THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS,
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND POLITCAL VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA

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SPRING 2017

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for baccalaureate degrees
in International Politics
and Community, Environment and Development
with interdisciplinary honors in International Politics
and Community, Environment and Development

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ABSTRACT

The Middle East and North Africa remains a region popularly categorized as a "hotbed of conflict." In this thesis I attempt to breakdown popular and conventional sentiment of the political violence in the Middle East through an analysis of political and economic horizontal inequality in the region as a guiding force to instances of violence. Frances Stewarts (2009) introduces the concept of horizontal inequality defining it as distinct and salient group identities coinciding with enduring group-level inequalities. Stewart (2009) argues that horizontal inequality sheds light on unaddressed and underlying factors influencing conflict onset. A global, and regional analysis of data form Cederman et al. (2011) posits that the existence of horizontal inequality can increase the risk of civil war onset. However, in the Middle East and North Africa the relationship between horizontal inequality and civil war onset appears insignificant. Despite the existence of both documented horizontal inequality and violence in the region. Such a peculiar finding warrants an analysis on the earlier mechanisms of inequality and violence. The literature has primarily tested the link between horizontal inequality and violence. Yet, other mechanisms occur prior to incidences of violence, such as the attitudes of individuals within the group towards forms of collective action. I utilize the case of Palestine-Israel using micro-analysis survey data from Hillesund (2015) to further explore the impact of horizontal inequality on attitudes towards violence and non-violent collective action in the Arab context. The benefit of conducting an analysis on attitudes gives policy makers space to plan adequate interventions that address underlying group-grievances before they erupt into situations of violence.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My utmost thanks and appreciation to

Dr. Scott Bennett for introducing me to the complicated world of research and providing

me with the support and mentorship the research process required

Dr. Ted Alter for your continued guidance and mentorship within my undergraduate

career, words cannot express the impact you have had on my own personal education, thank you

for your hope in the world

Dr. Gretchen Casper for the many invaluable lessons on what constitutes good research

Dr. Michael Berkman for facilitating a space and structure in which research could

flourish

Carolina Spies for your friendship and support in a frustrating, yet rewarding process of

continuously overcoming obstacles

David Gaines for your patience and persistence as you pushed me to believe I could

finish this just as much as you believed in me

Friends who have become family giving me support when I needed it the most

Father and Mother for consistently providing me with the lessons and skills I need to

face the world, your love and support have been pivotal in enabling me to do all that I have done,

words will always fail to describe the gratitude and love I have for you.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Violent conflict has been on the decline since the 1990s, yet most recently the number of armed conflicts in the world has risen. Specifically, the beginning of the 21st century brought about events in the Middle East that significantly raised battle-related deaths. In 2013, conflict dyads had increased from 40 to 46, compared to the peak year of 1990 with 52 active conflicts. The number of conflicts increased immediately during the post-Cold War era, but went down, only to go back up in recent years. Developments in Syria, Iraq and Yemen have increased the

Figure 1 Types of Global Conflict

fatalities in the region (Themner & Wallenstenn, 2016). Furthermore, a notable trend is the rise in internal conflicts and civil wars in recent years owing to the ongoing nature of conflicts and the emergence of new ones (PRIO, 2016). Popular narratives of conflict center on "age-old ethnic hatreds," or unavoidable "clash[es] of civilizations", as proposed by Huntington (1993).

Frances Stewart (2009) argues that the majority of multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries experiencing conflict are usually poor. Conflict in those societies is not inevitable, despite stark levels of inequality. Moreover, the vast majority of multi-ethnic societies remain relatively free of violence. Therefore, it becomes imperative to examine the conditions and circumstances that enable violent conflict to occur in multi-ethnic societies.

The Middle East and North Africa remains a region popularly categorized as a "hotbed of conflict." In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, violence and instability developed in the region. With one-sided political violence by governments against challengers, coups, dissident-state interactions, and overall intensified state repression (Moore, 2012). Such developments have poised an urgent empirical question of the circumstances that illicit collective violence in the region.

Scholars such as Moore (2012) build off of the dissent-repression nexus to explain the developments of collective violence by citizens and the response by the state. Furthermore, he states that understanding the Arab Spring as merely a response to various degrees of repressive governments is ahistorical. Such an interpretation discounts significant contentious political events that have been developing across the region for over the past decades.

Mainstream literature has predominately discounted the relationship between persistent and enduring inequalities, which has in many cases dated back to colonial rule, and political violence. For example, Fearon and Latin (2003), building on Collier (2002), argue that ethnic and religious diversity contributes little to civil war risk, and that diminished state capacity is a more likely contributor. Such an argument appears to conflict with Gurr's long-standing theory of relative deprivation, which states that grievances acts as a mobilizer to internal violence.

Murshed (2009) states that ethnic identities can be a crucial factor in enabling necessary group formation in intra-state conflict. Therefore, enduring identities can be central to the mobilization of groups, as conflict entrepreneurs act to respond to group level grievances.

Ethnic conflict is often presented as violence, which is primarily motivated by heightened animosity of one group towards the other. However, scholars such as Stewart (2000) have pointed to the fact that economic, social, and cultural inequalities appear to coincide with ethnic, cultural and religious groups in a society. In an attempt to resolve the long-standing debate in the inequality-conflict literature, many scholars have revisited the concept of grievances as a cause of conflict. As Murshed (2009) states, grievances in the context of civil war and rebellion can be understood as justice-seeking motivations. Moreover, he divides grievance-based explanations of conflict to include theories on relative deprivation, polarization and most recently horizontal inequality (HI). Stewart (2009) introduces horizontal inequality, arguing that the measurement of inequality in much of the literature fails to account for the importance of the group component of inequality. She argues that the concept of HI provides a better measure to understanding the relationship between inequality and violence. Specifically, scholars have attempted to move away from traditional measurements of inequality, arguing that the existence of HI alongside other factors appears to lead to violent struggles, which appear increasingly rooted in deep resentment (pg. 222).

Additionally, it is crucial to examine the failure of successful group mobilization to occur to respond to these grievances. According to the theoretical claim Stewart (2009) postulates on horizontal inequality and violence, we should see a s significant relationship between economic HIs and civil war onset. Jazayeri (2016) broadly argues that groups facing high degrees of exclusion can build ethno political networks of power within a society over time. Such networks

are leveraged as groups attempt to mobilize and respond to their grievances, in a way that individuals facing inequality from the state cannot. Therefore, she argues that horizontal inequality can increase the risk of instability in a society. Alternatively, Brown (2011) argues that certain grievances are more likely to lead to mobilization of violent conflict than are others. Furthermore, as argued by Stewart (2008), Wimmer et al. (2011) and Cederman et al. (2010), groups which are excluded from access and control over government are more likely to engage in political violence.

Initially, much of the literature on horizontal inequality came in the form of case studies. Regional analysis focused primarily on Far-East Asian and Sub-Saharan countries. For example, Murshed and Gates' (2005) case study on Nepal has played a significant role in furthering research on horizontal inequality. As group-level inequality was used to explain the onset of the Maoist insurgency. However, recent cross-country empirical studies, have also emerged in support of the relationship between horizontal inequality and political violence. Most notably Stewart (2009) references Barrows' (1976) work on Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s, Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) data from 1945-2010, and Mancini's use of district level data to connect horizontal inequality with instances of conflict in districts of Indonesia, as empirical studies that have supported the role of horizontal inequality in conflict. Therefore, I will be adding to the literature by testing the relationship between HI and instances of political violence with a focus specifically on the Middle East and North Africa. The region is notable due to its almost unique concentration of salient political identities alongside high levels of HI.

In the rest of this thesis, I will start by briefly summarize the literature. Second, I will outline my hypothesis and theory. Third, I will test the relationship between economic and political HI and onset of civil war specifically in the Middle East and North Africa region

through a quantitative analysis, replicating data collected by Cederman et al. (2009). Fourth, I

will use Palestine-Israel as an example to test the relationship between horizontal inequality and

attitudes toward violent or non-violent resistance. Fifth, I will detail my findings and their

implications. Sixth and finally, I will conclude with a summary of my main points.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Within the conflict literature, scholars have attempted to explain the onset of conflict in two primary ways. The first is through the greed and grievance framework developed by Collier (2002), which has gained popularity in the literature, emphasizing elite competition and natural resource rents. Collier (2002) builds off of the greed and grievance framework, which has two primary mechanisms, greed and grievance. He places greater emphasis on the greed mechanism, which falls in-line with what scholars have called relative opportunity. Relative opportunity states that conflict will usually be found in corrupt, and poor countries with weak intuitions. Such circumstances give oppositional groups an opportunity to take advantage of state resources and power. The second is through Ted Gurr's (1970) long-standing theory on relative deprivation emphasizing the connection between grievances and violence. While Fearon and Latin (2003), building on Collier (2002), argue that ethnic and religious diversity has little to do with the onset of civil war, Gurr (1970) highlights inequality as central to leading to conflict. Alternatively, scholars have categorized these two approaches as opportunity-based and motivations-based approaches to conflict. In this paper, I will argue in support of the motivations-based approach.

Opportunity-Based Approaches

Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) argue that conflict onset can be explained as a product of the poverty, corruption, and inept institutions found in failed states. Furthermore, they maintain the importance of primary commodities in the economic structure and the opportunity for extracting natural resource rents as central to the greed hypothesis. Ultimately, the opportunity cost of initiating conflict will be lower in a state with weaker institutions. Greed, is largely an argument of opportunity where conflict is initiated by "warlords" attempting to capitalize and profit off natural resource exploitation. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) empirically test primary commodity export and civil war onset to find a significant statistical association that strengthens their interpretation of the greedy rebel hypothesis. Violence is arguably a tactic in which groups, or in other cases the state, are able to appropriate the resources of others.

Other scholars have argued that the role of greed in conflict onset appears to be overstated. First, Murshed et al. (2009) argues that better data is needed to capture resource rents as a variable; and, according to him, Fearon (2005) appears to represent the strongest challenge to Collier and Hoeffler's (2002, 2004) empirical finding on the link between primary commodity export and civil war. Fearon (2005) finds that effect of primary commodity exports appears confined to oil, and that the significance of the finding vanishes when using different statistical methods. Moreover, Humphreys (2005) finds that effect of oil production per capita on civil war is positive. Yet, he argues that this appears to be more so due to a weak state mechanism than a greedy rebel hypothesis. Despite the empirical issues associated with the greed hypothesis, it remains popular among Western media outlets.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) provide an alternative hypothesis of grievance or justice seeking, which focuses on ethnic and religious division, political repression and horizontal inequality as increasing the risk of conflict. Østby (2010) states Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Latin (2003) arguably find no statistical significance between inequality and conflict in their empirical tests. However, the statistical rejection of the relationship between conflict and inequality, several scholars have maintained the ability of inequality to explain instances of collective violence. For example, Murshed et al. argues conflict cannot proceed without perseverance of perceived group differences often alongside historical divisiveness according to those differences. Yet, scholars continue to maintain the importance of grievance-based motivations to explain onset of violence by groups, through empirical analysis, case studies, and survey data. Cederman et al. (2011) finds a statistical link between political and economic structural inequalities and civil war onset. Furthermore, they argue that it is premature to discount the grievance-based explanation of civil war onset. Brown (2011) states that the extent of political and economic grievance can ultimately dictate the level of violence experienced in a society.

Several reasons potentially explain the lack of statistical significance between conflict and inequality. Simply, the measurement of inequality itself, in many of the studies conducted by Fearon and Collier, may have failed to capture the importance of group-level inequality in comparison to individual-level inequality. Moreover, in disregarding the importance of ethnic or religious differences in a society, Fearon and Collier appear to underestimate the ability of enduring social identities to act as effective mobilizers for collective violence.

Motivation Based Approaches

Broadly, three main theories fall under the grievance or motivations-based approach: relative deprivation, polarization and most recently horizontal inequality. The psychological concept of relative depravation developed by Ted Gurr (1970) remains the most prominent explanation connecting grievances to conflict onset. Gurr (1970) simply defines relative deprivation as the discrepancy between group aspiration and group achievement. He states that relative deprivation produces grievances, which can lead to collective violence. When relative deprivation is applied to conflict, its intensity and scope among members of a society appears to influence the potential for collective violence. For example, as explained by Murshed et al. (2009) greater educational achievements coupled with an economic downturn can cause young people to vent their frustration through mass political violence. Unemployment acts as an important grievance, especially among a young and educated demographic. Furthermore, Murshed et al. (2009) links relative deprivation to multi-ethnic societies by arguing that ethno-communal lines, regional boundaries or societal class divisions leading to conflict act as applications of the relative deprivation theory.

In the same vain as the greed and grievance framework, scholars have similarly argued that relative deprivation theory has often times overstated its ability to explain conflict. Muller (1985) criticizes the theory's assumption of a direct relationship between "deprivation-induced" discontent and collective political violence, while also largely negating the role of resource-mobilization, and opportunity-based motivations in sustaining political violence. According to Brush (1996), the concept failed empirically on several occasions. However, in spite of its criticisms, Gurr's (1970) theory of relative deprivation remains crucial in explaining outbreaks of

collective violence. Especially, as scholars have attempted to address many of the significant challenges to theory.

Murshed et al. (2009) apply relative deprivation to instances of political violence in Indonesia, Northern Ireland and Nepal as groups respond to the feeling of deprivation vis-à-vis the general situation. A notable example is that of Indonesia. Indonesia experienced its bloodiest conflict as Christian's in the Indonesian province of Maluku responded violently to the rising economic and political advantages experienced by the Muslim community. Esteban and Ray's (1994) theory of polarization and Frances Stewart's (2000) horizontal inequality built further on the work of relative deprivation, expanding the explanatory capabilities of the relationship between inequality and conflict.

Polarization presented an alternative to traditional measures of inequality. Furthermore, it developed an argument that moved past mere measures of interpersonal inequality, but rather highlighted the importance of group identity and inequality. Murshed et al. (2009) then distinguishes between economic polarization and ethnic polarization. However, economic polarization occurs primarily in culturally homogenous societies, while ethnic polarization occurs in heterogeneous societies with an economic dimension. Marxist theory argues that socioeconomic inequality in a society can act as a mobilizer of class-based conflict. However, in diverse societies, where cultural, or ethnic groups face state-repression, ethnicity becomes a group mobilizer. And in certain societies mobilization around identity can occur alongside an economic dimension. Additionally, it is not merely the number of groups within a society that increases its risk to experience conflict; rather, it is the combined alienation groups experience from others, and the strengthened feeling of group identity that comes with alienation that fosters polarization.

Stewart (2000) argues on behalf of a group level and multi-dimensional approach to measuring inequality. Horizontal inequality (HI) as she defines it, builds on both relative deprivation and polarization, strengthening the argument in the literature in favor of motivations-based approaches to conflict. Stewart and Brown (2007) define HI as the coincidence of cultural differences with political and economic disparities in a heterogeneous population with various groups. Furthermore, Cederman et al. (2011) argues that HI emerged from a need in the literature to connect distributional asymmetries and conflict behavior. As Stewart (2000) states, these distributional asymmetries appear on multiple dimensions, economic, political, social and cultural. However, HI's are measured by scholars in multiple ways, as differential returns to education, literacy, and child mortality. Additionally, Stewart (2009) appears to point to alternative mechanisms within the relationship between group inequality and collective violence. Thus, I will explore alternative mechanisms that enable group inequality to lead to political violence.

Social Identity and Mobilization

Grievances do not appear to be sufficient to lead to conflict by themselves. Rather, as Cederman et al. (2011) argues the existence of grievances must be linked to enduring social identities in order for grievances to lead to action. Esteban & Ray (2008) claim that merely having group identities does not appear to be a sufficient source of alienation. Rather, they argue that both grievance and group identity are critical. As one example, Simon Robins (2011) argues that the vast socio-economic gap in Nepalese society appears to have played an important role in the onset of the decade-long Maoist insurgency. Robins (2011) argues that the insurgency was

driven by the Hindu kingdom's exclusion of indigenous people, lower castes and women, alongside the existence of persistent economic and social inequalities. Again, grievances coinciding with identity appears to be a key factor in increasing the likelihood of violence. For example, in the case of Nepal, once again, according to Robins (2011) the Maoist insurgents mobilized the people based on ending exclusion grounded in ethnicity, caste, and gender. As Thus, it appears that the consequence of unaddressed systematic inequalities among disadvantaged groups can lead to the occurrence of political violence

Similarly, Stewart (2009) notes that multi-ethnic societies are not inherently prone to conflict onset. Rather, she argues that the existence of HIs, must be linked to enduring group identity to lead directly to political violence. Additionally, Murshed et al. (2009) states, conflict entrepreneurs are often key to mobilizing groups as they further politicize group-identity for a strategic purpose. Gurr's (1993, 2000a, 2000b) reexamination of relative deprivation theory finds that in response to state-imposed disadvantages and discrimination, collective violence occurred through ethnic mobilization due to group-level grievances.

Stewart (2009) point to alternative mechanisms within the relationship between group inequality and violence. Furthermore, she notes that the success or failure of political mobilization around group grievances can be influenced by various factors. For example, Ghana, Bolivia and Malaysia as cases with prevalent and enduring HI, yet absent of instances of national violence. Lijpart (1969) points to the inclusion of the excluded populations in government positions, arguably increasing the population's tolerance towards inequality. For example, in Bolivia, the indigenous population holds a 50 percent higher instance of infant mortality than the nonindigenous population. Yet, their continued involvement in the government appears to increase the indigenous population's tolerance to inequality. Stewart (2009) notes that just in the

Northern region of Ghana, the child mortality rate is nearly 2.5 times higher than in Ghana as a whole. While in Ghana, informal political mechanisms are in place that ensures that when a Southerner is president, the Vice President must be from the North. Reducing political HIs in this way reveals the potential success of political cooption of the leadership in disadvantaged minorities. It appears that even through the existence of intense socioeconomic inequalities groups will not always respond with violence.

Violence and Horizontal Inequality

Recently, key cross-country statistical studies have empirically validated the link between horizontal inequality and violence. Østby (2008) and Wimmer et al. (2009) contributed to the initial development of a comprehensive global dataset on horizontal inequalities. Østby's (2008) Large-N study studying the onset civil conflicts and horizontal inequalities across 36 different countries from 1986 to 2004 is arguably the first attempt at examining systematically objective data on horizontal inequalities across countries. Specifically, they measure HI using the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) measuring population, health, and nutrition of women and children in developing countries. Moreover, Østby (2008) measures HIs as average household assets, and social HIs as average years of education. Furthermore, the data included interviews with women from the ages of 15-49 with results across countries, and over-time on a yearly basis within one country. This gives multiple measures of HI that can be examined. Overall, a significant relationship was found between social and economic HIs and onset of violent conflict for all

groups defined by ethnicity, religion and region. While Østby (2008) argues that the DHS's use of standardized questions is clearly formulated and standardized, its large sample size and random sampling makes it a reliable and valid source of data, as she herself states, even though the data and sample of countries is limited and the surveys are subjective.

Stewart (2009) notes that many scholars have utilized various measures of inequality. Østby (2008) argues that dependent on the level of development of the country, measures of household assets should differ. For example, in a developing country it appears important to measure household assets by land tenure. But in less developed economies inequality can best be measures by landlessness. Furthermore, Robins (2011) argues that economic inequality alongside class and ethnic differences appeared to enable collective mobilization. Robins (2011) argues that the conflict over land allowed bands of laborers to come together and revolt against the landlords.

Arguably, this appears to have given scholars conducting case studies more room to investigate economic disparities in multiple ways. Therefore, inequality can be measured through levels of literacy rate, landlessness, and differential rates to education. Moreover, the interaction between race and class varies across contexts and influences the likelihood of political violence occurring. Horowitz (1985, p.22) argues that different colonial systems created ranking systems in which they divided populations across race and class and that such systems have carried over into the modern states. Similarly, CEH (1999, p.81) argues that the Guatemalan state remains exclusionary, racist, authoritarian and centralist. State tactics dictating the economic and societal distribution of goods and services in the state are heavily based on racial and class divides from colonial times. Even with the available quantitative data on the subject, there is still a need to consider the diverse forms of collective violence.

Chapter 3: Theory

Structural asymmetry can lead to the experience of violence in a country. HIs can be broken down to political and economic forms of HIs. Initially we can begin by testing the causal mechanism between economic HIs on specifically civil war onset. Perceived group-level inequalities must coincide with politicized and enduring group identities. However, Stewart (2009) states that horizontal inequality remains insufficient in leading to political violence by aggrieved groups. Relative deprivation is a central mechanism in the causal chain. Groups must initially recognize their unachieved potential through the performance of other, more powerful groups in society. The role of conflict entrepreneurs coupled with the strength of group identity can facilitate the mobilization and collective action process. Moreover, individual attitudes of resistance within groups become central in defining the way in which groups will act on their grievance. As H (2014) states groups facing HI are not inherently disposed to violent tactics, but non-violent tactics can be equally utilized.

Economic Horizontal Inequality and Violence

Cederman et al. (2005) draws on the multidimensional conceptualization of HI arguing that economic and political inequality can contribute equally to the outbreak of civil war. Specifically Economic HIs include inequalities in access to and ownership of assets, such as income levels and economic opportunities. Moreover, she argues that the distinction between political and economic inequalities is that the economic inequalities lead to the mobilization of a greater mass of the population. Additionally, the further an ethnic group's GDP per capita from a

country's average the higher risk of conflict. Therefore, we expect to see a positive relationship between economic HI and civil war:

HI: Economic HIs increase the likelihood of civil war.

Østby (2008b) finds empirical support for the relationship between interregional inequality and political exclusion in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Furthermore, Jazayeri (2016) examines the relationship between state repression and initiation of violent and non-violent protests by repressed groups. Moreover, she finds that the Middle East is unique in is concentration of authoritarian regimes that have created salient tribal and religious identities. Ncube et al. (2014) documents the large variance in terms of inequality in the region. For example, despite the measure of GDP per capita in the region averaging US$6,478 in 2009, it remains a relatively high number in comparison to sub-Saharan Africa with a GDP per capita of $US2,205. Because of these identities and the variation in inequality we expect the theory to apply well in the Middle East.

H2: Economic HIs increase the likelihood of civil war in the Middle East and North Africa.

Political Horizontal Inequality and Violence

Political inequalities can lead to the exclusion and repression of groups by state authorities. Stewart (2009) states that once groups have mobilized and utilized violence as a

tactic, the states response becomes pivotal. Moore (2012) broadly states that state's often respond to behavioral challenges from the citizenry with coercion and repression. The consistency of such findings has prompted what Davenport (2007a) calls the "The Law of Coercive Responsiveness." Moreover, Stewart (2009) claims that the state's reaction influences both the intensity and severity of conflict. Lowrance (2006) similarly argues that in the states attempt to maintain stability there is an unintended consequence of enabling greater political resistance.

H3: Political HI, increase the likelihood of civil war.

The connection between religion, ethnic favoritism from the colonial period, and incomplete development has made those dynamics more volatile in the Middle East in particular. But, it also appears that power among ethnic groups within a society can influence the decision of the State to repress certain groups. For example, Rorbaek and Knudsen (2015) noted that despite the existence of ethnic diversity and grievances in both Kuwait and Syria, political authorities have utilized violent repression as a tactic in Syria but not Kuwait. This may help explain why we see conflict in some settings but not in others. The Middle East and North Africa arguably documents ample evidence on the use of coercion and repression by states.

H4: Political HI increase the likelihood of civil war in the Middle East and North Africa

Finally, Murshed et al. (2009) states that the direction of the relationship between horizontal inequality can go both ways, with powerless groups initiating conflict against

powerful groups, and powerful groups initiating conflict when constrained by the poor. However, Mansoob and Gates (2005) also argue that the impact of HI as a cause of conflict can work in both directions. Within groups inequality can be experienced to various levels of intensity dependent on the development and salience of group identity within a state. Therefore, it appears that we should see the relatively powerless and excluded group more likely to experience civil war:

H5: Groups with less access to central executive power, relative to other groups in the society are more likely to experience civil war onset.

Horizontal Inequality and Attitudes about Forms of Collective Action

The literature has primarily tested the link between horizontal inequality and violence. Yet, other mechanisms occur prior to incidences of violence, such as the attitudes of individuals within the group towards forms of collective action. Additionally, Hillesund (2015) points to the important, yet neglected tactic of non-violence as a response to horizontal inequality. An important empirical question is the forms of collective action that mobilized groups taken in response to horizontal inequality. Hillesund (2015) measures horizontal inequality through differences in consumer durability and expenditures of between Palestinian governorates and the closest Israeli sub-district. According to Stewart (2009) with higher economic HI we should see higher levels of violence. Therefore, in terms of individual attitudes we should see greater support for violence in governorates with higher economic HI:

H6: Palestinian individuals are more likely to support violent over non-violent resistance the larger the difference in expenditure and consumer durable ownership between their own governorate and the closest Israeli sub district.

Ultimately, both Lowrance (2006) and Stewart (2009) argue that increased repression can lead to greater resistance. In turn, representation and the distribution of power can influence the decision of groups to mobilize and utilize violence. For example, Rørbaek and Knudsen (2015) find that ethnic groups are more likely to rebel when they are excluded from power.

H7: Palestinian individuals are more likely to support violent over non-violent resistance if they are exposed to greater Israeli violence and perceive their civil and political rights to be unsatisfactory.

Chapter 4 Quantitative Analysis

Methods

Initially, I will be testing the postulated theoretical link connecting economic HI to violence, specifically civil war onset. I utilize the most recent and comprehensive date-set developed by Cederman et al. (2011). I conduct a statistical analysis of the relationship between civil war onset and HI. Specifically, I will be testing how economic and political HI affect civil war onset. I will analyze whether HI has an effect on the outbreak of civil conflict from 1991 to 2005. I use a rare events logit analysis with 52 conflict onsets recorded and 450 groups per year, with a total of 6,438 group years. Cederman et al. (2011) build their dataset utilizing two primary datasets, geospatial data from the Ethnic Power Relations date set, GeoEPR alongside data from GeoEcon. First, I replicate their analysis in an attempt to find similar findings. However, I also conduct three other statistical analyses in which I run a separate analysis for each region of the world.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable I will be testing is onset of civil war. Cederman et al. (2011) test onset of conflict as their dependent variable, coding it as a dichotomous variable. For example, "1" indicates that the group became involved in a civil war against the government in that year. Additionally, Cederman et al. code the onset of conflict as either territorial or government conflict, in addition to coding on a yearly basis.

Independent Variable

The two primary independent variables are economic and political HI. Inequality is measured as the square of the logarithm ratio between g, the GDP per capita of the ethnic group, and G, the average GDP per capita of all groups in the country. Economic HI captures the deviations from the country average symmetrically and is zero for groups at the country average. The higher the vale, the more the group is unequal.

Cederman et al. (2011) derive political HIs and group size through the EPR dataset, which provides a time varying indicator for groups' exclusion from central power. Political inequality is measured within countries and across groups based on the Ethnic Power Relation dataset, which includes approximately 310 different groups. Their sample is restricted to groups that are above a population of 500,000 and for the time period of 1991 to 2005. The EPR data set codes group status based on the degree of inclusion in the political system. Additionally, group status is coded dichotomously. For the analysis group status is broken up into two main categories, groups included and excluded in the political system. Exclusion is disaggregated to include groups that are regionally autonomous, powerless, discriminated or separatist.

Control Variables

Control variables include power balancing. Power balance is measured by accounting the group's demographic with the ethnic group(s) in power (EGIP) as its share of the dyadic population. GDP per capita of the group, number of excluded groups, country level democracy dummy variable using the Polity score, peace years, and world regions. In the analysis the status

of groups that are a monopoly, dispersed or dominant are controlled for. In addition, if a conflict

is ongoing then it was also controlled for. I will also control for the regions of the world.

Table 1 Descriptive Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Economic Inequality*	0.096	0.291	0.000	3.344
Low Inequality	0.766	0.766	0.000	6.046
High Inequality	0.496	0.614	0.000	3.344
Excluded Groups	0.528	0.499	0.000	1.000
Power Balance	0.248	0.262	0.000	1.000
Power Balance (sq.)	0.130	0.222	0.000	1.000
GDP Per Capita (log)	7.944	1.060	5.231	10.494
Number of excluded groups	8.405	13.706	0.000	46.000
Year	1998.093	4.300	1991.000	2005.00
Peace Years	34.421	18.118	0.000	59.000

Empirical Analysis

Table 2 shows the results from Model 1, which replicates Cederman et al.'s (2011) main

findings. HI, or the inequality hypothesis, is tested based on the economic inequality variable. As

H1 states, the existence of economic HI increases the likelihood of conflict as indicated by the

positive coefficient on the inequality variable. Model 2 narrows the focus of the large groups by

excluding ethnic groups with a population less than 500,000. In this analysis, the number of

observations is reduced to 3,967 and conflict onset narrows down to only 42 instances. Yet, we

appear to see a stronger significance with the economic inequality variable, as the coefficient

triples. It appears that the significance of economic horizontal inequality carries over, even as the

sample is narrowed. It appears from my replication that H1 is supported, and Cederman et al.'s

(2011) findings are indeed replicable.

Table 2 Global Analysis of Civil War Onset and Political and Horizontal Inequalities

Variables	Economic Inequality	Group Pop. Greater than 500,000	Economic and Political Inequality
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Economic Inequality	0.6219**	1.7998***	1.7796***
	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Excluded			1.2125***
			(0.000)
Power Balance	3.702	3.572	5.6574**
	(0.128)	(0.172)	(0.021)
Power Balance (sq.)	-4.989	5.889	7.7906 *
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.028)
GDP Per Capita (log)	-4.555	0.8654***	0.8865***
	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Number of Excluded Groups	-0.154	0.0467 *	0.0596***
	(0.370)	(0.012)	(0.000)
Year	-0.182	0.2244***	0.2233***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years	-0.014	0.1535	0.1591
	(0.8980)	(0.166)	(0.127)
Constant	-362.865	450.4483	447.4063 ***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	6,438	3,967	3,967
***p<.001, p**<0.01, *p<0.05			

Model 3 tests H3, which states that both economic and political horizontal inequality

increase the probability of conflict onset. Model 3 introduces the excluded groups variable,

which is a dummy variable to measure the political horizontal inequality of a group. The results

reveal that the exclusion of ethnic groups has a positive and statistically significant effect on the

likelihood of conflict occurring. It appears that H3, is also supported by the data.

Both H1 and H3 test the strength of the relationship of civil war onset and political and horizontal inequality on a global level. Even when smaller ethnic groups were filtered out of the data the relationship remains positive and statistically significant. It appears that both economic horizontal inequality and political inequality play an important role in the onset of conflict.

Table 3 Civil War and Political and Economic Horizontal Inequality in Sub Saharan Africa and Asia

Variables	Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)	Asia	Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)	Asia
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Economic Inequality	1.4870**	2.537***	1.1797**	3.167***
	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Excluded			1.624**	4.1641***
			(0.004)	(0.000)
Power Balance	5.8489	9.740	10.1812*	20.068*
	(0.163)	(0.070)	(0.030)	(0.003)
Power Balance (sq.)	-10.3449	-10.7174	-15.0157*	-18.0831***
	(0.071)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.001)
GDP Per Capita (log)	-4.5550	-1.1370	-0.8963*	-1.6581**
	(0.013)	0.030	(0.026)	(0.008)
Number of Excluded Groups	-0.0049	-0.0450	-0.1154	-0.0825*
	(0.950)	0.101	(0.330)	(0.030)
Year	-0.0532	-0.2808	-0.0475	-0.2444**
	(0.527)	0.000	(0.565)	(0.004)
Peace Years	-0.0408	0.3528	-0.0141	0.3690
	(0.898)	(0.166)	(0.940)	(0.102)
Constant	108.884	564.251	96.504	490.975*
	(0.519)	(0.000)	(0.559)	(0.003)
Observations	1,357	1,172	1,357	1,172

***p<.001, p**<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 3 tests the application of the theoretical link between economic HI and civil war onset on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) and Asia. An empirical test on Latin America was not possible due to the insufficient number of cases. Table 3 is an across regions analysis, which

provides an in-depth look at the variance, that can occur. Model 4 and 5 are purely testing the implications of economic horizontal inequality, and in both cases a positive and statistically significant relationship is found. The probability of conflict probability appears to increase to a greater extent in Asia than globally and in Sub Saharan Africa. In Sub Saharan Africa, as shown in Model 4, a relationship between economic inequality and likelihood of conflict also appears to positive and statistically significant. Model 6 and 7 are an opportunity to test the relevance of political inequality alongside economic inequality in those specific regions. Again, a statically significant relationship is recorded in both Asia and Sub Saharan Africa, with the empirical link stronger in Asia. Thus, we can arguably claim that Cederman et al.'s (2011) claim, which they test globally, also hold true for both the Asia and Sub Saharan Africa.

After considering H1 and H3, I move to considering H2, which states that the existence of economic HI should increase the likelihood of civil war onset, specifically in the Middle East and North Africa. However, due to the limited nature of the dataset, the tests carried out in Table 4 include all observations from 1946-2005 in the region; it was not possible to run a test on 1991 to 2005 only, as was done globally, in Sub Saharan Africa, and in Asia. A greater set of observations needed to be included for an empirical test to be conducted. Even with the longer time period in Model 8 and Model 9, it was noted that there was no statistical significance between economic and political horizontal inequality and civil war onset in the regions. Furthermore, a negative and insignificant relationship is noted. Thus, it can be concluded that both H2, and H4 are unsupported empirically by the data.

The findings appear both unusual and distinct among regions. Despite the lack of statistical significance, a negative relationship between economic HI and civil war onset is

found. I explain these unusual findings further in the findings, and more in depth in the case studies.

Table 4 Civil War Onset and Political and Horizontal Inequality in the Middle East and North Africa

Variables	Middle East and North Africa	Middle East and North Africa
	Model 8	**Model 9**
Economic Inequality	-0.3643	-0.265
	(0.272)	(0.525)
Excluded	1.506	
	(.088)	
Power Balance	4.8116	1.728
	(0.183)	(0.584)
Power Balance (sq.)	-3.8481	-0.5181
	(0.304)	(0.870)
GDP Per Capita (log)	-4.555	-0.1615
	(0.013)	(0.331)
Number of Excluded Groups	0.0161	0.669
	(0.831)	(0.331)
Year	0.0167	0.0240***
	(0.174)	(0.000)
Peace Years	0.0783	0.0193
	(0.449)	(0.900)
Constant	-37.957	-51.165***
	(0.103)	(0.000)
Observations	1,776	1,776

***p<.001, p**<0.01, *p<0.05

Figure 2 indicates that the groups that initiated conflict most frequently are separatist, and discriminated groups. Ultimately, Figure 2 reveals that "no conflict" is more likely to occur, than "conflict." The highest probability of conflict for any group of conflict for any group is 3.9%. For most groups, the probability of conflict in any year is less than 1%. Civil war remains to be a

rather rare event despite horizontal inequality, and group status, relative to other groups in society. Additionally, the percentage of conflict that groups without power actually initiate is quite low. For example, Cederman et al. (2011) record 447 instances where conflict did not occur by separatists, and 18 instances where they experienced civil war. Excluded groups were more likely to experience civil war. Groups which were excluded from executive decision making but enjoyed regional separatist autonomy had the highest probability of conflict of 3.9%, while discriminated with a 1% probability, and powerless groups with a 0.6% probability. Separatist groups despite enjoying regional autonomy remain excluded from executive decision making. Figure 2 reveals that excluded groups are more likely to experience civil war, but at a much lower rate than expected. H5, which postulates that groups with less access to central executive power, relative to other groups in the society are more likely to experience civil war onset appears to be supported. However, for unidentified mechanisms in this analysis, the rate in which that occurs is relatively low.

Moreover, groups that are dominant and hold a monopoly in the society appear to have no incentive to initiate a civil war. Furthermore, they are less likely to mobilize and engage in civil war, in comparison to those enjoying less power relative to the centralized power in the society.

Figure 2: Probability of Civil War Onset by Group Status

For raw data please see Table 5 in Appendix A

Discussion

Despite the comprehensiveness of Cederman et al.'s (2011) dataset; as they themselves argue there is room for further research. However, their results present an important initial study on the relationship between economic horizontal inequality and civil war onset on the global level. Cederman et al.'s (2011) main results of study reveals that ethnic groups above and below the country average are prevalent in initiating civil conflicts. Additionally, political horizontal inequality appears to also have a strong influence on civil war; especially, with ethnic groups that are excluded from central executive power. Thus, alongside previous studies, which are more limited in scope, Cederman et al.'s study arguably empirically confirms the relevance of understanding grievance-based-explanations to civil war onset.

As indicated by the results above, the lack of statistical significance in the Middle East and North Africa appears peculiar. Despite the empirical robustness of the results in SSA, Asia, and globally, the region appears distinct. Arguably, the existence of HI in the MENA region and the relatively small number of civil wars fails to make the relationship between conflict-inequality significant. In an attempt to explain the unusually high levels of political exclusion and violence in the region, scholars have argued on behalf of Middle East exceptionalism. However, specific issues, overlooked or brushed over in the literature may adequately explain the nature of horizontal inequality and civil war in the region, such as the salience of group identity, and various forms of collective action.

Further research and data collection would be required to better understand the impact between political and economic horizontal inequalities on civil war onset in the Middle East. Contrary to these statistical findings, during the period of 1946 -2005 stark HI existed among different ethnic groups in the region. According to Jazayeri (2016) the salience of political marginalization and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa has been shaped by the existence of tribal and religious identity alongside a high concentration of authoritarian regimes. Additionally, dynamics of ethnic favoritism, and exclusion have roots in the colonial period, where group identities were strategically shaped. For example, the Alawite tribe in Syria, despite making up approximately 11% of the population has remained dominant in Syria reflecting the deep impact of colonial favoritism on modern day conflicts in the region (Rørbaek and Knudsen 2015). These circumstances suggest that there should be a relationship between HI and conflict.

A key component in the conflict process is the importance of group mobilization in initiating collective action. It is through the case study literature that the dynamics of within-group inequality and mobilization can be better understood. Furthermore, perception of regime

instability, especially in the MENA region, due to the high concentration of authoritarian regimes, can influence the likelihood of group mobilization occurring in response to stark HI. Moreover, it is crucial to be cautious of making the claim that the absence of civil war, as a form of political violence in the region, fails to be indicative of the existence or relevance of HI. Collective violence has taken many forms throughout history; however, in regards to understanding the impact of HI, quantitative data remains limited to violence in terms of civil war onset. Yet, it remains necessary to look at various forms of violence collectively in order to get a more accurate understanding of the impact on conflict. For example, as noted by PRIO (2016) the Middle East appears to be experiencing prolonged low-levels of conflict. Such conflict types are not considered civil war, and they are coded separately. Therefore, it appears that due to the authoritarianism alongside the history and division of the region, civil war may not be the primarily way in which conflict appears in the society.

A broader definition of political violence that includes forms of low-level violence will arguably better capture the effect of HI in the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, violence remains to be only one form of collective action mobilized groups can take. Hillesund (2015) introduces the importance of horizontal inequality leading to non-violence. Given the choice between violence, non-violence or none, how does horizontal inequality influence the attitudes of groups towards appropriate collective action? Prior to the mobilization of groups, the development of individual attitudes within a group towards forms of action has been less studied in the literature. Yet, this link is crucial in further understanding the causal chain of horizontal inequality and collective action.

Thus, I utilize the case of Israel-Palestine as an example to potentially showcase the influence of horizontal inequality on attitudes towards various forms of resistance. Additionally,

I frame this analysis through an examination of broader forms of documented collective action utilized by Palestinians. Such an analysis attempts to shed light on the ability of horizontal inequality to impact forms of collective action taken by disenfranchised groups.

Chapter 5 The Case of Israel Palestine

Case Selection

The complication in examining Israel-Palestine is due to the ambiguity surrounding Israel's relationship to the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza (Hillesund 2015). Additionally, the literature has not entirely distinguished whether the case of Palestine-Israel should be considered similarly to other internal conflict. Hillesund (2015) argues that the existence of an illegal occupation, alongside the quasi-sovereignty enjoyed by Israel over the Palestinian territories may lead to the consideration of the territories as a part of Israel. Moreover, the level of control, both economically, and militarily by the Israeli government appears to warrant some sort of connection. Moreover, it then appears theoretically possible to observe objectively the horizontal inequality that exists between Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, making the case of Israel-Palestine generalizable to conflicts with similar dynamics.

Israel-Palestine alongside many Arab countries, as Moore (2012) argues, has seen multiple attempts by aggrieved groups to highlight their grievances through various forms of collective action even prior to the 2011 Arab Spring. The pattern of dissent and repression in Israel-Palestine, which Moore (2012) talks about as a cycle, does not appear to follow the larger trends of the region, in terms of when dissent is likely to occur. A distinction between the dissent of aggrieved groups in other Arab states and Palestine, is the unequal publicity, which each receives. Palestinian dissent has largely been document to be in the form of suicide bombings and rockets. Yet, despite the existence of non-violent collective action in response to grievances

largely perceived to be the result of Israeli state action (Hillesund 2015), little attention has been given to such instances.

Much of the literature has focused on one aspect of the causal chain, horizontal inequality and violence. For example, Cederman et al.'s (2011) study empirically tests the relationship between horizontal inequality and violence. Yet, other mechanisms occur prior to incidences of violence, such as the attitudes of individuals within the group, towards various forms of collective action. As Stewart (2009) argues, horizontal inequality does not inherently lead to group mobilization. This reveals the importance of mechanisms, which occur prior to violence. Violence, as Hillesund (2005) states is one form of collective action, which disenfranchised groups can adopt. Therefore, alongside the work of Hillesund (2005) I use the Israel-Palestine example to test an earlier aspect of the causal chain, the translation of grievances into attitudes towards form of collective action. As Hillesund (2005) measures forms of collective action can be support for neither, support for violence, support for non-violence, and support for both. Thus, it appears important to understand the role of non-violence in the collective action techniques of Palestinians.

Methods

Through the example of Palestine-Israel I empirically test the less examined link between horizontal inequality and attitudes toward appropriate collective action, prior to mobilization. However, this may not lead us directly towards understanding what type of action actually

occurs. Yet, it enables a closer analysis on the ability of horizontal inequality to influence

attitudes towards violence, non-violence, or neither. I utilize survey and district-level data

gathered by Hillesund (2015) in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover,

such unique data allows for micro-level tests of horizontal inequality mechanisms. I conduct a

statistical analysis of the relationship between support for resistance by Palestinian individuals

and economic HI. Individual-level data from 2011 was conducted in the West Bank and Gaza.

Hillesund (2015) calculates this measures though the Israeli expenditure survey and Palestinian

census. First, I run a logit analysis to test the relationship between support for resistance by

Palestinian individuals and objective economic horizontal inequality. Second, I conduct a cross

tabular analysis on governorate level and horizontal inequality. Third, I conduct a cross tabular

analysis on governorate level and support for forms of collective action.

Independent, Dependent, and Control Variables

Economic horizontal inequality is the primary independent variable being tested in this

study, and it is split up into two gap measures, HI expenditures, and HI consumer durables.

Hillesund (2015) measures objective economic HI in two primary ways. First, he creates an

index which takes into account the horizontal inequality between Israeli regions neighboring

Palestinian in ownership of a set of consumer durables. Expenditure is calculating the share of

households in each Palestinian governorate and corresponding Israeli sub-district as data from

the 2007 Palestinian census is combined with the Israeli 2008 expenditure survey. While the

consumer durables index is a more long-term measure of economic horizontal inequality.

Hillesund (2015) divides household expenditure levels for each Palestinian governorate, using

2009 estimates for Palestinian territories, by household expenditure level in the closest Israeli sub-district, using 2008 estimates, and subtracts it from 1.

Additionally, political horizontal inequality is measured indirectly through survey data of Palestinian individuals with a sample of 1,706. Hillesund (2015) states that the measure does not explicitly reference other groups, however, it remains satisfactory to the extent that Palestinians compare themselves to the situations of Israeli Jews when rating their status. Additionally, in the Palestinian territories the status of civil and political rights is heavily dependent on group belonging. While, Hillesund (2015) argues that legally Palestinians are under the authority of the Palestinian authorities, the lack of autonomy of the territory appears to place the responsibility of the lack of political rights and exclusion place the responsibility on Israel.

The dependent variable of support for resistance, by Palestinian individuals. Hillesund (2015) utilizes an index in which he combines a dummy variable measuring support for violent and non-violent resistance into an index with four primary categories: (i) support for neither form of resistance (9%); (ii) support only for non-violent resistance (44%); (iii) support only for violent resistance (27%); and (iv) support for both forms of resistance (20%). Moreover, he doesn't use a dummy variable for "support for violence" as that operationalization would exclude supporter of non-violence.

Hillesund (2015) ensures that traditional theories of opportunity and grievance are accounted for. For example, individual relative deprivation is controlled for through the interaction of self-evaluated wealth, and level of education. While, the opportunity cost argument utilize self-evaluated wealth alongside governorate level, and through average per capita monthly expenditure.

History of Collective Action of Palestinians

I will briefly examine responses by Palestinian collective action from 2000 to 2014. By 2000, the Palestinian people had been under a 39-year military occupation by Israel (Pape). The second *intifada* or uprising (2000-05) erupted on the 28th of September when Arial Sharon entered the Temple Mount (Araj, 2008). Moreover, Araj (2008) states that collective action techniques of mobilized Palestinians included demonstrations, marches, and stone thrown. On March 4, 2011, the first suicide attack by a Palestinian killed three Israelis and wounded 50 others. The suicide attack became one of the reasons that prompted a harsh Israeli retaliation, which elicited a largely weak Palestinian response. For example, Araj (2008) notes that in response to the suicide bombing the Israeli army fired live ammunition at Palestinian demonstrators, 48% of whom were killed with shots in the head and neck according to medics. Jaegar and Paserman (2006) further document the cycle of violence during the second *intifada* in Figure 3.

Moreover, Stewart (2009) points out the reaction of the state to dissent can often dictate the level of severity and intensity of conflict that erupts as a result of the engagement between the state and the dissenters. Similarly, Araj (2008) furthers this argument through his study of the relationship between harsh repression by Israel and the adoption of suicide bombing by Palestinians. Furthermore, suicide bombings developed into a tactic that many Palestinians utilized during the second *intifada.* Araj (2008) argues that suicide bombing is perhaps an example of the most extreme form of collective action that groups can adopt. It is the requirement of the death of the protestor, which appears arguably makes it the most extreme tactic possibly adopted. For example, states that non-violent action can occur as a result of

horizontal inequality. Moreover, he critiques the literature by stating that the implicit assumption

made that inequality must lead to violent, rather than non-violent mobilization is unjustified

both, theoretically, and empirically. Therefore, in the examination of the case of Palestine and

Israel we broaden the definition of collective action to capture activities beyond violence.

Moreover, Hillesund (2015) argues that the firing of rockets from the Gaza strip largely replaced

suicide bombings as the predominant, if not only, form of armed resistance by Palestinians after

the mid-2000s.

Figure 3 Cycle of Violence Second Intifada

The   case of

Palestinian collective action is interesting in that multiple forms of collective action were seen

just in the second intifada. Suicide bombings occurred alongside demonstrations and marches.

This appears to signal the variance in attitudes towards Palestinian factions of appropriate

responses to perceived inequities. Hillesund (2015) attempts to understand the circumstances

which illicit such variance in attitudes towards appropriate forms of collective action. Although

harsh state-repression appears to indicate most clearly political repression, it can also encompass

economic repression. Therefore, in this case I will add to the literature by highlighting the

importance of enduring group-level economic inequalities in influencing attitudes of Palestinians

of appropriate collective action.

Horizontal Inequality in the Palestinian Territories

Stewart (2009) argues that horizontal inequality does not merely apply to ethnic groups,

but rather extends to members with a strong feeling of group identity. Lowrance (2006)

maintains that the Palestinian identity is a multi-faced and politicized group identity. Moreover,

as Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug (2013) identity, the existence of subjective group grievances

is crucial for the theory of horizontal inequality to appear. Hillesund (2015) states that

Palestinians and Israelis are distinctly defined groups with well-developed identities. For

example, competition over land and water alongside a Palestinian narrative of injustice and

blame towards Israel makes the lens of horizontal inequality applicable in this case. Table 5

depicts the sixteen governorates in the West Bank and Gaza alongside their level of economic HI

in terms of expenditures, and consumer durables. The variables are unstandardized and as

Hillesund (2015) state the HI variables are measured on a scale of 0 to 1. The closer the variable

is to 1 the more unequal the governorate is. Additionally, expenditure levels are measured in

Jordanian Dinars.

Table 5 Palestinian Governorates and Horizontal Inequalities

Governorate	HI Expenditure	HI Durables
Jenin	0.51	0.45
Tubas	0.51	0.5
Tulkaram	0.64	0.43
Nablus	0.62	0.39
Qalqilita	0.63	0.46
Salfit	0.67	0.43
Ramallah	0.53	0.32
Jericho	0.46	0.43
Jerusalem	0.35	0.41
Bethalem	0.55	0.35
Hebron	0.62	0.4
Gaza North	0.56	0.52
Gaza	0.68	0.4
Deir Al Balah	0.68	0.52
Khan Yunis	0.7	0.54
Rafah	0.62	0.54

According to Table 1 we observe that the governorates with the highest level of HI expenditure levels are Khan Yunis 0.70, Rafah 0.62, Deir Al Balah 0.6, and Gaza 0.68. While governorates with the lowest HI expenditure levels are Jerusalem 0.35, Bethlehem 0.35, Jericho 0.46, and Jenin 0.51. However, in terms of HI consumer durables we notice that again Khan Yunis 0.54, Rafah 0.54, and Deir Al Balah 0.52, appears to have the highest level of HI consumer durables alongside having high level of HI expenditure levels. Additionally, Gaza North also has the highest HI consumer durables.

Evidence of Attitudes towards Forms of Collective Action and Horizontal Inequality

Table 6: Governorate Level, Attitude Towards Resistance

Governorate	Neither Violence or Non-Violence	Only Non-Violence	Only Violence	Violence and Non-Violence
Jenin	11.5	46	14.9	27.6
Tubas	19.4	35.5	29	16.1
Tulkaram	6.6	37.4	31.9	24.2
Nablus	8.8	33.1	29.1	29.1
Qalqilita	**20.6**	41.2	11.8	26.5
Salfit	**4.5**	50	27.3	18.2
Ramallah	8.3	34.9	34.9	22
Jericho	12.8	**30.8**	**35.9**	20.5
Jerusalem	11.6	**47.3**	**24.1**	17
Bethalem	5.7	65.7	17.1	11.4
Hebron	5.5	52.1	34.4	8
Gaza North	8.3	**51.6**	**19.8**	20.3
Gaza	9.9	48.9	24.3	16.9
Deir Al Balah	13.3	51.7	16.7	18.3
Khan Yunis	8.6	**36.4**	**33.3**	21.6
Rafah	4.5	**25.9**	**42**	27.7

Table 6 can be used as a way to analyze Palestinian governorates independently in terms of their attitude towards resistance. Moreover, the ability to highlight the top four Palestinian governorates with the highest HI in terms of expenditure and consumer durability is useful in allowing us to further observe the impact that HI can have on various attitudes. Jerusalem has the lowest HI expenditure level, and the lowest HI in terms of consumer durability. Table 6 then reveals that 47.3 % of individuals in Jerusalem are more disposed towards attitudes of non-violence. However, those who support only violence are 24.1% of individuals, which remains to be a significant number. Therefore, other variables may have greater explanatory value in

impacting likelihood to support violence, yet the low HI appears to correlate to the attitude of non-violence.

An interesting finding is that in Khan Yunis, despite being the governorate with highest level of HI individuals holding attitudes in support of violence, 36.4%, and nonviolence, 33.3%, appear to be equally split. This appears to be an odd finding, considering H6 postulates that higher levels of HI leads to attitudes in support of violence over non-violence. Additionally, this reveals that further studies need to be conducted to understand the factors, which may influence support for attitudes of non-violence. On the other hand, Rafah, a governorate very close to the high HI experienced in Khan Yunis appears to support H6, as individuals appear more disposed to support only violence, 42%, than they are to support non-violence, 25.9 %, and non-violence and violence, 27.7%. An additional variable that is not considered in this analysis that may have an influence on attitudes towards violence, or non-violence is the level of Israeli violence individuals may be exposed to.

Empirical Analysis

I run two regressions utilizing the date Hillesund (2015) compiled. As seen in Table 7 in Model 1 I run a regression in an attempt to understand the attitude that supports violence in Hillesund's (2015) attitude towards resistance scale. H6 states that we should see a greater likelihood to support violence over non-violence if HI in consumer durability and level of expenditure is high. Model 1 reveals a positive and significant correlation between HI in terms of consumer durability, while, HI expenditure levels is positive but insignificant. As evidenced in

the variation between economic HI and attitudes that support violent or non-violent resistance seen above among the different governances indicates that other variables may be applicable. Therefore, in Model 2 I introduce exposure to Israeli violence and perceived civil and political rights as variables. H7 states that with higher levels of exposure to Israeli violence and lower perceived status of their civil and political rights they are more likely to support violence over non-violent attitudes. In Model 2 it appears that H7 is not supported, as higher levels of perceived civil and political rights are associated with lower tendencies to support attitudes of violent resistance. Additionally, Model 2 reveals that the exposure that the lower the higher the level of exposure to Israeli violence the lower the likelihood that individuals will support violent resistance.

Table 7 Analysis on the Likelihood to Support Violent Resistance

Support of Violent Resistance	Model 1	Model 2
HI Consumer Durability	0.2612*** (0.000)	0.4253*** (0.000)
HI Expenditure Level	0.0835 (0.137)	0.2013*** (0.001)
Self-Evaluated Wealth	-0.0156** (0.017)	-.0118* (0.075)
Completed Education	-0.0104*** (0.004)	-.0118*** (0.000)
Exposure to Israeli Violence		-.0050*** (0.000)
Perceived Civil and Political Rights		-.2158*** (0.000)
Constant	0.3680*** (0.000)	.4709*** (0.000)
Observations	10,818	10,647
***p<.001, p**<0.01, *p<0.05		

Discussion

Hillesund (2015) creates a unique index to measure HI, in which he measures relative deprivation by measuring the closest Israeli sub district to a Palestinian governorate. Both H6 and H7 were supported and reveal the significant influence that HI either political, or economic can have on the region. In the case of Israel and Palestine as an example it appears that higher levels of HI arguably increases the likelihood that Palestinian individuals will support violence only as an attitude. However, further research needs to be conducted to more adequately test the relationship between non-violence and horizontal inequity. Additionally, if we are to analyze governorates individuals utilizing the data of HI and attitudes, very superficially, we note interesting trend that economic HI cannot fully explain or influence the attitudes of Palestinians.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

Cederman et al.'s (2011) postulated relationship between economic and political inequality in leading to civil war conflict is a significant empirical finding. Additionally, through my analysis I prove that both economic and political horizontal inequalities are important in a leading to a groups engagement in civil war in Sub Saharan Africa and Asia. Moreover, it also appeared that groups, which were discriminated or powerless, in comparison to the central executive authority were more likely to engage in civil war onset. The empirical research conducted has profound policy implications. These findings shed light on the importance of grievance-based explanations as a motivator to conflict. Furthermore, such grievances, which appear to be both political and economic in nature, shed light on the important and often neglected inequality experienced at a group level within a state. However, I was unable to conclude that the same relationship holds in the Middle East and North Africa region.

Further opportunities for research include creating a more comprehensive and up-to-date dataset in which the definition of political violence can be broadened beyond civil war onset. Moreover, it remains crucial to test the empirical relationship between horizontal inequality and political violence in the Middle East and North Africa. In this paper I have attempted to argue against the explanation of Middle East exceptionalism. Rather, I propose a broader measure of political violence, which takes into account the distinct mechanisms in which groups reveal their grievances. Additionally, the centralization of authoritarian regimes in the region complicates the ability of groups to mobilize. Thus, context-specific dynamics of power, alongside strength of group identities, colonial influence on regime policies, impact the likelihood that grievances will translate to collective action.

Stewart (2009) argues that multiple mechanisms can inhibit the ability of groups in multi-ethnic societies to act upon their grievances. Societies, which are multi-ethnic and unequal may not necessarily experience more conflict than others. Mobilization of groups experiencing horizontal inequality, alongside the combination of other factors creates a situation where political violence is possible. Thus, the findings are two parts; I argue that political and economic horizontal inequality can increase the likelihood of civil war onset. While, also finding that horizontal inequality will not always lead to political violence.

Additionally, understanding horizontal inequality enables state representatives, policy makers, and international organizations to better predict, overcome, and stop the potential eruption of violence. Similarly, to Murshed et al.'s (2009) argument, much of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal can be explained by decades long unaddressed and salient group inequalities. The lower-caste, and indigenous populations were consistently discriminated and barred from accessing land. While, they remained the primary labor force that the dominant groups relied upon. As shown in this paper, similar dynamics appear in multiple conflicts and settlings.

In my case study I unpack the relationship between collective action and horizontal inequality, through the inclusion of political violence as merely one form of collective action. Furthermore, the case study reveals the importance in the Arab context of the theme of perceived discriminations or grievances, which is brought up by Stewart (2000) as crucial to initiating political mobilization. Lowrance (2006) argues that when affective bonds between state and individual exist, it becomes harder for minority grievances to become "destabilizing forms of action." Moreover, she states that a link between identity and protest is an important factor in ethnic stability. The role of nationalism, or support and identification with the state in ensuring

ethnic stability. Therefore, it is possible that horizontal inequality fails to lead to any sort of collective action or mobilization due to the strength of factors such as nationalism, within a society. Despite the difficulty in maintaining ethnic stability, the identification of minority groups with the state can act as a stabilizing factor amid grievances.

The implications of this study appear to align closely to the findings of Gurr (2000a, 2000b) and Lustick (1979). Gurr (2000a, 2000b) states that greater global acceptance of ethnic inclusion indicates that ethnic conflict, or conflicts driven by identity, is decreasing worldwide. Despite, what has been recently noted as an increase in identity-driven conflict by PRIO (2016) it remains important to note the increasing popularity of an ideology "inclusion." Lustick (1979) further argues that ethnic domination is increasingly more unacceptable, with an increasing global trend of inclusion. Therefore, it appears to become increasingly difficult for regimes to maintain ethnic control, alongside the inequality they inevitably create. Lowrance (2006) states that ethnic domination, as in the case of Israel, may arguably contain the very "seeds of its own undoing." Therefore, it has become increasingly difficult for regimes to maintain ethnic control as group inequality can often increase the likelihood of violence.

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Appendix A

Data

Table 8 Number of Conflicts Initiated by Group Status

Status of Group	No Conflict	Conflict	Total
Dominant	1707	0	1707
Monopoly	1672	0	1672
Junior	5340	19	5359
Discriminated	4511	46	4557
Autonomy	5408	15	5423
Separated	447	18	465
Powerless	7385	44	7429

Table 5 Palestinians Should Put More Emphasis on Civil, Non-Violent Resistance

Governorate	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Total
Jenin	11	44	12	2	16	85
Tubas	2	11	9	3	6	31
TulKarem	10	35	25	7	12	89
Nablus	26	47	31	14	26	144
Qalqilya	1	22	11	0	0	34
Salfit	5	9	4	2	2	22
Ramallah & Al Bireh	17	39	18	26	7	107
Jericho	1	18	11	4	4	38
Jerusalem	14	48	22	12	14	110
Bethlehem	16	41	9	3	0	69
Hebron	31	53	40	22	14	160
North Gaza	45	92	34	15	5	191
Gaza	48	156	61	29	15	309
Deir Al-Balah	25	62	19	8	5	119
Khan Yunis	29	65	35	29	4	162
Rafah	20	39	22	30	1	112
Total	301	781	363	206	131	1,782

Table 6 All Palestinian Factions Must Stop/Refrain from Firing Rockets Against Israel

Governorate	Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Total
Jenin	9	36	20	3	16	84
Tubas	1	11	8	2	9	31
TulKarem	10	23	28	10	18	89
Nablus	18	37	37	30	24	146
Qalqilya	0	21	10	2	1	34
Salfit	5	9	5	3	0	22
Ramallah & Al Bireh	10	29	16	39	12	106
Jericho	4	12	10	7	5	38
Jerusalem	17	38	22	16	16	109
Bethlehem	10	34	12	4	7	67
Hebron	32	53	37	25	12	159
North Gaza	40	71	45	24	11	191
Gaza	51	124	74	46	13	308
Deir Al Balah	18	48	25	14	14	119
Khan Yunis	25	47	47	41	2	162
Rafah	10	23	36	42	1	112
Total	260	616	432	308	161	1,777

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