

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF TURNOUT IN NEW AND
ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES

MAXWELL H. ALBONE
SPRING 2018

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for baccalaureate degrees
in Political Science and Economics
with honors in Political Science

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Matthew Golder
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor, Honors Advisor

Michael Berkman
Professor of Political Science
Faculty Reader

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College.

ABSTRACT

What explains variation in voter turnout in democracies? In particular, do the same factors that influence voter turnout in established democracies affect voter turnout in new democracies? It is important to determine the factors that influence rates voter turnout, because levels of political participation are considered key indicators of the well-being and responsiveness of democracies. It is particularly important to consider these impacts new in democracies as these countries are undergoing a critical period of political transformation. Previous literature suggests that newer democracies will be less responsive to various socioeconomic, institutional, and party system factors that affect turnout in established democracies. Contrary to my theoretical expectations, with the exception of presidentialism, there are no significant differences in how these factors influence turnout in new democracies compared to established democracies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Chapter 2 Theory and Hypothesis.....	5
Socioeconomic Factors	6
Institutional Factors.....	8
Party System Factors.....	13
Chapter 3 Data and Methodology	15
Chapter 4 Replace with Chapter Title.....	20
Chapter 5 Conclusion.....	25
Appendix A Table of Country-Elections in New Democracies.....	28
Appendix B Table of Country-Elections in Old Democracies	34
BIBLIOGRAPHY	41

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Summary Statistics for Voter Turnout.....	15
Table 2. Modeling Differences in Turnout Between New and Old Democracies	21

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor and honors advisor Dr. Matt Golder as well as my faculty reader Dr. Michael Berkman, without whom I would not have been able to complete a quality undergraduate honors thesis. I also would like to, once again, thank Dr. Michael Berkman for his continued help and support in PLSC 306. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Gretchen Casper for her help in the initial process of learning to develop an idea and work through the initial stages of the project in PLSC 300. Finally, I extend my gratitude to the staff of Schreyer Honors College, whose constant willingness to help served as an important resource throughout the process of completing this thesis.

Chapter 1

Introduction

What factors influence the level of voter turnout in democratic elections? Are the impacts of these factors different in emerging democracies than they are in established democracies? From a normative perspective, society values high levels of political participation, as low levels of participation indicate unequal representation and, therefore, unequal influence (Lijphart 1996). Furthermore, a lack of political participation may denote a population that believes political involvement will have little impact on policy. Thus, voter turnout, an indicator of the most common form of political participation, represents a key indicator of the health and representativeness of democracy (Lijphart, 1996; Fornos et al., 2004). Since levels of electoral participation vary considerably across all democracies, it is important to identify what factors influence levels of turnout. In particular, it is crucial to study turnout, as an indicator of the well-being of democracy, in emerging democracies, undergoing a state of political transformation (Kostadinova, 2003).

Much research examines the causes of variation in cross-national voter turnout. Most of these studies have focused on elections in a small number of established or advanced industrialized democracies (Powell, 1982, 1986; Jackman, 1987; Blais & Carty, 1990; Jackman & Miller, 1995). Blais and Dobryznksa (1998) point out that this narrow approach of limiting cases to only a select number of older democracies leads to a relatively small number of observations and an inability to generalize results across all democracies. Therefore, the authors conduct their analysis by considering all democratic elections (Blais & Dobryznksa, 1998). While the effect of legislative structure is unclear, these studies generally find that voter turnout in advanced democracies can be

relatively well explained by institutional variables. For example, democracies with compulsory voting laws and proportional representation electoral systems foster higher turnout. The analyses that include socioeconomic variables find that more wealthy countries also have higher turnout (Powell, 1982; Blais and Dobryznska, 1998). Finally, elections in countries with a greater number of parties were found to yield lower turnouts (Jackman, 1987; Blais and Carty, 1990; Blais and Dobryznska, 1998).

More recently, research has extended towards exploring whether previous findings are applicable to new emerging democracies, which represent an inherently different political landscape (Péres-Liñán, 2001; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004; Endersby & Kriekhaus, 2008). The results of studies of turnout in new democracies are less conclusive. For example, Norris (2002) finds no evidence that compulsory voting has a significant positive impact in new democracies. Findings on the impact of PR systems in emerging democracies have yielded inconsistent findings (Péres-Liñán, 2001; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004; Endersby & Kriekhaus, 2008). These studies have also generally found socioeconomic variables to have no significant impact on turnout in emerging democracies (Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004; Endersby & Kriekhaus, 2008). While Kostadinova (2003) finds that the number of parties has a similar impact on turnout in new democracies, Péres-Liñán (2001) and Fornos et al. (2004) find no evidence that parties affect turnout. Furthermore, the bulk of the research on new democracies is limited to the analysis of a small number of cases and lacks any comparison between turnout in emerging democracies and established democracies. While Endersby and Kriekhaus (2008) offer an analysis of whether age of democracy has an influence over the impact of electoral system on voter turnout, they offer no discussion of whether the effect of other institutional, party, or socioeconomic factors depends on the age of democracy (Endersby & Kriekhaus, 2008).

Findings on the determinants of voter turnout in emerging democracies are mixed. Moreover, while some scholars have begun to look at voter turnout in new democracies, they have not made an explicit comparison with consolidated democracies. As a result, we still do not know if the factors that affect voter turnout in established democracies are significantly different from those that affect voter turnout in new democracies. In this honors thesis, I seek to remedy this problem by providing a more comprehensive investigation of turnout in both new and established democracies and examining several different types of factors in a large sample of elections across all democracies. In pursuit of this goal, I remodel an approach utilized in a number of previous works (Powell, 1982; Blais & Dobryznka, 1998; Fornos et al., 2004). Powell (1982) identifies three types of variables that determine political performance: socioeconomic setting, constitutional influence, and party factors. Furthermore, Blais and Dobryznka (1998) use this framework to research the effect of a number of different variables on turnout. Similar to Blais and Dobryznka (1998), I am interested in socioeconomic, institutional, and party effects on turnout. However, I run two analyses distinguishing between new democracies and established democracies to determine whether the results differ between democracies of different age. I, then, plan to run an interaction model to determine whether these differences are statistically significant.

The first two models report different socioeconomic, institutional, and party effects across democracies of different ages; however, the interaction model demonstrates that only one of these differences is statistically significant. The only factor that seems to differ in its effect on new democracies compared to old democracies is presidentialism. Specifically, I find that presidentialism decreases turnout by about 14.6 percent more in established democracies than it does in new democracies.

These results have strong implications for future research on turnout in emerging democracies. Studies of turnout in new democracies often report differences in the impact of many variables compared to established democracies. However, much of this research is limited to a small sample, such as Latin American democracies or Post-Communist democracies (Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004). Therefore, these results cannot be generalized to all emerging democratic regimes. Furthermore, while I find differences in the coefficients estimated by my models of new and old democracies, I do not find them to be statistically significant. Therefore, in future research, it is important run an interaction model, when comparing results across groups. By doing so, researchers will mitigate the risk of overstating the significance of their results or support for their hypothesis.

Chapter 2

Theory and Hypothesis

Voters decide to vote based on the perceived costs and benefits associated with casting their vote. This can be demonstrated by the following equation representing the expected utility of casting a vote (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). This equation is the most commonly utilized theoretical framework explaining voter turnout.

$$R = pB - C + D$$

In this equation, the benefits are B, the difference in benefits attained from the victory of the preferred candidate over the less preferred candidate, discounted by p, the probability of casting a decisive vote, and D, the benefits felt as a result of doing one's civic duty. These benefits, along with the costs associated with voting, determine the utility gained from casting a vote. As long as the benefits of voting exceed the costs, a rational actor will cast a vote because they will gain utility. Therefore, any factor that changes either the benefits or costs associated with voting (or not voting) should also affect the level of electoral participation. Finally, any factor that changes the probability of casting a decisive voting will affect turnout.

Several studies have attempted to explain cross-national variation in voter turnout. These authors take a variety of approaches in their investigations of turnout. Most commonly, authors have considered theoretical arguments that focus on the impact of the socioeconomic environment, the institutional setting, and the party system. However, the majority of the literature on voter turnout is limited to analysis of advanced democracies. While there are some studies that examine turnout in new democracies, these studies are often restricted to a small number of cases rarely

make explicit comparisons between turnout in new democracies and established democracies. Consequently, we do not know whether many of the factors affecting turnout have a statistically significantly different impact in new democracies. Therefore, I plan to test the effects of several socioeconomic, institutional, and party system variables on a sample of new democracies and a sample of consolidated democracies. Finally, I will compare the differences in the effects calculated in each model to determine whether they are statistically significant.

Socioeconomic Factors

A number of studies have investigated the effect of the socioeconomic atmosphere on the level of voter turnout. In particular, economic development is often thought to have a significant impact on a democracy's level of turnout. For example, in Powell's investigation of how modernization affects political performance, he finds that higher levels of GNP per capita lead to greater levels of turnout (Powell, 1982). He attributes these findings to higher levels of information and political awareness in more economically developed countries (Powell, 1982). There is strong evidence in the literature to support Powell's hypothesis that greater economic development fosters higher levels of turnout. Blais and Dobryznska (1998) reinforce the previous findings using sample of a greater number of democracies. Furthermore, Norris (2002) finds that postindustrial democracies have greater levels of voter turnout than industrial democracies.

Research of the impact of economic development in new democracies has not found the level of economic development to significantly impact turnout. For example, Fornos et al. (2004) finds that GDP per capita has no impact on turnout from 1980 to 2000 in their sample of Latin American Democracies. Moreover, Kriekhaus and Endersby (2008) also find that GDP per capita

has no significant effect on turnout from 1972 to 2000 in his large sample of democracies. However, neither provide any theoretical explanation for their surprising results. I see no reason why the level of economic development should differ in its impact on turnout in new democracies compared to old democracies. Therefore, similar to Powell (1982), I believe that voters in both new and old democracies will have a greater level of information and political awareness. This means that voters in more economically developed democracies will be more likely to vote, because they have a greater understanding of the benefits associated with the victory of their preferred candidate.

Economic Development Hypothesis: Higher levels of economic development leads to greater turnout in both new democracies and old democracies.

It is also important to consider how changes in the economic environment of a country affect voter turnout. For example, it is thought economic booms and busts may have an impact on a citizen's willingness to participate politically. Rosenstone (1982) finds that economic adversity depresses turnout by causing citizens to shift their focus away from politics towards personal anxieties. However, Radcliffe (1992) offers several potential outcomes resulting from downturns in the economy. These include increases in political participation as a means of seeking redress of grievance, withdrawal from the political process due to preoccupation with personal concerns, and no impact on political involvement (Radcliffe, 1992). Many of the studies of voter turnout that analyze the impact of economic change find that it has little impact on turnout. For example, Blais and Dobryzanska (1998) find that growth in GNP per capita impacts voter turnout neither statistically nor substantively. Furthermore, case studies of turnout in relatively newer democracies similarly found no effect (Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004). I believe that some voters will

view the benefits of voting as greater during economic downturns, because they view the act as a means of ending the economic crisis. However, other voters will shift their focus toward personal concerns and view the opportunity cost of casting a vote as greater. Therefore, I believe there will be no resulting impact from downturns in the economy on turnout in either new or old democracies.

Economic Change Hypothesis: Changes in the economic conditions
is not associated with changes in turnout in new or old democracies

Institutional Factors

As I have indicated earlier, I seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of factors that impact voter in early and established democracies; therefore, I also will research the impact of institutions on rates electoral participation. One important institutional variable that has largely been found as the most impactful in the literature on institutions and turnout is compulsory voting. The reasoning behind this impact is clear. Sanctions imposed on those that choose not to vote increase the cost of not voting and thus increase turnout. Jackman (1987) finds that compulsory voting bolsters turnout by about 13 percent in his sample of industrial democracies. Much of the research on established democracies since has shown support for this estimate. For example, in their examination of whether PR systems foster turnout, Blais and Carty (1990) finds that compulsory voting laws increase turnout by 11.8 percent. Moreover, Blais and Dobryznska (1998) estimate similar increases in their more comprehensive study.

The research on the effect compulsory voting laws in newer democracies, however, is less conclusive. For example, Norris (2002) finds that compulsory voting laws have a strong positive impact only in older democracies. In new democracies, though, she estimates that the effect on

turnout is very weak or even slightly negative. Norris posits that this result may be due to an inability to enforce strict laws in new democracies, the presence of social norms that emphasize adherence to the law, or the implementation of ineffective laws to bolster turnout in new democracies characterized by low levels of turnout (Norris, 2002). Endersby and Kriekhaus (2008) find that compulsory voting has a statistically significant positive impact of 10.64 in old democracies; however, they find that similar laws have impact of 7.01 percent, significant at only the .05 level, in new democracies. Fornos et al. (2004), though, find that compulsory voting laws had a significant positive impact in both legislative and presidential elections in their analysis of turnout in Latina American democracies from 1980 to 2000. I believe that compulsory voting will have a strong positive impact in established democracies by imposing a greater cost on those that do not vote. However, I expect that this impact is lesser in new democracies, because new democracies less capable of effective enforcing these laws and impose a lesser cost on those that choose not to vote.

Compulsory Voting Hypothesis: Compulsory voting has a stronger positive impact on turnout in old democracies than it does in established democracies

Another institutional factor thought to have some impact on turnout in the type of electoral system employed in any given democracy. Jackman (1987) takes into account electoral rules and size districts in his analysis, finding that the variable he calls “nationally competitive districts” fosters greater levels of turnout. He reasons that there are many seats, where there is no doubt about the eventual winner, in single member district plurality systems. Therefore, in PR systems, fewer voters believe that their vote does not matter, and parties have a greater incentive to mobilize all voters (Jackman, 1987). In support of Jackman’s results, the estimates of Blais and Carty (1990)

indicate that PR systems lead to greater levels of turnout in advanced democracies; however, they find Jackman's rationale insufficient through their analysis of a number of intervening variables. In a comprehensive study of both established and emerging democracies, the results of Blais and Dobryznska (1998) report PR systems as only a weak determinant of turnout.

The literature focused on emerging democracies has led to mixed results. PR systems were found to increase turnout by 7.75 percent in post-communist, but nationally competitive districts were found to depress turnout in Latin American democracies (Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004). Finally, Endersby and Kriekhaus (2008) test the hypothesis that PR systems have a lesser impact in new democracies, as voters have not had many opportunities to witness how electoral systems determine the competitiveness of elections and political outcomes. The authors find that PR systems have only marginal statistical significance in older democracies and no statistical significance in new democracies. Furthermore, they report PR systems have essentially the same substantive impact across their two samples. I believe that voters are less likely to turnout under majoritarian electoral systems because they believe they are more likely to believe that their vote does not matter and are less likely to believe that they could potentially cast a decisive vote. However, voters in new democracies have had relatively less experience in witnessing the outcomes of previous elections. Therefore, they are less likely to know whether an election will be competitive and are less likely to act strategically by refraining from voting.

PR System Hypothesis: PR systems have a stronger positive impact on turnout in established democracies than they do in new democracies.

The next variable that I will use to analyze the effect of early and established democracies' institutional environment on their rates of turnout is legislative structure. Jackman (1987) finds

that turnout is significantly higher in industrial democracies whose legislatures are made up of only one chamber. He argues that this is due to the fact that voters understand that lower house elections play a less decisive role in determining policy outcome, when power must be shared between two chambers (Jackman, 1987). Blais and Carty (1990) find, however, that unicameralism has no significant impact on turnout in established democracies.

Similarly, the literature on emerging democracies is split on the subject of whether unicameralism effects levels of turnout. For example, Pérez-Liñan (2001) finds that unicameralism has no significant influence on the level of Latin American democracies from 1980 to 1991. However, Fornos et al. (2004) find in their analysis of Latin American democracies that unicameralism has a statistically significant positive impact on voter turnout in both legislative and presidential elections. I believe that the results of my analysis will indicate that democracies with unicameral legislatures will have higher levels of turnout, because voters will consider the benefits of voting greater in democracies with unicameral legislatures that do not split power between two chambers. However, I expect to find that the legislative structure in emerging democracies has a less substantial impact. This is because voters in new democracies have not had sufficient time to observe the relative power of each chamber, and thus will not consider this when deciding whether to cast a vote.

Unicameralism Hypothesis: Unicameralism has a stronger positive impact on turnout in established democracies than it does in new democracies.

Then next variable that I plan to test for an impact on turnout in both new democracies and established democracies is the presence of direct presidential elections. Jackman (1987) posits that the presence of direct presidential elections is unlikely to have a considerable effect on the level

of turnout in a democracy. However, Blais and Carty (1990) suggest that because the presence of direct presidential elections increase the number of voting opportunities, it may decrease the probability that voters choose to vote in any particular election. That being said, Blais and Carty (1990) find no evidence that democracies, which directly elect heads of state, have significantly different levels of turnout than those, which do not. Since the research on how presidential elections effect turnout are limited a small number of established democracies, I plan to test the effect of this variable in a larger sample of democracies and compare results across democracies of different ages. Like Jackman (1987), I do not anticipate that presidentialism will have a significant impact on levels of turnout.

Presidentialism Hypothesis: Presidentialism is not related to changes in turnout in either new or old democracies.

The last variable that I analyze for the effect of institutions is the policy of holding legislative elections concurrently with presidential elections in democracies that elect a head of state. Since presidential elections are often considered more important, scholars believe that turnout is higher in presidential elections. Therefore, there is a coattail effect in legislative elections that are held simultaneously with presidential elections. In the United States, legislative elections held in presidential election years were found to have greater levels of turnout than those held in midterm election years (Fornos et al., 2004). Furthermore, Franklin (1996) finds evidence that voter turnout is lower in any elections that do not have executive implications. Finally, Fornos et al. (2004) find that elections held concurrently in Latin American from 1980 to 2000 had higher levels of turnout than those that were not. I believe that voter view the benefits of voting as greater in presidential elections; therefore, voter turnout should be greater in legislative elections that are

held concurrently with presidential elections. However, I do not believe the effect of concurrent elections differs between new democracies and old democracies

Concurrent Elections Hypothesis: Holding legislative elections concurrently with presidential elections will increase turnout in both new and old democracies.

Party System Factors

The last hypotheses that I wish to investigate are those regarding the effect of party system size. Jackman (1987) presents two differing hypotheses of how multipartyism affect electoral participation. First, he lays out more intuitive proposition that a greater number of parties provides more options for voters, and increases the chance that voters will find platforms that match their own policy preferences. Then, Jackman suggests an alternate hypothesis that a greater number of parties may lead lower levels of turnout, because democracies with a large number of parties must form coalition government. Consequently, the likely policy outcomes of these governments may be ambiguous and subject to compromises made between many parties. In this scenario, although voters have the opportunity to vote for a party that shares their policy preferences, they concede much more of their influence over policy to the legislature that is formed by a coalition many parties (Downs, 1957; Jackman 1987). Ultimately, Jackman reports that multipartyism has a negative effect on turnout. Several subsequent studies provide evidence in support of the original findings of Jackman. For example, Blais and Carty (1990) find that a greater effective number of parties leads to slightly lower turnout in advanced democracies. Blais and Dobryznska (1998) find that this result holds in their investigation of a wider variety of democracies.

Results on the effect of parties on turnout in new democracies are mixed. For example, Kostadinova (2003) presents results, similar to those in established democracies, in new post-communist democracies. However, Pérez-Liñan (2001) and Fornos et al. (2004) found that effective number of parties has no statistically significant impact on levels of turnout in new Latin American democracies. Like changes in economic conditions, it is difficult to predict the effect number of parties on turnout given that there are competing hypotheses, both of which are reasonable. This difficulty is compounded by the results described by both Blais & Carty (1990) and Blais & Dobryznska (1998), which, contrary to the Jackman's reasoning, indicate that turnout is not higher in elections that yield single party majority governments. I believe that a greater number of parties will lead to a decrease in turnout, because voters will view the benefits of casting their vote as lower due to likelihood of compromise on policy issues in governments with a greater number of parties. Furthermore, I believe that a mutltipartyism will depress turnout less in emerging democracies, because voters will have relatively fewer elections to observe whether each party is likely to win enough seats to influence policy. Therefore, voters in new democracies will be less likely to act strategically.

Multipartyism Hypothesis: Multipartyism has a stronger negative impact on turnout in established democracies than it has in new democracies.

Chapter 3

Data and Methodology

Following conventions in existing literature, I construct my sample using the Polity IV dataset scores to determine whether a country is a democracy in any given year. The dataset scores every country with a population of over 500,000 on a scale from -10 to 10 based on regime authority from the period of 1800 to 2016. Each country with a score of 6 or greater is considered to be a democracy. To distinguish between relatively new and old democracies, I will utilize a cutoff developed by Lijphart et al. (1999) and later used by Endersby and Krickhaus (2008). This cutoff classifies countries considered democracies for 19 years or fewer as new democracies and any others as old democracies. My unit of analysis is the country-election and, I include all democratic elections to the lower chamber of the national legislative body of each of the democracies in the sample for which data are available. If elections are carried in two rounds, voter turnout data is included for only the second round elections. I have been able to collect data on 938 elections held in 112 different democracies from 1946 to 2016. Of these elections, 449 occur in 103 new democracies and 534 occur in 70 old democracies. The summary statistics for voter turnout are listed below in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary Statistics for Voter Turnout

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Voter Turnout	982	67.17	15.61	20.65	99.57
Voter Turnout (New Democracies)	449	64.57	15.65	20.65	96.85
Voter Turnout (Old Democracies)	533	69.36	15.24	23.88	99.57

The average turnout rate is lower in new democracies than it is in old democracies. Using a difference-in-means test, I find that the difference between the means in the two groups is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).

My measure of turnout is the percentage of age-eligible voters that cast a vote. As Powell (1986) and Blais and Dobryznska (1998) point out, there are a number of problems with this measure. For example, voting eligibility is normally restricted to citizens; however, population figures used to calculate the number of age eligible voters include illegal aliens, who are barred from voting. That being said the percentage of registered voters that a cast a vote, the measure employed by Blais and Dobryznska (1998), also has its disadvantages. The percentage of registered voters that cast a vote is not an accurate measure of percentage of citizens that have chosen to cast a vote because this measure does not take into account citizens that were not sufficiently motivated to register to vote (Endersby & Krieckhaus, 2008). Therefore, in my analysis I use the percentage of age-eligible voters to measure electoral participation. The source for this data comes from the International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance.

As I have stated previously, I test the effects of three categories of variables on voter turnout. The first category of variables is the socioeconomic variables. To evaluate the hypothesis that the level of economic development impacts only established democracies' turnout, I use GDP per capita in 1990 international prices acquired from The Maddison Project (2018) as a measure of economic development in each country. It is likely the relationship between economic development and turnout is non-linear. That is, adequate turnout requires some level of economic development beyond which the further development has little impact (Blais & Dobryznska). Therefore, I take the log of GDP per capita to conduct my analysis, because the marginal effect of income on turnout should decline as income increases. I have also lagged GDP by one year due to

the assumption that rational voters will make decisions in elections in any given year based on what has occurred in previous years. Furthermore, to evaluate the hypothesis that economic decline has no effect on turnout, I use change in GDP per capita in 1990 international prices from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project to capture the current state of the economy.

To measure the impact of institutions on voter turnout, I consider the impact of compulsory voting laws on turnout using data taken from the International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance. This variable too is represented as a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for countries that have compulsory voting and 0 for those that do not. I first consider the impact of a country's electoral system. Next, to test the effect of electoral systems, I have gathered electoral systems data from the Democratic Electoral Systems, 1946-2016 dataset. I code PR systems as a dichotomous variable in which 1 indicates that a country employs a PR system and 0 indicates that it does not. In cases of mixed electoral systems, I have coded mixed independent systems as 0 and mixed dependent systems as 1. Moreover, I test the effect of legislative structure on levels of electoral participation. To operationalize this concept, I obtained data on the number of chambers in the legislature of each democracy from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. I have also used a dichotomous variable to represent countries that have unicameral legislatures. 1 represents countries that have unicameral legislatures and 0 represents countries that have any other legislative structure. Finally, I will test for the effect of presidential elections that are held simultaneously with the elections of the lower house of the legislature. To measure this effect, I have created a dichotomous variable, which takes the value of 1 if a regime elects a president and 0 if it does not, using data from the Democratic Electoral Systems, 1946-2016 dataset. I also created a separate dichotomous variable that indicates whether a legislative election in any given year was held concurrently with a presidential election using data from the International Institute

for Democracy and International Assistance. Elections that are held concurrently are indicated as 1 and those that are not are indicated as 0. By interacting these two dichotomous variables, I am able to test for the effect of concurrent elections held in presidential regimes.

To capture the effect of party system size on turnout, I use the measure developed by Laasko and Taagepera (1979) to calculate the effective number of electoral parties. This formula, seen below, weighs the party count by the relative strength of each party measure by voteshare.

$$\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n v_i^2}$$

In this formula, v_i refers to the vote share of each individual party i . I have acquired data for the effective number of electoral parties in each country from the Democratic Electoral Systems, 1946-2016 dataset.

Given the nature of my dependent variable, I use OLS regression to examine socioeconomic, institutional, and party effects on voter turnout in a wide variety of democracies. I run three models in my analysis. The first model will test the effect of each independent variable on the voter turnout in new democracies. The second model will test the effect of each variable in consolidated democracies. The functional form of the first two models is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TURNOUT} = & a + b_1 \text{GDP per capita} + b_2 \text{Change in GDP per capita} + b_3 \text{Compulsory Voting} \\ & + b_4 \text{PR} + b_5 \text{Unicameralism} + b_6 \text{Multipartyism} + b_7 \text{Presidentialism} \\ & + b_8 \text{Presidentialism} * \text{Concurrent Elections} + E \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the third model uses a combined sample of all democracies. This model interacts a dichotomous variable in which 1 constitutes new democracy and 0 constitutes old democracy with each independent variable to determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the two groups. The functional form of this model is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{TURNOUT} = & a + b_1 \text{GDP per capita} + b_2 \text{Change in GDP per capita} + b_3 \text{Compulsory Voting} \\
& + b_4 \text{PR} + b_5 \text{Unicameralism} + b_6 \text{Multipartyism} + b_7 \text{Presidentialism} \\
& + b_8 \text{Concurrent Elections} + b_9 \text{New Democracy} + b_{10} \text{GDP per capita} \\
& * \text{New Democracy} + b_{11} \text{Change in GDP per capita} * \text{New Democracy} \\
& + b_{12} \text{Compulsory Voting} * \text{New Democracy} + b_{13} \text{PR} * \text{New Democracy} \\
& + b_{14} \text{Unicameralism} * \text{New Democracy} + b_{15} \text{Multipartyism} \\
& * \text{New Democracy} + b_{16} \text{Presidentialism} * \text{New Democracy} \\
& + b_{17} \text{Presidentialism} * \text{Concurrent Elections} * \text{New Democracy} + E
\end{aligned}$$

This framework serves as an effective way to determine the specific impact of several different determinants of voter turnout. Having defined and operationalized my concepts, I can conduct my analysis, present my results, and discuss the compare the impact of each of my variables on voter turnout across democracies of different ages.

Chapter 4

Replace with Chapter Title

The results of the models are presented below in Table 2. The first variables shown are those representing the potential socioeconomic determinants of turnout. In new democracies, I find that the level of economic development has a statistically significant positive impact on turnout. More specifically, every one-unit increase in logged GDP per capita leads to a 3.74 percentage point increase in voter turnout in emerging democracies. The results indicate, however, that level of economic development has only a weakly significant positive impact in old democracies. Every one-unit increase in logged GDP per capita in new democracies leads to only a 1.62 percentage point increase in voter turnout in established democracies; however, this result is only significant at an alpha level of .05. These findings contradict my hypothesis that level of economic development has a significant positive impact in both new and old democracies. Furthermore, these results are interesting in that they contradict much of the existing literature on how socioeconomic factors affect democracies of different age.

While level of economic development seemed to have a strong impact on voter turnout in new democracies, changes in the state of the economy appear to have no significant influence on turnout in new democracies. Furthermore, increases in GDP per capita have only a weakly significant positive impact on established democracies. This evidence provides support for my hypothesis that changes in the economy will significantly impact voter turnout in neither emerging nor established democracies. However, the weakly significant positive sign on the coefficient in the model of turnout in established democracies offers some support for the hypothesis posed by Rosenstone (1982) that downturns in the economy cause citizens to shift their focus toward personal concerns rather than political concerns.

Table 2. Modeling Differences in Turnout Between New and Old Democracies

Variables	New Democracies	Old Democracies	Interaction Model
<i>SOCIOECONOMIC</i>			
GDP per capita	3.74*** (1.05)	1.62 (0.91)	1.62 (1.00)
Change in GDP per capita	-0.01 (0.17)	0.42* (0.20)	0.42 (0.22)
<i>INSTITUTIONAL</i>			
Compulsory Voting	6.78*** (1.848)	9.42*** (1.450)	9.42*** (1.604)
PR	7.14*** (1.85)	11.18*** (1.47)	11.18*** (1.63)
Unicameralism	2.51 (1.635)	4.29** (1.362)	4.29** (1.506)
Presidentialism	-5.22** (1.89)	-19.82*** (1.48)	-19.82*** (1.63)
Presidentialism*Concurrent Elections	1.39 (2.03)	1.55 (2.03)	1.55 (2.25)
<i>PARTY SYSTEM</i>			
Multipartyism	-1.35*** (0.41)	-1.19** (0.38)	-1.19** (0.42)
<i>INTERACTIONS</i>			
New Dem.			-21.64 (12.34)
GDP per capita*New Dem.			2.12 (1.38)
Change in GDP per capita*New Dem.			-0.43 (0.27)
Compulsory Voting*New Dem.			-2.64 (2.32)
PR*New Dem.			-4.04 (2.34)
Unicameralism*New Dem.			-1.78 (2.11)
Presidentialism*New Dem.			14.60*** (2.37)
Presidentialism*Concurrent Elections*New Dem.			-0.16 (2.91)
Multipartyism*New Dem.			-0.17 (0.56)
Constant	35.60*** (8.70)	57.24*** (8.60)	57.24*** (9.51)
R-squared	0.205	0.487	0.379
Observations	319	387	706

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The models of new and old democracies also indicate that several institutional variables impact the level of turnout in both new democracies and old democracies. For example, compulsory voting has a strong positive impact on turnout in democracies of all ages. Democracies that employ compulsory voting laws are found to have turnout 6.78 percentage points higher than those that do not in my sample of new democracies. On the other hand, I estimate established democracies that utilize compulsory voting laws have turnout 9.42 percentage points greater than those that do not. These estimates appear to provide support for my hypothesis that compulsory voting laws have a greater impact in established democracies, because they are more capable of enforcing mandatory voting laws. However, I show in the interaction model that the difference between the effects calculated in the two models is not statistically significant. Therefore, there is no evidence that compulsory voting laws affect the level of turnout differently in new democracies than they do in old democracies.

The results also indicate that choice of electoral system also has a significant influence on voter turnout. Democracies that employ PR electoral system in early democracies turnout that is 7.14 percentage points higher than democracies that do not. Moreover, Older democracies that utilize PR systems have levels of turnout greater by about 11.18 percentage points. While these findings also seem support the hypothesis that voters in new democracies have not had ample time to view the impact of electoral systems on political outcome and act strategically in their decision to vote as a result, the interaction model shows that these coefficients are not statistically different from one another.

The results of the model of turnout in new democracies indicate that unicameralism has no significant impact. However, the model of established democracies suggests that democracies that have only one chamber in the legislature have turnout that is estimated to be 4.29 percentage points

greater than turnout in those that have two or more chambers. This result is significant at an alpha level of .01. Although the first two models indicate that unicameralism has an impact significantly different from 0 only in old democracies, the interaction model shows that the results do not support the hypothesis unicameral legislatures will have a lesser impact on turnout in new democracies.

The first two models show that presidentialism has a statistically significant impact in both new democracies and old democracies. Specifically, presidentialism decreases turnout by 5.22 percentage points in new democracies and decreases turnout by 19.82 percentage points in old democracies. These results contradict the hypothesis that the presence of direct presidential elections has no significant impact on turnout in either new or established democracies. Furthermore, the interaction model indicates that presidentialism has a statistically significantly different impact in new democracies compared to old democracies. In particular, the presence of direct presidential elections decreases turnout by about 14.6 percentage point more in established democracies than it does in developing democracies. This also contradicts the presidentialism hypothesis, because presidentialism has a considerably different impact on turnout in established democracies than it does in new democracies.

The last institutional variable, concurrent elections, is found to be significant in neither the model of turnout in new democracies nor the model of turnout in established democracies. This is contrary to my hypothesis that holding legislative elections simultaneously with presidential elections would have a significant positive impact in both early democracies and consolidated democracies.

Finally, the models demonstrate that party system size has some impact on turnout in both emerging democracies and developed democracies. I find that multipartyism has a negative impact

in new democracies that is significant to the .001 level. In particular, the results indicate that for every one party increase in effective number of electoral parties, voter turnout is depressed by 1.35 percentage points. Moreover, multipartyism has a negative impact in older democracies, though this coefficient is only significant to the .05 level. The impact of an increase of one party in established democracies is a decrease in turnout of 1.19 percentage points. These findings contradict the hypothesis that parties have a less significant impact in new democracies, because voters have had fewer elections to observe whether each party is capable of winning enough seats to influence policy outcomes.

Recall that the third model tests to determine whether the differences in the coefficients estimated in the first two models are statistically significant. While the majority of the variables have a significant impact on voter turnout in the sample of all democracies at least at the .05 level, only one variable is found to have a statistically different impact in new democracies and old democracies. Consequently, we cannot say with confidence that any of these variables have a significantly different impact in new democracies with the exception of presidentialism. Excluding presidentialism, though, it is not clear that any of the hypotheses predicting how socioeconomic, institutional, and party factors influence turnout in emerging and consolidated democracies are supported by the data when subject to greater scrutiny under the interaction model.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this undergraduate honors thesis, I investigate how the socioeconomic environment, institutional setting, and party system of new and established democracies affect their turnout. Furthermore, I test to determine whether these factors have a statistically different impact in democracies of different ages. It is important to investigate what determines turnout, because the level political participation is often considered a critical indicator of how well a democracy is functioning and how responsive the government is to its citizens. It is especially important to examine turnout in emerging democracies, as these governments are undergoing a critical period of political transformation. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the findings on determinants of turnout in established democracies hold in democracies in transition.

I conduct my analysis of voter turnout using a large sample elections held in all democracies from 1946 to 2016. Then, following the work of Lijphart et al. (1999) and later used by Endersby and Krickhaus (2008), I break up my sample into early democracies, those that have existed for 19 years or fewer, and old democracies, those that have existed for 20 years or more. I measure the effect of the socioeconomic environment on turnout using GDP per capita and change in GDP per capita. To measure the effect of the institutional setting on turnout, I use compulsory voting, electoral system, legislative structure, presidentialism, and concurrent elections. Finally, to measure the effect of party systems on voter turnout, I use effective number of electoral parties. In my analysis, I run three OLS regressions: one modeling turnout in new democracies, one

modeling turnout I consolidated democracies, and the last modeling differences between the effects of each variable in the first two models.

The results of the first two models yield different estimates for the influence the socioeconomic variables on turnout. For example, GDP per capita has a more significant impact in new democracies, but changes in GDP per capita have a more significant impact in older democracies. Furthermore, the models generate different results for the effect of institutions on turnout in the two models. Each institutional factor, with the exception of concurrent elections, has a more pronounced impact on voter turnout in established democracies than emerging democracies. Finally, the finding from first two models show that multipartyism has a more substantively and statistically significant in new democracies.

I continue my analysis of turnout by constructing an interaction model to determine whether the apparent differences in the estimated effects of different variables on turnout in democracies of different ages are statistically significant. While the socioeconomic environment, institutional setting, and party system appear to have different effects in each model, the interaction model shows that only one, presidentialism, has a statistically different effect on turnout depending on the age of the democracy. The data, therefore, shows no support for my hypotheses that the socioeconomic, institution, and party factors have significantly different effects in democracies of different ages.

While my results do not show support for my hypotheses regarding the strength of different factors in determining turnout in emerging and established democracies, the results have important implications for future research. Much of the literature on turnout in emerging democracies is in the form of case studies that provide no explicit comparison of results with consolidated democracies; therefore, it is unclear, based on these works, whether turnout responds differently

to certain factors in these cases than it does in well-established democracies (Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004). Furthermore, studies that compare turnout across democracies of different of different political contexts fail to test whether the estimated effects of their variables are statistically different from one another (Norris, 2004; Krieckhaus & Endersby; 2008). Therefore, it is important that future research, investigating turnout in emerging democracies use interactions to test whether difference in effects of each variable on turnout to ensure so that the strength of the findings is not overstated.

Appendix A

Table of Country-Elections in New Democracies

Country	Year	Turnout	Country	Year	Turnout
Haiti	1990	52.69	Bulgaria	2005	62.41
Haiti	1995	33.07	Moldova	1994	64.13
Dominican Republic	1962	69.71	Moldova	1998	56.98
Dominican Republic	1986	60.7	Moldova	2001	63.77
Dominican Republic	1990	45.84	Moldova	2005	48.66
Dominican Republic	1998	45.62	Moldova	2009	46.36
Dominican Republic	2002	47.03	Moldova	2010	50.21
Dominican Republic	2006	56.4	Romania	1996	78.2
Dominican Republic	2010	58.57	Romania	2000	62.16
Jamaica	1962	73.65	Romania	2004	62.26
Jamaica	1967	54.86	Romania	2008	40.48
Jamaica	1972	57.27	Romania	2012	42.81
Jamaica	1976	84.83	Russian Federation	2003	54.34
Trinidad and Tobago	1966	67.91	Estonia	1992	40.93
Trinidad and Tobago	1971	25.59	Estonia	1995	48.84
Trinidad and Tobago	1976	64.25	Estonia	1999	45.95
Mexico	1997	54.36	Estonia	2003	48.12
Mexico	2000	48.2	Estonia	2007	53.44
Mexico	2003	43.44	Latvia	1993	57.72
Mexico	2006	63.62	Latvia	1995	50.64
Mexico	2012	63.71	Latvia	1998	51.91
Mexico	2015	48.93	Latvia	2002	55.08
Guatemala	1999	31.13	Latvia	2006	50.18
Guatemala	2003	49.28	Lithuania	1992	70.21
Guatemala	2007	57.19	Lithuania	1996	49.96
Guatemala	2011	69.99	Lithuania	2000	50.43
Honduras	1989	75.71	Lithuania	2004	43.33
Honduras	1993	63.49	Lithuania	2008	46.15
Honduras	1997	67.98	Ukraine	1994	73.42
Honduras	2001	72.34	Ukraine	1998	68.11
Honduras	2005	50.69	Ukraine	2002	69.57
El Salvador	1985	48.27	Ukraine	2006	67.2
El Salvador	1988	43.46	Ukraine	2007	62.73
El Salvador	1991	43.97	Ukraine	2012	55.94
El Salvador	1994	51.14	Georgia	2004	42.77

El Salvador	2000	37.95	Georgia	2008	51.7
Nicaragua	1990	73.33	Georgia	2012	59
Nicaragua	1996	76.25	Georgia	2016	46.98
Nicaragua	2001	75.13	Finland	1945	74.61
Nicaragua	2006	80.82	Finland	1948	79.36
Panama	1994	70.13	Finland	1951	73.96
Panama	1999	76.07	Finland	1954	80.27
Panama	2004	79.66	Finland	1958	74.71
Colombia	1958	65.04	Finland	1962	85.46
Colombia	1960	42.84	Norway	1945	71.35
Colombia	1962	49.82	Norway	1949	80.55
Colombia	1964	35.73	Norway	1953	79.55
Colombia	1966	38.5	Norway	1957	76.94
Colombia	1968	30.71	Norway	1961	77.67
Colombia	1970	45.96	Denmark	1945	80.65
Colombia	1974	48.4	Denmark	1947	79.98
Venezuela, RB	1958	79.66	Denmark	1950	76.57
Venezuela, RB	1963	78.26	Denmark	1953	75.48
Venezuela, RB	1968	84.63	Denmark	1957	82.09
Venezuela, RB	1973	81.07	Denmark	1960	85.91
Guyana	1992	63.71	Cabo Verde	1991	71.75
Guyana	1997	80.16	Cabo Verde	1995	79.48
Guyana	2001	72.56	Cabo Verde	2001	65.85
Guyana	2006	66.44	Cabo Verde	2006	79.98
Ecuador	1979	42.54	Guinea-Bissau	2008	64.25
Ecuador	1984	56.05	Guinea-Bissau	2014	79.07
Ecuador	1986	64.93	Gambia, The	1972	44.15
Ecuador	1988	67.03	Gambia, The	1977	68.17
Ecuador	1990	64.68	Gambia, The	1982	56.86
Ecuador	1994	66.3	Mali	1992	24.84
Ecuador	1996	67.83	Mali	1997	25.01
Peru	1980	58.01	Mali	2002	20.65
Peru	1985	64.85	Mali	2007	33.32
Peru	1990	56.9	Senegal	2001	40.99
Peru	2001	78.61	Senegal	2007	27.59
Peru	2006	84.09	Senegal	2012	30.27
Peru	2011	87.41	Benin	1991	46.54
Peru	2016	89.58	Benin	1995	73.65
Brazil	1958	35.72	Benin	1999	65.85
Brazil	1986	70.42	Benin	2003	52.2
Brazil	1990	76.57	Benin	2007	61.83
Brazil	1994	79.88	Niger	1993	34.09
Brazil	1998	81.03	Niger	1995	37.19
Brazil	2002	68.37	Niger	2004	43.44

Bolivia	1985	65.15	Niger	2011	45.64
Bolivia	1989	50.98	Burkina Faso	2015	36.45
Bolivia	1993	50.01	Liberia	2011	67.39
Bolivia	1997	64.54	Sierra Leone	2007	72.06
Paraguay	1993	45.42	Sierra Leone	2012	76.84
Paraguay	1998	59.38	Ghana	1979	37.11
Paraguay	2003	47.47	Ghana	2004	79.98
Paraguay	2008	49.86	Ghana	2008	66.59
Chile	1965	50.03	Ghana	2012	82.05
Chile	1969	45.71	Ghana	2016	70.88
Chile	1989	86.3	Nigeria	1979	41.13
Chile	1993	81.91	Nigeria	1983	58.23
Chile	1997	73.14	Nigeria	2015	32.11
Chile	2001	66.95	Central African Republic	2016	27.05
Chile	2005	63.65	Uganda	1962	31.92
Argentina	1973	74.99	Kenya	2002	38.51
Argentina	1983	77.52	Kenya	2007	54.49
Argentina	1985	77.76	Kenya	2013	54.99
Argentina	1987	80.14	Burundi	2005	70.39
Argentina	1989	82.07	Burundi	2010	50.81
Argentina	1991	89.41	Zambia	1991	34.24
Argentina	1993	78.09	Zambia	2011	42.25
Argentina	1995	79.77	Zambia	2016	51.19
Argentina	1997	78.07	Malawi	1994	67.94
Argentina	1999	81.32	Malawi	1999	92.48
Argentina	2001	72.99	Malawi	2004	55.32
Uruguay	1954	50.88	Malawi	2009	50.9
Uruguay	1958	54.33	Malawi	2014	64.04
Uruguay	1962	59.98	South Africa	1994	85.53
Uruguay	1966	66.85	South Africa	1999	63.86
Uruguay	1989	96.85	South Africa	2004	56.77
Uruguay	1994	96.11	South Africa	2009	56.57
Uruguay	1999	94.58	Namibia	1994	63.78
Netherlands	1946	85.47	Namibia	1999	61.71
Netherlands	1948	85.14	Namibia	2004	80.23
Netherlands	1952	86.87	Lesotho	1993	59.6
Netherlands	1956	88.07	Lesotho	2002	49.61
Netherlands	1959	88.76	Lesotho	2007	38.63
Netherlands	1963	87.95	Lesotho	2012	50.32
Belgium	1946	42.01	Lesotho	2015	49.77
Belgium	1949	88.23	Botswana	1969	37.46
Belgium	1950	86.31	Botswana	1974	26.21
Belgium	1954	88.5	Botswana	1979	46.37
Belgium	1958	89.25	Botswana	1984	54.18

Belgium	1961	87.96	Madagascar	1993	54.14
Luxembourg	1945	74.95	Madagascar	1998	40.64
Luxembourg	1951	37.29	Madagascar	2002	50.87
Luxembourg	1954	73.14	Comoros	2015	49.41
Luxembourg	1959	74.29	Mauritius	1976	84.43
France	1946	73.73	Mauritius	1982	91.46
France	1951	68.49	Mauritius	1983	77.04
France	1956	74.26	Tunisia	2014	45.39
France	1973	70.63	Sudan	1968	27.77
France	1978	63.4	Turkey	1950	77.77
France	1981	63.92	Turkey	1961	75.08
France	1986	69.91	Turkey	1969	59.25
Spain	1979	72.32	Turkey	1973	56.68
Spain	1982	83.11	Turkey	1977	66.79
Spain	1986	73.72	Turkey	1983	75.54
Spain	1989	71.28	Turkey	1987	91.78
Spain	1993	77.43	Turkey	1991	79.79
Spain	1996	80.56	Turkey	1995	79.05
Portugal	1976	83.29	Turkey	1999	80.38
Portugal	1979	88.25	Iraq	2014	76.81
Portugal	1980	87.91	Lebanon	2005	54.75
Portugal	1983	77.43	Lebanon	2009	66.34
Portugal	1985	79.69	Israel	1949	65.53
Portugal	1987	78.15	Israel	1951	72.77
Portugal	1991	77.71	Israel	1955	82.17
Germany	1990	73.1	Israel	1959	81.77
Germany	1994	72.39	Israel	1961	80.44
Germany	1998	75.32	Israel	1965	82.41
Germany	2002	73.46	Kyrgyz Republic	2015	42.46
Germany	2005	71.99	Mongolia	1992	86.11
Poland	1991	44.4	Mongolia	1996	73.64
Poland	1993	52	Mongolia	2000	70.96
Poland	1997	48.8	Mongolia	2004	64.91
Poland	2001	47.63	Mongolia	2008	60.47
Poland	2005	40.87	Taiwan, China	1992	71.2
Poland	2007	54.24	Taiwan, China	1995	67.08
Austria	1956	89.31	Taiwan, China	1996	75.1
Austria	1959	89.67	Taiwan, China	1998	64.56
Austria	1962	90.28	Taiwan, China	2001	63.14
Hungary	1990	65.52	Taiwan, China	2004	57.9
Hungary	1994	69.43	Taiwan, China	2008	56.8
Hungary	1998	59.03	Korea, Rep.	1988	73.76
Hungary	2002	71.55	Korea, Rep.	1992	74.59
Hungary	2006	68.84	Korea, Rep.	1996	65.32

Czech Republic	1996	77.57	Korea, Rep.	2000	55.74
Czech Republic	1998	76.73	Korea, Rep.	2004	59.46
Czech Republic	2002	59.03	Japan	1952	77.43
Czech Republic	2006	65.12	Japan	1953	70.71
Czech Republic	2010	62.22	Japan	1955	73.59
Slovak Republic	1994	75.93	Japan	1958	72.91
Slovak Republic	1998	78.86	Japan	1960	71.38
Slovak Republic	2002	71.63	Japan	1963	68.62
Slovak Republic	2006	56.4	Japan	1967	73.36
Slovak Republic	2010	58.38	Japan	1969	68.63
Italy	1948	93.26	India	1952	58.92
Italy	1953	91.53	India	1957	61.15
Italy	1958	93.92	India	1962	54.42
Italy	1963	95.31	India	1967	63.11
Albania	2005	48.73	Pakistan	1988	42.91
Albania	2009	50.77	Pakistan	1990	43.4
Albania	2013	53.31	Pakistan	1993	37.56
Montenegro	2006	65.84	Pakistan	1997	31.47
Montenegro	2009	61.15	Pakistan	2013	40.43
Montenegro	2012	71.01	Bangladesh	1973	55.01
Montenegro	2016	73.38	Bangladesh	1991	61.52
Macedonia, FYR	1994	71.16	Bangladesh	1996	64.57
Macedonia, FYR	1998	48.94	Bangladesh	2001	76.5
Macedonia, FYR	2002	85.35	Myanmar	1956	35.42
Macedonia, FYR	2006	64.5	Sri Lanka	1952	49.42
Macedonia, FYR	2008	67.08	Sri Lanka	1956	51.51
Croatia	2000	80.95	Sri Lanka	1960	54.97
Croatia	2003	71.96	Sri Lanka	1965	65.86
Croatia	2007	70.84	Sri Lanka	2001	72.24
Croatia	2011	66.09	Sri Lanka	2015	76.55
Croatia	2015	63.96	Nepal	1999	75.77
Croatia	2016	55.52	Nepal	2008	74.42
Serbia	2007	68.19	Thailand	1992	58.39
Serbia	2008	70.17	Thailand	1995	64.07
Serbia	2012	67.55	Thailand	1996	65.03
Serbia	2014	63.49	Thailand	2001	70.11
Serbia	2016	64.31	Thailand	2005	73.46
Kosovo	2010	61.31	Thailand	2011	69.29
Kosovo	2014	61.7	Malaysia	2008	53.4
Slovenia	1992	85.52	Malaysia	2013	62.95
Slovenia	1996	75.75	Philippines	1987	78.16
Slovenia	2000	72.33	Philippines	1992	65.29
Slovenia	2004	61.09	Philippines	1995	68.35
Slovenia	2008	65.04	Philippines	1998	66.78

Greece	1946	53.54	Philippines	2001	64.75
Greece	1977	82.41	Philippines	2004	68.77
Greece	1981	84.48	Indonesia	1999	85.69
Greece	1985	87.35	Indonesia	2004	87.6
Greece	1989	85.84	Indonesia	2009	74.04
Greece	1993	85.61	Indonesia	2014	82.93
Cyprus	1970	54.77	Solomon Islands	1980	54.71
Cyprus	1976	62.25	Solomon Islands	1984	55.32
Cyprus	1981	72.85	Solomon Islands	1989	55.76
Cyprus	1985	77.95	Solomon Islands	1993	60.56
Bulgaria	1991	84.54	Solomon Islands	2006	70.37
Bulgaria	1994	80.98	Solomon Islands	2010	75.73
Bulgaria	1997	66.9	Fiji	1999	74.84
Bulgaria	2001	72.1			

Appendix B

Table of Country-Elections in Old Democracies

Country	Year	Turnout	Country	Year	Turnout
United States	1946	38.78	Poland	2015	49.4
United States	1948	48.1	Austria	1966	89.83
United States	1950	42.64	Austria	1970	89.52
United States	1952	59.69	Austria	1971	88.23
United States	1954	43.15	Austria	1975	86.65
United States	1956	54.92	Austria	1979	86.81
United States	1958	44.53	Austria	1983	86.91
United States	1960	63.06	Austria	1986	87.07
United States	1962	47.27	Austria	1990	80.47
United States	1964	61.92	Austria	1994	76.02
United States	1966	48.38	Austria	1995	78.64
United States	1968	60.84	Austria	1999	72.64
United States	1970	46.6	Austria	2002	77.45
United States	1972	55.21	Austria	2006	73.21
United States	1974	38.23	Austria	2008	75.61
United States	1976	53.55	Austria	2013	65.87
United States	1978	37.2	Hungary	2010	63.67
United States	1980	52.56	Hungary	2014	63.36
United States	1982	39.79	Czech Republic	2013	60.03
United States	1984	53.11	Slovak Republic	2012	57.85
United States	1986	36.4	Slovak Republic	2016	59.43
United States	1988	50.11	Italy	1968	93.1
United States	1990	36.52	Italy	1972	94.7
United States	1992	55.09	Italy	1976	95.43
United States	1994	38.78	Italy	1979	92.75
United States	1996	49.08	Italy	1983	91.76
United States	1998	34.74	Italy	1987	94.4
United States	2000	47.35	Italy	1992	92.34
United States	2002	35.09	Italy	1994	90.84
United States	2004	55.31	Italy	1996	87.35
United States	2006	37.32	Italy	2001	84.92
United States	2008	52.59	Italy	2006	82.13
United States	2010	38.51	Italy	2008	79.13
United States	2012	51.8	Italy	2013	68.33
United States	2014	32.98	Macedonia, FYR	2011	69.37
United States	2016	54.59	Macedonia, FYR	2014	68.96
Canada	1945	70.17	Macedonia, FYR	2016	71.99
Canada	1949	71.97	Slovenia	2011	66.99

Canada	1953	65.38	Slovenia	2014	54.09
Canada	1957	67.9	Greece	1996	83.88
Canada	1958	75.39	Greece	2000	89.02
Canada	1962	73.31	Greece	2004	87.66
Canada	1963	75.08	Greece	2007	79.59
Canada	1965	70.75	Greece	2009	79.24
Canada	1968	68.35	Greece	2012	69.36
Canada	1972	71.27	Greece	2015	70.65
Canada	1974	64.21	Cyprus	1991	78.63
Canada	1979	68.39	Cyprus	1996	75.9
Canada	1980	64.53	Cyprus	2001	67.68
Canada	1984	67.91	Cyprus	2006	60.35
Canada	1988	68.34	Cyprus	2011	47.21
Canada	1993	63.87	Cyprus	2016	39.13
Canada	1997	57.06	Bulgaria	2009	72.43
Canada	2000	54.64	Bulgaria	2013	59.69
Canada	2004	55.28	Bulgaria	2014	60.88
Canada	2006	58.75	Moldova	2014	58.82
Canada	2008	53.59	Romania	2016	41.12
Canada	2011	54.16	Estonia	2011	55.45
Canada	2015	62.12	Estonia	2015	56.82
Dominican Republic	2016	64.26	Latvia	2010	52.46
Jamaica	1980	74.74	Latvia	2011	53.02
Jamaica	1989	58.96	Latvia	2014	51.69
Jamaica	1993	44.67	Lithuania	2012	55.86
Jamaica	1997	48.77	Lithuania	2016	54.51
Jamaica	2002	50.89	Finland	1966	85.14
Jamaica	2007	49.56	Finland	1970	83.63
Jamaica	2011	46.18	Finland	1972	84.48
Jamaica	2016	44.19	Finland	1975	80.29
Trinidad and Tobago	1981	64.41	Finland	1979	81.32
Trinidad and Tobago	1986	80.45	Finland	1983	81.1
Trinidad and Tobago	1991	70.4	Finland	1987	77.25
Trinidad and Tobago	1995	67.3	Finland	1991	71.93
Trinidad and Tobago	2000	69.99	Finland	1995	71.13
Trinidad and Tobago	2001	64.98	Finland	1999	65.21
Trinidad and Tobago	2002	71.91	Finland	2003	69.96
Trinidad and Tobago	2007	72.52	Finland	2007	68.18
Trinidad and Tobago	2010	77.16	Finland	2011	72.77
Trinidad and Tobago	2015	78.1	Finland	2015	73.14
Guatemala	2015	62.6	Sweden	1948	82.02
Honduras	2009	53.13	Sweden	1952	77.32
Honduras	2013	69.17	Sweden	1956	77.31
El Salvador	2003	28.58	Sweden	1958	75.6

El Salvador	2006	52.72	Sweden	1960	82.76
El Salvador	2009	61.65	Sweden	1964	80.85
El Salvador	2015	61.23	Sweden	1968	86.57
Nicaragua	2011	71.84	Sweden	1970	87.31
Nicaragua	2016	57.77	Sweden	1973	85.81
Costa Rica	1948	26.16	Sweden	1976	88.49
Costa Rica	1953	50.01	Sweden	1979	86.94
Costa Rica	1958	49.6	Sweden	1982	88.61
Costa Rica	1962	71.49	Sweden	1985	86.22
Costa Rica	1966	69.8	Sweden	1988	82.68
Costa Rica	1970	75.71	Sweden	1991	82.77
Costa Rica	1974	71.39	Sweden	1994	82.36
Costa Rica	1978	75.22	Sweden	1998	77.72
Costa Rica	1982	79.01	Sweden	2002	78.04
Costa Rica	1986	74.75	Sweden	2006	80.6
Costa Rica	1990	85.07	Sweden	2010	82.63
Costa Rica	1994	84.2	Sweden	2014	82.61
Costa Rica	1998	73.72	Norway	1965	85.03
Costa Rica	2002	67.04	Norway	1969	85.11
Costa Rica	2006	54.01	Norway	1973	80.06
Costa Rica	2010	62.26	Norway	1977	79.17
Costa Rica	2014	64.35	Norway	1981	82.26
Panama	2009	70.53	Norway	1985	83.65
Panama	2014	79.03	Norway	1989	81.52
Colombia	1978	30.75	Norway	1993	74.47
Colombia	1982	38.75	Norway	1997	76.77
Colombia	1986	41.1	Norway	2001	73.5
Colombia	1990	40.05	Norway	2005	76.54
Colombia	1991	25.61	Norway	2009	74.74
Colombia	1994	29.18	Norway	2013	77.93
Colombia	1998	40.47	Denmark	1964	84.77
Colombia	2002	40.62	Denmark	1966	88.46
Colombia	2006	39.42	Denmark	1968	87.98
Colombia	2010	44.07	Denmark	1971	87.31
Colombia	2014	45.88	Denmark	1973	87.37
Venezuela, RB	1978	74.48	Denmark	1975	86.63
Venezuela, RB	1983	77.1	Denmark	1977	87.74
Venezuela, RB	1988	72.7	Denmark	1979	83.23
Venezuela, RB	1993	49.95	Denmark	1981	86.28
Venezuela, RB	1998	42.66	Denmark	1984	86.04
Venezuela, RB	2000	46.52	Denmark	1987	85.85
Venezuela, RB	2005	23.88	Denmark	1988	82.73
Guyana	2011	75	Denmark	1990	80.42
Guyana	2015	86.27	Denmark	1994	81.73

Ecuador	1998	48.49	Denmark	1998	83.13
Ecuador	2002	70.26	Denmark	2001	84.34
Ecuador	2006	70.28	Denmark	2005	81.34
Brazil	2006	83.54	Denmark	2007	83.2
Brazil	2010	80.62	Denmark	2011	81.83
Brazil	2014	75.09	Denmark	2015	80.34
Bolivia	2002	66.82	Cabo Verde	2011	86.18
Bolivia	2005	63.44	Cabo Verde	2016	64.47
Bolivia	2009	85.55	Gambia, The	1987	53.74
Bolivia	2014	86.19	Gambia, The	1992	55.26
Paraguay	2013	58.15	Benin	2011	44.77
Chile	2009	59.63	Benin	2015	56.69
Chile	2013	53.66	South Africa	2014	53.77
Argentina	2005	70.73	Namibia	2009	67.53
Argentina	2007	70.88	Namibia	2014	74
Argentina	2009	70.89	Botswana	1989	47.9
Argentina	2011	77.35	Botswana	1994	44.63
Argentina	2013	78.08	Botswana	1999	41.98
Argentina	2015	81.41	Botswana	2004	44
Uruguay	2004	93.14	Botswana	2009	62.2
Uruguay	2009	96.88	Botswana	2014	55.09
Uruguay	2014	98.29	Mauritius	1987	84.63
United Kingdom	1945	70.05	Mauritius	1991	82.45
United Kingdom	1950	81.59	Mauritius	1995	77.09
United Kingdom	1951	81.36	Mauritius	2000	79.57
United Kingdom	1955	75.75	Mauritius	2005	75.34
United Kingdom	1959	77.46	Mauritius	2010	72.63
United Kingdom	1964	75.13	Mauritius	2014	71.23
United Kingdom	1966	73.77	Turkey	2002	75.86
United Kingdom	1970	71.15	Turkey	2007	74.46
United Kingdom	1974	77.88	Turkey	2011	86.53
United Kingdom	1979	75.06	Israel	1969	83.01
United Kingdom	1983	71.7	Israel	1973	81.77
United Kingdom	1987	75.17	Israel	1977	80.39
United Kingdom	1992	75.36	Israel	1981	79.85
United Kingdom	1997	69.39	Israel	1984	80.43
United Kingdom	2001	57.56	Israel	1988	82.39
United Kingdom	2005	58.32	Israel	1992	81.73
United Kingdom	2010	61.06	Israel	1996	84.67
United Kingdom	2015	60.45	Israel	1999	84.45
Ireland	1948	73.41	Israel	2001	69.57
Ireland	1951	74.39	Israel	2003	76.11
Ireland	1954	75.34	Israel	2006	71.16
Ireland	1957	70.38	Israel	2009	70.24

Ireland	1961	70.96	Israel	2012	73.19
Ireland	1965	74.43	Israel	2015	76.1
Ireland	1969	77.22	Mongolia	2012	56.24
Ireland	1973	77.76	Mongolia	2016	67.86
Ireland	1977	85.17	Taiwan, China	2012	74.22
Ireland	1981	78.78	Taiwan, China	2016	65.84
Ireland	1982	76.33	Korea, Rep.	2008	46.59
Ireland	1987	77.87	Korea, Rep.	2012	56.29
Ireland	1989	71.23	Korea, Rep.	2016	60.78
Ireland	1992	73.65	Japan	1972	73.86
Ireland	1997	67.38	Japan	1976	73.55
Ireland	2002	66.98	Japan	1979	68.18
Ireland	2007	68.89	Japan	1980	74.7
Ireland	2011	63.78	Japan	1983	67.6
Ireland	2016	58.04	Japan	1986	71.53
Netherlands	1967	92.07	Japan	1990	74.95
Netherlands	1971	77.83	Japan	1993	66.25
Netherlands	1972	80.24	Japan	1995	44.9
Netherlands	1977	86.27	Japan	1996	60.27
Netherlands	1981	85.19	Japan	2000	59.02
Netherlands	1982	80.3	Japan	2003	59.07
Netherlands	1986	84.22	Japan	2005	66.62
Netherlands	1989	78.01	Japan	2009	69.34
Netherlands	1994	75.2	Japan	2012	59.67
Netherlands	1998	70.12	Japan	2014	51.97
Netherlands	2002	76.82	India	1971	57.22
Netherlands	2003	77.54	India	1977	64.67
Netherlands	2006	77.48	India	1980	62.35
Netherlands	2010	71.13	India	1984	64.61
Netherlands	2012	71.02	India	1989	65.18
Belgium	1965	88.02	India	1991	57.23
Belgium	1968	86.18	India	1996	61.08
Belgium	1971	88.61	India	1998	67.45
Belgium	1974	85.71	India	1999	65.69
Belgium	1977	89.91	India	2004	60.91
Belgium	1978	87.78	India	2009	56.45
Belgium	1981	94.31	India	2014	70.29
Belgium	1985	86.32	Sri Lanka	1970	71.83
Belgium	1987	86.49	Sri Lanka	1977	76.78
Belgium	1991	85.1	Philippines	2007	54.87
Belgium	1995	83.2	Philippines	2010	64.7
Belgium	1999	83.14	Philippines	2013	64.42
Belgium	2003	85.95	Philippines	2016	72.17
Belgium	2007	86	Australia	1946	91.85

Belgium	2010	84.65	Australia	1949	91.67
Belgium	2014	87.21	Australia	1951	85.24
Luxembourg	1964	72.55	Australia	1954	81.93
Luxembourg	1968	67.79	Australia	1955	78.35
Luxembourg	1974	73.74	Australia	1958	86.05
Luxembourg	1979	68.48	Australia	1961	84.56
Luxembourg	1984	66.83	Australia	1963	85.65
Luxembourg	1989	64.07	Australia	1966	84.66
Luxembourg	1994	60.52	Australia	1969	83.89
Luxembourg	1999	56.92	Australia	1972	85.35
Luxembourg	2004	56.5	Australia	1974	84.31
Luxembourg	2009	53.2	Australia	1975	84.68
Luxembourg	2013	55.12	Australia	1977	84.48
France	1988	58.14	Australia	1980	83.97
France	1993	61.29	Australia	1983	81.24
France	1997	59.86	Australia	1984	84.2
France	2002	47.25	Australia	1987	84.14
France	2007	43.43	Australia	1990	82.09
France	2012	46.08	Australia	1993	83.43
Switzerland	1947	66.01	Australia	1996	82.99
Switzerland	1951	62.98	Australia	1998	82.24
Switzerland	1955	60.78	Australia	2001	84.2
Switzerland	1959	58.11	Australia	2004	82.37
Switzerland	1963	53.46	Australia	2007	82.38
Switzerland	1967	53.21	Australia	2010	81.02
Switzerland	1971	45.02	Australia	2013	78.86
Switzerland	1975	43.62	Australia	2016	78.96
Switzerland	1979	40.6	New Zealand	1946	92.13
Switzerland	1983	40.79	New Zealand	1949	99.57
Switzerland	1987	39.9	New Zealand	1951	95.11
Switzerland	1991	39.67	New Zealand	1954	91.08
Switzerland	1995	35.66	New Zealand	1957	85.54
Switzerland	1999	34.94	New Zealand	1960	85.55
Switzerland	2003	37.27	New Zealand	1963	83.32
Switzerland	2007	39.79	New Zealand	1966	79.35
Switzerland	2011	40.04	New Zealand	1969	85.62
Switzerland	2015	38.63	New Zealand	1972	85.31
Spain	2000	73.79	New Zealand	1975	81.7
Spain	2004	76.25	New Zealand	1978	82.32
Spain	2008	69.94	New Zealand	1981	88.86
Spain	2011	63.26	New Zealand	1984	87.44
Spain	2015	64.39	New Zealand	1987	81.43
Spain	2016	60.87	New Zealand	1990	78.62
Portugal	1995	79.11	New Zealand	1993	79.61

Portugal	1999	69.27	New Zealand	1996	83.02
Portugal	2002	68.62	New Zealand	1999	76.11
Portugal	2005	69.23	New Zealand	2002	72.49
Portugal	2009	66.14	New Zealand	2005	79.22
Portugal	2011	64.49	New Zealand	2008	77.84
Portugal	2015	61.75	New Zealand	2011	69.83
Germany	2009	64.61	New Zealand	2014	72.35
Germany	2013	66.07	Solomon Islands	1997	70.72
Poland	2011	48.54			

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blais, Andre, and R. K. Carty. "Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout?" *European Journal of Political Research* 18.2 (1990): 167-81. Web.
- Blais, Andre, and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. "Turnout in Electoral Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 33.2 (1998): 239-61. Web.
- Downs, Anthony. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." *Journal of Political Economy* 65.2 (1957): 135–150. Web
- Endersby, James W., and Jonathan T. Krieckhaus. "Turnout around the Globe: The Influence of Electoral Institutions on National Voter Participation, 1972-2000." *Electoral Studies*, 27.4 (2008): 601–610. Web.
- Fornos, C. A. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37.8 (2004): 909-40. Web.
- Franklin, M. (1996) Electoral Participation. In *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*, ed. L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi, P. Norris, (pp. 216-35). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
- Groningen Growth and Development Center. (2018). Maddison Project Database. Retrieved from <https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018>
- Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research. (2016). Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2016. Retrieved from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>
- International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance. (2016). Voter Turnout

- Database. Retrieved from <http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm>
- Jackman, Robert W. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81.2 (1987): 405. Web.
- Jackman, Robert W., and Ross A. Miller. "Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies during the 1980s." *Comparative Political Studies* 27.4 (1995):467–492. Web.
- Kostadinova, Tatiana. "Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 42.6 (2003): 741-59. Web.
- Nils-Christian Bormann & Matt Golder. 2013. "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011." *Electoral Studies* 32: 360-369.
- Norris, Pippa. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Web.
- Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal. "Neoinstitutional Accounts of Voter Turnout: Moving beyond Industrial Democracies." *Electoral Studies* 20.2 (2001): 281-97. Web.
- Powell, G. Bingham. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80.1 (1986): 17-43. Web.
- Powell, G. Bingham. *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Harvard University Press, 2009. Web.
- Radcliff, B. "The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative Analysis". *The American Political Science Review*, 86.2 (1992): 444-454. Web.
- Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American Political Science Review* 62.1 (1968): 25–42. Web.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. "Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 26.1 (1982): 25. Web.

V-Dem Institute. (2017). V-Dem Dataset. Retrieved from <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-7-1/>

ACADEMIC VITA
Maxwell H. Albone
maxwellalbone@gmail.com

Education

The Pennsylvania State University, The College of the Liberal Arts
Schreyer Honors College
Bachelor of Arts: Political Science
Bachelor of Science: Economics
Minor: Spanish
Graduation: May 2018

Experience

Wesselt Capital Group
Summer Analyst Intern
May 2017 – August 2017

- Created summaries of clients' policies to assist in case preparation for meetings to help clients achieve their personal financial goals
- Generated policy illustrations to project the cash values of policies to plan for future developments in client's finances
- Provided clients with updates on the state of the financial services industry and strategies by the firm to continue to succeed

Center For American Political Responsiveness
Undergraduate Research Assistant
June 2016 – July 2016

- Assisted in the conducting of research in an effort to determine which factors affect public participation in social movements
- Participated in the collection of data on those demonstrating outside of the 2016 Democratic National Convention using surveys
- Worked with a coordination with group of other undergraduate researchers to identify the most important issues to protestors

Activities and Service

Springfield For The Kids
Community Captain
September 2016 – May 2017

- Worked in cooperation with peers to raise money for pediatric cancer as part of the largest student-run philanthropy in the world
- Was responsible for fostering a sense of community among 20 members of an organization made up of over 250 members
- Aided in raising \$196,439 in 2015-16 through efforts such as canning, canvassing, THONveloping, and THONline