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ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS:
A CASE STUDY OF RWANDA

TALIA SAINCLAIR
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Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Clemente Abrokwa
Professor of African Studies
Thesis Supervisor

Kevin Thomas
Professor of Sociology
Honors Adviser

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College.

ABSTRACT

Conflict forms as an inevitable and fundamental aspect of human nature and coexistence, occurring due to natural differences in human interests, perceptions, desires, ambitions, and general dispositions. Conflict can occur, therefore, based on any range of issues including social, economic, political, cultural and religious beliefs. The purpose of this study is to examine the nature and causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa and the methods employed in resolving such conflicts. Specifically, it focuses on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the conflict resolution strategies employed by the government in its attempts at mitigating ethnic tensions in the post-genocide period of the country. The objective is to seek effective methods to help prevent and resolve conflicts on the African continent.

Several studies have been conducted on the Rwandan genocide that focus on the conflict itself and its causes, as well as the progress Rwanda has made in the twenty-two years since the end of the genocide. However, few studies have focused on the conflict resolution methods employed in the post-genocide period that enabled the country to recover from the effects of the conflict in 1994 to its current state of peace. This study aims to investigate the conflict resolution mechanisms employed by the government of Rwanda in an effort to achieve lasting peace, specifically the *gacaca* court system.

The findings of the study did not confirm our original hypothesis, which stated, “The conflict resolution method employed in post 1994 Rwanda, specifically the *gacaca* courts, were effective in facilitating reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi and aided in the creation of a more peaceful society.” The study outlines several recommendations for improving the *gacaca* (or other *gacaca*-like) system.

Data collection for this study included library resources, such as books, journals, newspapers, and Internet sources. Additionally, data also included interviews conducted by the author in May 2015, in Rwanda, with survivors involved in the conflict as well as the conflict resolution methods employed.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the nature and causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa and the methods employed in resolving such conflicts. Specifically, it focuses on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the conflict resolution strategies employed by the government in its attempts at mitigating ethnic tensions in the post-genocide period of the country. The objective is to seek effective methods to help prevent and resolve conflicts on the African continent.

The Problem

Several studies have been conducted on the Rwandan genocide that focus on the conflict itself and its causes, as well as the progress Rwanda has made in the twenty-two years since the end of the genocide. However, few studies have focused on the conflict resolution methods employed in the post-genocide period that enabled the country to recover from the effects of the conflict in 1994 to its current state of peace. This study aims to investigate the conflict resolution mechanisms employed by the government of Rwanda in an effort to achieve lasting peace.

Background to the Problem

Conflict is defined as “an active disagreement between people with opposing ideals or principles” (Conflict Definition). For the purpose of this study, conflict resolution will be defined as the methods and

processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict and retribution, otherwise known as reconciliation. There are countless, varying methods of conflict resolution and since each conflict is unique, there can be no one way to attempt reconciliation.

The complex and nuanced dynamics of the relationship between ethnic groups in Rwanda far outdate that of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. In an effort to better understand these relations and the effect that they had on the viability of a genocide, one must start by looking at the history of migrations into the region.

The Hutu first arrived in the region that is now Rwanda somewhere between five hundred and one thousand BC. Before then, the land had been inhabited by the Twa people, who lived near the forests as hunters and gatherers, and were increasingly refined to the forested areas after the arrival of other groups. Today, they make up less than one percent of the population. Generally speaking, the Hutu were an agricultural people who lived off of the land in large family groups (Kingdom of Rwanda).

The Tutsis first arrived in Rwanda sometime in the fourteenth century AD from the Greater Horn of Africa, namely the southern Ethiopian highlands. They were a nomadic people whose livelihood stemmed greatly from their livestock, typically cattle. Through a relatively slow, long and peaceful process, they settled in Rwanda with the Hutu people and adopted their language and culture (Kingdom of Rwanda).

By the fifteenth century, the Tutsi had established complete control over the Hutu peoples, with a pyramid style political structure with the head being a Mwami, a Tutsi king of supposed divine origin. Up until this point, the Hutu social structure was based on the clan and kings ruled over limited clan groups; however, the reign of the Tutsi Mwami continued successfully for several hundred years after this (History of Rwanda).

Eventually, land ownership was taken away from the Hutu and became the property of the Mwami. Although the Tutsi have never exceeded more than fifteen percent of the population, they succeeded in gaining political control of Rwanda and had been using that control to elevate themselves to

a higher social status mostly based upon economics. According to the University of Pennsylvania's African Studies Center, "Over time, Hutu-Tutsi relations took the form of a client-patron contract called the *ubuhake*. At first, the agreement meant that the Hutu could use Tutsi cattle in exchange for personal and military service. Over time, *ubuhake* became a feudal-type class system through which land and cattle, and therefore power, were in the hands of the Tutsi minority. The Hutu indentured themselves to a Tutsi lord giving him agricultural products and personal service in exchange for the use of land and cattle" (East Africa Living Encyclopedia).

Despite these factors, ethnic relations remained largely amicable as the Hutu and Tutsi lived largely as the same people, with any distinctions being made mostly by class, as both groups shared the same language, beliefs, culture and national identity. According to George Izangola, the only difference between the two groups was economic, rather than ethnic. In a 1996 interview with Charlayne Hunter Gault, Professor Izangola explained:

In Rwanda, the Tutsi and the Hutu are the same people. They are all people—large grouping or communities which go from seven regions of Cameroon to Uganda—all the way to South Africa, in the same culture," Izangola said. "People used to be Tutsi or Hutu, depending on the proximity to the king. If you were close to the king, you owned wealth, you owned a lot of cattle, you are a Tutsi. If you are far away from the king, you are a cultivator, you don't own much cattle, you are a Hutu (History of Hutu-Tutsi Relations).

The nineteenth century introduced two new problems that would largely affect future ethnic relations in the area: colonization and land redistribution problems. The latter was affected widely by the implementation of a previously mentioned system known as *ubuhake*, meaning, "to work for access to land," which made Hutus who were not part of the Tutsi nobility into serfs that worked on the land, in turn greatly disrupting the peace of Tutsi-Hutu relations and creating new tensions for both groups. The arrival of the Germans in the 1890s only worsened the problem, as the new colonizers endorsed the Tutsi power over the Hutu (History of Rwanda).

After World War I, the Belgians were given control over Rwanda and took almost no time to further increase the growing divide between ethnic groups through the use of eugenics, which was widely popular at the time, such as in Nazi Germany. This pseudoscience allowed the Belgians to assert "proof"

of the Tutsi's apparent "greater purity and closeness to European ancestry" than that of the Hutu peoples through arbitrary factors such as skull measurements showing "larger brain size," greater height, lighter skin tone, nose width, and overall supposed greater Caucasoid resemblance than the Hutu (History of Rwanda).

Under the Belgian administration, the power of the Mwami was curtailed, as they modified the *ubuhake* system and eliminated the paying of tribute. In 1946, Rwanda (then Rwanda-Urundi) became a United Nations Trust territory, and the Belgian mandate changed as they retained trusteeship but were required to integrate the Rwandans into the political process, hence integrating more Hutus into the administration, and this act angered some Tutsis (History of Hutu-Tutsi Relations).

By 1954, the then-Mwami, King Rudahigwa, called for complete Independence of Rwanda, following the end of Belgium's occupation. During this Independence struggle, a Hutu catechist named Gregoire Kayibanda published his *Hutu Manifesto*, a document that demanded political authority be given to the Hutus once the Belgians left, which resulted in the creation of two new Hutu political parties: the APROSOMA (L'Association pour la Promotion Social des Masses) and RADAR (La Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais) (History of Rwanda).

During this time of political transformation and upheaval, Mwami Rudahigwa mysteriously perished in Bujumbura, Burundi, and common speculation was that the Belgians had something to do with his demise, although this was never proven and the real cause of his death will likely remain unknown. His half-brother, King Kigeli V Dahindurwa, assumed power while the political party Parmahetu (Parti du Mouvement de l'Emanicipation Hutu) rose to the forefront (History of Rwanda). The new king was soon forced into exile and the newly 'democratized' Rwanda held its first election in 1960. Although it is believed by some that the Belgians tampered with the results, ultimately Parmahetu won and its leader, the aforementioned Gregoire Kayibanda, became Prime Minister of Rwanda. On September 25 of the same year, the United Nations held a referendum in Rwanda to decide if the monarchy should be abolished, and through this process the abolition of the monarchy won the majority

and Rwanda was transformed into a country with a president, effectively ending the long reign of Tutsi Mwami. In 1962, the Belgians left Rwanda and it was officially considered an independent state; however, the same referendum that had abolished the monarchy also gave the position of power to Kayibanda, a Hutu, as the new President and Prime Minister (History of Rwanda).

After hundreds of years of Tutsi rule, the roles were abruptly reversed. During Kayibanda's rule, there was an increasing exodus of Tutsi from Rwanda into neighboring nations, and Hutu power quickly became centralized as all Tutsi were removed from positions of political power to which Tutsi rebellions began and failed repeatedly while Tutsi killings began. Anti-Tutsi legislature was passed under Kayibanda, such as the 10% quota for Tutsis, which applied to school and university seats and the civil service positions reserved for Tutsi (History of Hutu-Tutsi Relations).

In 1973, Minister of Defense Juvénal Habyarimana toppled the Kayibanda regime in a smooth military coup; however, even with this new leader, the policies and positions of the government remained the same while Tutsi killings continued in spurts (History of Rwanda).

In 1978, Habyarimana issued a new constitution that established the reigning political party, MRND or Mouvement Revolutionnaire et National Pour le Developpement, as the sole political party, banning all others. As an immediate response, what would become the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was established by exiled Tutsis in Kenya, and in three years time they began an armed conflict against the MRND, which also intensified the violence, and widespread killings of Tutsi continued (History of Rwanda).

On August 4, 1993, the Arusha Peace Accords were ratified by both parties, and stated that a transitional government would be put into place, decentralizing power and incorporating forces such as the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front). While it appeared that peace had been brokered at this time, seven months later President Habyarimana's plane was shot down before the terms of the Arusha Peace Accord had been implemented. While the actual perpetrators of this event still remain unknown, the MRND and other Hutu parties immediately placed the blame on the Tutsi "cockroaches," and the path for genocide

began. The killings began immediately with breakneck speed, as more than 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were slaughtered in a span of just one hundred days (Rwanda, Genocide).

On July 4, 1994, the RPF took control of Kigali, effectively ending the conflict. Thousands of Hutu fled in fear of reprisal killings as the RPF assumed power, returning the Tutsi as rulers. The new government employed the use of *gacaca* courts as a conflict resolution mechanism to resolve the animosities that existed.

This study will focus on the nature of the *gacaca* courts, and how they operated in the conflict resolution efforts, following the end of the genocide in 1994. *Gacaca* is a traditional communal Rwandan justice system. The word translates from Kinyarwanda to “on the grass,” and in terms of *gacaca* courts, that can be translated loosely to “justice amongst the grass,” which is the very nature of *gacaca* where the court takes place at a communal gathering point on the grass. This traditional system is unique to Rwanda and has been one of the most prominent and visible methods of conflict resolution that has helped to facilitate peace in the post-genocide era.

Hypothesis

The conflict resolution methods employed in post 1994 Rwanda, specifically the *Gacaca* Courts, were effective in facilitating reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi and aided in the creation of a more peaceful society.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is two-fold. First, the study will add to the existing corpus of knowledge concerning conflict resolution mechanisms, particularly in the African context using Rwanda as a case study, while also contributing to the understanding of the nature of *Gacaca* Courts as well as

their effectiveness. Secondly, it will benefit numerous groups, including Rwandans and Africans in general, anyone living in a post-conflict zone, the African Union, the United Nations, academics, and researchers interested in conflict resolution.

Data Collection

Data collection for this study included library resources, such as books, journals, newspapers, and Internet sources. Additionally, data also included interviews conducted by the author in May 2015, in Rwanda, with survivors involved in the conflict as well as the conflict resolution methods employed. Research in Rwanda also included visits to local genocide memorials throughout the country, such as in Kigali and Murambi, in an effort to better understand the history of the conflict, as well as viewing documentaries on the genocide.

Research Questions

The following questions guided the data collection for the research project:

1. What is the history of ethnic relations in Rwanda?
2. What caused the Rwandan genocide?
3. How did Rwanda recover from the genocide of 1994? / What conflict resolution mechanisms did Rwanda employ post genocide?
4. What is *gacaca*?
5. What are the historical and cultural backgrounds of *gacaca*, and what role did these courts play in the reconciliation process?

Interview Questions

1. What would you like to share with me about your experiences in the 21 years since 1994?
2. What has Rwanda done to recover from the genocide?
3. What have you done for yourself to recover from the genocide?

4. Is there anything that has not been done/tried that you think would be helpful?
5. Do you have any thoughts you would like to share on the conflict?
6. What will you teach/share with the younger generations?

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter discusses theories of conflict in an effort to better understand how conflict is formed, and therefore how it can be mitigated. Topics covered include the primordial theory, the class theory, and the eclectic theory.

Theories of Conflict

Conflict forms as an inevitable and fundamental aspect of human nature and coexistence, occurring due to natural differences in human interests, perceptions, desires, ambitions, and general dispositions. Conflict can occur, therefore, based on any range of issues including social, economic, political, cultural and religious beliefs. In regards to the age-old question: “Why do people fight?” The literature recognizes three main theories: the primordial, the class, and the eclectic.

The Primordial Theory of Conflict

Primordialism as a theory of conflict argues that ethnic identity is ascriptive in the sense that membership is assigned at birth and therefore difficult to change (Isajiw, 1993). This theory asserts that ethnic ties are inherent in us as human beings and that we have deep natural connections that connect us to some people and create natural divisions with others whether due to race, religion, language or location (Geertz, 1973: 250). Membership of ethnic groups is therefore fixed and passed down intact across

generations with ethnic identity being singular, timeless and fixed with distinct social boundaries (Poata-Smith, 2013). Thus, collective action by each primordial group is structured around ethno-cultural specificities based on their perceptions, beliefs and expectations. In primordialism, ethnic differences are perceived as ancestral, deep and irreconcilable (Esteban et al., 2012) and because of this, conflict naturally arises from ‘ancient hatreds’ between ethnic groups (Weir, 2012). This theory explains the fear of domination, expulsion or even extinction that lies at the center of most ethnic conflicts (Glazer, 1986: 429) and reveals the attachment to beliefs that provoke a depth of intense emotion that drives violent atrocities committed in such conflicts. The weakness of this theory is that it does not account for the structural, economic and political processes within which these conflicts erupt (McKay, 2011), and also that its emphasis on genetic and therefore unshakeable factors promotes an image of ethnic conflict as a permanent state of human nature that is ‘ineradicable’ (Laitin and Sunny, 1999: 153). The belief that “social conflict is not inherently or exclusively racial, nor is racial or ethnic difference inherently conflictual,” refutes this claim (Carney, 15).

The Class Theory of Conflict

The class theory on conflict, rooted in Marxism, asserts that every society has an economic mode of production, which is the key to determining the status of the members of the society. This develops social classes, which determine the critical topic of allocation of resources in a given society in terms of who gets what and how much they get. Consequently, according to this theory, each member of society belongs to either the owning class, which determines the allocation and distribution of resources, or the subordinate class, which comprises the petite bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the peasantry (Rummel). Thus, the essence of conflict theory is best epitomized by the classic “pyramid structure” in which a small elite dictates terms to the larger masses. In understanding conflict theory, competition between classes plays a key part in response to structural inequality, which leads to exploitation. In this sense, class

conflict is the result of the development of class consciousness by the subordinate class of their exploitation. Because of this, it can be concluded that the exploitation itself is not enough to create conflict, but the subordinate class must first become aware of their exploitation in order to wage a class struggle that is often revolutionary as opposed to evolutionary in nature (Rummel).

The Eclectic Theory of Conflict

The third, and likely most widely recognized modern theory of conflict is the eclectic theory, which asserts that conflict arises as a result of a confluence of factors as opposed to a singular motivating force, including political, economic, historical, social and external factors (Burton, 1990). This theory is mainly used to study civil conflicts due to the complexity of such occurrences and therefore the insufficiency of a single identifying factor to explain the overriding conflict. For example, a civil conflict could be due to a culmination of political, religious and class factors as opposed to simply one of the three. There can also be multiple reasons under each main reason; for example, political conflict could be caused by repression, human rights abuses, and too strong of a concentration of power at the political center. Conflict therefore, can arise due to a combination of factors, including poverty. Individual and regional disparities in allocation of resources and therefore state of well-being may act as an enticing factor in inciting violence in societies facing other problems as well. For example, the civil war in Sudan was the result of religious, racial, economic and political tensions which combined to throw the country into a state of conflict (Burton, 1990). External factors include foreign actors engaging in and obstructing local politics. In conclusion, this theory serves as the catch-all for conflict theory, as it assumes any combination of triggers can combine to set off conflict.

Chapter 3

History of Rwanda

Introduction

This chapter presents the history of Rwanda. The topics discussed include the history of ethnic relations in Rwanda from precolonial times to the colonial era, and then to Independence and finally the genocide of 1994.

Rwanda: A Brief Overview

Rwanda is a landlocked country in Central East Africa bordered by Burundi to the South, Tanzania to the east, Uganda to the north, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the west (see Appendix A for map). Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa with about 12 million people in a country about the size of the U.S. state of Maryland, with land spanning approximately 26,000 square kilometers (cia.gov). Historically there are three main ethnic groups in Rwanda: the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, with the Hutu forming the majority of the population in terms of the percentage, at eighty-four percent; the Tutsi comprising around fifteen percent of the population, and the minority Twa being one percent of the population (Twagilimana, 1998). The Tutsi are mostly pastoralists and the Hutu agriculturalists, although there is much overlap between the two groups. The Twa are known as hunter-gathers who mainly keep to themselves and reside in the forest areas.

Rwanda has made remarkable progress since the genocide in 1994, which can be noted by their economy's attainment of pre-1994 levels, despite the devastation caused by the genocide. As of 2012, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) reached \$15.02 billion, with a notable 7-8% growth rate over the

past nine years. Rwanda imports over thirty percent of its products from the bordering countries of Kenya and Uganda, followed by the UAE, China, India, Tanzania, Belgium, and Canada. In return, Kenya imports the largest share of Rwanda's export products, which are mainly coffee, tin and niobium ores, and tea, valued at \$512 million in 2012 (cia.gov; Simoes). However, according to the CIA, the Rwandan government spent \$1.871 billion on imports in 2012, an even higher figure than the \$1.565 billion spent the previous year (cia.gov). Because of the limited natural resources Rwanda possesses due to their land size (those they do have are primarily wolframite, columbite-tantalite, and cassiterite), the largest share of their imports belong to the category of mineral and chemical fertilizers, followed by aircraft/spacecraft vehicles, petroleum, medicaments, and raw sugarcane (Yager, 2011). Due to the significant imbalance on the amount spent on imports versus the revenue generated by exports, in addition to sizeable loan payments to foreign countries, Rwanda holds an external debt of \$1.656 billion (USD), as of a 2014 estimate (imf.org).

Despite the improvement in Rwanda's economy, it is estimated that approximately 44% of its citizens still live below the poverty line. While there is no current data on unemployment rates in Rwanda, the rural unemployment rate was estimated to be at 14% as of 2002 (IMF Country Report No. 04/383). More recently, the African Development Bank conducted a study that cited 42% of Rwanda's youth are either underemployed or unemployed, which is a significant fact given that roughly 40% of Rwanda's population in comprises the youth. The study linked the high unemployment rates to a lack of jobs and economic growth, namely in the rural areas (African Economic Outlook Rwanda, 2012).

History of Ethnic Relations in Rwanda

Despite their central importance in Rwanda's tragic postcolonial history, the categories of "Hutu" and "Tutsi," are not easily defined or even understood, and over a century of scholarship has still not answered the seemingly simple question of "Who is Hutu and who is Tutsi?" The two groups have been

variously described in terms of not just ethnicity, but also of race, caste, socioeconomic status or political power. According to journalist and award-winning author Dina Temple-Raston in her book *Justice on the Grass*, “Tutsiness or Hutuness was as much a state of mind as it was some closely tracked lineage” (Raston, 2005: 21). The disagreement over how to define the two categories reflects a longstanding division on the history of ethnic migration into Rwanda, as there is no certain historical consensus on the matter; however, if there is a narrow consensus, it holds that the first group to arrive in what is present-day Rwanda were the Bantu-speaking groups later associated with the Hutu, beginning around 1100 AD as part of the broader Bantu migrations that shaped so much of the Iron Age history in Africa (Carney, 2014: 10). Although they worked as both pastoralists and agriculturalists, the Hutu were more strongly associated with the latter. Their communities retained a higher degree of political autonomy in northern and western Rwanda well into the twentieth century, while the Hutu and Tutsi mixed more frequently in the central and southern parts of the country (Carney, 2014: 10).

From here things get more controversial as the chronological origins of the Tutsi are less agreed upon than the Hutu. While colonial theorists supposedly traced the Tutsi ancestry to Ethiopia or Egypt, modern scholars have located their origins much closer to Rwanda, possibly from the Ankole in Southwestern Uganda or the pastoralists from the plateaus of Tanzania. Although colonial commentators and Hutu nationalist historians tended to describe these ancient Tutsi migrations in terms of a single military conquest, it is much more likely that these pastoralists migrated into Rwanda relatively slowly over the course of several centuries somewhere between 1100 and 1650. This theory is favored by modern scholars who agree more on a gradual and peaceful infiltration of the Tutsi, marked by mixing with the local Hutu population. This is supported by the idea that many of the political and religious traditions associated with the Tutsi, such as pastoralism, monarchy, and military, are likely to have originated from the Hutu (Carney, 2014: 10).

The Kingdom of Rwanda was one of the oldest and most centralized kingdoms in the history of Central and East Africa. Originally, the Hutu social structure was based on the clan, ruled by kings or

Bahinza whom they believed could cause rain, as well as protect crops from insects and cows from diseases (East Africa Living Encyclopedia). The Hutu never established a centralized power, but the Tutsi changed that with the creation of a Kingdom, which according to tradition, was founded in the Bwanacambwe region near the current capital of Kigali in the fifteenth or sixteenth century (Kingdom of Rwanda). What is now Central Rwanda was absorbed in the sixteenth century, and the outlying Hutu communities in what is now Northern and Western Rwanda were subdued by the king, or *Mwami*, Ruganzu II Ndori in the seventeenth century. The borders of the kingdom were rounded out in the late nineteenth century by Kigeri IV Rwabugiri, and by 1900 Rwanda was a unified state with a centralized military structure (Kingdom of Rwanda).

When first described by Europeans, it was assumed the differences between the Hutu and Tutsi were purely racial or biological; however, this presumption is undermined by the blurred line between the two based on intermarriages and the custom of allowing certain people to become honorary members of a different group (History of Rwanda).

Unfortunately, in the late 1800s, race science was in fashion, and no one was given more credit for making sense of the “dark continent” than British explorer John Hanning Speke who was best known for finding the source of the Nile and for his doctrine known as the Hamitic theory (Raston, 17). Sadly, for Rwanda, because of his popularity, British society embraced his theories as gospel, and his ideas in his Hamitic theory were propagated by twentieth-century scholars such as C. G. Seligman and Jan Czekanowski (Carney, 2014: 11).

On his travels to Central and East Africa, Speke came to classify Africans into orders, deciding that all culture and civilization in Central Africa by 1863 had been the work of a “taller, shaper-featured people who he decided must have come from a Caucasoid tribe in Ethiopia” (Raston, 2005: 18).

According to Speke, this “higher order” of Africans were descendants from Noah’s son, Ham (hence Hamitic Theory), who married a Cainite woman. This special class of Africans had a royal family and a semblance of a government and were, as a result, superior to the native Negroids, he said, casually

classifying them as “subhuman” (Raston, 2005: 18). Such theories also implied that the Tutsi were of foreign origin and the Hutu were the native peoples.

However, among scholars, understandings of these two groups began shifting in the 1950s and 1960s as language of “caste” rather than “race” began to mark studies of Hutu-Tutsi distinction (Carney, 2014: 12). According to J.J. Carney, assistant professor of theology at Creighton University and author of *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, “Caste underlined the supposedly endogamous and occupational distinctiveness of each group while emphasizing the socially integrated nature of Banyarwanda society” (Carney, 2014: 12).

Further developments were made toward a “socioeconomic” understanding of the Hutu-Tutsi divide in the late 1960s and 1970s, where Tutsi referred to the land-owning aristocracy and Hutu to the landless peasantry. This language of social class was successful in avoiding the genetic and biological presumptions of the racial, tribal and ethnic terminology and implied more fluidity between the two groups; however, skeptics point out that there were many wealthy Hutu who never became Tutsi, and there were thousands of lower-class Tutsi who struggled to maintain a living far removed from the luxuries of the Tutsi royal court (Carney, 2014: 12).

Contemporary reflections on the Hutu-Tutsi distinction tend to be broken into two sides: the first maintains that the Hutu-Tutsi distinction is an ethnic or racial divide that dates back to the precolonial period, and the second highlights the problematic history of racial, tribal, ethnic or even economic terminology, instead describing the distinction as “social categories.” The first is composed primarily of Hutu expatriates and Westerners critical of the current Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government, and sees current efforts to subsume Hutu and Tutsi under the national Banyarwanda identity as “overtly ideological and historically naïve (Carney, 2014: 12). While this school of thought does allow for a colonial role in exacerbating Hutu-Tutsi tensions, these scholars further emphasize the cultural and supposed biological distinctiveness of the two groups and trace the origins of social discrimination to the precolonial period.

The second school of thought is associated with Tutsi nationalists during the independence period, the current RPF government of Paul Kagame in Rwanda, as well as the writings of the influential French academic Jean-Pierre Chrétien, and emphasizes the integrated nature of traditional Rwandan clans and the military, Rwanda's shared linguistic and political heritage, Hutu-Tutsi mixed marriages, and the precolonial fluidity of the Hutu-Tutsi line (Carney, 2014: 13). According to Carney, "There are elements of truth to both accounts. The first school accurately recognizes that colonial agents did not make up these categories out of whole cloth; the second group reminds us that Hutu and Tutsi categories retained a significant degree of flexibility until the colonial period" (Carney, 2014: 13). A third and more radical school of thought maintains the idea that the only ethnic group in Rwanda is the Banyarwanda, and rejects the categories of Hutu and Tutsi as colonial impositions lacking any foundations in traditional Rwanda.

In any case, the late nineteenth century saw Hutu-Tutsi labels develop ideological overtones that were not present in previous periods of Rwandan history. In light of the categories' relative flexibility during precolonial times, "the subsuming of all identities under the supposed dualist struggle of 'Tutsi lord' and 'Hutu serf' is one the most regrettable legacies of European colonialism," and as Catherine Newbury argues, European colonial policies "did not create ethnicity; instead they served to mold its social salience" (Carney, 2014: 14).

Rwanda Under Belgian Colonial Rule

Rwanda was a German colony from the time of the Berlin Conference in 1885 until 1916, when in the midst of the First World War, Germany pulled out of its East African territories, allowing Belgium to take on the responsibility for Rwanda and neighboring Burundi. Belgian paternal rule lasted for forty-five years (Raston, 2005: 17).

When the colonizers came to 'civilize the savages,' the otherwise amorphous differences between the Hutu and Tutsi were formalized. According to Raston, "It was the colonizers who took two people

who had more in common than not and taught them to loathe each other” (Raston, 2005: 17). Taking their cues from Speke, white rulers in Rwanda decided that the Tutsi were the superior race both culturally and racially and therefore were given administrative duties as the Hutu were shunted aside (Raston, 2005: 19). The Hamitic thesis combined the biblical narrative of the “curse of Ham” (Genesis 9:18-29) with the scientific racialism of the late nineteenth century, and for European theorists in Rwanda, the Tutsi fit the role of the Hamitic civilizer and the Hutu were classified as Bantu Africans.

It is important to note that these categories were developed from the colonial theorists’ experiences at the royal court, because although Rwanda’s peasantry included thousands of poor “petit Tutsi,” or poor Tutsi peasants, colonial missionaries continued to describe the poor masses as “Bahutu” and the political and economic elite as “Batutsi” (Carney, 2014: 12).

Under Belgian rule, the Hutu were given menial tasks and in most instances they were obliged to work for the Tutsi by tilling their land or grazing their cattle. This enlistment by the Belgians of the Tutsi as de facto rulers allowed the colonizers to develop and exploit an enormous network of tea and coffee plantations without having to install a contingent of Belgians on the ground, and they appreciated this orderliness so much that they institutionalized the differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi in a series of administrative measures between 1926 and 1932. Most significantly, they issued identity cards, which divided everyone as either Hutu or Tutsi (Raston, 2005: 19). No one is sure how the distinction was made when there was such a severe overlap and legacy of intermarriages, but we can be sure that however it was done was quite primitive. Colonizers were recorded literally measuring the noses of people to determine their grouping; however, some say that anyone who owned ten cows was automatically designated a Tutsi, and therefore the system was based more on caste than ethnicity (Raston, 2005: 19).

The methods by which ethnicity was assigned are not as important as what these assignments meant for Rwandan society. The very act of recording ethnicity not only made it more important in society, but also fundamentally changed its character. Raston explains that “the Hutu and Tutsi designations were no longer amorphous categories; instead, they became inflexible” (Raston, 2005: 19).

As the Tutsis were the immediate benefactors of colonial rule, they began to use that to their advantage while the marginalized Hutus began to take on the hallmarks of the oppressed, banding together against the Tutsi.

The 1950s were a time of transition across sub-Saharan Africa. Exhausted and overstretched after World War II, European colonial powers increasingly spoke of devolution of powers and local autonomy, if not yet full independence. Political change in Rwanda, like the rest of Africa, accelerated with the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations. After visits to both countries in 1948 and 1951, the UN instructed Belgium to accelerate both Rwanda's and Burundi's path towards independence.

A Belgium under pressure announced in 1952 a ten-year economic and political plan that promised regional and national councils, democratic elections, and increasing local autonomy (Carney, 2014: 46). Under this new plan, representative structures were to be instituted in 1953 and democratic *sous-chefferie* (sub-chiefdom) election were to take place in 1956. The new system could be broken down into many pieces that all fit together to form a hierarchical representative body. The new *sous-chefferies* would be composed of one sub-chief and five to nine counselors who were to each represent 500 civilians. Further up, each of the higher *chefferie* (chiefdom) councils were to include five to nine appointed members from the lower *sous-chefferies*, and the *chefferie* councils were to then send representatives to the territorial councils. The highest consultative body was to be the *Conseil Supérieur du Pays* (CSP) and included the presidents of the nine territorial councils, six additional chiefs, nine notables, and four royal appointees. Although this system sounded great in theory because of the way it offered a measure of representative democracy, in actuality it was problematic because local chiefs had to endorse candidates for higher council, which served to reinforce the country's existing oligarchies rather than to better balance the system. As a result, two-thirds of the sub-chiefs elected in 1956 were Hutu, which is unsurprising due to the Hutu majority of the population; however, thirty-one of the thirty-two CSP members remained Tutsi (Carney, 2014: 47).

These were not the only significant changes taking place in the post- World War II era of Rwanda. Most significantly, at least as far as socioeconomic changes, was Mwami Mutara's decision in 1949 to abolish *uburetwa* followed by his 1954 decision to eliminate *ubuhake*. *Uburetwa* required Hutu workers to spend two days per week cultivating a local Tutsi patron's land while *ubuhake* was a patron-client relationship in which a patron lent land and cattle to a client in exchange for the client's services (Carney, 2014: 47). The latter increasingly marginalized the Hutu from the Tutsi during the colonial era. The abolition of *ubuhake* happened as a new class of Hutu elites emerged in Rwanda, with many of them being prosperous emigrants who returned from Uganda and other neighboring countries. According to Carney, "If there was ever an 'ethnic gap' in Banyarwanda socioeconomic status, it disappeared in the 1950s. In fact, a survey of family incomes in the mid-1950s revealed an average annual Hutu family income of 4,249 Belgian francs, just below the Tutsi figure of 4,430 francs." (Carney, 2014: 47). Furthermore, a Belgian working group for Rwanda and Burundi concluded in 1959 that only 6,000 to 10,000 of Rwanda's 150,000 Tutsi should be classified as upper class elites. At this point in time, Tutsi status may have retained a certain social prestige, but it connoted little to no financial advantage.

Despite all of this, the culmination of the Hutu's pent-up resentment exploded in November 1959 when an attack on a Hutu political activist sparked the first modern recorded violence of Hutu against Tutsi. Rumors of the attack sent bands of Hutu into the street. They organized themselves into groups of ten and hunted their Tutsi neighbors who were summarily killed. The incident would later come to be known as the "wind of destruction" (Raston, 2005: 20).

After this killing spree, Rwanda's Belgian administrators finally decided to replace around half the local Tutsi authorities with Hutu, and popular elections were held the following year. As the Hutus hold an overwhelming majority, it came as no surprise that they won most of the seats, and in September 1961, a striking eighty percent of Rwandan citizens voted to end recognition of the Tutsi monarchy entirely and for good. Following this, the Belgians allowed Rwandans to claim an independent republic on July 1, 1962 and retired from the colony, but not before turning the existing political structure upside-

down by putting the Hutu in power (Raston, 2005: 20). The Belgian-implemented identity cards remained in force.

Independence and the 1994 Genocide

The Hutu consolidated their power in Rwanda by installing a charismatic Hutu leader named Grégoire Kayibanda as president, as thousands of Tutsi fled for their lives fearing further ethnic killings like that of 1959. These people became stateless refugees in the neighboring countries of Burundi, Uganda and Zaire (now DRC). The violence of 1959 forever cleaved Rwandan into a before and after, and was popularly known as the Hutu Revolution. In the words of Raston: “Residual Belgian perceptions of Tutsi and Hutu found a place in the Rwandan psyche. Tutsi were seen as a handsomer people, a smarter people. Never mind that there was nothing to substantiate either claim. It was enough that people believed it to be true” (Raston, 2005: 21).

Unfortunately, the ethnic and political strife that marked the pre-independence period of 1959-1962 did not end with Rwanda’s Independence in 1962. While the frequency of the violence may have declined, the intensity certainly increased as innocent Tutsi civilians suffered collective retribution at the hands of state and local militias. In the first decade after Independence, the largest incident of anti-Tutsi violence occurred in 1963-1964 and 1973.

Rwanda’s declaration of Independence on July 1, 1962 did not stop its opponents from challenging the legitimacy of the new Parmehutu-dominated state. The Rwandese National Union’s (UNAR, which was the remnants of the previous Tutsi monarchist party) determination to topple the government only grew in 1963, especially after Parmehutu’s decision in February of that year to suspend the government’s only two Tutsi cabinet officials. Over twenty UNAR officials were convicted of treason in a secret overnight trial on December 21, and they were executed on December 22.

The day after the government executed the political opposition, anti-Tutsi massacres broke out across the country. On December 23, Hutu militia killed ninety-eight Tutsi in Cyangugu in southwestern Rwanda and one hundred in Kibungo in Eastern Rwanda; however, by far the worst violence occurred in the Southern prefecture of Gikongoro where a reign of terror began on Christmas day. Hutu militia killed between 8,000 and 14,000 Tutsi over the course of five days (Carney, 2014: 178). Government authorities did not halt the massacres until December 29, despite missionary appeals that began on the first day of the killings. More sporadic killings continued through the first two weeks of January 1964. Inevitably, Rwanda's refugee crisis grew exponentially after the event in 1963-1964; the external Tutsi refugee population nearly tripled from 120,000 in 1962 to 336,000 in 1964 (Carney, 2014: 179).

In 1973 there were a series of Tutsi school expulsions and anti-Tutsi purges began in Catholic secondary schools and minor seminaries in Kabgayi, the Dominican-run National University in Butare, and the Catholic major and minor seminaries in Nyundo (Carney, 2014: 184). In these instances, the church institutions served as epicenters of violence as opposed to their role as places of refuge in the past.

More than twenty years before the genocide, in July 1973, General Juvénal Habyarimana, the army's most senior officer, toppled President Grégoire Kayibanda in a *coup d'état* and assumed power. In a promise that would come to haunt him later on, Habyarimana said he would allow those who had fled to neighboring nations out of fear to return and called on Rwandans to welcome the exiles, promising the country's future would be brighter. A small portion of the exiles took him up on his offer, and it only took two years for Habyarimana to decide that these exiles he had promised the right of return were not really all that welcome. The country simply didn't have the resources, namely the space, to absorb them, and there were battles over land. Returnees demanded that the government make good on its promise of right of return, but there wasn't anything the government could do to create more land space. There were simply too many people already in this tiny country. Habyarimana grew concerned that the violence would weaken his hold on power and so took the drastic actions of closing the borders and making Rwanda a one-party state under the National Republican Movement for Development, or MRND (Raston,

2005: 23). Overnight, everyone in the country became an ally of the president, and local leaders were decreed MRND members by default. Because of the previously discussed political structure of Rwanda which is broken down through a highly organized hierarchical structure, ensuring that everyone adhered to Habyarimana's political reorganization was relatively easy as it was not difficult by any means to keep track of everyone. This structure made the administration of authoritarian rule simple.

By 1990, a rapid militarization of Rwandan society was underway in response to Tutsi offensives by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Rwandan army grew rapidly; the ranks expanded from a few thousand soldiers to forty thousand in the span of just three years, and by 1992, the military engulfed nearly seventy percent of the Rwandan governments budget (Raston, 2005: 26). Between 1985 and 1990, the military consumed 1.6 percent of the nations GNP, and by 1993 it was three times that amount.

In the seventeenth year of Habyarimana's regime, 1990, there was an alarming outbreak of politically motivated kidnappings and murders where political opponents went missing and moderate Hutu turned up dead (Raston, 2005: 35). In 1992, the first real dress rehearsal for the genocide took place in the swampy town of Bugesera, sparked by a broadcast on Radio Rwanda by historian Ferdinand Nahimana, who would go on to later become a founding member of RTLM radio, which was responsible for inciting violence during the genocide in 1994. But that would come later. Nearly two hundred Tutsi and moderate Hutu were slaughtered by the government's *Interahamwe* militias and fifteen thousand people had simply disappeared (Raston, 2005: 32).

Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) was incorporated in April 1993 and was broadcasting that summer. Nahimana was one of three founders. Although the station was a private enterprise, in reality it got a significant amount of support from the Habyarimana government. The president was the largest shareholder in the venture, holding a million shares (Raston, 2005: 49). The station was also linked in numerous ways to the national station, Radio Rwanda, and that made it difficult for Rwandans to understand the difference between the two.

By 1994, there were three main political parties in Rwanda. The most prominent was obviously Habyarimana's party, the MRNDD (since changed from MRND to become the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development). The most blatantly anti-Tutsi party was the Coalition for Defense of the Republic, or CDR. This party often worked with Habyarimana's party and not surprisingly, historians later testified that the party itself was created solely for the purpose of Habyarimana having a place to propagate his party's most extreme ideas without actually tying those ideals to MRNDD itself (Raston, 2005: 53). The third party was the Democratic Republican Movement, or MDR, which got its start in the Parmehutu party that overthrew the Tutsi monarchy in the 1959 revolution. With the Arusha Accords looming, this party eventually split into a radically anti-Tutsi faction and a more moderate wing.

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi's president Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down over Kigali, leaving no survivors (history.com Staff). To this day it has not been conclusively determined who was responsible for the crash, and it is likely we will never know. Some say it was Hutu extremists who would use the incident as the spark they needed to light the fire of the genocide, while others blame leaders of the RPF, including current president Paul Kagame. In either case, the Tutsi were immediately blamed by the government, and within an hour of the crash, the Presidential Guard along with members of the *Interahamwe* ("those who attack together") and *Impuzamugambi* ("those who have the same goal") set up road blocks across the capital and began mercilessly massacring Tutsi and moderate Hutu on sight. According to Raston: "By April 10, four days into the killing, the Red Cross estimated tens of thousands were dead, eight thousand killed in Kigali alone. The counting was made easier by the fact that none of this was done in secret. There were corpses stacked in front of houses, laid in the street; and according to one report, a pile of bodies six feet high was outside the main hospital. A genocide, though it would take the world months to call it that, had begun" (Raston, 2005: 10).

The killing quickly spread throughout the rest of the country, especially as RTLM broadcasts sanctioned and even ordered ordinary Rwandan citizens to kill as their “duty”. In one hundred days of pure chaos and terror, more than 800,000 innocent civilians were slaughtered by their neighbors, friends, and family. There was mercy for no one, not even children. An RTLM broadcast reminded Rwandans that “a baby cockroach is still a cockroach,” referring to the derogatory nickname *inyenzi* (cockroach) given to the Tutsi. Another said, “the time has come; we must cut the tall trees,” speaking in an obvious code referring to the longstanding stereotype of Tutsis being much taller than their Hutu counterparts. As the number of murders and murderers rapidly swelled beyond comprehension, “it was collectively decided that the Tutsi as a whole were responsible for any suffering or slight a Hutu might have felt in a lifetime” (Raston, 2005: 9).

The world stood by and did nothing. In the United States there were bureaucratic battles over what to call it since by law, calling it a genocide would mean they were obligated to act. Instead they said, “acts of genocide have occurred.” It has been estimated that with the amount of manpower it took to evacuate the foreign white people from Rwanda at the onset of the killing, the genocide itself could have been stopped. The violence was perceived as ancient tribal warfare, but “what outsiders didn’t understand was that the root of this conflict was not prejudice so much as a competition for resources. Rwanda, a nation the size of Maryland, has little land. And when there is no room, something has to yield. Hutu and Tutsi had taken turns massacring each other over the years because the nation was unable to accommodate both the Hutu farmers and the Tutsi herders. The killings were not fueled by hate. They were fueled by politics and power. RTLM told Rwandans quite plainly what was at stake: ‘Hutu brothers’, they said, ‘it is them or us,’” (Raston, 2005: 7).

On July 3, 1994, the RPF marched into Kigali, effectively ending the genocide and dispersing the interim government of Hutu extremists. In response to their presence, more than two million people, mostly Hutu, fled to the neighboring country of Zaire (now DRC) in fear of reprisal killings.

The RPF established a coalition government similar to that agreed upon in the Arusha Accords, with Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, as president and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, as vice president and defense minister (history.com Staff). Habyarimana's MRNDD party was outlawed due to its role in inciting violence during the genocide, and a new constitution adopted in 2003 eliminated reference to ethnicity for the first time since the Belgians had imposed it some fifty years earlier. This new constitution was followed by Kagame's election to a ten-year term as president in the country's first ever legislative election (history.com Staff).

In an effort to somewhat comprehend the magnitude of these events, I would like to end this section with the following excerpt from Temple-Raston's *Justice on the Grass*:

The mind had trouble counting to 800,000, twice the number of civilians who died in the Vietnam War. The rounded-off figures were only educated guesses, of course. And with their attendant zeros, lined up like soldiers neatly one after another, they seem inconceivable. Others tried to make the unfathomable accessible by tying figures to particular towns. There had been 250,000 Tutsi in Kibuye in March of 1994. When the authorities counted again, after the families who had fled returned, they could find only 8,000. The best the government figures could do was convey horror in an abstract way.

For people closer to it all, who spent time in Rwanda during the genocide or picked up the pieces in its aftermath, the deaths had no zeros. Instead, casualties were counted on their hands. They remembered the brothers, sisters, and mothers and fathers who had disappeared. Once the figures were tabulated, one in every ten people in the country had been killed in the space of a hundred days (Raston, 2005: 10).

From such an event, it was asked, how could anyone hope to recover?

Chapter 4

Post-Genocide Rwanda

Introduction

This chapter discusses the conflict resolution methods employed in Rwanda, following the genocide in 1994. Topics discussed include most specifically the *gacaca* courts, followed by a brief overview of other conflict resolution mechanisms used by the government during Rwanda's recovery.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

When the Rwandan Patriotic Front took power after the genocide in 1994, they were immediately confronted with the enormous issue of delivering justice for the massacres that claimed the lives of more than three-quarters of the country's Tutsi population, as well as a significant number of moderate Hutu who either refused to join the killing or actively tried to protect their Tutsi comrades from the onslaught. With over 800,000 people murdered in a span of just 100 days, the number of killers was staggering. Facing the issue of simply trying this sheer number of people would have been an enormous challenge for any country, but the task was made exponentially more difficult in a Rwanda utterly devastated by the preceding violence.

It wasn't just the decimation of the Rwandan population that took place during those three months of horror, but also a complete destruction of Rwandan society as a whole, including their infrastructure. Schools and hospitals were destroyed as well as much of the judicial infrastructure, but even more importantly, a large number of judges and other judicial staff had been either killed or fled, leaving next to nothing to work with. Of some 600 judges in service before April 1994, only 237 were available to resume work in August 1994 and only 53 of these had previously sat in courts with jurisdiction over serious crimes. Similarly, the pool of prosecutors, judicial officers, police officers, clerks

and lawyers was greatly reduced. According to Human Rights Watch, “War-time damage to the judicial ministry building was so serious that the new minister of justice worked from his hotel room, filing documents in boxes under his bed. Other court buildings had been stripped of furniture and electrical fixtures. At the national prosecutor’s office, judicial officers had trouble finding paper and pens to record the interrogations that they wrote out by hand” (Wells). Hundreds of new employees were recruited, but they were offered only minimal training before being put to work, again due to lack of resources.

A few months following the end of the genocide, Rwandan prisons were bursting at the seams with genocide suspects awaiting trial. According to Human Rights Watch, by 1998 there were approximately 130,000 prisoners confined in spaces meant to hold no more than 12,000 people (Haskell). The results were horrific conditions universally deemed inhumane. These conditions claimed thousands of lives due to lack of basic needs, sanitation and medical care.

The conventional courts in Rwanda began trying genocide cases in December 1996, but by 1998 they had only managed to try 1,292 genocide suspects (Haskell). At this rate it would have taken over a century to try all those accused, forcing suspects to wait behind bars for years or even decades. The process could have possibly been accelerated if foreign lawyers and judges had been brought in to help, but the Rwandan government rejected these proposals.

The *Gacaca* Courts

Due to the lack of personnel and resources needed to try the many cases, the new Rwandan government proposed “an African solution to an African problem;” *gacaca*. Originally *gacaca* (pronounced ga-cha-cha) was the name of a type of grass that grew in Rwanda, but the word came to refer to a tribal system of justice dispensed through courts that took place literally on the grass in communities. It was originally a type of small claims court run in individual communities by the elders, or wise men, who would bring both parties of the dispute together in the open air and mediate. Typically, cases

involved relatively minor things such as cows or land or water disputes that could generally be remedied by reparations and/or a heartfelt apology by the accused. The decision of the mediators was supposed to be final and end the neighborly disputes. The practice faded out in the 1930s until the new president, Paul Kagame sanctioned its return for use in the genocide trials (Raston, 2005: 133). The decision was announced in January 1998 by then Vice-President Kagame, who remarked that Rwanda could not afford the U.S. \$20 million a year necessary to support the huge population then in prison. He proposed that the most guilty be executed, and that others be dealt with through the customary judicial mechanisms of *gacaca* that would allow for greater speed than the conventional courts, and that their punishment would be entail enforced labor on public works as opposed to solely jail time (Wells). The first of these measures was carried out partially three months later by the government (not by *gacaca* courts), when 22 people convicted of genocide crimes were executed in the first and only formal executions carried out as a consequence of the genocide (Wells). The main objective of the *gacaca* trials was to drastically reduce the prison population; however, the public objectives were to not only deliver justice, but to also strengthen reconciliation and reveal important truths about what took place during the genocide (Rwanda: Justice After Genocide- 20 Years On).

Like its customary predecessor, the new *gacaca* courts were run by local judges with the participation of local community members and was aimed at rapidly rebuilding the nation's social fabric, in part by making ordinary Rwandans the main actors in the process of dispensing justice and fostering reconciliation (Rwanda: Justice After Genocide- 20 Years On). In theory, the *gacaca* mechanism appeared plausible, but the reality was much more complex than the stated goals. In October 2001, each of Rwanda's eleven thousand voting districts elected nineteen "persons of integrity" to serve as unpaid *gacaca* judges. Many of the more than 200,000 chosen were illiterate, and they received only a thirty-six-hour crash course in *gacaca* before attaining the authority to launch investigations, summon Rwandans to court, pronounce sentences, and confiscate property (Raston, 2005: 135).

By the time the accusation phase of *gacaca* had ended, some 818,000 persons had been accused, with 77,000 of those being placed in category one and so designated for trial in a conventional court as opposed to *gacaca* which was to handle only category two killers. These numbers, in particular those in category one, far exceeded the expectation of Rwandan officials who recognized that so many conventional trials would take decades, which was precisely what they had intended to avoid with the implementation of the *gacaca* system. In response, lawmakers redefined the two categories in a March 2007 law that allowed some accused to be moved from category one to category two where they could be tried by *gacaca* jurisdiction. The goal was to reduce the number of category one killers to no more than 10,000 and perhaps to as few as 2,000; a striking difference from the 77,000 it started with (Law and Reality). The qualifications of agents charged with the reclassification as well as the rules under which they operated were not publicly announced, running counter to the basic premise of *gacaca* to be an open procedure with full community participation.

Since their implementation in 2005, just over 12,000 community-based *gacaca* courts have tried approximately 1.2 million cases until their closing in 2012 (Rwanda: Mixed Legacy for Community-Based Genocide Courts). These trials will leave behind a mixed legacy.

On one hand, many Rwandans agree that *gacaca* had shed significant light on what happened in their local communities during the one hundred days of the genocide, even if not all truth was revealed. This alone is significant because it helped to bring closure to many people who otherwise would have had no idea what happened to their loved ones. Some Rwandans say that it has helped set in motion reconciliation within their communities, and in fact, almost every Rwandan interviewed by the author of this report noted *gacaca* being a significant factor. In order to protect those involved in the study, their anonymity has been preserved. Below are some of the responses on the *gacaca* system used:

- Respondent A:

There's a court called *gacaca*, where the government calls upon the witnesses and the perpetrators, who share their stories and apologize in front of many people, and then they receive their punishment for what they have done. The government has encouraged

forgiveness and reconciliation down to the community level where they encourage those in possession of land which is not theirs to give it back.

- Respondent C:

The *gacaca* courts are the main thing that were put in place after the genocide to help people move forward. Here, the perpetrators would be tried for their crimes in front of the community so that stories could be heard and closure could be had. Forgiveness between perpetrators and victims was encouraged by the government, as they tried to help the perpetrators see the wrong they had done. The *gacaca* courts worked very well, but the only problem is the process was very slow. Because of this, there have still been trials in recent years and still some waiting to be had. This means perpetrators had many years of freedom before facing their crimes and victims waited very long to receive closure, but I'm not sure how the process could have gone faster just because of the magnitude of the genocide and therefore the number of trials needing to be had.

- Respondent E:

After the genocide, there was no other way Rwanda had to solve their problems besides *gacaca*, where they sat together and heard information from victims and witnesses. People want to know who killed their families. So some wise Rwandans sit together and talk about the issue. In *gacaca*, they call the people from the village and they ask them what happened to that village in 1994. In the villages there are families that are completely wiped out, so there is no one left to tell their story. So they call upon the people from the village to give information about these families so that it can be determined who killed who. In *gacaca*, when you accept your fault and you accept the truth, you ask the pardon from the court, but you are supposed to ask pardon from the family you committed crimes against. For example, if you are sentenced to twenty years, you serve ten in prison and the other ten are spent doing work in the community where you committed your crimes. Then after that you reintegrate into your community. You have to build back what you have destroyed. If you have nothing to pay back, you can talk to the family and they can forgive you. If you can pay for the property you damaged, however, you pay. But if you cannot pay sometimes they can forgive you. I think things like *umuganda* and *gacaca*, that bring the community together for a common purpose, those are the things that have worked the best. In *gacaca* the common goal is discovering the truth and deciding consequences- but also forgiveness and reconciliation.

- Respondent F:

We've had the *gacaca* courts but that is a slow process and many perpetrators escaped the country after the genocide and still live freely. We have also faced the problem of overpopulation in the jails however, which makes things difficult. So on the one hand you want to see people punished for their crimes, but on the other hand this causes a major problem for the country to maintain the jails. A lot of people have been pardoned, and of course, there are mixed feelings about this, but what else can we do? One good thing, however, is that those who remain in prison often do a lot of community service work, so this helps the government to develop the communities and provides the prisoners the opportunity to give back to the communities they once helped destroy. It is much better than just sitting in a jail cell.

- Respondent G:

The *gacaca* courts helped provide justice and closure. They were focused on providing the truth about what happened. Those 100 days were a whirlwind, and everything

happened so fast. It was complete chaos. Many people had no idea how or where their family members died, or who had killed them. The aim of *gacaca* was to provide some of those answers, because people have the right to know if they wish to. Of course the courts also decided the punishments for those responsible for the crimes at hand.

- Respondent I:

The unity between all Rwandans alongside *gacaca* were what helped to get us where we are. In *gacaca*, the perpetrators are supposed to realize their mistakes and own up to them, accepting responsibility for their actions. There were reduced punishments for those who expressed their regret and their desire to make up for their mistakes. I think *gacaca* has been wonderful for our country because it has helped us all receive closure and move on. I think a lot of times, people needed to hear what happened to their loved ones in order to be able to properly move forward- and that is the kind of closure *gacaca* provided. In *gacaca* people give testimonies to what they witnessed and who they killed, so that what happened during the genocide could be more clear. The wisdom I got from these past years is that at first I didn't understand how people could come in *gacaca* and stand in front of their community and admit the horrible things they had done, and ask for forgiveness- but I realized that if they can do that, we can find it in our hearts to forgive, and to learn from one another.

- Respondent J:

The good thing the government has done is establish *gacaca* because it has enabled unity and cooperation between people. For example, if someone killed your mother, that is not an easy thing to accept or forgive. But through *gacaca*, people came to realize that we are all human and susceptible to human mistakes- even horrible ones. And we are all Rwandans and we need to find it in our hearts to forgive.

- Respondent K:

Rwanda has the *gacaca* courts which helped the reconciliation because they did not like to put things in formal court because the goal there is just to punish, but *gacaca* is a traditional court aimed at reconciliation.

According to Human Rights Watch, the system's achievements include "swift trials with popular participation, a reduction in the prison population, a better understanding of what happened in 1994, locating and identifying bodies of victims and a possible easing of ethnic tensions between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups" (Rwanda: Mixed Legacy for Community-Based Genocide Courts).

On the other hand, Human Rights Watch found several fair trial violations committed by the *gacaca* system, which included "restrictions on the accused's ability to mount an effective defense; possible miscarriages of justice due to using largely untrained judges; trumped-up charges, some based on the Rwandan government's wish to silence critics; misuse of *gacaca* to settle personal scores; judges' or

officials' intimidation of defense witnesses; and corruption by judges and parties to cases" (Rwanda: Mixed Legacy for Community-Based Genocide Courts).

The perceived success or lack thereof of *gacaca* will remain highly controversial among both Rwandans and the international community. Between the former, some Rwandans stress that *gacaca* helped them better understand what happened in the darkest period of their country's history and helped to ease tensions between the two main ethnic groups, while others noted the following:

- a) Not all perpetrators were arrested or punished adequately for their crimes,
- b) Trials were seriously flawed,
- c) Private individuals and government authorities manipulated the course of justice,
- d) *Gacaca* became highly politicized over the years,
- e) and ethnic tensions within the country still remain high (Haskell).

With the closing of the *gacaca* courts in 2012, the Rwandan government faces other problems, particularly in correcting some of the grave injustices that occurred through this process. Many of the miscarriages of justice or serious procedural irregularities were not resolved by existing *gacaca* appeals procedures. While the government's recognition in 2010 of the need to correct the instances of injustice is a step in the right direction, Human Rights Watch recommends implementing a specialized unit within the conventional court system, staffed with professional judges or other trained legal professionals, to review the cases, as having the cases reheard in *gacaca* risks replicating the same problems and may not solve the issues at hand (Haskell). Fair and impartial handling of these cases is vital in both the legacy of *gacaca* as well as to strengthening the Rwandan justice system and the country's ability to reconcile its differences in the long run.

In addition to the large number of cases tried by *gacaca* courts, to date at least 10,000 people have been tried by the conventional courts for genocide-related crimes with the majority of these trials taking place before *gacaca* started, others while it was going on, and some since it closed in 2012 (Rwanda: Justice After Genocide- 20 Years On). The standard of these trials has varied greatly, just as

that of *gacaca*. Some were marred by a failure to respect due process, pressure on judges, intimidation of witnesses, interference by outside parties and in several instances, by the government. This must be taken with a grain of salt because other trials, particularly in more recent years, have shown a greater respect for due process as the government became more equipped to deal with the issues at hand (Rwanda: Justice After Genocide- 20 Years On).

It should be noted that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), created by the United Nation's Security Council in 1994 in response to the genocide in Rwanda, worked simultaneously during the time *gacaca* courts were in session; however, their goals were much different. We will refrain from going into too much detail on ICTR as it was *not* a conflict resolution mechanism employed by the Rwandan government, but it is important to understand its role. The mission of ICTR, which since formally closed on December 31, 2015, was to prosecute those responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda or by Rwandan citizens in neighboring countries between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994 and it was expected to try mostly high-level suspects who played a leading role in the genocide (Rwanda: International Tribunal Closing its Doors). This is obviously in stark contrast to the goals of *gacaca*, which were to try only level-two killers, focusing on average Rwandan citizens who got caught up in the violence and caved under pressure to join in.

The ICTR was successful in trying and convicting several high profile figures, including former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda; the former army chief of staff, General Augustin Bizimungu; and the former Defense Ministry chief of staff, Colonel Théoneste Bagosoro. According to Human Rights Watch, ICTR indicted 93 people, sentenced 61, and acquitted 14, substantially contributing to the establishment of truth on the organization of the genocide in Rwanda while also providing a certain level of justice to its victims (Rwanda: International Tribunal Closing its Doors).

In light of its success we must also examine the shortcomings of the ICTR. Criticisms come mainly from Rwandans who note the lack of reparations for victims, the tribunal's location outside of

Rwanda, the fact that genocide convicts were allowed to speak to the media, the relatively small number of cases handled, its high operating cost, as well as its bureaucratic processes and the length of time trials have taken. However, none of these complaints compare to ICTR's greatest failure, which mirrors that of *gacaca*'s. Both courts were unwilling to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 1994 by the RPF, the ruling government party. According to Human Rights Watch, "As they took over the country in 1994, RPF troops killed thousands of predominantly Hutu civilians. Though the scale and nature of these killings were not equivalent or comparable to the genocide, the victims and their families also have the right to justice" (Rwanda: International Tribunal Closing its Doors). ICTR did in fact have a clear mandate to prosecute these crimes; however, they failed to follow through and not a single RPF case was brought before the tribunal.

In the words of convict Joseph N. who was eventually acquitted by *gacaca* due to his innocence but only after serving six years in prison for crimes he did not commit, "This process [*gacaca*] doesn't work because only the Hutu are guilty. Everyone knows that there were reprisal killings by the Tutsi army. Do people think they walked into Kigali in 1994 without harming any Rwandans? That they were unopposed? How can we possibly have reconciliation if the only people who have to admit to anything are the Hutu?" (Raston, 2005: 139).

The success of *gacaca* was hindered by difficulties in revealing the truth as well as its inability to follow due process in all cases. In addition, according to Human Rights Watch, "*gacaca* did not deliver on its promises of reparations for genocide survivors: survivors received no compensation from the state, and little restitution and often overtly formulaic apologies from confessed or convicted perpetrators-casting doubt on the sincerity of some of these confessions" (Rwanda: Justice After Genocide: 20 Years On). In conclusion, the expectation that *gacaca* could deliver national-level reconciliation in a matter of a few years, especially so soon after the genocide, was unrealistic from the outset; however, it may have served as a first step to help some Rwandans on the long path to reconciliation even though it did not manage to dispel distrust between many perpetrators and survivors of the genocide.

Other Methods of Reconciliation Used by the Government

While *gacaca* was certainly the most prominent and visible conflict resolution mechanism employed by the Rwandan government in the years following the 1994 genocide, it was certainly not the only one. Although the focus of this study is the *gacaca* courts and a full examination of all conflict resolution methods falls outside of the scope of this project, we will also briefly examine several other methods of reconciliation employed by the Rwandan society.

The Rwandan government's prime goal after the genocide was to build nationalism and abolish the mentalities of ethnicity that had allowed the genocide to take place. The abolition of identity cards as well as outlawing the discussion of ethnicity were the most prominent steps in this direction. They also implemented a program called *nd'umunyarwanda* (literally "I am a Rwandan") to help with this goal. According to one of the respondents of this study, *nd'umunyarwanda* "helps people work through what has happened and share their stories. It just means, there is no Hutu, there is no Tutsi, and there is no Twa. We are all Rwandan- no matter what happened or what will happen. We are all one people and we need to move forward as such" – Respondent A.

Another goal of the Rwandan government was the reintegration of perpetrators into their communities upon release, based upon the same community approach taken by *gacaca*. One of the ways this was done was by having convicts complete community service in the communities where they had committed their crimes, so that they could help rebuild what they had once destroyed instead of simply sitting in a jail cell. This action helped both the perpetrators and community members accept a process of reintegration more easily. Another way this was done was through a community-based project called *umuganda*. In the words of one of the respondents:

There is *umuganda*, the last Saturday of every month. Everyone is expected to help clean up their communities. They look what is needed in the communities and then see if the government can provide help for that. *Umuganda* helps the community come together. For example, if I have a fear of the person who killed my family, when we work side by side, little by little, that fear goes away. So now it is much better than previous years as fear has subsided." –Respondent E.

Another tactic of the government was to encourage citizens to relocate themselves after the genocide, even if it was not far from where they had previously lived. One of the interviewees of the study explained:

After the genocide, the government told everyone they should move if they were able, but most people's homes were destroyed anyway. Because you see, in the villages, families had lived there for many, many years, so everyone knew what everyone else was in terms of ethnicity. We know that it is not easy to tell the difference between a Hutu and a Tutsi just by looking at someone, but in those times everyone knew each other, and there were lists. So that's why the government thought it would be a good idea for everyone to move, even if it was not very far, so that they could start over in a community where not everyone knew who they were, or what tribe they belonged to."

He continued, "after the genocide I followed the advice of the government and moved from my village- not far, only 15 or 20 minutes by car, but that was enough. After the genocide, my family was gone. Before the genocide, we were nine people. My mother, my father, my brothers and sisters and me. But after the genocide I was the only one to remain, so I said, I need a family. I waited until 21, and then I got married. Now we are seven people. My wife and I and our five children. So now we thank God because we are very blessed to have a big family. I built my house, and my wife and I built our family, and we are very happy now. -Respondent F.

His relocation allowed his family to do all of this without fearing neighbors who had known him prior to the genocide, and therefore his and his family's ethnicity.

Another interesting mechanism was the implementation of grassroots theatre organizations. According to the African Journal on Conflict Resolution, "In Rwanda, the presidential pardon of genocide prisoners saw over 20,000 prisoners in 2003 and 35,000 more in 2005 rejoining the Rwandan population. This demanded that Rwandan citizens live side by side with their former enemies. Over 300 theatre grassroots ensembles, also called associations, were formed throughout Rwanda. They made use of theatre, music, dance and poetry to rebuild communities after the genocide. These theatre groups naturally emerged from a genuine, organic need for people to interact in the aftermath of violence" (Mtukwa, 2015: 93).

The following was reported by a female member of the *Umuhazi w'u Grassroots Theatre and Reconciliation Association*, whose five children had been killed during the genocide:

This art and theatre gave me some kind of happiness. At first I would be discouraged, I would be lonely; as I associate and interact with people I begin feeling all right, I become happy. I can laugh. I can talk to people. I feel liberated. When you are with others singing, acting, performing... [you] feel relaxed. Another thing is when you are in this mission; it leads others to understand things which they didn't understand before. It makes you interact with a person you used to fear. Another thing is that there are things that were hidden from you which you get to know [...] and we go in this group to give an example of how people will live together (Mtukwa, 2015: 94-95).

The above quote from a genocide survivor shows how this type of participatory theatre can evoke new insights otherwise unavailable.

The last mechanism we will cover is a government installed counseling system for women rearing children of the genocide called *enfants de mauvais souvenirs*. This program was aimed at helping these women cope with not only the trauma of rape, but also with the daily reminder of the sexual violence in the form of a child. Of course, AIDS was a huge problem, but the government installed a system to distribute antiviral drugs. According to Raston, “While there were complaints aplenty about who got which drugs, organizations were at least seeking to address the problem and to help the mothers still struggling with the aftermath of the genocide” (Raston, 2005: 249).

Chapter 5

Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

This chapter presents the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the study, regarding conflict resolution mechanisms in Rwanda post 1994 genocide.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to examine the nature and causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa and the methods employed in resolving such conflicts. Specifically, it focused on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the conflict resolution strategies employed by the government in its attempts at mitigating ethnic tensions in the post-genocide period of the country. The objective was to seek effective methods to help prevent and resolve conflicts on the African continent. Many studies have been conducted on the Rwandan genocide that focus on the conflict itself and its causes, as well as the progress Rwanda has made in the twenty-two years since the end of the genocide; however, very few have been focused on the conflict resolution methods employed post genocide that enabled the country to recover from the effects of the conflict in 1994 to its current state of peace. This study aimed to investigate the conflict resolution mechanisms employed post genocide in an effort to better understand how and why Rwanda has been so successful in alleviating ethnic tensions and rebuilding their country.

Hypothesis

The findings of the study did not confirm our original hypothesis which stated that the conflict resolution methods employed in post-1994 Rwanda, specifically the *Gacaca Courts*, were effective in facilitating reconciliation between the Hutus and Tutsis and aided in the creation of a more peaceful and understanding society. This conclusion is based on the nature of the findings, especially from the responses provided by the persons who were caught in the genocide – both the perpetrators of the killings and those who lost their families to the killers who still live among the people. The respondents revealed that the traditional gacaca courts were ineffective in terms of truly resolving the various animosities that lay underneath the anger of those who lost their families and property. While some form of peace currently exists across the country, it's due to the government's imposed vigilance against any form of violence which appears to be sustaining the fragile peace achieved thus anything could happen, should that vigilance be suddenly removed. Additionally, the study discovered that some citizens were very much afraid even to comment on the subject for fear the government would literally, "hear them," because they think some of the government's own people who took part in the murders have not been prosecuted.

Methodology

Data collection for the study included library resources, such as books, journal articles, newspaper articles, and Internet sources. In addition, the author conducted field research in Rwanda focused on personal observations and interviews with genocide survivors who could attest to the progress made since 1994. As stated in chapter 1, research in Rwanda also included visits to local genocide memorials throughout the country such as in Kigali and Murambi in an effort to better understand the history of the conflict, as well as viewing documentaries on the genocide.

Conclusions

The following conclusions were drawn from the findings of the study:

1. The *gacaca* judges, in large part, did not receive adequate training in order to be able to perform their assigned duties properly, which was detrimental to the success of the courts.
2. The process of selecting “persons of integrity” to serve as *gacaca* judges was aimed more at selecting those in good social standing than those with actual qualifications, which ultimately hindered the *gacaca* process.
3. Over the years, the *gacaca* courts significantly interfered with the efficiency of the conventional court system by impeding on their resources as focus shifted to deploying the minimal resources available towards the *gacaca* courts instead of the conventional courts. During the years *gacaca* was in session, the conventional courts saw a dramatic decrease in the number of cases tried.
4. The *gacaca* principle of an open process was sometimes not upheld, thus weakening the integrity of the system.
5. The inability of the accused to defend themselves fully, due to their lack of representation strips the *gacaca* process of its right to call itself a fair trial.
6. The *gacaca* system was limited, in terms of proper representation for defendants as well as protection for witnesses.
7. The use of “level of remorse” to either acquit or reduce sentences for defendants provided an escape route for several people convicted of serious crimes during the genocide to simply manufacture a remorseful appearance to receive reduced sentences. This was a major limitation of the *gacaca* courts.

8. The *gacaca* courts did pressure some defendants to “confess” thus failing to give them the chance to prove their innocence and failing to attain the courts’ goal of “delivering the truth.”
9. It was discovered that in certain cases, government appeared to have influenced the decisions of the *gacaca* courts which was detrimental to those seeking real justice and truth.

Recommendations

The following recommendations were drawn from the conclusions of the study, regarding conflict resolution mechanisms, especially in Rwanda and regarding the *gacaca* system and other similar traditional court systems:

1. Sensitive cases, such as rape, should be tried in the conventional court systems to protect the privacy and dignity of the victims involved.
2. Adequate training should be provided both for the conventional as well as traditional judges and other officials involved in delivering judgment (i.e. the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa).
3. The traditional court judges, must be, at least, literate.
4. The traditional courts should not be allowed to interfere with the efficiency of the conventional court system in efforts to elicit justice for victims, while the traditional system should enforce transparency to uphold truth and justice.
5. All defendants should have access to a lawyer capable of defending their cause, and witnesses given adequate protection from any intimidation and personal harm, following their testimony.

6. It is imperative that in spite of the mechanism employed to resolve conflicts, that all sides involved are effectively prosecuted.
7. The use of “level of remorse” as a sign of guilt admission hence pardon in the traditional court system should be discouraged as it encourages false remorse pretenses.
8. Government should not be allowed to circumvent justice given either by the traditional or conventional courts. The Law must be allowed to take its own course of judgement.
9. Authorities involved in the conflict resolution process should respect the rights of accused persons and the integrity of the court system.

Implications for Further Study

The following are drawn from the study for further study:

1. The challenges facing Rwanda in the post-1994 genocide society.
2. The perspectives of the genocide survivors on the conflict resolution mechanisms employed by the Rwandan government.
3. The challenges and limitations of the traditional *gacaca* court system in Rwanda.

Appendix A

Map of Africa Showing Rwanda

Figure 1 Political map of Africa with red arrow pointing to Rwanda (worldatlas.com).



Appendix B

Geo-Political Map of Rwanda

Figure 2 Geo-political map of Rwanda (Chossudovsky, 2014).



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ACADEMIC VITA of TALIA SAINCLAIR

EDUCATION

The Pennsylvania State University, 2013-2016

College of the Liberal Arts
African Studies Major, French Minor

Schreyer Honors College

- Honors Program including advanced academic coursework, a senior thesis, ethics study, and leadership/service commitment

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Urukundo Home for Children: Muhanga, Rwanda, Africa

Volunteer/Big Sister, 2009-present

- Building a lasting relationship with the fifty+ children in the home over eight trips of 3-6 weeks in length
- Assisting around the home with childcare and chores, as well as in the primary school on the grounds
- Administering activities and classes with the children such as soccer, yoga, theater and ESL

Study Abroad: Paris, France

FR197A: France and the Holocaust, March 2016

- Visiting local sites of significance to the Holocaust in France such as the neighborhood of Marais and the concentration camp at Drancy
- Speaking with several of the last remaining survivors in an effort to bear witness and better understand what remains beyond comprehension

Study Abroad: Morocco, Africa

CAS 199: Islam and Intercultural Communication, July 2015

- Examining facets of Muslim, North-African and Moroccan culture through intercultural encounters
- Applying intercultural communication tactics to real-life situations and reflecting on those interactions

Research for Undergraduate Thesis: Rwanda, Africa

Primary Investigator, May 2015

- Conducting interviews with Rwandan citizens
- Visiting various genocide memorials throughout the country and speaking with genocide survivors to gain a greater insight into Rwanda's past

Study Abroad: London and Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Theatre 497H: Honors London, January 2015

- Exploring various forms of prejudice as they are represented across diverse forms of theater
- Investigating the culture and history of the United Kingdom through visits to sites of historical significance such as the Tower of London and the Edinburgh Castle

Global Brigades: Panama

Member of the Human Rights Brigade, March 2014

- Assisting Panamanian lawyers with providing pro-bono legal consulting to rural communities
- Implementing a community education project in an effort to help inform rural citizens of the legal process to secure alimony, divorce and other rights

LEADERSHIP

Teacher's Assistant: State College, PA

African Studies 202: Gender Dynamics in Africa

Fall Semester 2015 - Spring Semester 2016

- Grading quizzes and homework assignments, maintaining a record of all grades and attendance, and answering students' questions in and outside of class
- Aiding the professor in facilitating classroom discussion and activities

Model African Union: University Park, PA

President, Fall Semester 2015 - Spring Semester 2016

- Facilitating the club and the development of members' resolutions for the annual conference
- Planning the trip to D.C. for the conference and making all necessary preparations for the group

Outdoor School: Camp Blue Diamond, Pennsylvania

Camp Counselor, October 2013 and 2014

- Supervising my cabin group and teaching lessons to as well as supervising my learning group

PRESENTATIONS

Model African Union Conference: Washington D.C.

Head Delegate, February 18-21, 2016

- Representing Malawi on the Social Matters Committee
- Visiting the Malawian Embassy for a Q&A session with the United States Ambassador of Malawi
- Preparing a resolution for consideration by the committee, participating in delegation and voting

Model African Union Conference: Washington D.C.

Economics Committee, February 19-22, 2015

- Representing Egypt on the Economics Committee
- Participating in voting and delegations through teamwork and collaboration with fellow delegates

Data-Driven Development in Africa Conference

Conference Attendee, 12 February 2016

- Exploring the significance of social science data for African development based on discussions of existing data systems, new technologies, innovative methods and Big Data

Extractive Industries for African Development: A Paradigm Shift: University Park, PA

Conference Attendee, 27 March 2015

- Examining the juxtaposition of extractive industries in Africa contributing notably to economic growth while simultaneously being associated with a host of problems such as environmental degradation, etc.

ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE

Literacy Empowerment Action Project (LEAP):

Washington D.C. / Konko Village, Ghana

Online Intern (leapglobal.org), May-July 2015

- Assisting the Executive Director with development projects and trip planning, such as developing a contingency plan and teacher training materials

McLanahan's Downtown Market: State College, PA

Café Barista/Cashier, September 2015- March 2016

Panera Bread: Bloomsburg, PA and State College, PA

Associate Trainer, November 2011- May 2015

Rita's Italian Ice: Bloomsburg, PA and State College, PA

Treat Team Member, February 2011- October 2014

AWARDS

PSU Africana Research Center, \$2000, 2015

Penn State University Provost Award, 2013-2017

Bloomsburg Lionsgate Student of the Year Award, 2013