

The Pennsylvania State University
Schreyer Honors College

Department of History and Religious Studies Program

Trends in Political Culture in Post World War II Greece: An Explanation of Greece's Current
Crisis

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Spring 2011

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for baccalaureate degrees
in History and Classics and Ancient Mediterranean Studies
with honors in History

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to examine the changes and development, or lack of change and development as the case may be, in Greece's political culture since c. 1950 as a means of explaining and understanding the current political, economic and social crisis. A chronological analysis of major political events will be used to explore the political culture of Greece. Major political events will be limited to domestic events. Foreign policy and foreign influence and/or intervention will largely be ignored as political culture is defined here within a domestic setting. Overall Greece has a weak political culture despite opportunities to strengthen it. The current crisis is another such opportunity but it remains to be seen if the political culture will be strengthened as a result and thus bring about real change.

Trust is the underlying problem of Greece's political-culture. This relationship between citizen and political elite has been affected by decades of scandal and corruption. Further weakness in the system is also evident by the domination of "family dynasties" and nepotism, making real change a seemingly impossible task. The gap between rich and poor, with no substantial middle class, is another problem facilitating the lack of trust. I seek to address all of these factors as they contribute to the political culture of Greece.

My thesis will primarily rely on newspaper articles from Greek, foreign, and American newspapers along with interviews performed by me. Secondary sources will be used to provide a general understanding of important events over the last sixty years.

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Academic Vita

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the people who helped me decide what to write my thesis on and who contributed to the project's success. Dave Lunt, then a Ph.D. Candidate at Penn State University, taught my first collegiate course, Ancient Greek Civilization. The fact that he used his own photos in the power-points made me want to go to Greece myself and I did in the spring of 2009. Dr. Garrett Fagan, professor on the spring 2009 Athens semester abroad, made both ancient and modern Greece engaging and exciting. The staff at the Athens Center, the school I attended both times I was in Greece, for working to ensure that my experiences were safe, interesting and exciting. Thank you Rosemary Donnelly, Nina Lorum Stamatiou, Vassia Vassiliou, Katja Ehrhardt, and Maggie Tiftikidis. Zoe Stamatopoulou spent the last year tutoring me in Modern Greek on her own time. She also gave me insight into Greek culture and politics, translated material, and provided gentle guidance on how to tackle the seemingly impossible task of writing this thesis. My thesis supervisor, Dr. Tobias Brinkmann ensured that this thesis was a success with his insightful critique and thought provoking conversation. He acted as a sounding board that allowed me to put all the discrete pieces together. Finally I would like to thank my parents and boyfriend Steve for supporting me throughout this process.

Political culture is the somewhat amorphous relationship between the citizens, politicians and governmental institutions within a given country. In a strong and/or stable political culture all participants agree and are committed to the rules of the game. These rules are culturally accepted norms that are highly valued by both the citizenry and the politicians. A strong and stable political culture is one that is deeply rooted in a nation's cultural identity and the rules of the game have remained stable and unchanged for a long period of time. Constant change of the rules signifies institutional weakness, a lack of commitment by the political actors and the voters, and a weak political culture. For Greece to have a strong, stable political culture democracy would need to be highly valued by both citizens and political elites alike. The actions that the political elites are allowed to undertake however, betray a weak political culture. Repeatedly, election procedures have been changed in favor of the ruling party, political scandals abound and there is a distinct disconnect between the politicians and the citizens.

For being heralded as the birthplace of democracy, Greece's political system today is far from the ideal model of a well oiled, highly functioning democracy. Political parties are easily fractured into competing factions and political issues are easily polarized. The various newspapers and other news outlets have a clear bias toward a certain party, leaving no room for impartiality. Jobs within the political bureaucracy are often gained through nepotism and the spoils system. The saying, "it's not what you know, but who you know," is particularly apt to describe the political institutions of Greece. Add to this the seemingly rampant corruption among elite politicians who are implicated in taking bribes and other scandals. Furthermore in the early post-world war II period the political institutions were not the supreme authority in Greece. As a constitutional monarchy until 1974, the monarch did on numerous occasions

involve himself in political matters. The military also had an influence on politics and due to its close relationship with the crown and therefore without fear of punishment involved itself in politics both directly and indirectly. As a result of the scandals, polarization and instability, the Greek political atmosphere has a distinct scent of distrust in which the people do not have faith in the governing elite. Complicating the picture further is the fact that there is a lack of consensus on what it means to be Greek. There are two contrasting traditions. One sees Modern Greece as the legacy of Aristotle, Plato and Socrates and the classical pagan religion of Ancient Greece. The other sees the Modern Greek tradition as arising from the Byzantine Empire and the Orthodox faith.¹

From my research, which is by no means exhaustive, I have found the literature on the subject of Greek political culture to be lacking in that no one has provided a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affect Greek political culture, namely the military, the monarchy, the politicians and political parties, the Orthodox Church, and the press. Instead each actor is analyzed separately, but these actors do not exist in a vacuum and in many events interact with one another. The other sources on Greece, the general history books, provide a good chronological outline of the major events, but provide little or no analysis of the significance of those events. The history books also leave out seemingly less important events that are illustrative of the peoples' attitude. It is into this gap that I aim to place my thesis, by tying together the relevant actors, analyzing the significance of events and highlighting both major events and less well known events to illustrate the trends and themes in political culture.

¹ George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 1-2.

I have been to Greece twice. The first time was from January 2009 to April 2009 on a Penn State study abroad program with 19 other students. We arrived shortly after the shooting of the teenager by police and subsequent riots of December 2008. When we initially arrived we were told to stay away from *Σύνταγμα* (center city) until things quieted down. I remember going to center city later in January and numerous other times during my spring semester in Greece and never encountering any problems with protesters. In fact we accidentally walked into a small protest outside the parliament building which is located in center city, but no one gave us any problems, nor did the protests give the police any problems.

I returned to Greece for an intensive language course in June 2010. As I was planning my trip I kept abreast of the developments and atmosphere in Greece. I arrived in Athens, Greece for the second time on June 6, 2010 and departed June 26, 2010. As I went shopping and out to eat, I felt a sense of desperation in the Greek people. I do not remember hearing desperation in people's voices when I was studying in Greece in 2009. It was obvious to me that the situation had dramatically changed for the worse in the year I had been away. The number of strikes and/or protests had increased dramatically too. There were so many it seemed that most didn't make the news because they were a daily occurrence. Like clock-work, every Thursday the metro, train, bus and tram workers would go on strike from 11am-4pm. Students who lived farther from the school I was attending than I complained about having difficulty getting to class. One day our teacher was very late because center city had been shut-down due to a major protest.

At that time I only understood the basic outline of the Greek crisis and wanted to know what specifically people were upset about and how the government austerity measures were affecting individual's lives. I came to understand that this current crisis is not a recent

development but the product of historical forces dating back to the birth of the Modern Greek state in 1830.

The following chronology and analysis is based on an inherent comparison of the Greek system to that of Western Europe and the United States. This underlying assumption is appropriate because Greece herself sought from early on to be associated with the western democratic system and the western political culture. If Greece had sought close relations with her neighbors or a place of prominence within the Balkans, the appropriate underlying assumptions of the analysis would be to view Greece in relation to the political development of Southeastern Europe. In this case, Greece is the regional leader in democracy and political maturity and the following analysis would be more positive. Greece however sought to emulate western parliamentary democracy systems as such will be measured by the western yardstick of democracy and political maturity. The larger purpose of this chronological analysis is to uncover the underlying reasons for the current political, economic, and social crisis in Greece. The current crisis is not due to new developments or recent poor choices by the government nor is it a reaction against new developments. The crisis is a reaction to fundamental problems in the Greek political system, which have their origins in the post-WWII era. As such a chronological narrative of events is necessary along with an analysis of the problems as they arise, before the current crisis can be fully explained and understood.

Greek Independence and Nation Building, 1830-1930

When the Greek war for independence from the Ottoman Empire began in 1821, many Greeks took up arms in the belief that they were fighting for both their political as well as their

religious freedom. This majority identified Greece as the legacy of the Byzantine Empire and the Eastern Orthodox faith. Even as Modern Greece was fighting for its independence, there was already a minority of Greeks who desired to establish an independent secular state. This group of Greeks was largely educated in western universities and understood Modern Greece as the descendant of the ancient pre-Christian past. Once independence had been won in 1830, the Great Powers of Europe, Great Britain, France and Russia, bestowed a monarch upon Greece. Otto of Bavaria, a German, was selected. In setting up the new state, Otto's regent Georg von Maurer, brought the Orthodox Church under the control of the state. This was an imposition of the relationship between church and state in Germany and completely contrary to the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox Church, with its patriarch in Constantinople, had operated largely autonomously from Ottoman authority as the leader of the Greek *millet* or nation within the Ottoman Empire. The 1833 constitution however separated the Greek Church from Constantinople and while professing complete loyalty to the Orthodox faith, the Greek King was recognized as the head of the Greek Church.²

As the structures of the state developed, the nature of political arena took on characteristics that would become hallmarks of Greek political culture but would also be detrimental to Greece's political culture. The military coup in 1843 was just the first of many coups in Greece's history until the end of the final military coup in 1974. Political parties were not founded on any ideological beliefs, but were groupings around prominent politicians whose main goal was to be perpetually elected to office. Society in general was organized by patron-

² Charles A. Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 128, 130-132.

client relationships. Originally such relationships developed during Ottoman rule as a defense against the harsh and arbitrary methods of the Ottoman government.³ These patron-client relationships formed the basis for what George Kourvetaris calls “in-groups” and “out-groups.” “In-groups” are comprised of immediate family and close friends and “out-groups” are those with which an individual has a secondary relationship such as with the government or social institutions. These “in-groups” would form the basis for political party formation around a particular family, such as the Papandreou’s or Karamalis’s of the latter half of the 20th century. In government the political party that is in power is considered an “out-group” by the political party that is not in power. Trust is only granted to those within one’s “in-group” which hinders the democratic system from functioning properly and contributes to the overall weakness of the system and of political culture.⁴

From the time of its birth, Greece’s foreign policy was driven by the *Megali Idea*. The goal was to incorporate all Greeks within the Modern Greek nation with the capital at Constantinople.⁵ The Orthodox Church with its Byzantine heritage was ideologically and pragmatically supportive of *Megali Idea*⁶. With Constantinople the capital of the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s however, Athens was chosen as the country’s capital. Symbolically Greece had chosen to culturally orient herself toward her classical past over her Byzantine heritage.⁷

Megali Idea had some success from the mid-19th century through World War I. In 1864 the British ceded the Ionian Islands to the Kingdom of Greece. In the latter part of the century

³ Ibid. 53, 61, 63

⁴ George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 5-6.

⁵ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 47.

⁶ Theofanis G. Stavrou, “The Orthodox Church and Political Culture” in *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Dimitri Constan and Theofanis G. Stavrou (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 44.

⁷ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 50.

Greece received Thessaly and part of Epirus as part of the Great Powers dividing up territory in the Balkans in 1878.⁸ In response to the Young Turk revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire, Crete declared *enosis* or union with the Kingdom of Greece. The Greek politicians were slow to respond to the Cretan pronouncement as they faced a faltering domestic economy. Army officers from the Athens garrison, upset with the politicians' performance, created a Military League and launched a coup. Once the prime minister resigned, the League put its support behind Eleftherios Venizelos, a politician from Crete. Under Venizelos' leadership during the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 Greece incorporated Salonica (Thessaloniki), the islands of Chios, Mytilini, Samos and Crete into the country. The new territories increased Greece's size by 70% and almost doubled her population. Northern Epirus, with its sizeable Greek population, was incorporated into Albania however and remains outside of Greece to this day.⁹

When World War I broke out in 1914, Venizelos wished for Greece to enter on the side of the Entente, but the king refused to give his consent to such action. As a result Venizelos resigned in March 1915, thus beginning the 'National Schism' that pitted the king against Venizelos. The split signified another division in Greek identity. Those who supported Venizelos, supported the *Megali Idea*, while the king and his supporters identified with the heartland of Greece and wanted to consolidate the kingdom's control over the territories added during the Balkan wars.¹⁰ Venizelos also represented those who wanted Greece to modernize and adopt Western institutions and values. The king represented those that were hostile to Western Enlightenment ideas and institutions, preferring indigenous and traditional values and

⁸ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 69-71.

⁹ *Ibid.* 73, 75-76, 81, 83.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 87, 89

institutions.¹¹ This question over whether Greece was a “western” nation only added to the fragmented nature of Greek political culture and would continue to be a political issue through the 1980s.

The ‘National Schism’ ended with a victory for the Venizelos supporters. The king left the country in June 1917 and Venizelos returned as prime minister. In a precedent setting move, Venizelos purged the armed forces of royalist sympathizers. War weariness led Venizelos to lose power in 1920 and a plebiscite returned the monarchy and his supporters re-took control of parliament. Just as Venizelos had done in 1917, the royalists purged the civil service and army of Venizelos supporters and sympathizers. Despite being elected due to the country’s “war weariness,” the royalist controlled government launched an offensive in Anatolia in March 1921. By September 1922, the Greeks had been badly defeated by the Turks led by Modern Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal, better known as Atatürk. With the defeat, *Megali Idea* ceased to be the foundation of Greek foreign policy.

The Treaty of Lausanne, formally ended the Greek-Turkish conflict with the exchange of some 1.4 million people between the two countries. The exchange was based on religion, not language, and in many served to bring more divisions to both Turkey and Greece as many Orthodox Christians from Asia Minor spoke Turkish, and many Greek Muslims spoke Greek. The refugees largely supported Venizelos’s agenda and helped secure the vote to abolish the monarchy in 1924. After four years of rule by the military, Venizelos was elected prime minister once more in 1928. He helped ensure his victory by changing the electoral procedure to a majority vote system. This was another Venizelos precedent setting move: throughout the 20th

¹¹ Nicos P. Mouzelis, “Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and Political Culture,” in *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Dimitri Conostas and Theofanis G. Stavrou (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 20.

century the incumbent government would manipulate the electoral voting procedure in an attempt to retain power.¹²

The elections of 1932 ended the four years of stable government under the liberal Eleftherios Venizelos, as no party won an absolute majority. The world economic crisis of the period also brought about labor unrest. The Populists led by Panayis Tsaldaris took power tenuously, but overconfidently sought to remove army officers affiliated with the Liberal party. As a result the Liberals brought down the Tsaldaris government in January 1933 and called for new elections. The elections returned the Populists to power but with a much clearer majority than in the 1932 election. The blow to the Liberals led republican Colonel Plastiras to lead a coup in March 1933, which due to limited planning ended in utter failure. Plastiras went into exile in France. Three months later in June an assassination attempt was made on Eleftherios Venizelos, whose chief of security, appointed by Venizelos' opposition Tsaldaris, was implicated in but not Tsaldaris himself.¹³

As the Populists now held control of the government firmly, purges were carried out within the army to rid it of republicans and liberals. In response to this, another attempted coup was made in March 1935. While better organized, this coup also failed and this time Venizelos joined Plastiras in exile as he had openly sided with the insurrectionists.¹⁴ Purges of republicans and liberals in the army were completed following this coup. The result was a military that was politically affiliated with the royalist right wing, and increasingly aware of its own potential political power. Following the March 1935 attempted coup, Greece had been placed under

¹² Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 93, 95, 97, 101, 103, 106-108.

¹³ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 67-68.

¹⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113.

martial law. New elections in June 1935 returned the Populists to power with a 95% majority (the Liberals had abstained), but this overwhelming vote for the Populists did not bring about stability. Tsaldaris was outmaneuvered in his own party by the more conservative, right wing elements led by George Kondylis and Ioannis Metaxas, both army officers and in line with the newly purged army, who supported the return of the monarchy. Tsaldaris was reluctant to destruct the Greek Republic in favor of constitutional monarchy and was as a result forced out of office.¹⁵ With the royalists in control of government, the monarchy was then restored by decree in October of 1935 on the basis of a plebiscite in favor of the return of the monarch. The plebiscite was a farce with the vote, 1,491,992 to 32,454 in favor of returning the king, which seemed too much in line with the extreme right's wishes to be realistic. Nevertheless King George, King Constantine's son, returned to Greece in November 1935.¹⁶

Metaxas, World War II and Civil War: 14 Years Without Democracy

Elections in 1936 were inconclusive and the Populists and Liberals could not find a way through the impasse created by the die-hards in each party. A caretaker government led by Professor Demertzis was formed to govern Greece until new elections could be held or the two main parties could come to an agreement. Demertzis died in April 1936 and King George, newly reinstated as king and without consulting any political leaders, intervened in the political affairs of the country and asked General Ioannis Metaxas to form a government. Since the army was now staunchly royalist, a military government insured that Greece would reverse direction from Venizelos's outward looking and westernizing ways, but to a traditional, inward orientation.

¹⁵ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 68.

¹⁶ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 115.

Growing labor unrest and the apparent instability of the political parties, made Metaxas' ideas of strong government appealing to the king. The king approved of a dictatorship, which was established in August 1936.¹⁷ Metaxas died in 1941, thus ending the military dictatorship, but by this time World War II had broken out and Greece was invaded by both Italy and Germany. A democratic political structure would not return to Greece until c. 1950. Thus from 1936 to 1950, Greece experienced fourteen years without democracy.

Three months after Metaxas' death in January 1941, German forces invaded Greece. By June all of the Greece was under Axis control. Whatever formal democratic institutions had not fallen apart under the Metaxas dictatorship, were thoroughly wiped out during the occupation. The Germans used Greece to exploit raw materials and export them to its armies throughout Europe, leaving the Greek people to literally fight for survival. Occupied procuring enough food rations, people had no time for political concerns and no way to set up formal and legitimate political institutions. The war left over half a million dead with roads, bridges, canals, railroads and factories out of commission. Furthermore the Greek people were expected to supply the Axis occupation force with food which in 1942 amounted to 90% of the Greek national income.¹⁸ Communist leaders did lead a resistance movement called the National Liberation Front (EAM) that was already set up in September 1941. The National Liberation Front Army (ELAS) was created as the military wing of the quasi-political EAM. Young people and women were particularly receptive to the ideology of EAM which advocated the organization of resistance and the freedom to choose the type of government once Greece was liberated from Axis control. Most of those involved in the resistance were not communists; the resistance was

¹⁷Ibid., 117, 119, 121.

¹⁸Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos and Harry J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 104

united instead as anti-occupation and anti-monarchy as King George's action had brought about the Metaxas dictatorship. As the occupation wore on, EAM tried to set itself up as the only organized political and military force with the ability to take power once liberation was achieved. British attempts to organize all of the various resistance groups, including the communists, had failed when the communists demanded they hold key ministerial positions and that the monarch not return unless a plebiscite voted to restore the monarchy. The other groups rejected cooperation on these terms.¹⁹

At the time of liberation, EAM had approximately 50,000 troops and 1,500,000 members, and controlled over two-thirds of the Greek state. The political vacuum left by the German retreat led to a bloody confrontation between EAM and EDES, the Greek Republic National League, which was not guided by communist ideology. An agreement was reached between the two groups in February 1944 which ended open conflict and drew up new plans for coordination between the guerrilla groups. Despite the agreement, EAM set-up its own government, called the Political Committee of National Liberation, as a challenger to the official Greek government in exile in Cairo, Egypt. The creation of this challenger government led to mutinies within the Greek armed forces stationed in the Middle East. The ensuing purge of the armed forces left only 3,000 troops on active service. The British then intervened, bringing back to Greece from exile George Papandreou, an active politician before the Metaxas dictatorship, to form a government. A deal was brokered between the competing guerrilla groups to work together to form a unified national government with the participation of the communist EAM. How much

¹⁹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125-132.

participation EAM would have been left unspecified and EAM refused to go along with the arrangement.²⁰

Fearing the communists might receive support from the Soviet Union, Winston Churchill met with Josef Stalin in May 1944 to definitively define their respective spheres of influence. At the meeting, Stalin respected early agreements that Greece was to be part of the British sphere and never went back on said agreement. This agreement between Stalin and Churchill over Greece was part of a larger “percentages agreement” in which the two ultimate victors of the Second World War divided Europe into spheres of influence. Greece was part of the British, democratic sphere and in exchange Romania and other Eastern European countries became part of the Soviet socialist sphere.²¹

EAM forces did concede to the Papandreou government in September 1944 under the Lebanon agreement in which all guerrilla forces were placed under the leadership of British general Scobie. By conceding to Papandreou, EAM gave up its best chance at taking power following the German retreat. When Papandreou arrived in Greece in October 1944, he proposed that all resistance groups, except the royalist ‘Mountain Brigade’ disband. EAM strongly objected. At the end of November, EAM ministers resigned from the Papandreou government and called a general demonstration for December 3rd. The demonstration was fired upon by police forces. ELAS forces joined the EAM demonstration and engaged in street fighting with British troops for 33 days. In January British reinforcements from Italy finally tipped the balance in their favor and a ceasefire was signed. The Varkiza agreement was signed in February 1945. ELAS was to turn over its weapons by the following month in exchange for

²⁰ C.M. Woodhouse, “Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century,” in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 72, 75-76.

²¹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 133.

amnesty. EAM would take no part in the new government. Freedom of the press was to be respected as were individuals' political beliefs.²² It was also agreed that a plebiscite on the restoration of the monarchy would be followed by general elections.²³

The Varkiza agreement turned about to be a sham. The definition of political crimes was so restricted that 80,000 persons who had thought they were promised amnesty found themselves prosecuted under common law crimes.²⁴ Furthermore the British puppet government led by Themistocles Sophoulis reversed the order of the plebiscite and elections.²⁵ Elections were held in March 1946 and then the plebiscite in September. The result of the plebiscite was 69% in favor of the king's return. The Left denounced the results and continued organizing in the mountains to lead a forcible takeover of Greece.²⁶ A forcible takeover seemed possible, as the official Greek government had no real control; eight governments had been in power between January 1945 and April 1946.²⁷

The March elections easily brought to power the People's Party led by Dino Tsaldaris as the Left abstained from the election and the center politicians were in utter disarray.²⁸ The decision by the Left only served to heighten political polarization and any hope of a peaceful

²² C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 76-77.

²³ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 137.

²⁴ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 77.

²⁵ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 137.

²⁶ Theodore A. Coulombis, John A. Petropoulos and Harry J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 114.

²⁷ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 77-78.

²⁸ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 139.

transition was quickly lost.²⁹ The communists, KKE, reorganized EAM/ELAS into the Democratic Army which was supplied by the neighboring communist regimes in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Initially the Democratic Army scored successes fighting as a regular army, but by 1948 it was clear that abandoning guerrilla tactics was not in the communists' best interest. In July 1949, Yugoslavia closed its borders to the communist guerrillas and the Americans pumped supplies to the regular army. This forced the communist Democratic Army to disband and flee to Albania. In the late summer of 1949, the civil war finally ended.³⁰

WWII resulted in the death of approximately 550,000 Greeks. The civil war added another 40,000 military casualties and 4,000 civilian deaths. Moreover 700,000 refugees from communist controlled northern Greece were displaced mainly to Athens, while another 50,000 to 100,000 fled during the civil war.³¹ In a country of only about 8 million at the time, the human loss amounted to almost 10% of the population.

Dictatorship, occupation and civil war destroyed the politic fabric of Greece. Any democratic political culture or cultural values of democracy were first easily overthrown and then subsequently lost. In 1950 when the war against the communists was finally over, the political atmosphere remained tense. The defeated communists and their sympathizers fiercely opposed with the government that was set up. There were also further issues with the rules of the game as democracy was restored under the watchful eye of the Americans and not solely by the Greek people themselves. A constitution was agreed upon by those in power which tried to

²⁹ Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos and Harry J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 114.

³⁰ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 139-143.

³¹ Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos and Harry J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 117.

resurrect the republican model of democracy from the 1930s. The only clear rule of politics in 1950 was finding a leader capable of stabilizing Greece.

A weak political culture would be the overarching trend in Greek politics from the time democracy was restored up to the present day. Part of this phenomenon is and was culture. Democracy was not considered the ultimate goal of the people or the politicians. The people wanted prosperity and the politicians wanted power. On the whole Greece did not seem to want a stable political arena. The following narrative and analysis will explore the major political events and how they fit into the prevailing political culture, keeping in mind the two sets of underlying divisions. The first division emerged at the birth of Modern Greece in 1830 or whether Greece was the legacy of Ancient, Classical, and pagan Greece, or the legacy of the Byzantine Empire and the Orthodox Christian Church. The second division, which emerged during the 'National Schism,' was over the direction the country would take. Venizelos wanted to westernize Greece by copying western institutions and values. Royalists distrusted the Western Enlightenment tradition and wished to pursue instead the traditional, inward oriented direction. The overarching trend of a weak political culture has been broken down into five subcategories specific to the 1950-1974 period which highlight specific aspects of the unstable political atmosphere.

1. Interference of the Monarch

A constitutional monarch is in theory subject to the laws of the country's constitution and acts as head of state not head of government. In the case of Greece the head of government was the prime minister and Parliament the governing body. The king however used his position to unilaterally determine who would run the government. He appointed someone loyal to him in Ioannis Metaxas and condoned the

construction of his subsequent dictatorship. The monarch fled Greece during the occupation and returned under the justification of the 1946 plebiscite. But the monarchy did not acquiesce to its role under the Parliament that was elected by the people. In the mid-1950s the monarch would exert his will into politics again, with less drastic results than the Metaxas dictatorship. In the mid-1960s however a new, young monarch would push the limits of his power which would result in the collapse of the government and the monarchy.

2. Politicization of the Army

After the purges of republican elements from the army in 1933 and 1935, the army became and remained ideologically allied with the conservative and royalist right wing. The army defended the monarchy and took on the responsibility of providing a strong government when elections were inconclusive or it was felt that the politicians could not provide a stable government. Inconclusive elections led to the appointment of Metaxas. Actions of the monarch in the 1960s led to political instability and after almost two years of failed caretaker governments, the army, this time without the approval of the monarch, forcibly took power. The fact that coups took place many times in the twentieth century signals that the hierarchy of authority was not well defined in Greece. Clearly the army was not subject to the civil government, nor was it completely subject to the monarch. The monarch was not constrained by the constitution and had no qualms intervening in the civil government. All in the all, the civil government was not sufficiently strong to wield real power.

3. Lack of Cohesion in Political Parties

Political parties and coalitions are fluid in Greek politics and governments are easily susceptible to collapse when they do not control an absolute majority. The fragile nature of politics accounts for the ease with which the military took over and the inability of the civil government to put itself above the military and the crown. The inability of the civil government to sit at the top of the authority hierarchy meant that the government was unable to form a credible relationship with the people, and because of this, the people had no faith or trust in the government. This problem would persist in the post war period when democracy was restored. The inability of the politicians to reach a solution after the inconclusive elections of 1933, illustrated the fragility of the political structure. Reconstruction after the civil war was economic, social and political for Greece. The government had to remake its democratic institutions and parties while simultaneously trying to re-build the country economically and socially. The lack of organization within the political parties and endemic creation of splinter parties, hindered the system of parliamentary democracy, which contributed to the instability.

4. Family Charisma

Greek political parties are not necessarily centered on a political ideology but form around the personality of a charismatic leader. These leaders often pass on the leadership of their party to a family member, creating political dynasties.

Papandreou, Karamanlis and Venizelos are prominent political names in the twentieth century. The Venizelos dynasty died out in the 1950s leaving Papandreou and Karamanlis to struggle back and forth for power. With elite political leadership staying largely within families, there is little or no changeover. This would contribute

to the problems of trust between the people and government. No new faces in government, made the Greek democracy look more like a hereditary government given legitimacy under the guise of elections and a constitution. When scandals involving these politically elite families became public then, the people were only alienated more, but found no relief as the same people remained political leaders.

5. Labor Unions

Labor unions were never much of a factor in the political arena and are therefore not mentioned in the chronology of political events. Labor unions were tied by law to the government through patronage and leadership. Laws were also in place which restricted the rights of unions to strike, especially public sector workers. Due to the nature of the law labor unions did not advocate for worker's rights or material benefits and therefore did not influence the political process.³²

Restoring Democracy: Personalities, the Military Element and the Political Right

Greece emerged from the civil war divided, exploited and ravaged. The meager resources of Greece and the weak governments of the early 1950s were focused on continuing to contain communism, not on rebuilding the devastated country. Like the country, political parties were none too organized. Konstantine Tsaldaris still led the right wing People's Party. The center was divided into three parties, the Liberals led by Sophocles Venizelos (son of Eleftherios

³² Dimitri Conostas and Theofanis C. Stavrou, *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century* (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 155-157.

Venizelos), the National Progressive Center Union led by General Nikolas Plastiras and the George Papandreou Party led by George Papandreou.³³

In January 1950 the government fell when Venizelos and the Liberals withdrew their support from the coalition government with Tsaldaris and his populist party. The fall of the government meant that new elections had to be held. A caretaker government appointed by the king served solely to set a date for elections. At this most crucial time then, Greece was politically focused on elections not on rebuilding the devastated country.³⁴ Elections were held March 5, 1950. Over 100 “parties” stood for election. Many were one man parties and no political party had a coherent ideology or platform. In fact there was no discernible difference between the major parties. As was often the case in Greek elections, the parties ran on the character of their leader. If there were any factors in the election for the people to vote on it was the hatred felt toward the communists, anti-inefficiency and selfishness of the government and opposition toward Athenian centralization.³⁵ The results of the March 5 election reflected the continuing instability of politics. The populist right wing People’s Party, the largest before the Metaxas dictatorship, only received 62 seats out of 250. Combined the center parties secured 136 seats. A multitude of smaller parties received the rest of the seats. Although there was a clear majority for the center, it was bitterly divided between those led by Venizelos, Plastiras and George Papandreou. This resulted in weak coalition governments until elections were held again in September of the following year (1951).³⁶

³³ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 145-146.

³⁴ “Greek Coalition Cabinet Resigns; Liberals, Army Balk at Tsaldaris,” *New York Time*, 6 January 1950, 1.

³⁵ “Greece Prepares for Elections.” *The Economist* 18 February 1950: 381.

³⁶ C.M. Woodhouse, “Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century,” in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 80.

Field Marshall Alexander Papagos would have to wait until the 1952 elections to be democratically brought to power. Field Marshall Papagos resigned his post as Supreme Commander of the army in order to stand for election. King Paul told the media that this was done against his wishes and that Papagos did not enjoy close relations with palace officials. The king reported that he was under the impression that Papagos was going to stay on a Supreme Commander.³⁷ As a political candidate, Alexander Papagos was very popular. Soon after he resigned his army post he had replaced the People's Party with his own party, the Greek Rally. Popularity did not mean automatic majority however. Working in his favor was a new electoral law passed by the Venizelos led government under which elections would run on a semi-proportional system. This would help reinforce larger parties and help keep them from splintering, since splinter groups would have little chance of taking enough seats to constitute any real power.³⁸ Papagos received 36.5% of the vote but the center parties led by Venizelos and Plastiras polled a majority. Their majority was not absolute however and another coalition was formed until new elections were held again in November 1952.³⁹

While not a dictatorship, Papagos was ex-military, right wing and conservative. For once though, this interjection of military influence into politics seemed to be good for Greece. Papagos was a strong, but just leader, who provided a suffering country with the political stability it needed to focus on rebuilding. After yet another inconclusive electoral result in 1951, the electoral system was changed to simple majority rule. The United States Ambassador to Greece at the time, publically called for this change as majority rule favors large, cohesive

³⁷ "King Paul Defends Greek Politicians" *New York Times*, 18 August 1951, 3.

³⁸ "Return of Papagos." *The Economist* 11 August 1951: 334.

³⁹ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 80-81.

parties. By adopting a system disinclined to splinter factions, the system was designed to elect a majority that could setup a strong government. Papagos and the Greek Rally won 49% of the popular vote, which under the majority system gave them 82% of the seats in Parliament.⁴⁰ Nearly three years after the civil war ended a clear victor was finally elected. Now the country could focus on rebuilding.

And rebuild it did. Papagos released or commuted the sentences of those convicted of political crimes committed during the civil war in an effort to heal the divisions over communism.⁴¹ Stability of the drachma was restored by first devaluing it in 1953 followed by strict monetary control. This decrease in value of the Greek currency increased exports and attracted foreign capital.⁴² Government support for economic diversification away from agriculture was lacking however. Papagos channeled money into modernizing the armed forces to continue to thwart communist threats and deal with an emerging military crisis in Cyprus. The economy therefore continued to be dependent on foreign aid from the United States. Despite this the Greek population became wealthier and more mobile. By the early 1960s per capita income had doubled and the percentage of the population living in urban vs. rural areas had reversed. 53% now lived in urban areas, compared to 35% in rural areas. In the 1960s alone, Athens increased in size by 37%.⁴³

In October 1955 Alexander Papagos died having appointed Stephan Stephanopoulos the new leader of the Greek Rally. The king however decided to call upon the relatively young and

⁴⁰ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 147.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁴² George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 18.

⁴³ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 148-149.

unknown Minister of Public Works, Konstantine Karamanlis, to form a new government, thus passing over long time right wing politicians Stephanopoulos and Panayiotis Kanellopoulos.⁴⁴

Leadership of the Greek Rally party should have changed hands based on Papagos' appointment. Instead, the monarch again interfered and played an active role in politics. His motive was self-interest. By choosing who would take over the party, the king sought to appointment someone who would be loyal to him. The king thought that the relatively unknown Karamanlis would be appreciative of his new political position and thus seek to please the King as a measure of gratitude and means of keeping his new position. The king's successful interference illustrated that even with a strong leader running the government for three years the civil authority had yet to assert its place atop the power structure. The ease with which the king interfered highlighted the weakness of the governmental institutions. It also displayed the continued existence of "Old World" political culture in which the king had final say and the right to make such decisions. The weak political culture that allowed the king to interfere undermined the legitimacy of the newly restored democracy by highlighting the democracy's limited power in checking the king and the ease with which the king could overstep his constitutional and ceremonial boundaries.

Complicating this task may have been the fact that Papagos was ex-military and since the purges of 1933 and 1935, the military was very conservative and strongly pro-monarch. As such Papagos, who did not enjoy close relations with the crown, may have feared trying to assert authority over the crown for fear of a violent response by the military. Papagos being ex-

⁴⁴ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 82-83.

military however, and his large presence in the government, illustrated the continued influence of the military in the civilian government. Papagos was also the quintessential charismatic party leader that characterized Greek politics. This meant the party was based on Papagos' personality, not any articulated ideology. The voters voted for a charismatic leader, not a party with specific policy ideas on how to rebuild a war ravaged country. In fact Papagos used much of the government's budget to modernize the armed forces, not rebuild the war torn country. His military background shaped his governmental priorities and these priorities were not focused on helping the wider citizenry of Greece. The lack of distinguishable political parties with markedly difference ideological platforms was another sign of weak democratic institutions. The attraction of a charismatic leader illustrated the people's desire for stability with no cultural commitment to democracy or fostering strong democratic institutions.

Konstantine Karamanlis would prove to be an adept leader with his own charismatic personality; a continuance of weak parties, weak political culture and a government led by one man's ideas not a parties ideological commitments. Like Venizelos and Papandreou, Karamanlis would also be a family dynasty in politics.

Eight Years of Konstantine Karamanlis: Continuation of Rule by the Political Right

After his appointment by the king, Karamanlis made the Greek Rally his own party by renaming it the National Radical Union. Seeking a sense of legitimacy for his rule, he called for elections in early 1956. As was accepted practice, Papagos had enacted a complex election law that favored his party.⁴⁵ The National Radical Union received only 45.8% of the popular vote, but under the election law this transferred into 161 seats out of 300 in Parliament. Meanwhile

⁴⁵ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 151.

the Democratic Union and the United Democratic Left, a front for the outlawed communist party, polled almost 50% which resulted in only 139 seats.⁴⁶ Paradoxically the electoral law allowed small splinter to factions to survive. Most of these small center and leftist parties joined forces in the 1956 election, understanding that a united opposition was the best chance to oust Karamanlis and the conservatives.⁴⁷ In a straight plurality vote, the opposition would have taken power, but accepted practice of allowing the party in power to manipulate the election law in their favor, Karamanlis and the conservatives remained in power. The Center Parties, which had coalesced under the name of the Democratic Union, didn't offer much of an alternative to the conservative right wing. While pledging to act in the nation's interest, no specific policies to be enacted once elected were articulated.⁴⁸ The Center may have fared better if it had dropped its extreme leftist elements, as the horrors of the civil war and attempted communist takeover were still fresh in the electorate's mind. The paradoxes of the election law were highlighted again in the 1958 when Karamanlis received less of the popular vote (only around 41%) but his majority in Parliament increased from 161 seats to 170. The largest opposition party in the 1958 elections was the United Democratic Left with 24% of the vote. This surge in support for the communists was disturbing to many.⁴⁹

Karamanlis and the right would remain in power until 1963, largely because until then the Center was embroiled in squabbling between leading individuals. While the center remained in disarray the only other alternative was the extreme left which could never secure enough votes as most people's attitude toward communism and the communists remained skeptical at best and

⁴⁶ "Greek Election Resolves Little: Opposition Unreconciled to Defeat after Having Won Majority of Votes," *New York Times*, 26 February 1956, E5.

⁴⁷ "Greeks' Election Has Its Hazards," *New York Times*, 23 January 1956, 2.

⁴⁸ Theodore A. Coulombis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 99-100.

⁴⁹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 151.

outright hostile at worst. The longevity of the Karamanlis government (longevity for Greek politics at this point was more than four years⁵⁰ provided the Center with time to consolidate, but individual ambition hindered this process. Furthermore the continued change in electoral law complicated the matter as a simple proportional system favored personal ambition and splinter groups while a majority system favored large parties and would have forced cooperation and compromise within the center.⁵¹

The Coming of Change: Elections and Assassination

As if on cue, the new decade of the 1960s brought about a new political atmosphere; one with a stronger, more cohesive center that would challenge not only Karamanlis and the right but also the monarch. As the decade wore on, the Center again faced division as father and son, George and Andreas Papandreou, disagreed ideologically. The scandals that came out implicating Andreas Papandreou only added to the tension and confusion. Into this instability, the military would once again insert itself. These events would starkly display just how weak Greek political culture was. The weakness stemmed from continued disagreement between Karamanlis, Papandreou and the king over the rules of the game. The disagreement over the rules would lead to violence, government collapse and military takeover in an effort to restore stability. Stability would continue to be the only agreed upon rule of the game.

Before the elections in which Karamanlis lost power to George Papandreou, the people began speaking out against the right. General George Grivas, leader of the 1960 revolt against the British in Cyprus, called Karamanlis corrupt on the grounds of perpetuating his tenure in

⁵⁰ "New Political Patterns in Greece." *The Economist* 26 December 1959: 1249.

⁵¹ "Greece's Divided Center." *The Economist* 13 August 1960: 655.

office unfairly. The report in the New York Times labeled this as the beginning of the movement to oust Karamanlis.⁵² The Cyprus issue that led to the 1960 revolt, came about as Great Britain looked to relieve itself of responsibilities in the Mediterranean. Archbishop Makarios III, in exile in Athens at the time, offered the British a way out of its sovereignty over the island that was home to both Greek and Turkish inhabitants. Makarios proposed making Cyprus an independent nation. This was an affront to the long time desire of Greece for *enosis*, an idea closely tied to the *Megali Idea*. Cyprus did become an independent nation in 1960, but questions over the country's national identity as Greek, Turkish or independent continued.⁵³

Economic troubles also hurt Karamanlis. In December of 1960 workers took to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with inflation. The strikes resulted in violent confrontations between the workers and the police. It was speculated that the strike sought to speed up the timetable for elections.⁵⁴ Karamanlis' tax policies favored the higher-income brackets and encouraged real estate speculation over investment in manufacturing. The effect was increasing income inequality.⁵⁵ International tensions also contributed to pushing up the timetable for new elections that were to be held in May 1962 but were instead moved up to October 1961. George Papandreou and the Center managed to check the influence of the far left, leaving the electorate to decide between Karamanlis and the NRU which represented stability and the still structurally unsound center which had eight leaders.⁵⁶ The election used a modified system of proportional representation under which a party would need 46 or 47% of the vote to

⁵² "Grivas Attacks Athens Regime; Opens a Drive to Oust Premier," *New York Times*, 12 November 1960, 6.

⁵³ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 151, 153-154.

⁵⁴ "Athenian Barricades." *The Economist* 10 December 1960: 1122.

⁵⁵ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 10.

⁵⁶ "A Fresh Mandate for Mr. Karamanlis?" *The Economist* 23 September 1961: 1175.

capture an absolute majority in the Parliament.⁵⁷ Karamanlis and the National Radical Union polled 51% of vote, taking 176 seats of the 300 seat Parliament. The Center Union received only 100 seats, which the rest going to EDA and the extreme left.⁵⁸ As soon as the results were announced the Center denounced them, claiming the right had terrorized the electorate into not voting for the Center and as such refused to accept the 1961 election results. Charges of terror were never proved, but the vow of Papandreou to lead an “unyielding struggle to nullify the election results” was an effective rallying cry that both gained the Center support in the electorate and brought cohesion to the Center party itself.⁵⁹

Part of “nullifying the 1961 election results’ was a call to hold new elections. Papandreou also strove to awaken the voters to the fraud of the current government and how their actions went against the peoples’ will.⁶⁰ The Center’s opposition to Karamanlis overflowed in the wake of the assassination of Gregory Lambrakis in May 1963. Lambrakis, a leftist deputy, was speaking at a rally in Salonika (Thessaloniki) against allowing NATO to place nuclear bases in the country. A counterdemonstration outside the hall where the peace rally took place caused a clash between the two groups. The result was a motorcycle running Lambrakis down in the street, causing a fatal head injury.⁶¹ Lambrakis died three days later.⁶² Karamanlis was labeled the moral instigator of the assassination as he failed to control right-wing demonstrations.⁶³ A year later, Karamanlis and five members of his administration were sued for moral instigation of Lambrakis’ death by George Tasarouhas, who was also injured in the attack, and Gregory

⁵⁷ “Athenian Permutations.” *The Economist* 18 October 1961: 357.

⁵⁸ C.M. Woodhouse, “Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century,” in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 84.

⁵⁹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 155.

⁶⁰ “Tension Continues in Greece’s Politics,” *New York Times*, 11 March 1962, 27.

⁶¹ “Greek Leftist Hurt; Regime Is Accused,” *New York Times*, 24 May 1963, 3.

⁶² “Injured Greek Deputy Dies; Political Reactions Feared,” *New York Times*, 27 May 1963, 8.

⁶³ “Greek Leftist Hurt; Regime Is Accused,” *New York Times*, 24 May 1963, 3.

Lambrakis' widow.⁶⁴ This was the first major act of violence in the 1960s. The fact that such violence occurred over a disagreement of the political rules adeptly and tragically illustrated just how weak the political culture was in Greece. This was only the first crack in the governmental system and neither side seemed able or willing to agree on the rules of the game before the situation escalated.

Conspiracy theories and rumors suggested that the government and Salonika police were actually directly responsible for Gregory Lambrakis' death. Some, including writer, Vassilis Vassilikos, believed that the government had planned the assassination. In his book, *Z*, published in 1968, Vassilikos tells the story of the Lambrakis assassination as one of pre-meditated murder by the leaders of both the police and government in Salonika. Both the Chief of Police and Mayor in the novel, communicate the plan to murder Lambrakis, known as *Z* in the novel, to working-class men who are loyal to them and the right wing of government. As was and is the hallmark of Greek society, the police and local government threatened those sympathetic to the leftist views with taking away their jobs or family members' jobs in an attempt to prevent the leftist rally from finding a venue. During the leftist rally, the counter-demonstration that gathered outside was given free range to beat and assault suspected leftists and ultimately run down *Z*. Police, including the Chief, were present among the counter-demonstrators, but the Chief never instructed them to restrain the right-wing counter-demonstrators and no attempt was made to either safely escort the leftist deputies from the rally or chase after the truck that ran over *Z*. *Z*'s calls for protection were ignored outright. In fact when the driver of the truck was apprehended elsewhere in Salonika for an unrelated minor offense and taken to the police station, those in charge allowed him to go to the cafeteria and

⁶⁴ "Ex-Greek Premier Sued In Death of Leftist Deputy," *New York Times*, 31 May 1964, 5.

subsequently leave. Officials then tried to cover up the way in which Z was killed, claiming that it was an accident. In reality, a passenger in the truck had struck Z in the head with a bat as the truck drove past him. In the novel, a civilian jumps on the back of the truck that struck Z. This civilian later approaches a reporter in Salonika who investigates at his own personal risk, taking the case all the way to Athens and ultimately reveals the truth. The Police Chief and Mayor of Salonika were put in jail along with other officials and the perpetrators of the violence at the rally. It is also revealed that judges were on the take when the driver of the truck was taken to court, as they had a clear bias against the Left and refused to allow certain evidence such as the testimony of a witness.⁶⁵

In was in this atmosphere of conspiracy and dwindling support for Karamanlis and the right that the November 1963 elections approached. Facing implication in the Lambrakis assassination and in a disagreement with Queen Frederika over a visit to London, Karamanlis resigned in June 1963.⁶⁶ A caretaker government was set-up for the interim until the November elections. George Papandreou, now the undisputed leader of the Center Union, polled 42% of the vote in November. The NRU polled 39%. With his party's loss at the polls and the previous disagreement with the crown, Konstantine Karamanlis left Greek politics for Paris and the National Radical Union leadership passed to his uncle, Panayotis Kanellopoulos.⁶⁷

In mature political cultures and democracies the losing candidate does not go into self-imposed exile. He or she many times remains in the political arena but in another capacity. Karamanlis' decision to not only quit politics but also to leave Greece could easily have been due to his disgust with the Greek political culture. By leaving, Karamanlis showed not only his

⁶⁵ Vassilis Vassilikos, Z, trans. Marilyn Calmann (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968)

⁶⁶ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 157.

⁶⁷ Theodore A. Coulombis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 168.

disagreement with Papandreou and the king's rules of the game but also illustrated his opinion that he could no longer try to influence the rules or the political culture. Political culture remained weak and unstable even after thirteen years of democratic rule. While this hadn't changed, the intensity of disagreement had and as such the system was weaker than it had been when democracy was restored.

The Center Union however, did not have enough seats for a majority in Parliament. In order to achieve an absolute majority, the Center Union had to include the EDA in its government. Papandreou refused to include EDA deputies in his cabinet and resigned as Prime Minister after only 45 days, urging the king to call for new elections. New elections were held in February 1964. The Center Union easily won an absolute majority with 53% of the vote and 171 seats.⁶⁸ Just over two years previously, the Center Union had received 20% fewer votes, securing on 34% in the 1961 elections. Papandreou's rallying crying had truly been effective as the people responded by putting him and his party into power. After eight years under Karamanlis and eleven years of rule by the right-wing, the people of Greece were ready for a change a rule. The income disparity and civil unrest may have been main reasons that the people sought a change in government. The Center Union's economic and monetary policies attempted to redress the income inequality through wealth redistribution. The theory was that income redistribution was a precondition for industrial development. The main focus of industrial development was modernization in order to match the productivity and maturity of the other European Economic Community members, which Greece had joined in 1961. Subsidies would

⁶⁸ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 85.

continue to go to farmers, but the focus would shift from cereal production to husbandry and taxes were reformed to create incentives for private economic activities to thrive. The Center Union credit policy aimed at promoting private saving and stabilizing the banking system. Under these policies (and others) net domestic product was expected to grow 6% per year.⁶⁹

In the period between his first election in November 1963 and his second in February 1964, Papandreou also had to contend with an increase in tensions with Turkey over Cyprus. President Archbishop Makarios, in keeping with Orthodox tradition, had combined political and spiritual authority and demanded a reduction of the political powers granted to the Turkish minority on the island. A Turkish invasion of the island was prevented by the arrival of a UN peace-keeping force, which has remained in Cyprus ever since. The Cyprus issue remained unresolved however as Papandreou refused a settlement that would have allowed Cyprus to become part of Greece, thus achieving *enosis*, in exchange for the establishment of autonomous Turkish cantons on the island.⁷⁰ Cyprus remained an independent country, but tensions with Turkey over the island would continue.

Eleven years of rule by the political right, eight of which were under Karamanlis, provided Greece with a stable and long lasting government. But stability was also a problem for Karamanlis. As the fear of communism subsided in the 1960s, Greece and its people were no longer under a constant external threat. Stability brought the people a sense of security that transformed into an atmosphere where the people could speak freely about what they wanted and expected from the government. The first to speak out was General Grivas in 1960, who accused

⁶⁹ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 20-23.

⁷⁰ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 159-160.

Karamanlis of staying in power by election manipulation. Next were the people themselves who took to the streets to express their frustration with the government's ineffective response to inflation. Finally the political left inserted its voice by charging that the elections of 1961 were invalid due to terror inflicted by Karamanlis and the NRU to maintain their control of the government.

Alone all these voices against Karamanlis would not have led to his loss in the 1963 elections, as none of these voices represented a viable governing alternative. While the left was tolerated there was never enough support for it to win a majority in Parliament. What spelled the end for Karamanlis was the cohesion and organization of the Center Parties under one leader, George Papandreou. Papandreou took the divisions and anger of the average people toward Karamanlis and exploited them for his and his party's gain with great success. Papandreou vowed to nullify the 1961 election results, bringing him support from his own party and the left and presented economic policies that addressed the plight of the people who still hadn't recovered from the long years of war. The tenant of Papandreou's economic policies that most resonated with the people was wealth redistribution. It seemed that the policies under Karamanlis had favored the elite and/or only those loyal to the NRU. Papandreou's wealth redistribution spoke to the vast majority of the Greek people and thus the vast majority of the electorate. Appealing to the needs of the people overthrew Karamanlis and got Papandreou elected.

The 1963 assassination of Gregory Lambrakis, the ensuing social turmoil, and the almost immediate implication of Karamanlis and his government in the assassination dissolved whatever hope Karamanlis had of winning in 1963. The assassination also served as a rallying

platform for Papandreou on which to further rail against the right, which he did quickly and effectively.

George Papandreou's success in unifying the political center on the one hand showed maturity of the political system, but on the other the continuation of weak party politics. By unifying the center, there was now a viable alternative to the conservative right. With more than one viable party for election, the system showed maturity as it gave the people a choice. Like Papagos and Karamanlis however, Papandreou was a charismatic leader and the sole image of the Center Union party. The Center Union was united around George Papandreou not a set of policies or an ideological vision for Greece. While providing a viable alternative to Karamanlis and the NRU, Papandreou perpetuated unstable party politics and remained within the weak political culture.

A Young Monarch, George and Andreas Papandreou, and the Army

The Center appeared to have matured as a party, capable of building a stable government, like that of Karamanlis. There seemed to be a possibility of a maturing political culture. Unfortunately this was not to be the case. As had been the Center's problems from the start, the party soon fractured under the weight of scandal, and the promising economic policies did not have a chance to take root. From the start Papandreou's hold on power was not absolute. He did manage to release approximately 250 communist prisoners in jail for murder, sedition and espionage related to the civil war in the latter 1940s. The communist political party remained illegal however.⁷¹ This move can be seen as an effort to heal some of the lingering animosity and divisions wrought by the civil war. Papandreou however, was not in control of the army,

⁷¹ "Greece is Planning Leniency for Communists," *New York Times*, 2 March 1964, 8.

intelligence agency or even his own cabinet. Papandreou had the right to appoint his own cabinet, but cabinet members were subject to approval by the king. As such, the king used this power, which under the Constitution was intended to be a formality and not a source of the king's power, and forced Papandreou to accept his choice for Minister of Defense, Petros Garoufalias. Papandreou was also reluctant to remove officers who had conspired to bring about the independence of Cyprus. This move by the military in 1960 highlighted the military's continuing role in politics and fueled the growth of the leftist faction of the Center Union which would be led by Papandreou's son, Andreas Papandreou.⁷² Andreas Papandreou, formerly a professor economics in America, was elected to the Greek parliament in 1964.⁷³

In the summer of 1965 there were two almost simultaneous events involving the three major power players, George and Andreas Papandreou of the civilian government, king Constantine who had just come to the throne the previous year and officers in the army. These events would bring the chaos and confusion to the political system that would set the stage for the military takeover in April 1967. 1965 would be the year that would witness the events that would shatter the weak democratic political institutions and bring the civilian government crashing down. The events grew out of the same old disagreement over the rules of the game. Those who felt cheated or who were out of power exploited the weakness of the political culture to try and change the rules in their favor. Weakness had become so pervasive that opposing forces not only changed the rules when they were in power but also when they weren't in power.

⁷² C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 85-86.

⁷³ George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 71.

The crack that had appeared with the assassination of Lambrakis was about to become an ever widening rift into which the civilian government would fall.

In May 1965, a “conspiracy was uncovered” involving some 20 left-wing junior military officers and Andreas Papandreou, the prime minister’s son. It was alleged by the rightist elements and Minister of Defense Garoufalias that the secret organization was seeking to bring down the king and government, replacing George Papandreou with his son Andreas.⁷⁴ The evidence of Andreas Papandreou’s involvement was all circumstantial. It was speculated that Andreas Papandreou formed the secret group, known as Aspida, or shield, in response to the succession war within the Center Union party.⁷⁵ The name Aspida was an acronym from the Greek words “Officers, Save Country, Ideals, Democracy and Meritocracy”.⁷⁶ Prior to the arrival of Andreas Papandreou, other leaders of the Center Union had anticipated George Papandreou stepping down as the leader due to his age. His retirement would have allowed the other leaders the chance to be the head of the party. These leaders thus regarded Andreas Papandreou as an interloper.⁷⁷ What remained unclear was whether a coup had in fact been planned or if the group was organized in case such a measure became necessary.⁷⁸

A letter written by George Papandreou’s niece, Maggie in July 1965 to the wives of American President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, illuminates the more particular circumstances surrounding the Aspida affair. King Constantine demanded that the members of Aspida be taken to court, which George Papandreou moved to do. He also however, moved to prosecute officers behind the “Pericles Plan” which had been in operation during the 1961

⁷⁴ C.M. Woodhouse, “Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century,” in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 86.

⁷⁵ “When is a plot not a plot?” *The Economist* 8 October 1966: 139.

⁷⁶ “Ex-Premier’s Son Cited at Greek Court-Martial,” *New York Times*, 2 October 1966, 20.

⁷⁷ “The Greeks Have a Word for It.” *The Economist* 7 August 1965: 514.

⁷⁸ “When is a plot not a plot?” *The Economist* 8 October 1966: 139.

elections and was accused of aiding Karamanlis in illegally retaining power. This move incensed the conservative, pro-right wing king. Defense Minister Garoufalias, who Papandreou had appointed at the king's request, was colluding with the king behind Papandreou's back, deciding who would judge those accused of involvement in the Aspida organization without consulting Papandreou. Furthermore, according to Maggie, Andreas Papandreou's name was not originally linked with Aspida, but was a sudden development undertaken by those loyal to the king to "get Andreas" and in the process make George Papandreou guilty by association.⁷⁹ Acting in the role of the opposition, both the king and Defense Minister Garoufalias vehemently disagreed with Papandreou's rules and feared the imposition of them. This disagreement would only lead to further disagreement in a snowball effect as neither side was willing to compromise in order to stop it.

George Papandreou ran into further problems when he tried to purge the officer corp of its extreme right-wing elements and bring the army under civilian control. In the process, Papandreou dismissed defense minister Garoufalias. Garoufalias refused to resign unless asked to do so by the king. As the two enjoyed a special relationship, the king refused to sign the decree dismissing Garoufalias. Papandreou then expelled Garoufalias from the Center Union party in an attempt to force the king's hand.⁸⁰ The ability of the king to block the decision of the prime minister spoke volumes about the weakness of the government. The institutions were so weak that the leader of the civilian government did not even have sole authority on decisions regarding cabinet personnel. Furthermore the democratic political culture was so weak as to consider the actions of the king legitimate. The only people outraged by the king's actions were

⁷⁹ Theodore A. Coulombis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 234-235.

⁸⁰ "King's Choice." *The Economist* 17 July 1965: 222.

the Center Union deputies because they were the only people that the king's actions negatively affected. There was no recourse for the civilian authorities to overrule him. In his only response, Papandreou also offered his resignation, which to his surprise the king accepted in July 1965. The king then set about trying to splinter the Center Union party which had always been an uneasy coalition.⁸¹ The move signaled the king's perception that potential leftist infiltration of the army, thus pulling the army away from its loyalties to the palace and the political right, was more of a threat than toppling the civil government.

The king appointed Athnansiadis-Novas, a junior member, to lead the Center party much like his father had appointed Karamanlis to lead the Greek Rally. Unlike his father's appointment, Constantine's appointment of Novas was unsuccessful. In Karamanlis' case, the former leader Papagos was dead. George Papandreou was still very much alive in 1965 however, and remained in control of the Center Union.⁸² Again, in the tradition of Greek politics, the Center Union was more of a cult of personality around George Papandreou than an ideologically founded group. As such when the king dismissed Papandreou, the Center Union deputies continued to support him. The Novas government failed to convene a quorum to vote in Parliament as Center Union deputies had been boycotting sessions.⁸³ On August 4th Parliament voted 167-131 to bring down the three-week old Novas government. George Papandreou appeared at the session in order to cast his negative vote, timing his arrival with his name being called, causing an uproar in the session. The king refused to call elections fearing an election would be a referendum on the institution of monarchy and might well bring George Papandreou

⁸¹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 161.

⁸² "The Greeks Have a Word for It." *The Economist* 7 August 1965: 514.

⁸³ "Rivals for Greece's Premiership Continue Dispute," *New York Times*, 1 August 1965, 1.

back to power.⁸⁴ The strength and necessity of George Papandreou's personality in the party and the government, exposes a serious weakness in the system. Because the Center Union lacked a clear ideological platform and was solely unified around the figure of George Papandreou, the Center Union government could not function with George Papandreou being in power. There was no line of succession for prime minister should the prime minister for some reason no longer be able to hold his position. With no line of succession in place, and all party loyalty focused on Papandreou, no one else was able to effectively take over.

After the Novas government fell, further attempts by the king to form another government were blocked by Center Union deputies. Stephan Stephanopoulos, a Center Union deputy, was invited to form a government but was barred from doing so by the party. Stephanopoulos chose to abide by the party's decision. The Center Union made it clear to the king that he had two choices, reinstate Papandreou or call for new national elections. As all of this political hassling was taking place more or less behind closed doors, supporters of Papandreou roamed the streets of Athens and massed before the Parliament chanting support for Papandreou.⁸⁵ George Papandreou, once dismissed, had gone to the people for support. He presented himself as champion of the people and the king as trying to rule and reign, effectively ignoring the constitution. His decision not to give in over the minister of defense produced the crisis, strengthening his own position and increasing his popularity but at the expense of his party's support. As the crisis dragged on, rumors of a military takeover emerged and gave the communist left more legitimacy in the eyes of the people.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ "Greek Deputies Topple Cabinet in Wild Session," *New York Times*, 5 August 1965, 1.

⁸⁵ "Greek Party Bars Bid for Premiership by Stephanopoulos," *New York Times*, 10 August 1965, 1.

⁸⁶ "Pyrrhic Victory?" *The Economist* 14 August 1965: 589.

Disgruntled feelings brought on by the arrival of Andreas Papandreou, coupled with rumors during the 1965 crisis that Papandreou had allowed communists to enter the ranks of the army and government, caused the Center Union party to split in August 1965. The horrors of the civil war still lingered along with feelings of suspicion and animosity, and hostile feelings toward Andreas Papandreou had been bubbling just beneath the surface for some time. The combination of the two split the Center Union. Stephanopoulos and Tsirimokos, the other leaders of the Center Union disassociated themselves, causing the coalition that was the Center Union to crumble, although Papandreou vowed to rally popular support against his party defectors.⁸⁷ The entrance of Andreas Papandreou into Greek politics and his high place in his father's party illustrated two things about the Greek party system. First that parties and politics were largely based on family ties. The fact that family relationships got Andreas Papandreou to his position showed that the party system did not reward deputies based on merit. The system was all about who you knew and more importantly who you were related to. These two things together created competition between personalities within the Center Union as more senior deputies felt their loyalty and dedication were being overlooked and underappreciated. This competition kept the party from maturing and kept the party focused on one man and not an overall ideology. This caused the party to splinter into multiple groups focused around multiple strong personalities. Personalities and family ties caused competition, which caused the splintering of the party, which kept the overall party system and political culture weak.

In mid-August Tsirimokos was given the position of prime minister. In response Papandreou supporters clashed with police in Athens leaving 100 injured. This was the worst violence seen since the 1944 communist revolt. The streets were littered with bricks, metal rods

⁸⁷ "Greece-Opposition to Papandreou Grows," *New York Times*, 15 August 1965, E3.

and barricades on fire. Tsirimokos blamed Papandreou.⁸⁸ 116 people were charged with sedition.⁸⁹ Tsirimokos did not remain prime minister for long. Stephan Stephanopoulos took over the post and in late September 1965 and won a vote of confidence to stay in power. He planned to postpone elections for as long as possible in hopes that popularity for George Papandreou would wane.⁹⁰

After fifteen months of tenuously holding power, the Stephanopoulos government was brought down when National Radical Union deputies withdrew their support for the government.⁹¹ Stephanopoulos had advocated using a simple proportional representation system for the next elections, which favored small parties. This may have been an attempt to splinter potential support for Papandreou. The National Radical Union was opposed to using the simple proportional system, instead advocating a reinforced proportional system which favored major parties.⁹²

In the interim both the National Radical Union leader Kanellopoulos and George Papandreou had agreed to a caretaker government under Paraskevopoulos until elections could be held in May (1967).⁹³ It was speculated that the elections would go one of three ways: 1) bring the Center Union back to power, 2) result in a coalition of the Center Union and the former Stephanopoulos government or 3) a military dictatorship. Karamanlis was expected to remain in Paris, where he had resided in self-imposed exile since Papandreou's election in 1963.⁹⁴ As part of agreeing to support the Paraskevopoulos cabinet, Papandreou dropped the anti-monarch line of his campaign. His son, Andreas, was strongly against the monarch and commanded the

⁸⁸ "Regime Tightens Athens Security," *New York Times*, 22 August 1965, 24.

⁸⁹ "116 In Greece Face Sedition Charges," *New York Times*, 24 August 1965, 4.

⁹⁰ "New Greek Regime Facing Difficulties," *New York Times*, 27 September 1965, 1.

⁹¹ "The Plug Gets Pulled at Last." *The Economist* 24 December 1966: 1318.

⁹² "Greek Government Faces Crisis in Fight Over Electoral System," *New York Times*, 27 November 1966, 31.

⁹³ "A Gamble in Greece" *New York Times*, 29 December 1966, 30.

⁹⁴ "Greece's Political Calm Seen Ending in a Storm," *New York Times*, 31 July 1966, 16.

support of the leftists within the Center Union coalition. In response to his father pronouncement, Andreas Papandreou called for those deputies loyal to him to vote against the caretaker government.⁹⁵ He also accused his father of betraying party principles by what he saw as capitulating to the palace and the army.⁹⁶ This split between George and Andreas divided the Center Union party and increased the chances of victory for the National Radical Union in the May elections.

Before the elections took place however, the Paraskevopoulos fell and the king replaced it with a one-party government of the National Radical Union and Kanellopoulos. King Constantine feared a Center Union victory which would most likely remove the monarchy from power and from its role as political mediator. Under the pretext that it was questionable whether elections could safely be held next month, the king cancelled them. A proposal for a cabinet of all parties with George Papandreou as prime minister was rejected by Papandreou. Papandreou called for immediate elections, which he had been advocating since his dismissal in July 1965. The Kanellopoulos government faced a vote of confidence in which the smaller parties signaled they would vote no, in which case Parliament would be dissolved and new elections would have to be held within 45 days. It was feared that if Papandreou's popularity did not decrease, a military dictatorship would take over.⁹⁷ At this point the governmental institutions were in total disarray and the continued interference by the king and refusal of the civilian parties to come to any kind of compromise signaled an inevitable collapse. There seemed to be no hope of all parties agreeing upon the rules and as such new rules were about to be forcibly imposed.

⁹⁵ "The Son Calls the Father Gullible." *The Economist* 7 January 1967: 35.

⁹⁶ "A Gamble in Greece," *New York Times*, 29 December 1966, 30.

⁹⁷ "How to Stay Democratic Without Actually Cheating." *The Economist* 8 April 1967: 129.

It was suggested at the time that Papandreou's refusal to back down over Defense Minister Garoufalias resulted in the crisis that led to the military dictatorship. This assessment seems both simplistic and unfair. King Konstantine had already overstepped his constitutional and ceremonial boundaries when he forced his candidate for Defense Minister into the Papandreou cabinet. Constitutional law stated that the prime minister chose his own cabinet members, who were ceremonially approved by the monarch. As a new prime minister, Papandreou had accepted the king's man Garoufalias, submitting to the king. His move to dismiss Garoufalias was well within his prerogative as prime minister. The king's opposition and refusal to sign off on Papandreou's decision illustrated his (the king's) unwillingness to be constrained to a ceremonial role as spelled out in the constitution. Papandreou's attempt to dismiss Garoufalias and purge the army of extreme right-wing elements was a simple move to place the civilian government above both the army and the monarchy as was its rightful place in western, functioning democracies. The problem then was not Papandreou's drive to stabilize the power structure, which Greece desperately needed in order to move forward and develop as a true democracy, but the army and monarchy's unwillingness to allow the status quo to change even if it was in the best interest of the country as a whole.

In attempting to maintain his version of the status quo in regards to who held power in the government, the king dismissed the democratically elected and wildly popular George Papandreou. If the king had paid attention to the history of the nature of Greek politics he would not have done this, because he would have known that Greek politics is organized around individuals, not parties and the individuals' cults of personality. George Papandreou arguably had the best example of a cult of personality. Once dismissed his popularity only grew and largely did not diminish. The Center Union Party was loyal to him, and not any particular party

ideology. This loyalty went so far as to prevent the Center Union deputies from allowing another member to take over the party and the government. People chanted Papandreou's name in the streets and in quick succession people invited to take over the government by the king lost power by failing to achieve a vote of confidence because of Papandreou's continued popularity and continued loyalty from the Center Union deputies.

The king feared Papandreou and his liberal policies as well as his popularity. As such, the king delayed holding elections for almost two years through loopholes in the law that allowed him to invite leading members of the majority and minority parties to form governments. When he ran out of options, elections had to be set. While the king certainly had a hand in causing the governmental crisis by actively seeking to undermine, oust and keep Papandreou from power, Papandreou is not entirely blameless. If Papandreou had supported another member of the Center Union to take over the government, it is extremely likely that the other Center Union deputies would have accepted this new government. In this case at least the Center Union would have remained in power. If George Papandreou had chosen this route the governmental crisis of 1965-1967 would likely have been avoided and he may have even been reelected to as prime minister when elections were held again. His overwhelming popularity however would not allow him to concede to another leader. The king had unjustly taken his post away and so ever the believer in the democratic state, he went to the people to get it back calling for the democratic constitution to be enforced and new elections be held. The constant cultivation of his popularity made creating a new government without him impossible. In effect neither Papandreou nor the king would concede their position and as such both are responsible for the series of ineffective governments from July 1965 to April 1967, at which point a select few military elites decided that it was their duty to restore order.

The king's refusal to accept his constitutionally bounded role in government highlighted the fact that the rules of game had not been fixed or firmly established let alone agreed upon. The political culture was therefore already weak. The disagreement between the king and Papandreou over the Defense Minister, followed by Papandreou's resignation and the failure to find an alternative government destroyed the feeble political culture. Both sides continued to adhere to their own version of the rules and neither side was strong enough for one side of rules to win out over the other. This division was the reason that the political culture was destroyed. After almost two years over caretaker governments and the king's refusal to hold elections, all opportunities and options to save the political system had been exhausted. If the elections scheduled for May 1967 had taken place would Papandreou have won a majority? If he had would the king have accepted the peoples' decision? It seems unlikely holding the elections as scheduled would have settled the question over the rules. It seems more likely that they elections would have just postponed a final collapse of the system. The military was a politicized entity and no friend of George Papandreou's. The army would have intervened eventually whether election had been held or not. By taking over before the elections, the military simply chose to intervene sooner rather than later.

1967-1974: The Military Dictatorship

The one party Kanellopoulos government had no chance of passing the vote of confidence and elections were set for May 1967. These elections never took place however, because on April 21, 1967 a coup led by middle-ranking military officers took over the government. Tanks surrounded the royal palace, parliament, telegraph offices, important

ministries and the Hellenic Radio Foundation building.⁹⁸ The seizure of the radio building was key as it was used to officially announce the takeover by the armed forces early on the morning of April 21. The takeover of both radio and television provided the military with total control of the broadcasting media over which it broadcast propaganda to provide “national, moral and social education” to the public. The armed forces retained control of broadcasting by placing loyal generals on the boards of the broadcasting corporations. Newspapers were also quickly subject to censorship by the coup. The official policy stated that no announcement, information or comment was allowed to oppose the regime in any way. Leftist papers were subsequently banned and their files confiscated. Most other newspapers either voluntarily shut down or were forced to do so. Only one major newspaper remained, Eleftheros Kosmos which became the puppet for the military junta. The military had taken complete control of the media, but maintained that freedom of the press had not been abolished, just that the press was being held responsible for covering state affairs in a positive light.⁹⁹

Besides surrounding important government buildings and announcing its takeover, the army had left-wing politicians and leading political figures from other parties were arrested. An estimated 6,500 were arrested in all. Most were gradually released in the following months. Martial law and curfews were also put into effect along with the suspension of several articles of the constitution. Schools, banks and universities were closed and gatherings of more than five people were prohibited.¹⁰⁰ All these measures along with taking control of the media and press were effective measures in stopping any resistance before it started. The coup had effectively planned and executed the takeover.

⁹⁸ Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 226-227.

⁹⁹ Thimios Zaharopoulos and Manny E. Paraschos *Mass Media in Greece: Power, Politics, and Privatization* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 28-29, 43-44.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 227.

The coup caught the people and the politicians off-guard and as such the coup faced little resistance. The political upheaval of the previous two years had left the parties splintered and without any cohesive organization around which resistance could form. It was also speculated at the time that the middle class supported the military regime since it provided a semblance of stability after almost two years of political chaos. Citizens may have also accepted military rule because it largely did not disrupt patron-client relationships, which were the backbone of Greek society. Party identity or affiliation was less important and therefore easier to abandon.¹⁰¹ The lack of organized resistance by the people or the politicians suggests that democracy had not put down strong roots over the preceding two years and that the only remaining applicable rule of the game was stability. The governmental institutions were so weak and in disarray at this point that the people seemed to have accepted that they would have to look elsewhere for stability. Since the military seemed able to provide this, most people tacitly accepted the takeover.

A lack of resistance did not mean the military coup was considered legitimate. The junta had taken power in the name of the king and maintained that the monarch had signed the decree dissolving the Kanellopoulos government. This was in fact not the case.¹⁰² The king had condemned the action of the coup as a betrayal of their oath as officers and to him personally. Generals loyal to the king however advised him that attempting to put down the coup would result in bloodshed. The king therefore tacitly approved of the junta, but remained behind closed doors out of sight from the public. This move threatened any pretense of legitimacy the junta had since it had taken power in the name of the king.¹⁰³ The three leaders of the coup, Colonel George Papadopoulos, Colonel Nikos Makarezos and Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos' first acts in

¹⁰¹Ibid., 241-242.

¹⁰² Ibid., 230.

¹⁰³ "King Konstantine," *New York Times*, 11 June 1967, 23.

power were to address this question of legitimacy. To this end they gave up their military rank and appointed a civilian Konstantine Kollias as prime minister. Other civilians were appointed to the various ministries. In an appeal for the people's support the coup leaders promised a more equitable system of distribution of social wealth and started on a program of institutional reforms and economic development.¹⁰⁴

The façade of civilian leadership collapsed on December 13, 1967 when the king and puppet prime minister Kollias launched an unsuccessful countercoup and fled into exile. Colonel Papadopoulos got wind of a possible countercoup and arrested the military officers still loyal to the king. As such the king did not have the necessary force to re-establish a constitutional government.¹⁰⁵ With the civilian prime minister and the king now in exile, Colonel Papadopoulos took over as prime minister. In addition he consolidated his power by taking over the ministries of defense, education, foreign affairs and government policy.¹⁰⁶ With the king in exile and the fact that the military was actually ruling and not a puppet civilian government exposed, the faintest threads of legitimacy had disappeared. No other major power governments or major political parties within in Greece recognized the junta. To redress this, the junta courted the king to return to Greece in hopes that he would tacitly legitimize them.¹⁰⁷ The regime promised to uphold the constitutional monarchy, but reconciliation proved impossible and king Konstantine remained in exile in Rome.¹⁰⁸

Once it became clear that the king would not return to Greece, the junta set about legitimizing itself through constitutional changes. The constitution of 1968 kept the outward

¹⁰⁴ George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 71.137.

¹⁰⁵ "Constantine Tries, and Fails," *New York Times*, 17 December 1967.

¹⁰⁶ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.

¹⁰⁷ "Constantine Tries, and Fails," *New York Times*, 17 December 1967.

¹⁰⁸ "Impasse Reached on Return of King," *New York Times*, 27 December 1967, 5.

appearance that the junta wanted constitutional rule, despite the fact that no announcement had been made regarding holding democratic elections. In reaction to the absence of the king, the constitution largely stripped the monarch of any real power. The king no longer held the power to appoint or dismiss ministers or command the armed forces. Increased power was given to the prime minister and the army was given the responsibility of protecting the regime. The army was furthermore made an independent entity with no allegiance to the king or the constitution. The only allegiance of the army was to the nation and its ideals and traditions. The communist party was banned and the constitution gave the regime the power to ban other political parties if they opposed the junta.¹⁰⁹ Civil liberties were also restricted as freedom of the press, association and assembly became subject to approval by the military dictatorship.¹¹⁰

The 1968 constitution also reorganized the government. Parliament was now partly elected and partly appointed and had no input on questions of defense or foreign policy. Defense and foreign affairs policy was made by the Supreme Council of National Defense which was chaired by the head of the armed forces (a new position created by the junta). This body also controlled the expenditures on the armed forces. The Council of State was established consisting of the regent king, Speaker of Parliament, President of the Constitutional Court, head of the armed forces and the leaders of the two major political parties. This body appointed the prime minister, could dissolve parliament and postpone elections. The Constitutional Court was composed of permanent members originally selected by the junta and then authorized to appoint to their own successors. The Court decided the eligibility of political parties to participate in elections and could ban parties. The Court could also dismiss a member of Parliament who

¹⁰⁹ "King's Power Cut by Greek Charter" *New York Times*, 12 July 1968.

¹¹⁰ C.M. Woodhouse, "Diplomatic Development Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 67-68.89.

worked to subvert the regime. Finally, and unsurprisingly, the armed forces were given special status.¹¹¹

While legitimacy of rule was difficult for the military junta to establish, justification for its takeover was grounded in traditional arguments and the military's perception of its place and role in politics. Junta leaders claimed that they took over the civilian government fearing a communist resurgence. The far left had received 25% of the vote in the 1958 elections, but their percentage of the vote had continually declined in subsequent elections. Further, the lack of a reaction from the communists when the coup was carried out indicated that no plans for a communist push had been made by the far left party.¹¹² What the military was really afraid of was that George Papandreou and the Center Union, which the coup members regarded as sympathizing with the communist left, would win the May 1967 elections with a large majority and carry out purges of extreme right-wing elements within the military, which Papandreou had attempted to do when he was in power.¹¹³ As a means of protecting their jobs, coup leaders prevented democratic elections from taking place.

The military while professing to be above politics was a politicized entity. Back in 1935 when the military became firmly right-wing oriented due to purges of liberal and republican officers, the military became aware of its political potential. The socialization of military duty blurred the line between military and political. As a result, military officers saw them as one in the same and therefore felt they had a duty and a right to intervene in the political arena. In April 1967, Greece had experienced almost two years without a democratically elected government and the political arena was in chaos. The inability of the politicians to resolve the crisis led to

¹¹¹ Ibid., 67-68.. 89-90.

¹¹² Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 227, 232-233, 235.

¹¹³ George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999),140.

disenchantment among the population. With this political decay, the military's perceived communist threat and the years of social decadence under Papandreou, the officers of the coup felt they had no choice but to takeover in order to restore stability.¹¹⁴

The regime's plan to achieve its promises of redistribution of social wealth and economic reform, involved ridding the state bureaucracy of nepotism and patronage. A new relationship was to be formed between the state and its citizens in which there would be limits on citizen behavior. The Orthodox Church and educational system were the targets of the overall plan.¹¹⁵ Redistributing wealth was important because severe social inequality bred support for communism. The problem as the junta saw it was the absence of any sizable middle class. Another problem, identified at the beginning of this thesis as the trend of political family dynasties, was that there were no new names in politics. The political elite discouraged new entrants as a result hindered the development and maturity of the political system. Parties, as mentioned previously, were based on personalities, not coherent programs, policies or ideologies. These personalities further hurt the political system by engaging in politics of personality and personal rivalry.¹¹⁶

The aim of restructuring the government was to eliminate personality cults and corruption. These goals if achieved would have been very beneficial to Greek politics. The constitution also answered the question of what entity, army, king or civilian government, sat atop the pyramid of authority.¹¹⁷ Naturally the military chose itself, but for the first time since

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 138.

¹¹⁵ "Regime in Greece Silent on Voting," *New York Times*, 14 November 1967, 1.

¹¹⁶ George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 142-143.

¹¹⁷ "Watchdogs Forever," *The Economist*, 20 July 1968: 28-29.

the re-establishment of democracy following the civil war, authority and power were clearly vested in a single entity, not three. Corruption, nepotism and patronage in the political system needed to be combated and the relationship between the civilian government, army and king needed to be sorted out. As such, the goals of the military junta were on target with what the Greek political system needed, but in a democracy, the military is not the entity that should address problems of corruption, nor be the entity at the top of the power structure. So while the broad goals of the dictatorship were in Greece's best interest, the method of implementation was flawed and ended up hurting Greece more than helping. Had the junta been successful in combating the patronage in the political system, a major step would have been taken toward laying a foundation for a strong political culture. A stronger political culture would have provided for more stable government institutions. If this had been achieved the junta may have decided to return power to the civilian government. This is questionable however, because the fact that the military took over suggests a lack of commitment to democracy and therefore a lack of commitment to civilian government. While combating patronage would have strengthened the political culture, the presence of the military at the center of the political structure actually weakened the political system.

Even though the military regime hurt Greece and her political structure, the effectiveness of taking power combined with the simultaneously display of the three political trends already identified, meant the junta would not be overthrown anytime soon after its establishment. The coup leaders had clearly planned how to take control of the country. Immediately all three media sources, television, radio and newspapers, were seized. Major political actors including the king and caretaker prime minister were either arrested or forced to acquiesce because there was no other choice. These actions made the execution of the coup highly effective. What kept the

coup leaders in power were the three political trends that in this case manifested themselves into problems. First the question of who held ultimate authority was still up in the air. The power relationships between the army, the king and the civilian government remained unclear, since Papandreou's efforts to answer that question by placing the civilian government at the top had been thwarted by the king and resulted in his resignation, which precipitated the crisis which brought about the military coup. Second the fluidity of Greek political parties had led to the development of splinter groups as a result of the political crisis, leaving the major political parties weakened and unable to establish a stable government. Third and finally the big, family names in politics, specifically Papandreou, had prevented the government and political party leadership from passing onto another party member. The combination of these problems resulted in a crisis that both the politicians and the king seemed unable to resolve. The military then was the only entity left with enough power and authority to takeover and try to find a solution.

The military regime, effective at taking control, was largely ineffective when it came to actually governing. The junta fell far short of the lofty goals of social and economic reform. The largest obstacle to the dictatorship's success economically was the continued expenditures on the military that consumed a large portion of government revenue. Military expenditure greatly reduced the amount of funds available for social, economic and educational reform and development. Coup leaders hoped this funding gap would be filled by foreign investment, however, the military regime did not inspire confidence abroad. Members of the European Common Market, which Greece joined in 1961, turned away from Greece in a reaction to the military takeover and the United States was trying to divert funds from Greece to Vietnam. Besides lacking funds because of decreased investment and military expenditure, the junta also

faced economic hurdles in the form of poor transportation, a shortage of skilled workers and scarce energy resources.¹¹⁸ Again, seeming to lack the knowledge to rule effectively, the sectors of the economy that the junta did invest in were short-sighted and provided little real benefit to the country's economy.

The monetary and credit policies implemented by the regime were most favorable to the tourism and construction of residences industries. Emphasis on these sectors had immediate positive effects on the economy but provided no long term infrastructure or technological improvement in productivity or efficiency. Military expenditure was also not only maintained during this period, but actually increased. The expressed goals for the economy then of improving education and healthcare, eliminating tax evasion and increasing the salary of civil service employees fell by the wayside. Greece also failed to become more competitive in the international market and the agriculture sector, the main sector of the economy, shrank from lack of improvement in infrastructure and skilled labor. What was the worst for the regime was that wealth inequality actually got worse contrary to the regime's objective of wealth redistribution. From some of the numbers however it seemed the Greek economy was in fact doing well under the junta. The economy grew an average of 6.8% every year, but mostly due to the expansion of the service and tourism sectors. In 1970 GDP grew by 13.9% with growth in all sectors of the economy. This growth was all short-term gain however, with no hope of long-term growth or stability and would fall apart by the end of the military regime.¹¹⁹

Curtailed civil liberties and less than encouraging economic development eventually led to a reaction from the people and a call for the return of democracy. By the summer of 1969

¹¹⁸ Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 239-240.

¹¹⁹ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 61, 64-66, 69, 91-92.

explosions were the common way of expressing discontent. Eleven bombs went off between the beginning of July and mid-August. All except the bomb that exploded on August 9 in Constitution Square in central Athens did not injure anyone. The August 9 bomb injured six tourists, two Americans and four United Kingdom citizens. The National Resistance Movement led by General Akritas claimed responsibility for the bombings. This group was the most active resistance group, calling for the people to be loyal to the exiled King Konstantine and the former premier in exile Konstantine Karamanlis.¹²⁰ The fact that the most active resistance group was led by a general illustrated that not the entire military supported the military dictatorship. The dictatorship was actually orchestrated by a very small group of officers. The division within the military ranks undermined the regime and played a role in its downfall.

As the dictatorship dragged on, people began speaking out against it. Konstantine Karamanlis, in self-imposed exile in Paris since his defeat by the Center Union in 1963, had remained silent when the military took over Greece. Two years later however, in 1969, he spoke out vehemently against it. He accused the regime of fooling the Greek people and the international community into thinking it would hold democratic elections once it had restored stability, when in reality the coup leaders had every intention of remaining in power. He also called upon the military to overthrow the dictatorship and knowing he was considered the only man behind which the nation could rally, implicitly offered to lead a new government.¹²¹ Two more years passed with little change in Greece. Then in 1971, the junta leader Colonel Papadopoulos moved to do exactly what Karamanlis had accused the regime of, remaining in power with no intention of holding elections. Papadopoulos downgraded the two other coup leaders, Patakos and Makarezos, to second and third deputies, stripping of them of any real

¹²⁰ "Firecrackers in the Night," *The Economist*, 16 August 1969: 23-24.

¹²¹ "Karamanlis Urges Overthrow of Greek Regime," *New York Times*, 1 October 1969, 14.

supervising power in the ministries. New leaders were to be cultivated in the provinces.

Papadopoulos came from a rural background and may have believed that personnel taken from the provinces would be loyal to him and the regime because of a shared background. He did state that his goal was to create a class loyal to his government in opposition to the opposition led by General Akritas.¹²²

In his book *Politics in Modern Greece* published in 1969, Keith Legg speculated that if the military regime stepped down from power it would do so on its own terms.¹²³ This is exactly what it decided to do beginning in 1973. Events however, were not entirely in the regime's control. Inflation was in double figures in 1973 causing fear of social unrest and exposing the ineffectiveness of the military's long term economic policies. Papadopoulos and the junta decided that it was time to restore democracy. Spyros Markenzinis, leader of the fringe progressive party, was appointed to set-up a caretaker regime to oversee elections in the following year. Military officers holding ministry and cabinet positions agreed to resign so that a civilian government could be set up by Markenzinis. Potential candidates for election promised to act fairly and honestly in the elections. As such Markenzinis hoped to hold elections early in 1974.¹²⁴

The military regime's relinquishment of power did not come smoothly or cleanly with the proposed elections. Seeing cracks in the harsh coup leadership, student demonstrations picked up and culminated in the occupation of the Polytechnic University in central Athens. The Faculty Law building was occupied in March and other university buildings were subsequently

¹²² "Greek Premier is Planning to Develop New Leaders," *New York Times*, 10 September 1971, 13.

¹²³ Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 242.

¹²⁴ "Greece Prepares the Way for "Fair" Elections in '74," *New York Times*, 1 September 1973, 1.

occupied in the following months.¹²⁵ Student protests became problematic on November 4 when the ceremony commemorating the death of George Papandreou five years earlier evolved into an anti-government demonstration. Once the students occupied the University, they set up their own radio and broadcast calls to workers and farmers to rise up against the junta. The students also chanted “this is our life.”¹²⁶ This organized resistance was put down brutally. Tanks crashed through the gates of the Polytechnic University and army and police personnel indiscriminately opened fire. It was reported that between twenty and forty students were killed.¹²⁷ This huge tactical error by junta leader Papadopoulos resulted in him being ousted from power in the early hours of November 25 by the head of the military police General Dimitrios Ioannides. Ioannides was against the election of a civilian government and the planned elections under Markenzinis were called off.¹²⁸

The shooting at the Polytechnic University was the event that made it clear that the junta would soon fall from power. Citizens, especially students, did not want to live in the political culture created by the military in which civil rights and liberties were curtailed. Freedom of speech and debate and right to challenge or criticize the government had been taken away. In fighting back against the junta the people reasserted their value of democracy and democratic rules and institutions. Since the military government had moved so far in the opposite direction, disagreement arose and resistance formed.

It seemed that under new leadership the junta planned to remain in power, but another tactical error, this time outside of Athens, would bring the junta crashing down in a matter

¹²⁵ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 166.

¹²⁶ “Young Rebels, A New Force in Greek Politics,” *New York Times*, 21 November 1973, 6.

¹²⁷ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 60.

¹²⁸ S. Victor Papacosma, “The Military in Greek Politics: A Historical Survey,” in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 186.

months. Cyprus, an independent nation since 1960, was the battleground. Ioannides sought *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece, however there was only marginal support for this in Cyprus itself and Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios stood against *enosis*. Ioannides may have been attempting to increase the popularity of the military regime by achieving the long time nationalist goal of unifying Cyprus with Greece. In response, Makarios insisted that mainland Greek officers be removed from the Cyprus National Guard. Despite sharing the same religion and language, Ioannides forcibly ousted the leader of Cyprus under the transparent guise of a *coup d'etat*.¹²⁹ Fearing that Cyprus would be unified with Greece, Turkey mobilized its armed forces and invaded the island in order to protect the Turkish minority living there. Ioannides also called for Greek forces to mobilize, but due to a lack of information on the situation on the mainland because of censorship, the Greek people and armed forces were caught by surprise. Mobilization quickly became a catastrophe as transportation, weapons, clothing, food and other supplies were not organized for mobilization. Facing backlash from other officers because of the situation he had created, Ioannides and the junta stepped down on July 23.¹³⁰ Konstantine Karamanlis returned from exile and was sworn in as prime minister at 4 a.m. July 24, 1974.¹³¹ The junta had fallen.

With the fall of junta and the return of democratic government, the trends in political culture both changed and remained the same. The change came as both the military and monarchy would no longer be interfering in politics. The military soon would accept its place

¹²⁹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 168.

¹³⁰ S. Victor Papacosma, "The Military in Greek Politics: A Historical Survey," in *Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides and Domna Visvizi-Dontas (London: Zeno Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), 187-188.

¹³¹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 168.

beneath the civilian government and became loyal to democratic institutions. The monarch who had been in exile since early in the junta would not be invited back to Greece. As such both monarchical and military interference in government ceased and the civilian government claimed its rightful position as the sole governing authority. The weakness of the party system remained the same however. Political parties remained focused around one charismatic individual with no clear party platform and these charismatic personalities would continue to dominate politics. Disagreement over rules of the game would also continue to be the overarching problem and as such the political culture would remain weak.

Return of Mr. Karamanlis

Bringing Greece to the brink of war with Turkey over Cyprus was only part of Ioannides' error. War required mobilization of the army, an army which wasn't fully behind the dictatorship. Although many pro-royalist officers had been purged from the ranks the purge was not entirely successful. Also working against unity within the army was the fact of universal conscription. All males were required to serve in the armed forces. This meant that men from all backgrounds and political ideologies were present in the lower ranks of the army.¹³² When the army was called to mobilize then, senior officers who disagreed with the regime's ideology were leading troops who also were against the regime. This division in the army collapsed the chain of command, making any potential war with Turkey a catastrophic failure before any shots could be fired.

¹³² Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 243.

Once sworn in Karamanlis set up a government of national unity composed of leaders from all political parties. Center Union leader George Marvos was named Foreign Minister. The 1952 Constitution was reinstated over the military constitution of 1968. Freedom of the press and speech were restored as were citizenship rights and passports to those who had been stripped of them.¹³³ Included in those stripped of their rights were notable journalist Panayiotis Lambrias and composer Mikis Theodorakis. The thousands of political prisoners were also released. Calls for harsh punishment of the junta leaders were minimal and facing war with Turkey, Karamanlis was hesitant to create any disunity within the army by punishing junta leaders.¹³⁴ Included in the release of political prisoners was a grant of general amnesty, which extended to the outlawed communist party. The party was allowed to resume newspaper publication and to participate in elections, effectively lifting the ban on the party in effect since 1948.¹³⁵

Elections were held in mid-November. In October the national unity government stepped down. A caretaker government led by Karamanlis was put in place to oversee the elections. Karamanlis' political opponents called the election an electoral coup by Karamanlis charging that they were given an inadequate amount of time to prepare for the elections. Karamanlis felt elections should be held quickly in order to elect a legitimate government. His government of national unity was appointed by the despised military junta and holding elections was the only way to fully restore democracy.¹³⁶ There were four contending parties in the November 1974 elections. New Democracy led by Karamanlis, the Center Union led by George Marvos, the Socialists led by Andreas Papandreou and the far-left communist party. Karamanlis and New

¹³³ "Good Start in Greece," *New York Times*, 5 August 1974, 22.

¹³⁴ "Seven Lean Years Are Over," *The Economist*, 27 July 1974: 16-17.

¹³⁵ "Dissenting Voice Off-Stage," *The Economist*, 10 August 1974: 34-35, 38.

¹³⁶ "Greece's Premier to Resign Today," *New York Times*, 8 October 1974, 6.

Democracy received 54% of the vote and 220 seats in the 300 seat parliament. The Center Union took 60 seats; the Socialists received 12 seats and the communists 8 seats.¹³⁷

With the overwhelming victory at the polls, Karamanlis set about putting the country back on course. In December a referendum was held on whether or not to invite the monarchy to return. Almost 70% voted against the restoration of the monarch.¹³⁸ Following the western European countries somewhat belatedly, the institution of monarchy was formally and finally abolished. With the abolition of the monarchy a king would no longer be interfering in politics and government. The military had conceded its place under the civilian government when it invited Karamanlis to take over. Furthermore, the military regime had brought shame to most of the military and as such the military would not try again to take power. The civilian government was conclusively the ruler of Greece.

By quickly holding elections to make his government democratically legitimate and holding a referendum to decide the fate of the monarch, Karamanlis was trying to create a stable foundation on which a stable political culture could be built. The election and referendum were of establishing what the rules of the game would be in the newly restored democracy. On the whole the people seemed to believe in democratic elections and abolishing the monarchy. A foundation had been laid. The question was whether or not the rules of game could continue to be agreed upon and a strong political culture created.

Internationally, the rule of the military dictatorship had harmed Greece's reputation and relations. Karamanlis worked hard to rebuild Greece's image on the international scene mainly by pushing for entrance into the European Economic Community, which was obtained ahead of

¹³⁷ "A Sober Vote is the Best Toast to Freedom," *The Economist*, 23 November 1974: 41-42.

¹³⁸ "Greece Rejects the King," *New York Times*, 10 December 1974, 44.

schedule in January 1981. These international events were important issues for the Karamanlis government, but outside the scope of this thesis which is focused on the domestic political development. Domestically Karamanlis and Greece faced the need to restructure their government because of the abolition of the monarchy, the question of how to deal with the military dictatorship leaders, their officials, and pro-junta officers in the army and how to rebuild a floundering economy.

At the beginning of 1975, Karamanlis proposed a new constitution. The new constitution created a president who was to take over many of the powers that the now disposed monarch had. The president was a much stronger executive, at least in theory, than the monarch had been. Karamanlis believed that more power and responsibility should be entrusted to the executive at the expense of the legislature.¹³⁹ This way in times of crisis, decisions could be made faster and action taken more quickly. The power to appoint and dismiss the premier, and dissolve parliament, previously a right of the monarch, were now vested in the president. The president was also given the power to veto bills passed by the legislature, issue legislative decrees, proclaim martial law and declare war. The president was elected by parliament, not the people, to a five year term. A person had to receive 200 out of 300 votes in parliament to be elected president. Andreas Papandreou and the socialists were angry that the new constitution had so little faith in the people and George Marvos, leader of the Center, proclaimed that a president elected by the parliament that approved the constitution would be a totalitarian system.¹⁴⁰ The new constitution continued the tradition of recognizing Orthodoxy as the “dominant” religion

¹³⁹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 173.

¹⁴⁰ “Draft Constitution Criticized,” *New York Times*, 14 January 1975.

but stipulated that it was no longer required that the head of state or the president be of the Orthodox faith.¹⁴¹

Nevertheless, with New Democracy's overwhelming majority, the constitution passed and a president was elected. It passed officially in June 1975. Voicing concern and opposition, all opposition parties to New Democracy walked out of parliament before the final vote and refused to attend the signing. New Democracy held 220 of 300 seats however, so the final vote was never in jeopardy. The opposition parties agreed to abide by the constitution, but pledged to work on modifying it by democratic means.¹⁴² The first president was Konstantinos Tsatsos, an academic philosopher and conservative politician who never exercised the theoretically vast powers of the executive which helped to mollify critics.¹⁴³

The new constitution was meant to address the placement of powers once held by the monarch. This meant that a new set of rules had to be put in place. Karamanlis was trying to strengthen the governmental institutions. The absolute majority that his party held in parliament however led opposition parties to question if the new rules of the game were fair since they could be implemented by only one party's support. Opposition parties also did not agree with the distribution of power between the parliament, the prime minister and the new position of the president. By walking out of parliament before the vote and refusing to attend the signing of the new constitution, the opposition made it clear that they did not agree with the new rules of the game. Any nascent agreement that Karamanlis had secured by quickly restoring legitimate democracy and abolishing the monarchy disappeared with the disagreement over the new

¹⁴¹ Theofanis G. Stavrou, "The Orthodox Church and Political Culture," in *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Dimitri Conostas and Theofanis G. Stavrou (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 260-262.

¹⁴² "Limited Joy in Greece," *New York Times*, 16 June 1975.

¹⁴³ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 173.

constitution. Any hopes of building a stronger political culture under Karamanlis were erased by the disagreement over the constitution.

Regarding the leaders of the military dictatorship, initial reactions had not been vengeful. By the beginning of 1975 this had changed. Karamanlis was being accused of not punishing the junta leaders quickly enough. General Ghizikis remained president until the November 1974 elections and Brigadier Ioannides was not arrested until early 1975. When Karamanlis returned to take over the government in July 1974 he was in a tight spot. He had been invited to return to Greece by the military junta and elements loyal to the junta within the army, especially the tank divisions that surrounded Athens, could have easily removed him if he had moved too hastily. As such removing and retiring officials and officers who were loyal to the junta was a delicate process.¹⁴⁴ On October 4, 1974, four junta leaders including Colonel George Papadopoulos were ordered into exile on the island of Kea. Criminal proceedings against 50 conspirators began on November 1 and formal charges were brought at the end of that month. Papadopoulos and Brigadier Ioannides also faced charges related to the November 1973 shooting at the Athens Polytechnic University.¹⁴⁵

Students, who had been instrumental in bringing down the junta, put pressure on Karamanlis to take further action by barricading themselves inside the medical school in Salonika and clashing with police during demonstrations in Athens. Parliament passed a bill stating that the 1973 general amnesty did not cover political crimes and therefore opened the way for the junta leaders to be formally tried. Ioannides was the first to be jailed on charges of high

¹⁴⁴ "The Army and Mr. Averoff," *The Economist*, 20 September 1975: 12.

¹⁴⁵ "Ioannides Jailed on Treason Charges," *New York Times*, 15 January 1975.

treason and insurrection.¹⁴⁶ Parliament also declared that the military takeover was a coup not a revolution and therefore democracy had never been overthrown just usurped.¹⁴⁷

As formal charges mounted for junta conspirators, other loyal officers and officials were prematurely retired including 18 or the 28 major-generals. This combined with the legalization of the communist political party and the criticism and abuse of the army in the media, put some loyal junta officials over the edge.¹⁴⁸ In February 1975, Defense Minister Evangelos Averoff uncovered a plot involving thirty-seven officers conspiring to overthrow Karamanlis and Archbishop Makarios who had been restored to the presidency in Cyprus at the end of 1974.¹⁴⁹ Of the thirty-seven conspirators, twenty-one were tried and fourteen were sentenced to prison.¹⁵⁰ After this plot was foiled, the armed forces loyally served New Democracy until the party lost the 1981 elections.¹⁵¹

The trials for the military dictatorship leaders were held in the summer of 1975. Charges included responsibility for establishing the dictatorship, torture of dissidents and brutal suppression of the student occupation of the Athens Polytechnic University. Brigadier Ioannides received seven life sentences for his role in the Polytechnic killings. The original leaders of the junta, Colonel Papadopoulos, Colonel Makarezos and Brigadier Patakos were sentenced to death. These death sentences were hastily commuted to life in prison for fear of an adverse reaction from the military which had not been entirely purged of junta sympathizers.¹⁵² In all Karamanlis retired approximately 500 junta supporters within the armed forces. However the entire group of

¹⁴⁶ "Ioannides Jailed on Treason Charges," *New York Times*, 15 January 1975.

¹⁴⁷ "Greek Ex-Dictator Refuses to Answer Treason Charge," *New York Times*, 16 January 1975.

¹⁴⁸ "The Army and Mr. Averoff," *The Economist*, 20 September 1975: 12.

¹⁴⁹ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 173.

¹⁵⁰ "The Army and Mr. Averoff," *The Economist*, 20 September 1975: 12.

¹⁵¹ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 97.

¹⁵² Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 173-174.

senior officers could not simply be retired, since this would have left the military lacking key leadership in a time of heightened tensions with Turkey.¹⁵³

Within a year of taking over Karamanlis and his government had been freely elected, held a fair referendum on the institution of monarchy, passed a new constitution and punished the leaders of the military dictatorship. The economy however was still in desperate need of attention. At the end of 1974 Greece had a foreign debt of \$4.5 billion and inflation for the year approached 30%.¹⁵⁴ To combat this and promote growth the economic plan was to loosen credit restrictions on industrial investment, the exportation of manufactured goods, shipping and tourism. Taxes were lowered for lower income brackets, while being raised on the higher income brackets, corporate profits and shipping. Karamanlis also nationalized Olympic Airways and Andreadis banks.¹⁵⁵ This added to the already large numbers employed directly or indirectly by the state, which strained the state's budget.

Karamanlis' main goal was to modernize infrastructure and the economy, while also improving education and social welfare. Education and social programs suffered under Karamanlis' policies because defense expenditure remained large due to the continued perceived threat from Turkey. As a result, Karamanlis had the same problem as the junta government. By continuing to spend large amounts on the military there was not enough money left to bring about needed reforms in education, healthcare and rural development. Agricultural subsidies were reduced and the government faced demonstrations and strikes by farmers. Most farms were

¹⁵³ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 96-97.

¹⁵⁴ "Austerity Ahead, Greeks Are Told," *New York Times*, 12 December 1974.

¹⁵⁵ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 97, 101-102.

small, family-owned operations that lacked the capital to invest in more efficient equipment. Many farms also lacked irrigation and flood-control methods. Attempts to organize collective cultivation had met strong resistance as farmers were loath to give up their rights to land that had been in their families for generations.¹⁵⁶

The goal for 1978-1982 was for an annual average GDP growth rate of 6%. In order to meet this objective manufacturing needed to grow at a faster rate than GDP. Growth of manufacturing was tied directly to the growth of exports. As such the primary policy was of import substitution and development of new exports. As Greece tried to grow its economy it faced two employment related problems. One problem was the fact that the labor supply was increasing and thus jobs needed to be created for them. The second and intertwining problem was that in preparation for entering the European Economic Community (EEC), a productivity increase was required and would require an increase in capital per unit of labor, thus decreasing the demand for labor.¹⁵⁷ So while the labor supply was increasing, the need for labor in the market was undesirable and increased labor would not help make the economy more productive and competitive.

Not surprisingly the goal of an average annual GDP growth rate of 6% was not realized. In reality, GDP grew by an average annual rate of 3.6%. Industrial and manufacturing output grew faster at 5% and 3.9% respectively, but other sectors of the economy continued to lag behind. Overall industry and services grew, while agriculture declined. Inflation remained a problem due to increasing labor costs and continued real estate speculation. The expectation of

¹⁵⁶ "A Need to Modernize Overtaking Agriculture in Greece: Greek Agriculture Facing a Need to Modernize," *New York Times*, 28 November 1975.

¹⁵⁷ George A. Jougamos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 97, 104-105.

inflation also drove wages up, creating a negative feedback loop where the expectation of inflation drove wages up, and as the cost of labor rose so did inflation.¹⁵⁸

While failing to meet to desired rate of growth, there were bright spots for the economy, like the growth rates of industry and manufacturing mentioned above. Also, in 1981, Greece entered the EEC as a full member which helped to increase its exports as membership provided Greece was access to more affluent Western European markets. Industrial exports, the bulk of exports, increased from 74% of total exports in 1975 to 82% in 1981. The service sector remained the foundation of the Greek economy but improvements had been made in the industrial and manufacturing sectors. The new taxes implemented under Karamanlis helped to redistribute income and wealth in favor of wage earners, which improved the social welfare for most of the Greek population. In all, the policies of Karamanlis stabilized the foundation of the Greek economy¹⁵⁹ and there was reason to hope for further modernization under future governments.

Karamanlis may have brought stability to the economy, but he did not bring stability to New Democracy. As was characteristic of Greek political parties, New Democracy was formed around one man, Konstantine Karamanlis, and was without any ideological foundation which another party member could lead the party with. The popularity that Karamanlis enjoyed when he returned to Greece and took over for the dictatorship, was popular support for him alone not the New Democracy party. This became evident in municipal elections held in the spring of 1975 in which many candidates running on the New Democracy ticket lost to opposing

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 109-110, 114.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 119, 125.

parties.¹⁶⁰ Within New Democracy there was a rift between conservative and moderate elements that hindered Karamanlis' ability to consolidate the party. Some of the more conservative deputies defected from the party and joined the extreme right royalists under the banner of the National Populist Party led by George Kourouklis. The political center also reverted to its past of splintered factions when three of its prominent members left the Center Union party complaining the leader George Marvos had directed the party in a more conservative direction. The departing members felt that there was no longer any clear difference between the Center Union and New Democracy.¹⁶¹

Lack of party cohesion and Karamanlis' inability to transfer his personal popularity into party popularity, had negative consequences for New Democracy at the 1977 elections. Their share of the vote dropped to 42%, down twelve percent from 54% in the 1974 elections. The party still claimed a majority in Parliament of 172 seats, but it was clear that New Democracy needed more than a charismatic leader to survive future elections. The break-up of the Center Union contributed to an increase in the vote for PASOK. PASOK received 25% of the vote and 60 seats in Parliament making it the official opposition to Karamanlis and New Democracy. PASOK was also the first non-extreme left party to have a nationwide organization and its socialist rhetoric appealed to a wider and wider portion of the electorate. This was a challenge to Karamanlis; a challenge he did not meet as New Democracy did not modernize its organization or ideological foundation.¹⁶² New Democracy remained the party of Karamanlis, not a party based on conservative ideology that could be lead by anyone believing in what the party stood for.

¹⁶⁰ "Loyalty but not Votes," *New York Times*, 18 April 1975.

¹⁶¹ "Shifts and drifts," *The Economist*, 2 October 1976: 59-60.

¹⁶² Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 178-179.

In 1980 the five-year term of the first president ended and unsurprisingly, if unwanted by New Democracy, Konstantine Karamanlis ran for the presidency. High ranking New Democracy deputies had tried to advise Karamanlis against running for president, arguing that New Democracy could not win the next year's election without him. The belief that ND could not win without Karamanlis running as the face of the party, illustrated that charismatic leadership was still central to the political system. Furthermore it signaled that the political culture had not matured since democracy was restored under Karamanlis in 1974. ND was still without a clear ideological platform, which made it unable to function without its creator and leader. With the political system still based on individual personalities, the system remained weak overall.

Karamanlis was not assured to win the presidency however. Election law stated that a candidate needed 200 votes on either the first or second ballot to be elected but only 180 votes on the third ballot, after which if no candidate was elected parliament would be dissolved and new elections would be called. New Democracy only held 172 seats and deputies from PASOK and the communist party made it clear that they would not vote for Karamanlis. On the third ballot Karamanlis received 183 votes and thus won the election. Independents and deputies from splinter parties provided the needed the votes. His election to the presidency left the prime minister and leadership position of New Democracy vacant.¹⁶³

In one of the many paradoxes of history, Karamanlis' election to the presidency may have helped Andreas Papandreou and PASOK get elected in 1981. The new leader of New Democracy, George Rallis, lacked the charisma of Karamanlis and the party quickly splintered, leaving PASOK as the only consolidated and viable party for election. Papandreou and PASOK were anti-EEC, anti-NATO and anti-American with elements of Marxist ideology. The "anti"

¹⁶³ "The Karamanlis Conundrum," *The Economist*, 12 April 1980: 31-32.

rhetoric had been toned down leading up to the 1981 elections, but not forgotten. This concerned voters who were disappointed by the conservatives' failure to find solutions for economics and bureaucratic problems, but were uncomfortable with and unsure of how leftist PASOK would turn out to be if elected.¹⁶⁴ Karamanlis was a strong, charismatic and committed conservative. In the position of president he was empowered with considerable rights and duties under the 1975 constitution but as yet unexercised. Having a conservative in the government as president then, served as a counterbalance to the socialists under Papandreou. Claiming to represent the non-privileged, or the majority of Greek society, PASOK won 48% of the vote and 172 seats in Parliament.¹⁶⁵

In 1974 Konstantine Karamanlis may have been the only man who could have successfully transitioned Greece from a military dictatorship to a democracy. George Papandreou was dead, his son Andreas was a controversial figure and there was no any other strong political figure to call upon. Karamanlis swiftly set up democratic elections and held on fair referendum on the question of monarchy. The trend of three governing bodies, the king, the army and the civilian government, vying for power ended with the civilian government as the supreme ruler of the land. The military junta leaders were punished to the satisfaction of the Greek people and although the economy did not meet expectations, improvements were made.

It seemed the people did not think enough improvement had been made and just as they had in 1963, elected a new party to power in 1981. Richard Clogg, in his work *A Concise History of Greece*, implies that Karamanlis spent too much of his time on foreign policy issues and that is why his party lost the 1981 elections. Karamanlis' big foreign policy project was

¹⁶⁴ "Greece is not Asia," *The Economist*, 10 October 1981: 18.

¹⁶⁵ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 180-182.

getting Greece into the European Economic Community which he achieved ahead of schedule in January 1981. Karamanlis believed that Greece needed to firmly associate itself with the west and model itself on the western European nations.¹⁶⁶ Karamanlis's push for Greece to join the EEC as a full member illustrated his and his party's identification with the idea that Greece should westernize and implement western institutions and values. Joining the EEC in 1981 also helped strengthen the parliamentary democracy which was modeled on the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. Karamanlis was also seeking greater international recognition and security for Greece in light of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 when both NATO and the United States failed to come to Greece's aid.¹⁶⁷

In contrast, Andreas Papandreou believed that Greece should be Greek.¹⁶⁸ Andreas Papandreou stood in opposition to Karamanlis's vision of what direction Greece should take. In stating the Greece should belong to the Greeks, Andreas Papandreou was advocating the position of traditional and inward-looking policies with a distinct distrust of Western institutions and values. Combined with Greece's history of being occupied by other countries, this idea and feeling of nationalism resonated with the Greek people. The fundamentally different visions of Greece's relationship to the rest of the world caused the re-emergence of divisions which precipitated the 'National Schism' during WWI. This difference in understanding of what it meant to be Greek led to different ideas of how the country should be governed. The difference in ideas on how the government should operate contributed to a disagreement over the rules of the game. In a sense then the different views of Greek identity kept the political actors from

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 177-179.

¹⁶⁷ George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 307-308.

¹⁶⁸ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 179.

agreeing on the rules of game and thus kept the political culture weak with no obvious avenue to foster agreement.

Andreas Papandreou and PASOK's socialist ideology was concerned with helping the average wage-earning Greek. These people constituted the majority of the Greek population and in many ways had been ignored by the conservative right which was associated with the privileged and rich strata of society. So while Karamanlis was popular and respected he was a conservative, right-wing politician and therefore was seen as representing the interests of the privileged and powerful. After enduring the military dictatorship that hurt the majority of the Greek population economically and failing to see the desired improvements under Karamanlis' conservative leadership, the people tried something new and elected the socialists. Furthermore with his election to the presidency, Karamanlis was no longer eligible for election as prime minister. As such Andreas Papandreou's biggest competition eliminated himself.

The trends in Greek politics changed during the Karamanlis period. The monarchy was abolished and the military after bringing shame upon itself with the dictatorship and attempted overthrow of Karamanlis, voluntarily submitted to the authority of the civilian government. So the trends of an interfering monarchy and a politicized military ended. Political parties remained unstable beings, subject to splintering. Parties also continued to lack clear ideological foundations, instead remaining organized around charismatic leaders. When a party lacked or lost a charismatic leader, it tended to splinter among various lower level leaders. That was what happened to New Democracy when Karamanlis was elected president and the party was taken over by a less popular and less charismatic person in George Rallis. The feature of family dynasties and big names remained in Greek politics as well. Andreas Papandreou, son of George

Papandreou, was the leader of PASOK and was elected prime minister in 1981. Karamanlis' five year as president would last until 1985. After that he and his name would not be absent from politics for long.

Andreas Papandreou and the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)

PASOK was not a socialist party in the western understanding of socialism however. Andreas Papandreou's socialist party was centered on nationalistic ideas. Too often Andreas Papandreou believed that Greece as a country should make its own decisions regardless of what her allies wanted. Andreas Papandreou also believed that Greece should be truly independent and should therefore pull out of the EEC and NATO and be neutral in world politics. Unlike Karamanlis who pursued ties with the west, Andreas pursued ties with the Greek people. PASOK did hold some more traditional leftist ideas, like wanting to expand healthcare and education, redistribute wealth and decentralize government.

Despite his leftist ideas, Andreas and PASOK received votes from all socio-economic classes with a fairly even division between rural and urban areas. Any unevenness to be found in the vote distribution came in regards to age. Younger voters supported PASOK and Andreas Papandreou more than older voters.¹⁶⁹ The change from a conservative to leftist government was smooth. The army did not try to impede the socialists taking over the government. Historically the army had forcibly resisted any leftward shift in the government.¹⁷⁰ This inaction of the army suggested the political system would become more mature. Between the conservative New Democracy and the socialist PASOK there were two distinct parties, each with a viable chance of winning an election. The election of the socialists, the opposition party,

¹⁶⁹ "Allaghi," *The Economist*, 3 July 1982: 3-4, 7.

¹⁷⁰ "Dancing in Athens," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 October 1981.

suggested the political culture was maturing and stabilizing. It also signaled that the Greek people wanted PASOK to move the country in different direction. Since the restoration of democracy in 1950, the conservative right had dominated, but the people hadn't really seen much improvement in their day-to-day lives or any real maturity in the political system. There was hope that Andreas Papandreou's rhetoric of change would be put into action and produce results.

When Andreas Papandreou and PASOK took power they faced a downward spiraling economy. Demand for raw materials such as nickel and aluminum had declined with the world economic recession. Textile production was being hurt by cheaper third world products and inflation hovered between 23-25%. Greek wages had increased but were well below the other EEC members and productivity had not matched the increase in wages. In other words although the Greek people were being paid more, there was not anything more to consume.¹⁷¹ Any hope of creating some semblance of the welfare states of Western Europe that had been promised in the election campaign, hinged upon putting the economy on sounder footing.

Andreas Papandreou ruled over his party, PASOK, with an iron fist. All ministers and deputies were strictly subordinate to him. Andreas Papandreou besides being prime minister was the de facto minister of defense, foreign policy and economics. Decisions on economic policy then were largely Andreas Papandreou's not his minister's.¹⁷² In 1982, there were five major economic decisions. First credit policy was tightened but financing for small to medium sized businesses and agriculture pursuits were encouraged. Second, limits were placed on government borrowing to help balance the budget. Thirdly, minimum wage and salary rates were increased 46% to increase the real income of poorer people and thereby move toward a more equal division of income. Fourth, the tax base was broadened while income and indirect taxes were raised to

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² "Allaghi," *The Economist*, July 3, 1982: 3-4, 7.

provide the government with additional revenue to fund healthcare expansion. Fifth and finally, the drachma was devalued by about 10% in order to improve the competitiveness of Greek exports.¹⁷³

By the last quarter of 1982 some promised reforms had passed but not nearly as many as expected. Civil marriage and divorce was legalized in July of 1982 and the civil code modified to line up with the 1975 Constitution to provide equality between the sexes. Modification of family law abolished paternal authority and the dowry system along with reducing the age of consent from 21 to 18. These changes challenged the relationship between civil and ecclesiastical law. Since the constitutions of 1833 the church was under the control the civilian government but had still managed to maintain some areas of dominance. Andreas Papandreou's changes challenged church authority over marriage, a long held prerogative of the church.

While enjoying success in modernizing civil law, Andreas Papandreou was unsuccessful economically. The economy had showed little improvement and while the people were willing to give Andreas Papandreou more time, Andreas Papandreou himself appeared frustration with the slow pace of reform. Inflation remained at 25%. Industry was mostly controlled by foreign multinationals which meant that any profit was being sent abroad. Most Greeks worked in agriculture, small business, or the bloated service sector in Athens. Despite increases in wages income distribution remained approximately twice as unequal as in the Western European EEC countries.¹⁷⁴

To remedy the economy, the goal was to gain control of important economic sectors while focusing special attention on reducing inflation, unemployment, government borrowing

¹⁷³ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 134-135.

¹⁷⁴ "Greece Under Papandreou," *The Miami Herald*, 12 September 1982.

and the deficit, while also balancing the budget. Healthcare, public utilities, banks, insurance companies and welfare organizations were all “socialized” by the government. Keeping with his promise of decentralization, this socialization did not mean complete state control. Local governments, workers, and stockholders were encouraged to participate in the administration of socialized industries.¹⁷⁵

Despite the slow pace of reform and economy recovery, PASOK remained popular. In mayoral elections in 1982, socialist candidates won 129 of 200 contests, including races in urban areas such as Athens, Piraeus, Salonika and Ioannina. Socialist supporters in Athens celebrated the victories in the streets and Andreas Papandreou called the socialist victory a political and ideological defeat of New Democracy.¹⁷⁶ Socialist governments had swept the country at all levels and the political culture seemed to be on a track of maturity.

As the 1985 elections approached, signs of weakness and instability remained. For one, Andreas Papandreou had reshuffled his cabinet four times in his first term. The first was in the summer of 1982 when Andreas Papandreou moved his focus from foreign to domestic policy. Four ministers had been dismissed, four others were transferred to other ministries and seven new people were brought into the cabinet. Two of the seven were senior officials at state owned banks, who although officially outside the PASOK party were given top economic posts.¹⁷⁷ Subsequent shuffles were less drastic. The constant cabinet changes signified that Andreas Papandreou, despite his confident rhetoric, did not know on what issues his cabinet should focus or which individuals would be best for the job. The constant change meant there was a lack of continuity in the ministries and reinforced the image that Andreas Papandreou favored a

¹⁷⁵ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 135, 138.

¹⁷⁶ “Greek Socialists Pull Well Ahead in Local Elections,” *New York Times*, 25 October 1982.

¹⁷⁷ “Shift in Greek Politics,” *The Globe and Mail*, 5 July 1982.

centralization of power in his hands while preaching to support decentralization, creating a contradiction. Another possible area of weakness was the question of whether or not PASOK would change the election rules for 1985 as all previous governments had in order to retain and potentially gain seats in parliament.

A re-election of PASOK and Andreas Papandreou was not guaranteed. Andreas Papandreou was far behind schedule implementing promised social reforms and much of his campaign rhetoric seemed to be just talk. Greece remained in the EEC and NATO and the United States retained its lease on the use of military bases in Greece despite Andreas Papandreou's promise to shut them down. The Greek people had been willing to give Andreas Papandreou more time in 1982 and seemed to embrace the change that he stood for, but it was unclear if the people still believed Andreas Papandreou would deliver on his promises of change.

1985: Election Scandal Dashes Potential Strengthening of Political Culture

Konstantine Karamanlis' 5-year term as president expired in 1985. At first it seemed likely that both New Democracy and PASOK would endorse Karamanlis for a second term. Just before the March 15th election, on March 10th, Andreas Papandreou announced that in fact he and PASOK would be putting forth their own candidate for president, Christos Sartzetakis. Sartzetakis was a Supreme Court judge who had been involved in bringing those involved in the Lambrakis assassination to justice. In response, Karamanlis resigned five days before his term as president expired.¹⁷⁸ By choosing his own candidate, Andreas Papandreou removed the conservative restraint of Karamanlis. While the move was an attempt to the court communist

¹⁷⁸ "Intrigue, doubts linger in Athens after election of new president," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 April 1985.

deputies into voting for PASOK in the national elections, it also caused apprehension among some center deputies who had been instrumental in PASOK's victory in 1981.¹⁷⁹

The actual election of Sartzetakis came down to a third and final vote. The election would require all PASOK and communists deputies to vote in favor of Andreas Papandreou's choice. In order to ensure this outcome, the PASOK majority voted to allow interim president Ioannis Alevras to vote in the election. Sartzetakis received exactly the 180 votes needed to be elected. Konstantine Mitsotakis, leader of the New Democracy, immediately challenged the legality of the election, citing the vote by the interim president as invalid because the constitution forbade the president from performing any other duties beyond that of chief of state. PASOK countered that ambiguities regarding the roll of an interim president had allowed them to vote to allow Alevras to vote. Mitsotakis also claimed the vote was invalid because there had been a violation of voting by secret ballots. White ballots had been used for blank votes and blue ballots were votes for Sartzetakis. Parliament President Michael Stephanides stated that the change was made because socialists who had publically committed to Sartzetakis had defected during the first round of voting.¹⁸⁰ The heavy-handed party discipline that forced all socialists to vote with Andreas Papandreou showed an inability of deputies to make individual decisions or make any attempt to represent the people's wishes. The vote for president in 1985 was in no way performed by a representative democracy, but by a self-serving party leader who had the power to make sure the election came out in his favor.

About a year later, it came out that Christos Sartzetakis was not the first individual that Andreas Papandreou had approached about being the PASOK presidential candidate. Panayotis Kanellopoulos, a former prime minister and Themistokles Kourousopoulos had both been

¹⁷⁹ "Papandreou's Switch: A New Phase in Greece," *The Washington Post*, 11 March 1985.

¹⁸⁰ "Intrigue, doubts linger in Athens after election of new president," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 April 1985.

approached but had turned down the offer. Kanellopoulos had been approached on February 24th but up until March 8th Karamanlis was being reassured of his re-nomination by Andreas Papandreou. It was also reported that the nephew of Kanellopoulos told Mitsotakis about the offer made to his uncle, and therefore Mitsotakis failed to warn Karamanlis of Andreas Papandreou's scheme.¹⁸¹

Mitsotakis refused to recognize the new president. He called for immediate parliamentary elections, hoping that the removal of Karamanlis, which cleared the way for the unpredictable Andreas Papandreou, would have alarmed the people into voting more conservatively. ND was ahead in the polls, especially with the youth, because of PASOK's failure to solve the unemployment problem. Mitsotakis' problem was that elections can only be called by the president, and since Mitsotakis did not recognize him as legitimate he could ask him to call new elections.¹⁸²

Andreas Papandreou, besides being behind in the polls, had reason to hold off on elections. Proposed constitutional changes that would abolish presidential powers that served as a check on the prime minister required two ratifications; one by the current parliament and one by the next parliament. Having already secured 180 votes for his presidential candidate, Andreas Papandreou had no problem securing the vote to ratify the constitutional changes, but needed time for the vote. Also delaying elections allowed Andreas Papandreou to campaign and rebuild some of his lost support.¹⁸³

National elections were set for June 2 and the parliament duly dissolved a month prior on May 7th. In 1981, PASOK had promised to introduce a system of simple proportional

¹⁸¹ "Karamanlis was deceived," *The Times*, 1 February 1986.

¹⁸² "Is it all Greek to the Greeks?," *The Economist*, 6 April 1985: 53-54.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 53-54.

representation for the 1985 elections. Simple proportional representation is advantageous to smaller parties and the communists had long demanded the switch. Declining popularity led PASOK to do what all previous governments had done however, and manipulate the electoral law to favor their re-election. The system that was put in place would allow a party with a plurality, not a majority, to still obtain a working majority in parliament. This system favored larger parties, and New Democracy, although in the opposition, supported the implementation of the new system.¹⁸⁴ As the campaign got under way, there was no affinity between the two parties. Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of planting a newspaper story that he had been a Nazi collaborator during WWII. Papandreou joined crowds chanting, “friends of the SS will die.” Mitsotakis was actually condemned to death twice under Nazi rule and played a key role in the Cretan resistance for which he was decorated by the British. Both sides criticized the other for their conduct during the military dictatorship.¹⁸⁵ Both Andreas Papandreou and Mitsotakis made promises to the electorate to try to gain votes. Mitsotakis promised to lower taxes and to cut military service requirements. He also promised a freer economy and less government spending. Papandreou promised to increase pensions and provide cheap housing loans. Both parties kept quiet on issues of foreign policy and Papandreou made no mention of the constitutional revisions on presidential power.¹⁸⁶

Unfulfilled promises by Andreas Papandreou from 1981 hurt his credibility as he vied for a second term. While it was an achievement for the socialist government to have served the entire term, the list of other accomplishments was short. Roads and other infrastructure had been built, but the economy had been managed poorly and the political arena polarized. Inflation was

¹⁸⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193.

¹⁸⁵ “Conservative Leader Accuses Papandreou of Mudslinging,” *The Associated Press*, 15 May 1985.

¹⁸⁶ “Promises, promises,” *The Economist*, 11 May 1985: 58.

down to 18.6% from 25% but still remained three times higher than the average in the EEC. Unemployment was conservatively estimated at the time to be 8.1% (with a population of only around 10 million) while foreign debt had grown from \$8 billion to \$13 billion with no prospects for foreign or private investment. The takeover by the government of floundering industry and wage increases in anticipation of inflation swelled the already bloated ranks of those employed by the government.¹⁸⁷

Politicians at the time believed that 1985 would be a watershed moment in Greece. If PASOK won a second term, ND believed that Greece would slide into an authoritarian one-party state and pluralist political institutions would deteriorate. PASOK believed that if the conservatives were brought back to power they would bring back with them the repressive policies of the 1950s that had suppressed the communist party. So bold was this claim that the communists themselves defended the right, recognizing that the conservatives of the 1980s were different than the conservatives of the 1950s. The political polarization that had been occurring since Andreas Papandreou won in 1981 came to a fever pitch in the election of 1985. PASOK won 46% of the vote, down only two percent from 1981. ND came in a close second with 41% of the vote, up five percent from 1981. Under the electoral system implemented for the election, 46% of the vote gave PASOK a majority in parliament with 161 seats. Due to the crumbling economic situation, PASOK quickly announced an austerity program. Imports were discouraged, public expenditures cut and government revenues increased. Although backed by an emergency loan from the EEC, the policies provoked major strikes by public sector employees. Opposition parties made large gains in the municipal elections in 1986 and cracks

¹⁸⁷ "Papandreou Is Issue in Greek Election," *The Washington Post*, 1 June 1985.

appeared within PASOK despite Andreas Papandreou's authoritarian leadership of the party.¹⁸⁸

Immediately following the election, the communist party, which performed poorly in the election, pledged opposition to PASOK. The communists accused Andreas Papandreou of what Mitsotakis feared would result, an authoritarian government. The communists were also angry over PASOK's failure to close American military bases in the country and pull the country out of NATO and the EEC.¹⁸⁹

Power was democratically transferred from New Democracy to PASOK in 1981 and there was reason to hope that political culture could be strengthened and stabilized. Andreas Papandreou's failure to follow through on his promises and bring about economic improvement made it possible that he would lose power in 1985. Unwilling to face this outcome, Andreas Papandreou manipulated the system and returned himself to power while also electing his personal candidate to the presidency. The manipulation by Andreas Papandreou in the presidential election discredited his message of change. He had resorted to the tactics of the conservative right which he had vehemently derided when he was in the opposition. The weakness of the political culture made it all too tempting to continue the bad habits of previous administrations and change the rules for his and his party's advantage. Striving for real change and listening to what the people wanted and needed quite possibly could have meant a loss of power. Like most politicians Andreas Papandreou proved to be myopic and only concerned with remaining in power, not with building upon the foundation set by Karamanlis for long-lasting change that would have strengthened Greece's political culture. There would be no signs of stable political culture for the rest of the 1980s. Family dynastic traditions would continue, the

¹⁸⁸ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 196-197.

¹⁸⁹ "Communists Pledge Strong Opposition to Socialists," *The Associated Press*, 9 June 1985.

political atmosphere would be ripe with accusation and murder, and top PASOK government officials, including Andreas Papandreou himself, would be caught in a major scandal.

“Megatrouble”

Following PASOK’s re-election, economic austerity measures were announced. The left was unsupportive of these measures and the tension from the political atmosphere soon spilled over into the social atmosphere. Leftist supporters demonstrated against the austerity measures and PASOK officials were accused of handling the demonstrators with “kid gloves.” At the annual march commemorating the lives lost at the Athens Polytechnic University in 1973, a teenager was shot and killed by a police officer. The officer was disembarking a police bus that had been set on fire. The PASOK government responded by firing three police generals for failure to control the situation and arraigned the officer who shot the teenager on murder charges.¹⁹⁰ Three years later in 1988, tensions between the left and PASOK were still high and violence erupted once more. U.S. Navy Captain William Nordeen was killed by a car bomb in July of 1988. The bombing was part of the campaign against US military stationed in Greece. Andreas Papandreou had promised in 1981 when he was elected to close the US military bases, but had not done so. The bombing illustrated the inability of the police to deal with domestic terrorism and their failure to wipe out small anarchist bands in the city of Athens. Andreas Papandreou’s failure to deal with anti-American opinion was also highlighted by the death of Captain Nordeen.¹⁹¹ The bombing also illustrated that significant minority of people were operating outside of the traditional political arena, further evidence that the people and the politicians did not agree upon the rules of the game and the political culture was weak.

¹⁹⁰ “The Exarchists,” *The Economist*, 11 November 1985: 68.

¹⁹¹ “Greece: Climate of Terror,” *The Washington Post*, 13 July 1988.

The failures of the government to deal with domestic terrorism and anti-American sentiment were small problems compared to the scandal that rocked the political system at the end of 1988. In 1984 George Koskotas bought the small Bank of Crete. He then proceeded to surround himself with PASOK government officials and state deposits quickly poured into his bank making him rich. Demands for an investigation into the source of this wealth were slow. An investigation was opened in the summer but no order was filed to perform an audit. Shortly thereafter, the Central Bank of Greece produced evidence that documents related to deposits held in America were fraudulent. George Koskotas disappeared on November 6th becoming a fugitive charged with embezzling state money through his bank. PASOK officials began resigning from Andreas Papandreou's cabinet in response to publically being connected to Koskotas. Andreas Papandreou claimed the scandal was a conspiracy designed to cost him his seven seat majority in parliament. Not everyone within PASOK agreed. Apostolos Lazaris, a respected deputy, resigned following the announcement by Andreas Papandreou, stating that not only had Andreas Papandreou allowed a cover-up of the embezzlement to take place, but he had also invented the conspiracy to quell dissent within the party.¹⁹² By the summer of 1989, George Kostokas himself had stated in several publications that the embezzlement scheme involved top PASOK officials including Andreas Papandreou. Andreas Papandreou and his aides had skimmed off the interest payments on state funds deposited in the Bank of Crete. The total amount skimmed off was said to be \$230 million. Andreas Papandreou continued to deny the charges and claim that they were an intervention of the CIA.¹⁹³

¹⁹² "Megatrouble," *The Economist*, 19 November 1988: 67-68.

¹⁹³ "Grave Scandal for Greece," *New York Times*, 18 June 1989.

Opposition leaders called for a vote of no-confidence in December 1988 and March 1989, both of which failed.¹⁹⁴ In the March vote, three socialist deputies abstained from the vote and were subsequently dismissed from the party, which left Andreas Papandreou with only a four seat majority. Former deputy prime minister, Agamemnon Koutsoyiorgas, the man most connected to the Kostokas cover-up resigned and the cabinet was reshuffled again on March 16th. Seeing that the banking scandal, which Andreas Papandreou still maintained was an American conspiracy to oust him from power in the next election, had cost PASOK support from the public, Andreas Papandreou tabled a bill to change the electoral rules from proportional representation to a more plural system. A proportional system favored the larger parties like PASOK at the expense of smaller parties such as the communists. By keeping the proportional system, Andreas Papandreou was hoping to force the communists to ally with PASOK so they could receive cabinet positions and PASOK could remain in power over ND.¹⁹⁵

Having survived two votes of no-confidence, Andreas Papandreou and PASOK finished their second full term before calling elections in June 1989. Besides the violence and banking scandal that had severely damaged Andreas Papandreou's credibility and popularity, the economic policies of his second term had done little to improve Greece's economic situation. Despite austerity measures, GDP only grew 0.7% on average from 1982 to 1987. Industrial output declined by an annual average of 0.5% during that same period. Agricultural production also decreased. The only bright spots were the service sector and trade. The service sector grew by an average rate of 2.1% per year. Exports on average increased more than imports suggesting a favorable balance of trade for Greece. Exports also increased as a percentage of GDP during the decade due to increased competitiveness of Greek products, lower international interest rates

¹⁹⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 198-199.

¹⁹⁵ "Coalition Ahoy," *The Economist*, 25 March 1989: 60, 63.

and a depreciated dollar. Inflation remained high however, as labor costs and oil prices increased and the drachma was depreciated.¹⁹⁶

In spite of the failures of Andreas Papandreou and PASOK, the June 1989 elections did not bring New Democracy to power. ND received 44% of the vote, securing 144 seats in parliament, seven short of a majority. PASOK received an impressive 39% given the circumstances. This left the communists holding the balance of power. As leader of the largest party, Mitsotakis and ND tried to form a coalition government but failed and the mandate passed to Andreas Papandreou. Historically PASOK and the communists were supportive of each other, but since the 1985 election the communists had been critical of PASOK. As Andreas Papandreou tried to work out a coalition with the communists, he himself became the point of impasse as the communists demanded he step down as prime minister. Just before President Sartzetakis would have been required by law to call new elections, Mitsotakis and ND formed a coalition of limited duration with the communists.¹⁹⁷ The coalition government was formed around three objectives: 1) the prosecution of any member of parliament involved in the Bank of Crete embezzlement and/or cover-up and any member of parliament that had received kick-backs on defense contracts, 2) depoliticizing Greek television and radio, and 3) handing the government over to a team of caretakers once prosecutions were well under way so that new elections could be held in October. The temporary alliance of the conservatives and communists was largely focused on the desire of both to punish socialist deputies. On other issues such as the continued operation of American military bases, the two parties were in disagreement.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ George A. Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991: An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 142-145, 149, 155.

¹⁹⁷ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 199-200.

¹⁹⁸ "The ends meet," *The Economist*, 8 July 1989: 44-45.

The prosecution of socialist deputies resulted in an indictment of Andreas Papandreou on charges of bribery in connection with the Bank of Crete embezzlement scandal. Parliament voted 165-121 to indict and set-up a 12-member tribunal to handle the criminal proceedings. Andreas Papandreou dropped the rhetoric that the scandal was a conspiracy by the American CIA and accepted political responsibility for allowing the scandal to happen during his administration. He continued to deny personal involvement however. The 12-member tribunal concluded that Andreas Papandreou took bribes on at least two occasions totaling \$600,000 drachma and \$250,000 West German marks in return for government deposits in the Bank of Crete totaling \$800 million.¹⁹⁹ Four ex-ministers were also indicted for embezzlement. Andreas Papandreou was also indicted for illegal phone-tapping of the opposition, his own aides and household. If convicted Andreas Papandreou and his ex-ministers faced life in prison.²⁰⁰

As promised, once the prosecutions were well underway, ND and the communists allowed a caretaker government to take over and prepare for November elections. Just over a month prior to the elections, a domestic terrorist group assassinated conservative deputy Pavlos Bakoyiannis, the son-in-law of ND leader Mitsotakis.²⁰¹ In a tense atmosphere over Andreas Papandreou's trial and the assassination of a parliamentary deputy, the November 1989 elections were held. New Democracy again won a plurality of the votes but still failed to win a majority as voters continued to remain loyal to PASOK despite the Bank of Crete scandal. Knowing that a coalition with either the communists or PASOK was out of the question this time, Mitsotakis sought to receive a vote of confidence from parliament for his minority government. No party wanted to hold yet another election, as that would simply mean the country would be without a

¹⁹⁹ "Greek Legislators Set Trial of Papandreou; Parliamentary Vote Endorses Bribe Charges," *The Washington Post*, 28 September 1989.

²⁰⁰ "Accusation and Assassination," *The Economist*, 30 September 1989: 63-64.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 63-64.

government for even longer.²⁰² In light of that fact, the three parties agreed to form an all-party cabinet. Former governor of the Bank of Greece, Xenophon Zolotas became the new prime minister at least until April 1990 when another election would be held. In the meantime Zolotas cut government spending and raised taxes but did not cut welfare, education or health.²⁰³ Elections were held in April 1990 and New Democracy with 47% of the vote won the slimmest of majorities. Konstantine Karamanlis was also elected president for the second time in March 1990. The conservatives had taken control of the government once more.²⁰⁴

With the smooth transfer of power from the conservative Karamanlis administration to the socialists PASOK administration, there was reason to hope that the foundation provided by Karamanlis would be built upon and political culture would stabilize and mature under PASOK. By the end of PASOK's second term the foundation provided by Karamanlis had crumbled and political culture continued to languish in a weak state. The major political parties, ND and PASOK, continued to lack a clear ideological platform. This was especially true of PASOK, which was led by the will and whim of Andreas Papandreou. For all his rhetoric of change, in practice, Andreas Papandreou's politics were very similar to those of ND. Greece remained in NATO and the EEC and the American military retained its bases in Greece. The lack of difference between ND and PASOK left the voters without choices on what direction the country should move in, since both parties were likely to implement similar politics.

The unpredictable will and whim of Andreas Papandreou weakened political culture because it constantly changed. This constant change manifested itself in the numerous cabinet

²⁰² "Greek Conservatives Lead in Votes but Fail to Win Majority of Seats," *New York Times*, 6 November 1989.

²⁰³ "Now try this one," *The Economist*, 25 November 1989: 75.

²⁰⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 202.

reshuffles. Andreas Papandreou seemed unable to define what Greece's most pressing concerns were and who was best equipped to address the problems. Andreas Papandreou also continued the tradition of family dynasties in politics by naming his eldest son, George Papandreou, Minister of Education in 1988 during the 14th cabinet shuffle of his two terms.²⁰⁵

The manipulation of election law, implication in the Bank of Crete scandal and failure to address the political tension that led to periodic outbursts of violence, destroyed not only the credibility of PASOK but of the entire system of government. Minority parties were cheated out of representative by the changes in electoral law and as such the people who supported these parties were left without a voice in government. The banking scandal and the 1985 presidential scandal illustrated that Andreas Papandreou cared not about acting in the country's best interest, but in his own and his party's best interest. With a leader who was unresponsive to the needs of the people and who had created intense political tension, violence became the outlet for frustration. The 1980s that had started on a note of promise and potential, ended in political turmoil. Political culture had not only been weakened by Andreas Papandreou's actions, but utterly destroyed. The rules of the game were nowhere near being agreed upon by ND, PASOK and the communists and each worked throughout the decade to change them in their favor. The lack of consensus stood at the core of the weakened state of political culture.

Between 1990 and 2004, the economic, social and political problems what Greece would face beginning in 2008 were largely ignored and the government simply continued its inefficient and at times corrupt ways. For most the period, from 1993-2004, PASOK was in power, so is no surprise that the domestic policies remained consistent with those seen in the 1980s. In the

²⁰⁵ "Papandreou's son in election team; George Papandreou; Greek cabinet changes," *The Times*, 23 Jun 1988.

economic boom of the 1990s, the PASOK governments spent money freely, which largely explains why Greece went bankrupt when the economic recession of 2008-2009 hit. The problems of a bloated civil service, economic inequality, modernization and government corruption were ignored.

2008-2011: Not Just an Economic Crisis

In the 1980s both the labor unions and the media outlets were largely under the control of the PASOK government. PASOK had strong ties to the labor unions and this meant that the unions had access to government officials. Television and radio were largely concentrated in the hands of a few conglomerates that also had political ties to PASOK. As such during the 1980s neither the labor unions nor the media criticized or challenged the PASOK government. After the PASOK fell in 1989, the access labor unions had to the government disappeared as New Democracy did not have close relations with the unions. By the time the current world crisis hit Greece in late 2008, labor unions had become independent political actors who frequently went on strike or organized demonstrations against government actions. The current PASOK government is also not the same PASOK party of the 1980s and does not have the same relations with the unions. PASOK relations with the media have also changed since the 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s the number of television and radio stations increased and began providing more diverse programming. Newspapers, which historically were tied to certain political parties, decreased in importance as television and radio became the main avenues for distributing information. The growth of television and radio left the political parties unable to control the way information was distributed as information began to be geared to the consumer not the

interests of the political parties.²⁰⁶ The advent of the internet allowed the Greek people access to information coming from sources outside of Greece and outside of Greece's corrupt political arena. With access to more truthful information and fewer ties to the government through labor unions, the Greek people are speaking out more frequently and in some cases more violently against the government.

The current crisis in Greece is being talked about in purely economic terms. Media coverage revolves around the EU bail-outs to Greece and the economic austerity measures that the government is proposing and implementing in order to restore the country's economy. The demonstrations, strikes, and violence by the Greek people against these government measures is also covered by the media, but the question of why the people are reacting so intensely against the government's actions remains unanswered by the media. The answer and explanation lie in the development of political culture since the restoration of democracy in 1950. The events between 1950 and 1989 led to a persistently weak political culture. Politicians manipulated electoral law, were implicated in high profile scandals and were unsuccessful in developing a diversified and vibrant economy. The economic state of the country left a wide gap between the wealthy and the average person, and society remained a vertical hierarchy. Additionally political parties remained dominated by charismatic leaders with no real core ideology. As such the political arena has remained one largely of rhetoric, not action. The weakness and inherent problems in Greece's political culture make the current economic crisis a political and social crisis as well. The people are angry at the elite politicians whose policies made it possible for

²⁰⁶ Manolis E. Paraschos, "The Greek Media Face the Twenty-First Century: Will Adam Smith Complex Replace the Oedipus Complex?" in *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Dimitri Conostas and Theofanis G. Stavrou (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 260-262.

the economic crisis to be so severe. This anger illustrates that not only is there disagreement between the political parties on what the rules of the game are, but also between the people and the politicians. For instance, the average worker believes that the government and the wealthy are responsible for the economic crisis and therefore should be the ones who provide a solution.²⁰⁷

Economically, politically and socially Greece is in crisis. At the heart of all three is the issue of trust. The people do not trust the politicians and because of this positive communication between the people and the government cannot take place and there can be no cooperation. The political culture has become so weak that the social fabric of Greece is literally coming apart at the seams. In order for the fabric to be sown back together the political culture of Greece must change. The rules of the game must be agreed upon by all political actors and by the people. The trust between elected officials and the people must also be restored. As of now however, this seems unlikely to happen in the near future.

Austerity

New Democracy held a majority in Parliament from 2004-2009 led by Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, nephew of Konstantine Karamanlis, the founder of the party, former prime minister and former president. In December 2008, events transpired that ensured ND's defeat in the 2009 elections and PASOK's victory. On December 6th a teenage boy was shot and killed by an Athenian police officer in the district of Exarchia, the home base of the anarchist movement in Athens. Not since 1985 had a teenager been shot by the police. Anarchists in the district of Exarchia started a riot in reaction to the shooting, and the rioting quickly spread to the main areas

²⁰⁷ "Greeks greet another government austerity plan, and an IMF/EU rescue package, with riots and violence," *The Economist* 6 May 2010.

of Athens. Rioting continued for four days as cars were set on fire, shop windows were smashed and petrol bombs were hurled inside. The shooting only served to enrage an already angry populous. It had been revealed that senior cabinet officials of Kostas Karamanlis's had lined their own pockets with 100 million euros during a land exchange agreement between the Vatopedi Monastery in Mount Athos and the government. Kostas Karamanlis had also hurt his chances for re-election throughout his five year term by not focusing on domestic issues such as education and unemployment.²⁰⁸ The most recent elections were held in October 2009.

PASOK, led by George Papandreou, son of Andreas Papandreou the party's founder, received 43.9% of the vote and under proportional representation electoral rules, claimed a majority in parliament with 160 of the 300 seats. ND experienced its worst showing at the polls, receiving only 33.5% and 91 seats.²⁰⁹

By the time Papandreou took office, the world recession was seriously affecting Greece and the irresponsible policies of previous administrations, both ND and PASOK, were causing a downward economic spiral and the country seemed to be moving toward bankruptcy. In response the PASOK government implemented austerity measures aimed at decreasing the budget deficit and boosting GDP. Initially austerity focused on cutting tax evasion, not on cutting public sector pay. Other measures included increasing the Value Added Tax (VAT), increasing the tax on alcohol, tobacco and fuel, freezing pension payments and cutting public sector bonuses by 30%.²¹⁰ These measures proved to be not enough however, and Papandreou approached the IMF and the EU for a bailout package. The bailout from the IMF totaled 110 billion euros to be paid out over three years. The agreement for the 110 billion euros required

²⁰⁸ "Riots of Greece put pressure on the government of Kostas Karamanlis," *The Economist* 9 December 2008.

²⁰⁹ "George Papandreou's PASOK is victorious in Greece's election," *The Economist* 5 October 2009.

²¹⁰ "Greece's new austerity measures may prove to be enough-if they are fully implemented," *The Economist* 4 March 2010.

Greece to raise the VAT from 21 to 23%, freeze civil servants' wages, eliminate bonuses for parliament deputies and civil servants, increase the tax on fuel, tobacco and alcohol by 10%, and reduce the number of exceptions that allow early retirement. The government also agreed to cut its budget by 30 billion euros.²¹¹

Another component of the IMF bailout agreement was the liberalization of the closed professions in Greece. Closed professions include pharmacists, lawyers and architects. No new licenses to practice these professions had been issued for decades. The first profession to be liberalized was trucking, or road freight. New licenses could be purchased for small fee, a dramatic change from the hundreds of thousands of euros that older licenses were sold for. In liberalizing the more than 70 closed professions, GDP would be boosted by 10% in just five years.²¹² By December of 2010 an umbrella law was set to pass to liberalize all the closed professions. As a result, pharmacists would lose their 35% guaranteed profit margin and basic fees charged by lawyers and civil engineers would be eliminated. The liberalization would result in public sector job loss for the first time in living memory.²¹³

The biggest problem plaguing Greece's finances was the bloated number of public sector workers and their generous salaries and benefits.²¹⁴ Recognizing that he had to address the problem that previous administrations had chosen to ignore, George Papandreou proposed tough austerity measures. Severance pay was reduced and minimum wages in the private sector were to be frozen for three years. First time workers would only be paid 80% of the current minimum wage and the basic retirement pension was reduced to 350 euros. While helping to ensure Greece did not go bankrupt, it was projected that the Greek economy would not grow until 2012.

²¹¹ "Greece Takes its Bailout, but Doubts for the Region Persist," *New York Times* 2 May 2010.

²¹² "Greece Liberalizes Trucking Profession," *New York Times* 22 September 2010.

²¹³ "The Greek government sees of striking truckers. Next: the other closed shops," *The Economist* 5 August 2010.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

These austerity measures, which passed parliament with a coalition of PASOK and Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) support, in combination with the required austerity measures of the IMF, were expected to save Greece 36.4 billion euros by 2014 and reduce the public deficit from 13.6% in 2009 to 2.6% in 2014.²¹⁵

Papandreou and parliament also passed measures to reform the social security and pension system. Beginning in 2015 the retirement age would be 65 for both men and women. This is an increase from 57 and 52 respectively. The minimum number of years worked before an individual could retire was also increased from 37 to 40. Furthermore the retirement age would continue to increase as life expectancy increased. Pensions would increase relative to inflation. The calculation to determine the amount of an individual's pension also changed. Originally pensions were equal to the average contribution to social security over the last five years of work. These were the years when an individual was presumably contributing the most as the individual was earning the most. In the overhaul of the system, pensions were to be equal to the average of an individual's contribution over his or her lifetime, not just the peak five years. This would greatly reduce the amount an individual would receive in pension payments. Another component to pension reform was that individuals whose pension exceeded 2,500 euros a month would no longer be eligible for the two bonuses paid every year.²¹⁶

The Reaction

The Greek people have more adamantly expressed their discontent beyond simply withdrawing their support from PASOK and ND. Public demonstrations and strikes by the labor unions and other organized groups are a part of Greek life, but since austerity measures and the

²¹⁵ "Greece sets out on long, hard road to recover," *AthensPlus* 7 May 2010: 4.

²¹⁶ "Pension system in for overhaul," *AthensPlus* 7 May 2010: 5.

IMF bailout were announced, it seems that strikes, protests and demonstrations have increased in both in frequency and intensity.

In March 2010, a general strike was held. The strike was called by the two major labor unions, which represent about 2.5 million workers. All transportation-trains, buses, the metro, ferries, trams and the airport shut down and it was reported that almost 20,000 people gather in protest in front of parliament. Trash collectors were also on strike, leaving Athens littered in trash because collection had not been performed in 6 days. The strike was in protest of the austerity measures that called for raising taxes and cutting civil servant vacation pay. Union leader Yiannis Panagopoulos articulated the workers belief that the government was trying to force the workers to pay for the economic crisis. The protest turned violent in its final stages when anarchists engaged the police. No serious injuries were reported.²¹⁷

In May, a bomb exploded inside a bank in central Athens, near center city during a major protest and three bank employees were killed. . The death of the bank employees shocked the Greek people and whether out of respect for the dead or fear that another bomb would go off, no major protests or strikes were held for several weeks.²¹⁸ When I was in Greece just over a month later, I walked past the bank that was bombed. Outside the boarded up building were flowers stacked at least a foot deep. In addition numerous notes of sympathy and prayer had been tapped up on the boards. The bombing of the bank and other violence including vandalism, petrol bombs and spontaneous attacks on the police are not committed by the tens of thousands who strike as part of a labor union, but by the estimated 500-1,000 anarchists, whose culture of petty

²¹⁷ “New Strike Paralyzes Greece,” *New York Times* 11 March 2010.

²¹⁸ Personal conversation with Katja Ehrhardt, Athens, 16 June 2010.

violence, drugs and prostitution was allowed to flourish under the conservative administration from 2004-2009.²¹⁹

On June 16, 2010 a rally in central Athens, protesting social security and pension reform, was held. The protest was organized by leftist groups who were protesting the social security and pension reforms. People both young and old gathered in Klafthmonos Square, which is about a five minute walk from center city and parliament. People carried signs and banners, and passed out pamphlets. A few speeches were made and then the group marched to parliament chanting, “this is their [the government’s and the capitalists’] crisis, find the solution.”²²⁰ Signs called for the government to tax the rich and for the people to “defect through strife.”²²¹ The banner on the stage from which the speeches were given, read, “Lay your hands down from social security!” a call for the government to cease its reforms of the social security system.²²² Other signs and banners called for the people to throw out the EU and IMF, whom they believe are part of the problem not the solution.²²³ More radical demands were also made. A pamphlet distributed by ΣΕΚ (Socialist Labor Party), read, “we demand freezing the debt, the nationalization of the banks under the control of the labor force and without compensation for the bankers. [We demand] the taxation of the rich; [we demand] forbidding lay-offs by law.”²²⁴ Leftist groups do not recognize the debt and believe that the Greek people should not pay it. They believe that the capitalists and the rich are responsible for the crisis and therefore if anyone should pay the debt it should be them.²²⁵

²¹⁹ “Not all Greece’s protestors are the same,” *The Economist* 13 May 2010.

²²⁰ Video taken in Athens, 16 June 2010.

²²¹ Photo taken in Athens, 16 June 2010.

²²² Photo taken in Athens, 16 June 2010.

²²³ Photo taken in Athens, 16 June 2010.

²²⁴ Pamphlet from the Socialist Labor Party (ΣΕΚ), “εργατική αλληλεγγύη” (labor solidarity) June 2010. www.sekis.gr.

²²⁵ Ibid.

While certainly not everyone agrees with the demands made by the groups protesting on June 16, 2010, their ideas are certainly attractive in this time of crisis. While the government clearly needs to reform many aspects of itself, the austerity measures are having a significant negative impact on the lives of average individuals. I interviewed the staff of the school I was attending to find out just what austerity meant to their personal lives. Nina, a single mother of two, told me that petrol prices, rent, food and other bills had increased dramatically and she had to be very frugal with her money. She also said that there is a huge gap between rich and poor and that the rich had gotten away with tax evasion for many years, which was contributing to the government's budget deficit.²²⁶ Maggie, a Greek-American who had been living in Greece for about four years, noted the number of small businesses that were closing and the new phenomenon of people shopping around for the best price on goods. She explained that Greeks are proud people who don't want to be seen as bargain hunters because this is a sign of being poor. Due to the crisis however, survival has trumped pride.²²⁷

In July, the government moved to liberalize the trucking industry. In response, truckers blockaded the roads leading into Athens for eight days causing widespread petrol and food shortages. 33,000 truckers protested either in front of parliament or in the blockades. The truckers were angry that their trucking licenses were no longer worth the hundreds of thousands of euros that they had paid for them.²²⁸ Those who marched to parliament chanted, "thieves," at the parliament deputies inside.²²⁹ This strike seemed to be the first major one since the protest that resulted in the bank bombing two months previous in May. Since then large protests and strikes have become more frequent and more violent.

²²⁶ Personal conversation with Nina Lorum Stamatiou, Athens, 14 June 2010.

²²⁷ Personal conversation with Maggie Tiftikidis, Athens, 16 June 2010.

²²⁸ "The Greek government sees of striking truckers. Next: the other closed shops," *The Economist* 5 August 2010.

²²⁹ "Greece Liberalizes Trucking Profession," *New York Times* 22 September 2010.

In December 2010 lawmakers voted a proposal into law that cut wages and jobs at debt-ridden public companies and watered down legislation that would have protected workers' rights. In response the seventh general strike of 2010 was called. There were three separate demonstrations in which 20,000 people from the labor unions, private sector and communist party took part. The airport was closed and ferries remained docked. Government offices and schools were also closed. Hospitals operated with emergency staff only and a news blackout occurred when journalists joined the general strike. The strike turned violent when anarchists engaged the police with petrol bombs. Kostis Hatzisakis, former ND minister and current opposition deputy in parliament, was attacked by the protesters outside of parliament and had to be escorted away by police.²³⁰

Two months later in February 2011, lawmakers moved to open up more closed professions. Their efforts were met with sit-ins at the ministry of health and walk-outs by lawyers, architects and engineers.²³¹ Later that month another general strike was called for February 23rd. Public transportation ran only limited service, while sections of the metro were closed and the airport was closed for four hours in the afternoon. Tax offices and municipalities were closed along with pharmacies. Doctors, lawyers and teachers staged a walk-out as did journalists resulting in another news blackout.²³² The mostly peaceful rally involving an estimated 30,000 people also became violent like the December strike as 15 policemen were injured when protestors threw petrol bombs at them. Nine people were arrested in connection with the violence.²³³

²³⁰ "Anti-Austerity Protest in Greece Turns Violent," *New York Times* 15 December 2010.

²³¹ "Despite impressive austerity, Greece may still be unable to repay all its debts," *The Economist* 3 February 2011.

²³² "General strike to disrupt services," *eKathimerini* 22 February 2011.

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_22/02/2011_379830

²³³ "Nine arrests at Wednesday protest rally in Athens," *eKathimerini* 24 February 2011.

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_24/02/2011_379892

Just this week, doctors announced a strike for March 30. Non-urban public hospitals will be closed and city hospitals will not be providing services from 10am to 3pm. The strike is over proposed spending cuts in the health sector and the government's refusal to renew doctors' contracts.²³⁴ Trash collectors have also been on strike recently over the municipalities' refusal to hire them with permanent contracts.²³⁵

The State of Current Political Culture

Political culture in Greece is weak. Party leadership is still dominated by elite political families and party ideology remains dominated by these elite politicians. George Papandreou, prime minister at the time of writing, is the son of Andreas Papandreou, founder of PASOK and prime minister from 1981-1989, and grandson of George Papandreou, founder of the Centre Union Party and prime minister from 1963-1965. Kostas Karamalis, prime minister from 2004-2009 as leader of ND, is the nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis, founder of ND and prime minister from 1956-1963, 1974-1980 and president from 1980-1985 and 1990-1995. So only during the military dictatorship from 1967-1974 and in the late 1990s and early 2000s was Greece under the leadership of someone not from the Karamanlis or Papandreou family. Politics is a closed profession in its own way, which in the last 60 years has created a chasm between the politic elites and the people they are supposed to represent.

At its core this chasm is a disagreement over the rules of the political game and has manifested itself into a complete distrust of the government by the Greek people. This distrust is evident in the number of daily strikes that have been occurring for a year or more now and the

²³⁴ "Doctors at public hospitals and IKA to strike," eKathimerini 25 March 2011.

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_25/03/2011_384629

²³⁵ "Standoff in trash protest continues," eKathimerini 23 March 2011.

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_16505_23/03/2011_384232

increase in scale, frequency and violence of strikes, demonstrations, rallies and protests. It is clear that the people do not trust the government to solve the country's problems and by extension the people's problems in a way that is economically sound and politically free of scandal. Given the track record of the government since the 1950s this is not an unreasonable belief for the people to have. Corrupt government officials have plagued the Greek government with scandals since the restoration of democracy in 1950. The violent outbursts and massive strikes speak to the severity of the current crisis. Both have happened before, but like the present instances, only occurred when the situation in Greece became seriously unstable. Combine the current economic volatility with the government's shabby track record in righting such situations and the current situation is not unexpected or unpredictable.

As stated, striking and demonstrating are not new features of Greek politics. These tactics have been used by various groups for the past 60 years as a way of trying to make clear to the government how people felt about policies and what various groups of people wanted to see the government do about various issues. Violent protests are also not new. The most obvious example would be the confrontation between students and the junta in 1973 at the Polytechnic University. Labor unrest in the 1960s also led to confrontations with police as did political instability from 1965-1967. The current instances of violence are a product of the continued weakness of the political culture. The scandals of the government and its inability to put Greece on the path to economic stabilization have left the people feeling disconnected from and distrustful of the political elite. As such, the people believe that the government does not understand their plight nor is the government interested in doing anything about it. As a result, the people are doing the only thing they know to do: strike, demonstrate and protest, hoping that

if they shout loudly enough the government will not only listen to their demands but make policy decisions in accordance with them.

Consequences of the Current Crisis

What happens to the Greek political system and Greece's political culture because of the current crisis will have a lot to do with what actions the current government takes in trying to find a solution to the situation. There are three possible outcomes of the current crisis: 1) this crisis serves as the catalyst for real institutional and culture change, 2) the system survives the way it is and Greece continues on its current path, or 3) the political system unravels and collapses.

If corruption is rooted out and a more transparent democracy emerges, a foundation for real institutional change would be laid and with it the possibility of the political culture maturing. There is a segment of the population that believes the government is handling the crisis well, even though austerity measures have brought hardship to peoples' lives. Within this segment of the population are those who feel that the problems Greece is experiencing will spread to other countries and bring about change in those countries as well. These individuals view this change as both positive and exciting.²³⁶

Not everyone is as optimistic about the potential for change. Corruption is present at all levels of government and has contributed to the weak political culture since the restoration of democracy in 1950. In order for an honest system to be realized, corruption must be attacked at all levels, including the top politicians. While politicians have attacked corruption at the lower levels of government, the same political faces have remained atop the political hierarchy. There

²³⁶ Personal conversation with Katja Ehrhardt, Athens, 16 June 2010.

are no new faces in politics and the continued domination by well connected families sends the message that it is okay for politicians to line their own pockets at the expense of the people. As Nina put it, cleaning of the political house needs to start at the top.²³⁷ Political party leaders, parliament deputies, ministers and the prime minister himself should be the first to go. This seems an unlikely course of action for Greece to take and as such many believe Greece will simply survive this crisis as it has survived other economic downturns and political scandals without changing the system to prevent something like this from happening again. The politicians and the political interests are too invested in the current system to simply step down and let a new group of people try their hands at the reins.

The final possible outcome, a collapse of the political system, is certainly the most pessimistic view, but may not be that far off the mark. Many Greeks feel that the country is in fact headed toward such a collapse because the use of patronage by the political parties will ultimately exhaust the country's finances.²³⁸ Also of concern, besides the dire state of Greece's finances, is the fact that support for the two main political parties, PASOK and ND, has dropped significantly. In February 2011, polling conducted by the newspaper *Eleftheros Typos* found that if an election was held now PASOK would win with only 23.5% of the vote, while ND would receive 20% of the vote. Another poll had similar results. PASOK received support from 26.1% of respondents and ND received support from 22.7%.²³⁹ This means that a majority (over 50%) of the population does not support either of the two main political parties. It is possible

²³⁷ Personal conversations with Nina Lorum Stamatiou, Athens, 14 June 2010 and Vassia Vassiliou, Athens, 15 June 2010.

²³⁸ "Greeks greet another government austerity plan, and an IMF/EU rescue package, with riots and violence," *The Economist* 6 May 2010.

²³⁹ "Two polls show government with narrowing lead as ND leader insists it is 'close to collapse,'" *eKathimerini* 20 February 2011. http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_20/02/2011_379485.

then that this majority will seek a new leader outside of the traditional political arena. The traditional political parties have failed to provide the people with significant economic improvement and the scandals and corruption have served only to make the government seem untrustworthy. The corruption and scandals have tainted every politician in the current political system and as such people may abandon the traditional parties in favor of a charismatic leader from outside the political elite who promises them real change and an honest government. As it stands now, no charismatic leader of the people has emerged.

Cliché as it may be, only time will tell which of the three possible outcomes will result. If George Papandreou is able to seriously cut the civil service down to size, root out corruption, and deal effectively with the country's debt, Greece may be able to emerge with a truly changed system that values the democracy. Standing in his way are PASOK nationalists who do not like the fact that George Papandreou is trying to move the country onto a more moderate path. It seems unlikely that Greece will simply survive this crisis due to its magnitude economically, politically and socially. If George Papandreou fails to tackle the issues that have plagued the political system for decades, it is likely that the political system will collapse. What the political system will be replaced with following such a collapse is unclear. What is known is that a collapse would bring about change, however change is not always for the better. The best option for Greece is to seek political change and to that end to support the austerity measures of George Papandreou recognizing that rock bottom has yet to be hit and things may get much worse before they get any better. If this path is followed, in the long run Greece will be a more efficient and more mature country and trust can be restored between the people and the government. If Papandreou is only able to make some of the needed reforms, another crisis in the future will be

the inevitable result. It is simply better to deal with problems now instead of putting them off and allowing them to fester into the future as previous administrations have done for decades.

What fate will befall Greece's political system may be answered in the next election. The next election is not scheduled to take place until 2014, so the three years until then are critical. If the people and the government can find a way to cooperate between now and then, the political system has a chance to change and allow for the political culture to mature in the future. If the people and the government cannot find common ground however, the country should be prepared to face political collapse in the 2014 elections.

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Photos taken at a pension reform rally, Klafthmonos Square, Athens, 16 June 2010.

Academic Vita

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Current Address: 228 S. Garner Street Apt. 203 State College, PA 16801

Education:

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa

Schreyer Honors College

Double major in History and CAMS, Bachelor of Arts expected May 2011

Double minor in Political Science and International Studies

Dean's List all semesters

Thesis Title: Trends in Political Culture in Post-World War II Greece: An Explanation of Greece's Current Crisis

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Tobias Brinkmann

International Education:

Athens Center Study Abroad Program, Athens, Greece; Spring 2009

Athens Center Intensive Language Program, Athens, Greece; June 2010

Employment:

PSU Intramural Sports Supervisor, Penn State University (August 2008 to present)

Oversee referees and players in a variety of sports depending on the season and officiate any sport if needed

Handle administrative tasks including organizing all paperwork pertaining to the that evening's games and signing in and out all equipment for the night

Work with other supervisors to answer questions and administer disciplinary action should such a situation arise

Grading Assistant, Penn State University (August 2010 to December 2010)

Grade 75 weekly multiple choice quizzes and objective sections of 3 exams

Digital Scholarship Lab Research Intern, University of Richmond (June 2009 to August 2009 & May 2010 to August 2010)

Assisted with research and development of digital history projects, particularly "Redlining Richmond" (<http://americanpast.richmond.edu/holc>)

Gained computer skills by working with databases, Google maps, Arc GIS, KML files and computer coding in website development

Grants:

Schreyer Ambassador Travel Grant

Awards and Professional Memberships:

CAMS Student Marshal

Gelder Scholarship in the Liberal Arts

President's Sparks Award
President's Freshman Award
Eugene N. Borza Award
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