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FUJIMORI'S *DECENIO*: A CASE STUDY ON NEO-POPULISTIC LEADERSHIP AND
ETHICS IN PERU

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ABSTRACT

Alberto Fujimori is one of the most polarizing figures in Peru; he is regarded as one of the most successful yet notorious presidents in the Incan nation's history. A political outsider and career academic, Fujimori emerged from obscurity to win the presidential election in 1990. This thesis examines the various kinds of discourse used by Fujimori to handle crises; it is a case study on presidential crisis management and neo-populistic leadership. The first chapter will discuss the institutional factors, coupled with the porous living conditions in 1980s Peru, that enabled a political outsider to go from complete obscurity to President. The next chapter will center around Fujimori's first term and will offer a discussion as to why the mass public was overwhelmingly supportive of this regime, despite its borderline unethical initiatives. The final chapter will discuss the factors, such as increased skepticism and corruption made public, that caused his regime to unravel as quickly as it arose.

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“Cuando despiertan mis ojos y veo
 Que sigo viviendo, contigo Perú
 Emocionado, doy gracias al cielo
 Por darme la vida, contigo Perú
 Eres muy grande y siempre lo seguirías siendo
 Pero si todos estamos, contigo Perú
 Sobre mi pecho llevo tus colores
 Y están mis amores contigo Perú
 Somos tus hijos y nos uniremos
 Y seguro que triunfaremos contigo Perú”

- Arturo “Zambo” Cavero

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke once referred to humans as “the symbol-using animal.” Symbol use, according to Burke, was perhaps the most important thing that defined humans. Unlike birds and other animals, humans have the ability to use symbolic communication – speech, writing, and other forms – to infuse life with meaning as well as make sense of the environment around him. In addition, Burke argues that humans are goaded by the spirit of hierarchy. They are drawn to order and status, hence why divisions of labor and classes are inherent in nature. While humans emerge from different symbolic environments, Burke’s multi-faceted assessment of life is applicable throughout the governing of humans. A nation’s political structure and landmark documents (ie. Constitution) attempt to create meaning and guide life in both times of peace and discomfort. The institutional power of the Executive, and thus the identity of the President, is derived from such discourse. At no point in time is rhetorical action of the President as important than in the midst of crisis.

Deriving from the Greek root *kinos*, the term “crisis” has evolved over time. In the olden days, “crisis” was specifically used in the medical field, as it referred to a critical or turning point of a disease.¹ The patient’s fate – life or death – was dependent on this critical moment. Since then, throughout various languages, the word has gradually obtained a figurative meaning, metaphorically applicable in both political and social situations. It is a dangerous state of affairs that poses a significant threat to the existence of society – whether a person, group, or country - an unfinished event that places enormous pressure on individuals to make fundamental decisions.²

In contemporary society, an overwhelming majority of individuals have experienced life-altering crises. These crises can originate from a variety of internal or external factors – economic, social,

¹ (Tangjia 2014, 4).

² (Tangjia, 8-9).

environmental, etc. A head coach is left to crash and burn when his star quarterback suffers a serious injury. A family is faced with a moral catastrophe when parents cannot afford to send their kid to the school of his dreams. A community rich with tradition and honor, one that wears its pride on its sleeves, is ravaged in crisis from the heinous actions of one man.³ As members of the Penn State community, the latter example really hits home. Regarding crisis, humans can fare one of two ways: they either survive and overcome or become its victim. The manner in which one manages crises goes a long way in determining the overall outcome.

As perennial inhabitants of crisis, it is essential for the common man to build awareness and sensitivity to it and develop contingency plans. That is, however, much easier said than done, especially when assuming the role of President of a nation. It is the toughest job in the world. Think of the above examples on steroids. Pressing issues across the nation, potentially simultaneous in nature, suddenly become your problems. The United States, for example, is currently in the midst of a multi-faceted crisis: an opioid epidemic currently plagues the country's streets and youth; the economy is at risk for another financial crash; and national security, in such a globalized world, is more pressing than ever before. The President, thus, is responsible for the lives of millions.

On top of holding the fate of millions in the palms of his hands, a President is likely to face many pressures and problems during a crisis, which often leaves him with gray hair and significantly stressed faces. Among the most extensive pressures is time. In a political landscape, time is a double-edged sword. It is often a very scarce resource as many crises require a speedy response. This is especially the case when the threat of war is present: if a response isn't given at that moment, will it be too late? On the flip side, the very nature of a crisis tends to be difficult and confusing. There is a lot of complexity and uncertainty to begin with.⁴ Thus, the danger of making a rash decision is significant and can further escalate a conflict.

³ In reference to the Jerry Sandusky Scandal that plagued Penn State in 2011.

⁴ (Genovese, 1986, 4-5).

Despite these pressures, managing crises is one of the most crucial jobs a president is elected to do. The manner in which he handles these high-pressure situations not only affects the state of his respective nation, but also shapes his legacy. Communication plays a very integral role in all of this. Over the course of history, the presidency has been shaped by what the president says and how he says it. This role has only been enhanced in recent decades. Through the emergence of electronic media, a president has the ability to speak to a national audience whenever, wherever, and on whatever topic they choose.⁵ Through such communication – oral, written, or non-verbal – a president is provided with the opportunity to persuade his audience, the people, to conceive themselves in ways compatible with his view of government. Renowned rhetorical critic Karlyn Kohrs Campbell calls this a president’s “deeds done in words.”⁶ A president’s “deeds” have brought both dazzling successes as well as miserable failures, with regards to satisfying the demands of the people, the audience, and the institution.

This thesis is about presidential rhetoric in the midst of crisis. Specifically, it is about the various kinds of rhetoric used by a neo-populist leader by the name of Alberto Fujimori, once an obscure engineer, to not only assume the office of President of the Republic of Peru, but also to mobilize the masses in support of his questionable and borderline ethical decisions.

This project is driven by three central questions:

1. How can a virtually unknown engineer become President of Peru?
2. How could an overwhelming majority of Peruvians support Fujimori’s unprecedented and borderline unethical measures, such as dissolving Congress and indefinitely suspending the Constitution?
3. How was Fujimori’s empire able to fall so swiftly?

To answer these questions, I will conduct an analysis of Fujimori’s discourse throughout the course of his *decenio* – his ten-year reign as head of the Peruvian state – and how his deeds, coupled with the social

⁵ (Campbell & Jamieson, 2013, 4-6).

⁶ (Campbell & Jamieson, 10-11).

and economic conditions, shaped public opinion. The first chapter will discuss the institutional factors, coupled with the porous living conditions in 1980s Peru, that enabled a political outsider to ascend to the Presidency. The next chapter will center around Fujimori's first term and will offer a discussion of why the mass public was overwhelmingly supportive of this regime. Additionally, this chapter will consider, from various ethical perspectives, why Fujimori said and did the things he did. The final chapter will discuss the changing environment Fujimori faced in pursuit of a third re-election as well as highlight how the regime unraveled so quickly.

Before reaching these analyses, the rest of this chapter will provide a synopsis on the notorious Alberto Fujimori, as well as the key concepts of communication ethics and neo-populism that I apply in my work.

Background: Alberto Fujimori

Alberto Fujimori is a quite fascinating figure. He serves as the antithesis of most successful politicians. Rather than entering the world of politics with a rich pedigree or a plethora of experience, Fujimori was a self-made man of humble beginnings, a *nisei* (first generation immigrant) who went from mathematician to one of the most polarizing figures in Peruvian history. This is his story.

Alberto Kenya Fujimori was born in the capital city of Lima on Peruvian Independence Day, July 28, in 1938. He is one of four siblings born to Naoichi and Matsue, who emigrated to Peru in 1934 in order to escape the poverty from their native village of Kumamoto, Japan. Such Japanese ascendance is why Alberto is commonly referred to by Peruvians as "El Chino." While in Peru, not much changed for the Fujimori family. They lived in a humble neighborhood of Lima. Additionally, Naoichi had many unsuccessful business ventures. His tailoring business folded in the unfavorable political and economic climate. Afterwards, he turned to cotton growing, though this venture also ended in failure when the soil in the field the Fujimori's rented was poor in quality. Finally, the Fujimori's got their break. Naoichi, upon

noting the growth in traffic in Lima, decided to open a tire repairing business, a move that brought great success. Such success, however, would not last very long. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and after facing immense pressure from the United States, the Peruvian government confiscated all Japanese-owned businesses, including the Fujimori family business.⁷ Essentially, the Fujimori's had to overcome both poverty and prejudice.

Despite the hardships encountered throughout childhood, young Alberto was able to move away from the Japanese community and integrate himself into Peruvian life. There, it became apparent that he was a gifted academic as well as a hard worker. He learned to speak fluent Spanish while completing his primary education at “La Rectora.” Then in 1957, Fujimori pursued a degree in Agricultural Engineering from the Agrarian National University in La Molina (*Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina*). He graduated at the top of his class in 1961.⁸ Upon graduation, Fujimori remained at his alma mater and briefly served as a lecturer in mathematics. In 1964, three years after obtaining his engineering degree, Fujimori moved to France to study at the renowned University of Strasbourg. Later on, he migrated to the United States to pursue his Master of Arts in mathematics at the University of Wisconsin, a distinction he earned in 1969.⁹

After briefly traveling the world to pursue higher education, Fujimori returned to his native Peru. There, he married Susana Higuchi, a Peruvian engineer of Japanese ascendance, in 1974. Together, they had four children: Kieko, Hiro, Sachi, and Kenji. Additionally, Fujimori returned to his old stomping grounds – Universidad Nacional Agraria – to continue his career in academia that culminated with his appointment as dean of the sciences faculty as well as rector of the university from 1984 – 1989.¹⁰ Fujimori also became president of the National Assembly of University Presidents.¹¹

⁷ (The Rise and Fall of Alberto Fujimori, n.d.).

⁸ (The Rise and Fall of Alberto Fujimori).

⁹ (Alberto Fujimori Biography, 2017).

¹⁰ The term *rector* in South America is used to refer to the President of a University.

¹¹ (The Rise and Fall of Alberto Fujimori).

His entrance in politics did not begin until 1988, towards the end of his tenure as university president. Rather than immediately running for public office, Fujimori hosted a television show *Getting Together (Concentrado)* on the popular Channel 7.¹² It was on this show, a program that examined environmental and agrarian issues, where Fujimori caught the nation's eye as a skilled political analyst. After sustaining some success in this role, Fujimori founded his own party – Change 90 (*Cambio 90*) – in 1989, and officially threw his hat in the 1990 Peruvian presidential election race. The media, however, paid little attention to him and his Change 90 colleagues. Renowned author Mario Vargas Llosa of the Democratic Front was the heavy favorite to capture the presidency. Nevertheless, after building strong grassroots support, a topic I will go further in depth later in this project, coupled with an ill-fated campaign on the part of Vargas Llosa, Fujimori shocked the world. On June 10, 1990, Alberto Fujimori, the *nisei* of humble beginnings, was elected as the 62nd President of Peru.

Communication Ethics

To this day, Alberto Fujimori remains one of the most polarizing figures in Peruvian history. Many of his “deeds” throughout of his *decenio* have been lauded by some and heavily criticized by others. Over the course of this thesis, I will consider the communication ethics surrounding some of these deeds. Communication ethics is the study of how ethics is disclosed in language and represented in a public phenomenon. For the most part, my ethical judgements surrounding these rhetorical actions will be rendered from a utilitarian point of view. Fujimori's tenure as head of the Peruvian state is very complex and controversial. Perhaps, through these ethical considerations, one can determine if there were any ulterior motives to his actions.

In order to talk about communication ethics, though, it's important to know what ethics is. According to Stephen Browne, professor of Communication Arts and Sciences at the Pennsylvania State

¹² (Britannica, 2018).

University, ethics is the systematic study of questions of the good. Shaped by religious beliefs, cultural norms, biology, and life experiences, ethics involves principles for right living. Furthermore, it is grounded on a set of assumptions, assumptions that enable the rendering of ethical judgements. We assume that ethics shape the human condition. Humans are, by definition, ethical animals; what it means to be human is to operate in the zone of the ethical. In addition, we assume that the person has agency – the capacity to act under free will. Finally, we assume that the zone of the ethical is universally agreed upon. As noted by Dr. Browne, “It’s not a judgement like “I like pumpkin pie.” Rather, it is something along the lines of a principle.”

In the field of ethics, there are three competing schools: deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. For the purpose of this project I will only cover the first two. Deontology is a duty-based ethic; it is based on obligation and doing the right thing. A key component of deontology is that motives do not matter. The only thing that matters is that the person did the right thing.

Utilitarian ethics, on the other hand, is rooted by the famous quote “the end justifies the means.” It is a calculus, concentrated on motives, that seeks to maximize the greatest good, a concept that saturates the world of public policy. This doctrine, however, is fundamentally flawed as it can conflict with our moral conscience. Take torture, for example. It is an international crime, an act that involves physically abusing another human being. Yet, from a utilitarian perspective, it can be rendered ethical. If there is a ticking time bomb, torturing someone with information on the bomb can save lives. Hence, the torturer is maximizing the greatest good. This concept of net gain pops up frequently throughout the Fujimori administration. Some of his most controversial and borderline unethical actions, such as suspending the constitution and subsequently shutting down congress, can be justified by a utilitarian. Moreover, his pursuit to cling onto power as long as possible can perhaps be vindicated as “maximizing the greatest good” for himself. Rendering these ethical judgements further add to the polarity of the mystic figure that is Alberto Fujimori.

Neo-Populism in Latin America

The opening lines to Peru's national anthem are as follows: "somos libres, seámoslo siempre, seámoslo siempre." – we are free, may we always be so, may we always be so. There is much irony in these lines, especially with regard to the cyclical nature of Peru's political history.

Like the rest of the region, Peru has had a rich history with strongman (*caudillo*) rule.¹³ The military, in particular, has had a predominant role in the nation's history. Elections staged between populist parties favored by the military as well as abuse of human rights, such as controls on the press, were common.¹⁴ My mother, born and raised in Lima, recalled an instance in which the military followed a young, outspoken woman wearing a pink sweater. Military coups were far from uncommon as well. For example, in the span of seven years (1968-1975), there were two bloodless military coups. In 1968, following a licensing dispute with the International Petroleum Company, General Juan Velasco deposed the democratically elected President, Fernando Belaunde Terry. Seven years later, Velasco was the victim of a military coup and was replaced by General Francisco Morales Bermudez.¹⁵ Considered a more pragmatic leader, Bermudez presided over a return to a civilian government under a new constitution and in 1980, with the re-election of Fernando Belaunde Terry in May 1980, Peru became one of the first countries in South America to successfully transition from military rule to a democratic government.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the institution of government remained weak in Peru. The institutional mechanisms created by the 1979 Constitution preserved this idea of strongman rule – a centralized system of government with authoritarian characteristics. Thus, the democratic transition period in Peru was characterized by a strong discord between state and civil society.¹⁷ Such disconnect would persist throughout the 1980s.

¹³ (Mauceri, 2000).

¹⁴ (Politics & Political History of Peru Colonial Times until Today, n.d.)

¹⁵ (Politics & Political History of Peru Colonial Times until Today).

¹⁶ (Hudson, 1992).

¹⁷ (Cameron & Mauceri, 1997, 29-30).

Furthermore, institutional weakness, coupled with the urgent issues facing the country throughout Latin America's "Lost Generation" provides permissive conditions for a neo-populistic leader to emerge.

Neo-populism is another form of strongman rule. According to Nagidmy Acosta, neo-populism is the response to poor governmental leadership. It is the response to when a political system is unable to provide social stability and provide people's basic needs. While neo-populistic governments do not follow exact ideological patterns, they all tend to possess a charismatic leader, an unorganized political strategy focused on mass mobilization, and anti-elitist political rhetoric.¹⁸ Neo-populist leaders thrive under crisis. It opens up many opportunities for them to mobilize support by promising salvation for the difficulties facing the nation.

However, because of its ideological nature, neo-populistic leadership is very volatile. The foundation of their rule is performance. It is very crucial to have concrete success right away or risk being left abandoned and vulnerable to challenges.¹⁹ Ironically, such concrete success threatens the continuation of neo-populistic leadership. It resolves the resolvable problems that are needed to justify their existence. Furthermore, it brings to light issues that are far more difficult to resolve, such as unemployment, poverty, and low incomes.²⁰ This tends to diminish support and signal the downfall for neo-populistic leaders. Kurt Weyland, a Professor of Government at the University of Texas, calls this a "paradox of success." On one hand, neo-populist leaders need to achieve success that justifies their leadership. That very success, on the other hand undermines their existence in the first place.²¹

The government of Alberto Fujimori is a classic case study of neo-populistic leadership. He was Peru's savior from economic and social collapse, which is reflected in his approval ratings and landslide re-election in 1995. Once those issues were resolved, however, his approval ratings declined almost as

¹⁸ (Acosta, 2006).

¹⁹ (Carrión, 2006, 14-15).

²⁰ Carrión, 15-16).

²¹ (Weyland, 2000).

quickly as they fell, to the point where he had to resort to illegal means to remain in power. I hope to demonstrate this throughout my project as I detail Fujimori's rise, reign, and downfall as the 62nd President of the Republic of Peru.

CHAPTER 2: THE BEGINNING OF THE FUJIMORI ERA

There is a story behind every political figure's ascendance to power. For personalist leaders, their stories are not attributed to one event. Rather, they are rooted in a mixture of factors that have brought crisis and instability to a nation and its inhabitants. Essentially, people become desperate. Desperate times call for desperate measures. While this phrase may be cliché, this theme of desperation, throughout the course of history, has been prevalent in the meteoric rises of political unknowns.

Take Germany in the 1930s, for example. The Treaty of Versailles blamed the Germans for initiating the First World War. As a result, Germany had to pay millions in reparations and was stripped of its colonies. Furthermore, its military and industry were limited. Thus, when the Great Depression plagued the world economy, it was ten times worse for Germany. The people were angry. They were poor. They were desperate. The combination of these factors planted the seed for a man by the name of Adolf Hitler to rise to political stardom. Under Hitler, the Nazi party became the strongest party in Germany and as a result, he was legally appointed as the Chancellor of Germany. We know the rest.

On July 28, 1990, Alberto Fujimori was sworn in as the 62nd President of Peru. How was this possible? How could Fujimori, an obscure mathematician and nisei become President of Peru? Like our previous example, people were desperate for relief. The porous conditions that Peruvians faced throughout the 1980s, coupled with the changing political landscape, propelled the rise of Fujimorismo.

In this chapter, I will discuss all of these factors that enabled the Fujimori tsunami, his rise from obscurity to the presidency in a matter of months, to take place. This chapter will cover the components that made up *la crisis*.²² This will really provide a glimpse of a day in the life of an average Peruvian in the 1980s as well as the sheer pandemonium facing the Incan nation. Furthermore, this chapter will cover Fujimori's rhetoric throughout the 1990 Presidential campaign. Through simple slogans and mass

²² *La crisis* was a culmination of a social, political, institutional, and economic crisis that plagued Peru throughout the 1980s (Alberto Fujimori Profile: Deeply Divisive Peruvian Leader, 2018).

mobilization techniques, I will highlight how Fujimori's neo-populist leadership style enabled him to wear the coveted red and white sash on July 28, 1990.

Economic Crisis: Hyperinflation and Unmanageable Debt

Throughout the 1980s, Latin American fell victim to financial crisis. This period, often referred to as the Lost Decade (*La Década Perdida*), plagued many Latin American countries, to the point where their foreign debt exceeded their earning power and thus, rendered them unable to service their debt.²³ Included among the nations on the verge of economic collapse was Peru, though its economic woes can be traced back as early as the 1960s. The Peruvian economy was a ticking time bomb; its collapse was bound to happen. In order to fully understand the severe economic conditions that ravaged Peru towards the end of the Lost Decade, it is imperative to look back at two administrations – General Velasco and President Belaunde – that delivered terminal blows to the Peruvian economy.

In the 1960s, in an effort to rid Peru of poverty, Fernando Belaunde and his administration designed an economy that not only relied upon an expansion of exports, but also aimed to liberalize the major industries of Peru. These efforts failed because, as previously noted, Belaunde was overthrown in a military coup led by General Juan Velasco. With Velasco in office, Peru's economic policies took a substantially different turn. In a very unprecedented move, he removed land from elite landowners and redistributed plots between the peasantry. Furthermore, his administration not only de-privatized many aspects of the economy, but also, in an effort to protect local markets, imposed higher tariffs on foreign imports.²⁴

All of these economic policies, however, backfired significantly. His land reform nearly collapsed the agricultural industry altogether. The Peruvian elite had the financial and technological means to develop agriculture to a western standard. Redistributing smaller plots of land among more people was neither

²³ (Sims & Romero, n.d.).

²⁴ (Gomez, 2005).

efficient nor effective; rather, it weakened the wealthy ruling class and degenerated living conditions for the masses. In addition, the latter of Velasco's reforms, while relatively successful, proved very costly. In order to enact such drastic economic changes, the government had to consistently spend money that it didn't have. As a result, the government borrowed absorbent amounts of money that it could not pay back, causing Peru's debt to grow to astronomical and unmanageable levels. By the time Peru returned to civilian rule, with the re-election of Belaunde in 1980, the economy had already suffered immensely.²⁵ Essentially, the military's 12-year executive tenure planted the seed for a future economic collapse.

Upon re-election, Belaunde once again sought to liberalize the Peruvian economy by privatizing 2/3 of the economic sector. Early on, his policies worked; wealth began to flow into the country. For the average Peruvian citizen, however, times remained tough. While this may have been the case, Belaunde provided an aura of hope. He promised that these hardships would eventually subdue and that growth in Peru would be substantial enough to improve.²⁶ Yet, just like in 1968, Belaunde's efforts to liberalize the economy failed. This time however, his failures were a result of two external factors that left the internal environment in disarray.

Economic improvements were devastated by a series of national disasters, courtesy of El Niño, a term coined by Peruvian fishermen to identify a complex and sporadic meteorological disturbance across the equatorial Pacific. The 1982-83 episode of El Niño was the worst recorded in history; it is responsible for over \$13 billion in damage as well as 1300-2000 lives. Weather-related disasters occurred on almost every continent.²⁷ For Peru, a country just south of the equator, this event could not have happened at a worse time and from December 1982 – July 1983, the entire Andean nation was ravaged from El Niño's disastrous consequences. North and Central Peru were characterized by extreme rainfall, flash flooding, and rainfall. Areas that usually received six inches of rain were getting close to 11 feet.²⁸ Infrastructure,

²⁵ (Gomez).

²⁶ (Gomez).

²⁷ (Amaral, n.d.).

²⁸ (Amaral).

consequently, eroded. On the other hand, the highlands of Southern Peru suffered from drought. Rainfall in this region, unlike the North, was scant and insufficient to support the growth of potatoes, quinoa, maize, and alfalfa. As a result, agricultural production significantly waned; it was reduced by approximately 66%. Additionally, the drought caused many social problems, especially for the poor peasant families. Some, unable to take care of their weakened herds of cattle and llama, sold their animals for pennies on the dollar. Others, pushed to the brink of survival, even sold their children to better-off families.²⁹ Peruvian infrastructure and agriculture was severely damaged at the hands of El Niño.

To make matters worse, the United States, Europe and Australia subsidized their agricultural industries. There was less demand in imported agricultural goods. This change was reflected in the market. Following the law of supply and demand, the international price for Peru's heavily exported products, such as potatoes and sugar, decreased.³⁰ For Peru, a country heavily dependent on exportation, a subsequent decrease in demand and market price is detrimental to its economic model. Reduced demand and world price equate to lost sales and reduced revenue from exports, spurning growth. Coupled with the severe damage caused by El Niño, the decrease in world price of Peru's major exports set the Peruvian economy back and left it on life support. Real wages dropped. GDP per capita dropped. Living conditions continued to deteriorate. This left Belaunde with only one option: borrow money.

The 1980s in Peru can be characterized by a period of heavy borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to statistics conducted by the World Bank, borrowing amounted to over \$473 million dollars. Yet, despite such heavy borrowing, infrastructure remained weak. Rather than building new institutions or infrastructure, the money borrowed was used to put a band-aid on a leaking roof – to repair existing and failing institutions. Even the police force had to be funded with borrowed money! Furthermore, since the IMF was notorious as a “lender of last resort,” regular investors were unwilling to loan or invest in Peru; it was deemed too risky. Thus, both the debt and inflation continued to

²⁹(Caviedes, 1984, 20-24).

³⁰ (Gomez).

rise. Things did not get any better under Alan García. In fact, because of some of his economic shortcomings, which we will discuss later, things got worse. Inflation had turned into hyperinflation and by 1990, it had skyrocketed to over 7000%. GDP per capita, decreased to \$1908.³¹ To put things into perspective, per capita incomes in Peru were higher in 1960!³² Living standards had deteriorated for all sectors: a large proportion of Peruvians were underemployed and lived below the poverty line. A recession is an understatement; this was truly a decade of steep economic decline, one that left the Peru's 23 million inhabitants in complete despair.

Domestic Terrorism: The Shining Path and the MRTA

Another severe consequence accompanied the economic hardships of 1980s Peru: social instability. As living conditions continued to deteriorate, insurgent violence and criminal activity began to rise, to the point where Peru became a battleground for civil war. Two guerilla organizations led the charge against the government and threatened civil society through blood and brutality: Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA).

“The people are angry, they arm themselves and rising up in rebellion put a hangman's rope to the necks of imperialism and the reactionaries, they grab them by their throats and grip them, and strangle them necessarily. What is left over will be burned and the ashes will be scattered by the winds of the earth so that only the sinister memory remains of what will never be again because it cannot and must not be again.” – Abimael Guzman, 4/19/80³³

³¹ (Gomez).

³² (Hudson, 1992).

³³ (Cameron & Mauceri, 1997, 186).

High up in the Andes Mountains in Ayachucho, one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations was born. Inspired by Jose Carlos Mariategui, a Peruvian Marxist and founder of Peru's first communist party, Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga, founded the Shining Path in 1970. Formed as a split from the Peruvian Communist Party, this Maoist-oriented confederation took its name from a famous Mariategui quote, "Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution."³⁴ Led by Guzmán – also known as "Presidente Gonzalo" – and a core group of disgruntled intellectuals at San Cristóbal, the Shining Path wanted to spark its own cultural revolution.³⁵ The group strongly opposed Lima, the capital city responsible for allocating resources to the rest of the country. This is, in large part, because Ayachucho, while rich with political history, had long been marginalized and ignored by the government. This, supplemented with Peru's economic woes, resulted in a region of indigenous people living in extreme poverty. Such poverty and injustice made Ayachucho fertile ground for an insurgency movement. In fact, according to a survey, 71% of Peruvians agreed that the combination of poverty, social injustice, and the economic crisis served as the foundation for the Shining Path's revolution.³⁶ Acting on behalf of the impoverished, the Shining Path aimed to eliminate the perpetrators of the past, those that contributed to these conditions, and establish a new world order. Unlike other Latin American insurgency groups, the Shining Path romanticized this idea of a "blood quota" – being willing to pay the quota of blood necessary in order for the revolution to succeed. As a member of the Shining Path, individuality was rejected. Militants had to be willing to "cross the river of blood" necessary for a triumphant revolution.³⁷ Thus, the manner in which they strived to achieve their mission was through violence.

³⁴ (Profile of Shining Path, n.d.).

³⁵ In reference to the cultural revolution that took place in China under Mao.

³⁶ (Hudson).

³⁷ (Cameron & Mauceri, 187).




Figure 1: Shining Path Propaganda

After spending a decade recruiting the likes of young intellectuals, disgruntled school teachers, and estranged peasants throughout Ayachucho and neighboring provinces as armed supporters, amassing roughly 5,000-7,000 combatants, the Shining Path began its armed struggle with the Peruvian establishment. On May 17, 1980, the day of Peru's first democratic election in 12 years, the Shining Path committed its first act of violence. In protest of the election, Sendero troops in Ayaychucho burned the ballot boxes. Soon enough, Senderistas were staging bombings, assassinations, and other terrorist attacks throughout the country. These activities were financed through "liberating property," primarily in the rural highlands, and by establishing itself in the cocaine business (Huallaga, in particular, accounted for more than 40% of the world's production of cocoa).³⁸

At first, Lima did not take this threat seriously. In fact, the government waited two years after the Shining Path's first act of violence, to finally act (Belaunde authorized action in December 1982). Furthermore, the government's response was extremely ineffective. Instead of thinking rationally and attempting to bolster economic conditions in the affected areas, Belaunde's authorized the armed forces to intervene in the counterinsurgency struggle. Peru would be fighting fire with fire, an act that would further plague the country with civil war.

Atrocities were committed on both sides. Prospective new members of Sendero were forced to kill police officers for their weapons. They engaged in mass executions. Anyone who represented or defended the status quo was labeled as an enemy and targeted, including those they wished to win over in the struggle. Take the Shining Path's response to the Institute of Rural Education (IRE) as a great case in point. Backed by the Roman Catholic church, the IRE sought to empower the poor by teaching them to farm more efficiently and lead land takeovers. To Sendero, however, this was not empowering the poor. They believed that the only way the poor can be truly empowered was by through the leadership of Presidente Gonzalo. Thus, in retaliation, Senderistas not only went after the organizers, but also forced workers to pillage the

³⁸ (Rosenberg, 1990)

IRE headquarters.³⁹ One word can truly define the Shining Path: brutality. Sendero continued to grow from a regional movement to a national crusade. At its peak, it had a presence throughout the country, including in Lima, and controlled the rural highlands of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac. At its peak, the Shining Path had the potential to “cut the umbilical cord of Peru.”⁴⁰

The Peruvian government, on the other hand, became the worst human rights violator on the planet. Peruvian police and military personnel were frequently accused of indiscriminate killings. General Luis Cisneros, the Minister of Defense, highlights these human rights violations when addressing the government’s counterinsurgency strategy:

*“The police do not know who the senderistas are, nor how many there are, nor when they are going to attack. For the police force to have any success, they would have to begin to kill senderistas and non-senderistas alike, because that is the one way they could ensure success.”*⁴¹

The results of this civil result are striking. In a ten-year span, 1980 – 1990, Sendero’s war with the government was responsible for over 18,000 deaths. The population of Ayachucho and its neighboring provinces decreased by 66%. Roughly 200,000 Peruvians were driven from their homes. 68% percent of Peruvians surveyed identified the Shining Path as the nation’s most pressing issue. Half the Peruvian population lived in an emergency zone.⁴² By 1990, no area in Peru was safe from Presidente Gonzalo and “The People’s War.”

While the most prominent, the Shining Path was not the only insurgency group rising in Peru at the time. Another organization, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) first surfaced in November 1983. This group, named after, the leader of a large Andean rebellion against the Spanish

³⁹ (Rosenberg).

⁴⁰ Quote from Erique Bernales, a Socialist Senator in Lima who headed the congressional commission on terrorism (Brooke, 1989).

⁴¹ (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

⁴² (Hudson, 1992; Brooke, 1989).

colonials in the 18th century (Túpac Amaru II), was founded with the mission of reforming the Peruvian government and creating a society in which everyone shares the means of production. Inspired by Che Guevara's attempted communist revolution in Cuba, the MRTA launched its guerilla campaign against Peru's wealthy elite in 1984. However, unlike the Shining Path, the MRTA was less extreme in its insurgency methods. Rather than mass executions and bombings, the MRTA primarily engaged in kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking.⁴³ Perhaps the group's most notorious act was when 14 members held hundreds of prominent diplomats and government officials for 126 days at the Japanese Embassy. For the most part, though, the MRTA frequently warned of its attacks well in advance, in order to minimize the number of casualties.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the rise of the MRTA and the Shining Path certainly highlighted a security crisis that supplemented a woeful economy.

The Rise of Independent Candidates: The Dismantling of Political Institutions

Unlike two party systems, multi-party systems enable multiple parties across the political spectrum to run and gain control of public office. Peru operated under a multi-party system and throughout much of the Lost Generation, this multi-party system consisted in a strong center and extremes on both sides of the spectrum. Parties that hovered at the center or center-left of the spectrum tended to win the Peruvian presidency. The two prominent and traditional parties located in the center of the spectrum are the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) and the Acción Popular (AP).

By 1990, however, there was great instability throughout the entire political spectrum, enabling the rise of independent candidates. To begin, both the Left and Right failed to adapt to the changing electorate. In the late 70s and early 80s, it was apparent that the average voter was moving away from extremist positions and were instead veering towards the center. Yet, both the Left and Right were too deeply

⁴³ (The Rise & Fall of Alberto Fujimori).

⁴⁴ (Gregory, 2009).

entrenched in their extreme ideological positions. As a result, traditional parties continued to run the same candidates. Their stubbornness not only rendered them unable to capitalize on the changing political environment, but also further isolated them from the average voter.⁴⁵ The center, on the other hand, was left discredited as administration after administration failed to manage the economy efficiently and mitigate the terrorist threat. Alan García's first term as president (1985-90) proved to be the smoking gun in the weakening of the center.

A young and highly charismatic leader, Alan García took Peru by storm. Departing from traditional ARPA candidates, García, in pursuit of the presidency, dropped all of his party's sectarian symbols and opted to run on the slogan, "my commitment is with all Peruvians." With such a move, the private sector perceived him as a "lesser evil" than his counterpart, Alfonso Barrantes of the Izquierda Unida (IU). As a result, García, obtaining 47.8% of the nation's vote, defeated Barrantes in the first round of elections.⁴⁶ Because Barrantes declined to run in the runoff election, García was elected the 61st President of Peru.⁴⁷ At the age of 36, he became the youngest civilian president in Peruvian history. In a time of severe national distress, Peruvians looked to García as their savior.

Immediately upon taking office, García sought to steer the ship on Peru's financial crisis through his concertación strategy. The government believed that the root of country's bout with inflation stemmed from cost-push factors – increases in the cost of wages and raw material, which weaken supply. Based on this view, García attempted to remedy the nation's stumbling economy through an increase in consumer spending and by containing inflation – essentially a demand-led economic boom. Thus, in an effort to increase consumer spending, taxes were cut to enhance purchasing power and employees enjoyed raises in pay. Additionally, employment was stimulated through public support programs. To contain inflation, the

⁴⁵ (Cameron & Mauceri, 40-43).

⁴⁶ (Hudson).

⁴⁷ Peru had a two-round system of voting. In such a system, if no candidate wins an absolute majority of the vote (over 50%), a second-round runoff is held to determine the winner of the election. This runoff election consists of only the top two candidates (Cameron & Mauceri, 48-49).

government-imposed price freezes and froze the domestic exchange rate. While eating up reserves, these policies delivered early on; the results from the first year were stunning. GNP increased 8 ½ percent. Real wages increased 7 percent and farm income soared, up 25 percent.⁴⁸

García also defied the international financial community. In his 1985 inaugural address – a speech in which he is very critical of the IMF and even goes as far as blaming them for Peru’s enormous debt for their “injection of unproductive credits” and “encouragement of unproductive centralism” – García declared that he would be limiting Peru’s foreign debt payments. Rather than paying 60 percent of the total value of the country’s exports, Peru would only be paying 10 percent. Regular payments, according to García, would resume when their exports recover their monetary value and when “rich countries respect a fair level of exchange and the value of our work.”⁴⁹ While this may have isolated Peru from the international financial community, his nationalistic rhetoric coupled with his early economic policies, brought unprecedented popularity throughout Peru. At one point, his popularity reached 97%.⁵⁰ In his first few years in office, García had instilled a sense of promise that Peru had not seen for a very long time.

By 1987, however, the wheels started coming off the bus. By then, the government had already defaulted on its \$800 million debt to the IMF. Not only did this render Peru ineligible to borrow money, but it also effectively branded the country as an outcast among foreign creditors. Furthermore, it became clear that the government’s economic strategy had run its course; it was not sustainable long-term. Export revenues fell by 10 percent, which created a trade deficit to the tune of \$500 million dollars. García, in response, continued to rapidly expand the economy, hoping to get the private sector to invest. However, because of Peru’s unstable political climate, there was a huge deficiency in private investment. This

⁴⁸ (Robinson, n.d.)

⁴⁹ (García, 1985).

⁵⁰ (Rosenberg).

decision, thus, backfired significantly. It ate up federal reserves and paved the way for the economy to be strangled via hyperinflation.⁵¹

In a last-ditch effort, García announced the nationalization of Peru's banks at his yearly presidential address on July 28, 1987. This announcement served as the beginning of the end. To begin, this decision made very little sense politically. In fact, this result yielded great political polarization. Why? Because few people knew about it to begin with. This measure was designed by García and a small group of advisors; few members of García's party or administration were even consulted. Even Luis Alberto Sanchez, García's Vice President, was unaware of the decision until an hour prior to the announcement. As a result, the decision took everyone by surprise. Furthermore, this announcement made little sense economically; only 20 percent of Peruvian banks were private.⁵² Less than a year later, he retracted his policy of bank nationalization. All this decision showed was that García was naïve and unfit for office.

*"The names of the two greatest terrorists in Peru both begin with the initials
'A.G.: Alan García and Abimael Guzmán'" - Carlos Boloña, Minister of Economy
(1993)*⁵³

The government continued to maintain unrealistic subsidies, despite lacking financial reserves, which further weakened Peru's economy. By the end of his term, inflation reached 7,649% and national reserves were negative \$900 million. Additionally, García could not curb the domestic terrorist threat; violence only escalated as the Shining Path and MRTA expanded into major cities. As stated earlier in the chapter, the civil war between the guerillas and the government was responsible for over 20,000 deaths. People lived in a constant state of fear. Moreover, poverty increased significantly. At the start of García's presidency, 41.6% of Peruvians lived in poverty. This percentage nearly jumped 13%, to 55% at the end of

⁵¹ (Robinson).

⁵² (Robinson).

⁵³ (Cameron & Mauceri, 58-59).

his presidency. Furthermore, living conditions continued to deteriorate to the point where there were shortages of the most basic goods, such as water and electricity. “I remember these days clearly since my siblings and I were sent daily to various supermarkets to buy what we could find” said Nicole Ferrand, a reporter from the Center for Security Policy who endured the struggles of this time.⁵⁴ García’s first term in office began promising but ended catastrophically; he failed miserably to the point where he took his country to the brink of bankruptcy. In the eyes of the people, especially among those of the dominant class (as referenced by the Boloña quote above), this was comparable to the loss of life caused by Guzmán and the Shining Path. He left the Presidential Palace an utter disgrace.

García’s shortcomings, coupled with the inability of both the Left and Right to adapt to changing preferences, left the Peruvian party system in a bit of a conundrum: the party system no longer reflected the electoral majority. Peru’s party system was broken; the middle was left wide open. With Peruvians looking to cast their votes elsewhere, a golden opportunity was created for politicians outside the traditional party system – “anti-politicians,” independent candidates. Enter Ricardo Belmont. A prominent television personality, Belmont kickstarted the independent wave when he threw his hat in the 1989 Lima mayoral race. Under his independent coalition, OBRAS (“Works”), Belmont ran under a platform that called for more public works in Lima. He avoided polarization and class conflict; he did not get political. This, along with his charisma, enabled him to draw support from a multi-class electoral coalition and emerge victorious in the mayoral race. In fact, Belmont’s victory was not even close. His margin of victory was over 15 percent in most districts.⁵⁵ The Peruvian people were tired of traditional politicians; Belmont’s victory was a clear rejection of the status quo.

⁵⁴ (Ferrand, 2008).

⁵⁵ (Cameron & Mauceri, 45-46).

The 1990 Presidential Election: “Work, Honesty, and Technology” for the Win

In 2016, Donald J. Trump was elected as the 45th President of the United States. Much of his popularity throughout the campaign trail can be attributed to his status as an anti-politician. The people, Democrats and Republicans alike, were frustrated with the political system. While other candidates were controlled by their respective party handlers, Trump was not. He was a renegade, the “screw you, Washington” vote.⁵⁶ His campaign rhetoric, along with national unrest, enabled Trump, a career business mogul, to send shockwaves around the world and be elected President.

Similar sentiments were felt 26 years earlier in Peru. Ricardo Belmont’s victory in the Lima mayoral elections burst the traditional party bubble open and significantly changed the nation’s political dynamic. Leading up to the 1990 presidential election, roughly one-third of the electorate moved away from the traditional parties. Soon, with the disqualification of the ARPA and the Left, that number reached 50%.⁵⁷ This put an independent candidate in prime position to emerge victorious in the election. Early on, many people believed that this independent candidate would be Mario Vargas Llosa, a renowned novelist. He was the favorite to win the election for the same reasons Belmont won the mayoral election: he was an outsider, the antithesis of traditional politician. He also had very important and wealthy friends, people who can perhaps help remedy Peru’s crisis. He was seen as the man on a white horse – the hero of a western movie.

However, as the first-round election came closer, Vargas Llosa’s popularity began to plummet. This is because Vargas Llosa began to turn into the very person he did not want to be – a politician. His party (FREDEMO) formed alliances with two of Peru’s traditional right-wing parties. Thus, his “independent” party list felt like old wine in a new bottle; it read like that of a traditional party. Additionally, he, along with other politicians, plastered his face on TV ads and billboards throughout the country.

⁵⁶ Taken from the BBC video “Why they love Trump: ‘He’s not a politician’” (Brown, 2016).

⁵⁷ (Cameron & Mauceri, 45).

Furthermore, his response to attacks on his policies had politician written all over it; rather than confront the questions or concerns at hand, he avoided them, using vague slogans. For example, regarding his economic “shock” policy, he responded to attacks as followed: “Shock is the disaster we have now.”⁵⁸ The more this campaign lingered, the more Vargas Llosa became an insider, liked with the economic elite. As voters were faced with the prospect of a runoff between Vargas Llosa and the ARPA’s Alva Castro, a dull candidate that represented a failed government, their behavior changed. They began searching for a viable alternative to the two. Enter *El Chino*.

Vargas Llosa’s failure to position himself as a moderate candidate cost him dearly and paved the way for strong competition from a centrist candidate. What he and his FREDMO team did not anticipate was that this competition would come in the form of an unknown candidate. That candidate was Alberto Fujimori.

“Imagine an outsider, a university academic. He’s sitting in his office and it dawns on him where his country’s problems lie. A billion dollars a year in cocaine exports. But there were also economic problems: hyperinflation of 7600 per cent was eating away at people’s pockets. 25,000 people had died, victims of terrorism. The Shining Path and MRTA were two terrorist groups that had been growing since 1980. Shining Path was in a position where it could actually take over power. The government simply wasn’t governing. It was terrible. It was total chaos. I said to myself, “Who’s going to fix this? Will it be the same politicians trying to gain power once again? I feel a certain responsibility towards my country. Why not?” – Alberto Fujimori⁵⁹

Running under the loosely knit movement Cambio 90, Fujimori took the role of outsider that once belong to Vargas Llosa. Fujimori successfully appealed to different social classes by making Peruvians feel like he was one of them. Unlike the original outsider candidate, Fujimori immersed himself with his constituents and created a discourse that links himself with them – one of his slogans was “un presidente como tú” or “a president like you.” He recognized the importance of the informal sector and not only promised relief, but also included small and medium-sized entrepreneurs on his party’s tickets. On top of that, he would

⁵⁸ (Rosenberg).

⁵⁹ Direct quote taken from Fujimori in the 2006 documentary “The Fall of Fujimori.” (The Fall of Fujimori, 2006).

dress in indigenous clothing, drink *chicha*, eat popular foods, and dance with crowds.⁶⁰ His only first round television spot featured him in a poor neighborhood. There, among children, Fujimori proclaimed, “we can live better,” and constantly repeated his campaign slogan: “honesty, technology, and work.”

⁶⁰ Peru is a very diverse nation. Northern Peru is often known for its Incan/Native American heritage. The people who occupy this region are known as indigenous Peruvians. While they speak Spanish, they also speak Quechua.



Figure 2: Fujimori, dressed in traditional clothing, embracing an indigenous Peruvian.
Source: mtholyoke.edu

While simple and vague, this slogan proved to be very effective and credible. Honesty alluded to the corruption taking place under the current administration (President García would later be brought up on corruption charges during Fujimori's presidency). The latter two, technology and work, were made credible because of Fujimori's reputation and ancestry. Peruvians had a very positive image of Japan. "Those Japanese really know how to run things," citizens would say. The prospect of Peru being run by a technocratic administration, led by a Japanese engineer-president, was very appealing to Peruvians. There was even hope that, because of Fujimori's background, Japan would invest in Peru.⁶¹ Furthermore, Fujimori, like Belmont, avoided politicized rhetoric; his proposals projected the image of a true independent candidate. For example, when asked about the economic "shock" debate, Fujimori insisted that Peru did not need a shock; rather, the country needed an economic adjustment.⁶² Such avoidance from traditional politics endeared *El Chino* to the electorate and made him a favorable alternative to Vargas Llosa.

With the help of the García administration, Fujimori gained widespread support and captured 24.3% of the vote in the first-round election.⁶³ This was good for second place, behind Vargas Llosa's 28.2%. Because no candidate had over 50% of the vote, Fujimori was set to face Vargas Llosa in a runoff election.⁶⁴ With Vargas Llosa's popularity at a free fall, Alberto Fujimori, who only had .5% of the vote prior to the first-round election, now became the favorite to become President of Peru. Seeing the writing on the wall, Vargas Llosa offered to establish an alliance between his party and Cambio 90. Doing so would have provided Fujimori not only the presidency, but also a congressional majority.⁶⁵ Fujimori rejected this allegiance and forced the runoff election. Able to fill the center of the continuum, Fujimori won the runoff

⁶¹ (Rosenberg).

⁶² (Schmidt, 1996).

⁶³ Having Castro finish second in the first round of elections would have been the worst possible scenario for President García. Not only would it have clinched a Vargas Llosa victory, but it would also lower García's chances of recapture control of his party (Cameron & Mauceri, 45-46).

⁶⁴ (Hudson).

⁶⁵ Congressional elections were conducted at a different time than the Presidential election. Vargas Llosa's party, FREDEMO, occupied a majority in Congress.

by a significant margin; he captured 62% of the vote compared to Vargas Llosa's 38%. Fujimori, like Trump in 2016, shocked the world and was elected President.

Ethical Considerations

There are several actions to consider throughout the duration of the 1990 presidential campaign. The first action is regarding Fujimori's willingness to throw his hat in the presidential race. What would compel an outsider, a university rector, to run for president? While one may point to Belmont's victory, look at his 2006 quote – "I feel a certain responsibility towards my country." Peru was down for the count. Not only was the country falling behind from the rest of the world, but terrorism also threatened the fabric of society. With the government doing nothing to combat these crises (even making the situation worse), Fujimori felt obligated to help his country get up before the "10" count; it was the right thing to do. Fujimori thus operated with a deontological approach.

The next action to consider is Fujimori's refusal to form a congressional alliance with Vargas Llosa's FREDMO. As stated earlier, this would have given Fujimori the presidency as well as a strong congressional majority. On the other hand, agreeing to this coalition would turn Fujimori into an "insider." In addition, it would mean that he could be controlled by the party. Because he was not a career politician and never held public office, he did not need to play by the establishment's rules. He owed them nothing; he did not need to grant them special favors. Rejecting this offer would also enable him (at least people hoped) to form a nonpartisan cabinet and do what's best for the country. This idea of "greatest good" is an example of utilitarian ethics.

CHAPTER 3: THE REIGN

When Alberto Fujimori was inaugurated on July 28, 1990, expectations were low. The anti-politician vote, Fujimori was inheriting a broken Peru, highlighted by enormous fiscal deficits, widespread poverty, a guerrilla insurgency led by disgruntled and leftist organizations. To make matters worse, Fujimori, a political unknown until weeks before the preliminary election, did not even come close to having a congressional majority. He could only count on 14 senators (out of 62) and 32 deputies (out of 180).⁶⁶ Coming into office, the future looked bleak; the writing was already on the wall for Fujimori and his government to fail, like his predecessors before him.

Yet, while in office, it was clear that Fujimori and his administration, notably Vladamiro Montesinos, would do anything and everything in power to wake Peru up from its decade-long nightmare. This includes engaging in borderline ethical behaviors, such as suspending Congress on April 5, 1992, a deed known as the *Autogolpe* (self-coup). In the end, despite being dealt a bad hand, *El Chino* once again defied the odds. He did what he said he would do. He defeated hyperinflation and restored relations with the International Financial Community. He curbed the terrorist threat, highlighted by the capture of Sendero's fearless leader. His performance not only endeared him with the public - who supported everything he did regardless, of its position on the ethical continuum - but also earned him 5 more years at the head of the helm.

This chapter will focus on Fujimori's historical first term in office. I will discuss both his policies as well as the lengths he and his administration were willing to go in order to both provide stability to the country and sustain power. Through his neo-populistic style and rhetoric, whether in speeches or televised public service announcements, I will highlight how Fujimori emerged victorious in his fight against Peru's

⁶⁶ Peruvians voted for its legislators, consisting of senators and deputies, during a time in which the outcome of the presidential race could not be predicted. By the time Fujimori emerged victorious in the runoff election, the congressional results had already been determined, leaving him in this predicament. (Cameron & Mauceri 1997, 49).

economic and insurgency crises and how he became a beloved president, deemed worthy of an unprecedented second term.⁶⁷

Vladamiro Montesinos: The Man Behind the Fujimori Wave

It's impossible to discuss the Fujimori administration without exploring Fujimori's right-hand man, Vladamiro Montesinos. Born to communist parents (he was named after Lenin) in Arequipa, Montesinos spent his early years in the military. In 1965, he graduated from the US Army's School of the Americas in Panama, as a military cadet. A year later, he graduated from the Military School of Chorrillos in Lima and joined the army. There, he quickly climbed up the military ladder. In 1970, during the military regime of General Velasco, he became a captain in the army. Afterward, he became the personal aide to the Prime Minister and Chief of the Armed Forces, General Juan Mercado Jarrín, who, like Montesinos, was also from Arequipa.

By 1976, however, his career in the military was no more. It soon became apparent that somebody was leaking information regarding Peruvian activities to the United States, who feared communist influence in South America. Much of the suspicion fell on Montesinos. After being transferred to a remote garrison near the Ecuador border, Montesinos, on America's dime, spent two weeks in Washington D.C. without authorization from army command; he even forged military documents. Immediately upon his return to Peru, he was arrested. The subsequent investigation revealed that Montesinos was in fact the mole; his trip to Washington was to engage in meetings with the CIA. Thus, Montesinos was convicted of falsehood and desertion of command and dishonorably discharged in the army. He was sentenced to a year in prison. While in prison, he studied law. Upon his release, he began his new career, as a lawyer specializing in

⁶⁷ Fujimori's 1993 Constitution enabled him to run for a second term. This will be discussed later in the chapter.

defending people accused of tax fraud and drug trafficking.⁶⁸ This is where Montesinos and Fujimori's paths crossed.

During Fujimori's presidential campaign in 1990, there were accusations that Fujimori engaged in tax evasion and fraudulent real estate dealings. Worried that these accusations would damage his squeaky-clean reputation and thus his chances of election, Fujimori, per the recommendation of National Intelligence Service (SIN in Spanish) Chief General Díaz, hired Montesinos as his legal counsel. Montesinos delivered big time; after the documents in the case went missing, the charges against Fujimori were dropped.⁶⁹ From then on, Fujimori found himself increasingly dependent on Montesinos. After winning the 1990 election, Fujimori appointed Montesinos as the head of the SIN, a position he would serve for the entirety of Fujimori's decade long administration. Montesinos had a very controversial reputation, from his early military days to his days as security chief. His shadiness was exposed to the public in 2000, with the release of the "Vladivideos." The publication of these videos proved to be the straw that broke the camels' back, with regards to the Fujimori administration. I will go more in depth on the Vladivideos in the next chapter.

Laying the Groundwork: 1990 Inaugural Address

A president's inaugural address is a significant form of epideictic rhetoric. A sacred tradition, this speech unifies the audience by linking the past and future in present observation and setting forth the principles that will guide the president's administration. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. points out, the inaugural is a time in which "the nation listens for a moment as one people to the words of the man [sic] they have chosen for the highest office in the land."⁷⁰ On July 28, 1990, Alberto Fujimori was awarded the red and white sash and sworn in as President of Peru.

⁶⁸ ("The Rise and Fall of Fujimori, n.d.).

⁶⁹ (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

⁷⁰ (Campbell & Jamieson, 2013, 14-15)

“Recibo este encargo para para desempeñarme en la más alta magistratura del estado con la humildad de un peruano más, con el sentimiento de ser ‘un Presidente como tú’. Es para mi un alto honor haber sido elegido con la más alta votación histórica. Por ello, al ser ungido hoy, siento el inmenso compromiso con mi pueblo de obedecer firmemente a ese mandato” – Alberto Fujimori (July 28, 1990) ⁷¹

“I receive this assignment, to serve in the highest office of the State, with the humility of a Peruvian, with the feeling of being ‘a president like you.’ It’s a great honor to have been elected. Therefore, as I am being appointed today, I feel an immense commitment to my people to firmly obey that mandate,” Fujimori uttered to kick off his speech. Afterward, Fujimori used this speech to lay down general guidelines of his administration as he attempted to lead Peru out of this disaster.

To start, Fujimori asserted that he would restore integrity in Lima. He heavily criticized García, insisting that his predecessor’s administration behaved like “vulgar delinquents” and that they allowed “millionaire frauds” and drug trafficking to occur.⁷² Therefore, he called for a ‘Crusade of Moral Renewal’ – “the state will stop being a place where the grandest fortunes are made under the power.”⁷³ Fujimori also called for economic reforms. He promised to create a “true social market economy,” one that would break down the concentration of wealth caused by state sponsored monopolies, improve tax collection and reform, but not privatize, inefficient state companies. These policies alluded to the rigorous shock program that he would soon implement. In addition, he said that he would restore Peru into the good graces of the international financial community, a relationship that was heavily strained with García’s announcement five years prior. Furthermore, Fujimori advised citizens to get rid of illusions, with regards to another country bailing Peru out of its profound crisis.⁷⁴ Rather, he insisted that it was on Peru to be the protagonists

⁷¹ (Fujimori, 1990).

⁷² This is a personal dig on García, who was accused of embezzling government funds. In 1991, García was officially charged with corruption charges relating to these allegations.

⁷³ (Christian, 1990).

⁷⁴ As stated in the previous chapter, many Peruvians believed that if Fujimori were elected, Japan would invest in Peru.

of its own destiny – take advantage of domestic minerals like copper and properly use foreign aid. This is not to say that Fujimori did not want to seek foreign investment. That is far from the case, though Fujimori maintained that these investments would only be useful if it united with national savings.⁷⁵ Like a business engaging in strategic planning, Fujimori’s plan encompassed his mission; “honesty, work, technology.”

⁷⁵ (Christian).



Figure 3: Fujimori delivering his inaugural address, July 28, 1990. Source: Associated Press

Fujishock: Restoring Economic Stability

Fujimori wasted little time trying to stabilize the Peruvian economy. Within two weeks into his first term, he implemented something that he campaigned against en route to the presidency: economic ‘shock.’ The situation left by the García administration – inflation that reached over 7600%, a lack of government resources (negative \$900 million in reserves) and a strained relationship with international lending agencies – left Fujimori’s hands tied. If he wanted to save Peru’s economy from further distress and open the country up for potential foreign investment, Fujimori had to implement an economic shock program; he had no other choice. These rigorous neo-liberal reforms, known today as “Fujishock,” consisted in the removal of subsidies and tariffs, privatization of state-owned enterprises, price increases on consumer goods, and higher taxes.⁷⁶ It was Belaunde’s attempt to stabilize the economy on steroids. This is where Fujimori’s lack of institutional ties proved very crucial. Belaunde, a career politician, was very vigilant to eliminate industry protections, such as tariffs and subsidies. Because he thought like a politician, Belaunde was unable to implement such drastic reform.⁷⁷ This, along with natural disaster, doomed Peru. Fujimori, on the other hand, did not feel the need to be vigilant. As a political outsider and career academic, he did not owe anything to anyone. “I can do things no other politician can do. I can say to political interests that have had special state subsidies or advantages that I am cutting them off and there is nothing they can do about it.”⁷⁸

While entirely necessary, there is no denying that “Fujishock” had brought extreme hardship to ordinary Peruvians. To start, the country was still amid an economic crisis. Underemployment and unemployment approached 90 percent. Additionally, with the implementation of “Fujishock,” not only were citizens forced to pay higher taxes and higher prices on consumer goods, but they also had to do it with less money and purchasing power. Fujimori refused to raise salaries for the government’s two million plus

⁷⁶ (Alberto Fujimori Profile, 2018).

⁷⁷ (Gomez, 2005).

⁷⁸ Direct quote from Fujimori in an interview, July 7, 1991. (Nash, 1991).

employees. As a result, working Peruvians were earning half of what they did in 1985.⁷⁹ Even members of Peru's educated middle class, composed of teachers and nurses, struggled to get by. Earning roughly \$40 a month, some members of the Peruvian bourgeoisie did not have enough money to pay for their food. In the words of some observers, "Overnight, Lima became a city which had Bangladesh salaries with Tokyo prices."⁸⁰

Such hardships took a toll on Peruvians as well as Fujimori's popularity. After his first year in office, his approval rating plummeted from 60% to 38%, which, at the time, was lower than any modern Peruvian president after his first year.⁸¹ Furthermore, Peruvians took to the streets to vent their frustrations "With Fujimori, there is no work, no money, no jobs, so we are all out on the street...sometimes you eat, sometimes you don't."⁸²

Yet, despite a dip in popularity and concerns regarding protests outside the Presidential Palace, Fujimori would not bend on his economic policy. In fact, he frequently defended his position with his campaign slogan, "honesty, technology work." These were the decisions he was elected to make. He inherited an economy hanging on by a thread. Even government-owned companies piled up enormous debts, through pension systems, and expensive maintenance contracts. In order to stabilize inflation and generate enough revenue to function as well as re-enter the international financial community via debt repayment, he was left with no other alternative than to implement this stabilization program. His administration anticipated that there were going to be high social costs. However, he was willing to pay these costs, no matter how hard it was on the average Peruvian, because there was a light at the end of the tunnel. People just needed to work harder to overcome these hardships and reap the benefits.

⁷⁹ (Cameron & Mauceri, 91).

⁸⁰ (Hudson).

⁸¹ Approval rating retrieved from Apoyo, a prominent polling firm in Lima. (Nash).

⁸² Quote from Carlos Gonzales, a Peruvian citizen protesting (Nash).

*“I think they realize that this is a time for sacrifice. But I feel very much part of the people [sic], and I think they are still with me. They know we were on the verge of collapse.” - Alberto Fujimori, when asked about the protests (7/7/91)*⁸³

As initially projected by his administration, Peru and its inhabitants benefitted from these economic policies long-term. By increasing prices of consumer goods to their global market value and refusing to let the national reserve print more money, Fujimori significantly curbed inflation. In just one year, inflation dropped from 7650% to 139%. Inflation continued to drop throughout the rest of Fujimori’s presidency that, by the end of his last full year as president, inflation was a mere 3.6%.⁸⁴

Additionally, by raising taxes, maintaining government salaries, and reducing the role of the state in certain aspects of the economy, the Fujimori government not only invited foreign investment but also created a monthly budget surplus that allowed the country to pay back part of its debt to the IMF and World Bank – roughly \$50 million a month.⁸⁵ By showing good faith to these lending organizations as well as implementing favorable market reforms, Fujimori got in the good graces in the financially responsible countries, highlighted by the Inter-American Bank granting Peru a \$425 million loan in September 1991.⁸⁶ After a five-year hiatus, Peru was reinserted into the international financial community. This loan created a domino effect. Just days later, the IMF approved of Fujimori’s shock program, which effectively removed the country’s blacklist label and rendered it eligible to borrow among foreign creditors. Almost immediately after receiving IMF endorsement, Peru rescheduled the entirety of its \$6.6 billion foreign debt with the Paris Club, which included a 60% relief on the \$3.1 billion owed during the 1993-1995 period.⁸⁷

⁸³ Quote retrieved from NY Times Article “Peru’s President Is Trying to Tame a Maelstrom of Inflation and Poverty” (Nash).

⁸⁴ (Alberto Fujimori Biography, 2017).

⁸⁵ (Nash).

⁸⁶ (Carrión, 2006, 136).

⁸⁷ (Carrión, 136; Cameron & Mauceri, 85).

Fujimori's success in curbing hyperinflation and encouraging foreign investment, moreover, had a trickle-down effect on the Peruvian people. While real wages were down, living conditions significantly increased, due to interaction with Western nations. For example, imported medicine from Western nations facilitated a decrease in infant mortality rate. From 1980-2000, infant mortality rate was cut by over 50% - from 89 deaths per 1,000 babies to 40 deaths per 1,000 babies.⁸⁸ Technologies imported from the West helped build a more effective primary education system, as the literacy rate of all adults over the age of 15 increased from 79% to 90%.⁸⁹ Thus, "Fujishock," once criticized for escalating hardships on the ordinary Peruvian, turned the corner. It was no longer customary for Peruvians to live helplessly and with an economy in free fall. Economic stability and sustained economic growth, rather, became the new norm.

*"Peru was in a state of absolute collapse when Fujimori took over. The problems have not gone away, but they are getting better. I think considering what he started with, he has done a remarkably good job"*⁹⁰

These developments contributed heavily to the restoration of Fujimori's popularity. After a mere 38% approval rate in July 1991, Fujimori's numbers surged, highlighted by a 22-point spike in the October 1991 Apoyo poll.⁹¹ Sustained public approval became a defining feature of the Fujimori administration. Fujimori's numbers only continued to rise throughout his first term, which enabled him, back by the masses, to take drastic action on April 5, 1992.

⁸⁸ (Gomez).

⁸⁹ (Gomez).

⁹⁰ Quote from Gabriel Ferrer, director of the National Society of Industry, in July 1991. The National Society of Industry is a trade group that represents manufacturers (Nash).

⁹¹ (Carrión, 136).

Counterinsurgency Struggle: Tensions with Congress

Having already curbed the hyperinflation crisis with his economic stabilization program, Fujimori turned his attention to the counterinsurgency struggle. Fujimori's policy on the insurgency crisis was crystal clear: he did not negotiate with terrorists. He vowed to defeat Sendero and end the insurgency struggle. In order to do so effectively, it was imperative to develop a social and militaristic strategic plan.

Fujimori sought to create social equality – the government must promote and encourage the opportunity for all citizens to have an equal chance to advance. One cannot undermine the importance of adopting such a strategy, as the backbone of Sendero's message is rooted in social injustice and poverty. Many of Sendero's followers come from impoverished regions that the government had historically ignored. The people resonated with Sendero's cries for rebellion. This is highlighted in the quote below:

“...people identified with Sendero's message. They'd say 'look at the education our children get. Look at those run-down schools! Which authorities have come here? None!' That message of the terrorists was true. 'My goodness,' I thought. 'We have to fix this situation and we have to fix it now.'”⁹²

The way Fujimori sought to fix this situation was through public works projects. He traveled all over Peru, including the country's most remote and dangerous areas, and built roads, schools, and hospitals.⁹³ By implementing these social justice reforms, Fujimori not only won over the hearts of many poor Peruvians, but also mitigated the threat of Sendero influence.

At the same time, Fujimori re-emphasized the role of autonomous peasant patrols (*ronda campesinas*) throughout the Peruvian highlands by providing weapons.⁹⁴ The government's intended purpose in arming *rondas* was so that they can protect themselves against insurgent forces.

⁹² Direct quote from Fujimori, regarding Sendero, in his documentary film *The Fall of Fujimori* (The Fall of Fujimori, 2006).

⁹³ (The Fall of Fujimori).

⁹⁴ Rondas were originally formed as a protection force against cattle thieves and local abuse from police officers in the late 1970s. In the 1980s, these rondas developed, with the help of the military, as a counter-revolutionary force against the Shining Path and MRTA (Mauceri, 1991, 18-20).

While great in theory, reliance on *rondas* can be quite a mess in practice and thus, not enough to emerge in the dirty war against Sendero.⁹⁵ Here, Fujimori encountered some trouble.

As already stated, Fujimori lacked a Congressional majority. Unlike his predecessors, both of which commanded strong legislative majorities, Fujimori could not guarantee a seal of approval on his initiatives. Yet, despite a lack of strength in numbers or a willingness to build a stable majority (refer to the proposed alliance between Vargas Llosa's FREDMO and Fujimori's Cambio-90), Congress granted Fujimori the power to issue special decrees on an emergency basis. These decrees enabled the President to implement his economic and counterinsurgency plan. This gesture of goodwill, however, backfired. Throughout the implementation of the economic stabilization program, Peruvian legislators found themselves ignored by the President, who imposed policies without consulting Congress.⁹⁶ At one point, he even acted on issues outside the special decrees' jurisdiction. For example, he broke customary tradition and appeared before Congress on May 15, 1991, not to consult them about a drug agreement with the United States, but rather to tell them about said agreement.⁹⁷

Fujimori's actions resulted in multiple ramifications. His actions alienated the parties that helped him become president in the first place (ARPA, leftist parties). Most importantly, however, many legislators believed that Fujimori exceeded his authority. As a result, Congress began to flex its muscles and push back on Fujimori's security decrees. They overturned Fujimori's December 1990 decree. Under this decree, any soldier who commits a crime in an emergency zone may only be tried in military courts. This is predicated on the notion that the soldier, regardless of time or whether he was on patrol, engaged in an act of service.⁹⁸ Additionally, in late November 1991,

⁹⁵ According to Mauceri, the arms were used more so for solving private disputes between peasant communities than for protection against Senderistas (Mauceri, 20).

⁹⁶ (Burt, 2007).

⁹⁷ Traditionally, Presidents only address Congress once a year on the 28th of July. Fujimori broke tradition by addressing Congress a second time in the calendar year. See "MENSAJE DEL PRESIDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL DEL PERÚ, ANTE EL CONGRESO NACIONAL, EL 14 DE MAYO DE 1991" (Fujimori, 1991).

⁹⁸ (Burt).

Fujimori submitted a package of 126 legislative decrees. Some of these decrees pertained to the rigid expansion of military powers. For instance, Fujimori advocated for tightening restrictions on journalists, confiscating property on the grounds of national security, and creating special military courts to try individuals suspected of terror.⁹⁹ Many of these decrees were either overturned or modified.

It was clear that Congress did not support Fujimori's agenda. Such policy-gridlock not only increased citizen dissatisfaction with the state but also caused tensions between the executive and legislature. Frustrated with this legislative stalemate, Fujimori began publicly criticizing Congress for its ineffectiveness. In November 1991, he ignited a war of words when, in a speech to in a speech to the National Confederate of Private Business Institutions (COINEF), he complained that the powers delegated to him by Congress were too broad.¹⁰⁰ As time progressed and as congressional opposition continued to mount, Fujimori's rhetoric escalated. He later suggested that Parliament was corrupted – that their stance on his reforms could have been influenced by drug traffickers.¹⁰¹ Congress was not the only democratic institution Fujimori accused. He also accused the Judiciary of crippling the counterinsurgency effort. What good does capturing terrorists do when they are just going to be freed or slapped on the wrist?¹⁰² Nevertheless, these condemnations of Congress and the Judiciary were generally supported by the public. In fact, 72% of people questioned were in favor of Fujimori's confrontational style, as not only did these attacks resonate with their frustrations but they also held some merit.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ (Cameron & Mauceri, 55; Burt).

¹⁰⁰ (Cameron & Mauceri, 56).

¹⁰¹ (Cameron & Mauceri, 56).

¹⁰² This statement calls attention to two things. To start, judges would either be intimidated or bribed by terrorists. Additionally, because guards did not dare enter their cell blocks, terrorists had complete control of the jails they inhabited. As a result, Fujimori dubbed these prisons "Postgraduate Schools of Terrorism" Lastly, this statement refers to the fact that 235 convicted terrorists had been freed since Feb. 1991. (The Fall of Fujimori; Burt).

¹⁰³ (Holmes, 2001).

“They had a vindictive attitude. An anti-Peruvian attitude!” – Alberto Fujimori

(2006)¹⁰⁴

Tensions between Congress and Fujimori finally reached a boiling point in early February 1992. Besides rejecting or modifying seven executive decrees on pacification, Congress also passed the Law of Parliamentary Control. The purpose of this law was to impose a check on the executive branch. While the president still had the authority to issue legislative decrees, under extraordinary measures, the Law of Parliamentary Control allowed Congress to review all decrees in accordance with the constitution.¹⁰⁵ It was a divisive law to say the least. Both sides believed that the opposing side exceeded the constitution. On one hand, Congress felt that Fujimori excessively sought to centralize power and implementing this law. Enacting this law, thus, was a way to foster the institution of democracy in Peru. On the other hand, the Fujimori camp believed that implementing this law would represent a congressional takeover, a “golpe with white gloves.”¹⁰⁶ This law would not check the president’s power; rather, it would elevate Congress above the Presidency. Tensions between these entities reached a point of no return; this law was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

Confronted with this internal crisis, Fujimori considered closing Congress by legal means. Coincidentally, procedural law was already in place. Per the 1979 Constitution, the President can close Congress if he meets the necessary legal instruments. Achieving these legal measures can be done one of two ways. The President can either request that Congress repeal the legislation (in this case, the Law of Parliamentary Control) or he could request a vote of confidence for the Prime Minister [a vote of no confidence would force the PM to resign]. This process is repeated three times. The government would be in a legal position to “close Congress” if, after the third occasion,

¹⁰⁴ This quote is taken directly from the film. This quote pertains to the congressional stalemate that ultimately led to Fujimori closing Congress (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹⁰⁵ (Cameron & Mauceri, 57).

¹⁰⁶ Quote taken from an interview with a cabinet official in Lima (Cameron & Mauceri, 57).

Congress refuses to adhere to the request and votes nonconfidence on the Prime Minister.¹⁰⁷ Notice how closing Congress is in quotation marks. This is because the government could only close one house of Congress – the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate, on the other hand, could not be closed by the government.¹⁰⁸ Fujimori considered this option, though he opted for a more extreme alternative. That alternative was the *autogolpe*.

Autogolpe

*“Como Presidente de la República, he constatado directamente todas estas anomalías y me he sentido en la responsabilidad de asumir una actitud de excepción para procurar aligerar el proceso de esta reconstrucción nacional, por lo que he decidido tomar las siguientes trascendentales medidas.”*¹⁰⁹

Having reached a boiling point with Congress, Fujimori, supported by the Armed Forces, decided to take matters into his own hands. On April 5, 1992, Fujimori infamously announced his *autogolpe* (*self-coup*) – that he would be temporarily dissolving Congress and reorganizing the Judiciary. This Sunday night television address to the Peruvian people was nothing short of a rhetorical masterpiece. Not only is it very methodical in nature, which helps justify the coup, but it is also very Fujimori-esque in nature. The speech offers a ray of hope; it sells an image of sureness, decisiveness and undermines the prestige of others.¹¹⁰

Fujimori begins the speech by listing the goals his administration set out to accomplish, such as building a democracy “in which we can overcome the backwardness, misery, lack of

¹⁰⁷ (Cameron & Mauceri, 57).

¹⁰⁸ (Cameron & Mauceri, 57).

¹⁰⁹ One of the most famous lines of Fujimori’s *autogolpe* speech (Fujimori, 1992 April 5). For the entire text in Spanish, see “MENSAJE A LA NACION DEL PRESIDENTE DEL PERU, INGENIERO ALBERTO FUJIMORI, EL 5 DE ABRIL DE 1992.”

¹¹⁰ (Long, 1993).

opportunities, corruption, and violence in the medium term.”¹¹¹ He follows this up by highlighting some of the positive results that had already been seen in his government’s first twenty months. Most of the good pertains to Peru’s economic recovery and stability, as at this point, hyperinflation had been controlled and the country had been re-admitted into the International Finance Community. By emphasizing the progress that has been made since his administration took office, Fujimori builds credibility with his audience.

After these first few paragraphs, the speech takes a different turn. He begins this transition with the following paragraph:

“But today we feel that there is something that is keeping us from advancing along the path of national re-construction, and the people of Peru know the cause of this entrapment. The people know that it is none other the breakdown of the institutional framework currently in place. Chaos and corruption, and a failure of some fundamental institutions, such as the Legislature and Judiciary, to identify with great national interests hinders government action aimed at accomplishing national reconstruction objectives. The ineffectiveness of Parliament and the corruption of the Judiciary are compounded by the obvious obstructionist attitude and hidden conspiracy by partisan leadership against the efforts of the people and the government by partisan leaders [*cupulas*]. These *cupolas*, an expression of traditional politicking, act with the sole interest of blocking the economic measures that will clean up the bankruptcy situation that they themselves left behind. Similarly, there are groups that are interested in seeing the pacification strategy fail because they do not dare take a clear stand against terrorism. Today, the political adversaries of yesterday are uniting to prevent the government’s success, with no regard for the future of the country. Recovering lost political ground is the common interest behind this shameful alliance.”¹¹²

Fujimori is building off the credibility he established to blame Congress and the Judiciary for their ineffectiveness and their “anti-Peruvian attitude.” Effectively, he is playing the victim card and blaming both institutions for obstructing national progress. He then uses the next five pages of his speech to highlight numerous examples that serve as evidence to these claims. Listing these examples further strengthened his credibility and made it seem like the autogolpe needed to be done.

Most of Fujimori’s criticisms were aimed at Congress, as he listed countless examples to support his belief that members of the legislature, members of the traditional parties, wanted him to fail so they can regain power. For example, Fujimori references Legislative Decree #736, a law that

¹¹¹ (Fujimori, 1992). English translations of this text, seen later in the chapter, were done by Robert Al-Moustafa and Peggy Blue, Professor of Spanish at the Pennsylvania State University.

¹¹² (Fujimori, 1992).

would sanction money laundering, lift banking confidentiality, sanction the purchase and sale of illicit drug trafficking goods, and punish public servants who cover-up for narco-traffickers. All these provisions, according to Fujimori, were revoked by Congress “without the slightest explanation and without considering how it has left the country with no means to severely punish those who commit drug trafficking crimes.”¹¹³ Unsurprisingly, Fujimori references Congress’ enactment of Law #25397 – the Law of Parliamentary Control. Fujimori believes that this law highlights Congress’ lack of respect for constitutional mandates and that the law “handcuffs him” and “cuts his fundamental duties to govern.”¹¹⁴ Moreover, Fujimori indicts Congress of being negligent. This accusation is supplemented by the fact that there had been many Congressional sessions in which the floor did not have quorum. Without quorum, important legislative decisions cannot be made. Thus, in the eyes of *El Chino*, a man whose presidential platform included the pillar “work,” Congress was not pulling its weight – “...many bills that are important for the nation’s progress remain buried because of irresponsibility and laziness from the so-called ‘Fathers of the Motherland’.”¹¹⁵

*“The administration of justice, won by political sectarianism, venality, and complicit responsibility, is a scandal that permanently discredits the democracy and law. This country is sick of this reality and longs for solutions.”*¹¹⁶

While relatively brief, Fujimori’s attack on the Peruvian justice system was effective in highlighting the need for re-organization. The purpose of any judicial system is to protect citizens’ rights and punish violators of the law. The Peruvian judicial system, however, was the very antithesis of traditional law and order; it was rotten with corruption. “In Peru, justice has always been a commodity bought or sold

¹¹³ (Fujimori, 1992).

¹¹⁴ (Fujimori, 1992).

¹¹⁵ (Fujimori, 1992).

¹¹⁶ (Fujimori, 1992).

by the highest bidder,” Fujimori asserts in this speech. This is supplemented by the fact that terrorists/guerillas would either bribe or intimidate judges. Similarly, 235 terrorists had been freed in the span of roughly 14 months.¹¹⁷ So much for punishing those who endanger the rights of Peruvian citizens. While painting the Judiciary as a corrupt institution, Fujimori acknowledges that there are some upstanding enforcers of the law – the Colonel Carrillo’s of the Peruvian legal system.¹¹⁸ With that being said, he stresses the need for these upright judges and prosecutors to be “rescued.” Per Fujimori, such liberalization is made possible through the dismissal of all the corrupt and the process of reorganization.

Fujimori’s denunciation of Congress and the Judiciary for large portion of his speech painted a picture that Peru was ungovernable – that both institutions were checks on progress rather than agents of change. He uses this as justification to move forward with his unprecedented actions – dissolving Congress and the Judiciary.

“If the country is not rebuilt at this very moment, if the foundations of national development are not laid down, then there can be no possible guarantee on the welfare of Peruvians as a civilized group, as a state.”¹¹⁹

Rather than playing the victim card, like in the first half of the speech, Fujimori transitions into an “ethical problem solver” role. This is evident throughout the remainder of the speech. Through his prophetic remarks, the audience could really sense great urgency on this matter. It is his inherent belief that these measures - which includes temporarily dissolving Congress, completely reorganizing the Judiciary, restructuring the Office of the General Comptroller, and establishing a Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction to modify the Constitution – are critical for the country’s rebirth. In fact, he believes that national reconstruction is Peru’s only way out of this cyclical cycle of dysfunction and as

¹¹⁷ (The Fall of Fujimori; Burt).

¹¹⁸ In reference to the TV show *Narcos*. In this show, Colonel Carrillo, loosely based on Colonel Hugo Martinez, leads Search Bloc, a division of the Colombian National Police, with the goal of capturing Pablo Escobar. Many members of the Colombian National Police were corrupt at the time, as they would be paid off by the drug-traffickers. Carrillo, however, was upright and honest to the badge of justice.

¹¹⁹ (Fujimori, 1992).

President, it's his duty to do what is necessary to improve the general welfare of Peruvians – even if unconstitutional. Whether this is how he really felt is a later discussion. To conclude this speech, Fujimori stressed the notion that these actions do not represent a negation of real democracy. Rather, it serves as a starting point for a genuine and effective democracy “...that allows all Peruvians to become builders of a more, just, developed, and respected Peru...”¹²⁰ Furthermore, he arranged for the military to take immediate and appropriate action in order to not only see out these measures but also to ensure the safety of the citizens.

¹²⁰ (Fujimori, 1992).



Figure 4: Fujimori's announcement of the Autogolpe, 5 April 1992 (right) and subsequent aftermath (left).
Source: Peru.com

Widespread National Support and 1993 Constitution

Following his announcement on April 5, Fujimori dissolved Congress and made wholesale changes to the Judiciary, removing 13 of the 23 Supreme Court Justices on top of dozens of other judges. Tanks rolled into Lima's Palace of Justice. The military took over journalists' TV stations. Soldiers arrested lawmakers and opposition politicians. The authorities even attempted to arrest Alan García on the night of the autogolpe; however, he hid in a nearby lot and escaped to Colombia.¹²¹ With the Constitution temporarily suspended until further notice, Fujimori ruled by decree.

*"I had the opportunity to go out on the streets on 6 April 1992. There was a multitude, a huge crowd. Everyone on the streets approved of the measure. They supported me. And again, they cheered 'Long live El Chino.'"*¹²²

On July 28, 1990, Fujimori swore to protect and uphold the Constitution. 20 months later, he was violating that very Constitution. One might expect the public to be outraged by such a situation. Yet, that was hardly the case. In fact, according to the polls, an overwhelming majority of people supported Fujimori's measures. According to an Apoyo poll conducted a week after the coup, 71% of Peruvians supported Fujimori's dissolution of Congress. 89% supported Fujimori's judicial reform.¹²³ Fujimori's overall approval ratings surged to 80%.¹²⁴ He was able to walk the streets of Lima an adored man. A majority of business leaders endorsed Fujimori's measures. Those who did not were socially secluded.¹²⁵ The domestic results of the autogolpe were crystal clear. The people had spoken. There was great contempt for the political system. The people were tired of corruption and living insecure lifestyles. They wanted a solution. Like all humans, they strived for order. If that meant living in a centralized government, so be it.

¹²¹ (Cameron & Mauceri, 60; Lane, 1992).

¹²² (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹²³ (Lane).

¹²⁴ (Carrión, 94)

¹²⁵ (Cameron & Mauceri 50-51).

In the words of Augusto Blacker Miller, Fujimori's Foreign Minister, "It does not serve much to raise the flag of democracy when half the population is dying of hunger."¹²⁶

Fujimori's domestic support for the autogolpe was not replicated internationally. The United States immediately sanctioned Peru and suspended economic and military assistance. Japan soon followed suit and withdrew assistance.¹²⁷ Withdrawal of foreign aid would not only reverse all the work he had put in to secure international investment over the last two years but also would prove to be a deadly blow to the Peruvian economy. Thus, Fujimori surprised the Organization of American States (OAS) on May 17 and promised a return to democracy within a year. In return, the OAS would not impose sanctions on Peru. The election for a Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD), the legislative body tasked with drafting a new constitution and serving until 1995, was set for November 22, 1992.¹²⁸ This election reversed Fujimori's congressional fortunes. Unlike his first two years in office, Fujimori occupied a congressional majority, occupying 48 seats in an 80 seat, unicameral Congress.¹²⁹ The subsequent constitution, adopted via referendum in 1993, differed greatly from its 1979 predecessor. Under the 1993 Peruvian Constitution, the role of Congress is significantly reduced; the legislature was unicameral or a single-chamber Congress. In addition, the President no longer needed Congressional confirmation on ambassadors and can dissolve Congress if two ministerial cabinets are censured or rejected. Furthermore, the President can now run for immediate re-election.¹³⁰ Under the 1993 Constitution, power is consolidated to the executive.

Defeating the Shining Path & Re-Election

In May 1992, a month after the autogolpe, Fujimori officially launched his counterinsurgency plan by enacting Decree #25475, also known as the Antiterrorist Law. This law imposed some of the harshest

¹²⁶ (Lane).

¹²⁷ (Burt).

¹²⁸ (Burt).

¹²⁹ (Cameron & Mauceri, 67).

¹³⁰ (LivinginPeru, 2011).

measures to combat terrorism. Anyone who was accused of terrorism was accused of “Treason to the Motherland.” The term terrorism was used in very broad terms. Even if there was no proof, a citizen could be accused of terrorism and detained. Nevertheless, once charged terrorism, which could take up to a year in some cases, an individual would be tried in military courts by anonymous tribunals.¹³¹ The purpose of these “hooded & faceless judges” was to protect their identity and prevent them from being threatened by the terrorists. 75% of Peruvians interviewed supported this provision.¹³² Nevertheless, the accused were not permitted any council and were sentenced immediately.

The Peruvian government immediately began to see results. On June 10, 1992, a month after enacting the Antiterrorist Law, Victor Polay, the leader of the MRTA was captured. The capturing of Polay, however, was overshadowed by the Shining Path’s intensifying actions. On July 16, 1996, in an effort to bring the war to Lima, the Shining Path blew up a car on Tarata Street, part of the high end of Miraflores, killing 25 and injuring over one hundred and fifty more.¹³³

¹³¹ Taken from interview with Luis Iberico, a Peruvian Journalist turned congressman (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹³² (Carrión, 134).

¹³³ (McCarthy, 2007).



Figure 5: The aftermath of the Tarata bombing. Source: micromuseo.org

The Tarata attack was the Shining Path's bloodiest attack in Lima; it served as a breaking point. It was a call for more extreme measures to be taken in the counterinsurgency struggle. A week later, Fujimori ordered the largest crackdown of suspected terrorists in Peru's history. Essentially, the government fought terrorism with terrorism.¹³⁴ Two months later, the government finally got its man.

*"In life, one has to know how to win and lose. It was my turn to lose"*¹³⁵

On September 12, 1992, five months after the coup, the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DIRCOTE), led by General Antonio Ketin Vidal, raided a home in Surco that they believed to be a terrorist safehouse. Several Sendero leaders were captured, highlighted by the brains of the operation – Abimael Guzman.¹³⁶ He would be later revealed to the public behind bars and in a striped suit, similar to the ones seen in Hollywood movies. Since Peruvian prisoners did not wear that type of outfit, dressing Guzman in stripes was symbolic. It marked a huge turning point in the war against terrorism; a defeat of the Shining Path. Rather than be executed for treason, which would make him a martyr to his followers, Guzman was tried by hooded judges and sentenced to life in prison.¹³⁷ Though Peru was, by definition, less democratic, the future of the nation looked far more prosperous.

Fujimori's ability to end hyperinflation and curtail terrorism in his first term put him in uncharted territory. Since Peru's return to civilian rule in 1980, no President ended his first term more popular than when he started. Fujimori broke that trend. In fact, his approval ratings did not fall below 60 percent until May 1996.¹³⁸ A contributing factor to this overwhelming public support is Fujimori's popularity among all Peruvian social classes. This is contrary to 1990, where grassroots evangelicals served as his preliminary support base. By 1995, his popularity between the rich and poor was indistinguishable.¹³⁹ Such strong

¹³⁴ This will be talked about in more detail later, as increased reports of death squad killings begin to be uncovered after Fujimori's first-term (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹³⁵ Guzman reportedly said this immediately after being arrested in his house (Brooke, 1992)

¹³⁶ (Alberto Fujimori Biography, 2017).

¹³⁷ (Nash, 1992).

¹³⁸ There is one exception to this claim. February 1994 is the only time in that span that approval ratings fell below 60% (Carrión,129).

¹³⁹ (Carrión,129).

public support, coupled with his first-term accomplishments and the promulgation of the 1993 Constitution, not only enabled him to run for re-election, but also propelled him to a landslide victory. In the first round of elections, Fujimori clinched five more years at the helm of Peru, winning 64% of the vote. The runner up in the election, former Secretary General of the UN Javier Perez de Celular only had 22% of the vote. It was not even close; Fujimori won in all 23 provinces.¹⁴⁰ The people had spoken once more. The people wanted Fujimori to carry on with the progress he had already made.

Ethical Considerations

“The leader of the Senate kept saying to the President ‘we want to meet with you to find some middle ground.’ But Fujimori refused. He wanted to create the impression that there could be no consensus.”¹⁴¹

Various scholars have speculated about Fujimori’s autogolpe. They do not believe the spiel that came from the Palace – that Fujimori was left with no other choice. Scholars like Cynthia McClintock, a political science professor specializing in Latin American policy, have already unpacked that narrative. The truth is that despite Fujimori’s minority in Congress, the opposition was willing to work with him. In fact, according to McClintock, Congress and Fujimori were close to an agreement long before the coup took place.¹⁴²

So, what caused Fujimori to pull the trigger on the autogolpe? Some scholars argue that the wheels were already in place even before Fujimori became President in 1990 – via *Plan Verde*. According to Cameron and Mauceri, Plan Verde was a top-secret plan that outlined a strategy for a militarized-civilian government. It is alleged that this plan fell into the hands of Montesinos, who showed Fujimori. Fujimori,

¹⁴⁰ (Sims, 1995).

¹⁴¹ Quote is in regards to Fujimori’s autogolpe (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹⁴² (Sims, 1997).

in turn, firmed up control over high ranking military officials and implemented a modified version of the plan – by providing the military with a legal basis to operate in the counterinsurgency struggle.¹⁴³ On the other hand, some argue that the timing of the autogolpe pertains to a scandal involving Fujimori. In early 1992, Fujimori's wife, Susana Higuchi surprised everyone when she publicly accused Santiago and Rosa Fujimori, President Fujimori's siblings who had prominent roles in his administration, as well as Santiago's wife of corruption. In an unannounced press conference, one that President Fujimori did not even know would be taking place, Higuchi claimed that Fujimori's relatives profited from the clothes donated by Japan to victims in Northern Peru.¹⁴⁴ Higuchi became a whistleblower.

*“When the donated clothes came from Japan, Santiago Fujimori's wife took
the best clothes for herself and then donated rugs using my name. I find that
outrageous.”*¹⁴⁵

Such a wild accusation would have prompted the congressional opposition, who were still bitter about the 1990 defeat, to launch an investigation on the matter. Had it been true, Fujimori's reputation as an honest technocrat would have been shattered far earlier than it did. Above all, it could have prompted impeachment. These plans perhaps influenced Fujimori's decision to close down congress. This is supported by his quote in his 2006 documentary, “Before they could depose me and before terrorism could take control of power, I stepped in.”¹⁴⁶

From an ethical standpoint, this quote is utilitarian in nature – that if Congress were to investigate the matter, he would have been deposed (this alludes to the fact that Higuchi's claims were factual) and by correlation, terrorism would live on and destroy the country. Another way this quote could be interpreted is as follows: “before they could get to me, I had to get to them.” This is utilitarian ethics with a more

¹⁴³ (Cameron & Mauceri, 51-53).

¹⁴⁴ (Carrión, 156; The Fall of Fujimori).

¹⁴⁵ Excerpt from Susana Higuchi's press conference, in which she accuses Fujimori's siblings of corruption (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹⁴⁶ (The Fall of Fujimori).

individualized approach. Nobody but Fujimori knows what he means when he says this. Nevertheless, all signs point to this incident as the true motive for Fujimori's autogolpe; he was just rhetorically gifted enough to convince Peruvians otherwise. As for his relationship with Higuchi, it never recovered. She disappeared from public view for a few months. During that time, she claims that she had been imprisoned at the SIN headquarters and tortured.¹⁴⁷ Upon her return to the public radar, Higuchi continued to speak out against her husband's administration, even criticizing Montesinos, who was relatively unknown to the public at this time. Such public denunciations, coupled with the leaking of her plans to challenge her husband in the 1995 elections, proved to be the match in the powder barrel. Fujimori, in response, "fired" his wife as first lady, on the grounds that she suffered from a mental illness. By 1996, he and Higuchi were divorced. To replace Higuchi as first lady, Fujimori instilled his eldest daughter, Kieko, as his fill-in first lady.¹⁴⁸

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¹⁴⁷ (Carrión, 156).

¹⁴⁸ (Carrión, 156 -157).

CHAPTER 4: THE FALL OF FUJIMORI

The date is December 17, 1996. Around 8:20 PM, on a cool summer night in Lima, a party was being held at the Japanese embassy, in honor of Emperor Akihito's birthday. Among the many guests in attendance were Lima's most important political and social figures, such as the President of the Supreme Court, the Japanese ambassador, and both Fujimori's mother and brother, as well as other prominent Japanese businesswomen. Suddenly, something that sounded like an explosion silenced the guests. Within 30 seconds, 14 masked men and women, who identified themselves as members of the MRTA, entered through the hole caused by the explosion and took the 452 guests' hostage¹⁴⁹. The leader of the group, Cerpa Carlioni, requested that, in exchange for these hostages, Fujimori meet with him in person and agree to release all (roughly 460) of MRTA's imprisoned comrades. Fujimori balked at this request and refused to appear in person. Carlioni refused to respond with violence – "don't worry, we're not killers" – instead, he opted to play the waiting game.¹⁵⁰ A standoff ensued inside the embassy.

Carolini was certain that Fujimori would soon succumb and accept his offer. His beliefs were misguided. While agreeing to hold preliminary conversations with the rebels, in which he appointed a commission of guarantors, Fujimori was preparing a military solution, one that would use engineering techniques to not only plant the explosives but surprise the terrorists.¹⁵¹ On April 22, 126 days after the initial capturing of the hostages, the military engaged in a dramatic raid of the embassy. All 14 rebels were killed while all but one hostage, who suffered a heart attack, were freed.

"Gentlemen, in Peru we're not going to accept terrorism. In Peru, we will support the principles of democracy. And we have given an example to the

¹⁴⁹ After storming the building, the MRTA released all women and service personnel. Afterwards, knowing that 14 people would not be able to hold hundreds of people against their will, the MRTA released hostages in waves. In one case, shortly before Christmas, over 225 hostages were released as a "good will gesture." In the end, the final hostage count was at 72 (Schemo 1997; The Rise and Fall of Fujimori, n.d.; The Fall of Fujimori, 2006).

¹⁵⁰ (Scherma).

¹⁵¹ (The Fall of Fujimori).

*international community by not allowing ourselves to be blackmailed by terrorists by not giving in.*¹⁵²

The successful defeat of the guerillas, at minimal expense to the hostages, was lauded by both the international community and the Peruvian people. Such adulation was reflected in Fujimori's ratings. In just a few days his popularity jumped 29 points, from 38% to 67%.¹⁵³ His management of the hostage crisis all but cemented his legacy. With inflation no longer an issue and terrorism curbed, things seemed to be going very well inside the Fujimori camp. However, within four years of this event, everything came crashing down, culminating with his resignation overseas in November of 2000. How could that be? How was it possible for a man like Fujimori, who was lauded for ridding his country of hyperinflation and terrorism, to end his presidency in such a disgrace and eventually end up behind bars? In truth, by the time this hostage situation occurred, the seeds for destruction were already in motion. This chapter will explore all of the factors that led to Fujimori's inevitable downfall. In particular, I will address Fujimori's paradox of success as well as the lengths he was willing to go to remain in power. This is highlighted by his historic bid for a second re-election. Finally, I will address the release of the Vladivideos and the government's subsequent response. Through these factors, I will highlight how Fujimori's government unraveled as quickly as it arose in 1990.

Fujimori's Second Term: Encountering the Paradox of Success

As stated earlier in this paper, neo-populist rulers thrive under crisis; it opens the door for them to mobilize support by promising to rescue the country from these grave difficulties. Immediate performance plays a crucial role in a neo-populistic ruler's fundamental support. However, as previously mentioned, this can lead to what Weyland calls a "paradox of success." On one hand, achieving great success justifies their

¹⁵² Fujimori, in a public address to a crowd following the successful raid on the Japanese embassy (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹⁵³ (Schemo).

existence. On the other hand, resolving the resolvable issues threatens the continuation of neo-populistic leadership. Succeeding removes the very conditions that enabled the rise of neo-populistic rulers in the first place. Furthermore, it brings to light issues that are far more difficult to resolve, which as a result, tends to diminish widespread support.

Fujimori's first term is characterized by performance. In the end, he did what he said he was going to do. He overcame Peru's most pressing issues at the time. He ended hyperinflation. He helped stimulate future economic growth. He restored Peru into the International Financial Community. He also seemingly put the insurgency struggle to bed. With the leaders of both terrorist organizations behind bars, it was no longer the norm for Peruvians to live in fear. In short, Fujimori's first-term successes restored normality to the everyday Peruvian. As a result, the Peruvian plebiscite, in a landslide, rewarded him with five more years in office.

Because of Fujimori's successful first term, however, there was a shift in issue salience. The issues of yesterday were of lesser importance; they were now being taken for granted. Instead, these issues made way for other persisting problems, such as poverty, unemployment, and low wages.¹⁵⁴ Despite low inflation, Peru was still in the midst of a recession. In early 1995, over half the country's citizens still lived in poverty. 85 percent of the work force did not have full-time jobs.¹⁵⁵ Unlike the major themes that hovered over Fujimori's first term, these problems were impossible to resolve in a dramatic and visible fashion.¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, by unanimously re-electing Fujimori for another five-year term, it was clear that Peruvians believed in him to once again be the agent of change. With such great power comes great responsibility. The people demanded relief from these social issues. Consequently, there was amplified pressure on Fujimori to not only address these pressing issues, but also to achieve similar success.

¹⁵⁴ (Carrión, 2006, 25).

¹⁵⁵ (Sims, 1995).

¹⁵⁶ (Carrión, 25).

*“With a majority in Congress, the ball is now in Fujimori’s court and he has no excuses for not addressing the social needs. When you win by such a large margin, people’s expectations are set very high.”*¹⁵⁷

Unfortunately for Fujimori, he could not live up to the population’s newfound expectations. He was unable to deliver. In fact, he significantly underwhelmed. This is because poverty, low wages and unemployment, unlike hyperinflation and domestic terrorism, could not be solved in a dramatic fashion. While a determined government can implement sweeping reform to gradually put an end to hyperinflation, it could not, by the very same token, issue an edict to create millions of full-time jobs.¹⁵⁸ Correspondingly, Peru suffered from renewed economic problems, which forced Fujimori to adopt restrictive measures towards the end of 1995. While these measures were implemented to prevent the economy from overheating, they ultimately slowed the country’s economic growth (2.6% in 1996) and heightened Peru’s employment crisis.¹⁵⁹ Fujimori’s government was not nearly performing to the people’s standards; social improvements were not being made. Thus, an overwhelming majority of Peruvians grew frustrated with Fujimori’s second-term performance.

Such disapproval was reflected in the form of public opinion polls. For example, according to surveys conducted by Apoyo, 60% of respondents supported Fujimori’s neo-liberal economic reforms in August 1995. By May 1999, support had crashed to a meager 25%.¹⁶⁰ Fujimori’s policies were not the only victims of public disapproval; his overall popularity diminished as well. In January 1996, his popularity reached 75%. However, as it became increasingly clear that he was incapable of improving people’s socioeconomic conditions, not only did Fujimori’s popularity drop significantly, but there was also an increase in opposition approval. By the end of 1996, his popularity dropped to 45%, a 30% fiscal decrease. Furthermore, aside from his late April/May 1997 ratings, which were conducted following the rescue of the

¹⁵⁷ Direct quote from Francisco Sagasti, a senior researcher at Grade. Grade is a Peruvian research agency (Sims).

¹⁵⁸ (Carrión, 25).

¹⁵⁹ Carrión, 27-28).

¹⁶⁰ (Schmidt, 2000, 120).

72 hostages at the Japanese embassy, Fujimori's approval ratings typically ranged from 35-45%. Disapproval, on the other hand, hovered around 50-63%.¹⁶¹ Based on these numbers, it's apparent that Fujimori, throughout his second term, was exposed to this paradox of success. He was now expendable.

Democratic Spring? Public Outrage over Fujimori Quest for a Second Re-Election

*"That period is known as the 'democratic spring' because the people were saying 'we're giving you a second chance to be a legitimate president. We're going to forget the coup.'"*¹⁶²

In addition to a vote of confidence, Fujimori's triumph in the 1995 election provided him with a chance at redemption. As indicated by the above quote, re-electing Fujimori provided him with another opportunity to restore democratic credibility to the executive office of the President. It was a chance for Fujimori to start with a fresh slate. The people were willing to let bygones be bygones and forget Fujimori's previous offenses to democracy. In exchange, they sought a 'democratic spring' – a new future with peace.

Instead, Peruvians were once again left frustrated as Fujimori and his administration engaged in questionable actions, especially with regards to an unprecedented second re-election. Such a re-election would be prohibited under Fujimori's 1993 Constitution, which extended term limits from one to two. At first, it seemed as if *El Chino* was accepting of this. Upon winning re-election in 1995, he suggested that he was finished; when asked if he would run for a third term, he replied "in accordance with the Constitution, no."¹⁶³

Within a year, it became increasingly evident that this would not be the case. In 1996, the Fujimori administration orchestrated a series of legal maneuvers, with the goal of securing legal grounds for an

¹⁶¹ (Carrión, 28)

¹⁶² Quote from Enrique Zileri, the editor of *Caretas* Magazine. This quote is in reference to Fujimori's 1995 triumph (The Fall of Fujimori).

¹⁶³ (Schmidt, 120).

unprecedented third term. To begin, on August 23, 1996, a pro-Fujimori Congress passed Law #26657 – the Law of Authentic Interpretation.¹⁶⁴ Congress then used this law to “interpret” the meaning of Article 112 of the 1993 Constitution, which dealt with the consecutive term limit. According to Congress’ “interpretation” the 1993 Constitution could not be applied retroactively; it did not include periods before the Constitution took effect. Thus, in the eyes of Congress, Fujimori’s 1990 election did not count for re-election purposes, meaning he was eligible to run in the 2000 election.¹⁶⁵

The Law of Authentic Interpretation sent shockwaves across the public domain. According to a September 1996 Apoyo poll, 49 percent of Lima residents considered this law unconstitutional.¹⁶⁶ Many legal experts and political commentators not only believed that Congress lacked the authority to interpret the Constitution, but also insisted that the Law of Authentic Interpretation contradicts Article 112, making it unconstitutional.¹⁶⁷ Peruvians across all social classes were outraged and sought legal methods to strike down this blatantly unconstitutional measure. The opposition were provided with three different legal routes to challenge the constitutionality of this law:

1. They could persuade the Constitutional Tribunal, the “independent”¹⁶⁸ judiciary established by the 1993 Constitution, to nullify the measure.
2. They could appeal to the National Elections Jury (JNE), the agency tasked with presiding over all electoral matters, to prohibit Fujimori from competing in the 2000 election.
3. They could utilize the Constitution’s referendum provision and, provided the petition is well supported, have the people decide on the matter.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ (Carrión, 142).

¹⁶⁵ (Carrión, 142; Schmidt, 120).

¹⁶⁶ (Schmidt, 121).

¹⁶⁷ (Schmidt, 120).

¹⁶⁸ Independent is in quotation marks because the Tribunal was heavily influenced, inherently, by the pro-Fujimori Congress. As a result of legislative decree, in order for a law to be deemed unconstitutional, six of the seven justices must be in accordance. A near unanimous ruling was required in order to strike down a law. This is contrary to most legal systems, like the United States Supreme Court, where a simple majority is sufficient (Schmidt 120-121).

¹⁶⁹ (Schmidt, 121).

All three measures were pursued in an effort to emerge triumphant against the possibility of a third term. Yet, despite taking every avenue possible, these efforts were to no avail. Regardless of the action taken, the intentions of the pro-Fujimori Congress became disturbingly clear; it would do everything in its power to preserve Fujimori's eligibility for a second re-election.

The Lima Bar Association wasted no time getting the ball rolling, filing suit with the Constitutional Tribunal to challenge the Law of Authentic Interpretation a mere six days after it was enacted.¹⁷⁰ As indicated earlier in the footnotes, six of the seven judges must agree that the law is unconstitutional in order for it to be struck down. Unfortunately for the Lima Bar Association, only three of the seven judges ruled in their favor. The other four abstained from voting. As a result, the Tribunal had no other choice but to rule the law "inapplicable" to the government.¹⁷¹ The three judges who voted for the decision just so happened to be charged with breaching the Constitution. None of them were given the opportunity to learn or rebut the charges against them, throughout the investigative period, and in May 1997, they were controversially impeached by the pro-Fujimori Congress.¹⁷² Such a provocative deed further infuriated the Peruvian people; over 80% of respondents to an Imasen poll believed this to be an act of retaliation.¹⁷³ Furthermore, the removal of these judges had negative implications on the fight against a potential second re-election. It effectively prevented any additional rulings on a law's constitutionality, as four of the seven members of the Tribunal were pro-Fujimori loyalists.¹⁷⁴

Likewise, Peruvians did not have much hope with an appeal to the JNE, as a pro-Fujimori legislature passed two laws that would once again play a significant role in the rendering of a decision. In order to fully understand the impact of these laws, it is important to address the overall structure of the JNE. The JNE is made up of a five-person board. Seats in the board are filled by representatives of the Supreme

¹⁷⁰ See "Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru: Judgement of September 24, 1999." This decision can be accessed here: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_55_ing.pdf

¹⁷¹ (Schmidt, 121; Youngers, 2007).

¹⁷² (Schmidt, 121; Constitutional Court v. Peru, 1999).

¹⁷³ (Schmidt, 121).

¹⁷⁴ (Youngers; Carrión, 49).

Court, the Public Ministry, the Lima Bar Association, and the laws schools of both public and private universities. Historically, an outcome could be determined by a simple majority - three of the five members.¹⁷⁵ With that in mind, Congress, in an effort to neutralize the JNE, enacted two laws: Law #26898 and Law #26954. Passed in December 1997, Law #26898 was designed to manipulate the JNE selection process. According to Schmidt, this law allowed Supreme Court judges and esteemed prosecutors – that were provisionally appointed by the Fujimori administration after the *autogolpe*- to vote for their respective representative to the JNE.¹⁷⁶ This law was merely a legal maneuver to get Fujimori supporters on the board. That is exactly what happened. In 1998, two loyal Fujimori supporters were appointed.¹⁷⁷ But Congress was not done there; in May 1998, they passed Law #26954. Under this law, disqualifying a candidate required a four-fifths majority; a simple majority was no longer suffice.¹⁷⁸ All it took was for two members of the five-man board to disagree with the ruling. Ironically, two loyal Fujimori supporters were already on the board. Thus, with the enactment of this law, Congress effectively blocked the JNE from making an objective ruling on Fujimori's candidacy.

Peruvians' final hope lay in the hands of a successful referendum. In September 1996, Foro Democrático hit the ground running and launched a petition to force a referendum, but once again, the pro-Fujimori legislature tried to interfere and suppress the will of the people.¹⁷⁹ In response to the petition, Congress changed the requirements to summon a referendum. On top of mobilizing a strong base, a petitioner also had to obtain the support of 48 congressmen (2/5 of Congress). However, this time, Congress' suppression attempt was unsuccessful. The JNE ruled that these requirements could not be applied retroactively.¹⁸⁰ This meant that, much to the displeasure of Congress, the petition did not need to adhere to these new requirements.

¹⁷⁵ (Youngers).

¹⁷⁶ (Schmidt, 121).

¹⁷⁷ (Youngers).

¹⁷⁸ (Schmidt, 121; Youngers)

¹⁷⁹ (Schmidt, 121).

¹⁸⁰ (Schmidt, 121-2).

A social movement was subsequently created; support was exceptionally strong across the board. Peruvians of all social classes were quick to rally behind this initiative. The numbers are quite fascinating. Per Apoyo, from October 1996 to August 1998, public support for the referendum never fell below 60%. Average overall support throughout these twenty-two months was 68.8%. When this statistic is broken down by social class - Upper (71.8%), Middle (71.1%), Poor (70.1%), Poor (70.1%) and Very Poor (64.4%) – consistency across the board is evident.¹⁸¹ It did not matter if you were a farmer, mechanic, or businessman; it was clear that Peruvians were against a second re-election. Ultimately, in July 1998, Foro Democrático presented 1,441,053 signatures.¹⁸² Under the constitutional provision, that should have been sufficient to force through a referendum. Finally! There seemed to be a light at the end of the tunnel. The government, however, had other ideas. The JNE, which now included two pro-Fujimori members, retracted their earlier decision and maintained that 48 congressional votes were needed to hold the referendum. This decision was supported by the National Office of Electoral Procedures (OPNE). When only 45 members supported the initiative, Congress blocked the referendum on August 27, 1998.¹⁸³ Despite gaining the support of nearly 70% of Peruvians, the petition failed. The dream to bar Fujimori from participating in the 2000 election was now dead.

These questionable methods had very serious implications. To start, it delegitimized the very institution of democracy in Peru. By obtaining formal approval to participate in the 2000 election, with the help of Congress, Fujimori abused the 1993 Constitution, the very constitution that he established. It started to become increasingly clear that Fujimori would hang onto power at all costs. As a result, the public narrative surrounding him was significantly altered. A month after the autogolpe, 52% of respondents considered Fujimori's government democratic. By June 1998, however, many Peruvians (62% of respondents) considered Fujimori to be a dictator.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, these actions caused serious tensions to

¹⁸¹ (Carrión, 142-3).

¹⁸² (Schmidt, 121-2).

¹⁸³ (Schmidt, 121-122, 124).

¹⁸⁴ (Carrión, 31).

mount, especially among members of the middle class. With all legal options exhausted, Peruvians expressed their disapproval via protests. Picket signs and banners filled the streets of major cities. Everyone from university students, business leaders, and union leaders rallied to streets to express their disapproval.¹⁸⁵

“There is a perception in this country that the law is what Fujimori says. If a law gets in his way, he just changes it.”¹⁸⁶

These protests were entirely different than the ones Fujimori encountered during his first term. The people out on the street in 1991 were expressing their economic grievances. This time, however, it was more than just economic grievances – these were anti-government protests, as evidenced by the rhetoric of the various groups protesting. Never before were opponents of Fujimori able to evoke such strong and public displays of discontent.¹⁸⁷ These demonstrations effectively turned the tide. The same people who once rallied around him were now the ones cursing his very name.

A Rotting Government: The Uncovering of Scandals (1996-1997)

“When I returned to Peru in 1997, I noticed that my father’s closest advisors were distancing themselves from him for various reasons. And I began to hear rumors, to hear stories, about Vladamiro Montesinos.”¹⁸⁸

In the previous chapter, I briefly discussed President Fujimori’s deteriorating relationship with his ex-wife, Susana Higuchi. In particular, I discussed her 1992 whistleblowing incident, in which she publicly accused Fujimori’s relatives of corruption, as it could have been a factor in Fujimori’s autogolpe. Furthermore, I addressed her quest for Peru’s highest office, during which she frequently criticized

¹⁸⁵ (Koop, 1997)

¹⁸⁶ Quote from Alejandra Alayza, a student at Catholic University in Lima (Koop).

¹⁸⁷ (Carrión, 143-4).

¹⁸⁸ Quote from Keiko Fujimori, Fujimori’s daughter and First Lady following his divorce with Susana Higuchi (The Fall of Fujimori).

Fujimori's government and Montesinos by name. While her actions may have led to her "firing" as First Lady, Higuchi briefly took Peruvians inside a vast network of illicit government activities, which had a lasting domino effect for the remainder of the Fujimori regime. Not only were journalists intrigued, but little by little, speculation of wrongdoing began to mount on Fujimori and his mysterious spy chief.

In 1996 and 1997, while Fujimori was trying to preserve his eligibility for the 2000 election, his government was rocked by a series of scandals that were disclosed to the public domain. These scandals pertained to the military and the intelligence service (SIN), led by Montesinos. The first major scandal was triggered by Demetrio Chavez, a notorious drug kingpin. During his trial in August 1996, Chavez claimed that he paid the SIN \$50,000 a month in exchange for protection. At least one of those payments to the SIN, according to Chavez, was also in the presence of Montesinos.¹⁸⁹

While many public officials were quick to discredit Chavez – including the highest-ranking justice official, Blanca Nélida Colán, who publicly denounced these remarks as a "tall story...beyond belief." – the Peruvian people appeared to believe him. This is reflected throughout various polls. Per Apoyo, not only did 88-97% of the public think that a probe should be launched against Montesinos, but also 71% also believed Montesinos was guilty of engaging in criminal activity.¹⁹⁰ While the Prime Minister, Adolfo Pandolfi, was successful in shutting down congressional inquiries on the matter, this situation, in several instances, returned to life. In October 1996, the transmission tower of the television station, Global Televisión, was bombed. Global Televisión had been avidly following the Montesinos case and had been critical of the government.¹⁹¹ Afterward, in November, Rodolfo Robles, a retired army general known for publicly confirming the existence of La Colina¹⁹² in 1993, asserted that he had concrete evidence that a member of this death squad was responsible for this bombing. In response to this leak, the military

¹⁸⁹ (Schmidt, 122).

¹⁹⁰ (Carrión, 115).

¹⁹¹ (Schmidt, 122).

¹⁹² La Colina was a military death squad. During the counterinsurgency struggle against the Shining Path, members of Colina engaged in various human rights abuses. This group is responsible for the massacre at La Cantuta University in 1992, where nine students and a professor were assassinated. In 1993, Robles confirmed the existence of this group and was subsequently forced to resign (Sims, 1996).

forcefully detained Robles (he was forced into a car and was sprayed in the face with an unknown substance) and charged him with insubordination.¹⁹³ The very nature of Robles' arrest was subject to widespread criticism from the public domain, so much so that Fujimori was left with little choice but to free him.¹⁹⁴

Within four months, the government was back in the news again, subject to another major scandal. Unlike the previous one brought to light, this scandal contains multiple layers. Over a one-week span (April 6, 1997 – April 13, 1997) Channel 2 broadcasted a tidal wave of unflattering information, regarding both the SIN and Montesinos. On April 6, Channel 2 reported the murder of an army intelligence agent, Mariela Bareto Riofano, who was allegedly in a relationship with the leader of La Colina, Major Santiago Martin Rivas. An exclusive interview, live from a military hospital, immediately followed this report. The subject of the interview, Lenor La Rosa Bustamente, was a colleague of the deceased. During this interview, Bustamente revealed that she was interrogated by fellow army intelligence agents and subsequently tortured.¹⁹⁵ These reports uncovered a series of human rights abuses conducted by the SIN.

A week later, Channel 2, per an unnamed insider in the tax office, leaked information regarding Montesinos personal finances. The leak of these documents made one thing painfully clear: Montesinos was earning far more than a public servant should be. Murmurs of embezzlement began to surface, prompting congressional investigation.¹⁹⁶ Pandolfi was called upon by Congress to explain the situation. However, like Montesinos' previous scandal, Pandolfi refused to elaborate on the matter. This time, he cited confidentiality of tax documents and employees of the intelligence service. Following Pandolfi's appearance, congressional inquiries were put to bed.¹⁹⁷ Once investigation of this scandal ceased, the government retaliated against Channel 2 and Baruch Ivcher, the majority owner of the TV station of Israeli

¹⁹³ (Sims).

¹⁹⁴ (Schmidt, 122).

¹⁹⁵ See "Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru." This case was retrieved from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This case can be accessed below;
https://iachr.ils.edu/sites/default/files/iachr/Cases/Ivcher_Bronstein_v_Peru/Ivcher%20Bronstein%20v.%20Peru.pdf

¹⁹⁶ (Carrión, 116; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru).

¹⁹⁷ (Carrión, 116-7).

descent. Ivcher was charged with treason and as a result, his Peruvian citizenship was revoked. Ivcher was forced to relinquish control of his TV station to the minority owners, the Winter family. Coincidentally, the Winter family were avid Fujimori supporters.¹⁹⁸

While he may have avoided any formal charges (at this point in time), Montesinos' credibility was tarnished. These frequent allegations pointed to a government rotting with corruption. The subject of corruption remained prevalent in the public domain for the rest of Fujimori's tenure as President. Suspicion never waned, no matter how many times the administration tried to deny any wrongdoing. The seed was in place for an inevitable collapse.

Allegations of Fraud: The 2000 Election Cycle

Despite numerous allegations of corruption, Fujimori went ahead and ran for a second re-election. However, from the very beginning of this election cycle, it was clear that this election would be anything but fair. So many factors insured that Fujimori, the incumbent, was not playing on a level field.

To start, the government exerted control over television programming. Press coverage of Fujimori's two main opponents, Alberto Andrade and Luis Castañeda Lossio, was overwhelmingly negative and outright defamatory. For example, Castañeda Lossio was subject to a campaign that accused him of misappropriating state funds when he was the director of social security.¹⁹⁹ There is so much irony in this accusation, considering the fact that just a few years earlier, Montesinos' tax documents highlighted a disconnect between his income and that of a public servant. In addition to all the negative press, Fujimori's opposition rarely get any air time. According to a study conducted by Transperencia, in November 1999, Andrade and Castañeda Lossio combined for just four hours and ten minutes of air time. Fujimori, on the other hand, had over six times that amount (26.5) hours.²⁰⁰ It even got to the point where television stations

¹⁹⁸ Carrión, 236; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru).

¹⁹⁹ (Youngers).

²⁰⁰ (Youngers).

would reject paid advertisements by opposing candidates. For instance, when Andrade announced his intention to run, none of the three major television stations in Lima aired advertisement.²⁰¹ Furthermore, the government restricted all political news programming. Any program that was critical of the government in anyway was taken off the air.²⁰² That's like a conservative President removing CNN, CBS, NBC, and MSNBC off the air. Thus, throughout the election cycle, Peruvians were left without objective news reporting, which is the epitome of state-sponsored censorship.

Blatantly controlling television stations was merely the tip of the iceberg. By allocating state resources to favor to essentially buy votes, the government further tipped the scale towards Fujimori. As noted earlier, despite low levels of inflation, a large proportion of Peru's population lived in poverty. Many families relied on some form of government aid. The government, as a result, held a lot of leverage; it could manipulate these families in exchange for loyalty, whether that's through increased government assistance or the mere threat of taking away such aid.

*"All of the soup kitchens in our area received the same message. Go to the plaza and join in the birthday celebration or you will not get food this week."*²⁰³

For example, on February 13, 2000, just two months before the first round of elections, Fujimori announced the creation of a Family Lot Program. Under the conditions of this program, state-owned land would be distributed to urban squatters, or people who lived in the streets or in abandoned buildings. Within two weeks, over a quarter of a million people applied for a new lot of land.²⁰⁴ There is no doubt that his intentions were crystal clear. 60% of respondents insist that this program was a merely a vote-buying measure. However, 36% of respondents agreed with the substance of the program.²⁰⁵ Thus, this program, all on the government's dime, proved to be very beneficial for Fujimori. It provided him with an advantage

²⁰¹ (Youngers).

²⁰² (Youngers).

²⁰³ Quote from a community leader from the Canto Grande neighborhood in Lima (Youngers).

²⁰⁴ (Carrión, 143).

²⁰⁵ (Carrión, 143).

that none of his opponents could replicate. All of these conditions made it very difficult for formidable opposition to overtake Fujimori in the polls.

To further add salt to the wound, evidence of fraud is apparent throughout various portions of the 2000 election cycle. On December 27, 1999, in preparation for the first-round of elections, Fujimori launched his fourth electoral movement, Perú 2000, an alliance composed of his previous three vehicles (C90, NM, VV).²⁰⁶ In accordance with Peruvian electoral rules, a party needs a set number of signatures to get onto the ballot. Unlike 1990, however, Fujimori lacked strong grassroots support. This made it nearly impossible to obtain the necessary signatures in a short period of time (the first round of elections was less than four months away). Faced with potential ineligibility, members of Fujimori's party took matters into their own hands. They falsified over one million signatures to ensure Fujimori's name would appear on the ballot.²⁰⁷ Such fraudulent activity was eventually leaked to the public by *El Comercio*. Yet, despite public outcry, the Electoral Commission did not initially launch a thorough investigation and allowed Fujimori to continue under the Perú 2000 banner.²⁰⁸ The plan to launch a new electoral vehicle significantly backfired; the revelation of fraud proved to be damaging. Not only was it damaging for his credibility, but it also increased public skepticism, with regards to the electoral process.

*"Fujimori had no scruples. He didn't care about democracy and he didn't care if illegal and corrupt means were used to keep him in power."*²⁰⁹

Furthermore, the public's negative perception of Fujimori played into the hands of another candidate, Alejandro Toledo. Born to an indigenous Quechua family, Toledo, like Fujimori in 1990, emerged from virtual obscurity to emerge as a viable contender for the presidency.²¹⁰ He separated himself from the rest

²⁰⁶ Fujimori launched his third electoral vehicle, Vamos Vecino, during the 1998 municipal elections (Carrión, 95-6).

²⁰⁷ (Carrión 96; Peru Elections 2000, n.d.)

²⁰⁸ (Peru Elections 2000).

²⁰⁹ (The Fall of Fujimori).

²¹⁰ In Apoyo's December 1999 survey, Toledo only had 7 percent of the vote. That was good for fourth place behind Fujimori, Castañeda Lossio, and Andrade. By April, however, it became evident that Toledo has the best shot of unseating Fujimori (Schmidt, 125).

of the opposition by dressing in traditional clothing, drinking water from local rivers, and playing off his cultural and academic background – dubbing himself, “The Cholo from Harvard.”²¹¹ If there was anyone Fujimori needed to worry about in the election, it was Toledo.

Early exit polls from the first-round election confirmed Toledo’s legitimacy as a candidate. Each of the three polls conducted suggested either a virtual tie between the two candidates or a Toledo lead. Quick counts suggested a Fujimori lead. Regardless, none of these polls suggested that Fujimori would exceed 48.8% of the vote.²¹² Yet, after three days and some computer delays, Fujimori emerged victorious with 49.96% of the vote, compared to Toledo’s 40.39%.²¹³ While this result ensured a runoff election would be held, Fujimori’s victory put a sour taste in people’s stomachs. Allegations of fraud began to surface once more, predicated on the many irregularities observed during Election Day: illegal propaganda was found around polling sites; military personnel attempted to intimidate political party agents; illegal ballots were cast by convicts; ordinary citizens voted with false documentation; Toledo’s name was cut from some of the ballots; and above all, there were more votes than voters.²¹⁴ Hollywood could not make this up. There was large scale fraud in Lima.

The revelation of these irregularities challenged the legitimacy of the Fujimori government. Nearly half of Peruvians surveyed, 47%, believe the results were fraudulent.²¹⁵ This election also did not meet international standards. Upon investigating the matter, the Organization of American States (OAS) concluded that there had been tampering with ballots. In his report, Eduardo Stein, the OAS chief, contended that, because ballots and tally sheets went missing for hours while votes were being tallied, they could not, with absolute certainty, verify the results.²¹⁶ Furthermore, he heavily criticized the ONPE for implementing new computer software, without consulting the opposition. As indicated earlier, this software

²¹¹ (Profile of Alejandro Toledo, n.d.).

²¹² (Peru Elections 2000).

²¹³ (Tribune, 2000).

²¹⁴ (Peru Elections 2000).

²¹⁵ (Carrión, 145).

²¹⁶ (Krauss, 2000, May 19).

was subject to controversy as it encountered glitches. These glitches contributed to the three-day delay in results. Moreover, this software did not give the opposition access to the final vote count. “The election calendar makes it impossible to do a complete test,” Stein said, regarding the new software.²¹⁷

With that being said, the OAS recommended that, in order to ensure a free and fair process, the second round of elections be pushed back from May 28 to sometime in June.²¹⁸ Postponing the election would ensure the OAS has sufficient time to fully investigate the new software and ensure that the count would be transparent.²¹⁹ Toledo also asked Fujimori to delay the elections. When Fujimori refused to comply with his and the OAS’ demands, citing that there would not be any irregularities, Toledo dropped out of the race.

*“We will not participate in a fraudulent election process like the one of the
first round.”*²²⁰

Toledo’s resignation from the race effectively ensured that Fujimori would be in the Presidential Palace for another five years, unless an agreement to postpone could be made. Stein was optimistic that such compromise could be made. Negotiations had escalated to the point where Fujimori was directly in contact with the head of the OAS, former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria. However, these negotiations were futile as the OPNE voted 3-2 against postponement.²²¹ This decision sent shockwaves across Peru. Violent demonstrations raged in the streets. Stein spoke out against the Peruvian electoral system. Regardless, the people were powerless. Fujimori would once again be re-elected as President; but, for the first time since the autogolpe, he did not hold a majority in Congress. This will be very important moving forward.

²¹⁷ (Krauss).

²¹⁸ Normally, in accordance with Peruvian law, the runoff election must be held within 30 days of when the first-round results were announced. While the presidential results were released on April 12, congressional results were not released for a few more weeks. This made a delay valid under Peruvian law (Krauss).

²¹⁹ (Krauss & Krauss, 2000, May 27).

²²⁰ Quote from Toledo, in response to Fujimori’s refusal to delay the elections. Toledo then urged his followers to spoil their ballots on May 28 and peacefully protest on the streets (Krauss; Peru Elections 2000).

²²¹ (Krauss).

*“The conditions of the election do not provide a strong basis of legitimacy. I
feel deceived and disappointed.”*²²²

Fujimori once again took office on July 28, 2000, though this time, he was met with a polarized public. Organized by Toledo and opposition parties, hundreds of thousands of Peruvian, from different parts of the country, traveled to Lima to protest Fujimori’s inauguration. A series of protests from July 25-28 followed. These rallies, known as the “Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos²²³” proved to be momentous. According to an Imasen poll, 48% of the population voted in favor of the rallies.²²⁴ Furthermore, the government was unable to replicate the size of these crowds in pro-government rallies. To put things into perspective, Peruvians from all over the country traveled to Lima in protest. Considering the fact that 51.3% of the population disapproved of the regime, mobilizing mass support in favor of the government was not feasible.²²⁵ Fujimori lost the people. It was only a matter of time before the regime would collapse like a house of cards.

²²² Quote from Eduardo Stein, after the ONPE voted against postponement (Krauss).

²²³ The name of this protest alludes to the four regions that divided the Inca Empire. Considering the fact that hundreds of thousands of Peruvians traveled from their homes to Lima, the name bears significance (Están marchando hacia Lima miles de opositores a Fujimori, 2000).

²²⁴ (Están marchando hacia Lima...)

²²⁵ (Carrión, 146; Están marchando hacia Lima...)




Figure 6: Special Edition of La República, commemorating the 10 year anniversary of ‘La Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos.’ Source: nestoracontecimientosinternacionales.blogspot.com

The Fall of Fujimori: The Vladivideos and Resignation

Fujimori's third term began in the same fashion his second one ended: stained with controversy. Once again, his spy chief Montesinos was the center of all controversy. On August 21, Fujimori held a news conference to announce that the government had intercepted a shipment of arms from Jordan headed to Colombia. He claimed that the recipients of these arms, AK-47 rifles, were guerillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and then applauded Montesinos for playing spoilers on the entire operation.²²⁶ The Jordanian government, however, issued a counterclaim and said that these arms were sold to members of the Peruvian armed forces – 10,000 AK-47 rifles for \$500,000. Taleb Rifai, the Jordanian Information Minister, maintained that an anonymous American official bore witness to the transaction.²²⁷

Upon preliminary investigation, in which members involved with the scandal spoke, it became increasingly clear that the Peruvian government sanctioned the sale and the weapons in Colombia were linked to that transaction. *El Comercio* reported that not only were the weapons picked up by members of the Peruvian Air Force in Jordan, but also that the \$500,000 was paid through the Peruvian Defense Ministry account.²²⁸ Who de-facto runs the Defense Ministry? Vladimiro Montesinos. To make matters worse for Fujimori's right-hand man, the Peruvians arrested in the probe, José and Luis Aybar, are related to Manual Aybar Marca; they are cousins. Why is that important? Well, Marca commands the SIN's primary unit. He is also a known associate of Montesinos.²²⁹ Nevertheless, while this scandal further enhanced suspicion regarding Montesinos' activities, the public did not yet have indisputable evidence of corruption within the Fujimori government. A month later, that would all change.

²²⁶ (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori, n.d.)

²²⁷ (Tamayo, 2000).

²²⁸ (Tamayo).

²²⁹ (Tamayo).

“What we’re going to see, on this tape, which we’ll show in its entirety, is an example of someone who has sunk to the lowest moral standards.”²³⁰

As stated earlier, in the 2000 election, Fujimori, for the first time since the autogolpe, did not have a congressional majority. It soon became apparent how Fujimori was able to maintain support in the legislature and judiciary – full scale bribery. Six weeks into Fujimori’s third term, on September 14, 2000, a scandal equivalent to *Watergate* rocked Peru. On this day, congressmen Luis Iberico and Fernando Olivera obtained a videotape that implicated Montesinos for corruption and broadcast it live on Channel 8, the only independent channel in Peru. In this video, given to the congressmen by Montesinos’ long trusted bookkeeper and mistress, Matilde Pinchi Pinchi, Montesinos is seen bribing congressman Luis Alberto Kouri - \$15,000 USD in exchange for Kouri to renounce his party and support Fujimori.²³¹ At the same time that this video was aired for the first time, Congress was in session. The revelation that certain members in Congress were getting bribed created a massive uproar.

While the Kouri video was enough to indict the government for corruption, it was the first of many videos to be released to the public. These videos, known as the Vladivideos, highlighted the extent of Montesinos’ network.

“...When one [video] came out, it caused panic among the military, business people, and stars of sport, and TV.”²³²

Montesinos bribed everyone and anyone. For example, one of the videotapes showed Montesinos bribing Alipio Montes de Oca, a Supreme Court Justice. He offered Montes de Oca quite a compensation package. In exchange for loyalty to Fujimori, Montesinos offered Montes de Oca \$10,000 per month, medical care, personal security, and not just a seat on the OPNE, but the presidency. In another video, he

²³⁰ Quote from Luis Iberico, a journalist turned congressman. Alongside Fernando Olivera, another opposition congressman, Iberico obtained the videotape and leaked it to the public (The Fall of Fujimori; McMillan & Zoido, 2004, 76).

²³¹ (McMillan & Zoido, 71).

²³² Quote from Luis Iberico, regarding the release of the Vladivideos (The Fall of Fujimori).

is seen bribing Ernesto Gamarra, one of the congressmen tasked with investigating the source of his income. In short, Montesinos paid off Gamara to ensure that the committee would not find damning evidence against him.²³³ In all, Montesinos dealt with over 1600 people.²³⁴ While we may never know how many videos are in circulation (according to Iberico's source, there were roughly 2,000), it is clear that under Montesinos's watchful eye, large scale corruption was taking place in Peru.

²³³ (McMillan & Zoido, 71)

²³⁴ This is predicated on the fact that 1600+ videos are stored in a room in Congress. (McMillan & Zoido, 74)



Figure 7: Footage from the first Vladivideo, in which Montesinos bribes Kouri. Many more videos have been released. To watch the full video, visit this website: <https://rpp.pe/politica/gobierno/los-vladivideos-que-marcaron-noticia-1111709>

With the release of these videos, Fujimori's reputation was tarnished. Upon taking office in 1990, he pledged to restore morality back in government. Then, in 1992, he justified his autogolpe to rid Congress and the Judiciary of corruption. Meanwhile, over 1600 people – comprised of virtually every sector of society – accepted bribes from Fujimori's right-hand man. Regardless if he knew about these actions, he inherently benefitted from some of these bribes. He was absolutely humiliated. His fate was inherently tied to that of Montesinos; his days in office were numbered. On September 16, 2000, after remaining silent on the matter for a few days, Fujimori finally addressed the situation. In his announcement to the nation, he fired Montesinos, dismantled the SIN, and called for a new election, where he would not run.²³⁵

*“After profound reflection and objective evaluation at this juncture, I have made a decision. First, I will dismantle the National Intelligence System and secondly, I will call a general election as soon as possible. It goes without saying that I will not be participating in that general election.”*²³⁶

Following this announcement, Fujimori went on the hunt for Montesinos. To start, he appointed Jose Ugaz, a respected government lawyer, to launch a criminal investigation against Montesinos. He also literally went on the hunt for Montesinos.²³⁷ Dressed in combat boots and a black leather jacket, Fujimori commanded a manhunt for Montesinos. He was even seen on TV barking orders and directing traffic.²³⁸ It was completely unnecessary; the manhunt resembled a scene in a Hollywood film. Montesinos was not found during this show, but, soon, the motives for this manhunt became apparent: he wanted to cover his tracks.

On November 7, Fujimori sent Lt. Col. Manuel Ubilluz Tolentino to raid one of Montesinos's Lima apartments. In this raid, he took possession of some documents and videotapes. These videotapes, according

²³⁵ (Carrión, 276; The Fall of Fujimori).

²³⁶ Quote retrieved from Fujimori's announcement to the nation, September 16, 2000 (The Fall of Fujimori).

²³⁷ After the release of the videos, Montesinos fled to Panama. However, he was refused asylum and returned to Peru. He then went into hiding (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

²³⁸ (Krauss, 2000, October 27).

to Justice Minister Alberto Bustamante, were in the possession of Fujimori – “the small room was full of big suitcases, I counted 18.”²³⁹ On November 12, Fujimori drove to Bustamante’s place and handed over a large corpus of documents, all pertaining to Montesinos and his family. He asked that Bustamante pass that information along to Ugaz, who announced earlier that the probe against Montesinos could extend to Fujimori.²⁴⁰ The next day, Fujimori flew to Brunei to attend an economic conference. A week later, on November 20, 2000, Fujimori faxed his resignation from Japan. Congress refused to accept Fujimori’s resignation. Instead, they impeached him on the grounds that he was “morally unfit” to govern.²⁴¹ After 10 years of ups and downs, *El Chino*’s reign on Peru was finally over.

Arrest and Extradition

Following his resignation, Fujimori remained in Japan, with no intentions to return. For Fujimori, Japan was a safe haven. Unlike Montesinos, he did not have to worry about seeking asylum. Because he was born to Japanese immigrants and his birth was registered with the Japanese embassy, Fujimori was a dual citizen of Peru and Japan.²⁴² Moreover, Japan did not have an extradition treaty with Peru. No matter what charges were brought against him back in Lima, Japan would not act against one of their own.²⁴³ Despite pleas from the Peruvian government or organizations like Amnesty International and Interpol, who issued an international arrest warrant in March 2003, Fujimori would not have to worry about rotting behind bars.

As of right now, Fujimori is rotting in a Peruvian jail cell. Did Japan sign an extradition treaty with Peru? No. Did Japanese authorities act on Interpol’s warrant? No. Then what happened? As we will see below, Fujimori’s ego got the best of him.

²³⁹ (Krauss, 2000, December 3)

²⁴⁰ (Krauss).

²⁴¹ (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

²⁴² (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

²⁴³ (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

The elections Fujimori called for, prior to his resignation, were won by Alejandro Toledo, who narrowly defeated Alan García. In his inaugural address, he followed through with some of his campaign promises, such as creating 400,000 jobs per year, anti-corruption measures, and increased tourism.²⁴⁴ Effectively, through his own mouth, Toledo set the bar very high for himself. Within a year, however, it was clear that Toledo was unable to fulfill these promises. Likewise, Toledo was marred with personal issues that infuriated Peruvians. He was frequently tardy. He failed to acknowledge his 14-year-old illegitimate daughter, Zarai.²⁴⁵ Moreover, he increased his monthly salary to \$18,000, making him the highest paid president in the region.²⁴⁶ As a result of his personal issues and failure to live up to expectations, Toledo's popularity decreased significantly. For the remainder of his presidency, his popularity languished in single digits. In addition, the people longed for Fujimori. According to a survey conducted by the University of Lima in 2003, 41% of Peruvians approved of Fujimori's administration. In addition, 29% of Peruvians said Fujimori was the best President in Peru's history. Toledo only received 1.3% of the vote. Even García received more votes than Toledo (7.7%), and this was before he would right the ship in 2006.²⁴⁷

*"I want to go back to Peru and put it back on the right path. There's nothing to stop me legally, politically or ethically from becoming president again."*²⁴⁸

As Toledo's popularity continued to linger in the basement, it started to become clear that Fujimori was planning a return to Peru, with the goal of becoming President for a fourth time. In November 2005, he sought to realize his dream and flew into Chile. However, he was arrested by Chilean authorities and

²⁴⁴ (Associated Press, 2001).

²⁴⁵ A decade earlier, the daughter's mother, Lucrecia Orozco, filed a paternity suit against Toledo. Among his many promises on the campaign trail, Toledo agreed to take paternity tests after the election. After he won, he refused to take the test. His reluctance to acknowledge his daughter did not sit well with many Peruvians (Peru president admits illegitimate daughter, 2002).

²⁴⁶ (Bridges, 2007).

²⁴⁷ Fujimori frequently defended himself and addressed the situations unfolding in Peru in his blog (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori; Fujimori, 2003).

²⁴⁸ Fujimori, in an interview with David Pilling that was published on May 1, 2004 in the Financial Times (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

eventually extradited to Peru in September 2007.²⁴⁹ Three months after his extradition, he was convicted of abuse of power and sentenced to six years in jail. Sentencing would not end there. On April 7, 2009, Fujimori was convicted of human rights crimes, for his role in the massacres carried out by La Colina during his presidency. On top of his six-year sentence, Fujimori received 25 more years in jail.²⁵⁰ He was safe in Japan. His ego drove him back to Peru. It is also what put him in handcuffs for, potentially, the rest of his life.

Ethical Considerations

There are many things to consider, from an ethical perspective, regarding Fujimori's swift fall from grace. Why would he not face the music? Why would he delegitimize himself as a democratic leader by manipulating his own constitution? Why would he do everything in his power to ensure that he would be valid to run in the election, even blocking a referendum. Why would he engage in such blatant fraud? As stated in the introduction, the doctrine of utilitarian ethics is fundamentally flawed as it can conflict with moral conscience. Even a violent act like torture could be rendered ethical per this doctrine. Anyway, only Fujimori himself knows the answers to these questions. However, we can speculate that it was for utilitarian purposes, one way or another. Take a look at this quote from his 2006 documentary:

*"I had worked so hard for ten years that my main concern was how to continue with the work. How to ensure things would continue running well. I didn't want to leave that to chance."*²⁵¹

Based on this quote, his actions were fueled by a desire to keep Peru steered straight. He did not want to hand over the keys to an amateur that could potentially send Peru backwards. This claim has some validity,

²⁴⁹ (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori).

²⁵⁰ (The Rise and Fall of Fujimori; Alberto Fujimori profile: Deeply divisive Peruvian leader, 2018; Cespedes & Wade, 2009).

²⁵¹ (The Fall of Fujimori).

considering the fact that his predecessors failed miserably. We also see that, following his resignation, Toledo flopped miserably as well. Thus, from a strictly utilitarian perspective, considering this quote, Fujimori's actions could perhaps be rendered as ethical as he was maximizing the greatest good.

The same could be said -maximizing the greatest good – about those who engaged in Montesinos's vast network of corruption. While highly illegal, these members were incentivized with great benefits and lucrative positions. Some of these benefits would set these members and their families up for a very long time or for life. As a result, one could argue that the 1600 or so people who did business with Montesinos were operating under a calculus, where "the end justifies the means," especially when considering the amount of money Montesinos paid in exchange for loyalty. The uncovering of these videos, however, caught these members with their pants down.

DISCUSSION: THE FUJIMORI LEGACY

To this day, the name “Alberto Fujimori” brings cheers and groans; his legacy is not black and white. He remains a very polarizing force in Peru. Such polarization was evident on December 24, 2017, when Fujimori, who suffered from illnesses such as arrhythmia and tongue cancer, was medically pardoned by then-president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK).²⁵²

On one hand, Peruvians were delighted with the decision. A good portion of the country remained grateful of Fujimori. He inherited a Peru on the verge of collapse. Inflation was over 7000%. The nation was blacklisted from international financing. Furthermore, over half of the country lived in emergency zones. Prior to Fujimori, living in fear was the norm. Under Fujimori, stability was restored. His economic shock program proved to be a necessary evil. While it may have been a tough pill to swallow at first, it put Peru on a fast-track to end hyperinflation. As previously mentioned, in Fujimori’s ten years in charge, not only was he able to significantly decrease inflation (from 7650% to 3.6%) but he also restored relations with the international community.²⁵³

More importantly, in the eyes of Peruvians, Fujimori curbed terrorism. He dismantled both the MRTA and the Shining Path. Victor Polay? Captured. Abimael Guzmán? Captured. Terrorists no longer had leverage in Fujimori’s Peru. No longer could they intimidate judges or negotiate with justice. Take the 14 MRTA members who took guests hostage in the Japanese embassy, for example. They hoped that their actions would free their fellow comrades. Instead, they ended up six feet under, while all but one hostage was rescued. In short, Fujimori’s firm stance on terrorism enabled him to quell a stench that permeated the country for well over a decade. Fujimori supporters will always remember him for this, despite his involvement with Montesinos. A month after Fujimori faxed his resignation, a poll asked the following question: “Twenty years from now, when we talk about Fujimori, what will he remember?” 56% of

²⁵² (Zarate & Chan, 2017).

²⁵³ (Alberto Fujimori Biography, 2017).

respondents said, “the defeat of terrorism.”²⁵⁴ He left the country in a better place than when he inherited it.

On the other hand, Peruvians were enraged with the pardon. Opposition politicians and human rights lawyers were quick to denounce and challenge the pardon. Lima was met with thousands of protestors.²⁵⁵ To this sector of the population, the pardon revived old wounds. In their eyes, Fujimori is an autocrat, a dictator who would do anything to remain in power. The Vladivideos confirmed this. Additionally, while he may have defeated terrorism, Fujimori went through the depths of hell to do so. His methods to combat terrorism were brutal and against human decency. Under his watch, a military death squad (La Colina) engaged in multiple atrocities. In one instance, La Colina killed innocent partygoers in a neighborhood gathering. Victims of this massacre included an 8-year-old child.²⁵⁶ In another instance, referenced earlier in the text, this same death squad assassinated nine students and a professor at a local university. Fujimori looked the other way in these instances, perhaps because he was the one who ordered these killings in the first place. His 2009 trial, regarding human rights abuses, found him guilty of doing so, beyond a reasonable doubt.²⁵⁷ His hands were not clean; they were covered in the blood of innocent people. Try telling someone like Teresa Tyntalla Contreras that Fujimori should be pardoned. She lost one of her children in one of these massacres.²⁵⁸ There would be no closure for her, or any of the victims, if Fujimori were to be freed. Rather, it would be a giant slap in the face.

“There will be no peace, no democracy, or justice when the pain of the family members who are victims of the atrocities of Fujimori and Montesinos is not respected.”²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ (Carrión, 2006, 133).

²⁵⁵ (Zarate & Rochabrún, 2017).

²⁵⁶ (Sullivan, 2018).

²⁵⁷ (Sullivan).

²⁵⁸ (Zarate & Rochabrún).

²⁵⁹ Quote from Marisa Glave, a member of the Peruvian legislature (Zarate & Chan).

This is what severely complicates Fujimori's legacy among Peruvians. There is no denying that he did some amazing things while he was in office, especially during his first token. Likewise, many Presidents that have succeeded him have either been jailed or impeached from office.²⁶⁰ By the same token, he victimized Peruvians; his name will forever be linked to crimes against humanity and utterly disregarding democratic principles, alongside his right-hand man Montesinos. It seems that Fujimori is finally aware of this reality. After maintaining his innocence for years, following his resignation, he recognized that he had let people down during his tenure as president.

*"Those I ask for forgiveness from the bottom of my heart."*²⁶¹

When people get older, they tend to reflect on their actions and share what they wish they did different. Was this apology Fujimori finally coming to terms with his culpability? Nevertheless, the Peruvian Supreme Court eventually ruled that, under Peruvian and international law, crimes against humanity could not be pardoned. Therefore, the Supreme Court overturned Fujimori's medical pardon and ordered him to return to jail.²⁶²

While Fujimori's story continues to be written, as his life comes to an end, his legacy transcends that of Peru. His efforts to remain in power at all costs spawned a series of copycats around Latin America. For example, in 1998, Hugo Chávez was democratically elected as president of Venezuela. A year later, he did the same thing Fujimori did 6 years earlier – he organized a Constituent Assembly to create a new constitution. This constitution, which was approved by a referendum, allowed immediate re-election. As a result, he was re-elected in 2000 and 2006.²⁶³ The same things happened in Bolivia, with Evo Morales. Elected in 2005, Morales, too, launched a Constituent Assembly, which put together a new constitution.

²⁶⁰ PPK was the most recent Peruvian president to endure this fate. In December, he was accused of receiving money from Oderbrecht, a Brazilian engineering and construction company, while serving as the minister of economy and finance in 2004. After surviving impeachment votes in December, videos emerged of his allies attempting to buy votes. Thus, in March 2018, PPK resigned. Like Fujimori, Congress did not accept his resignation and impeached him (Valencia, 2018).

²⁶¹ Quote from Fujimori, moments after receiving a medical pardon from PPK (Alberto Fujimori profile, 2018).

²⁶² (Sullivan).

²⁶³ (Tanaka, 2018).

The new 2009 Constitution made it legal for a president to be immediately re-elected once. Morales was subsequently re-elected in 2009 and 2014. To be eligible for the 2014 re-election, he pulled something out of Fujimori's bag of tricks. Because the Constitution was ratified in 2009, Congress considered Morales' 2010 government to be his first, rendering him eligible for the 2014 election, one in which he emerged victorious.²⁶⁴ 14 years after being elected president of Bolivia, Morales still occupies this position and it is clear that he is not finished. In 2017, the Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia ruled in favor of Morales and struck down the re-election provision of the Constitution, on the grounds that it violates his human rights.²⁶⁵ As a result, Morales is eligible for a third re-election. Should he win the 2019 election, scheduled for October, all signs point to Morales remaining in office for a very long time.

The big takeaway here? None of this would be possible without Fujimori. His attempts to remain in power has had a lasting impact on all of South America. The Morales situation sounds all too familiar. Had the Vladivideos not been exposed, who's to say that Fujimori would not be in power today? He had members of the legislature and judiciary in his back pocket. He had already stonewalled attempts from the opposition to render him ineligible. It wouldn't be out of the question. Time and history will ultimately determine Fujimori's legacy. As evidenced throughout this text, it is a very complex matter.

²⁶⁴ (Tanaka).

²⁶⁵ (Tanaka).



Figure 8: An ill Fujimori, 79, waving to the public following his medical pardon. Source: NPR

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Academic Vita of Robert Al-Moustafa

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EDUCATION:

Pennsylvania State University
Schreyer Honors College & College of Liberal Arts
Major: Communication Arts and Sciences
Minor(s): Business in Liberal Arts, Spanish
Smeal College of Business Fundamentals Certificate
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University Park, PA
Aug. 2015 – May 2019

Thesis Title: Fujimori's Decenio: A Case Study on Neo-Populist Rulers & Utilitarian Ethics
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen H. Browne

EXPERIENCE:

Penn State Campus Recreation, Competitive Sports

Student Manager of Officials Development & Student Supervisor

University Park, PA
Mar. '16 – present

- Developed, in collaboration with professional staff, new officiating program structure & content
- Created rules and mechanics training materials for officials' training
- Lead on-field trainings for newly recruited officials and coordinate on-site practice scrimmages
- Evaluate over 80 officials, across various sports, weekly & provide feedback via continued training
- Assist in marketing of officiating program for Penn State University student body

Penn State University, Smeal College of Business

Undergraduate Teaching Assistant, Management & Organization (BA 304)

University Park, PA
Jan '19 – present

- Assist with classroom management for a class of 180 students
- Facilitate in-class student discussions regarding principles of management
- Supervise student examinations and grade work submissions based on devised rubrics
- Function as a liaison between professor and student and address students' questions or grievances

Linguistic Agency & Intention to Engage in Antibiotic Stewardship Behavior

Research Group Member

University Park, PA
Aug '16 – Dec '16

- Created experimental conditions in study by developing flyers embedded in survey
- Ensured survey had content-validity and ran statistical analyses via IBM SPSS
- Contributed to final paper and poster that was presented at the 2017 Undergraduate Scholars Conference in Boston, MA

ACTIVITIES:

Penn State IFC/Panhellenic Dance Marathon (THON)

Fundraising Volunteer

University Park, PA
Sep '15 – present

- Year-long effort to raise funds and awareness for the fight against pediatric cancer
- Since 1977, THON has raised more than \$127 million for the Four Diamonds Fund

Penn State University, Schreyer Honors College

Honors Orientation Mentor: SHO TIME 2016-18

University Park, PA
Mar '16 – Sep '18

- Lead small group throughout three-day honors orientation aimed at helping first-year scholars acclimate to the requirements and resources of the College as well as fostering relationships

Chi Phi Fraternity

Vice President of Communications

State College, PA
Oct '15 – Aug '18

- Serve as liaison to national and university offices regarding all membership records & reports
- Created a Chapter Instagram to supplement an updated website and Twitter page to ensure successful Chapter communication and attract potential new members
- Oversaw recruitment of largest spring class since recolonization (at the time) and one of the largest

- at Penn State University
- Past positions: Penn State IFC/Panhellenic Dance Marathon (THON) Chair, IM Sports Chair

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS, AWARDS & SCHOLARSHIPS:

Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society, Penn State Chapter

- Nation's oldest and most selective honor society for all academic disciplines

Lambda Pi Eta Honors Fraternity, Zeta Rho Chapter

- National Communication Association's official honor society at four-year colleges and universities

Marie Radomsky and Vernon W. Elzey Honors Scholarship in the College of Liberal Arts 2018-2019

Michael Hodes Scholarship in Communication Arts and Sciences 2017- 2018

- Provides recognition for students enrolled or planning to enroll in the major, who have achieved superior academic records or who manifest the promise of outstanding academic success

Harold O'Brien Memorial Award in Communication Arts and Sciences 2017-2018

- Honors outstanding academic achievement demonstrated by an undergraduate in his or her first year as a major in Communication Arts and Sciences and gives preference to those involved in forensic activity

Tracy Winfree McCourtney Scholarship in The College of the Liberal Arts 2017-2018

Schumacher Honors Scholarship 2016- 2017

Merrill Lynch Honors Scholarship, Schreyer Honors College 2015- 2016; 2018- 2019

- Given to students in the college who contribute to the ethnic or cultural diversity of the student body

Academic Excellence Scholarship 2015-2019

- Given to members of the Schreyer Honors College

University Park 4 Year Provost Fund 2015-2019

Recipient of Chi Phi Educational Trust 2016-2017

- Merit-based academic scholarship that honor those that work hard to achieve academic success and serve their Chapter

4th at Penn State in Deloitte Case Competition Feb. '16

SKILLS:

- Conversational & written proficiency in Spanish
- Social Media: Meltwater Engage, iMovie & Final Cut Pro X
- Software: MiniTab Express, IBM SPSS, Zoho CRM