ABSTRACT

The Northeast has been a Democratic stronghold over the past sixty years, yet it is also a region that has many ideologically moderate Republicans who have traditionally voted for more moderate Republican Congressional representatives. Despite the region’s Democratic trend there are a few congressional districts that remained solidly Republican into the 1990s and 2000s. However, even these Republican incumbents eventually lost their seats to the Democratic Party. I examine those four districts specifically and ask whether or not a recent increase of conservatism in the Republican Party contributed to these once solid, moderate Republican districts finally becoming Democratic. I hypothesize that the Republican conservative shift did not please some of the more moderate constituents of these districts who in turn voted their Republican representatives out of office. I use ticket-splitting as an indicator of partisan change and all the districts had more Republican ticket-splitting than the national average. Once the Republican congressmen had lost their seats, the ticket-splitting was less significant, indicating that voters who had previously split their Republican tickets had permanently left the Party. I also used an indication of ideology to see if the representatives had become more liberal compared to the rest of the Congress and compared to the national Republican Party. This would have indicated that the representatives were attempting to balance the preferences of their districts and the preferences of the party. I use DW-NOMINATE scores as a measure of relative ideological placement. To my surprise, the scores for the representative remained stagnant or became more conservative. These findings address the hypothesis and are perhaps even more significant because it provides stronger evidence to explain why the representatives were voted out of office. They did not adhere to moderate district preferences, and voted too much with the increasingly conservative Party.
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Introduction

The 2008 congressional elections were difficult for Republicans nationwide but one of the most contentious and important races was that of incumbent Christopher Shays in Connecticut’s 4th District. After a difficult campaign, the election results poured in and Shays had been defeated by Democrat Jim Hines after twenty-one years in the House (CBS News 2008). This election would have been simply another instance of an embedded Republican incumbent finally succumbing to long time opposition pressures except for the fact that his district was in the Northeast.

Shays was one of the last Republican House of Representatives members left in the entire region, save a few in New York State. Towards the end of his campaign, he even referred to himself as an “endangered species” in reference to the fact that he was one of the very few remaining Republicans in the Northeast (Ebbert 2008). The failed re-election campaign of Shays raises many questions about the Northeast and its evolution away from the Republican Party.

According to realignment and dealignment theorists, the Northeast has steadily become less and less congressionally Republican since the 1950s (Hadley and Howell 1979; Brewer, Mariani and Stonecash 2002) but a few Republican districts have continued to endure over the years. However, since the 1994 election, the Republican districts that had remained through the Democratic transition (such as Shays’) have all but disappeared.

As these recent changes have occurred in Republican congressional districts in the Northeast, there have also been changes in the composition and ideology of the Republican Party as a whole. Beginning with President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s the Party has become more conservative and social issues oriented. These recent changes culminated in the 1994 and 1996 elections when the Party took over Congress under campaign promises based on the “Contract
with America.” Overall the composition and goals of the party have changed which has caused an increase in conservative members (Abramowitz and Saunders 2002; Keeter 2006a; Keeter 2006b) and internal Party fractionalization (McAdams 2009).

Has this increased conservatism and fractionalization of the Republican Party on a national level led the remaining ‘Yankee Republicans’ in the Northeast who are typically social moderates and fiscal conservatives (Ebbert 2008) to finally turn away from the Party? Have feelings of disenfranchisement and disconnect caused these more moderate Northeast votes to vote their Republican representatives out of office? These are the main questions that must be addressed, and the questions I will deal with in the following thesis.
Literature Review

The Evolution of the Republican Party

Abramowitz and Saunders (2002) evaluate how the Republican Party has experienced significant changes in recent years. They show that the Republican Congressional takeover in 1994 and 1996 was a realignment signified by changes in the base constituencies of the Democratic and Republican parties. They also argue that because the parties became more polarized in the 1980s and 1990s that the electorate could better classify them into one party or another. They claim that the Democratic Party has lost voters because far fewer voters identify with the Party as they did in previous decades. On the other hand, Republicans have gained a significant amount of voters, most of whom are conservative and have conservative policy and issue favoritism. Abramowitz and Saunders (2002) do make sure to note that Republicans have made few gains among Northern whites, but overall whites who are college educated and have higher income levels have constituted Republican gains.

It is important to evaluate how the Republican Party has evolved to be more conservative in recent years, especially because of an increase in religious constituents. Christian Conservatives have become an important and influential group in the Party (Green et al. 1996; Layman 1997; Wilcox and Larson 2006). Keeter provides statistical evidence for this evolution. He shows that Evangelical Christians compose 22% of the general population, and 39% of the Republican Party (Keeter 2006b). In more recent history, evangelical Christians have been steadily aligning themselves with Republicans. According to Keeter with the Pew Research Center, “…from 1999 to 2004, the number of evangelicals identifying themselves as Republicans grew dramatically, rising from 39% in 1999 to 47% in 2001 and peaking at 49% in
2004 and 2005” (2006a). The speed of this alignment is astonishing and almost unheard of in American politics. It is also an alignment that has been growing for several decades.

Knuckey (1999) provides a definition of evangelical Christians and their associations with the Republican Party. Knuckey looks at “religious conservatives” as, “those conservative Republicans for whom religion is salient in their lives” (487). Knuckey also describes four issues of importance to Republican evangelical Christians; social issues, social welfare, race, and foreign policy (1999). The group is overwhelmingly conservative on all of these issues, and for the most part their issue beliefs are an important aspect in defining the movement.

Bolce and Maio show contextually how the Republican Party has recently become more conservative and has associated itself with conservative values and beliefs. They used the American National Election Survey (1999) to look at the size and intensity of fundamentalist Christian public dislike. They find in the survey that there is significant antagonism towards fundamentalists. They support the explanation that the public views evangelical Christians as being in the middle of controversial social conflicts, as well as a group who perpetuates unpopular concepts such as anti-homosexuality and anti-feminism.

Bolce and Maio (1999) also show using American National Election Survey results that there is an overwhelming association the public sees between Christian evangelicals and the Republican Party. This connection is potentially damaging based upon the general dislike and antagonism felt towards evangelicals. “At the mass level…among significant segments of the public today, Christian Fundamentalists are disliked for religious (i.e. cultural) as well as political reasons” (Bolce and Maio 1999, 49).

Generally speaking, the two largest negative effects of Evangelicals on the Republicans are internal party disagreement, fractionalization, and a fear (or reality) of alienation of moderate
and independent voters which McAdams (2009) addresses. According to McAdams (2009) the party has become more socially conservative due to Christian Right pressure. McAdams claims that some scholars view the consequences of this as pushing moderates and Independents away from the party, and increasing party divisions. She argues that the Christian Right is even potentially pushing away previously devoted members of the Republican Party. Knuckey’s (1999) previous research supports these claims and says that if the Republican Party chooses to support issues that are of importance to religious conservatives than it will alienate Independents, Democrats, and other members of the party.

McCarthy, Poole and Rosenthal (2003) evaluate the increases of income inequality in the United States since the 1970s and its relationship to partisanship. They find that increases in political polarization of elites in Congress moves systematically with the increases of income inequality nationwide. They analyzed partisanship and its relation to income level and found that in the 1950s and 1960s, there was virtually no link between the two. However in the 1990s, voters in the highest income levels were more than two times as likely to vote for a Republican as those voters in with the lowest income levels (2003). They showed that relative income was statistically significant factor in Republican partisanship. They also found that high education levels tying a voter to the Republican Party have leveled out, but are still significant. Overall, they concluded that income has become much more significant now, than in the 1950s, and that it trumps other demographics. It is important to note that they have witnessed a decrease in income based partisan voting in the North as of very recent years (2003).
The Evolution of Partisanship in the Northeast:

Hadley and Howell (1979) analyze how the Northeast has evolved since the middle of the twentieth century and how it has dealigned from the Republican Party since the 1960s. Their indicators of partisan change are an increase in political Independents, and split-ticket voting. They find that the South and the Northeast has significant increases in the number of Independents compared to other regions by 1976, and increases in split-ticket voting from 1952 to 1972 (1979).

When Hadley and Howell (1979) examine the phenomenon in the Northeast more closely, they find that levels of straight-ticket Democratic voting have remained stable while straight-ticket Republican voting has decreased substantially. An important finding is that in the Northeast, the Republican coalition of high-income, college educated, white young professionals were exactly the groups moving away from the Party, signifying a loss of base support. They also show evidence that there was a decline in straight-ticket Republican voting among those voters who were considered liberals or held liberal positions in regards to certain policy issues. The authors expect these trends to continue occurring.

Miller (1991) somewhat contradicts the findings of Hadley and Howell (1979). Miller shows that there was significant stability demonstrated by white men and women and their partisanship in the North for 30 years. This held true for both Democrats and Republicans. He statistically shows that Northern Republicans have supported their Party’s Presidential choice for 90% of the time (1952-1988). It is important to note that Miller performed his evaluation solely on presidential vote choice, which often times has to do with character and personal persona more than just party affiliation. Therefore he also does not take into account split-ticket voting as a trigger for regional partisan shifts as did Hadley and Howell (1979).
Rohde (1991) performs an extensive analysis of the House and how the parties have changed and the member’s partisanship has changed. Although his book is encompassing, he does address several factors of importance to this thesis. He explains how moderate and liberals are a Republican faction regionally located in the Northeast. They are also a group who conflict with the older conservatives and even more so the newer conservatives of the Party who emerged in the late 1970s (1991, 122-124). These newer conservatives were first organized and led by Newt Gingrich who later (post-publication) became the Speaker of the House after the Republican Revolution in 1994. Rohde explains (1991) that in regard to the moderate and liberal Republicans in the Northeast, from the 1960s to 1980s, their numbers have decreased and they have constituted a smaller and smaller portion of the Republican House minority. In the 1950s they made up over \( \frac{1}{3} \) of the House Republicans, and by the 1980s they made up less than \( \frac{1}{4} \) of House Republicans (1991, 124).

Rohde (1991) goes further to explain that within this Republican faction, there always remained more loyalists (or supporters) than opponents during party votes. This shows a stable and enduring level of support for the party by these moderate Northeast Republicans. He then makes an important point of comparison between these Republicans and Southern Democrats. He explains that Northeast Republican reliability and faithfulness persisted much more than Southern Democrat loyalty to their respective parties. However, the Democrats on a whole eventually grew more homogeneous after the mid-1970s when the unhappy Southern Democrats left the party altogether, but the Republicans have not (1991). If anything they have become more fractionalized.

Brewer, Mariani and Stonecash (2002) research partisanship in the Northeast as well. They first discuss, as other authors have, how party polarization has increased in recent decades
and Republicans have become more conservative and Democrats more liberal. They show that Democrats have won more and more House seats in the North from the 1950s to the early 1990s moving from 35% to 60% (2002, 425 & 426). They look at how increasing numbers of Democrats in the Northeast has contributed to this polarization, specifically in the House of Representatives. They show that as Democrats left the South in the mid-twentieth century, Democrats in the North became more predominant and important. They also show that the North has diminished significantly as a base for the Republicans.

The authors (2002) claim that the Democrats have made gains in the North in districts that are urban, less affluent, and have more minority constituents (Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002, 438). This is the case because income inequality has become more and more pronounced throughout the decades and population minorities have increased. With all of this information, they conclude that Democrats generally have a better chance of winning in House districts that are non-white, urban and less affluent (Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002, 432). They found evidence to support their hypothesis in northern districts, and claim that those districts are now core districts for the Democratic Party. They also show that the number of these core districts, in proportion to other northern districts, has increased. In contrast, my thesis will attempt to evaluate where the Republicans have had losses in the North. Also, a problem with their analysis is that they use ADA scores from 1970 to 1994 which are based on interest group ratings and do not always reliably and accurately depict a congressman’s ideology.

Carmines and Stanley (1991) add to the sub-literature and argue that Northern Whites as a constituency, from 1972 to 1988 have moved away from the Democratic Party and towards the Republican Party. They show that the number of Northern White Republicans has increased in the years specified. They also show that education and income levels of those Republican
constituents have increased. After analyzing other demographic groups they find that overall partisan change in the Northeast among whites has meant increases for the Republicans and losses for the Democrats (1991).

Abramowitz and Knotts (2006) more recent research explains the findings of Carmines and Stanley (1991). They show that conservative Northern whites were already Republicans before Reagan but during the Reagan years (1980-1988), moderate and liberal Northern Whites also became Republican identifiers. This shows from where the increase in Republicans that Carmines and Stanley (1991) discuss originated from. Abramowitz and Knotts (2006) then go on to demonstrate that post-Reagan (1988-2000) these moderate and liberal Northern Republican whites returned to the Democratic Party. They claim this movement was in response to the increase in Republican Southern conservative whites in the party leadership and the party composition. The above discussion only matters if the voters pay attention to what members are doing and hold them accountable for their decisions and actions in Congress.

The Importance of Voter Preferences

Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan (2002) perform an in-depth analysis of the importance of elected officials remaining accountable to their voters. They show that the more an incumbent votes with his or her party the less is his or her likelihood of reelection. They also show that the more an incumbent votes with the poles of his or her party the more their vote share decreases (2002). Johannes and McAdams (1981) evaluate the incumbency advantage, what factors contribute to it, and they question why the incumbency advantage is different in different elections. They claim that case work and “home style” (Johannes and McAdams 1981, 538) i.e. doing work and bringing back assets to the district, do not really increase the incumbency
advantage. Instead, incumbents are insulated more so by active participation in Washington, and an avid protection and representation of their district’s preferences and interests. Johannes and McAdams (1981) also found that incumbents who do not adhere to district preferences are in danger because many constituents often vote based on policy. In essence, they argue that voters are aware and do pay attention (1981).
Theory and Hypothesis

The literature describes two phenomena. One is of the partisan change that has occurred in the Northeast, and the other is of the overall conservative swing of the Republican Party. In regards to the first, some scholars believe it is apparent that the Northeast has been voting increasingly Democratic since the 1960s (Hadley and Howell 1979; Rohde 1991; Brewer, Mariani and Stonecash 2002). However, other scholars disagree about the movement away from the Republican Party (Carmines and Stanley 1991; Miller 1991). There are apparent disagreements in the literature, but no one can contest the fact that there are virtually no congressional Republicans left in the Northeast, signaling a definite partisan change.

We see by 2008, the culmination of this congressional trend in the North with Democrats winning virtually every House district. The problem is that most of the literature addresses the Northeast’s development before the 1990s. We are missing literature that could help to clarify how and why the Democratic evolution has finalized and the Republicans have become virtually extinct. For example, Rohde (1991) explains how moderates in the Northeast have declined in numbers but have not necessarily altered their loyalties away from the Republican Party. Their lack of deflection suggests that there remained some common ground between the moderates and the conservatives of the party. So what happened? Did new and growing Republican conservative pressures finally culminate and increase to push the moderate voters away from the Party as Abramowitz and Knotts (2006) claim? This is a question that Rohde (1991) was not able to address because his analysis was performed late in the 1980s. Significant changes have occurred in the past two decades that I will address.

For instance, during the 1990s and 2000s, we have witnessed party polarization in Congress at its highest. Contributing to this has been the increased conservatism of the
Republican Party (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003). During the same time period, the congressional districts in the Northeast that had endured as Republican through the mid to late twentieth century and past the 1994 and 1996 congressional takeover have recently and finally turned Democratic. In order to perform an up to date analysis and fill in information, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the districts that remained in Republican congressional control into the 1990s but then turned Democratic. I want to see how the Republican voters of those districts have changed their votes, specifically I theorize, in response to Republican Party conservatism.

The second visible trend is the fact that the Republican base has become more conservative (Abramowitz and Saunders 2002). There is a significant amount of literature about how social conservatism has been a significant factor in the evolution of the Party (McAdams 2009; Bolce and Maio 1999). Combining the phenomenon of the Democratic Northeast and the phenomenon of the recent changes in Republican Party composition, one must question whether the two are connected. Especially, during the 1990s and 2000s, this was a defining time in terms of solidifying the conservative changes in the Republican Party. During the same time period the last Northeast Republicans in the House of Representatives lost their seats. Were these Republican representatives ousted because they fell out of touch with their constituents while adhering to a more conservative national party?

**Theory**

I theorize that the importance of voter preferences is the reason that these districts in the Northeast have finally turned Democratic and the Republican incumbents lost re-election. This is because the representatives were not following or staying with the preferences of their
constituents. As the Republican Party became more conservative, I theorize that the Republican representatives from these districts have remained too close to the party and have lost their seats because of it. The Republican congressmen stopped representing the moderate sentiments of their districts and therefore were ousted by their constituents who were unhappy and uncomfortable with the overall conservatism of their representatives and the party. The reason the Republican House districts endured so long in the North is because the constituents were Republican moderates and liberals who came in during the Reagan years (Abramowitz and Knotts 2006) who have felt pressure from the recent influx of social conservatives into the party (McAdams 2009).

**Hypothesis**

I hypothesize that because these moderate and liberal Republicans have recently become disconnected from the party due to its increasing conservatism they have voted out their Republican representatives. If this trend is occurring then we should see some voters in these specific districts splitting their votes between the parties instead of voting a straight-line Republican Party ticket (Hadley and Howell 1979). This would show that some Republican voters are attempting to sort themselves out and react to party changes while still voting for their Republican incumbent congressional members. These voters have realized that the party has grown more conservative.

It is also important to examine how the representatives have evolved in regards to ideology. District preferences are very important when it comes to reelection (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002) and representatives are primarily concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974). If the members are attempting to balance district preferences with party preferences I
hypothesize that we should see member ideology becoming more liberal as time passes. Their constituents will want them to remain more moderate while the Party will want them to vote along more conservative Party lines. This liberal evolution will represent the struggle between party and the constituents.

Overall, if these trends are occurring they could signify bigger problems for the Republicans. Because of the increased conservatism of the party, more and more moderates who traditionally comprise an important base constituency of the Republican Party could feel edged out or disconnected. The Northeast is a prime example of this occurrence.
Data and Methodology

In order to examine the hypotheses, I evaluate New Hampshire’s 1st district, Connecticut’s 4th District, New York’s 4th District, and New York’s 19th District. These districts have all been Republican before the 1994 midterm takeover, and turned Democratic after. One must ask if the Republican constituents have changed their votes because of Republican Party conservatism, and because their representatives were voting too much with the conservative party. There are a few ways to test the hypothesis.

First, I examine congressional and presidential vote shares in each district. If the constituents are moving away from the party we should see an increase in ticket-splitting. Another trend to look for that will support the hypothesis is to examine the representatives’ behavior in relation to the rest of the Party. My hypothesis is that their constituents will want them to remain more moderate while the Party will want them to vote along more conservative Party lines. I will use DW-NOMINATE (Joyce et al. 2010) scores to evaluate the members’ behavior. DW-NOMINATE measures a member’s behavior based on their roll call votes. The scores are a convenient way to approximate the members’ relative ideological point in Congress. DW-NOMINATE scores are based on two dimensions but they are operational in one dimension. The scores range from +1.0 to -1.0, +1.0 corresponds to the most conservative member and -1.0 corresponds to the most liberal member (Joyce et al, 2010). If this trend is occurring, the members’ scores should become more liberal as time passes over the years. This would show that the members are moving and voting in an attempt to balance their constituent’s preferences with more conservative party preferences.
District Descriptions

Connecticut’s 4th District

Connecticut’s 4th district is in the Southwest corner of the State. According to Barone and Cohen (2009) a prominent feature of Connecticut’s 4th district is its connection to New York City. Wealthy commuters travel into the city because of the district’s close proximity. Many businesses and corporations have also moved out of New York to the district to avoid New York expenses and taxes. Thanks to the influx of wealthy commuters and executives, much of the geographic area has grown in terms of income since the 1950s and it is one of the most affluent districts in the country.

Connecticut maintained all congressional seats in 1990, but in 2000 it lost a district and in essence merged the 5th and 6th districts together. At this point in time, the 4th district was considered one of the Republican strongholds and remained relatively untouched, as described in the New York Times article on December 2, 2001. The 4th district did not lose any residents but gained roughly 100,000 residents from the old 5th district. With the new influx of roughly 100,000 people, the Republicans made gains (Connecticut State Data Center 2002).

Based on information from the Connecticut State Data Center (2002), Connecticut’s 4th district is 71% White, 13% Hispanic, 11% African American, and 2% Asian. Although the numbers are not significantly different, the 4th district has the largest Hispanic population and the smallest white population of any other district; however that population percentage changed slightly with a large influx of Whites from the 2000 redistricting.

In terms of other demographic characteristics, the 4th district varies significantly from the rest of the Connecticut. Once again based on the Connecticut State Data Center (2002) it is the only district in the state that has significant population segments with median and mean
household incomes above $120,000 and $150,000. Majorities of Greenwich, New Canaan, Wilton, Weston, Easton, Darien, Westport and parts of Fairfield all have mean household incomes over $150,000. Among those same population segments, over 30% to 40% of the population has bachelor degrees. Amidst the wealth and education of the 4th district there are areas of poverty. For example, in the urban areas of Bridgeport, Stamford, and Norwalk the mean and median household incomes are well below $50,000 and in most of Bridgeport are even below $30,000. In line with those numbers is the fact that in the same urban cities less than 9% of the population holds bachelor degrees.

The congressional history of Connecticut’s 4th district was mixed for the first half of the 20th century, but grew solidly Republican in the second half. This began with Republican Lowell Weicker Jr. from 1969 to 1971, followed by Republican Stewart McKinney who served from 1971 to 1987 until he died (Biographical Directory of the Untied States Congress. 1774-Present). In 1987, Republican Christopher Shays won the seat in a special election, and won again in 1988 to solidify his place in the district. When first elected, Shays was a Republican with one of the most liberal voting records in the House (Barone and Cohen 1989). Connecticut’s 4th congressional district would remain in his control for the next twenty years.

In the 2008 congressional election, Shays was finally defeated by Democrat Jim Himes. It was a close election, with Himes receiving 51% (158,475) of the vote and Shays receiving 48% (146,854) (Barone and Cohen 2009). Himes reportedly made most of his gains in Bridgeport which is a large urban, industrial city that has an overwhelming amount of Democratic support. His victory in Bridgeport, as well as the entire district, was bolstered by Presidential candidate Barak Obama’s popularity (WestportNow.com 2008). So was it merely
and increase in voter turnout for the Democrats or were there changes on the Republican side as well?

According to Barone and Cohen (1995) the district began to show signs of pressure from the conservative and religious right of the Republican Party however, in 1992 and 1994 Shays tried to maintain a more liberal voting record compared to other Republicans in the House. In 1994 and 1995 he asserted that he was part of the Republican majority control of Congress but he was careful to try to maintain his individual identity. He was also a supporter of Newt Gingrich who grew to be a controversial conservative (Barone and Cohen 1997). By 1998 he was moving farther and farther away from his fellow Republicans in the House and, realizing the damages that his support for Gingrich had caused, grew to oppose him on many initiatives (1999).

**New Hampshire’s 1st District**

The 1st district in New Hampshire is one of two districts in the state, and makes up the Eastern half of the state. According to Barone and Cohen (1991), the district has prospered tremendously since the 1950s. A prominent feature of the district (and the state) is that there are very few taxes. Most of the population is anti-tax and the growth of the district has been in part by an influx of people avoiding taxes in other Northeast states. Because of the increase in population and jobs, New Hampshire’s 1st has thrived and flourished economically in the latter half of the 20th century and parts have grown very affluent. The district is more Republican than the 2nd district and is over 93% white with a solid mixture of urban and rural areas. Over 90% of the population has high school degrees, 32% have college degrees and 11% have graduate degrees. The most recent data on median income has it at $59,829 (Barone and Cohen 2009).
Sentiments of fiscal conservatism describe most of the 1st district’s inhabitants, and they have been voting primarily for Republicans since the 1940s (Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. 1774-Present).

Republican Robert C. Smith was elected in 1984 and represented the district until 1990. He was followed by Republican Bill Zeliff who held the seat from 1990 to 1996 and John Sununu from 1996 to 2002. The last Republican to represent New Hampshire’s 1st was Jeb Bradley from 2002 to 2006 when he was defeated by a Democrat (Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. 1774-Present).

Robert C. Smith had an interesting political history. Like most of his House successors he is fiscally conservative, but he is also socially conservative and entered national politics as a strong supporter of former president Ronald Reagan. He served as both a House member for the 1st district and a New Hampshire Senator but did not like the way the Republican Party had evolved away from what he believed were its basic principles. In 1999 he criticized the Party and left it, becoming an Independent for a few months before becoming Republican once more. This move permanently damaged his relationship with Republican leaders and hurt his Senatorial campaign (Portsmouth Herald 1999; Belluck 2002).

Bill Zeliff represented the district after Smith and was fiscally and socially conservative, however when it came to abortion he was pro-choice (Barone and Cohen 1995). He was well known for being very conservative when it came to taxes and excess government spending (John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs at Ashland University 1994). John Sununu was a fiscal conservative and upheld his views with a conservative voting record. He ran for the seat in 1996 when Bill Zeliff ran for governor, and he resigned from his seat in 2002 to run for the Senate (Barone and Cohen 2001). Jeb Bradley was different from his predecessors and considered more
of a moderate. He was pro-environment and pro-choice and was ultimately classified as a fiscal conservative and social moderate (Darman 2002). He lost his 2006 re-election campaign to Democrat Carol Shea-Porter.

New York’s 19th District

Redistricting in New York has been significant after every census. New York’s current 19th district composes a geographic area that was previously the 21st district, 25th district, and the 28th district. For the most part the geographic area has remained the same but the district numbers have changed. The same representative, Republican Hamilton Fish, Jr. represented this district from 1969 to 1995. He was succeeded by Republican Sue W. Kelly from 1995 to 2007 when she lost the seat to a Democrat (Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774-Present). The district consists of the area north of Manhattan in the lower part of the Hudson River Valley. A section of it actually borders Connecticut’s 4th district. The district is home to a wealthy upper class who have inhabited the area historically and newer residents who are middle to high income families seeking an alternative to New York City (Barone and Cohen 2003; 1999). The district is relatively diverse catering to multiple interests including corporations, agriculture, and military due to the United States Military Academy at West Point (Office of History and Preservation, Office of the Clerk 2007). According to the most recent data, the district has a median income of $79,800. In regards to education levels, 89.7% of the residents have high school degrees, 35.1% have college degrees, and 15.4% have graduate degrees (Barone and Cohen 2009).

Hamilton Fish, Jr. represented the district from 1969 to 1995 and was part of a political dynasty. His father was the representative for the same geographic area that is currently New
York’s 19th from 1920 to 1944 (Barone and Cohen 1993). Due to his longevity in Congress, he became a very high ranking Republican and was a member of the House Judiciary Committee. He was consistently more liberal than the rest of his party but as a respected senior member he was able to use his moderate stances to compromise between the parties. He was generally more conservative on economic issues and more liberal on cultural and social issues (Barone and Cohen 1993). When he retired in 1994 Sue W. Kelly won his open seat.

Republican Sue W. Kelly had a moderate voting record. For the most part she voted pro-choice, and was concerned with women’s’ issues and health (Barone and Cohen 2003; Office of History and Preservation, Office of the Clerk 2007). She had voted against the Republicans on important issues such as stem cell research and the environment, which put her in contention with many members of her own Party (Sharfenberg 2006; Barone and Cohen 1999). During her time in Congress she was inconsistent with some of her and votes and received pressure from both the right and the left. More than once she was challenged in primaries by more conservative Republicans, (Barone and Cohen 2001) but managed to hold on to the district because of her more moderate views until she was defeated in 2007 in the general election.

New York’s 4th District

New York’s 4th District has also been impacted significantly by redistricting. During the second half of the 20th century, much of what is present day district 4 was in district 5 but for the most part has consisted of the southern portion of Nassau County. In the 1980s, the 5th district was on the eastern side of the county and the 4th district was on the west (Barone and Cohen 1987). It is difficult to map exactly what representatives were elected in the area’s history because redistricting played such a significant role, but from the 1970’s to the 1990s both
districts have encompassed the same geographical area and both have been Republican
strongholds. For the purposes of this thesis the geographic and demographic area of study will
be the southern portion of Nassau County. Currently, the median income is $80,700. 86.6% of
the constituents have high school degrees, 35.5% have college degrees and 14.7% have graduate
degrees. The district has increased in diversity over the 1990s and 2000s and is 56.1% white,
18.9% black and 17.1% Hispanic (Barone and Cohen 2009).

The current 4\textsuperscript{th} district is primarily a suburban area. It is close in vicinity to the city and
is composed of middle to upper class families (Barone and Cohen 1993-2009). Raymond
McGrath was the Republican representative for the area from the 1980s to 1992 when he retired
and was followed by Republican David Levy (Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress 1774-Present). McGrath was a powerful and influential congressman who was on the
Ways and Means committee. He was considered a moderate voter who was a proponent of
lower taxes and the individual needs of his state. Also, the redistricting after the 1990 census
was expected to increase his Republican constituency (Barone and Cohen 1993; Gruson 1992).

The politics of the 4\textsuperscript{th} district during the 1990s were volatile. Levy only served for one
term because in the 1994 primaries he was ousted by Republican Dan Frisa. He entered congress
during the 1994 Republican takeover and even though he was new he became a member of the
Commerce Committee (Barone and Cohen 1995). Despite his success he only served one term
as well and was ousted in 1996 by Democrat Carolyn McCarthy. McCarthy was initially a
Republican, and she considered running against Frisa in the primary but was instead recruited by
the Democratic Party (Barone and Cohen 1997). She was a unique candidate in the District as a
strong advocate for gun control after her husband was killed and her son injured in the Long
Island Railroad Massacre (Barone and Cohen 1997; Barry 1997). She is also a prime example of a registered Republican evolving to support Democratic causes and issues.
Split-Ticket Voting Analysis

An indication of partisan change is an increase in split-ticket voting compared to straight-ticket voting (Hadley and Howell 1979). Using voter statistics from Barone and Cohen’s *Almanac of American Politics* (1987-2009) I compared the Republican candidate vote shares for each district, for the House candidate and Presidential candidate. Figure 1 displays the vote percentages for Connecticut’s 4th district, Figure 2 displays the vote percentages for New York’s 19th district, Figure 3 displays the vote percentages for New Hampshire’s 1st district, Figure 4 displays the vote percentages for New York’s 4th district, and Figure 5 displays the vote percentages nationally to be used as a comparison.

Figure 1: Connecticut’s 4th district

Note: In the 1996 election, there was a third party candidate, Joseph DioGuardio who was a conservative who challenged Kelly in the primary election and ran under the Right to Life Party in the general election. Kelly received 46% of the vote and DioGuardio received 12% in the general. Combining their vote percentages together would assume the total for Republican voters of 58% (Greene 1996).


Figure 4: New York’s 4\textsuperscript{th} district


Figure 5: National Vote Shares-Republican Congressional vote averages compared to Republican Presidential vote averages

By analyzing the vote percentage trends between the districts some useful observations can be made. First, although the data is not ideal, there is definitely a distinctive trend of Republican ticket-splitting. This is especially evident during the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections when voters split their tickets between the presidential candidate, the third party presidential candidate (Ross Perot) and the congressional candidate. Abortion and health care were serious issues in the 1992 election and deflected many Republicans away from George Bush (Abramowitz 1992; Alvarez and Nagler 1995). Overall, there is more ticket-splitting in the individual districts than there is nationwide when compared to the national vote percentages.

There was some national ticket-splitting during the 1992 and 1996 elections but it is not as substantial as it is in the Northeast districts in this study. This is true for all of the districts during the 1992 election and three districts that voted for a Republican House member (NY’s 4th, CT’s 4th and NH’s 1st) in the 1996 election. Another general trend is that ticket-splitting decreased once the Republican congressional candidates lost their relative elections and their vote percentages fell below 50%. This indicates that some voters who previously supported Republican candidates are no longer doing so and their partisan shift away from the Republican Party may have solidified.

It is valuable to examine each graph individually and analyze each in terms of the district it represents. In Figure 1, Connecticut’s 4th district, there is a steady, decreasing vote percentage for the Republican incumbent Christopher Shays, the representative in the district throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s until he lost in 2008. In Figure 2, New York’s 19th district, the Republican congressman Sue Kelly lost re-election in 2006. There is a trend of ticket-splitting in the district until the 2008 election when the Republican congressional vote and presidential vote percentages both decreased below 50% and grew closer together, showing that voters who were previously
splitting their tickets are no longer voting for Republicans at all. Figure 3, New Hampshire’s 1st district, follows a very similar voting trend as New York’s 19th district. There is a similar trend of ticket-splitting until the 2008 election when both the presidential and congressional vote percentages fell below 50% and grew nearly equal to each other. In this district the Republican congressman also lost re-election in 2006 and the 2008 vote percentages reflect the loss as well as the decrease in ticket-splitting.

Figure 4, New York’s 4th district, is the most interesting district to analyze because the Republican congressman lost re-election in 1996, ten years earlier than the other districts. The district has a significant amount of split-ticket voting in 1988 and the early 1990s, but once the district turns congressionally Democratic in 1996, the following elections show very little split-ticket voting and Republican vote percentages below 50%. This district experienced partisan change earlier than the other districts and the graph displays trends that we would expect to see in the other districts for future elections.

Figure 5 represents the national vote percentages per election and compares the congressional Republican vote average to the Republican Presidential vote. This graph provides a national comparison of ticket-splitting. As expected, the national ticket-splitting is less than the splitting in the districts, especially during the elections in the 1990s as an indication that district constituents were in the process of sorting themselves out.
DW-NOMINATE Score Analysis

The DW-NOMINATE scores will demonstrate the representatives’ struggle between their constituents and the Republican Party. The scores will provide a measure of member ideology that can be compared between Congresses of the same chamber over time\(^1\), in this instance the House of Representatives. I examined the DW-NOMINATE scores from the 101\(^{st}\) Congress (in 1989) to the 110\(^{th}\) Congress (2007) for the representatives from each district. What is interesting is that the results are not what were predicted in the hypothesis but they are perhaps even more significant. When in office, the Republican representatives from each of the districts actually became more conservative as time progressed. They did not grow more liberal which would show a responsiveness of moderate district preferences. In actuality, their ideology remained constant or became more conservative which would show a lack of responsiveness by the representatives of their district’s preferences.

For example, in the 101\(^{st}\) Congress Christopher Shays from Connecticut’s 4\(^{th}\) district had a DW-NOMINATE score of .101. He progressively became more conservative in each Congress and by the 110\(^{th}\) Congress he had a DW-NOMINATE score of .334. In New York’s 19\(^{th}\) district, Sue W. Kelly was the Republican incumbent elected in 1994. During her first Congress her DW-NOMINATE score was .288 and she also became more conservative in each Congress and by the 109\(^{th}\) Congress had a DW-NOMINATE score of .385. The 109\(^{th}\) Congress was her last Congress because she lost her re-election campaign in 2006. New Hampshire’s 1\(^{st}\) District had three different Republican congressmen in the 1990’s and 2000’s. Even these different representatives maintained conservative DW-NOMINATE scores. Robert C. Smith, the representative during the 101\(^{st}\) Congress had a score of .54, and Bill Zeliff maintained a score

\(^{1}\) Because each DW-NOMINATE score is based on the placement of every member as the membership changes it is sometimes problematic. However, in this exploratory analysis the scores provide a sense of any individual movement over time.
of .463 during his time in Congress form the 102\textsuperscript{nd} to the 104\textsuperscript{th}. John Sununu actually was more conservative than his predecessors and during his first Congress (105\textsuperscript{th}) had a score of .641 that he maintained through the 106\textsuperscript{th} and 107\textsuperscript{th} Congresses until Republican Jeb Bradley took over his empty seat. Bradley was not as conservative as Sununu but during his first Congress (108\textsuperscript{th}) he had a score of .517 which only became slightly more liberal during the 109\textsuperscript{th} Congress.

In comparison, for New York’s 4\textsuperscript{th} district which turned Democratic in the 1996 election, the Democratic representative Caroline McCarthy maintained a consistent DW-NOMINATE score that is considered moderately liberal. In her first Congress (105\textsuperscript{th}) she had a score of -.244 and in the 110\textsuperscript{th} Congress she had a score of -.294.

The fact that representatives’ DW-NOMINATE scores have not changed significantly or become more liberal shows that they are moving and voting more with the conservative Party and not necessarily with their constituents who are more moderate. These findings are more significant than what was initially hypothesized because they better explain why all these Republican representatives lost their seats; they did not take voter preferences into account as much as they should have.

In the district evaluations, representatives such as Sue W. Kelly, and Christopher Shays, were considered to have moderate voting records, which is true when one compares their DW-NOMINATE scores to more conservative representatives such as Bill Zeliff and John Sununu. However, as the Republican Party evolved to become more conservative, apparently they were not moderate enough to keep their seats safe from the Democratic Party.
Summary and Conclusions

More than most politicians, Christopher Shays is aware of the conservative direction that the Republican Party has been moving towards, and he has personally experienced the backlash. When he first came into Congress in 1987, he was part of a multi-member Northeast group of moderate Republican representatives. By 2008, when he lost re-election, he was the last remaining member of that group (Applebome 2008). Recently, he has criticized the party as not being diverse enough and pushing voters away rather than attracting new ones like the Democratic Party has been able to do, especially in recent elections. In a New York Times article by Peter Applebome, Shays is even quoted as saying “I don't see us winning with social conservatism, the party will not be rebuilt without moderates being a part of it” (2008).

Although his worries and sentiments about the party mirror those of the moderate Northeast voters, his attempts to appear more liberal are not reflected in his voting record. He has not separated himself from the Party as much as he may think (Applebome 2008), and his informed and unhappy constituents voted him out of office.

Shays was not the only Republican representative in the Northeast to recently lose his seat. Representatives from New Hampshire’s 1st, New York’s 4th and New York’s 19th also lost reelection, turning almost every district in the Northeast into a Democratic stronghold. After analyzing each district’s vote shares for Congress and the President, and comparing them to the national average, the findings were meaningful. There is more ticket-splitting in the four Northeast districts, especially while each district still has a Republican congressional representative. This supports the hypothesis that the voters are attempting to sort themselves out in regards to what party they fit into, while still voting for the Republican congressional candidate. As the vote shares for president fell below 50%, the vote shares for the House
candidate remained higher. This trend lasted into the 2000’s until each representative lost their respective reelections. This is true for all the districts except NY’s 4th in which the constituents voted out the Republican congressman earlier, in the 1996 election. This district speaks to my ticket-splitting hypothesis. Once the district turned Democratic, the ticket-splitting decreased substantially as the voters who were on the fence stopped voting for Republican candidates altogether.

The Republican representatives’ DW-NOMINATE scores do not directly reflect what was initially hypothesized but the findings are unexpectedly more meaningful. For the districts, the scores remained stagnant and conservative, and most became more conservative. This provides evidence for the fact that the representatives were not changing their vote choices, policy decisions, or ideologies. They maintained Party support and did not pay close enough attention to the preferences of their districts. As the party has become more conservative this became a bigger problem with voters and helps to explain why all of the representatives were voted out of office.

These findings are valuable because they can be used to make predictions. If these changes are occurring in the Northeast there could potentially be other districts and other regions where the Republicans are losing supporters because the party has grown too conservative. It is also a lesson in constituent accountability. Even the most insulated incumbents such as Shays can lose their seats if they do not vote in accordance with their district’s preferences; preferences that may be at odds with the policy preferences of the national party.

In regards to future research, I have provided a useful foundation for potential and new inquiry into these districts and other like them. The effects of gerrymandering and redistricting can be examined to see if they have had any impact on the relative composition and ideologies of
these districts; effects that could potentially also cause Republicans to lose votes. Also, each of these districts has relatively high income and education levels and they can be analyzed more closely to see if the ticket-splitting Republican constituents in these districts specifically belonged to the educated rich demographic group. This could help explain the constituents’ moderate connection and appeal to the Republican Party. Finally, my findings add to the literature about regional partisan shifts and can be extrapolated to other regions to analyze whether national party changes can contribute to isolated geographical partisan shifts.
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