

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY  
SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

PARTISAN BIAS IN ELECTORAL CONFLICT: TANZANIA'S KAWE CONSTITUENCY

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SPRING 2018

A thesis  
submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements  
for baccalaureate degrees  
in International Politics and African Studies  
with honors in International Politics

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## **ABSTRACT**

This work examines what factors influence varied perceptions of electoral conflict using a case study in Kawe Constituency, Tanzania. Using an original survey on electoral violence in Tanzania, I find substantial partisan effects on the perception of conflict. I find that those who support the incumbent party were 12 percentage points less likely to report that violence had occurred in their constituency, despite widespread local news reports and other outside evidence that violence had indeed occurred. Other factors such as age, gender, wealth, and religion did not have substantial effects on perceptions. This study contributes to a fledgling literature examining the generalizability of Americanist theories on partisanship and partisan bias in the context of new or weak African democracies.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I begin with thanking Dr. Elizabeth Carlson for supervision over this thesis and all the fieldwork that went into it. The comments and direction were a large part of the reason I was able to complete this document.

I want to next express my extreme gratitude to the Heilman family for hosting me in Dar es Salaam during the data collection for this project. Your house came to feel like a home away from home.

To Remigius Mawenya, who not only co-developed the survey that this project evolved from but travelled with me throughout the fieldwork and was a welcome companion, thank you.

To Dr. Michael Berkman, Dr. Gretchen Casper, and my colleagues in the thesis honors writing courses, your inputs helped push this thesis to be better than it would have otherwise.

To Hafsa and Grace, thank you for your professional enumeration services and enjoyable fieldwork.

This work was financially supported by The Pennsylvania State University's African Studies Program, Political Science Department, Africana Research Center, and Student Engagement Network, I thank all of them and the staff who work with them for facilitating the logistics of this work.

Lastly, I wish to thank my family, for without your support and encouragement, I would never have been able to finish this project!

To anyone I fail to mention here, know that your support is appreciated.

## Chapter 1

### Context

In 1992 amid the third wave of democratization, the government of Tanzania opened elections to opposition parties, with the first multi-party elections taking place in 1994 and each election afterwards becoming contested further (Chaligha & Mmuya 1992, 122-23). The most recent general elections in 2015 marked the strongest competition to ruling party dominance (Roop & Weghorst 2015, 191; TEMCO 2015, 149). This election saw a coalition of the main opposition groups that ran under the same candidate (Roop & Weghorst 2015, 191), as is typical in many emerging democracies who have entrenched incumbent parties (LeBas 2011, 6). While relatively peaceful, some constituencies within Tanzania, largely urban ones, experienced varying levels of conflict (Mawenya Forthcoming).

Conflict in this study considers any violent event between voters and security forces, or between voters supporting opposite parties. Typically, the conflict was in the form of a demonstration and refusal to leave polling stations, which the incumbent party deemed illegal. Because the incumbent party banned people from congregating around the polling stations late in the election campaign citing security issues, opposition supporters conducted more demonstrations and publicly stated their mistrust of the vote-counting procedures (LHRC & TACCEO 2016; Mawenya Forthcoming; TEMCO 2016; The Citizen 2015). The refusal to leave polling stations led to police and other security forces dispersing the crowds, sometimes violently<sup>1</sup>. The timing of the conflict was generally between the voting and the announcement of results, though some occurred immediately prior to the elections when the ruling party arrested election observers and vote-counters to obstruct their operations (Ng'wanakilala 2015). Kawe Constituency was one of four constituencies that the incumbent party challenged the results of, citing vote-counting discrepancies (The Citizen 2015). In addition to the challenge to the National Electoral Commission, the voting results were delayed for longer than most other constituencies in the country (Eyakuze 2015), causing some opposition and incumbent supporters to believe that the others were interfering in some way to delay and alter the results, which increased tensions about the election and its' results further.

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<sup>1</sup> I found minimal evidence to support widespread conflict between voters supporting opposite parties in Kawe. With a few isolated, but public incidences, which could lead to respondents recalling those events when asked about electoral conflict.

The conflict was widely publicized by news agencies, who reported regularly about the conflict, the delayed results, and the government's challenge of the results (Eyakuze 2015). With this publicity, I would expect mostly positive responses on an open-ended survey question asking about the conflict. This meant that the first question asked the respondent if there was conflict in Kawe constituency during the 2015 general elections, meant to set the stage for the rest of the questions, which asked about specific details regarding the election and the security forces<sup>2</sup>. Despite the publicity of the conflict, constituents in Kawe report a lack of perception of conflict when asked as an open-ended question on our survey.

The question guiding this study is why do perceptions of conflict during the 2015 general elections in Kawe Constituency vary? This study contributes to an emerging literature on partisanship and partisan bias in new and weak African democracies by providing additional data and evidence of partisan bias on salient topics within countries that democratized during the third wave. My findings suggest that partisan identification with an opposition party significantly and positively influences the perception of conflict during the 2015 general elections in Kawe.

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<sup>2</sup> I developed the survey in conjunction with a master's student at the University of Dar es Salaam, with translation and wording input from two other master's students, who were also the enumerators.



For the Tanzanian case I examine Kawe Constituency, which is located along the coast in the northern section of Dar es Salaam. Kawe consists of neighborhoods of varied wealth, and education. The most northern and northwestern sections of Kawe are part of a vastly expanding Dar es Salaam. These contexts provide for incredibly contentious elections within the constituency. Some subwards, such as Mbopo consist of villages that cannot be accessed without four-wheel drive, while other subwards such as Masaki and Mpiji consist of voters who live in some of the most expensive stretches of land on the East African coastline. Moreover, some subwards such as Mtongani are highly dense with a population greater than ten times Mbopo, Masaki, and Mpiji<sup>3</sup>. While the population density in these two subwards are similar, the needs and demands of a member of parliament for each are vastly different. Below is a map depicting Kawe constituency, the site for this study with the various wards labelled and different colors (NEC 2010).

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<sup>3</sup> All subwards mentioned were included in the sample for this study.

## United Republic of Tanzania Kawe Constituency, Wards and Registration Centres




Figure 1: Map of the Wards of Kawe Constituency

## Chapter 2

### Theory

Americanist partisan bias theory predicts response bias that favors the political party a voter feels close to for low-salience topics (Bartels 2002; Bullock et al 2013; Wlezien, Franklin & Twigg 1997; Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck Nadeau, & Elias 2008). This theory supposes that partisan bias happens because voters seek to present the party they support in a positive way (Bartels 2002; Brennan and Lomasky 1997). Expectations of future economic growth, personal economic situations, and beliefs about the current national economy are all examples of low salience issues where partisan bias should have a strong impact on responses. Less commonly examined are the impacts of partisan bias on highly salient issues such as electoral conflict or civil war, which have the potential for serious normative considerations.

In existing work, long-term affiliation with a party was a key assumption for respondents to display partisan bias (Fiorina 1981; Bartels 2002). It is not clear from existing work whether these findings translate to newer democracies (LeBas 2011; Carlson 2016; Brader & Tucker 2002; Mainwaring & Zoco 2007; Dalton & Weldon 2007) or to more salient issues such as violence (Kalyvas 2003; Bratton 2011). Topic salience and access to non-partisan news sources are potential mitigating factors of partisan bias.

Both Bartels (2002) and Nyhan and Reifler (2015) find that with access to non-bias news, partisan differences in perception of events persists. This suggests that even with more access to non-bias news sources, which online sources brings, partisan bias will likely persist. Bartels (2002) further explains that which partisan structure an individual belonged to did not influence the impact found (Bartels 2002, 134-38), which gives us reason to believe it is not one specific party that is perceiving the events incorrectly.

While Bartels shows that partisan bias is present among many issues that are non-violent, work by both Kalyvas (2003) and Bratton (2011) show that partisan violence is present in issues pertaining to violence. Bratton examines the effects of partisanship on support for retributive justice in wake of campaign violence in Zimbabwe 2008. He argues that partisanship is a major factor in determining support for the justice against those who

perpetrated violence (Bratton 2011, 367,372). Kalyvas posits that partisan bias in civil conflict extends beyond merely actors witnessing the conflict to those recording the history and preparing reports. This could mean that the recorded events of conflict may be just as subject to bias as reports from those witnessing the conflict first-hand (Kalyvas 2003, 35-38).

Other than partisan bias, respondent censoring may occur on a politically salient survey with the presence of a guide from the incumbent party (Afrobarometer 2014). To address this, I control for the presence of a guide and add an interaction between the presence of a guide and support of the opposition. If censoring is to occur because of the presence of a guide, supporters of the opposition will likely censor more frequently than supporters of the same party the guide is from.

The current Tanzanian party structure aligns with the theory I present as Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM henceforth), the ruling party since independence and longest serving modern African political party (Roop & Weghorst 2015, 191), uses a slogan that they are the ‘party of peace’. The slogan has some power, as Tanzania was one of a few countries that gained independence peacefully rather than through military force. Moreover, Tanzania has never seen internal violent political conflict (Ewald 2013, 7). Harnessing that legitimacy may reinforce partisan perceptions of peace and conflict.

*H1: Voters who support the ruling party will perceive less conflict than those who support opposition parties.*

While partisanship is the main explanatory variable in the model I employ, another important covariate for Tanzania is age. Age is theoretically important because Tanzania maintained a single-party system until the mid-1990s, meaning some older Tanzanians were voting for the single-party longer than multi-party elections have taken place. This could mean long-term reinforcement of partisan affiliation due to previous loyalty to the socialist state, the party of independence, or Julius Nyerere himself. Julius Nyerere presented CCM as an all-inclusive, peaceful revolutionary party. This image of peace and security that was consistently reinforced, may lead older respondents to view conflict between voters and security/police forces as less of a conflict and more of law and order. Thus, downplaying their perception of conflict overall.

*H2: Older respondents will perceive less conflict than younger respondents will perceive.*

Other than partisan bias effects, some scholars suggest religion and gender may have influence over the perceptions of violence through inherently different worldviews. Religion in Tanzania varies in its level of salience

somewhat sporadically. The area of focus in my study, Dar es Salaam, is the commercial capital of Tanzania and is incredibly diverse. Some areas along the coast, and particularly in Unguja (Zanzibar and Pemba), religion-based conflicts occur with more frequency (Heilman & Kaiser 2002; Kessler 2006, 8-9). Muslim Tanzanians feel the government banned religion on census surveys to hide the perceived favorable ratio of Muslims to Christians, because a Christian ran CCM at the time (Heilman & Kaiser 2002, 698).

*H3: Muslim respondents will perceive more conflict than Christian respondents will perceive.*

Beyond partisanship and age, other factors that may affect perceptions of conflict include gender, religion, wealth, and education. Mawenya supposes that gender may have an influence on not just the outcome of violence, but the perception of it as well. He finds support that women are keepers of the peace, as well as a calming influence within families and communities. Especially during tense political times through, his evidence emerges from interviews with stakeholders in the Kawe general elections (Mawenya Forthcoming).

*H4: Female respondents will perceive less conflict than male respondents will perceive.*

In addition to the variables mentioned previously, I include education and a proxy for wealth to help soak up variance to strengthen the validity of any findings I encounter for the independent variables. While I do not have theoretical reason to believe a more or less educated or wealthy person would see conflict differently, they may soak up variance for other variables, strengthening the validity of any findings my model produces (Peterson 2016; Heatherington 2001). Lastly, I include a variable for each enumerator to test for effects they may bring into the data (Afrobarometer 2014).

## Chapter 3

### Methods

I conducted a survey of 152 subjects in Kawe, which is a beneficial site for a case study because it is one constituency that experienced conflict during the elections. I sampled all wards within the constituency and 19 subwards. Theoretically, every respondent in the sample experienced the conflict. I randomly selected subwards as enumeration area from the population of wards. I selected Kawe because of the conflict that occurred during and shortly after the 2015 general elections. Kawe was one of four constituencies where the ruling party rejected the ruling and filed for contestation. This contestation came after delayed results, which in part fueled the conflict that occurred around the polling stations. Additionally, Kawe had two high-profile politicians running, causing a large amount of publicity to the race. The candidate from the national ruling party was the opposition for this constituency seat and the son of a former prime minister. The incumbent for the seat comes from the national opposition party, whose fiery attitude and regular removal from parliament make her a popular public figure. Kawe has 10 wards spread across a vast area of Dar es Salaam, leading to vast geographic and social-economic differences among wards. This project surveyed all 10 wards.

I originally planned to utilize a linear multiple regression<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, the sample size determination I used for logistical purposes was intended for a linear multiple regression. To determine the appropriate sample size, I used G\*Power 3.1, a power analysis and effect size application that is open-sourced (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang 2009). I estimated the required sample size to detect an effect size of .1 with an error probability of .05, and a power level of .8. The maximum number of predictors for our model is six. I selected a small effect size to be conservative, even if we see an increase of .1; it may have significant normative implications. I selected .05 error probability and .8 power level, as they are discipline standards. I used the maximum number of predictors to stay on the conservative side, less predictors requires less of a sample size. The total sample size determined was 143, which we made 152 to fit with eight surveys per enumeration area and leaves room for non-response.

I used a minimum of eight surveys per enumeration area to keep consistent with standard practice (United Nations. Statistical Division 2008, 27; Afrobarometer 2014, 28). With 152 respondents per enumeration area, 19

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<sup>4</sup> Once I selected the logistic regression model, I re-ran the sample size determination and the originally determined sample size was sufficient.

subwards was the target. To determine the amount of subwards to survey per each of the 10 wards, I used a population weight. I took population of the wards and divided by the total population of constituency, giving a percentage of the sample population. I then multiplied this percentage by 19, the number of subwards desired and rounded to determine how many subwards to sample per each ward. Once I knew how many subwards per ward, I used the random number function in Excel to create a list of all subwards in Kawe Constituency. Then I selected the first subward to appear for each ward, then the second in those that applied, then the third in those that applied. Three subwards was the maximum selected per ward.

Because Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi show that white field researchers introduce significant bias in data based upon their presence at time of the experiment I did not conduct the interviews. Instead, I hired two enumerators, who are graduate students with household survey experience at the University of Dar es Salaam. I was also not in the enumeration area at the time of the interview, to reduce the likelihood that I would be associated with my enumerators. This is expected to reduce the likelihood of beliefs/perceptions that my team was there for any other than the stated purpose, which was research conducted by the Pennsylvania State University and the University of Dar es Salaam.

Upon ethics approval from federal, university, ward, and subward offices, we began the household selection procedure. This procedure involved a rotation of every tenth and every fifth house respectively, counting houses on both the left and the right side of the street. Once the street ended, enumerators took the street on the right and continued the count. Once they identified the household, the enumerators approached the house and asked whoever answered the door for the person in the house with the next birthday. They used the next birthday selection method for adults to get a representative sample for both age and of both males and females (Gaziano 2005, 126-27). Once they identified the respondent, the enumerators asked when they would be available for an interview and then follow-up and complete the interview. If someone refused, the enumerator substituted the next house in the rotation. If that interviewer refused, the enumerator continued the rotation starting with the tenth house rotation. For a full example of the sampling procedure, see appendix A.

## Chapter 4

### Data

The variables included in this study are conflict, opposition, age, gender, religion, education, wealth, enumerator, guide, and an interaction between opposition and guide. All are dichotomous except age and wealth. Conflict is a one if the respondent reported a presence of conflict and a zero if they did not report a presence of conflict<sup>5</sup>. Opposition is a one if the respondent expressed a partisan identity other than the incumbent, and a zero with preference for the incumbent party<sup>6</sup>. Age is the respondent's self-reported age in years. Gender is a one for female and zero for male. Religion is a one for Muslim and a zero for Christian<sup>7</sup>. Education is a one if the respondent completed secondary school or higher, and zero if they did not finish secondary<sup>8</sup>. Wealth is a two if the respondent's children attended public school only, and one if they had children in both public and private school, and a zero if they attended private school<sup>9</sup>. Enumerator is a one for the first enumerator and two for the second enumerator<sup>10</sup>. Guide is a one if there was a guide present with the field team from the incumbent party and a zero if there was no guide present<sup>11</sup>. A table of the descriptive statistics follows.

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<sup>5</sup> This question was the first content-related question on the survey and asked in an open-ended manner. Due to reporting inconsistencies between enumerators, it is reduced to dichotomous rather than ordinal.

<sup>6</sup> There were some respondents, who chose not close to any party, but this was likely due to censoring and they were included in the opposition category. I ran a separate model, which drops those observations, no meaningful differences occur.

<sup>7</sup> The question was open-ended and there were no responses outside of these two.

<sup>8</sup> While most studies in developing countries use completion of primary school as their metric, this study took place only in an urban setting. Thus, the sample is more educated than similar studies.

I use this proxy, as the presence of a private education is generally a sign of wealth when many respondents do not work for steady wages.

<sup>10</sup> I include this dummy to account for bias introduced among enumerators.

<sup>11</sup> I include this dummy to check for censoring, predominantly among opposition respondents when there is a guide present.



**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean (S.D.)</b>	<b>Min, Max (Median)</b>
Conflict	135	.341 (.476)	0,1
Opposition	135	.348 (.478)	0,1
Age	135	43.859 (14.774)	18,81 (42)
Gender	135	.504 (.502)	0,1
Religion	135	.444 (.499)	0,1
Education	135	.274 (.448)	0,1
Wealth	135	1.348 (.849)	0,2 (1.348)
Guide	135	.615 (.488)	0,1
Enumerator	135	1.556 (.499)	1,2

17 observations dropped due to missing data.

The next table is a conjoined contingency table, which shows the bivariate relationship between all the variables included in the model and conflict. The tables reports the percentage of respondents perceiving conflict in each category.

**Table 2: Perception of Conflict by Indicator Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Yes (% Perceiving Conflict)</b>	<b>No (% Perceiving Conflict)</b>	<b>N</b>
Ruling Party Supporter	28%	45%	135
Older Adult	36%	30%	135
Muslim	35%	33%	135
Woman	32%	36%	135
Wealthy <sup>12</sup>	38%	40%	135
Educated	29%	36%	135
Guide Present	30%	27%	135
Enumerator One	17%	48%	135

17 observations dropped due to missing data.

The bivariate relationship between enumerators and perception of conflict is the strongest in terms of raw percentages. I also suspect that the relationship between perception of conflict and age, partisanship, and incumbent guide may also be strong. I use a Pearson's  $\chi^2$  test and find a value of 15.9 with a significance of  $p < .000$  for enumerator and a value of 4.6 with a significance of  $p < .032$  for guide. Partisanship and age do not pass the test.

<sup>12</sup> I combined both answers of 0 and 1 for this table. This meant that only public school was the "Yes" category. The full breakdown is 0=30%(N=33), 1=18%(N=22), 2=40%(N=80)

## Chapter 5

### Findings

For the primary statistical analysis, I apply logistic regression model. The dependent variable is conflict and the main independent variables are opposition, age, gender, and religion. Wealth and education are included as demographic variables to strengthen any relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Enumerator and guide are included to control for survey methods and bias.

I run two models and the only difference in the two models is the introduction of an interaction variable between party identification and presence of an incumbent guide. While not in the original theory, when I discovered that both are influencing perception of conflict with the same direction, I added an interaction to test for an environmental effect on a behavioral variable, which if not included could lead me to an incorrect interpretation of the model. Theoretically, I would expect that when an incumbent party guide was present, conflict would be reported less from opposition supporters. Additionally, I expect that when someone is a member of opposition, she would perceive more conflict, as the review of partisan bias literature shows. One potential explanation for this oddity is that the incumbent party framed the conflict in a way that the opposition exclusively carried out the violence, thus, they would still want a perception of conflict present. This observation finds more support when we turn to our qualitative evidence, which places the blame on who caused the violence. Common responses to this question were that opposition members, or specifically, youths supporting the opposition were the primary actors involved in starting and participating in this electoral conflict. The ruling party could then use the conflict as an excuse to limit more opposition, as they eventually did. The incumbent government banned official party meetings during and after the elections and sent police to disrupt them using force.

**Table 3: Logistic Regressions on Perception of Conflict**

Variable	Model 1 (S.D.)	P-value	Model 2 (S.D.)	P-value
Opposition	1.082* (.491)	.028	1.795* (.754)	.017
Age	-.001 (.015)	.949	-.001 (.015)	.941
Gender	-.124 (.413)	.763	-.139 (.414)	.737
Religion	-.313 (.426)	.462	-.359 (.431)	.404
Education	-.398 (.472)	.399	-.387 (.474)	.414
Wealth	.39 (.277)	.159	.402 (.274)	.143
Guide	.951* (.451)	.035	1.505* (.653)	.021
Enumerator	1.566* (.453)	.001	1.586** (.455)	.000
Opposition*Guide			-1.167 (.907)	.198
Constant	-4.464** (1.177)	.000	-4.914** (1.242)	.000
N	135		135	
Log-likelihood	-73.589		-72.735	
$\chi^2$	26.03		27.74	
Probability > $\chi^2$	.001		.0011	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.1503		0.1602	

Dependent variable is dichotomous where one indicates a positive response to whether conflict occurred or not, and zero indicating a negative response. The independent variables are dichotomous, except for age and wealth, which are interval.

17 observations dropped from the model due to missing data.

Significance levels: \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01.

I found evidence to support a partisan bias explanation of perceptions of conflict. Those who support the opposition are 38 percentage points more likely to say there was violence in their constituency, significant at the 5% level. Age, gender, and religion are all not significantly correlated with perceptions of violence, refuting hypotheses two, three, and four.

Other effects, particularly those of enumerator and guide are not part of the original theory but I interpret to mean that an unknown factor about one of the enumerators primed respondents to report or not to report conflict. Moreover, I interpret the sign of guide present to indicate that the incumbent party wanted conflict to be seen, but only as a product of opposition discontent and thus legitimizing the actions of the security forces.

Having a guide from the incumbent party present is also a key predictor in this study. Enumerator is still the strongest predictor of perceptions of violence, which suggests one of the enumerators primed the respondents to either think of or not think of electoral conflict. Both enumerators are from Dar es Salaam, are the same age, have the same education background, and are the same gender, the only defining characteristic was religion, but as our model shows, religion is not a significant factor in and of itself.

As coefficients produced in a logistic regression are difficult to interpret, I run a marginal effects model and graph the results below. The model is ran with the other variables taking on their mean values. The bars are at 95% confidence intervals, with the center points being the marginal effect value. The vertical line through the middle represents zero effect.




Figure 2: Marginal Effects

This graph provides evidence of partisan bias influencing perceptions of conflict. Supporting an opposition party in Tanzania increases the likelihood that a voter will perceive electoral conflict in Kawe by 38 percentage points with all other variables held at their means. This finding suggests that opposition voters want to express that conflict occurred during the elections and that supporters of the ruling party are less willing to express the occurrence of conflict. This finding coincides with the story of the elections, in that the opposition supporters crowded the polling stations over fears of misconduct by the election officials. Moreover, the ruling party banned this behavior and deemed it illegal, encouraging their supporters to vote and return quickly to their homes, which suggests either an unwillingness to admit to conflict or that ruling party supporters weren't present in the precise locations of the conflict.

Additionally, my findings provide contradictory evidence that presence of an incumbent guide will lead to censoring of respondents. This finding further supports the story that voters want the ruling party to know they saw conflict. Lastly, the most significant impact on perceptions of conflict is which enumerator gave the survey. As mentioned previously, the only distinguishable difference between the enumerators was their religion, though religion itself has no impact on perception of conflict, and I have found no evidence to suggest the conflict took on a religious component, by perception or otherwise. Regardless, there was significant bias introduced between the enumerators and virtually no way to tease out what caused the bias.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Conclusion**

Through examining Tanzania as a case study, I can help to expand the base of evidence for partisan bias in emerging democracies. The selection of the context being the electoral conflict during the 2015 general elections allows me to test for how theoretical assumptions of partisan bias perform under diverse circumstances. I show that support for an opposition party significantly increase the likelihood that a voter will perceive the conflict as occurring in Kawe Constituency during the 2015 general elections. The presence of a guide from the ruling party further increases the likelihood that a voter will perceive conflict, which suggests that voters want the ruling party to know they saw conflict during the elections.

The 2015 general elections saw conflict, with varying perceptions of the occurrence, not just severity among the voters. With additional evidence supporting a partisan bias story, future research should address where these partisan effects come from: different experiences, different media consumption, motivated reasoning, partisan cheerleading, or willing negligence. Significant differences in perceptions of conflict during the most contested elections in Tanzanian history present a cause for concern. Particularly over the representation and perception of violent political events associated with the ruling party. Findings provide additional support for a growing body of work on partisan bias in new or weak African democracies.

## Appendix A

### Original Survey

#### Kawe Survey

##### Identity and Politics

Respondent number: \_\_\_\_\_

Ward: \_\_\_\_\_

Fieldworker number: \_\_\_\_\_

Town/Village: \_\_\_\_\_

Field number: \_\_\_\_\_

Street: \_\_\_\_\_

##### Household selection Procedure

*Interviewer: It is your job to select a random household. Start your walk from the starting point that has been randomly chosen. Team members must walk in opposite directions from each other.*

*Use a 5/10 interval pattern to select a household. That is, select the fifth household for the first interval, counting houses on both the right and left (starting on the right if they are opposite). Once you leave your first interview, continue in the same direction, this time selecting the 10<sup>th</sup> household. If the settlement ends, make a right turn continuing until you find the next house.*

*When you find a household with someone home, please introduce yourself using the following script.*

**How are you today? My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am here as part of a study being conducted in Dar es Salaam about to improve peace during future elections. The results from this study will be used to help promote peace and reduce tensions during elections. I do not represent the government or any political party. I am a researcher affiliated with The University of Dar es Salaam and The Pennsylvania State University. We are selecting random households within Dar es Salaam to take part in our study, your answers will be confidential and we will not record any identifying information. The survey will only take about 20 minutes and there is no penalty for refusing to participate, you may refuse to answer any questions you don't wish to answer.**

**I would like to speak with the adult in this house whose birthday is coming up next. May we proceed?**

**Habari ya leo? Naitwa \_\_\_\_\_, ninafanya utafiti wa kimasomo kuhusiana na kuboresha Amani wakati wa uchaguzi mkuu ujao. Siko kuwakilisha serikali au chama chochote cha siasa, huu ni utafiti wa kimasomo chini ya chuo kikuu cha Dar es Salaam na chuo kikuu cha Pennsylvania, nchini Marekani. Matokeo ya tafiti hii yatasaidia kuongeza Amani na utulivu kwa uchaguzi ujao, na chochote utakachosema kitabaki kuwa siri, ikiwemo na utambulisho wako binafsi.**

**Tunachagua nyumba katika baadhi ya maeneo, kata ya Kawe jijini Dar es Salaam. Kwa ruhusa yako, tutakuwa na mahojiano ya muda mfupi tu kutusaidia katika utafiti huu, na tungependa kumuhoji mtu mzima ambaye umri wake ni miaka 18 na zaidi, lakini ambaye siku yake ya kuzaliwa iko jiradi Zaidi.**

If yes:	May I please interview this person now? Ninaweza kukuhoji?
If no:	Will this person return here at any time today?
If no:	Thank you very much. I will select another household. <i>Substitute with the next household</i>



	<i>to the right and repeat the respondent selection procedure. (NOTE: YOU CAN ONLY SUBSTITUTE HOUSEHOLDS NOT INDIVIDUALS.)</i>
If yes:	<b>Please tell this person that I will return for an interview at [insert convenient time]. If this respondent is not present when you call back, replace this household with the next household to the right.</b>

**If the person is home,**

*If no one is at home, substitute the very next household. If the interview is refused, continue to the next house in your 5/10 pattern.*

For unsuccessful call, please indicate why: (empty house, not a citizen, refused, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

**To ALL respondents:**

*Repeat the introduction you gave earlier if the respondent is not the person who answered the door. [If respondent agrees, add]*

**We can do this interview in Kiswahili or English, which would you prefer?**

Before the interview, please note the following:

- I. Gender:
- II. Time interview starts:
- III. Date:

**Begin Interview**

**We will begin by talking about the 2015 general election in Kawe. We heard there was some electoral conflict during the elections in some areas. We want to know the attitudes of ordinary Tanzanians about these conflicts and about the 2015 elections in general. We will listen to these attitudes and use them together to help reduce conflict and promote peace during future elections.**

**Tutaanza kwa kuzungumza kuhusu uchaguzi wa mwaka 2015 kwani tulisikia kuna baadhi ya maeneo palitokea vurugu. Tungependa kujua mtazamo wa wananchi kuhusu hizo vurugu pamoja na hali ya uchaguzi kwa ujumla, ambao tutautumia kwa ajili ya kuhamasisha utulivu na Amani kwa uchaguzi ujao.**

So, let's begin,

1. Je unafikiri kulikua na vurugu za aina yoyote katika Jimbo la Kawe wakati wa Uchaguzi mkuu 2015?

(Do you think that there was any kind of electoral conflict in Kawe Constituency during the 2015 general election?)

2. Je uliona au kusikia uharibifu wa mali au watu kuumizwa katika vurugu hizo?

(Did you see or hear about any damage to property or people during those conflicts?)

3. Kama Ndiyo unafikiri nani alikua muhusika mkuu katika vurugu hizo.

(If so, who do you think the primary actors were?)

4. Je unahisi nini kinaweza kuwa chanzo/ kiini katika vurugu zilizojitokeza.

(If you had to guess, what would you say some of the primary causes were for those conflicts?)

5. Je Unafikiri Vyombo vya Ulinzi na usalama vilikutana na Changamoto gani kipindi cha uchaguzi mkuu 2015 Jimbo la Kawe? (What do you think were security challenges encountered by the security forces during 2015 general election in Kawe Constituency).

6. Je unafikiri kuna hatua zinaweza kuchukuliwa na vyama vya siasa, wapiga kura na vyombo vya ulinzi na usalama ili viweze kutimiza wajibu wao ipasavyo katika chaguzi zijazo? Ni hatua zipi hizo?

(Do you think there are some appropriate actions that the political parties, voters, or security forces can take to improve their roles during future elections? If so, what are those actions)

**For this next set of questions, I am going to ask your opinion on some topics about the 2015 general elections in Kawe.**

**Katika kipengele hiki, ningependa kujua mtazamo wako kuhusu masuala fulani yahasuyo uchaguzi mkuu wa 2015.**

*[Mark the box that the respondent choses]*

7. Kwa ujumla unaweza kusema mahusiano ya vyama vya siasa na vyombo vya ulinzi na usalama yalikuwaje? (In general, would you say that the relationship between political parties and security forces was very bad, was bad, was good, was very good, or there was no relationship?)					
Mbaya sana/ Very Bad	Mbaya/ Bad	Hakuna/ None	Nzuri/ Good	Nzuri sana/ Very good	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
8. Kwa ujumla unaweza kusema mahusiano Kati ya Tume ya Uchaguzi na Vyama vya siasa, waangalizi na vyombo vya ulinzi na Usalama yalikuaje? (In general, would you say that the cooperation between the National Electoral Commission, political parties, observers, and security forces was very bad, was bad, was good, was very good, or there was no cooperation? )					
Mbaya sana/ Very Bad	Mbaya/ Bad	Hakuna/ None	Nzuri/ Good	Nzuri sana/ Very good	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
9. Kwa ujumla unaweza kusema watu wa kawaida walikuwa na mtizamo gani juu ya vyombo vya ulinzi na usalama wakati wa uchaguzi? In general, would you say that ordinary people perceived security forces during the elections as very bad, as bad, as good, as very good, or there was no perception?					
Mbaya Sana/ Very Bad	Mbaya/ Bad	Hakuna/ None	Nzuri/ Good	Nzuri sana/ Very good	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
10. Kwa ujumla unaweza kusema Vyama vya siasa walichukuliaje vyombo vya ulinzi na usalama wakati wa uchaguzi? (In general, would you say political parties perceived the security forces during the elections as very bad, bad, good, very good, or there was no perception?)					
Mbaya Sana/ Very Bad	Mbaya/ Bad	Hakuna/ None	Nzuri/ Good	Nzuri sana/ Very good	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]

**For this next set of questions, I am going to read you some statements about the 2015 general elections. For each statement please let me know whether you strongly disagree, you disagree, you are neutral, you agree, or you strongly agree:**

**Kwa kipengele kifuatacho, ningependa kujua mtazamo wako kuhusiana na maelezo nitakayokusomea.**

11. Je polisi, jeshi, Usalama wa Taifa walitimizajibu wao ipasavyo wakati wa uchaguzi kuhakikisha hali ya amani na utulivu na tawala kipindi cha uchaguzi mkuu 2015? (In general, during the 2015 general election, the police, military, and state security agency played their roles effectively to ensure peace.)					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
12. Kwa ujumla Vyombo vya Ulinzi na Usalama vilitekeleza majukumu yao ipasavyo na kwa Usawa wakati wa Uchaguzi Mkuu 2015 Jimbo La Kawe? (In general, during the 2015 general election the security forces exercised neutrality In Kawe Constituency.)					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
13. Je kuna uhitaji wa vyombo maalum vya usalama au utaratibu maalum wa ulinzi kipindi cha Uchaguzi? (There is a need for a special force or mechanism to deal with security matters during elections.)					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know

					[DNR]
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**For this next set of questions, I am going to read some statements about your community and Tanzania generally, for each statement please let me know whether you strongly disagree, you disagree, you are neutral, you agree, or you strongly agree:**

**Katika kipengele hiki, ningependa kujua mtazamo wako kuhusiana na jamii na Tanzania kwa ujumla katika maelezo nitayokupa:**

14. Kwa ujumla unafikiri Mahusiano ya kijamii katika eneo lenu ni mzauri? (In general, you think that social relations in your community are good?)					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ / Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
15. Kwa Ujumla Unafikiri watu wa dini zote wana fursa sawa kielimu nchini Tanzania? (In general, you feel that Tanzanians of all religions have the same economic and educational opportunities.)					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ / Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
16. Kwa Ujumla unafikiri Wanawake na Wanaume wana Fursa Sawa za Kiuchumi na Elimu Tanzania? (In general, you feel that men and women have the same economic and educational opportunities in Tanzania.).					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ / Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
17. Kwa Ujumla unafikiri vijana wa Tanzania wana fursa sawa za Kiuchumi na Elimu kama wale walio na umri mkubwa zaidi hapa Tanzania? (In general, you feel the youth of Tanzania have the same economic and educational opportunities as older Tanzanians).					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ / Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
18. Kwa Ujumla unafikiri una Fursa Sawa Kiuchumi na Kielimu kama Watanzania wengine? (In general, you feel that you have the same economic and educational opportunities as other Tanzanians?)					
Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ / Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
19. Kwa ujumla unafikiri Watanzania wote kila kabila wana fursa sawa za kiuchumi na kielimu? (In general, you feel that Tanzanians of all ethnic groups have the same economic and educational opportunities.)					

Hapana kabisa/ Strongly disagree	Hapana/ Disagree	Hakuna tofauti/ / Neutral	Ndiyo/ Agree	Ndiyo kabisa/ Strongly agree	Sijui/ Don't Know [DNR]
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**We are almost done, in this last section, I am going to ask some general questions.**

**Tunakaribia kumaliza, katika kipengele hiki, nitaomba nikuulize maswali ya jumla kuhusu.**

20. Una umri gani? (How old are you?)
21. Lugha mama kwako ni ipi? (Which language is your mother-tongue?)
22. Kiwango chako cha juu cha elimu ni? (What is your highest level of education?)
23. Je kuna ndugu yeyote kwenye familia yenu anafanya kazi serikalini? (Does anyone in your family work for the government?)
24. Wewe ni dini gani? (What is your religion?)
25. Je ni vyombo gani vya nyumbani unamiliki? (Runinga, Redio, Gari, Friji, Mashine ya kufua, Jiko, Choo cha kuflashi) Which of these home appliances do you own? (TV, radio, vehicle, refrigerator, stove, washing machine, flushing toilet) *[mark those that respondent answers]*
26. Je Upo karibu/unapenda Chama gani cha siasa kama kipo? (Which political party do you feel close to, if any?)
27. Watoto wako wanasoma/walisoma shule gani? (binafsi/serikali)? (Which school do/did your children attend? (government/private school)

**THAT IS THE END OF THE SURVEY. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOUR ANSWERS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL.**

END INTERVIEW -- DON'T FORGET TO COMPLETE NEXT SECTION

***ALL SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY THE INTERVIEWER AFTER THE INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED***

- IV. Time the interview stopped:
- V. Were there any other people immediately present during the interview?
- VI. Who were they? (spouse, children, friends, etc.):
- VII. Did the respondent check with anyone before answering a question?
- VIII. How often?

EA-SVC: Are the following services present in the enumerations area?			
	Yes	No	Don't Know
A. Electricity grid that most houses could access			
B. Piped water system that most houses could access	1	0	9
C. Sewage system that most houses could access	1	0	9
D. Cell phone service	1	0	9

EA-HOUSE. Please indicate if the house had the following			
	Yes	No	Don't Know
A. A separate plot			
B. An exterior fence	1	0	9

C. The house is within a planned neighborhood	1	0	9
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EA-SEC. In The enumeration area, did you (or your colleague) see:			
A. Any policemen or police vehicles?	Yes	No	Don't Know
B. Any soldiers or army vehicles?	1	0	9
C. Any roadblocks set up by private security providers or the local community?	1	0	9

EA-ROAD. Thinking of the journey here:			
A. Was the road at the start point of the enumeration are paved/tarred/ concrete?	Yes	No	Don't Know
B. Was the road to this enumeration area impassable at any point?	1	0	9

INTERVIEWER: Do you have any other comments on this interview? For example, did anything else significant happen during the interview?

23. INTERVIEWER: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with the instruction received during training. All responses recorded here are those of the respondent who was chosen by the appropriate selection method.

INTERVIEWER SIGNITURE: \_\_\_\_\_

24. SUPERVISOR: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted with instructions given during training.

SUPERVISOR SIGNITIURE: \_\_\_\_\_

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## ACADEMIC VITA

**Seamus Wagner**

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### EDUCATION

**The Pennsylvania State University, Schreyer Honors College**  
**College of Liberal Arts**  
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations  
Bachelor of Arts in African Studies

**University Park, PA**  
May 2018

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### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

#### **African Studies Program**

*Teaching Assistant, Early African History and Modern African History*

- Managed student attendance, notes, and quizzes for five sections of 130 students
- Advised and reviewed student final papers during office hours

**University Park, PA**  
January 2015- May 2017

#### **Educational Psychology Program**

*Teaching Assistant, Learning and Instruction*

- Proctored exams for two sections of 190 students
- Answered administrative and assignment related questions posed by students

**University Park, PA**  
August 2015- December 2015

**Mkwiro Primary School, Assistant Teacher**

**Matunda Bora Academy, Assistant Teacher**

**Wasini, Kenya 2014**  
**Shimoni, Kenya 2014**

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### ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

#### **Invited Research Presentations**

*Presenter*

- Midwest Political Science Association: *Electoral Conflict in Kawe: Perceptions of Constituents.*
- Penn State Undergraduate Research Exhibition: *Partisan Bias in Electoral Conflict: Tanzania's Kawe Constituency.*
- Africana Research Center Undergraduate Research Exhibition: *Language Policy in Education: Tanzania's Use of Swahili and English. The Arab Slave Trade in East Africa and its Impact on the Coastal Peoples of East Africa.*

**Chicago, IL** April 2018

**University Park** April 2018

**University Park** October 2017

**University Park** October 2016

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### LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE

#### **Model African Union**

*Student Participant, Student Organizer*

- Secured funding for all delegates
- Provided revisions and edits to delegates proposals in order to meet conference deadlines
- Ensured effective communication between faculty supervisor and delegates

**Washington, D.C.**

February 2016

[participant]

February 2017-2018 [organizer]

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### WORK EXPERIENCE

#### **World Relief**

*Intern for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, South Sudan*

- Communicated with field teams for timely proposal submissions
- Monitored donor sites for funding opportunities
- Stayed current on multiple complex humanitarian situations
- Drafted and edited institutional profiles and funding proposals

**State College, PA**

Spring 2018

**Otto's Pub and Brewery**

**State College, PA**

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*Expeditor, Food Runner*

April 2014- Present

- Responsible for efficient transfer of food from various cooking stations to the table
- Facilitated communication between front and back of the house regarding allergies and dietary restrictions
- Responded to and corrected customer complaints of food
- Trusted with inventory control

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**SKILLS**

- Proficient in SPSS and Stata statistical packages
- Experienced in research design and methodology
- Composure under pressure to meet strict deadlines
- Conversational Swahili
- First Aid CPR certified (AHA)

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**SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS**

- African Studies Department Scholarship 2017, 2016, 2015
  - Africana Research Center Undergraduate Research Exhibition, Participant 2017
  - Africana Research Center Undergraduate Research Exhibition, 3<sup>rd</sup> place 2016
  - Dye Political Science Scholarship 2016
  - Susan Welch Dean's Chair LA Scholarship 2016
-