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WAR AND CONFLICT IN REGIME TRANSITIONING STATES

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ABSTRACT

Humans have been plagued by war and conflict throughout all of history. This war and conflict arises from several factors such as territorial disputes, power struggles, and greed. This thesis explores war under the context of regime change. Specifically, the relationship between regime change and conflict is examined in the pre and post-Cold War period under the Eastern European and former Soviet Union states, the states which were directly impacted and related to the set-up of the world powers system during both periods. Two hypotheses are analyzed. The first: from 1955 to 1990, countries undergoing democratization will experience more wars relative to countries autocratizing or not transitioning at all. The second: from 1991 to 2010, countries transitioning to more autocratic forms of government will experience more wars. These hypotheses are supported by the data, with both displaying statistically significant results. Two cases studies are also examined: the Romanian Revolution and the Tajikistani Civil War. However, the examination of these case studies did not provide much support for the theory that the world power system during and after the Cold War (a bi-polar powers system during the Cold War and a major powers system after Cold War) had a casual effect on democratization leading to more war during the Cold War, and autocratization leading to more war after the Cold War.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Conflict has been a part of the human condition since the inception of hunter-gatherer societies and civilizations. All of human history is marred with disagreements, arguments, fights, skirmishes, and all out wars. These wars and conflicts have done massive damage to not only the people that fight them, but also to the communities and families that experience them. Countless individuals have died and suffered in the name of war. As a result, many researchers have undertaken the task of better understanding and identifying the sources of war in an attempt to shed light on possible prevention. Regime change and transition is one such source which researchers have taken an interest, as it can not only create internal and external conflict, but also disrupt the equilibrium among the people in society. Researchers have disagreed, however, on what type of regime change actually encourages more war and conflict. For example, Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratization actually leads to more conflict (Mansfield & Snyder 1995), whereas other researchers such as Enterline found that autocratization, not democratization, encourages more conflict to occur (Enterline 1998). So with the disagreement in the field, I examine war as a function of regime change in the hope that some insight can be gained that can contribute to the literature and to a better understanding of the causes of wars.

Thus, I am researching the relationship between regime change and war. In my research, I will be expanding on work done by scholars such as Mansfield, Snyder, Enterline, Hegre, and Daxecker. My research question is: as states transition towards more autocratic forms of government, will they engage in more wars? I am looking at the impact of regime change on the

amount of wars using similar variables, statistical techniques, and theoretical framework. My work is similar as I use the same independent variable to measure regime change as most other studies: a change in polity categories. I also perform similar statistical tests and techniques as my dependent variable is dichotomous and I use similar control variables.

My work builds off of current literature, yet will be original in that different measures, time periods, and cases will be used. For example, Enterline examined the regime change and conflict relationship under temporal heterogeneity for the pre and post-WWII periods (Enterline 1998). I examine that same relationship, but in the pre and post-Cold War era under the states which were directly impacted and related to the set-up of the world powers system during both periods. Also, the aforementioned studies usually only focused on a single aspect of conflict, whether it was just interstate wars, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), or civil wars. I encapsulate all measures of war: inter, intra, and extra-state wars. Furthermore, I am specifically examining wars because they carry the largest detrimental effect to people and communities. Also, my work adds additional value and insight into the literature already in the field as I am including all wars as defined by the Correlates of War Project (COW), as opposed to just looking at interstate or civil wars. Additionally, I look at regime change and conflict within the realm of Eastern Europe under two different world power systems. Thus, this relationship is analyzed during the Cold War when the world operated under a bi-polar powers system, and post-Cold War when the world operated under a major powers system.

Even though there has been a lot of research examining the relationship between regime change and conflict, my question still bears importance. There is a lot of disagreement in the field over what type of transitions actually influence wars and disputes. Ever since Mansfield and Snyder drew the provocative conclusion that democratization, specifically incomplete

democratization, leads to conflict, many other researchers conducted their own studies and tests and have found conflicting results. Thus, there remains a big debate in the field. Using the same independent variable as most other researchers, using all types of wars, and examining my research question under the pre and post-Cold War eras, because, as Enterline has shown, time periods make a big difference (Enterline 1998), I will attempt to add my part to the debate.

I begin by reviewing the literature that has focused on studying regime change and conflict, and looking at how my study is similar or different, and what I have used as motivation and justification for my own work. Then, I outline my hypotheses and I discuss the theory I have developed that explains these hypotheses. Next, I justify my analysis and explain the results of my statistical tests. Finally, I end by looking at two case studies that exemplify my results and help to explain my theory, and finish with concluding remarks.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Mansfield and Snyder are the leading researchers in the field of regime change and conflict. In one of their very first studies, they conducted a nested analysis on political regime transition and the outbreak of war. They hypothesized that states undergoing democratization will be more involved in wars than states transitioning towards an autocracy or states with no regime change at all. For a measure of regime change/transition they used the Polity II database. For a measure of war, they used the Correlates of War (COW) Project data on wars. They used contingency tables to find the strength of the relationship between regime change and war during periods of one, five, and ten years. They did this through a single time period: 1811-1980.

They found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than states undergoing no regime change, autocratizing states were also more likely to go to war than states with no regime change, and finally that democratization was more likely to lead to war than autocratization. They found that the strongest relationship between democratization and war was in the 10-year period and the lowest in the 1-year period (Mansfield & Snyder 1995). In response to critics, Mansfield and Snyder have continued to conduct various variations of their study and for the most part have found results that support their hypothesis.

One of those critics is Matthijs Bogaards, who replicated the studies by Mansfield and Snyder, but changed the independent variable. He found that using different independent variables changes the likelihood of an outbreak of war. Using a change in Polity scores as a measure of incomplete democratization resulted in the most positive cases, while using a change

in Freedom House scores as a measure of incomplete democratization resulted in the least number of positive cases (Bogaards 2010). Thus, Bogaards showed that Mansfield and Snyder only came up with the results they did because of the specific measure of regime change they used.

Andrew Enterline is another big critic of Mansfield and Snyder's work. He stated that a lot of research has been done on interstate conflict on the war level, but not as much on interstate conflict roles (initiator vs. target), severity (disputes vs. war), and temporal heterogeneity (pre vs. post WWII). To test these, he analyzed a time-series cross sectional (TSCS) data set with state-year as the unit of analysis. He used two separate measures of conflict for his dependent variable: militarized interstate disputes (MID) and interstate wars as defined by COW. For a measure of his independent variable, regime change, he used Polity III data and defined a transition as a jump from one category to another.

From the period of 1816 – 1992, he analyzed the relationship between militarized interstate dispute initiation and targets with regime change and found that states undergoing an autocratic regime change were 24% more likely to be the initiators of conflict (Enterline 1998). However, his results were not as robust when he analyzed the period from 1946 – 1992. Therefore, he found that the relationship between dispute initiation and regime change is temporally heterogeneous. Enterline's research disagrees with Mansfield and Snyder's claim that democratization promotes interstate aggression. Thus, his results align more with Bogaards', as simply changing independent and dependent variables along with time period may change the results.

Yet another researcher, Ursula Daxecker, conducted tests and found results that disagree with those of Mansfield and Snyder. She introduced two hypotheses. The first: "Countries

experiencing democratic reversals have higher conflict propensities” (Daxecker 2007, 537). The second: “Large change toward democracy lowers the likelihood of conflict onset” (Daxecker 2007, 537). She examined countries in the COW Project MID dataset from the period of 1950 – 2000. Her dependent variable was militarized interstate dispute onset, taking on a dichotomous function with a value of 1 if MID occurred in a year and 0 if not. She had several independent variables that took on different measures of regime change. After she conducted a quantitative analysis with logit regression models using temporal spline variables, she found support for both of her hypotheses (Daxecker 2007).

She theorized that transitioning states will not be able to successfully send credible signals about their foreign policy preferences and that democratic reversals increase uncertainty about the credibility of a state’s signals and preferences. She also said that diversionary theory plays a role with leaders distracting the populace from domestic issues by instigating conflict abroad (Daxecker 2007).

Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) conducted a study wherein they focused on civil wars as the dependent variable. They conducted an empirical analysis from 152 countries in the period 1816 – 1992. They constructed three hypotheses. One, semi-democracies (anocracies) would have a higher probability of civil war than either full democracies or autocracies. Two, well established democracies and autocracies are equally unlikely to have civil war, and three, states undergoing a regime transition have a higher probability of experiencing civil war than states not undergoing a regime transition (Hegre et al 2001). They found support for all of their hypotheses. Thus, Overall they found that full democracies and autocracies are both as unlikely to experience civil wars, intermediate regimes are four times more likely to engage in civil war than democracies, and civil war is more likely after a regime

change (Hegre et al 2001). The results found here are similar to those found by Mansfield and Snyder in that democratization in the intermediate regimes is often times accompanied by conflict.

Thus a big debate in the field remains. A lot of the researchers in the field disagree on methods, variables, and results. For example, most researchers use Polity as their independent variable but Bogaards showed how using Freedom House instead will change the results. Researchers use many different dependent variables as well. Mansfield and Snyder used the COW dataset on wars as their measure of conflict, while Daxecker used militarized interstate disputes as the dependent variable. Establishing the time frame to be used also makes a big difference. Therefore, I base the using two different time periods part of my work off of Enterline, who found that different time periods bear significantly different results (Enterline 1998). For my independent variable, I use what most of the researchers in the field use: Polity. Finally, since most researchers only focus on a single aspect of conflict, I will provide a broader look by looking at the all the wars as defined by COW.

Chapter 3

Theory and Hypotheses

I am testing two hypotheses. My first: From the period 1955-1990, countries undergoing democratization will experience more wars relative to countries autocratizing or not transitioning at all. My second: From the period 1991-2010, countries transitioning to more autocratic forms of government will experience more wars. Arrow diagrams can be seen below:

1955-1990: Democratization → Increased Wars

1991-2010: Transition to More Autocratic Forms of Government → Increased Wars

Andrew Enterline has shown that time periods matter for the relationship between regime change and conflict (Enterline, 1998). Therefore, based off of his work, I believe that from 1991 to 2010 transitions to more autocratic forms of government will result in more conflict as opposed to democratization or no transitions at all, which is contrary to work of Mansfield and Snyder. They contended that regardless of time period, democratization will be frequently shrouded with conflict, even more frequently than autocratization (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). I plan to show that from 1991 – 2010, the findings for the relationship between regime change and conflict will be the opposite of what Mansfield and Snyder claimed, because, for one reason, the type of world system changed once the Soviet Union collapsed. However, during the Cold War, under the bi-polar powers system, conflict should accompany democratization, as Mansfield and Snyder have suggested. Specifically in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, during the Cold

War, war should accompany democratization as the Soviet government would attempt to prevent these countries from democratizing in order to maintain communism. In doing so, the people will protest and the government will use force to suppress these protests.

For the purposes of my study, I am using the same definition of regime change as Andrew Enterline and Mansfield and Snyder have used. Whenever a state jumped from one Polity category to another, they labeled that as a regime change (Enterline, 1998; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). So for example, if a state was labeled as an open autocracy, which has values of -5 to 1, and a year later as a democracy, which has values of 6 to 9, then democratization occurred. Thus, fluctuations within a certain category would be irrelevant. If a state was categorized as a democracy and its scores fluctuated within that 6 to 9 range, then regime change did not occur. However, if the scores transitioned to another category, say from 7 to 4 which would be an autocratic transition into an open anocracy, then regime change occurred.

Thus, I theorize that from 1955 – 1990 transitions to more democratic forms of government will experience more wars while from 1991 – 2010 transitions to more autocratic forms of government will have more wars because of the end of Cold War. During the Cold War, the world system operated under a bi-polar powers system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world system developed into a major powers system. These two different time periods will have an effect on the level of war which accompanies different regime changes as a result.

These hypotheses relate to my research question in that they answer yes, but with a condition, and that condition being the time period. As states transition towards more autocratic forms of government, they will engage in more war, but only after 1991. Democratization will result in more war before 1991.

After 1991, apart from the time period explanation, I believe that states that transition to more autocratic forms of government will be involved in more wars also because the newly formed autocratic regime will have to justify their existence to their core group of supporters in our modern, technologically advanced world. They will attempt to persuade the people that without their rule, the state would not survive and that the only way to prosperity and technological advancement is by their hand.

The autocratic rulers may create a need for their existence in several ways. They may instigate wars and conflicts abroad in order to distract the population from domestic issues. This idea is coined the Diversionary Theory. Jaroslav Tir conducted research on this theory and found that there is strong empirical support for it when linking government unpopularity with territorial conflicts (Tir, 2010).

Autocratic leaders can also more easily reward their supporters than can democratic leaders. In autocracies, dictators are able to stay in power from the support of a small, core group. Therefore, when they go to war, they can more feasibly divide the spoils of war amongst their supporters while in democracies it is impossible for a leader to do that to an entire population. Thus, the motives to go to war in autocracies are higher than in democracies.

Thus, states transitioning towards autocracy since 1991 will engage in more wars as compared to democratizing states because of the desire of citizens to transition towards a prosperous and stable system. As opposed to interstate wars, civil wars will be more likely to accompany democratization because of the role of modern free speech and media. The emergence of free speech and press in a modern democratizing state in which individuals can relay information to the world within seconds, will make it more difficult for leaders to convince the voters to engage in foreign affairs. For example, since 1991, in a relatively democratic

country such as Ukraine, the media was able to expose former president Viktor Yanukovych as he was attempting to centralize power and get involved in Russian foreign affairs. In contrast, Russian president Vladimir Putin has taken control of most of the media outlets in the country, and there is no one to question his actions. As such, he may more easily deploy diversionary theory tactics. From 1955 to 1991, I believe that the relationship between war and transition will be similar to research already done on the area, as internal conflicts were very numerous.

I am controlling for several factors as well. One is economic growth as defined by the percent change in per capita GDP. Mansfield and Snyder used percent change in per capita GDP in their study because they state it has a big impact on the theories of international conflict and so must be accounted for when conducting research on conflict behavior (Mansfield & Snyder 2002). To measure percent change in per capita GDP, I use per capita GDP data provided by Kristian Gleditsch. The data was transferred to Microsoft excel where then percent change for each year was calculated. Another variable that is controlled for is power capabilities. According to Daxecker, “power is a strong predictor of conflict behavior” (Daxecker 2007). The higher a state’s neighbor’s power capabilities are, the greater the likelihood of conflict. To measure power capabilities, I use COW’s Composite Index of National Capability. The CINC assessed a nation’s power by averaging its scores in values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members (Greig & Enterline, 2010). Finally, my third control variable is whether the state bordered either Russia or the Soviet Union at any given year. This took on a dichotomous value with 1 meaning the state bordered Russian or the Soviet Union during that year and 0 if it did not.

Chapter 4

Data and Method

I conducted a nested analysis. I used an analysis to determine the statistical significance relationship between my variables, and I also looked at specific case studies to investigate the causal logic of my theory.

My cases for analysis are transitioning states between 1955 and 1991 which I compare with transitioning states from 1991 to 2010. Thus my independent variable indicates whether a regime transition occurred, and my dependent variable is war. Thus, I look at states that have transitioned or are transitioning to an autocracy and at states that have undergone democratization, and compare the amount of wars between the two. I chose those variables because they provide the most logical analysis of my research question.

For a measure of transition in states I used the Polity IV Project. Research for the project is compiled by those associated with the Center for Systematic Peace. The Polity IV dataset covers independent states with a population of 500,000 or more from the period of 1800 to 2015 and covers 162 contemporary countries. It creates a spectrum of governance that goes from a fully democratic regime, to anocracies, to full-fledged dictatorships. Specifically, the project quantifies regimes and ranks them on a scale. A Fully democratic regime is a 10, democracies are ranked between 6 and 9, an open anocracy is from 1 to 5, a closed anocracy is from -5 to 0, and an autocracy is from -10 to -6. According to Marshall and Cole, an anocracy is a

government regime that features qualities of both democracies and autocracies (Marshall & Cole, 2014).

For a measure of war I used the Correlates of War (COW) datasets for intra, inter, and extra state wars. The war datasets cover wars from the period 1816 – 2010 for 243 countries. Data for inter, intra, and extra state wars can be found online at the COW website. This means I am examining, for the east and central European states I study, all the wars in the COW dataset as opposed to just looking at either intra or interstate wars. For a war to be considered an interstate war it must have sustained combat between forces from two or more states with at least 1,000 battle fatalities. A state participated in the war if they experienced at least 100 battle fatalities or deployed at least 1,000 personnel in active combat. Extra state wars are wars between a state and a non-state entity, outside the borders of the state actor. Intrastate wars are civil wars. An intrastate war occurred if the violence occurred inside the borders of a state, one of the belligerents is the national government, both sides offer effective resistance, and at least 1,000 battle fatalities occurred during each year the war lasts (Sarkees & Wayman 2010).

Cunningham and Lemke suggest that the analysis of interstate and intrastate wars should be combined when examining levels of conflicts generally (Cunningham & Lemke 2013). A lot of the previous research cited has separated different types of conflicts into, for example, interstate wars and intrastate wars, and then they drew conclusions based on those measures for the effect regime transition has on conflict. Cunningham and Lemke suggest that the results may vary if the analyses of conflict are combined, and so I am using all types of wars as defined by COW.

I have also used the militarized interstate disputes (MID) database, as an alternative way to measure my dependent variable. This permits me to get an extra look into the relationship

between regime transitions and conflict. Militarized interstate disputes are defined as conflicts between states that include fewer than 1,000 deaths and some show of military force, whereas the intra, inter, and extra wars in COW look at conflicts with more than 1,000 battle fatalities. Using both gives me a well-rounded look at conflict and aggression between states.

My units of analysis are transitioning states. More specifically, I am looking at Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states from 1955 to 2010. For the states included in my analysis, I used the former states of the Warsaw Pact, the former states of the Soviet Union, and the United Nation's classification of Eastern European states¹. I used such a broad definition of Eastern European states because I wish to analyze all the states that may have once been considered or still are relevant in that region of the world. I chose this specific region and time period because it provides a unique view on the states that were directly affected by the bi-polarity of the world system before 1991, and then those same states after that type of world system disintegrated. I chose 1955 as a start time because that was when the Warsaw Pact was signed. Also, in this region there are very little cultural and religious cleavages to skew data. For example, in the Middle East, a lot of the conflict centers around religion as Islam, Judaism, and Christianity all compete for control. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states are a relatively homogenous area with religion playing a much smaller role as compared to other parts of the world.

For my quantitative analysis I ran a logistic regression using STATA. I consider a jump from one Polity category to another (e.g. autocracy to anocracy or democracy, democracy to autocracy or anocracy, etc.) as a regime transition, as both Enterline and Mansfield and Snyder have done (Enterline 1998, Mansfield & Snyder 1995). A transition from anyone of these

¹ Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Georgia, German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia (Slovak Republic), Soviet Union, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

categories as marked by Polity was considered a regime change. For war, my dependent variable, I made it a dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 if a war occurred, and a value of 0 if not. So for example, if a state was considered a democratic regime in year one and then transitioned to an open anocracy in year two according to Polity IV, then that would be considered a regime change in my analysis. I then examined whether a war occurred from a regime change by running a logit regression using STATA.

I built my dataset in excel, and then used that information to transfer to STATA in order to run the regressions. The first three columns of my dataset include the country code, the name of the country related to that country code, and the year being examined. A country was included for each year it existed between 1955 and 2015. The next three columns were labeled democracy, autocracy, and polity2 respectively. This information was transferred from Polity IV data, with democracy corresponding to the states democracy score, autocracy corresponding to the states autocracy score, and polity2 corresponding to the states polity score, which is the difference between the democracy and autocracy scores. This polity score was then used to classify the state during a given year as either a full democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy, or autocracy. The next two columns created were called democratization and autocratization. Using the polity score, if the state jumped from one polity category to another compared to its score the previous year, then I labeled that either democratization or autocratization, depending on the direction of the jump, with a value of 1 for the relevant column, and a value of 0 for the other. If no change, then both columns received a value of 0.

The next columns of the dataset contain information for whether a militarized interstate dispute (MID), war, or conflict occurred. I defined a conflict occurring as either a MID or war having occurred that year. Each of these variables are also dichotomous, with a value of 1 if it

occurred and 0 if not. Finally, I then added my three control variables, economic growth as percent change in GDP, power capabilities, and a shared land border with Russia/ USSR. To measure percent change in per capita GDP, I use per capita GDP data provided by Kristian Gleditsch. The data were transferred to Microsoft excel where then percent change for each year was calculated. To measure power capabilities, I transferred data from COW's Composite Index of National Capability for each country used. To find out whether a state shared a border with Russia or the Soviet Union during any given year, I looked up the map information for each country during those years to determine if they shared a border with either Russia or the Soviet Union. If a state did share a border, then a 1 was marked for that state-year, and if not, then 0.

Chapter 5

Results

I ran a logistic regression and clustered the standard error on the country code. I found support for my first hypothesis, that from 1955-1990 democratization in states from this part of the world was more likely to result in more wars, with a p-value smaller than .05. I also found support for my second hypothesis at a p-value of .10: from 1991-2010 autocratizing states will experience more wars as opposed to democratizing. Tables 1 and 2 display these results, respectively.

Table 1: Democratization and War During the Cold War (1955-1990)

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	277
	wald chi2(2)	=	.
	Prob > chi2	=	.
Log pseudolikelihood = -13.294322	Pseudo R2	=	0.3646

(Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in countrycode)

war	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
democratization	5.342031	1.737583	3.07	0.002	1.936431 8.747631
percentchangeinpercapitagdp	2.941129	11.28215	0.26	0.794	-19.17148 25.05374
powercapabilities	119.7784	54.55921	2.20	0.028	12.84426 226.7125
borderedwithussrussia	15.06373	7.822536	1.93	0.054	-.2681593 30.39562
_cons	-23.09136	8.431253	-2.74	0.006	-39.61632 -6.566412

Table 2: Autocratization and War After the Cold War (1991-2010)

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	355
	Wald chi2(4)	=	43.76
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -23.263938	Pseudo R2	=	0.3918

(Std. Err. adjusted for 23 clusters in countrycode)

	war	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
autocratization		1.189114	.6338649	1.88	0.061	-.0532385	2.431466
percentchangeinpercapitagdp		-9.666222	2.461396	-3.93	0.000	-14.49047	-4.841975
powercapabilities		62.88339	10.95104	5.74	0.000	41.41975	84.34703
borderedwithussrrussia		.1313803	.6684771	0.20	0.844	-1.178811	1.441571
_cons		-5.323839	.7659059	-6.95	0.000	-6.824987	-3.822691

As shown, there is a difference between what type of regime change relates with war depending on the time period. During the Cold War in Eastern Europe, democratizing states experienced more conflict; after the Cold War, when the world powers system transitioned from a bi-polar to a major powers system, autocratization lead to more wars involving Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states.

As for the control variables, economic growth has a significant negative relationship during the post-Cold War era, meaning that as economic growth went down, war went up. No significant relationship was found during the Cold War. Power capabilities are significant during both time periods: as a state's power capabilities increased, the amount of wars it engaged in also increased. For my third control variable, a border with USSR/Russia, it is significant during the Cold War at a p-value smaller than .10, but not after the Cold War. Thus, a border with the Soviet Union had an impact on the amount of wars a state engaged in during the Cold War. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, sharing a border with Russia made no difference.

The same analyses were also run with militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as the dependent variable, but no significant results were found.

Specifically examining the Eastern European and former Soviet Union states provides a unique view point at the states that directly experienced and were affected by the two different world power systems during the Cold War and after. They show that the different world power systems and time periods had an effect on the type of regime change that accompanied war. It is also interesting to note that wars were statistically significant, but MIDs were not. Perhaps this shows a bit of the character of the Eastern European states in that they increased escalation to war levels in the context of regime change as opposed to just resorting to threats and minor disputes.

The results further exemplify the importance of taking into account time periods when running similar analyses. Running the same regressions through the entire time period, 1955-2010, would have yielded different results. Not only that, but the world powers system that represent the two time periods under examination might be the reason for the time periods difference. This indicates that the structure of world powers bears importance on the likelihood of wars occurring after democratization and autocratization. The influence of the structure of world powers may also translate into other fields of research and thus necessitates further examination. Using this knowledge and the results of my research may potentially help other researchers better understand wars in the context of regime change and so may further be utilized to aid those that suffer from wars all around the world.

Chapter 6

Case Studies

Romanian Revolution

The Romanian Revolution is an instance of a civil war that accompanied democratization prior to the Cold War's end. According to Polity, Romania in 1989 underwent democratization by going from an autocratic regime, to a closed anocracy. Then, in December 1989, the Romanian people revolted against the long standing communist rulers, Nicolae Ceausescu, and his wife, Elena. The accumulation of actions of Nicolae Ceausescu and, partly his wife, are perhaps the biggest reasons for the onset of this bloody civil war.

Nicolae Ceausescu's 24-year reign in Romania was accompanied by resentment from his people and strained relationships with the rest of the world. His wife, Elena, also played a major role in his rule by controlling the country's educational and scientific systems (Scovel 1989). Ceausescu was born in a small Romanian village as a peasant's son. He later joined the communist party at 14 years old, even though the party at the time was outlawed. After the Soviets took control of the Romanian government, he worked his way up the party ranks and eventually became head of state in 1975 (Scovel 1989).

Most of Ceausescu's reign, however, was not successful. Even though Romania had very rich agricultural areas and crude oil supplies, Ceausescu turned it into one of the poorest countries in the world (Scovel 1989). Aside from his economic failures, Ceausescu was also hated for his excessive and brutal use of his secret police, the Securitate, who worked to suppress free speech and eliminate opposition to communist party (Sebestyen 2009).

In order to repay his country's debt that had accumulated as a result of failed economic policies, Ceausescu instituted an austerity policy in 1981 (Scovel 1989). Like his secret police, however, this austerity policy was also characterized as excessive. The austerity program rationed and reduced the availability of many basic goods such as food, electricity, and heat (Roper 2000; Scovel 1989). Ceausescu also enacted a "Village Resettlement Program" in which he destroyed villages and relocated the people that lived in these villages into city apartment blocks. His intention was to raise the standard of living, but it in reality had the opposite effect (Scovel 1989). On top of the already dreadful economic situation, these policies understandably further angered the people.

This anger finally erupted into protest. On December 16, protesters gathered to protest the eviction of Lazlo Tokes, a pastor that frequently spoke out against Ceausescu's communist regime. The government responded by using machine guns and tanks against these unarmed civilians (Crawshaw 1989). Protests and violence then continued in other areas the following days (Crawshaw 1989).

In an attempt to quell the protests and violence, Ceausescu called together a public rally on December 21, and broadcasted his speech on national television in order to reach all the people (Crawshaw 1989). During his speech, however, the country rebelled against him. The crowd booed Ceausescu and publicly rejected the tyrant. Ceausescu's decision to broadcast the event on national television was the key to his downfall, as the rest of the country witnessed the people reject him, something they had not done before (Crawshaw 1989). Subsequently, the entire city revolted and the army, secret police, and civilians began to attack each other (Crawshaw 1989).

The following day, the army defected and joined the rebellion. Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled from the people. Nonetheless, the secret police stayed loyal to the Ceausescu regime. They and the army fought in the streets for a few days, wherein thousands of people died (Crawshaw 1989). Yet, the Ceausescus were eventually captured and executed (Crawshaw 1989). The people had won the revolution.

On December 22, after Ceausescu was overthrown, the National Salvation Front was officially created. This was the political party that after the end of the revolution took power and promised free elections (Roper 2000).

The democratization process that resulted from the revolution by the people was evidently accompanied by a bloody civil war. Once the people protested and began to fight for a more democratic form of government, the old regime fought back in an attempt to remain in power. The people fought for this democratic government because they were fed up with the misery that was caused by Ceausescu's failed policies and terroristic use of secret police.

It is also interesting to note that there is no evidence of Soviet involvement in this civil war. Even though Romania was a Soviet-backed communist regime, it was never officially conquered by the Soviet Union and Ceausescu's relationship with the Soviet government eventually deteriorated (Scovel 1989). Perhaps Ceausescu's poor relations with the Soviet government, and that the Soviet Union was beginning its eventual collapse that occurred in 1991, contributed to their non-involvement.

I theorized that war would accompany democratization from 1955 to 1990, as it did in Romania, because of the Cold War. Due to the Cold War, the world operated under a bi-polar powers system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe specifically, the Soviet Union would then work to maintain their sphere of influence and

suppress democratic movements. Therefore, if my theory were correct, I would expect that the Soviet Union would be involved in instigating the conflicts within their sphere of influence because of the structure of the bi-polar powers world. In the Romanian Revolution, however, there is no evidence of Soviet involvement. Thus, my explanation of direct Soviet involvement is incorrect in this case. Yet, the communist Romanian government acted in place of the Soviet Union in this case. So even though there is no evidence of Soviet interference, the Ceausescu loyalists fought against this democratic revolution in order to maintain their own communist sphere of influence. Be that as it may, it is still not determined whether the bi-polar powers system played a causal role in inciting this civil war in the wake of democratization because there is no evidence that the Soviet Union contributed to the war.

Tajikistani Civil War

The Tajikistani Civil War is another case of a country experiencing a civil war that accompanied a regime change. In this case, the civil war accompanied an autocratic transition in power, as opposed to the democratic transition that transpired in Romania. According to Polity, Tajikistan underwent autocratization by going from a closed anocracy in 1991, to an autocracy in 1992. The Tajikistan Civil War began in May 1992, and did not end until June 1997. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan was the most hesitant to assume independence (United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 1995). Part of the reason for the hesitation is that the primary elite of the country were communists, who wanted to keep strong and close ties with Russia (USIP, 1995). Perhaps it is this inclination on behalf of the elites in seeking to maintain autocratic power, which drove the citizens to rebel.

In September 1991, the banned Communist Party forced the acting president Kadriiddin Aslonov to resign. The party then took control of the country by establishing Rahmon Nabyev as president and declaring a state of emergency (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 1993). When elections were held in November, Nabyev won. It is under the presidency of Nabyev that Tajikistan transitioned into an autocratic regime.

The political opposition, composed of democratic reformists and Islamists, held many protests and demonstrations in the wake of Nabyev's election victory in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, and in other areas of Tajikistan. The government, in response, held their own pro-government demonstrations in the same areas as the political opposition (HRW, 1993). The opposition also organized a series of demands that included the resignation of President Nabyev, a constitutional referendum, new elections, and a new coalition government (HRW, 1993). However, instead of concessions, violence often occurred between the pro- and anti-government demonstrators (HRW, 1993). To make matters worse, President Nabyev handed out 1,800 automatic weapons to the pro-government demonstrators on modern day Dousti Square, then called Ozodi Square (HRW, 1993).

As a result, violence continued to increase, but the opposition made headway against the government by capturing key governmental buildings. This, in turn, caused President Nabyev to enact an agreement in which he lessened his own power and provided for the start of the formation of a new coalition government (HRW, 1993). But even with these concessions, the civil war raged on. On September 7, the opposition captured President Nabyev, and forced his resignation as president at gunpoint (HRW, 1993).

Emomali Rahmon was elected president in November 1992, and remains president to this day. He, with the help of the Popular Front, was able to recapture Dushanbe and most of the

country from the rebel opposition (HRW, 1993). The civil war continued, however, until June 1997. During the course of the war, much of the population was displaced, and hundreds of soldiers were killed (Pannier, 2017).

As opposed to the Romanian Revolution, which had virtually no foreign interference, the civil war in Tajikistan was influenced by quite a few powers, such as Russia, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan. Russian troops were actively engaged in the civil war: they served as border guards trying to prevent opposition forces from smuggling arms from Afghanistan (Burke, 1992). Opposition leaders claimed that Russian involvement was a major cause of tension (Burke, 1992). The Russians also supported the election of Emomali Rahmon (Pope, 1993). Rahmon even made an announcement that if it were not for the help of Russia and Uzbekistan, that Tajikistan would not exist (HRW, 1993). Indeed, Russia accounted for at least 70% of the country's economic aid (HRW, 1993). Uzbekistan helped Tajikistan by starting new security forces (HRW, 1993). The Afghan government, on the other hand, supported the opposition Tajik Muslims because Tajik Muslims faced persecution under the rule of the Soviet Union (Pope, 1993).

The Civil War in Tajikistan began from protests and demonstrations between pro- and anti-government demonstrators that erupted into violence, and later, full scale war. Then President Nabyev tried to suppress the protests and maintain power by reacting with violence. The opposition responded with violence as well, and a bloody civil war ensued. Hence, the autocratization of Tajikistan was accompanied by a civil war. Russian interference, along with assistance from Uzbekistan and Afghanistan prolonged and intensified the fighting.

I theorized that after the end of the Cold War, war would accompany autocratization as opposed to democratization due to the major powers world system that developed out of the bi-

polar powers system. In the case of Tajikistan, I was unable to find a particular “major powers effect” however. In a major powers effect, I would expect that many major countries, such as the United States and Russia, would be involved in the onset of the war. But in Tajikistan, there is not much evidence of major countries being involved in starting the war. Russia was indeed involved, but more so in prolonging and intensifying the fighting rather than starting it. So in the face of current evidence, there does not seem to be a major power effect. I also theorized that specifically for intrastate conflicts, civil wars will be more likely under autocratization because of the role of modern free speech and media. The citizens would be able to relay information to each other and around the world very quickly due to the internet and advanced communication technology. This would make it more difficult for leaders to engage in foreign conflicts, which is one way for dictators to justify their existence, and more difficult for leaders to suppress free speech and the dissemination of the truth. Nonetheless, specifically in relation to the Tajikistan War, modern free speech and media could not have played a role in the onset of the war because it began in 1992, when technology took on a much different form, especially in such a remote and underdeveloped country as Tajikistan. However, the role of free speech and media did play a small role in the war. The citizens initially protested using the limited free speech they had, even calling for demands to President Nabiyeu. During the very start of the conflict in early May, opposition forces seized the governmental television studio, which played a crucial role in Nabiyeu eventually signing an agreement that decreased his own power and sparked the start of a coalition government (HRW, 1993).

Chapter 7

Conclusion

A plethora of literature in political science has focused on the relationship between regime change and conflict. Researchers have not been able to agree, however, on the type of regime change, whether democratic or autocratic, that promotes conflict. I hypothesized that war would accompany a democratic or autocratic government transition depending on the time period of examination. Specifically in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, I hypothesized that more wars would accompany democratization during the Cold, and more wars would accompany autocratization after the Cold War. I thought this would be the case because of the respective world powers structure during and after the Cold War.

I was able to find statistical support for my hypotheses. I found support for my first hypothesis, that from 1955-1990 democratization in states from this part of the world was more likely to result in more wars, with a p-value smaller than .05. I also found support for my second hypothesis at a p-value of .10: from 1991-2010 autocratizing states will experience more wars as opposed to democratizing.

However, when I examined my case studies, I was unable to find an effect from the bi-polar and major powers systems that were in place during and after the Cold War respectively. In a bi-polar powers effect, I expected that the Soviet Union would be involved in instigating the conflicts within their sphere of influence because of the structure of the bi-polar powers world. In a major powers effect, I would expect that many major countries, such as the United States and Russia, would be involved in the onset of the war. I was not able to find evidence for either

effect in the Romanian Revolution or the Tajikistani Civil War. Thus, the qualitative evidence is less supportive of my theory in relation to my hypotheses.

My analyses of my case studies thus make me rethink the validity of my theory. However, I also only looked at two cases of wars, among the many other wars that occurred during and after the Cold War. I do still believe that time periods will make a difference in terms of which regime changes will encourage more war. Perhaps the time periods difference effect may be caused by something other than world power structure, but further qualitative examination of wars during and after the Cold War is necessary in order to make a better determination.

Since I focused on the Eastern European and former Soviet states, the states in the Soviet/Russian sphere of influence, future research may look at the states in the United States' sphere of influence. If similar statistically significant results are found, then there is further evidence that the time period I specifically outlined make a difference in the relations between regime change and conflict. Also, if qualitative results examining wars within the United States' sphere of influence during this time period show evidence of United States involvement during the Cold War, and a few major countries involvement after the Cold War, then this would support my theory. Nonetheless, perhaps a redefinition of a "bi-polar" and "major-powers effect" is required. A possible reexamination of my definition would need to be pondered by a future researcher.

If I were to redo my research, or expand upon it further, I would include the states within the United States' sphere of influence, along with those in Eastern Europe. This would give me a wider range of cases that were directly impacted by the bi-polar powers system, and then this system's collapse after the Cold War. I would also examine more wars within my set of cases to

see if there would be any evidence supporting my theory. If not, I would then fully rethink my theory, and try to figure out what else may be causing this time periods difference shown in my statistical analysis.

Overall, my research stresses the importance of time periods making a difference in research of wars and conflicts, which in this case is done in the context of regime change. If time periods truly make a difference in relevant parts of this research and future research, then it becomes important to find the cause of this time period difference, and to study this case in hopes of gaining more insight on war related research which has the potential of helping those plagued by war and conflict all around the world.

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EDUCATION

Schreyer Honors College, The Pennsylvania State University

B.A. in Economics

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Minors in Psychology and History

Thesis: *War and Conflict in Regime Transitioning States*

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Legal Intern

December 2015-January 2016

Kats, Jamison, & Associates, Feasterville-Trevoze, PA

- Drafted documents, letters, and helped prepare demands on behalf of the attorneys.
- Assisted with acquiring new clients and interacted with existing clients about their cases.
- Analyzed and organized legal documents in preparation for demand or trial.
- Researched existing statutes and facts dealing with cases.

Call Center Coordinator

June 2015-August 2015

Language Services Associates, Hatboro, PA

- Attended to hospital, legal, and government requests for language interpreters.
- Reviewed the quality of employed interpreters.
- Analyzed the Ukrainian and Russian interpreters to ensure that they were translating accurately and respectfully.
- Assisted with the training of new employees by teaching company software and customer service techniques.

INVOLVEMENT AND SERVICE

Grader for Economics of Sports (Econ447)

January 2018-Present

The Pennsylvania State University

- Work alongside Assistant Professor of Economics, Dr. Charles Murray, to grade exams, homework, and papers for a class of 75 students, and act as a communication liaison between the students and the professor.

Community Service (200+ Hours)

September 2014-Present

Grace Ukrainian Baptist Church, Warminster, PA

- Raised money for orphanages in Ukraine, cooked and distributed food for the homeless in Philadelphia, and volunteered for church activities that included technical presentation and lawn care.

Treasurer

August 2017-Present

Pi Sigma Alpha, The Pennsylvania State University

- Handled organization funds by balancing the budget, managing the account, fundraising, and monitoring spending.

Psychology and Social Science Research

March 2016

Eastern Psychological Association, New York, NY

- Gathered research extensively throughout the academic term which involved thorough background research, data collection, analysis, and interpretation.
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SKILLS

- Fluent in Ukrainian and Russian
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HONORS AND AWARDS

- Department of Economics Undergraduate Award
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- The President Sparks Award
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- Chaiken Trustee Scholarship
- 4 Year Provost Award Scholarship
- Lubert Ira and Karen Scholarship
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- Superior Academic Achievement Fall 2014 – Fall 2017
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Completed Course Work

Fall 2014

- College Algebra II – 3 Credits
- Introduction to Nutrition – 3 Credits
- Introduction to American National Government – 3 Credits (AP Credit)
- Introductory Microeconomic Analysis and Policy (Honors) – 3 Credits
- Introduction to Comparative Politics – 3 Credits (AP Credit)
- Western Heritage I – 3 Credits
- American Civilization to 1877 – 3 Credits (AP Credit)
- American Civilization from 1877 – 3 Credits (AP Credit)
- Introduction to Psychology – 3 Credits (AP Credit)
- Rhetoric and Composition – 3 Credits
- Elementary German I – 4 Credits
- Statistical Concepts and Reasoning – 3 Credits (AP Credit)

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- Elementary Statistics in Psychology – 4 Credits
- Seminar in Integrative Arts (Honors) – 3 Credits
- Elementary Spanish II – 4 Credits
- Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis and Policy – 3 Credits

Fall 2015

- Business Writing – 3 Credits
- Intermediate Spanish – 4 Credits
- Advanced Research Methods in Psychology – 3 Credits
- Effective Speech – 3 Credits
- Ancient to Medieval Art – 3 Credits
- Astronomical Universe – 3 Credits
- Money and Banking – 3 Credits

Spring 2016

- Civil Liberties and Due Process – 3 Credits
- Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis – 3 Credits
- Intermediate Macroeconomic Analysis – 3 Credits
- Energy and the Environment – 3 Credits
- Political Psychology – 3 Credits

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- Adolescent Psychology – 3 Credits
- Statistical Foundations for Econometrics – 3 Credits
- American Constitutional Law – 3 Credits
- Psychology of Adjustment and Social Relationships – 3 Credits

- Introduction to Independent Thesis Research (Honors) – 3 Credits

Spring 2017

- Introduction to Econometrics – 3 Credits
- Sex and Evolution – 3 Credits
- International Economics – 3 Credits
- Renaissance and Reformation – 3 Credits
- The American Legal Process – 3 Credits

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- Environmental Economics – 3 Credits
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- Senior Thesis Writing Workshop (Honors) – 1.5 Credits
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- Industrial Organization – 3 Credits
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- Colonial American History to 1753 – 3 Credits
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Total: 146 Credits (In Progress)