition pact forged with President Pascal Lissouba's UPADS party" (Clark 2008, 142) it seemed clear that the Republic of Congo's government was on the brink of collapsing. On October 31, 1992 the National Assembly passed a vote of no confidence, demonstrating the status and cohesion of the opposition bloc. Parties close to the president claimed this was done in their absence and protested procedural irregularities (Weiss 1995, 7). Nevertheless the vote forced the resignation of Prime Minister Bongho-Nouarra. Rather than accepting the resignation and naming a prime minister from the parliamentary majority, however, President Lissouba dissolved the National Assembly, as per his rights under Article 80 of the constitution, and announced that new legislative elections would take place in the following year. This prompted calls from the URD-PCT pact for civil disobedience. On December 2, 1992, government troops occupied Brazzaville and during an opposition march Lissouba's presidential guard fired on the protestors, killing three (Weiss 1995, 10). At this point the army, under orders Col. Michel Mikoko, began to intervene and mediate negotiations between parties until they agreed to form a "national unity" government to be headed by a neutral prime minister, a position filled by Claude-Antoine Dacosta on December 6, 1992. Ministers of the national unity government included twelve opposition ministers, nine Lissouba supporters, and two from the Army (Clark 2008, 135).

By the end of 1992, Congo's new multiparty system had survived, yet it was clear that ethno-regional cleavages had manifested into political allegiances. Aside from the clash between protestors and the presidential guard, tensions had remained minimally violent.

Veto Players, Republic of Congo 1992

One reason for minimal violence may have been that, from the end of 1992 until the beginning of 1993, there were no players who had the power and motivation to force change. From the 1991 National Conference forming the Republic of Congo's multiparty system, the army, led by Col. Jean-Marie Mokoko, had stressed that it would not intervene to save the state or mobilize to suppress the opposition. It also urged vengeful politicians to forgive the misdeeds and political assassinations of the past. This signaled to then president Sassou that the army would not be used to suppress civilians' demands for democratization and established its position as a mediating force. In addition to expressing the army's neutral stance, Mokoko urged senior officers and troops against intervention in civilian political reform, telling officers to "put on the coat of the diplomat more often than the helmet of soldiers" (Clark 2008: 162). Throughout 1992 the army continued to act as a pacifying force that mediated between political parties. Charged with ensuring a peaceful and structured atmosphere for the elections in 1992, the army's presence at polling stations was regarded as neither intimidating nor influential at the polling stations observed (Congo 2008). The equanimous position of army leader Col. Jean-Marie Mokoko continued this pacifying force of the army. While tensions rose in December 1992 and the presidential guard fired on protestors, Mokoko saw that his troops oversaw the demonstration without carrying arms with ammunition (Kouvibidila 2000, 299). Army leaders mediated negotiations between political parties for the creation of a "national unity" government in which

Mokoko became president of the follow-up committee to see that the agreement would be implemented. Given the president's constitutional powers as commander-in-chief of the army and the support Sassou had from military officers, it is conceivable that after the elections in 1992 the army could have taken partisan action. The army's behavior, however, signals that under Mokoko its main objective was preventing outbreaks in violence between other rival parties.

Table 5.3 Republic of Congo Veto Players, 1992

Group	Leader	Political Party Affiliation	Size
Army	Mokoko	Neutral	14,000
Aubevillois	Lissouba	UPADS	--
Zoulous	Lissouba	UPADS	--
Presidential Guard	Sassou-Nguessou	PCT	600

Source: Small Arms Survey, Clark (2008)

In November Lissouba, new to his presidency, had begun to create his own armed militias, the Aubevillois and the Zoulous, which were armed civilian recruits from Brazzaville and a militia of youth from the Brazzaville neighborhoods of Mfilou and Diata to defend the interests of the Lissouba government, respectively. These militias, however, were small and relatively disorganized. Their existence is worth noting because, despite their infancy, Lissouba's armed militia presence was still greater than that of the opposition bloc, whose forces would not take shape until the following year.

Former President Sassou and his supporters were a threat to Lissouba's infant regime in 1992. Sassou had considerably more money left over from his time as president than Lissouba

had at his disposal,⁹ and while as the current president Lissouba had the constitutional power as commander-in-chief of the army, many high-ranking officers remained loyal to Sassou (Daloz 1997, 182). Furthermore, many Mbochi army and police officers remained loyal to Sassou, as did his old presidential guard, which, by the end of 1992, was the core of what would become Sassou's armed militia known as the Cobras (Global Security 2011). Yet in 1992 Sassou's camps did not mobilize against Lissouba. This is perhaps for two reasons, the first being that Sassou and the PCT had hope for their political future. Sassou and the PCT had placed third in both the presidential and legislative elections, and while their loss to Lissouba and the UPADS was hardly disputable, despite the MCDDI's accusations of electoral fraud, the PCT was in a position to obtain political influence by forming a coalition with the UPADS as a majority bloc in the National Assembly (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). It was not until Lissouba had announced his selected cabinet members in September 1992 that the PCT felt slighted and shifted its support to the opposition to form a new majority coalition. Second, although Sassou maintained control of his former presidential guard and loyalty of Mbochi army officers, Sassou's forces were small in comparison to the Republic of Congo's army (Demetriou 2002).

Despite the creation of a unity government, the tensions formed in 1992 following the elections continued to brew as the Republic of Congo prepared for its rerun elections in 1993.

Republic of Congo, 1993-1994

The first round of legislative rerun elections was held on May 2, 1993. Despite what was described as "sloppy organization in the capital and other cities" (Globe May 1993), the elections

⁹ Funding for Sassou's endeavors largely came from oil revenues that he had acquired as president. "Oil revenues played their part in maintaining the Sassou-Nguesso regime beyond what might have been its "natural" life span. Many in the middle classes ignored the corruption and oppressiveness of the regime as long as they benefitted from oil-generated salaries and positions." (Clark 1997, 67).

were peaceful and most of the Congolese media and election observers had decided that the election had been fair (Kouvibidila 2000, 311). From this the Presidential Tendency Coalition, which was grouped around the UPADS, won 64 of the 125 legislative seats, the URD-PCT coalition led by Kolélas won 49 seats, the Union for Democracy and the Republic won 2 and the Patriotic Union for National Renewal won 1 seat (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013).

The opposition refused to accept the results, claiming irregularities and fraud. Throughout May tensions continued to brew as arms proliferated among partisans of leading Congolese politicians (Weiss 1996, 52). It is estimated that, prior to 1993, the government held between 18,000 and 31,000 arms appropriated among its 18,500-strong armed forces (Demetriou 2002, 22). On June 8, 1993 Kolélas initiated a campaign for civil disobedience, and tensions escalated to violence in Brazzaville throughout June and July. During this time militias began to form around the leading political parties who had played on ethno-regional identities, though most violence was carried out by neighborhood mobs. In June and July this violence led to ethnic cleansing of Brazzaville neighborhoods. Lissouba supporters purged Mfilo and Diata, neighborhoods in their control of Lari, who were assumed to be Kolélas supporters while the armed militia group loyal to Kolélas, known as the Ninjas, purged Bacongo and Makélékélé, which were neighborhoods they controlled, of Lissouba supporters (Gazette, 1993; Sundberg 1999, 7). “It is Lissouba and the hawks surrounding him that have forced us to this solution,” claimed Bernard Kolélas (Globe 1993).

By July 17, 1993 at least 23 people had died, over 500 families from pro-Lissouba regions had been forced out of Brazzaville neighborhoods loyal to Kolélas, and well-armed opposition forces continued to demand a rerun of the parliamentary elections (Global Security 2011). In just a year after its transition to a democracy, Congo’s first civil war had begun.

The first civil war in Congo took place primarily between the government and armed forces of Kolélas, known as the Ninjas. Most members of the Ninjas were of Lari ethnicity, like Bernard Kolélas. As leader of the URD and MCDDI, Kolélas announced a rival government and on August 4 the Congolese Supreme Court ruled that some irregularities had occurred in the 1993 elections. On August 4, 1993 General Secretary of UPADS Christophe Moukoueke, Bernard Kolélas, Sassou-Nguesso and General Damas Ngollo of the Army signed the Libreville Accords, under which a timetable was set up for new legislative elections in October (Batota-Mpeho 2014,169). In October, the eleven disputed seats of the National Assembly were voted upon in the first round of the rerun elections. The Presidential Tendency Coalition won three more seats from the election, giving Lissouba and undisputed majority in the National Assembly (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013).

Table 5.4 Republic of Congo Legislative Election Results, June 1993

Party/Coalition	Leader	Parliamentary Seats
Presidential Tendency (UPADS, RDD, UFD, PCR, UDC, UDPS)	Pascal Lissouba	65
Opposition Coalition (MCDDI, PCT, RDPS, URD, PRO-PCT)	Bernard Kolélas	56
Union for Democracy and Republic (UDR)	André Milongo	2
Patriotic Union for National Renewal (UPRN)	Mathias Dzon	1
Independent		1

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union

In protest the opposition boycotted the opening of the new Assembly session. Violence recommenced, as did rounds of ethnic cleansing and violence aimed at the representatives of rival ethno-regional constituencies and worse than the previous round of conflict. The worst of the civil war's fighting took place from November 1993, when armed militias set up checkpoints to disarm opposition militias, until January 1994, when a ceasefire agreement was made. The kidnapping of two senior officials in November caused the army's retaliation and Lissouba's ordered shelling of the Bacongo and Makélékélé districts, which were areas controlled by Kolélas' Ninjas. By the end of 1993, more than 1,000 people had died from the conflict (Uppsala 2015).

On January 31, 1994 two groups of deputies, one from the northern Pool region and the other from the southern Nibolek regions, met as an inter-regional committee and established a ceasefire agreement. From the protests in June 1994 until the formation of the inter-regional committee, at least 2,000 battle-related deaths had occurred in Congo (Uppsala 2015). The return to peace was seen as a military victory for Lissouba and the UPADS, whose militias took control of the Mfilou, Moutabala and Diata districts (Yengo 1998, 42). In an effort to maintain peace, army officers of the Pool and Nibolek regions created a 400-person peacekeeping force to prepare for the return of thousands of internally displaced people in the unsettled areas of Brazzaville. Command of this peacekeeping force was given to Colonel Philippe Bikinkita, nephew of Bernard Kolélas, and Colonel Jean-Marie Nguembo, who was commander of the Ministerial Reserve. In July 1994, Kolélas was elected as mayor of Brazzaville and in August he publicly embraced UPADS Secretary General Christophe Makoukédé, a sign to many that the two sides had reconciled (Weiss 1996, 56).

Table 5.5 Republic of Congo Veto Players, 1993-1994

Force	Leader	Party Affiliation	Strength
Army	Michel Mikoko	Neutral	--
Aubevillois, Zoulous (Cocoyes)	Pascal Lissouba	UPADS	2,000
Ninjas	Bernard Kolélas	Opposition Coalition (MCDDI)	1,500
Cobras	Denis Sassou-Nguessou	PCT	1,500

Source: International Foundation for Election Systems

Veto Players, Republic of Congo 1993-1994

During the civil war from 1993 until 1994 fighting occurred primarily between the government and the Opposition Coalition. Overall, total militia strength was no more than 2,000 yet they were relatively well trained (Demetriou 2002, 14). The army, for the most part, remained a neutral force until its retaliation against Bacongo for the kidnapping of two government officials in November 1992. As Lissouba stated in an interview, “the Army is a structure...trying to manage this situation, trying to hold it in check, this violence” (Paris Radio 1993). Its neutral stance began to wane after the replacement of Mokoko by Col. Claude Emmanuel Eta-Onka in August 1993, and its ranks increasingly followed Lissouba’s orders or were deserted by soldiers who chose to join militias of their respective ethno-regions. Serious damage in Brazzaville took place because of this change in obedience, specifically by Lissouba’s orders against the Bacongo

section where Kolélas' Ninjas were operating. This change also led to greater recruitment for ethno-regional militias, increasing their strength (Sundberg 1999, 7; Daloz 1997, 182).

During this time the Aubevillois and Zoulous militias allegedly received weapons from the government as their recruitment continued (Demetriou 2002, 54). Made up of half militia and half traditional warriors, they numbered around 2,000 (Weiss 1996, 11). The unofficial militias of Kolélas and Sassou, meanwhile, were some 1,500 strong and comprised of army deserters, conscripts, and unemployed urban youth (Weiss 1996, 12). Throughout the conflict these militias continued to recruit, train, and acquire arms. The Ninjas acquired arms primarily from fallen and ambushed FAC troops and by looting Posts of Public Security in the Makélékélé and Bacongo districts in Brazzaville as well as the Pool region. It is estimated that between 1993 and 1994 they acquired 1,600 weapons (Demetriou 2002, 55).

Noticeably quiet during the civil war were Sassou and his forces, known as the Cobras. Like Kolélas, Sassou continued to train his unofficial militias during the summer 1993. It is estimated that between 1993 and 1994 the Cobras acquired 3,000 weapons (Demetriou 2002, 57). Although he did not have a heavy hand in the 1993-1994 civil war, his forces were comparable to those who did and thus under his orders could have exercised his power as a veto player to spoil peace agreements, had other actors not already done so.

As with the previously examined cases, the veto players in the Republic of Congo were determined based upon their relative strength, independent agendas, and cohesiveness. Research makes it clear which factions had the capacity to maintain conflict and which political leaders lead these groups. Fighting between the veto players after free and fair elections indicates that they not only disapproved of the election results, but also that they had the strength and capacity

to organize themselves to fight. Given that not all veto players agreed with this new status quo, at first glance my hypothesis holds. Upon further investigation, however, events during Congo's first civil war cast doubt on this conclusion.

Failure of Libreville Accords, August 1993

What complicates the identification of veto players in relation to my first hypothesis are the events that took place after the Libreville Accords were signed on August 3, 1993. Representatives of all determined veto players, including General Secretary of UPADS Christophe Moukoueke, Bernard Kolélas, Sassou-Nguesso and General Damas Ngollo of the Army, signed this agreement, yet fighting continued after the October rerun elections. If all veto players had voluntarily agreed to the accords, why did renewed fighting occur between the government and opposition militias in mid-December?

There are a number of reasons for this, the first being that many Congolese did not support the accords and, under weakening leadership, took action into their own hands. Immediately after the accord was signed, opposition supporters fired isolated shots, some stating that they had not expected Kolélas to "sign a text that did not meet any of (the opposition's) demands" (Paris AFP 1993). Furthermore, although initially political, the civil war in Congo had now become an ethnic conflict. After the accords were signed militants continued to purge ethnic majority neighborhoods of minority ethnic groups through the use of arson, looting and assassination (U.S. Dept. Homeland Security 2000). This led to retaliatory outbreaks between ethnic groups. Motivations for conflict were no longer political but rather ethnic. Meanwhile political leaders "did not make use of this fraternization, since they still preferred a military solution" (Young 2004, 94) and, although they did not condone the ethnic violence, could do

little to stop it. Militiamen had become belligerents acting on their own accord. Political leaders were losing control of their militants. Leadership also continued to break down within the army with the replacement of Mokoko by Col. Claude Emmanuel Eta-Onka on August 12, 1993, which led to weakening cohesion within the army. When ordered by government officials to dismantle barricades or take action against their own ethno-regional districts, army unit members disobeyed orders and deserted the army to join private militias (Clark 2008, 163). When asked in an interview if the Congolese army was really loyal to the Republic, Lissouba responded, "It is not up to me to take it up directly, although I am the commander in chief of that army, but I must admit that the Congolese Army has serious problems" (Paris Radio 1993). The army was rapidly losing its ability to act as a unifying force and mediator for the country.

A second reason for the failed agreement was a lack of trust among the domestic actors. Political parties relied on international actors' presence to guarantee their newfound peace. In an interview immediately after signing the accords Kolélas stated that he was "very happy with this acceptable agreement," and when asked about guarantees from the presidential coalition that the agreement would be implemented he added, "The first guarantee is the international community. We are no longer alone" (Libreville 1993). While international mediation may have helped progress negotiations, it was evidently unable to guarantee sustained peace among Congolese actors, especially given the continued existence of private armed militias.

A third explanation for the failure of the accords was the ineffective disarmament of the political parties' private militias. The Libreville Agreement called for the disarmament of militias, yet its mediation had centered on problems arising from the elections. As a result, collection of illegal arms was slow and ineffective despite security forces' authority to undertake compulsory collection of weapons. In August 1993 President Pascal Lissouba's supporters

claimed they did not possess any weapons illegally while the opposition claimed that it had returned all of its weapons (Gouala 1993). In November 1993 the Congolese Armed Forces began operations in the Kolélas-supportive districts Bacongo and Makelekélé to dismantle the private militias whose existence, according to the government, endangered the state of peace and national unity that had been established after signing the Libreville Accord (Brazzaville Radio, Nov.1996). The reaction to this was renewed fighting. As Prime Minister Joachim Yhombi-Opango stated, “the fundamental problem...is the problem of power.” While the agreement had provided for the disarmament of militias, its implementation ineffective and thereby failed to remove the threat of renewed fighting by veto players.

My research indicates that militiamen acting according to their own agenda were most responsible for conflict after the agreement was signed. A lack of trust among veto players followed by conflict would indicate a futile agreement without solving the security dilemma for actors, especially when it failed to disarm militias. Slow and ineffective disarmament after the agreement kept the actors wary of one another and in turn failed to eliminate veto players and therein lessen the number of actors capable of unilaterally continuing conflict. What frustrates my hypothesis is that militiamen continued violence after the outward agreement by leading politicians to move towards peace. As stated, militiamen looted and killed according to their own agendas. Given a lack of cohesion and conflicting agendas, it may be that the factions, as led by prominent politicians, were not true veto players. Yet the prevention of peace by ethnic militias suggests they were, by their own right, veto players. While leading politicians negotiated, settled on an agreement and expressed their approval of it, they could not speak for their supporters in a conflict that quickly transformed from being political into ethnic. Thus although the Libreville Accords may have signaled leaders' intentions for peace and weakened conflict, their effect was

brief and ultimately acted to only postpone conflict until after the rerun elections rather than resolving it.

January 1994 Peace Agreement

In his year-end address, President Lissouba expressed his wish to form a national union government with the opposition (1994), and both Sassou and Kolélas followed with appeals for peace and a fresh start for Congolese politics. Additionally, “the youth sections (the source of at least some of the militia) of both UPADS and MCDDI made a joint declaration in favor of peace” (Weiss 1996, 11). It seemed that there was a consensus among the political elite and their forces that peace should be established. Following the January 1994 ceasefire agreement was the December 1994 *Forum national pour la paix au Congo*. Under foreign mediation, the forum met to resolve mutual distrust and create a series of recommendations to ensure peace and stability for Congo. The forum identified the causes of the 1993-1994 conflict as “the absence of institutional structures envisioned by the Constitution, the abdication of the State’s responsibilities, the tribalization of political parties, the illegal possession of arms by the population, as well as ‘private militias’ associated with political groups” (Weiss 1996, 13). Having identified these causes, the forum made peace and security its highest priority for the future of Congo. It established a committee charged with the task of reorganizing the army, gendarmerie and police, and rehabilitating the judiciary, actions which were seen as critical for collecting illegal arms from private militias. In addition to the Forum’s consensus, political concessions between parties also took place. In July 1994 Kolélas was unanimously elected mayor of Brazzaville, and in January 1995 Lissouba formed a new government in which Kolélas’ MCDDI party gained cabinet posts, including the interior ministry.

Despite these slow movements towards political cooperation, peace in Congo remained tense. Mutual suspicion and distrust among the political elite in Congo remained high, isolated incidents of violence continued, and illegal militias remained intact, despite the Forum's decision to integrate the military cadres into the regular army.¹⁰ Meanwhile, despite the agreements among the political elite during the Forum, in the following months almost none of the Forum's recommendations or decisions had been achieved. Ten months after the Forum, due to the "competing and mutually distrustful politicians...the army, gendarmerie, and police (had) not been recognized" (Weiss 1996, 13). Furthermore concessions made between Kolélas and Lissouba estranged Sassou. He therein had a smaller stake in the peaceful new status quo, lessening his incentive to avoid conflict. Furthermore, Sassou's relatively quietness during the 1993-1994 civil war had given him credibility leading up to the elections in 1997.

The consensus among the political elite and military cadres for peace and a fresh start for Congolese politics explains why relative peace was able to exist from 1994. This peace would last until 1997, when fighting began in the northern region between Lissouba and Sassou forces, and an internationalized civil war would occur until 2002. Because Congolese factions had military, political and material support from international actors, the war in Congo beginning in 1997 is outside the scope of this study. It is important to note, however, that fighting recommenced between the illegal private militias of political actors that had formed in Congo's first civil war.

From the events in Congo between its transition to a multiparty system in 1992 until the end of its first civil war in 1994 political parties rejected electoral results and vied for political control through conflict. What started out as a political conflict, however, became ethnic.

¹⁰ In May 1994 a major theft occurred in an army depot in which a wide variety of arms and ammunitions were stolen. Sassou's Cobras were later accused for the theft.

Militants identified with political leaders based upon their ethno-regional identity and accordingly organized themselves around their respective political parties. It was these private militias led by dominant political party leaders that created veto players strong enough to prevent Congo from peacefully forming new governments as per its 1992 and 1993 election results. Disagreements between these veto players between 1992 and 1994 explain why violence occurred in Congo despite the 'regular' transition and attempt to form a democratic government. Additionally the conciliatory agreement between the government and Opposition Coalition in 1994 reflects their initial agreement to collaboratively move towards peace and explains why the veto players' agreement temporarily ceased fighting. Growing mistrust between politicians would, however, lead to even greater war in 1997.

While my hypothesis explains why the initial conflict and temporary peace occurred, it does not explain why fighting continued after all veto player representatives had agreed to peace under the Libreville Accords. According to my first hypothesis, it would be expected that after all veto players had agreed to the accords there would be a newfound and more durable peace within Congo. Yet fighting continued. This is best explained by the independent actions of the militia groups whose motivations for conflict were ethnic rather than political. In this sense the militias were acting as ethnic rather than political veto players. This would explain why they did not adhere to the politicians' outward agreement. After the November 1993 elections, whose results were again disputed by the opposition, fighting once again became political, though no doubt with ethnic undertones. It was not until the army decimated Kolélas-supported neighborhoods by shelling and politicians made peace in January 1994 that violence dissipated. In this way my first hypothesis cannot be rejected in regard to political, rather than ethnic, veto players.

My second hypothesis, or that a regime settlement will be more stable if only veto players are included in the negotiations to form the new regime, is consistent with the events that occurred after the first Congolese Civil War ended in 1994. The 1994 peace agreement was made between two veto players, the PCT and MCDDI party, and therein did not include non-veto players. The result was peace in Congo, albeit tenuous.

It is important to note, too, that the negotiated peace in 1994 did not include ethno-regionals who identified with Sassou. While the negotiations to terminate fighting and move forward may not have included non-veto players, they failed to include all veto players, which explains why conflict recommenced in Congo three years later. This provides further support for my first hypothesis.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This study has offered an explanation for the events that took place after the regime changes in Georgia (1991-1995), Greece (1967-1974), and the Republic of Congo (1991-1994) by examining the role of veto players within the discussions that formed the new regimes.

From the case studies it seems that political actors made just as much effort, if not more, to eliminate other veto players as they did to include them in regime formation discussions. This proved particularly effective in Greece when the colonels purged the military, outlawed political parties, and imprisoned all those who were a potential threat to the junta.

All negotiations resulting in regime durability included all veto players except for one case. In 1994 Congolese representatives from the Opposition Coalition and the UPADS met and negotiated peace, yet Sassou nor his ethno-region was not represented. At first glance it would seem that the peace following the 1994 agreement frustrates the first hypothesis, yet Sassou's exclusion may have attributed the outbreak in conflict in 1997 between Sassou and the government. The Libreville Accords (1993) in Congo also initially seem to frustrate the first hypothesis – by signing the accords all identified veto players agreed to end conflict and begin anew with legislative elections, yet fighting between militias continued. However, this fighting was caused by ethnic, rather than political conflict, and thus the first hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Overall there is weak evidence for the second hypothesis. In some cases this hypothesis cannot be examined, such as after the removal of President Gamsakhurdia, because veto players

caused conflict and foiled any regime durability that may have otherwise occurred. In other cases, such as in the Republic of Congo in 1994, non-veto players were excluded from the discussion and the regime experienced peace. The joint chief's meeting in 1974 Greece frustrates the second hypothesis, however, because multiple actors not identified as veto players were included in the discussion and selection of Karamanlis to lead the democratization of Greece. Following the transition there was no conflict in Greece, which suggests that including non-veto players in negotiations can lead to regime durability equal to cases in which such players are not included. More research should be done to understand why non-veto players were included in the joint chiefs meeting. In most of the negotiations within the examined case studies, however, only veto players were included. It should be noted that this was accomplished mostly because actors, instead of giving 'weaker' players greater influence, took measures to eliminate other players' power.

The results of this study have certain policy implications. Foremost when forming a new regime, whether transitioning a state to a new political system or creating a peace settlement, it is critical to have approval of all veto players within the state. As this study's cases have shown, this is easier to do when there are fewer veto players in existence. Furthermore, the case of the Republic of Congo and the Libreville Accords (1993) implies that, in order for a state to move forward, when forming a peace settlement amongst leaders it is critical to ensure that they are not just leaders in name but also in practice. Without the allegiance and discipline of the militants, such agreements are meaningless.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alesnia, Alberto and Robert Perotti. "Income distribution, political stability, and investment."

European Economic Review: 40, 1996. 1203-1228.

Andonakos, Georgios. "Air Force Chief Message." *Athens Armed Forces Central Radio, Greece*

[English Translation]. 26 Apr. 1967. FBIS.

Areshidze, Irakly. *Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition*. East Lansing:

Michigan State University Press, 2007. Print.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: country studies. 4th ed. Lanham: Library of Congress, 1995.

Print.

Batota-Mpeho, Rufin. *From Political Monolithism To Multiparty Autocracy: The Collapse of the*

Democratic Dream in Congo-Brazzaville. United Kingdom: Lulu Publishing, 2014. Print.

Bonner, Raymond. "Georgian Fighter Wields Guns, Money, and Charm." *New York Times*. 16

Nov. 1993.

Clark, John. "Petro-Politics in Congo." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8 (3), 1997. 62-76.

Clark, John F. *The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 2008. Print.

"Congo." Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. Uppsala University.

April 2015.

Constantine II. "Telegram from His Majesty King Constantine." *Athens Armed Forces Central*

Radio, Greece [English Translation]. 22 Apr. 1967. FBIS.

- Coppieters, Bruno, and Robert Legvold, eds. *Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution*. Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005. Print.
- Couloumbis, Theodore, and Theodore Kariotis, Fontini Bellou, ed. *Greece in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge, 2008. Print.
- Cunningham, David E. "Veto Players and Civil War Duration." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2006): 875-892.
- Cunningham, David E. "Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War." *Penn State JL & Int'l Aff.*, Vol. 2 (2013): 38-182.
- Daloz, Jean-Pascal, and Patrick Quantin. *Transitions democratiques africaines: Dynamiques et contraintes (1990-1994)*. Paris: Karthala. 1997. Print. Author's Translation.
- Danopoulos, Constantine. "Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy in Greece, 1967-1974." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 98 (3), Autumn 1983. 485-506.
- "Delegates React to Agreement." *Libreville Africa, Congo* [English Translation]. 4 Aug. 1993. FBIS.
- Demetriou, Spyros. "Politics From the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Republic of Georgia (1989-2001)." Small Arms Survey. Nov. 2002.
- Demetriou, Sypros, and Robbert Muggah, Ian Biddle. "Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo." Small Arms Survey. April 2002.
- "Democratic Republic of the Congo, Assmblée nationale." Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2013.
- Dunman, Özkan, and Dimitris Tsarouhas. "'Civilization' in Greece versus 'Demilitarization' in Turkey." *Armed Forces and Society*, 32 (3): April 2006, 405-423.

Featherstone, Kevin and Dimitris Papadimitrou. "The Emperor Has No Clothes! Power and Resources within the Greek Core Executive." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 2012.

Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe*. New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005. Print.

Gleditsch, Kristian, and Andrea Ruggeri. "Political Opportunity Structures, democracy, and civil war." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 3, Special Issue on State Capacity and Civil War (May 2010): 299-310.

Gouala, Joseph. "AFP Reports on 'Ethnic Cleansing' in Brazzaville." *Paris AFP, France* [English Translation]. 15 Dec. 1993. FBIS.

"Government Rules Out Negotiations." *Brazzaville Radio Nationale Congolaise Network, Congo* [English Translation]. 6 Nov. 1996. FBIS.

Greece: a country study. 4th ed. Lanham: Library of Congress, 1995. Print.

"Greek Leaders Assail Military." *New York Times*. 26 Nov. 1973. LexisNexis Academic.

"Gunshots Heard Following Accord; Reaction Reported." *Paris AFP, France* [English Translation]. 5 Aug. 1993. FBIS.

Hartzell, Caroline. "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb., 1999): 3-22.

"Interviewed on 'Stage Managed' Plot." *Le Figaro, France* [English Translation]. 27 Aug. 1991. FBIS.

"Ioannides Under House Arrest." *London Reuter*. 24 Jul. 1974. FBIS

Kaloudis, George. "Transitional Democratic Politics in Greece." *International Journal on World Peace*, 17 (1): March 2000, 35-59.

Kenwick, Michael. "Intervention and Settlement Durability in Civil Conflicts." *Penn State University*. 2015.

Klein, Keith. "Elections in Congo: The Winding Road to Democracy." *International Foundation for Electoral Systems*. Sept. 1992.

Kocketkov, Albert. "Leaders Deny Coup." *Daily Report, Russia*. [English Translation]. 4 Jan. 1992. FBIS.

Koumoulides, John T.A. *Greece in Transition*. Norfolk: Lowe & Brydone Printers, 1977. Print.

Kouvibidila, Gaston-Jonas. *Histoire du multipartisme au Congo-Brazzaville: La marche à rebours, 1940-1991*. Paris: L'Harmattan. 2000.

"Military Council Recognized." *Moscow Radio, Russia* [English Translation]. 4 Jan. 1992. FBIS. New York Times. 27 Nov. 1973. LexisNexis Academic.

Noble, Kenneth. "Congo Political Conference Gives Africa a Democratic Model." *New York Times*, 25 Jun. 1991.

Pappas, Takis S. "The Causes of the Greek Crisis are in Greek Politics." 29 Nov. 2010.

"Report on Parliamentary Elections in Republic of Georgia, 5 November 1995." OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 1 Feb. 1996.

Pedaliu, Effie G.H. "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970." *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 18 (1), 2007. 185-214.

"President Lissouba Interviewed on Current Problems." *Paris Radio, France* [English Translation]. 31 Aug. 1993. FBIS.

"Republic of Congo (Brazzaville): Information on the human rights situation and the Ninja Militia." *U.S. Department of Homeland Security*. 14 Nov. 2000.

"Republic of Congo Civil War." *Global Security*, 7 Nov. 2011.

“Sigua Appointed Prime Minister.” *Daily Report, Russia* [English Translation]. 2 Jan. 1992.

FBIS.

Sotiropoulos, Dimitri. “The Authoritarian Past and Contemporary Greek Democracy.” *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 15 (3), 2010. 449-495.

Spandidhakis, Grigorios. “Ministers Issue Statements on New Policies.” *Athens Domestic Service, Greece* [English Translation]. 28 Apr. 1967. FBIS.

Spandidhakis, Grigorios. “Minister Spandidhakis Issues Order of Day.” *Athens Domestic Service, Greece* [English Translation]. 8 May 1967. FBIS.

Splidosboel, Flemming. “Russian Power and the South Ossetian Conflict.” *Royal Danish Defence College*, May 2009.

Sundberg, Anne. “Class and Ethnicity in the Struggle for Power – the Failure of Democratization in the Congo-Brazzaville.” *Africa Development*, Vol. 24 (2), 1999. 1-29.

Stedman, Stephen John. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall, 1997): 5-53.

“Ten die in Congo Political Strife.” *The Gazette, Canada*. 12 Jul. 1993. LexisNexis Academic.

Toft, Monica Duffy. “Peace through Security: Making Negotiated Settlements Stick.” *Research Group in International Security*. 2006.

Tsebelis, George. *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990. Print.

Tsebelis, George. “Veto Players and Institutional Analysis.” *Governance*, Vol. 13.4 (2000): 441-474.

“UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014a, 1946-2013.” *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset*, Uppsala Universitet. 2014.

- Weiss, Herbert, and Juan Herrero, Adamou Kombo, Thomas Bayer. "Congo, 1995 Technical Assessment." *International Foundation for Election Systems*. Aug. 1996.
- Woodhouse, C.M. *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. New York: Franklin Watts, 1985.
- "World in Brief: Asks for Army's Help." *The Globe and Mail, Canada*. 21 Jun. 1993.
LexisNexis Academic.
- "World in Brief: Congo's government in danger." *The Globe and Mail, Canada*. 28 Sept. 1992.
LexisNexis Academic.
- "World in Brief: Congo Voting Peaceful." *The Globe and Mail, Canada*. 3 May 1993.
LexisNexis Academic.
- Yengo, Patrice. "Un recours endémique à la violence." *Afrique Contemporaine*, 1998, 33-57.
- Young, Tom. *Readings in African Politics*. Bloomington: Indiana University press. 2004. Print.
- Zartman, William I. "Negotiating Internal Conflict: Incentives and Intractability." *International Negotiation*, Vol. 6.3 (2001): 297-302.

ACADEMIC VITA

K. Claire Greensmith
kcgreensmith@gmail.com

EDUCATION

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, Shchreyer Honors College Paterno Fellows Program **Graduation: May 2015**
Bachelor of Arts in International Politics, International Political Economy Concentration
Bachelor of Science in French
Economics Minor

Université Paul-Valéry, Montpellier, France
Studied French and history courses with French university students

EXPERIENCE

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Office of the President (Washington, D.C.), Summer Intern *July 2014-August 2014*

- Created with strategic planning staff the organization's comprehensive events calendar to improve corporate outreach and coordination across the organization

Office of U.S. Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. (Washington, D.C.) Legislative Intern *May 2014-July 2014*

- Researched legislative issues pertaining to transportation, appropriations, and small businesses and informed legislative staff of conclusions via memos
- Wrote 14 letters responding to hundreds of Pennsylvania constituents' inquiries, policy concerns, and requests for information

Pennsylvania Senate Democratic Appropriations Committee, Senator Hughes' Office (Harrisburg, PA), Legislative Intern *May 2013-August 2013*

- Researched and reported comparisons of constituent demographics and education to the senator
- Analyzed the potential financial impact of proposed budget legislation
- Assisted committee members with research and information presentations

The Hotel Hershey (Hershey, PA), Activities Attendant *May 2011-August 2012*

- Conducted game nights team-building activities for hotel guests
- Supervised children ages 3 through 12 at drop-off program

ACTIVITIES

The Penn State Ballroom Dance Club

President

- Managed account of approximately \$15,000 and university funding for the club
- Led executive board members in coordinating events for the club's 1,450 members

The Penn State Performing Arts Council

Leg Work Committee

- Communicate with performing arts clubs to increase outreach for the arts at Penn State
- Coordinate clubs' involvement in university-sponsored events

The Penn State International Affairs and Debate Association

Crisis Committee Chair

- Directed six committee members to formulate crises to prompt delegates' discussion
- Researched world conflicts in preparation for conference topics of debate

HONORS

Member, Phi Beta Kappa (2014)

Member, Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society (2013)

Recipient, The President's Sparks Award for Academic Achievement (2013)

Recipient, The President's Freshman Award for Academic Achievement (2012)

Recipient, Schreyer Honors College Academic Excellence Scholarship (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)