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TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND GROUP GOALS:
WHY VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS ARE LETHAL

MEGAN CICHOCKI
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Reviewed and approved* by the following:

James A. Piazza
Liberal Arts Research Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Gretchen Casper
Associate Professor of Political Science
Honors Adviser

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College.

ABSTRACT

Throughout the last several decades, the power and influence of violent non-state actors has risen considerably, and in the past five years, these actors have carried out over seventy thousand violent attacks worldwide. Some of these groups have gained control of territory, which has only increased their scope of influence and added a new dimension to combating violence throughout the world. While research has been done on the control of territory in the context of revolutions and insurgencies, there is little research on how the control of territory impacts terrorist organizations' ability and willingness to carry out acts of terror. This paper seeks to determine if groups that control territory are more lethal than those that do not. Additionally, I examine ideology, group rivals, group age, and group location to determine what affects the lethality of a violent non-state actor. I contend that the relationship between territorial control and lethality is significant and positive, and groups with empire or territorial control goals are more lethal than groups with policy change, regime change, status quo, and social revolution goals. I confirm that groups with religious ideologies and groups that are rivaled tend to be more lethal than their counterparts. To conclude, I discuss several policy implications of my results.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

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Chapter 1

Introduction

No two violent non-state actors are alike. They operate in different regions, have different goals, are different sizes, have access to different resources, and have many other distinguishing characteristics. Violent non-state actors also have different results, or varying levels of "success." Of the 111 violent non-state actors in this study, less than half have killed more than one hundred people between 1998 and 2012, and only twelve have killed more than one thousand people. This study seeks to understand why some violent non-state actors are more lethal than others and focuses on the role of territorial control in determining organizational lethality.

The strategic intent of modern terrorists is to create a large number of secondary psychological casualties by the means of large-scale physical attacks. Terrorism is different than traditional war. Instead of destroying the material resources of a nation and taking over that country, terrorists aim to incite terror and fright in civilian populations (Bongar 2007, 4). To intimidate and instill fear, violent non-state actors carry out severe attacks that gain the attention of the media, the immediate targets, and secondary targets. Oftentimes, the fear, stress, and exhaustion that terrorists cause is more dangerous than bombs and bullets (Bongar 2007, 6). Therefore, it is crucial that counterterrorist agents understand what allows violent non-state actors to carry out severe attacks and to understand why these groups use terror to target civilians.

Terrorism is unique because it is unpredictable and indiscriminately targets civilians. Terrorism invokes a sense of vulnerability, helplessness, loss of control, uncertainty, and threat to life, and despite the statistical improbability of being a victim of terror, people across the world list it as one of their top fears. According to a Pew Research Center Poll of 1,200 Americans, about forty percent of the public believes that the ability of terrorists to launch another major attack on the United States is greater than it was at the time of the September 11 attacks.

Over the past fifteen years, there has been a plethora of literature on terrorism, ranging from its origins to how groups end. As the world changes, so do the topics of interest. However, one area of study that is underrepresented is how the control of territory affects violent non-state actors' ability and willingness to carry out acts of terror on civilians. With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the issue of territorial control has become exceptionally relevant to policymakers and terrorism experts. In this paper, I intend to examine what characteristics of violent non-state actors lead them to carry out lethal attacks, with a focus on territorial control. Understanding the types and characteristics of organizations that kill and injure the most people is exceptionally important to determining the best way to target these violent non-state actors and minimize the amount of casualties that they cause.

In this paper, I will start by reviewing the literature on terrorism as a strategy, violent non-state actors' ideologies, the outbidding theory and territorial control. I will then identify hypotheses and explain my theories before testing those hypotheses and explaining the results. I will discuss the results and conclude by identifying several relevant policy implications.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Defining Terrorism and Terror

There is no commonly accepted definition of terrorism in the literature, although many scholars agree that terrorism is the "deliberate use of violence in order to influence some audience" (Goodwin 2006, 2028). Two significant areas of divergence include who can practice terrorism and who can be the target of terrorism. According to Tilly (2004), terrorism is "politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience". Hoffman (1998) asserts that terrorism is "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change". More specifically, terror can be defined as the "asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime" (Tilly 2005, 6). The use of terror by violent non-state actors varies depending on the goals of the group, the resources available to the group, and the group's strength. For example, according to Tilly, terrorism as a strategy can be the sole tactic for committed groups and networks of activists or just one segment of the group's overall strategy. Violent non-state actors may also choose to carry out acts of terror intermittently for specific but short-term aims (Tilly 2004, 8).

Terrorism as a Strategy

Scholars agree that terrorism is strategic, and groups that use terror as a tactic are rational. Groups carry out acts of terror because these attacks often deliver the desired response and provide an option for groups that are too weak to use organized violence to attain their goals. Kydd and Walter (2006) found that between 1980 and 2003, suicide terror campaigns often led to substantial concessions by the target government. While acts of terror can be carried out against governments, militaries, businesses, and infrastructure, the targeting of civilians is especially effective. When violent non-state actors carry out acts of terror on civilians, governments are often forced to respond and to make concessions in order to protect their citizens. Pape (2003) considers the strategic logic of suicide terrorism and finds that groups gain leverage by carrying out suicide attacks because of two distinct threats: the immediate panic caused by an attack and the risk of harm to civilians in the future. By carrying out attacks on civilians, these armed non-state actors try to convince their opponents that they are vulnerable to more attacks in the future.

Violent non-state actors are rational and strategic, and they sometimes use terrorist violence as a sign of costly signaling (Kydd and Walter 2006, 50). Because non-state actors that use terrorism are typically weak, they cannot make credible threats through ordinary means of communication to influence the behavior of their opponents. Instead, terrorists are forced to publicly display how far they are willing to go to obtain their desired results (Kydd and Walter 2006, 51). Therefore, they use five strategies of costly signaling in terrorism campaigns including attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling and outbidding.

Targeting Civilians

The relationship between violent non-state actors and civilians is complicated and heavily debated in the literature. Kydd and Walter (2006) argue that terrorists play to two key audiences: the governments whose policies they wish to influence and individuals whose support or obedience they seek to gain. While the need to overcome target governments is somewhat obvious, the domestic audience is also a crucial component of violent non-state actors' strategies. The domestic audience can provide resources to the terrorist group and must obey its laws on social and political issues (Kydd and Walter 2006, 58). When organizations wish to gain control over a specific population, they use the strategy of intimidation to demonstrate that they have the ability to punish those who disobey them. Because of the unpredictable nature of terrorist attacks, governments are left powerless to stop them. On the other hand, non-state actors need the support of some population to sustain operations. In order to gain that support, these actors work to convince civilians who support the government that their continued backing of the government will be costly (Kydd and Walter 2006, 66).

Violent non-state actors must make decisions about the type of targets they want to pursue and the audience that they want to impress. Targeting patterns and preferences of violent non-state actors have shifted over time as their goals change. Brandt and Sandler (2010) find that transnational terrorist organizations over the last thirty years have shifted their focus from targeting political officials and militaries to businesses and private parties or civilians. They also find that since the 1990s, organizations have preferred to attack people rather than property, and as governments tighten security to combat these attacks, terrorist organizations tend to direct their attacks against the targets that are the hardest to defend and the most vulnerable, which are civilians (Brandt and Sandler 2010, 216). In addition, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find that

organizations with religious ideologies target civilians more regularly than organizations with other ideologies.

Ideology

Many scholars argue that ideology is the driving factor of lethality. The collective lethality of terrorist organizations has increased because the ideologies of modern terrorist groups are more conducive and permissive of violent and deadly acts (Hoffman 1998, Lesser et al. 1999). Ideology is important because it provides a framework for the actions of a terrorist organization. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) argue that there are two characteristics of a group's ideology that make it more or less lethal than others: the ideology's audience and the ideology's ability to clearly define its opponent. For example, groups with religious ideologies must answer to an audience not on earth, their god, while groups with other ideologies like leftist, rightist, or separatist focus on an earthly audience and therefore do not have the same legitimizing force that religious groups have (Gressang 2001, 92).

According to Simon and Benjamin (2001), "Except in insurgencies and civil wars, groups with nationalist or social-revolutionary objectives…calculate that indiscriminate violence would undercut their claims to legitimacy and alienate potential sympathizers." Many of these groups have an ultimate goal of having a role in government or creating their own governments, and they would sacrifice their bargaining power should they carry out indiscriminate acts of terror (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 439). On the other hand, groups that are motivated by religion respond to theological demands and their interpretation of scripture to justify wide-scale violence against an "open-ended" category of opponents (Hoffman 1999, 7).

Some organizations discriminate in their targeting preferences. For example, some civilians are viewed as "convertible" to the terrorists' cause, and it does not make strategic sense for groups to target individuals who may become supporters. On the other hand, if there is a clear dividing line between supporters of the group and "others," then terrorist organizations have no incentive to discriminate when killing. As is often the case in ethnic and religious conflicts, these groups will indiscriminately target all people who are not on their side (Juergensmeyer 2003). By creating a separation between "us" and the "others," all "others" become legitimate targets. Furthermore, violent non-state actors have many strategic reasons for carrying out acts of violence on civilians. First, attacks generate publicity for their cause which can spur recruitment and help the organization to gather resources (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 438). Second, attacks on civilians signal to the opposing government that the organization is serious about their goals and is willing to use violence to attain those goals (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 440). Boyle (2009) asserts that al-Qaeda designs attacks to inflict maximum casualties on the civilian population in order to generate headlines and to apply pressure on the Iraqi government.

Outbidding

When there are multiple rival groups in an area, these groups are typically more violent. The outbidding theory states that violent non-state actors use violence to convince the public that their organization has greater resolve to fight their enemy than their rival groups and is therefore worthy of support (Kydd and Walter 2006, 51). Conrad and Greene (2013) argue that when terrorist organizations experience an increase in domestic political competition, they respond by

increasing their level of violence in order to "outbid" their competition in gaining public support and attention. Furthermore, in particularly competitive environments, organizations have an incentive to engage in more shocking or innovative tactics, which help to distinguish their brand from competitors and make them less sensitive to competition (Conrad and Greene 2013, 2). Boyle (2009) conducts a case study to explain violence against Iraqi civilians from 2004 to 2007. He explains that civilian casualties increased steadily from 2004 to 2007 in Iraq as a result of intense competition between different sectarian factions. Sunni and Shi'a insurgents fought to both outbid and outflank their competition, and they attacked civilians in order to signal political strength (Boyle 2009, 262). Interestingly, Boyle notes that groups only had an incentive to attack civilians in regions where there were multiple contestants for state power, and the capacity of these contestants was unknown. To demonstrate their strength and compete against each other, these groups escalated violence against civilians (Boyle 2009, 263). These acts of terror were used to win concessions, reinforce the credibility of threats and signal resolve to continue fighting (Boyle 2009, 266).

Territorial Control

While research has been done on the control of territory in the context of revolutions and insurgencies, there is little research on how the control of territory impacts armed non-state actors' ability and willingness to carry out acts of terror. There are two separate theories about territory control. The first theory is the territoriality theory, which suggests that territorial issues are especially likely to lead to conflict and war (Hensel 2000, 1). Because territory contains resources like water, oil, and minerals, both state and non-state actors want to control it.

Furthermore, the control of territory contributes to a state's perceived power, security and reputation (Hensel 2000, 2). Paul Hensel specifically looks at nation-states and militarized interstates disputes. He concludes that territoriality is important because the natural resources and power gained from territory control are extremely beneficial to the entity that controls them (Hensel 2000, 21). McColl adds to the theory by asserting that control of territory is imperative to the success of revolutionary movements. Holding territory has many benefits including providing the revolutionary group with a safe haven, demonstrating the weakness and ineffectiveness of the state government, and providing necessary human and material resources (McColl 1969, 614).

Eventually, as the insurgency expands, there must be a transition in focus from military to political considerations. Public support is key for insurgency, terrorist, and revolutionary groups, and the destruction of government buildings and equipment will no longer be sufficient to gain this support. Instead, the population of the territory that the group controls will expect the group to provide services normally provided by the government (McColl 1969, 626). Therefore, as the size of geographic territory that the group controls expands, it must expend more resources on building a stable political system and fewer resources on military expeditions (McColl 1969, 630). Although McColl's research focuses on revolutions, the same logic can be applied to other violent non-state actors. As violent non-state actors gain control of territory, they must use resources to defend it, making fewer resources available for carrying out attacks. Additionally, many believe that terrorism is a weapon of the weak. As McColl asserts, when organizations gain strength, they may abandon the strategy of carrying out severe acts of terror for more structured attacks or non-violent actions.

When explaining why some terrorist organizations are more deadly than others, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) come to a different conclusion. They found that organizations that maintain control over territory are likely to be more lethal than groups that do not maintain control over territory, because as groups control territory, their operational capacity expands, and they have more resources at their disposal to carry out complex attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 446). Furthermore, the authors found that organizations that have large memberships, have religious-ethno ideologies, and have alliances with peers are more likely to be lethal (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 446).

Many of the studies dealing with terrorism look at the correlation between weak and failing states and incidents of terror. Newman finds that although the most destructive terrorist groups are located in weak and failing states, there is not a conclusive relationship between state failure, weak states and terrorism (Newman 2007, 474). Furthermore, while terrorist organizations may benefit from the environment provided in weak states, they oftentimes depend on the conveniences and services that stable, functioning states provide (Newman 2007, 475). If terrorist organizations control their own territory, they will not be able to take advantage of the services that governments provide. As a result, there is an added cost to controlling territory that may take away from their ability to carry out acts of terror. On the other hand, Piazza (2008) explains that failed states suffer from administrative incapacity. Because they cannot provide the basic services that most citizens expect, criminal groups can function without repercussions, and many citizens will transfer their loyalties to non-state actors that can provide basic services (Piazza 2008, 470). He concludes that failing states are more likely to be the targets of attacks and are more likely to have their nationals commit attacks overseas (Piazza 2008, 471).

Makarenko (2004) agrees and argues that groups that control territory in weak or failing states often enjoy protection from military or civilian authorities seeking to combat terrorism.

Research designs for terrorism studies vary and include both case studies and large-N studies. For example, when looking at how terrorist organizations become weaker, Audrey Kurth Cronin conducted case studies. First, she identified seven ways in which terrorist organizations end. She then selected thirty organizations to examine by choosing at least two groups that ended because of each of the seven different reasons (Cronin 2006, 31). She conducted an in- depth case study of al Qaeda to predict how it will weaken (Cronin 2006, 33). Robert McColl also conducted comparative case studies. He looked at successful communist insurgencies in Cuba, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam and unsuccessful insurgencies in the Philippines, Greece, and Malaysia to determine if territorial control had any effect on their success or failure (McColl 1969, 631).

On the other hand, some researchers used large-N studies to conduct their research. For example, when examining whether or not weak and failed states are necessary for the formation of terrorist organizations, Newman conducted an analysis of 54 of the deadliest terrorist organizations. These cases were selected from a list which combined the U.S. State Department's "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" list, the European Union list of designated terrorist entities within the EU and worldwide, and the United Kingdom's list of organizations proscribed under the Terrorist Act of 2000 (Newman 2007, 472). Piazza uses the Failed State Index to examine the relationship between groups of states' rankings on the index and their experiences with transnational terrorism. He ran a cross-national, time-series regression analysis of the relationship between the intensity of state failures experienced by a state and its contribution to transnational terrorism (Piazza 2008, 474). Additionally, Asal and Rethemeyer

observed 395 different terrorist organizations and coded information on each group's size, date

of founding, ideology, sources of state sponsorship, number of connections to other terrorist

organizations, and the scope of the territory the group is purported to control (Asal and

Rethemeyer 2008, 442).

When examining the severity of terrorism, most studies look at the quantity of violence.

For example, when determining if global terrorist attacks are time-correlated, Telesca and

Lovallo define severity as the number of fatalities or injuries caused by an attack (Telesca and

Lovallo 2005, 480). Conrad and Greene assert that most studies only analyze the quantity of

violence used by terrorist organizations, while often overlooking the quality of violence (Conrad

and Greene 2013, 2). To test the logic of outbidding, they characterized domestic terrorist

attacks by the relative level of their severity. They created an index (shock value) which takes

into consideration both the type of target and the type of attack. The authors explain that the

severity level "captures the likely impact of an act based on the identity of the victim and how

the attack was carried out" (Conrad and Greene 2013, 3). To measure competition, the authors

include the number of active terrorist groups in a country as well as the annual change in number

of groups. The data for these variables are found from the Global Terrorism Database. They

find that states with greater levels of terrorism activity are likely to experience more severe types

of attacks (Conrad and Greene 2013, 23).

Chapter 3

Theory and Hypotheses

After examining and synthesizing the theories presented in the literature, I developed five hypotheses to test. These hypotheses are based on the territoriality theory, the outbidding theory, and the fact that violent non-state actors are strategic.

Hypothesis 1: Groups that control territory will have an overall higher level of lethality.

My main theory is that the control of territory increases the operational capacity of a violent non-state actor and provides the organization with the resources to carry out more severe attacks. Hensel's territoriality theory suggests that territorial conflict is likely to lead to war and violence because territory contains resources like water, oil and minerals and it is extremely beneficial for non-state actors to gain control of this territory (Hensel 2009). Therefore, groups must be willing to carry out acts of violence against civilians, militaries, and governments in order to secure new territory. Additionally, holding territory provides non-state actors with a safe haven and both human and material resources (McColl 1929). Because of these additional resources, non-state actors have a greater capacity to carry out more lethal attacks.

A contending theory is that when violent non-state actors control territory, they will have to expend more resources to defend that territory and therefore will not carry out as many attacks. Additionally, many organizations have the goal of territorial control, so if they achieve this goal they may shift their focus to political endeavors rather than carrying out terror attacks. If this is the case, then groups that control territory would have an overall lower level of lethality.

Hypothesis 2: Groups that control territory will carry out a proportionally lower amount of attacks on civilians than groups that do not control territory.

Once organizations control territory, they have a responsibility and strategic desire to protect and defend that territory. They need popular support to sustain their operations within a territory and have no incentive to carry out attacks on civilians within their territory. Without the support of the public, violent non-state actors will have trouble recruiting new members and gaining resources. As the non-state actor expands the territory under its control, McColl explains that the group must shift its focus from military to political considerations (McColl 1969). Since public support is so important, non-state actors cannot afford to continue targeting civilians. Additionally, these civilians will expect the non-state actor to provide them with services that the government normally provides and the group must expend more resources on governing the territory rather than killing civilians.

Hypothesis 3: Groups whose goal it is to control territory but do not yet control territory will be more lethal than groups that already control territory.

As a group looks to gain territorial control, it will carry out more attacks on civilians than groups that already control territory. Violent non-state actors are strategic, and they target civilians with the goal of forcing governments to make both political and territorial concessions. Additionally, violent non-state actors need to gain the support of the public, so they often turn to intimidation. These non-state actors use threats and costly signals when they wish to overthrow a government in power or gain social control over a given population. When violent organizations are able to inflict higher costs, their threat to inflict future costs is more credible, and governments are more likely to grant concessions. Because of this, violent non-state actors

will carry out more lethal attacks when they are trying to gain control of territory rather than when they already have control of that territory.

Hypothesis 4: Groups with more rivals will be more lethal than groups with fewer rivals.

The outbidding theory contends that when there are multiple rival groups in the area, these groups are typically more violent. Non-state actors use violence to convince the public that their organization is the most powerful and is worthy of support. Additionally, when there are a lot of groups with the same goal in a particular area, groups need to find a way to distinguish themselves. Because of this, groups with rivals are more likely to carry out more violent and shocking attacks in order to gain attention and improve recruitment and support. Civilians normally pledge allegiance to groups that they believe can protect them, and if the threat of violence is severe, civilians are likely to pledge support to a group in order to avoid being targeted. Therefore, it is rational for terrorist organizations who have rivals to carry out lethal attacks.

Hypothesis 5: Groups with ethnic and/or religious ideologies will carry out more lethal attacks than groups with other ideologies.

Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) argue that an ideology's audience and an ideology's ability to clearly define its opponent contribute to the level of a particular non-state actor's lethality. For example, groups with religious and ethnic ideologies can clearly define their opponent (people who do not hold similar religious beliefs or ethnic backgrounds) while groups with leftist ideologies have a harder time doing so. Because of this clear divide between "us" and "them," it is easier and more acceptable for groups with religious and ethnic ideologies to carry out violent

attacks on their opponents, including civilians who have different beliefs or backgrounds. Additionally, religious organizations answer to their deity, while leftist, rightist, or separatist groups answer to an audience on earth. Groups with an earthly audience cannot afford to carry out lethal attacks on civilians because they are looking to gain the support of civilians. Therefore, indiscriminate violence would undercut their legitimacy and decrease popular support for their cause.   Terrorist organizations are strategic, and they only act in ways that will further their ideologies or causes. Religious and ethnic organizations hold beliefs that allow for hate of their opponents, which are likely civilians. On the other hand, groups with leftist, rightist, and separatist ideologies have opponents that are more likely to be governments or militaries, not civilians.

Chapter 4

Data and Method

My dataset consists of 111 violent non-state actors with data compiled from the Big

Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Dataset and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), both of

which are funded through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to

Terrorism at the University of Maryland. The timeframe of my dataset is from 1998 to 2012.

My unit of analysis is the violent non-state actor, which I define as non-state groups that

intentionally use acts of violence or the threat of violence to attain a political, economic,

religious, or social goal. Additionally, the violent act must include evidence of an intention to

coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience other than immediate victims

(LaFree 2010, 4).   The Big Allied and Dangerous Dataset contains violent non-state actors,

which includes both terrorist and insurgent organizations. According to Asal and Rethemeyer,

the authors of the dataset, an organization is included in BAAD2 dataset if the entity:

1. Committed at least one terrorist attack as defined by the Global Terrorism Database criteria between 1998 and 2012, and/or
2. Was recorded in the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN by Non-state Actors dataset as having used, attempted to use, or pursued a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon at least once between 1998 and 2012, and/or
3. Was recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Battle Deaths dataset as having committed at least 25 battle deaths in an insurgency between 1998 and 2012

      AND

1. Was an organization and had the following characteristics: boundaries to clearly delineate members and non-members, persistence over time, at least minimal internal differentiation and resources held and/or owned for a collectivity rather than for individuals
2. Garnered enough coverage in sources to characterize name, homebase country, and ideology (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015)

Using the BAAD2 dataset, I compiled data on group name, group country and region, group

ideology, whether or not the group controls territory, the year the organization was founded, and

the number of rivals the organization has. The BAAD2 data were coded by hand from sources

including newspapers, magazines, websites, and academic articles and books. To ensure

consistency, accuracy, and reliability editors and the project principal investigators assessed the

data and completed consistency checks.

In the dataset, I include the groups' names and their countries of origin. The group's

name is based on the TORG crosswalk dataset master list. The country of origin, or

organizational home base, is the country from which the organization operates or has its

"headquarters." From the countries of origin, I coded the region of the world as a control

variable. There are five regions represented in my dataset: Africa, the Middle East, Asia,

Europe, and South America. I used five dummy variables (one for each region) to represent the

region in which each organization operates. There are six ideologies represented within the

dataset. I created six different dummy variables to represent the six ideologies (religious,

separatist, ethnic, leftist, rightist, vigilante). According to the BAAD codebook, groups with a

religious ideology are guided by some form of religious principles and may seek to incorporate

religious policies into public life. Ethnic organizations represent a certain ethnic group and

worked to advocate for the rights or expansion of that ethnic group. Separatist organizations

advocate for the independence, autonomy, or annexation of a geographical area for a represented

group. Rightist organizations promote economically rightist policies (extreme laissez-faire

policies, small government) while leftist organizations promote leftist economic policies like the

redistribution of wealth and the nationalization of industry. Vigilante organizations hold a strong

anti-crime goal and will often work as illegitimate police to fill the void that they feel

governments leave for not dealing with crime (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015).

The next variable included in the dataset is control of territory. This is a dummy variable

coded with "1" if the group controls territory and "0" if it does not. In this dataset, an

organization controls territory if it is able to control movement into, out of, or within a given

territory. Sometimes the non-state actors will provide services but this is not a necessary

characteristic. The area that the group controls must be substantial, meaning that it must be a

region or a city and not just a few buildings (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015).

The BAAD2 dataset includes a variable for the number of rivals that a group has, with

rivals being defined as "organizations that compete for the same object or goal as another, or try

to equal or outdo another. They seek to dispute another's preeminence or superiority" (Asal and

Rethemeyer 2015). I will use this variable to determine the effect of outbidding on civilian

casualties caused by a violent non-state actor.

The final independent variable is group goal, which is divided into six dummy variables:

territorial control goal, regime change goal, empire goal, policy change goal, status quo

maintenance goal, and social revolution goal. I used Jones' and Libicki's End of Terror Dataset

to code this variable. Groups with a status quo maintenance goal support the current regime or

territorial distribution and oppose groups who wish to change it. Groups with a policy change

goal have identified a specific set of policies that they demand to be implemented. Groups with

territorial change goal want to acquire territory from a state and may want to establish a new

state, join a different state or gain autonomy. Groups with a regime change goal want to

overthrow the current government and replace it with their own government. Groups with an

empire goal want to overthrow more than one regime and replace the overthrown regimes with

one sovereign authority. Finally, groups with a social revolution goal want to change the social

or cultural norms of individuals (Jones and Libicki 2008).

For my dependent variable, I am relying on data from the Global Terrorism Database

which is an open-source database containing information on over 150,000 terrorist attacks,

making it the most comprehensive unclassified terrorism database in the world. The information

was gathered and coded from a variety of open media sources, which the researchers have

deemed credible. For each attack, there is information on the date of the attack, the location of

the incident (by city), the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and

the group or individual responsible. The dataset includes all attacks carried out between 1970

and 2014, though I am limiting my study to between 1998 and 2012. The GTD defines terrorism

as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a

political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The data is

organized by perpetrator group and the attacks are in chronological order and dated.

From the Global Terrorism Database, I collected data on the number of attacks that each

group carried out against civilians from 1998 to 2012 as well as the number of civilian injuries

and fatalities that each group caused, and the total lethality against civilians (the sum of the

number of civilian injuries and fatalities). I also collected data on the total number of attacks,

total number of overall injuries (civilians and non-civilians like members of the military and

government officials), total number of overall fatalities, and total number of overall casualties.

In order to find this information, I searched the Global Terrorism Database for each of the 111

perpetrator groups in my dataset. Each attack is coded for the type of target, and I included

attacks against private citizens, transportation, and tourism in the count of civilian casualties.

The overall counts of casualties include attacks against all targets, and this is the variable that I will use as my main dependent variable.

Finally, I created a variable measuring the proportion of civilian casualties to overall casualties which will serve as my main dependent variable. I am interested in determining why some groups focus on attacking civilians while others carry out attacks on the government and military, so I divided the number of civilian total casualties by overall total casualties to get the variable *P_lethality*.

There are several limitations to my data. First, not all terrorist attacks are claimed by the perpetrator and the attacks that are not claimed are not randomly spread over all active organizations. For example, in some areas of the world, newspapers are rare and reporting is lacking, so many of the attacks in the Middle East and Africa go unclaimed. Additionally, religious organizations are less likely to claim their attacks, causing a slight bias in my data. Ideally, I would like to differentiate attacks that organizations carry out within their territory and outside their territory, but these data are very difficult to find and corroborate. I would also like to track control of territory over time to see how the civilian to overall casualty ratio changes as groups gain and lose control of territory. Unfortunately, these data are also not available, so my study is limited to simply examining whether or not groups control territory rather than conducting a time-series study.

Chapter 5

Results

My statistical results are presented below and support three of my five hypotheses. I used a negative binomial regression, because my dependent variable is a count variable. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 1. My study consisted of 111 violent non-state actors. Of those groups, 24 percent control territory, and the average lethality is 498 people killed and injured. The majority of groups (54 percent) have a separatist ideology, but many groups have a religious ideology (49 percent) and/or ethnic ideology (41 percent). Fewer groups have leftist (18 percent), vigilante (2 percent), and rightist (2 percent) ideologies, and this distribution is representative of the ideological distribution of the population. Some groups have more than one ideology. On average, groups have 0.91 rivals, and the average group age in 2012 is 19.8 years. 45 percent of the groups have a goal of controlling territory, while 6 percent have an empire goal, 35 percent have a regime change goal, 6 percent have a policy change goal, 2 percent have a social revolution goal and 4 percent aim to maintain the status quo.

Table 2 displays the results of a negative binomial regression which examines the effect of territorial control, ideology, rivals, age, location, and goal on overall lethality of violent non-state actors. The first model is a baseline model which only includes territorial control and group age, and as the model number increases, so does the number of control variables included. For example, model five includes territorial control, ideology (as dummy variables for religious, ethnic, separatist, rightist, and leftist), rivals, group age, region (as dummy variables for Africa,

the Middle East, Europe, and Asia), and group goal (as dummy variables for empire goal,

territorial goal, policy change goal, regime change goal, and social revolution goal). The

Table 1. Summary and Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
African group	111	.180	.386	0	1
Middle Eastern Group	111	.198	.400	0	1
Asian Group	111	.505	.502	0	1
European Group	111	.099	.300	0	1
South American Group	111	.036	.187	0	1
Religious Ideology	111	.486	.502	0	1
Separatist Ideology	111	.549	.501	0	1
Ethnic Ideology	111	.414	.495	0	1
Leftist Ideology	111	.180	.386	0	1
Vigilante Ideology	111	.018	.134	0	1
Rightist Ideology	111	.018	.134	0	1
Territorial Control	111	.236	.427	0	1
Number of Rivals	111	.910	1.004	0	4
Group Age	111	19.757	14.840	1	65
Total Lethality	111	497.71	1077.00	0	7438
Empire Goal	111	.063	.244	0	1
Territory Goal	111	.450	.500	0	1
Regime Change Goal	111	.351	.480	0	1
Policy Change Goal	111	.063	.244	0	1
Social Revolution Goal	111	.018	.133	0	1
Status Quo Goal	111	.036	.187	0	1

coefficient for territorial control is significant and positive through all of the models, as was

expected. This means that groups that control territory are more lethal than groups that do not

control territory, which confirms hypothesis 1: Groups that control territory will have an overall

higher level of lethality. Additionally, as hypothesis five predicted, the coefficient for groups

with religious ideologies is significant and positive through all of the models, meaning that

groups with a religious ideology are more lethal than those with other ideologies. Interestingly,

Table 2. Effect of territorial control, ideology, rivals, and goal on total lethality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Territorial Control	1.218 (.356)***	0.871 (.366)*	0.651 (.374) +	0.864 (.381)*	1.098 (.355)**
Religious Group		1.294 (.477)**	1.537 (.476)***	2.008 (.572)***	2.002 (.474)***
Separatist Group		0.036 (.414)	0.167 (.402)	0.341 (.450)	0.096 (.382)
Ethnic Group		-0.271 (.464)	-0.150 (.441)	0.108 (.489)	0.351 (.395)
Leftist Group		0.450 (.557)	0.150 (.558)	0.811 (.578)	1.218 (.507)*
Rightist Group		-0.402 (1.15)	-0.663 (1.162)	0.487 (1.251)	1.562 (1.154)
Rivals			0.381 (.196)**	0.396 (.183)*	0.305 (.161)+
Group Age	0.012 (0.013)	0.030 (.563)*	0.032 (.012)**	0.026 (.014)+	0.012 (.012)
African Group				1.148 (.838)	0.787 (.767)
Middle Eastern Group				0.001 (.913)	-0.737 (.805)
Asian Group				0.728 (.777)	0.040 (.701)
European Group				-0.712 (.805)	-1.086 (.695)**
Empire Goal					2.135 (.700)**
Territorial Goal					1.778 (.496)***
Regime Goal					0.731 (.514)
Social Revolution Goal					-2.935 (1.166)*
Constant	6.235 (.319)***	5.205 (.563)***	4.664 (.609)***	3.562 (.866)***	3.032 (.812)***
Observations	111	111	111	111	111
χ^2	13.18	29.05	32.86	42.87	68.76
R-square	0.008	0.018	0.020	0.026	0.042

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at .001 level. ** indicates significance at .01 level. * indicates significance at .05 level. + indicates significance at .1 level.

the models show that groups with ethnic ideologies are not more lethal than groups with other ideologies, so I was unable to confirm the second half of hypothesis five.

Furthermore, the coefficient for rivals was significant and positive throughout the last three models, which supports the outbidding theory and hypothesis four. Groups with rivals tend to be more lethal because they need to attract attention to themselves and gain more supporters by showing their strength and influence. When examining goals in relation to lethality, the coefficients for territorial goal and empire goal are significant and positive, demonstrating that groups who aim to gain territory or establish an empire are more lethal than their counterparts. This makes sense because in order to establish territorial control or an empire, groups most likely need to use force to overtake the current occupants. It would be interesting to study if the lethality levels remain high after groups comfortably have control, or if they reallocate their resources to governance and providing for their citizens.

Figure 1. The effect of territorial control on overall lethality

While the results from the negative binomial regression are interesting, substantive results are perhaps more useful. Figure 1 shows the substantive effect of groups that control territory as opposed to groups that do not. This test simulates how many more casualties for which a group that controls territory is responsible as opposed to a group that does not control territory, with all else being held equal. In this model, if a group does not control territory it will be responsible for 528 casualties, all else equal. If a group does control territory, it will be responsible for 1254 casualties, all else equal, meaning that groups that control territory are, on average, responsible for 726 more casualties than groups that do not.

While territorial control had a significant substantive effect, religious ideology proved to be the variable with the largest positive effect on overall lethality. Figure 2 shows the substantive effect of groups with religious ideologies as opposed to groups with a non-religious ideology. In this model, if a group has a religious ideology, it will be responsible for 1834 casualties, all else equal. If a group has an ideology other than religious, it will be responsible for 246 casualties, meaning that on average, the fact that group has a religious ideology causes it to kill or injure 1,588 more people than it would if it had a different ideology, all else equal.

Figure 2. The effect of religious ideology on lethality

To test the third hypothesis, which predicts that groups whose goal it is to control territory but do not yet control territory will be more lethal than groups that already control territory, I created a new variable, *controlgoal*. This variable is a dummy variable, which I coded as 1 if a group has a territorial goal, but does not control territory. I coded the remainder of the groups (groups that already control territory or groups that do not have a territorial goal) as 0. The results of the negative binomial regression are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3. The effect of territorial goal and lack of territorial control on overall lethality

	(6)
Religious Group	2.209 (.494)***
Separatist Group	-0.007 (.412)
Ethnic Group	0.302 (.449)
Leftist Group	1.270 (.580)*
Rightist Group	-0.087 (1.204)
Rivals	0.457 (.171)**
Group Age	0.014 (.014)
African Group	0.874 (0.759)
Middle Eastern Group	-0.391 (.795)
Asian Group	0.115 (.696)
European Group	-1.457 (.724)*
Empire Goal	0.335 (.656)
Policy Goal	-0.594 (.460)
Regime Goal	-1.349 (.741)+
Social Revolution Goal	-4.412 (1.197)***
Territorial Control-Goal	0.224 (.541)
Constant	4.533 (.904)***
Observations	111
χ^2	53.34
R-square	0.032

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at .001 level. ** indicates significance at .01 level. * indicates significance at .05 level. + indicates significance at .1 level.

While the coefficient for groups that have a goal of territorial control but do not yet control

territory is positive, it is not significant. Therefore, I cannot confirm the third hypothesis.

To test hypothesis two, which predicts that groups that control territory will carry out a

proportionally lower amount of attacks on civilians than groups that do not control territory, I

used a tobit model because my dependent variable is a proportion. The dependent variable is

calculated by dividing the number civilian casualties caused by a group by the total number of

casualties caused. The results of this test are in Table 4.

Table 4. The effect of control of territory on civilian casualties

	(7)
Territorial Control	-0.0002 (.0653)
Constant	0.536 (.032)***
Observations	111
χ^2	0.00
R-square	0.000

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at .001 level. ** indicates significance
at .01 level. * indicates significance at .05 level. + indicates significance at .1 level.

The test did not yield any useful results, as none of the coefficients are significant. Additionally,

the mean proportion for groups that control territory and groups that do not control territory is

very similar. Groups that control territory kill or injure civilians 53.79 percent of the time with

the remainder of their casualties caused being military, government, police or fighters of other

violent non-state actors. Groups that do not control territory kill or injure civilians 53.17 percent

of the time. In this model, targeting preferences are not affected by whether or not a group

controls territory. Because of this, I was unable to determine if groups that control territory are

less likely to target civilians than groups that do not control territory.

Chapter 6

Discussion

The results from the model demonstrate that groups that control territory are more lethal than groups that do not control territory. There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, when groups control territory they have more resources at their disposal and can afford to carry out complex attacks that result in more casualties. Terrorism is often considered to be a weapon of the weak because there are relatively low costs to the perpetrator but high costs to the targeted entity. Groups that are small and weak tend to carry out fewer attacks and attacks that are less complex and easier to thwart, resulting in a lower casualty count. On the other hand, groups that are strong enough to control territory have the financial, equipment, and membership resources to carry out a higher number of attacks and more efficient attacks, resulting in more casualties. Additionally, when groups hold territory they have a safe haven from which they can prepare attacks and protect themselves from any counterattacks. Perhaps most important is the idea that violent non-state actors have greater legitimacy when they hold territory, especially within their territory. They often gain a wide-base of support from the civilians in their territorial holdings, which consists of people who truly believe in their cause as well as others who have been intimidated into supporting the group (Kydd and Walter 2006, 59).

With that being said, violent non-state actors that control territory have less of an incentive to carry out attacks within their territory, because they need a base of support that will not challenge their authority from the inside. Additionally, the inhabitants of the territory likely expect the group to provide resources that a government would normally provide, and the violent

non-state actors are forced to reallocate resources typically devoted to carrying out attacks to providing basic public goods like security and education (Kydd and Walter 2006, 66). Non-state actors that control territory can collect taxes to offset some of these new costs.

Groups might not carry out lethal attacks in their own territory, but many groups do attempt to expand their territory. The resources from within their current holdings support these efforts and allow the violent non-state actors to conduct more effective and lethal attacks in the territory that they want to control. Furthermore, although territorial control provides violent non-state actors with a safe haven, it also presents opponents, like the military or rivals, with a clear target for counterattacks. Because of this, groups that control territory may be involved in more combat in order to stave off these counterattacks, which would increase their lethality.

When discussing the theory behind my hypotheses, I examined the contending theory which asserted that many groups have the goal of territorial control, so once they achieve this goal they might focus on political endeavors rather than carrying out attacks. This assessment might be true for some groups, but the results of this study indicate that, on average, groups that control territory continue to carry out lethal attacks to achieve new goals.

One group that exemplifies this trend is the Taliban. The Taliban are a hardline Islamist group that emerged in 1994, and remained in power in Afghanistan until 2001. As Figure 3 displays, while the Taliban were in power from 1996 to 2001, they carried out a minimal number of attacks. During these years, they ruled Afghanistan and were charged with increasing stability, improving infrastructure and imposing Sharia law. While they quickly quashed opponents, they did not carry out large scale attacks resulting in many casualties. After the American invasion in 2001, the group was overthrown and severely weakened and the incident count remained low until 2005. Between 2005 and 2009, the Taliban regained control of multiple districts, and

started to carry out more attacks. At the beginning of the Obama administration, there was a

temporary surge of American troops, causing the Taliban to withdraw from these regions, and

the number of incidents dipped again. Since 2013, there has been a huge spike in attacks as the

Taliban has started to reclaim territory (Almukhtar and Yourish 2016).

Figure 3. Taliban Incidents, 1994-2015

Source: Global Terrorism Database

The Taliban present an interesting case study, because the group's lethality has fluctuated

over the course of its life. When the Taliban were the government of Afghanistan from 1996 to

2001, they did not carry out many attacks. In this case, they governed and controlled the entire

country. In 2016, experts estimated that the Taliban controlled or contested about 20 percent of

the country as is displayed in Figure 4 (Roggio 2016). However, the number of attacks that the

group carries out and the casualties for which it is responsible continue to increase. Why has

their behavior changed so drastically? One explanation is that the Taliban do not have control of

the entire country, so they continue to carry out lethal attacks with the goal of expanding their

control. Furthermore, while they govern the territories that they control, they are not responsible for providing services to the entire country and can spend more of their resources on attacks. Additionally, today their territory is constantly under attack as Afghan and foreign militaries try to regain control. In response, the Taliban carry out more lethal attacks to defend their territory and to signal to their opponents that attacking their territory is costly.

Figure 4. Taliban Control of Afghanistan, 2016

Sources: *The New York Times* and *The Long War Journal*

I was unable to confirm that groups with a territorial control goal that do not yet control territory will be more lethal than groups that already control territory. Although the coefficient is not significant, the fact that it is positive is interesting and an area for further research. As I

discussed previously, groups that want to control territory or expand the area that they control, will carry out lethal attacks in order to gain control. In the fifth model, I found that territorial control is a significant and positive predictor of lethality. Perhaps one of the reasons why I was not able to confirm that groups that do not control territory but want to are no more lethal than groups that already control territory is because the same motives apply to gaining territory for the first time and to expanding territory. In both cases, groups need to overtake the current holders of territory and must use lethal force to convince the current holders that it is too costly to maintain control of the territory. Whether or not the groups already control territory may be irrelevant.

Another area for future research is whether violent non-state actors tend to target civilians or non-civilians. I was unable to confirm my hypothesis that groups that control territory are less likely to carry out attacks on civilians. My original theory was that once groups control territory, they have a strategic desire to protect and defend that territory, and they need public support in order to succeed. Because of this, non-state actors cannot afford to target civilians. However, the same logic that applies to current territorial control and the goal of controlling territory can apply here. When groups control territory, they may stop attacking civilians in their own territory, but that does not mean that they will not attack civilians in territories that they are attempting to control. A new study could identify the exact areas that violent non-state actors control and plot the locations of their attacks against civilians. It would be really interesting to see if those attacks fall within or outside of the territory that the group controls.

While the focus of this paper is the impact of territorial control on overall lethality, this study had several other interesting findings that are worth discussing. First, the variable that has the largest positive effect on lethality is religious ideology. Groups with a religious ideology are

significantly more lethal than groups with non-religious ideologies. One explanation for this is

that religious groups can easily identify their opponents as people with different beliefs. Because

of this, it is easier and more acceptable to carry out lethal attacks on disbelievers or people with

different religious ideologies. Furthermore, extremist religious groups believe that they answer

to their deity and their deity alone, while groups with ethnic, separatist, rightist or leftist

ideologies have to answer to an earthly audience who can hold them accountable.   Often groups

need the support of civilians, so they cannot afford to carry out lethal attacks on civilians.

Religious organizations are different because they can act in whatever way they believe their

deity wants them to, and they are not constrained by the strategic value of the people they attack.

In addition, my results indicate that groups with rivals are more lethal than groups

without rivals. This confirms the outbidding theory. Violent non-state actors are strategic, and

they need to show the public that they are more powerful than their opponents. One way for a

group to distinguish itself from its rivals is to carry out violent and shocking attacks to gain

attention and improve recruitment. Security is a priority for most people, so they tend to support

the groups that they believe can best protect them or the groups that will kill them if they do not

support.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This study provided evidence that territorial control increases the lethality of violent non-state actors. Specifically, groups in this study that control territory are, on average, responsible for 726 more casualties than groups that do not have control of territory, all else equal. Additionally, groups with religious ideologies, groups with rivals, and groups with an empire or territorial control goal are also more lethal than groups without these characteristics. These findings have many policy implications. Because violent non-state actors that control territory are more lethal than those that do not, one way to minimize casualties from acts of terror is to take away the territory that groups control. This is much easier said than done, but there are several policy approaches that governments can take to minimize the amount of territory in violent non-state actors' control. Two strategies include using military force to target terrorist groups and regain control of their territory and preventing groups from gaining control of territory in the first place by strengthening the states' governance in ungoverned areas. Violent non-state actors can more easily gain control of territory that is ungoverned or under-governed, so I will focus on the second strategy of strengthening states' governance to make it more difficult for violent non-state actors to gain control in the first place.

While the United States currently provides mostly military and security support to countries with ungoverned territory, there are complementary strategies that could contribute to regional stability in the long-term. One way to increase stability in a region is to improve the infrastructure and institutions in that region. The United States could encourage recipient countries to use developmental aid to improve their transportation network and establish a stronger presence in areas that are ungoverned. For example, by improving infrastructure,

mobility in an area could increase and police and judicial officials could more easily reach remote areas that are currently vulnerable to violent non-state actors (Peters and Moroney 2007, 34). Many terrorist organizations use the resources from the land they control to conduct criminal activities and gain income through drugs, diamonds, oil and other extractive resources, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering. The United States and its allies can cut off local sources of income by supplying counterdrug assistance and training local law enforcement. In some countries, engaging in these illicit activities is the only profitable way to make a living, so the United States could support governments by providing them with money for price subsidies for growing legal crops and expanding the legitimate economy and the employment opportunities that accompany it (Peters and Moroney 2007, 39).

Groups that control territory often also provide public goods to civilians when governments cannot, which makes these violent non-state actors more appealing to the general public. Development assistance from the United States and its allies can serve to reduce public support of violent non-state actors by filling the gap and providing goods like public health services, education and social welfare services. Providing public goods can decrease the regional dependence on extremist groups and minimize alienated populations that may be recruited into the groups.

In addition to having several counterterrorism policy implications, this study also raises further research questions. First, are groups that control territory more or less likely to target civilians? I was unable to effectively test this in the study, but it would be interesting to plot exact areas of control and to determine whether violent non-state actors are more or less likely to attack the civilians living in their territory. Furthermore, as the amount of territory that a group controls changes, how does their level of lethality change? For example, if a group loses

territory, how does that impact their lethality? One of the challenges that I had in this study was

finding data, especially on the exact area and amount of territory that a group controls, but with

the proper data this topic could give more insight into counterterrorism policy. Finally, does the

amount of natural resources in a territory affect the number of attacks that a group carries out?

For example, if a territory has an abundance of natural oil and a violent non-state actor is able to

extract and sell that oil, does the group spend that income on carrying out more attacks or does it

focus on improving the governance within its territory?

The goal of this study was to determine what factors make violent non-state actors more

lethal. Counterterrorism policy is constantly changing as global threats evolve, and no single

policy works to combat every non-state actor. However, by identifying a group's features and

comparing it to other violent non-state actors, we can determine counterterrorist methods that

have been successful in the past and adapt them to each unique group. This study determined

that groups that control territory, have a religious ideology, have rivals, and have an empire or

territorial control goal are more lethal than groups without these characteristics. By

strengthening governance in ungoverned areas and preventing groups from gaining control of

territory in the first place, the United States and its allies can potentially weaken violent non-state

actors and decrease the number of casualties caused by acts of terror.

Appendix A

List of Selected Violent Non-State Actors

Group Name	Country	Ideology	Goal	Territorial Control
Abdullah Azzam Brigades	Lebanon	Religious	Empire	No
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	Palestinian Territories	Religious, Separatist	Territorial Change	Yes
Al-Fatah	Palestinian Territories	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya	Egypt	Religious	Empire	No
Al-Nusrah Front	Syria	Religious	Territorial Change	No
Al-Qa'ida	Pakistan	Religious	Empire	No
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula	Yemen	Religious	Empire	Yes
Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb	Algeria	Religious	Regime Change	Yes
Al-Shabaab	Somalia	Religious	Regime Change	Yes
Allied Democratic Forces	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Religious	Regime Change	No
Ansar Al-Dine	Mali	Religious	Regime Change	Yes
Ansar Al-Islam	Iraq	Religious, Separatist	Regime Change	No
Ansar Al-Sharia	Libya	Religious, Separatist	Regime Change	No
Asa'lb Ahl Al-Haqq	Iraq	Religious	Regime Change	No
Azawad National Liberation Movement	Mali	Ethnic, Separatist	Regime Change	Yes
Baloch Liberation Army	Pakistan	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Baloch Liberation Front	Pakistan	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Baloch Republican Army	Pakistan	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Spain	Leftist, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Black Widows	India	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Boko Haram	Nigeria	Religious, Separatist	Regime Change	No

Caucasus Emirate	Russian Federation	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Colonel Karuna Faction	Sri Lanka	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M)	India	Leftist	Territorial Change	No
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist	Nepal	Leftist	Regime Change	No
Continuity Irish Republican Army	Ireland	Religious, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinian Territories	Leftist, Ethnic	Territorial Change	No
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Ethnic	Regime Change	Yes
Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi	Turkey	Leftist	Regime Change	No
Dima Halao Daoga (Dhd)	India	Ethnic, Separatist	Regime Change	No
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	China	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	Indonesia	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	Yes
Free Syrian Army	Syria	Separatist	Regime Change	Yes
Garo National Liberation Army	India	Separatist	Regime Change	No
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front	Turkey	Religious	Regime Change	No
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Palestinian Territories	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	Yes
Haqqani Network	Pakistan	Religious, Separatist	Territorial Change	Yes
Harkatul Jihad-E-Islami	Pakistan	Religious, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Hizb-I-Islami	Afghanistan	Religious	Regime Change	Yes
Hizballah	Lebanon	Religious	Regime Change	Yes
Hizbul Al Islam (Somalia)	Somalia	Religious	Regime Change	No
Hizbul Mujahideen (Hm)	Pakistan	Religious, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Indian Mujahideen	India	Religious	Regime Change	No
Irish Republican Army	Northern Ireland	Separatist	Territorial Change	No

Islamic Courts Union	Somalia	Religious	Regime Change	No
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	Pakistan	Religious	Empire	No
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham	Iraq	Religious	Territorial Change	Yes
Jama'Atul Mujahideen Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Religious	Regime Change	No
Jamiat Ul-Mujahedin	Pakistan	Religious	Territorial Change	No
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	Nepal	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Goit	Nepal	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Jwala Singh	Nepal	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Rajan Mukti	Nepal	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Jemaah Islamiya	Indonesia	Religious	Empire	No
Jundallah	Iran	Religious, Ethnic	Regime Change	No
Justice and Equality Movement	Sudan	Religious, Ethnic	Regime Change	Yes
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	India	Leftist, Ethnic, Separatist	Social Revolution	No
Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (Klnlf)	India	Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Kurdistan Free Life Party	Iraq	Ethnic, Separatist	Regime Change	Yes
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Turkey	Leftist, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	Yes
Lashkar-E-Balochistan	Pakistan	Ethnic, Separatist	Regime Change	No
Lashkar-E-Islam (Pakistan)	Pakistan	Religious, Vigilante	Territorial Change	Yes
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Pakistan	Religious	Territorial Change	No
Lashkar-E-Taiba (Let)	Pakistan	Religious	Territorial Change	No
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Sri Lanka	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Sudan	Religious, Ethnic	Regime Change	No
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (Lvf)	Northern Ireland	Religious	Status Quo	No
Mahdi Army	Iraq	Religious	Policy Change	No

Maoist Communist Center (MCC)	India	Leftist	Territorial Change	No
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	Philippines	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)	Iraq	Leftist, Religious	Regime Change	No
National Council for Defense of Democracy-Forces For The Defense Of Democracy (NCDD-FDD)	Burundi	Ethnic	Policy Change	No
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	India	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)	Democratic Republic of Congo	Ethnic	Regime Change	No
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	India	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)	India	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
New People's Army (NPA)	Philippines	Leftist	Regime Change	Yes
Oglaigh Na Heireann	Northern Ireland	Separatist	Social Revolution	No
Orange Volunteers (Ov)	Northern Ireland	Religious	Status Quo	No
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	Palestinian Territories	Religious, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
People's Committee Against Police Atrocities (Pcpa)	India	Leftist, Ethnic, Vigilante	Policy Change	No
People's Liberation Army (PLA)	India	Separatist	Territorial Change	No
People's Liberation Front Of India	India	Leftist	Policy Change	No
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	India	Separatist	Territorial Change	No
People's War Group (PWG)	India	Leftist	Territorial Change	No
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Palestinian Territories	Leftist, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)	Colombia	Leftist	Territorial Change	Yes
Popular Resistance Committees	Palestinian Territories	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Ranbir Sena	Nepal	Rightist, Religious	Social Revolution	No
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	Northern Ireland	Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Colombia	Leftist	Regime Change	Yes
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance And Sabotage Battalion Of Chechen Martyrs	Russian Federation	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (Rkk)	Thailand	Religious, Ethnic, Separatist	Regime Change	No
Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha (Sjmm)	Nepal	Ethnic	Policy Change	No
Shining Path (SL)	Peru	Leftist	Regime Change	No
Students Islamic Movement of India (Simi)	India	Religious	Empire	No
Sudan Liberation Movement	Sudan	Ethnic	Regime Change	No
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	South Sudan	Ethnic	Policy Change	Yes
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North	Sudan	Unknown	Territorial Change	Yes
Supreme Council For Islamic Revolution In Iraq (Sciri)	Iraq	Religious, separatist	Regime Change	No
Taliban	Afghanistan	Religious	Regime Change	Yes
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)	Pakistan	Religious	Regime Change	No
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan	Religious	Territorial Change	Yes
Terai Army	Nepal	Ethnic, Separatist	Policy Change	No
The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA)	Afghanistan	Unknown		Yes
Ulster Freedom Fighters (Uff)	Northern Ireland	Ethnic	Status Quo	No
Ulster Volunteer Force (Uvf)	Northern Ireland	Ethnic	Status Quo	No
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)	India	Leftist, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	India	Leftist, Ethnic, Separatist	Territorial Change	No
United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC)	Colombia	Rightist	Status Quo	No
Young Communist League	Nepal	Leftist	Policy Change	No

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ACADEMIC VITA
Megan A. Cichocki
megancichocki@gmail.com

EDUCATION

The Pennsylvania State University Schreyer Honors College, University Park, PA
Bachelor of Science in Economics and Bachelor of Arts in International Politics, 2017
Minor: German and International Studies

The Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg, Germany
German language study abroad experience, April 2016-July 2016

EXPERIENCE

Economic Analyst Intern, United States Federal Government   January 2016-April 2016
- Researched and analyzed foreign economic, trade and financial issues that affect US security interests
- Produced written intelligence papers and briefings for policymakers
- Examined microeconomic and macroeconomic issues facing North Africa

Research Assistant, Department of Economics   September 2015-December 2015
Pennsylvania State University College of the Liberal Arts
- Researched empirical trends of monetary policy in the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, and Japan under the supervision of Dr. Russell Chuderewicz
- Compiled graphs and reports finding correlations between interest rates, inflation, and GDP

Tour Guide, Undergraduate Office of Admissions   June 2015-August 2015
- Led tours of the Pennsylvania State University to prospective students and their families
- Directed panels about student life, transitioning to college, and Penn State's business program
- Developed strong presentation and public relations skills

Student Researcher, Center for Global Business Studies   October 2014 – May 2015
Pennsylvania State University Smeal College of Business
- Researched new global trends and their potential impact on businesses with a focus on the geopolitical ramifications of low oil prices and resource management
- Wrote opinion editorials and reports

Wealth Management Intern   Summer 2013 and 2014
Morgan Stanley, Allentown, PA
- Compiled stock portfolio reports for clients
- Coordinated communication between the clients and the financial advisors through phone and email conversations
- Updated the Fraenkel-Cichocki group's website every week to include new essays and insights on market behavior

Intelligence Community Summer Seminar   Summer 2014
- Attended a seminar conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency
- Developed skills in analyzing competing hypotheses, challenging assumptions, and intelligence writing
- Received instruction from CIA, DIA, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency analysts
- Participated in a week long intelligence crisis simulation and applied skills learned to a realistic situation

LEADERSHIP

Member, Presidential Leadership Academy at Penn State 2014 - Present
- Develop critical thinking and leadership skills through classes with the President of the University and the Dean of the Schreyer Honors College
- Work in a team to create a policy paper by researching and proposing a solution to a current crisis in the United States

Director of Correspondence, Order of Knowlton's Rangers August 2015-Present
- Coordinate communication internally and externally for a National Security Honor Society at Penn State
- Prepare national security simulations for society members to practice and improve research, analytical, and briefing skills

Alumni Relations Coordinator, Penn State Economics Association May 2015-December 2015
- Write and design a monthly alumni newsletter to maintain relations with the organization's alumni
- Coordinate an Alumni Mentoring Program to match current Penn State students with alumni who work in their field of interest

Marketing Coordinator, Penn State Economics Association August 2013 – May 2015
- Serve as a representative of the organization to the Penn State community and work to recruit new members through presentations, posters, and videos
- Design brochures and flyers to market the organization
- Maintain a presence on social media to keep current and prospective members informed of events and projects

CAMPUS ACTIVITIES

Penn State Lion Scout 2013 - Present
- Give tours to prospective Penn State students
- Participate in chat rooms with international and domestic prospective students

Springfield Special Interest THON Organization 2013 - Present
- Raise money for the Penn State IFC/Pan-Hellenic dance marathon by canning and participating in alternative fundraisers

Penn State Campus Orchestra August 2013-December 2015
- Play the viola in an ensemble for non-music majors at Penn State
- Participate in concerts and rehearsals

FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS

German—upper intermediate proficiency (attained B2.2 level)

THESIS

Territorial Control and Group Goals: Why Violent Non-State Actors Are Lethal
Supervisor: Dr. James Piazza. Liberal Arts Research Professor of Political Science