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ETHNICITY AND GOVERNANCE: WHY AFRICA CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE

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ABSTRACT

Since gaining independence from their colonizers, most African nations have struggled to form lasting institutions of government, provide quality governance to their citizens, and maintain peace. Many reasons have been proposed for these ongoing problems, but in this paper I will explore the role ethnicity plays in this process. By using the degree to which ethnicity affects individual's vote choice as a proxy measure of ethnic favoritism from leaders, I argue that high levels of ethnic favoritism are contributing to poor quality of governance throughout Africa.

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Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Michael Nelson, who taught me how to use R and actually start to work with and get results from data.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Mike and Tina Hertel, for always answering the phone, and for their constant support, guidance, and timely care packages; my sister, Alyssa, who has always been there to listen to me, and who always keeps me in check; and my friends, who have been there for me for the last few years, and who have helped keep me sane through it all.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Since gaining their independence from colonial powers, African nations have struggled to form cohesive governments, provide quality governance to their citizens, and maintain peace, and there have been many reasons proposed for these ongoing problems. In this paper, I show that ethnic salience, which is defined as the extent to which ethnicity is important to the average citizen's identity, leads to poor governance. Using survey data on an individual's ethnic group and their party preference for their country's leader, I show that in many countries, citizen's party preference is influenced by their ethnicity. Using this information, I then show that in countries where this occurs, there is lower quality of governance. I argue that this occurs because leaders target goods and services to their own coethnics, leaving the rest of the country with a poorer quality of governance. Although there have been previous measures of the impact of ethnicity in Africa[1], this paper offers a much more direct measure of the degree to which ethnicity influences politics.

[1] Alesina and Ferrera, 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997

Chapter 2

Theory

My hypothesis is that ethnic salience will be correlated with poor governance because it is a result of ethnic favoritism on the part of the country's leader. I assume that voters will continue to vote for a leader from whom they receive deliverables, and therefore high levels of ethnic voting are likely to mean that there are high levels of ethnic favoritism if an ethnic group in power provides goods and services only to their coethnics, particularly when the leader is from a minority group, resulting in insufficient or inefficient provision of public goods. If the government provides goods and services to a majority of its citizens, that is one of the marks of good governance. However, if a minority ethnic group holds power, and only that group receives deliverables from their government, it is problematic. Other research has offered reasons for this: some have argued ethnic prejudice[2], while others have proposed less nefarious reasons, such as the ease of knowing who and where coethnics are, as opposed to non-coethnics[3]. Based on this theory, I expect to find that:

Hypothesis 1a: In countries with high levels of ethnic voting, the quality of governance will be lower.

Hypothesis 1b: The effects of ethnic salience will be greater in countries where the leader belongs to a minority ethnic group.

If my first hypothesis is true, I expect to find a correlation between high levels of ethnic voting and a lower quality of governance. Additionally, I expect to find higher levels of ethnic salience

[2] Kramon and Posner, 2012; Franck and Rainer, 2012
[3] Kasara, 2007

in countries where the leader belongs to a minority ethnic group. I also expect to find that in these countries where the leader is part of a minority ethnic group, there is even lower quality of governance.

One of the main issues raised by researchers who wish to demonstrate the importance of ethnicity is the fact that an ethnic group is much more likely to vote for their coethnic candidate. Most have argued that voters will act this way, regardless of the candidate's performance. However, other evidence suggests that voters will actually vote for their coethnic only if that candidate has demonstrated good performance[4]. This suggests that, although ethnicity remains an important factor for voters deciding for whom to vote, they are also concerned with a candidate's past performance. This is important for my hypothesis, since I am operating under the assumption that voters will vote along ethnic lines as a means of rewarding good performance.

In many countries, research has shown that individuals will vote along ethnic lines, hoping to receive better access to goods and services once their coethnic holds office. Kenya, which has longstanding divisions between ethnic groups, has provided an excellent source of information for research on ethnic fractionalization. In the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya, individuals who identified in ethnic terms were most influenced by access to public goods[5]. This supports the idea that individuals use ethnicity as a means to indicate which candidate is more likely to increase their access to public goods.

Much of the research on public goods distribution in Africa also focuses on the relationship between the distribution of goods and ethnicity. In a study of schools and water supply in Kenya, ethnic diversity proved to have significant correlations with poor school quality

[4] Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Carlson, 2015; Ferree 2006
[5] Gutierrez-Romero, 2010

and poor well maintenance[6]. Additionally, in countries where nation-building has been part of public policy, there tend to be fewer problems of collective action, as well as more rapid economic growth[7]. With the distribution of goods so heavily influenced by ethnicity, ethnic voting may simply be part of a repeating cycle. Given the importance of ethnicity in both voters' preference and the distribution of goods, it is clear that finding a good measure of ethnic salience is important.

[6] Miguel and Gugerty, 2005
[7] Gugerty, 2002

Chapter 3

Research Methods

Although many African nations have made significant strides in development and democratization in recent history, much of Africa still struggles, and there are many African nations who continually rank among the worst in the world in terms of governance, life expectancy, education, and other measures. I have proposed that one of the main factors contributing to poor governance in Africa is ethnic salience. In the analysis that follows, I will be creating a measure of ethnic voting, which will serve as a proxy measure of ethnic salience, relying on survey data from the most recent Afrobarometer surveys conducted in each country.

This is a theory that has been tested in other ways by many political scientists. Several political scientists have studied ethnic salience through measures of ethnic fractionalization[8], but ethnic voting provides a more direct measure of the influence of ethnicity in a country's politics. Thus far, although there has been qualitative analysis done on the impact of ethnic voting, there has been little quantitative work done. Dowd and Dreissen[9] have put forth the only quantitative measure of ethnic voting, and in this paper, I will be creating a similar measure of ethnic voting. Since it is difficult to provide evidence of ethnic favoritism in each of the countries included in this analysis, ethnic voting will serve as a proxy measure of whether a leader is engaging in ethnic favoritism. Given that research has shown that coethnics are likely to vote for a well-performing politician from whom they are likely to receive deliverables, measuring ethnic voting allows for a good measure of ethnic salience in a country's politics.

[8] Alesina et al, 2003, Posner, 2004, Eifert et al, 2010
[9] Dowd and Dreissen, 2008

In order to measure the impact of ethnic salience on the quality of governance, I will be conducting a two part analysis. In order to measure ethnic salience, I improve on Dowd and Dreissen's measure of ethnic voting. Dowd and Dreissen calculated a measure of ethnic voting by including Afrobarometer data on a respondent's language and their political party preference in the equation for Cramer's Phi. They use Cramer's Phi for each country as their measure of ethnic voting. I will improve on this by calculating a partial correlation of ethnicity and vote choice, which will also serve as a proxy measure of ethnic favoritism from the leader. The partial correlation serves as a method of calculating the correlation between two variables while controlling for the effect of other variables.

The primary variables are an individual's ethnicity, which I coded as 1 if it was the same as the incumbent leader in that country and 0 if not, and the party that each respondent would vote for in the next presidential election. I coded this as 1 if the respondent intended to vote for the incumbent, and 0 if would vote for a different party or did not intend to vote at all. I also included control variables for whether the respondent was alone or with others during the survey[10], whether the surveyor was a coethnic of the respondent or not[11], and whether the participant lived in an urban or rural area[12]. These are all factors that may influence individuals to give dishonest responses during surveys, and by including them as controls, I hope to mitigate their potential impact.

Using these values, I calculated a simple correlation, or Pearson's R, to determine the degree to which ethnic voting is prevalent in each country. However, in order to have a better measure of ethnic voting, I recalculated the correlation, this time using a partial correlation

[10] Nederhof, 1985
[11] Fearon and Laitin, 1996
[12] Bawumia, 1998

equation, and including the control variables for whether the respondent lived in an urban, semi-urban, or rural areas, whether the respondent was surveyed by a coethnic or not, and whether others were present during the survey.

In order to use these control variables, I coded each of these variables, which also come from data from the Afrobarometer surveys. To measure whether a respondent was from an urban or rural setting, I coded respondents as 1 if they were reported as living in an urban or semi-urban environment, and as 0 if they were reported as living in a rural environment. This is a question that was answered by the surveyor, rather than the respondent. To determine whether a respondent was surveyed by a coethnic, I used a proxy measure of whether respondents and surveyors spoke the same native language. If the respondent and the surveyor both spoke the same native language, I coded it as 1. If their native languages differed, I coded it as a 0. Finally, for the measure of whether others were present during the survey, I coded it as 1 if the respondent's spouse or any others were present while the survey was being conducted. I coded it as 0 if the respondent was alone, or if only the respondent's children were present during the survey. I coded it as 0 if only the respondent's children were present since, in most cases, a person is not likely to lie about their political standings for fear of backlash from their children, but they may face backlash from a spouse or their peers.

I included all of these variables in a partial correlation, in order to calculate the correlation between a respondent's ethnicity and their party preference, when controlling for factors that could influence their response. The measures of a respondent's ethnicity and the party they would vote for in the next election served as my primary variables, and each of the other measures served as control variables in the partial correlation model. This formula gave me

the partial correlations, which I then use as my measure of ethnic salience in my models to test my hypotheses.

Table 1: Levels of ethnic voting by country

COUNTRY	Ethnic Voting	COUNTRY	Ethnic Voting
Benin	.149	Malawi	–0.098
Botswana	.084	Mozambique	.102
Burkina Faso	.015	Namibia	.207
Burundi	.246	Niger	.248
Cameroon	.168	Nigeria	–0.093
Cote d'Ivoire	.489	Senegal	.206
Ghana	–0.103	Sierra Leone	.421
Guinea	.439	Togo	.152
Kenya	.417	Uganda	.103
Liberia	–0.037	Zimbabwe	.023

Once I generated a measure of ethnic voting using these variables, I included that measure as an independent variable in the model to test my hypotheses. For the first hypothesis, I regressed country-level data for each of my variables. The dependent variable, or the measure of the quality of governance, is an average of the World Bank's World Governance Indicator scores. These scores range from –2.5, which indicates weak government performance, to 2.5, which indicates strong government performance. The scores for the World Governance Indicators are given for six different dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory

quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. By averaging the scores for each of these indicators of governance, I have a number that represents the overall quality of governance provided by each of the countries included in my analysis.

I first plotted a scatterplot of the data, using the variables of ethnic voting and the quality of governance. This shows that there is at least a negative pattern between higher levels of ethnic voting and lower quality of governance.



Figure 1: Levels of ethnic voting and the quality of governance

In order to determine if there are any variables that are statistically significant to my hypothesis, I regressed the quality of governance by several independent variables. The average of the World Governance Indicators serve as my dependent variable in my regression model, which includes

independent variables for GDP[13], education[14], whether a country was a former British colony or not[15], and whether a country's predominant religion was Protestant[16], as well as a control variable of ethnic fractionalization, to compare to my own measure of ethnic voting. Each of these variables is measured using the most recent available data. I included GDP as an independent variable, using data provided by the World Bank, since research has indicated that as a country's GDP increases, the quality of their governance often increases as well. Education is measured as the average years of schooling completed by adults older than 25 in each country. This data comes from the Human Development Reports issued by the United Nations Development Program, and is also included since research has indicated that as education levels increase, countries are more likely to democratize, which would impact a country's quality of governance. To measure whether a country was a former British colony or not, I coded each country as 1 if they were formerly colonized by the British, and 0 if they had been colonized by any other colonial power. For my independent variable measuring religion, I used information from the CIA World Factbook to code each country as 1 if the country's largest religious group was Protestant, and 0 if not. For the control variable of ethnic fractionalization, I used the measure of ethnic fractionalization created by Alesina et al.

[13] Bräutigam and Knack, 2004
[14] Grier, 1997
[15] Lange, 2003; Blanton et al, 2001
[16] Woodberry, 2012

Table 2: Regression analysis of the quality of governance

	Dependent Variable: Quality of Governance
Ethnic Voting	–0.315 (0.763)
GDP	–0.001 (0.001)
Education	0.056 (0.081)
British Colonizer	–0.036 (0.343)
Protestant	0.334 (0.377)
Ethnic Fractionalization	–0.221 (0.793)
Constant	–0.715 (0.681)
Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 Residual Std. Error F Statistic	20 0.319 0.004 0.515 (df=13) 1.014(df=6; 13)
Note:	* p < 0.1; 88 p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

In order to test my second hypothesis, and determine if the effects of ethnic salience were greater in countries where the leader belonged to a minority ethnic group, I created a second model, which is similar to the first. This model relies on the same data as the model which tests the relationship between ethnic voting and the quality of governance. However, this model is split into two groups: the first includes countries where the leader is a member of a minority ethnic group; the second includes countries where the leader belongs to an ethnic group that makes up a majority of a country's population. This data relies on information from the CIA World Factbook, which provides a breakdown of each country's demographics.

To test my second hypothesis, I split the countries into two groups based on whether the leader is a member of a minority or a majority ethnic group. There are only five countries in which the leader belongs to a majority ethnic group: Botswana, where the Tswana people make up 80% of the population; Burundi, where Hutus make up 85%; Namibia, where the Wambo people make up 50% of the population; Niger, where the Haoussa people make up 55.4%; and Zimbabwe, where the Shona people comprise 82% of the overall population. Botswana is the only one of these countries where the ethnic groups are slightly more complicated: the president is a member of the Mongwato ethnic group, which is a subset of the Tswana. Demographic data for the country does not provide a breakdown of the Tswana ethnic group. Since data on what percentage of the Tswana people belong to the Mongwato group was unavailable, I counted the leader as being a member of the Tswana people, and therefore a member of a majority ethnic group. Once the data were split, I ran the same analysis for both groups of countries, and compared the results between each.

Since splitting the data leaves such a small sample that I cannot run a multiple regression, including the same control variables as I did in the test of my first hypothesis, I instead regressed only the dependent variable, the quality of governance, and one independent variable, levels of ethnic voting.

Table 3: Regression analysis of the quality of governance based on whether the leader's ethnic group is a minority or majority

	Dependent Variable: Quality of Governance when leader is from a minority ethnic group		**Dependent Variable:** Quality of Governance when leader is from a majority ethnic group
Ethnic Voting	–0.605 (0.445)	Ethnic Voting	–0.171 (5.010)
Constant	–0.556*** (0.112)	Constant	–0.400 (0.931)
Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 Resid. Std. Error F Statistic	15 0.124 0.057 0.341 (df = 13) 1.848 (df = 1; 13)	Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 Resid. Std. Error F Statistic	5 0.0004 –0.333 1.025 (df = 3) 0.001 (df = 1; 3)
Note:	* p < 0.1; 88 p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01		

Chapter 4

Analysis

Using data from Round 5 surveys conducted throughout Africa by Afrobarometer, I have been able to gather enough data to analyze the levels of ethnic voting in 20 African countries. A sample size of 20 countries is a fairly limited sample, but this is all the data currently allows for. Although there is currently Afrobarometer data for over 30 countries, I could only include 20 in my analysis. Some countries could not be included because the leader's ethnicity is not possible to find. South Africa was excluded because the same political party has held power since the country's new government was formed in 1994. Zambia was excluded because at the time the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted, the president had Scottish heritage, and therefore I could not measure the impact of ethnicity. Given these constraints, the analysis is limited, but this data still provides enough evidence to determine if there are patterns or correlations between ethnic voting and the quality of governance.

Although there is not a statistically significant relationship between levels of ethnic voting and the quality of governance, that is not surprising when there is such a small sample size to draw from. In order to determine if there is any relationship or pattern between levels of ethnic voting and the quality of governance, I calculated the correlation between the two, and created a scatterplot of them, seen in Figure 1. The correlation, at the country level, between levels of ethnic voting and the quality of governance is –0.2, which demonstrates a weak, negative correlation. I ran a partial correlation as well, this time including the control variables

for GDP, education levels, whether a country was colonized by the British or not, whether the incumbent's party was a minority or a majority, whether the country's predominant religion is Protestant or not, and the control variable of ethnic fractionalization. This model generated a correlation of –0.311, which results in a slightly steeper slope, and a stronger, more negative relationship between levels of ethnic voting and the quality of governance. This pattern can be seen in a scatterplot of the two variables as well.

Graphing the relationship between the quality of governance (measured by the World Bank's Governance Indicators) and ethnic voting also show a pattern. Although the pattern seen in Figure 1 is fairly weak, and there are countries that stand out from the rest of the data, this pattern does reflect a slight, negative relationship between levels of ethnic voting and the quality of governance. These findings offer tentative support of my first hypothesis. Although it is unlikely to have statistically significant measures with data from such a small sample, the fact that there is a correlation of –0.311, and a pattern of a negative relationship between levels of ethnic voting and the quality of governance, suggest that high levels of ethnic voting will indeed have a negative impact on the quality of governance.

Given that the sample is already fairly limited, and splitting the sample into two groups made the sample size even smaller, I was unable to include multiple control variables in each correlation equation. However, using a simple regression that included only the dependent variable of the quality of governance and the independent variable of ethnic voting, I calculated the relationship. This uses the same data as the model to test my previous hypothesis: to measure the quality of governance, I used an average of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators; to measure the prevalence of ethnic salience, I used the measure of ethnic voting calculated in this paper. For countries where the leader belongs to a minority ethnic group, the correlation was

–0.353. In countries where the leader was a member of a majority ethnic group, the correlation was –0.020.

Although it is difficult to generate statistically significant results with such limited data, these correlation coefficients demonstrate that there is a definite difference between countries where the leader belongs to a minority ethnic group and countries where the leader belongs to a majority ethnic group. With an R^2 of 0.124 and a negative value for the independent variable, there is a clear negative relationship between the prevalence of ethnic voting and the quality of governance in countries where the leader belongs to a minority ethnic group. However, in countries where the leader comes from a majority ethnic group, there is an R^2 of 0.0004. This relationship is weak, suggesting that there is little relationship at all.

These numbers support my second hypothesis, that the effects of ethnic salience will be higher in countries where the leader belongs to a minority ethnic group. Both of the coefficients independent variables are negative, which shows that the relationship between ethnic voting and the quality of governance is still a negative relationship, regardless of the percent of a population that belongs to the leader's ethnic group. However, it is clear that there is a significant difference in the strength of that relationship depending on whether the leader is a member of a minority or majority ethnic group.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that there is a relationship between the levels of ethnic voting within a country and that country's quality of governance, and that this relationship is stronger in countries where the leader is a member of a minority ethnic group. The regression and graph for all 20 countries show that, although levels of ethnic voting do not have statistical significance in relation to the quality of governance, there is still an overall, negative relationship between ethnic salience, measured here as levels of ethnic voting and the overall quality of governance. After splitting the countries into two groups based on whether the leader was a member of a minority or a majority ethnic group, the correlation coefficients show that the effect of ethnic voting is much stronger in countries where the leader belongs to a minority group.

These findings can help explain why many African countries continue to struggle to provide good governance to their people. Divisions between ethnic groups have contributed to problems of governance and conflict for decades, and if levels of ethnic salience (which ethnic voting is a proxy measure of) continue to remain high, it is likely that problems of governance will persist.

My research was limited by a few factors, the most significant of which being the limited sample size. Given that I was only able to gather data to analyze for 20 countries, it is possible that a more robust idea of the relationship between ethnic voting and the quality of governance could be gained from a greater sample size. This could also help mitigate some of the problems I faced when splitting the sample into two groups based on what percent of the population belongs

to the same ethnic group as the leader. With a larger sample size, this would have allowed for more ways to measure the relationship, rather than using a correlation of two variables and comparing results.

Additionally, I ran my regression model for my first hypothesis using country-level averages for many of my variables, although I would have preferred to run a multilevel model. By using a multilevel model, I could gain a better overall idea of the prevalence of ethnic voting throughout Africa. This would allow me to examine the relationship between ethnicity and vote choice at the individual level, while controlling for country-level variables that may impact vote choice, such as GDP, education levels, or a country's predominant religion.

There are also ways in which this research can be expanded upon in order to address more issues or to provide a more comprehensive idea of the relationship between ethnicity and the quality of governance. First, as more data becomes available, this research could be expanded to include more countries. This would allow for a broader image of the impact of ethnic salience, and would also make it easier to conduct analysis for my second hypothesis, after splitting the sample into two groups. Additionally, as suggested originally in Dowd and Dreissen's work, it would be interesting to compare levels of ethnic voting over time in order to determine whether the prevalence of ethnic salience decreases with time, or if it remains fairly constant.

This paper offers evidence that ethnic salience, or the degree to which ethnicity is an important factor in an individual's identity, plays a role in shaping a country's politics. African voters continue to use ethnicity as an indicator of whether or not they will receive deliverables from their leader. When their coethnic leader performs his job well, those voters continue to vote along ethnic lines. This is not true for all of Africa: in some of the countries that were included in this analysis, there was no real link between an individual's ethnicity and their vote choice.

However, in those countries where ethnicity did impact vote choice, there is a clear pattern of decreasing quality of governance as levels of ethnic voting increase. Additionally, this pattern is stronger in countries where the leader belongs to a minority ethnic group than those where the leader belongs to a majority ethnic group.

These results suggest that as long as African leaders target goods towards their own coethnics, voters will vote for their coethnic, and problems with the quality of governance will continue. However, solutions to this problem are easier to suggest that to enact. Unless leaders are willing to provide quality governance, and provide goods to their citizens without regard for ethnic boundaries, it seems unlikely that governance in Africa will improve in the immediate future. Perhaps, if more nations are willing to pursue nation-building policies, African nations can start to overcome the ethnic divisions that currently result in poor governance. Until then, however, it seems as though much of Africa will continue to struggle to provide good governance so long as leaders from minority ethnic groups target goods and services towards their own coethnics.

Appendix

Tables and Graphs

Table 1: Levels of ethnic voting, by country:

COUNTRY	Ethnic Voting	COUNTRY	Ethnic Voting
Benin	.149	Malawi	–0.098
Botswana	.084	Mozambique	.102
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Ghana	–0.103	Sierra Leone	.421
Guinea	.439	Togo	.152
Kenya	.417	Uganda	.103
Liberia	–0.037	Zimbabwe	.023

Figure 1: Scatterplot of the quality of governance and ethnic voting



Table 2: Regression analysis of the quality of governance:

	Dependent Variable: Quality of Governance
Ethnic Voting	–0.315 (0.763)
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British Colonizer	–0.036 (0.343)
Protestant	0.334 (0.377)
Ethnic Fractionalization	–0.221 (0.793)
Constant	–0.715 (0.681)
Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 Residual Std. Error F Statistic	20 0.319 0.004 0.515 (df=13) 1.014(df=6; 13)
Note: * p < 0.1; 88 p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01	

Table 3: Regression Analysis of the quality of governance depending on the leader's ethnic group, and whether that group is a minority or majority:

	Dependent Variable: Quality of Governance when leader is from a minority ethnic group		**Dependent Variable:** Quality of Governance when leader is from a majority ethnic group
Ethnic Voting	–0.605 (0.445)	Ethnic Voting	–0.171 (5.010)
Constant	–0.556*** (0.112)	Constant	–0.400 (0.931)
Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 Resid. Std. Error F Statistic	15 0.124 0.057 0.341 (df = 13) 1.848 (df = 1; 13)	Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 Resid. Std. Error F Statistic	5 0.0004 –0.333 1.025 (df = 3) 0.001 (df = 1; 3)
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ACADEMIC VITA
Michelle R. Hertel

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EDUCATION

Pennsylvania State University, College of Liberal Arts — University Park, PA
Bachelor of Arts in International Politics, minor in *French* — *May 2015*
- Admitted to Schreyer Honors College through the Gateway application

INTERNSHIP EXPERIENCE

Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy — Washington, D.C.
Volunteer Student Intern, Europe and NATO Office — *July 2014-August 2014*
- Supported and contributed to meetings between Department of Defense officials, U.S. government officials, and international delegates by crafting action memos, read-aheads, and numerous letters
- Served as Acting Action Officer and Country Director for Germany, Austria, and Switzerland for seven days
- Compiled multiple trip books to provide Department of Defense officials, including the Secretary of Defense, with pertinent information for overseas travel

Strategic Intelligence Research Internship — Pennsylvania State University
Research Intern — *August 2013-May 2014*
- Conducted research in collaboration with another student and a faculty advisor to compile data on the link between the potential for US energy independence and political stability in the Middle East
- Presented findings to and met with members of the Intelligence Community during the fall and at the Five Eyes Intelligence Community conference in March

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Besançon, France — Study Abroad
Intensive French Language Courses — *June 2013-July 2013*
- Lived with a French family while completing two four-week courses of intensive French language study

Stirling, Scotland — Study Abroad
First Year Study Abroad Experience — *February 2012-June 2012*
- Selected as one of 19 students to study at *Stirling University* in Scotland during the spring semester of freshman year, as part of *Arcadia University*'s First Year Study Abroad Program

Akuapem Hills, Ghana — Volunteer Experience
Projects Abroad Volunteer — *Summer 2010*
- Worked with other volunteers and local villagers to plaster mud houses in impoverished villages to provide sustainable housing for the residents in a cross-cultural experience

WORK HISTORY

Auxiliary Police — Pennsylvania State University
Auxiliary Officer — *January 2015-Present*
- Served as student assistance to campus police, including working traffic and security details for large events
- Developed strong communication skills by working with other members of campus police, communicating with the public, and working alongside event coordinators

Wegman's — Bethlehem, PA and State College, PA
Produce Customer Service — *October 2012-Present*
- Worked quickly and efficiently to keep up with demand and worked overtime when required by staffing shortages
- Supervised several department members when closing the department at the end of each day

Cashier — *August 2008-October 2012*
- Developed strong interpersonal skills by interacting with customers and solving problems
- Awarded company scholarship for commitment to the job and excellent academic records

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES

Besançon: French Language Studies — Penn State University, University Park
Peer Mentor — *September 2013-December 2013*
- Volunteered to work with program coordinators to offer advise about the experience to prospective students

ADDITIONAL SKILLS

Languages: French (Conversational) and German (Beginner)
Microsoft Office (Proficient)
R [data analysis software] (Working Knowledge)