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STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION PARTY SUPPORT
UNDER AN ELECTORAL CAUDILLO

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ABSTRACT

An electoral caudillo is a semi-democratic leader who manipulates electoral contests to maintain his hold on executive power. In Latin America, this type of strong central leadership has become increasingly popular as citizens seek alternatives to democratic systems which they view as corrupt and inefficient. However, authoritarian qualities of electoral caudillo rule can prevent democratic consolidation and national development. This paper examines the structural characteristics of electoral caudillismo, specifically noting factors which may lead to increased opposition party support. Those factors are tested using a unique *municipio*-level dataset, which suggests that low levels of government funding, high quality of life, and weak clientelistic networks of the previous party system are associated with higher levels of opposition support. The data also underscore the importance of political contention which adheres to the minimum standards of democratic conduct.

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INTRODUCTION

The 1998 Venezuelan presidential elections which first brought Hugo Chávez Frías into power marked a critical juncture for democracy in Venezuela. After rewriting the constitution in 1999 with the approval of an electoral majority, Chávez began his assault on the limited democratic institutions of his predecessors, exchanging them for a political model which he named “Twenty-First Century Socialism” (Monaldi et al. 2006, 18; Corrales and Penfold 2007, 100-101). The political system of modern-day Venezuela — characterized by a centralized executive power, a subservient judiciary, and a weak legislature — falls far short of the liberal democratic ideal.

Hugo Chávez exemplifies the electoral caudillo: a semi-democratic ruler who mixes shallow democratic institutions with authoritarian ambitions of longevity in office. Once in power, he dismantles the constraints necessary for liberal forms of democracy, including all institutional checks and balances which would impede the power of the executive (Coppedge 2005, 292). He is thus free to manipulate the political order to his advantage.

At the same time, the electoral caudillo maintains democratic legitimacy both domestically and internationally through free and fair elections, directing all social policies towards his electoral majority as the sole benefactor. In Latin America, poor governmental performance over the past two decades has led to widespread disillusionment with democracy, especially for those who became marginalized under their political and economic system (UNDP 2010, 198-199; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2005, 52; Monaldi et al. 2006, 62; Morgan 2007; Landi 1995, 205). Widespread popular resentment fuels the campaign of the electoral caudillo, who casts himself as a democratic outsider untainted by the failures of the contemporary political

elite (Hellinger 2006, 5-6). He attracts votes by promising economic redistribution and societal inclusion to citizens who failed to integrate successfully in the democratic system.

Despite structural changes which undermine liberal democracy, Close argues that once the electoral caudillo is removed from office, a future government could reopen the system without radical, extra-constitutional actions (2004, 3). For this change to occur, opposition forces must be able to preserve enough societal support to facilitate an opening towards liberal democracy, despite the characteristics of electoral caudillismo which overwhelmingly favor the power of the incumbent (Diamond 2002, 24). History has demonstrated successful democratic transitions from electoral caudillismo.¹ However, current research fails to provide a systematic explanation of why opposition support emerges in some areas, but not in others.

Political opening is not the only future path available for an electoral caudillo — there is also a chance that he will turn to more autocratic measures rather than opening his system to fairer electoral competition (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52; Diamond 1996, 31). Thus, every advance towards a more liberalized system is important, “both for the prospect of a transition to democracy and for the quality of political life as it is daily experienced by abused and aggrieved citizens” (Diamond 2002, 33).

This project seeks to contribute to this literature by answering the following question: *What factors enable opposition forces to conserve significant electoral strength under a regime of electoral caudillismo?* Elections serve as the sole constraint on executive power under the caudillo. Thus, the ability of domestic forces to set their country on a path towards liberal democracy relies upon the ability of viable alternatives to attract societal support. This work fills an important scholarly gap by highlighting specific factors which favor the relative strength of opposition forces under an electoral caudillo.

¹ For an in-depth discussion of the Nicaraguan case, see Close and Deonandan (2004).

This paper will begin by identifying characteristics of electoral caudillismo, highlighting the roles of a participatory democratic structure and charismatic leadership. An examination of relevant literature will reveal testable hypotheses which predict the characteristics of opposition support.

THE ELECTORAL CAUDILLO AS IDEAL TYPE

First emerging in the political and social chaos which surrounded the Latin American war for independence, the traditional caudillo is a charismatic leader who relies upon coercive force and pointed rhetoric to gain and maintain his position of power. Over time, theorists translated the caudillo concept to unconsolidated democratic regimes characterized by weak party system institutionalization, independent media, and economic distress. Both the traditional and “new” caudillos emerge to fill a vacuum of political authority, and rely upon a carefully-crafted image of strong non-party leadership to gain followers (Landi 1995, 205-206; 211). Democracy under an electoral caudillo lacks institutional depth — the leader, allegedly representing the will of the people, is free to act arbitrarily without bureaucratic constraint (Close 2004, 4-5).

Electoral caudillos are proponents of *participatory democracy*, a system which emphasizes the direct influence of citizen voting on decisions which affect the country as a whole (Ellner 2010, 79). This Rousseauian interpretation of democratic institutions grants the president a great degree of centralized power and legitimacy through frequent referenda and elections (Myers 2008, 286; Ellner 2010, 80). Under an electoral caudillo, the system becomes delegative in nature. Once the president wins the support of an electoral majority, he is able to govern according to his interpretation of the “will of the people” (O’Donnell 1994, 59). Under these circumstances, the voices of all political outsiders are strangled by the majority

Under an electoral caudillo, this majority does not fully dictate the actions of the leader. The causal arrow points in the opposite direction—the electoral caudillo manipulates the electorate to serve his own needs using a charismatic style of leadership. Charismatic leaders do not arise from the traditional political realm, but are rare “holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit” rendering them worthy of political office (Weber 1946, 245). They reject formal institutional structures in favor of rule by the virtue of charisma, which appeals directly to a specific group of constituents. Objective economic rationality is not a necessary goal for the charismatic leader—he depends on an ability to “prove himself” and the validity of his “divine mission” to his followers so they fare well under his rule (Weber 1946, 246-249). As an electoral caudillo, Chávez emulates this deistic political rhetoric²: he dogmatically caters to marginalized sectors of the population and rejects traditional forms of power articulation in Venezuela in a revolutionary quest to create a “new” democracy (Tucker 1968, 733; Hawkins 2010, 28). So far, he has been able to maintain his position by because his constituents continue to fare relatively well under his leadership³.

Reforms that Reverse Structural Differentiation

Once in power, the electoral caudillo initiates a process of centralization and eliminates organizations that link masses to their government. Through constitutional manipulation or revision, the caudillo strips threatening groups of their political authority in an attempt to reduce the possibility of electoral challenge. Despite concentration of power in the hands of the electoral

² Tucker does not conceptualize charismatic authority as a traditional religious artifact, although he notes that Weber drew the concept from religious theory. Within modern secular society, “modern political religion” can still influence political actions of individuals (1968, 733).

³ The subject of populism, which has become a particularly nebulous term in the social sciences, was purposefully avoided in this paper to avoid analytical confusion. For discussion of Chávez as a populist leader, see Hawkins (2010).

caudillo, outward forms of formal democratic institutions remain intact. Courts and legislative bodies continue to execute limited duties. Elections are held regularly, but they are compromised by regulatory favoritism towards those who support the electoral caudillo (Close 2004, 3; Tarre 2011, 138-139).

Political parties, organized labor, and civil society organizations also serve a different purpose under the electoral caudillo, especially if access to his movement dictates the availability of finances and job opportunities (Ellner 2003, 141). In essence, the caudillo seeks to destroy the autonomy of all political institutions, which enables a tighter control of national, state, and local governments (Monaldi et al. 2006, 39). Institutional manipulation enables the caudillo to win critical majorities in elections which are generally seen as free and fair, while masking the gross asymmetry of political influence which characterizes the system.

In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez initiated centralizing structural reforms immediately after voters approved the 1999 constitution. This document grants the president a wide range of policy tools, allowing him to call for popular referendums, to authorize or discard laws, to amend the constitution, or call for a Constitutional Assembly vested with plenipotentiary powers (Monaldi et al. 2006, 43-44). With two-thirds legislative support from the *Asamblea Nacional*⁴ (National Assembly, AN), Chávez can bypass AN discretion in proposal and approval of laws through the *Ley Habilitante* (Enabling Law). This “blank check” grants wide unilateral ability to institute significant legal changes which can be extended up to a period of eighteen months (Myers 2011, 270-271).

⁴ The 1999 constitution weakened the relative power of the AN, but its final blow was dealt by the opposition movement. Five major opposition parties boycotted the 2005 national legislative elections after disputing the validity of the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (National Electoral Council, CNE), the governmental body which oversees elections. As a result, 114 of the 167 seats were filled with politicians from Chávez’s *Movimiento V República* (Fifth Republic Movement, MVR) party, while the remaining 53 seats were mainly filled with pro-government representatives (Sullivan 2009, 7-8).

To tame the judiciary, Chávez appointed pro-government magistrates during the 1999 Constituent Assembly, and expanded the bench in 2004 to include more pro-Chávez voices (Monaldi et al. 2006, 47). With sufficient societal support, it has become relatively simple for Chávez to manipulate the governmental structure to his favor once horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms are destroyed (Corrales and Penfold 2011, 8).

Elections and the Ability of the Electoral Caudillo to Dominate

A key component of the electoral caudillo's power and claims to democratic legitimacy lies in his ability to use elections to dominate competition (O'Donnell 1994, 60; Myers 2011, 300). Because the political system is centralized and malleable, voter behavior plays an enabling role. The electoral caudillo's power is rooted in a relatively clean electoral process, so the caudillo must always appear to serve the interests of his majority to maintain their support (Close 2004, 5). Widespread acceptance of democratic procedures throughout the Americas has rendered authoritarian seizure of power undesirable; rejection of procedural democracy may be observed by election monitors, and the ability of international actors to sanction⁵ the regime has lessened leaders' incentives to fully consolidate authoritarianism (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005, 42-43). Maintaining a minimally fair election process creates a façade of democracy which can be displayed to international observers who will certify the validity of the process (Close 2004, 196), thereby destroying opposition claims of outright electoral fraud.

As previously noted, the electoral caudillo first emerges as a strong presidential contender untainted by political party involvement, thereby separating himself from the shortcomings of previous administrations (Myers 2011, 281). Using the powers of the presidency he personally

⁵ While groups such as the Organization of American States and Mercosur are able to exert pressure on authoritarian regimes, they are relatively powerless to deepen democracy, or steer semi-democratic regimes towards more liberal governance (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005, 51)

dominates national elections to maintain his office, while state and local-level elections are used as a mechanism to monitor supporters and establish linkages with voters. Sub-national expressive voting represents an opportunity for citizens to oversee local officials and monitor their ability to meet their communities' needs. The local candidate selection process rewards effective politicians, and proscribes candidates who are unable to please their constituents (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 408; Magaloni 2006, 20). Pro-caudillo state and local government officials are also rewarded with increased social funding from the federal government (Corrales and Penfold 2007, 106). The responsiveness of sub-national governments ultimately allows the electoral caudillo to defeat challengers from the grassroots to the national level (Boix and Svulik 2007, 28).

The form of political organization favored by the electoral caudillo does not mirror the functions of an institutionalized political party. Instead, the electoral caudillo's popular movement serves as a mechanism for securing funds to buy votes, distributing exclusive benefits, and generally keeping the head of state in power (Close 2004, 5). This mechanism can become self-enforcing as incumbents use funds strategically to gain support and weaken the opposition in contested areas (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 407; Magaloni 2006, 124-125). If his electoral vehicle becomes fragmented or dysfunctional, the caudillo creates a new organization which better serves his needs. When the *Movimiento V República* (Fifth Republic Movement, MVR) no longer served the purposes of Hugo Chávez, he created the *Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV) to attract new allies and strengthen his hold over the electoral system (Hawkins 2010, 24-25).

The caudillo largely relies on clientelism, or the selective dispersion of governmental patronage funds, to buy voter support (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 407; Myers 2011, 300). The

goods are not benefit all members of the public equally — they systematically exclude certain sectors to create an incentive for desired behavior (Carrasquero 2006). Benefits need not be restricted to the financial realm—they can also include membership in social groups or opportunities for professional enhancement (Blanco 2006, 68). The electoral caudillo relies upon these linkage mechanisms to secure his “mass constituencies” (Roberts 2006, 127), so he can count on their continued support of his regime. Given their dependence on these exclusionary networks, electoral caudillos are most likely to emerge whenever ties between politicians and their constituents are already operating at least partially in a clientelistic mode. This facilitates the vertical transfer of funds from political leaders to their clients⁶.

There is ample evidence of clientelistic spending within Venezuela, where federalist rules governing resource distribution have been rendered ineffective by the operational reality that Chávez manipulates funds for the benefit of his constituency (Monaldi et al. 2006, 41). Chávez receives the majority of these funds from the petroleum industry, which is controlled by the state-run *Petróleos de Venezuela*, PDVSA) (Myers 2011, 296). It is impossible to estimate the exact amount Chávez has invested in clientelistic spending, but the government controls substantial oil revenues that are not subject to legislative supervision (Corrales and Penfold 2007, 106).

In Venezuela, the formation of clientelistic linkages between parties and their constituents can be traced back to policies implemented during the first democratic era of 1945-1948 (Hawkins 2010, 2). When limited liberal democracy returned in 1958 party leaders who held power from 1958 to 1998 developed a system to exploit state oil profits for political

⁶ The distinction between public goods provision and political clientelism can be subtle. The former benefits the population as a whole and generally cannot be restricted to certain sectors. The latter is directed towards a specific group of people in return for desirable political behavior, and can be withheld as a form of coercion to deter and punish unwanted actions (Magaloni 2006, 65; Close 2004, 5).

support, which began declining during the mid-1980's (Gil 1981; Myers 2004, 25). Since his election in 1998, Chávez has deepened governmental dependence upon the clientelistic policies favored by his predecessors. Myers notes that opposition forces are weakest in “precisely the regions where *Acción Democrática* (Democratic Action, AD) had been most dominant between 1946 and 1998” (2011, 286). This suggests a correlation between territories dominated by the main parties of the *Punto Fijo* system and territories currently supportive of Hugo Chávez.

COORDINATING IN OPPOSITION

“Los escuálidos que se organicen para elecciones, que se organicen, no le tenemos miedo...”⁷”

President Hugo Chávez Frías, commenting on opposition preparations for the 2012 presidential elections

For the electoral caudillo, opposition groups are a necessary evil, not a valued component of the political regime. Opposition candidates are vital to the appearance of democratic integrity in elections (Przeworski 1991, 10), yet the competing forces must not be allowed to threaten control by the caudillo (Blanco 2006, 71). Consequently, opposition forces begin their struggle from a position which is precariously legitimate and subject to regular subversion from the regime. As the charismatic leader in a participatory democracy, the electoral caudillo has little incentive to respect the rights of *los escualidos* (the squalid ones)—a moniker frequently used by Chávez to describe his political adversaries. Any expression of dissent, especially when directed toward the goals or authority of the electoral caudillo, considered to be an unwelcome threat to the unity of the hegemonic popular movement (Hawkins 2010, 5-6).

The caudillo actively suppresses minority opinion in an effort to sustain an electoral majority. He controls his political allies, strategically lending them financial and human resources to gain the upper hand in elections. The caudillo's popular movement controls

⁷ “The squalid ones that are organizing for elections, let them organize, we are not afraid...”(My translation). Words delivered at Los Proceres, Caracas on March 26, 2011 (“Presidente Chávez”).

distribution of government funds, limiting opponents' capability to organize and grow. Thus, opposition leaders must look to private companies for financial support (Randall and Svåsand 2002, 8). This resource asymmetry, as well as factionalization and candidate manipulation, contributes to the relative weakness of opposition candidates.

Use of the singular noun “opposition” to refer to the general political rejection of a caudillo can mask the complexity and internal inconsistencies in the groups which fight against the regime (Blanco 2007, 70). Differences rooted in regional biases, elite disagreements, funding discrepancies, exogenous shocks, and lack of societal credibility can all inhibit intra-opposition cooperation (Randall and Svåsand 2002, 20-23). To meaningfully compete with the electoral caudillo's popular movement, the diverse currents in the opposition must unite and present an unified vision for the country, proving themselves to be a possible political option once the caudillo is removed from power (Magaloni 2006, 25; Corrales and Penfold 2007, 108; Blanco 2006, 73). Remaining divided and uncoordinated, which decreases voter confidence and lowers electoral turnout rates (Rivas Leone 2006, 54), guarantees defeat by the electoral caudillo.

Recognizing the value of a divided opposition, the electoral caudillo creates policies designed to fragment and undermine his challengers. In the Venezuelan case, Hugo Chávez has placed the supposedly “neutral” *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (National Electoral Council, CNE) under his control (Brookings 2010, 44). In 2004, opposition supporters faced job discrimination after the Tascón List⁸, which contained identifying information for every individual who signed the petition supporting a presidential recall vote, was distributed throughout the private sector (Hsieh et al. 2009, 3-5; 15). This “blatant violation” of democratic principles led opposition and

⁸ The 2004 presidential recall referendum required signatures from 20 percent of Venezuela's electorate, which—due to legal maneuvering by Chávez allies—was only possible after three separate petition drives between 2002 and late 2003. The results of the third petition, which were publicly available on the CNE website prior to the referendum, were later packaged into database software called *Maisanta*, which divulged the area of residence of all registered voters as well as whether they signed any petition. This list has been used by private sector employers to discriminate against citizens who signed the third petition (see Hsieh et al. 2009).

undecided voters to question ballot secrecy. Fear of retaliation, as well as a non-neutral electoral council, reduces each individual's incentive to vote according to his or her preferences, suppressing opposition totals and increasing abstention levels (Corrales and Penfold 2011, 27-28). Chávez's attacks on freedom of the press and private opposition media have increased over time, which limits the flow of non-governmental information for those who cannot afford outside sources of information (Brookings 2010, 48; Myers 2010, 301).

The electoral caudillo gains further leverage by preventing popular opposition candidates from taking office. This type of intervention was particularly obvious in the campaigning and aftermath of the 2008 regional elections. The Comptroller General placed 270 individuals, 200 of which were opposition candidates, under suspicion of corruption, blocking their participation in the races (Corrales and Penfold 2011, 36). One notable opposition politician affected by this measure was Leopoldo López, head of *Voluntad Popular* (Popular Will, VP), a candidate who had steadily been gaining prominence in the anti-Chávez movement (Brookings 2010, 46). After Manuel Rosales, who ran against Chávez for the presidency in 2006, was elected mayor of Maracaibo in 2008, he was accused of corruption and forced to seek exile in Peru. The new opposition mayor of Greater Caracas faced a similar fate: in 2009 the National Assembly stripped Antonio Ledezma of administrative responsibilities which left him effectively powerless (Corrales and Penfold 2011, 36-37).

Importance of Electoral Competition

As noted earlier, the strength of an electoral caudillo rests on the continuing electoral support of his constituency. Once he has dismantled institutional constraints, elections are one of the few constitutionally-sanctioned mechanisms which can curb his influence. Because the

electoral caudillo relies upon electoral manipulation and representation of *el sovereigno*⁹ (the sovereign), strengthening opposition political parties is viewed as thwarting the “Will of the People” in the sense of Rousseau (O’Donnell 1994, 62). The electoral caudillo is aware that competition among party alternatives gives citizens greater leverage on their government through electoral accountability, which is a key component of democratic representation (Randall and Svåsand 2002, 7; Mainwaring et al. 2006, 32).

A weak opposition, of course, relinquishes the opportunity to curb government policies, enabling the caudillo to rule with essentially zero constraints. Ineffective opposition also leads to increased arbitrariness, authoritarianism, and corruption, which may generate further instability and violence (Tanaka 2006, 69). If his hold on power is sufficiently threatened, the electoral caudillo’s commitment to keeping the opposition weak can slip easily into outright authoritarian rule (Mainwaring et al. 2006, 30).

Hybrid¹⁰ regimes such as the electoral caudillo have surfaced in many locations over the past decades. Since the “Third Wave of Democracy” broke in the 1980’s, two kinds of democratic systems have gained traction (Huntington 1997, 4). Representative liberal democracy, initially dominant, has given way to hybrid political systems which do not function in a fully democratic manner. In other words, although the number of regimes that employ elections has increased over the last two decades, the quality of democracy, at least from the liberal perspective, has been eroding (Diamond 1996, 28). Other Latin American presidents who have been accused of electoral caudillismo include Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (Alcántara 2007, 15).

⁹ In the parlance of Hugo Chávez, the electoral majority is referred to as “the sovereign.”

¹⁰ Hybrid regimes are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. The chief executive rules through dominant-power politics, and the opposition is afforded limited yet real political space (McCoy and Myer 2003).

If opposition forces are able to overcome the structural and political manipulation which characterizes the government of these electoral caudillos, they may be able to co-opt portions of the electoral majority and peacefully gain control of the country. In cases where the opposition is unable to directly remove the electoral caudillo from office, competition between powerful opposition and pro-government forces can encourage policy moderation on both sides. This reduces of societal polarization as the caudillo is forced to expand his policies to include centrist voters as well as his traditional constituency (Coppedge 1993, 267; Corrales and Penfold 2011, 158). However, currently scholarly literature fails to identify exactly where or why opposition movements are able to gain support in some areas and not others.

EXPLAINING OPPOSITION SURVIVAL UNDER THE ELECTORAL CAUDILLO

This work fills a major hole by investigating the sources of opposition strength under an electoral caudillo. There has been little work devoted to the topic—some authors qualitatively examine the obstacles faced by these movements (e.g. Corrales and Penfold 2011, Close 2004, Hawkins 2010), but no studies systematically identify and test which structural factors allow opposition forces to do well at the polls.

This study operationalizes opposition electoral support as the percentage of votes cast for candidates who have not aligned themselves with the *chavista* (pro-Chávez) popular movement. The dependent variable, *Opposition*¹¹, thus captures all opposition activity in each *municipio* for the ten elections coded between 1998 and 2008¹². The study is limited to the four western

¹¹ For a more in-depth explanation of the dependent variable, see Appendix A.

¹² The ecological dataset contains municipio-level results of three presidential elections (1998, 2000, and 2006), two gubernatorial elections (2004, and 2008), three mayoral elections (2000, 2004, and 2008), one National Assembly election (2005), and the 2004 revocatory referendum in which the electoral caudillo or his party apparatus was

Venezuelan states of Mérida, Táchira, Trujillo, and Zulia, which share a common history of strong democratic governance and essentially comparative levels of development. Restricting analysis to a single geographic region helps eliminate contextual differences exogenous to the model which may confound the results (Myers 1975).

The work examined above suggests four hypotheses regarding how opposition forces have been able to acquire and hold electoral support in Venezuela despite the dominance of the electoral caudillo Hugo Chávez. Each hypothesis is outlined below, along with a brief discussion of the independent variables¹³ chosen to test the posited relationship.

HYPOTHESIS 1: As resources per capita allocated to the *municipio* by the Chávez government increases, support for the opposition in the *municipio* decreases.

(Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 407; Magaloni 2006, 124-125; Tanaka 2006, 28; Myers 2011, 300; Corrales and Penfold 2007, 106; Corrales and Penfold 2011, 43)

Due to opacity of the internal workings of the Venezuelan government, the true amount of money allocated to each sub-national unit is impossible to determine. Nonetheless, social policy under an electoral caudillo functions as “a key instrument” to build support (Corrales and Penfold 2011, 11). Bolivarian *misiones* (missions) are the keystone of *chavista* social policy, and one of the most visible forms of mass political clientelism in Venezuela. The *misiones* use their funding from *Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.* (PDVSA), the state-owned petroleum company, to target spending with the goal of electoral co-optation (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 64; 80). Thus, the prevalence of *misión* activities¹⁴ within each *municipio* indicates the strength of clientelism in the area. The independent variable will be operationalized as the average number of *municipio*

involved. Ideally, the 1998 gubernatorial election, 2000 legislative, and 2000 gubernatorial elections would also have been included, but data availability was severely restricted.

¹³ For further variable specification and explanation, see Appendix A.

¹⁴ These data were only available for the end of 2005, restricting all analysis of Hypothesis 1 to the 2006 Presidential election data.

residents for each outpatient clinic operated by *Misión Barrio Adentro*¹⁵, the oldest *misión* which provides routine medical care to poor residents.

HYPOTHESIS 2: The strength of the vote for opposition candidates will rise as increases occur in the indices of quality of life in the municipio.

(Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 408; Hellinger 2006, 11; Corrales and Penfold 2007, 106)

Current literature suggests that the effectiveness of clientelistic goods¹⁶ on electoral behavior depends upon the voter's dependence on governmental support. An individual with access to few resources will tend to not risk exclusion from the clientelistic exchange, while citizens of higher socioeconomic status would benefit comparatively less from the same level of government handouts (Lyne 2008, 51-52). If a citizen is less vulnerable to the material effects of redistribution and social policy, he or she will be more likely to vote for opposition candidates (Hawkins and Hansen 2006, 124-125; Corrales and Penfold 2007, 104-105; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 410).

To examine the relationship between quality of life and voter behavior, two variables will be used as proxy measures. Years of Potential Life Lost (*YPPL*) is an estimate of the average years a person would have lived if he or she had not died prematurely. A low *YPPL* measure suggests that residents are wealthy enough to access the resources required for better health, enjoy a comparatively higher quality of life, and will thus be more likely to vote for opposition candidates. The hypothesis will also be tested using the proportion of elderly municipio residents over age 65. This sector of the population tends rely more heavily upon government services due to retirement and or reduced income levels, and thus may benefit more from clientelistic policies.

¹⁵As noted in Appendix A, the raw data for ppBarrio were highly skewed right. Thus, the variable was log-transformed for inclusion in the regression analysis.

¹⁶Benefits can be conceptualized as either material or psychological. This work focuses solely on the material benefits.

HYPOTHESIS 3: The higher the proportion of votes received by traditionally dominant parties in the *municipio* in elections during the *Punto Fijo* period, the lower will be the support for opposition movements once Hugo Chávez entered the electoral arena.

(Close 2004, 5; Myers 2011, 286)

Close (2004) and Myers (2011) argue that the success of the electoral caudillo is due to his cooptation of the clientelistic networks which were previously managed by other powerful parties. Thus, *municipios* where AD and COPEI (*Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela*, Social Christian Party of Venezuela)—the two strongest parties in the previous *Punto Fijo* system—received significant support before democratic breakdown would show less support for opposition movements. The 1989 mayoral results proved to be the conceptually ideal test case: this election was the first in which mayors were directly elected by the population, and the last election before the two military coups of 1992, which severely affected citizen confidence in governments led by AD. Furthermore, the mayoral elections would capture the local-level relationships between candidates and *municipio* residents better than the results of the gubernatorial elections held the same year.

HYPOTHESIS 4: The lower the number of effective opposition parties that participate in an election within the *municipio*, the higher will be the total vote for all opposition movements.

(Magaloni 2006, Corrales and Penfold 2007, 108; Tanaka 2006, 70; Rivas Leone 2006, 55)

Fragmentation poses a particularly difficult problem for opposition forces. As mentioned earlier, lack of coordination between factions severely reduces the power of the opposition movement as a whole. When faced with a myriad of small parties, citizens tend to vote strategically for the largest party, or completely abstain from the elections (Perea 2003, 656). Indirect threats from the government, such as the *Maisanta* incident, further decrease the incentives for citizens to vote for anti-Chávez candidates. Areas where opposition movements

are coordinated should show higher overall opposition support because citizens would be less likely to abstain or vote strategically when presented with an opposition movement which is united behind fewer, electorally viable candidates. To assess the effects of fragmentation on opposition support, the effective number of opposition parties in each *municipio* for each election will be used¹⁷.

In addition to the variables tested above, three control variables were also added to the regression analysis. Concentration of population in the *municipio* capital is used as a proxy measure for urbanization levels, along with controls for population size and abstention rates.

Results and Interpretation

To test the explanatory power of the hypotheses drawn from the literature, each of the independent variables was regressed¹⁸ on the total vote-share earned by opposition parties in each *municipio* over the ten elections coded in the dataset. Table 1 summarizes the results of each model.

As discussed elsewhere, isolating and testing the effects of clientelistic spending in a country known for financial opacity is difficult, if not impossible. The number of *Misión Barrio Adentro* outpatient clinics serves as a good theoretical proxy for government investment, but the data are only available for 2005. As a result, Model 1 is restricted to the regression analysis of only the 2006 presidential elections¹⁹.

¹⁷ See Appendix A for details.

¹⁸ Regression analysis is appropriate in this case because the dependent variable can assume on any value between zero and 100, essentially mimicking a continuous range. Skewed variables were normalized whenever appropriate to adhere to the rules of regression analysis

¹⁹ Because of the low number of observations included in Model 1, the control variables of population and urbanization were excluded from the analysis.

TABLE 1: DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION STRENGTH

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2.1</i>	<i>Model 2.2^a</i>	<i>Model 2.3^a</i>
Residents per Barrio Adentro clinic (log)	3.05** (1.30)	-	-	-
YPLL	-0.02 (0.24)	0.12 (0.11)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.89)
Elderly Population	0.07 (0.88)	-1.72*** (0.38)	-1.33*** (0.32)	-1.20*** (0.31)
1989 AD and COPEI Vote	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)
Opposition Effective Number of Parties	-633.83*** ^b (185.35)	2.49*** (0.91)	10.57*** (0.75)	9.30*** (0.75)
Population	-	0.76** (0.33)	0.88*** (0.22)	0.93*** (0.23)
Urbanization	-	-2.06 (1.44)	2.25* (1.26)	1.87 (1.21)
Abstention	-0.32* (0.17)	-0.66*** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.04)
Post-coup	-	-	-	-6.09*** (0.93)
Constant	630.04*** (189.98)	93.37*** (5.37)	57.95*** (4.79)	67.94*** (4.92)
<i>N</i>	90	916	824	824
<i>R</i> ²	0.27	0.27	0.29	0.33

Note: Dependent variable is total percentage of votes not cast for a candidate aligned with Hugo Chávez or his electoral vehicle; standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.02$

^a Model calculated using robust standard errors.

^b The effective number of opposition parties for the 2006 presidential election remained nearly constant at a value of 1 for Model 1. While the variable is significant, the coefficient seems significant because the sample

Despite its limited temporal scope, Model 1 supports the hypothesis that government investment within the *municipio* is associated with lower pro-opposition voter behavior. An increase in the number of residents served per clinic — in other words, whenever comparatively fewer clinics are available for the same number of residents — the proportion of the vote obtained by the opposition movement increases.

The coefficient for effective number of parties is also significant, but in the wrong direction and inappropriately large. During the 2006 presidential elections, opposition forces united behind Manuel Rosales, the former governor of Zulia (Corrales and Penfold 2007, 108-109). In Model 1, this is reflected by an effective number of parties measure which falls close to a value of one in every *municipio*. Therefore, the effective number of parties does not serve as a good predictive variable within the model. No other variables achieved statistical significance in Model 1.

Model 2.1, which includes all elections in the dataset, shows significant support for hypotheses 2 and 3. YPPL does not affect voter behavior, although the percentage of elderly residents in the *municipio* shows a statistically significant negative correlation with support for the opposition movement as expected. The percentage of votes held by AD and COPEI in the *municipio* in the 1989 mayoral elections was also negatively associated with opposition support to a significant degree. The coefficient for effective number of parties is a significant variable, but not in the expected direction.

Model 2.2 extends the analysis from Model 2.1 by eliminating the results of the 2005 National Assembly race. This particular election differs greatly from others in the dataset because five of the major opposition groups chose not to field any candidates. After a disappointing loss in the 2004 recall referendum, elite members of the opposition movement openly questioned the neutrality of new electronic voting machines used by the CNE and directed their constituents to eschew the entire process (Corrales and Penfold 2007, 109). This was a grave miscalculation—despite abstentions which reached 75%, the elections were certified as free and fair by international monitoring centers (Myers 2011, 284). As a result, Chávez was

able to win the two-thirds National Assembly majority necessary to amend the constitution and grant decree powers.

Because the most powerful opposition forces refused to compete, the 2005 legislative elections were excluded in Model 2.2. As Table 1 shows, the revised model is able to explain more variation in the data.

Finally, scholars such as Penfold and Corrales note a significant qualitative difference between opposition and governmental actions before and after the 2002 coup (2007, 102). At the time, opposition parties had been gaining strength, while Chávez was suffering from chronically poor approval records. Following a massive opposition demonstration on April 11, 2002, Chávez was removed from power by Pedro Carmona, head of the powerful private business federation FEDECÁMARAS (*Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela*, Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce). The tenure of Carmona lasted less than two days. Dissolving the National Assembly and dismissing state-elected governors turned public opinion back in the favor of Chávez, who was quickly returned to office by loyal members of the armed forces (Corrales and Penfold 2007, 102-103; Penfold 2008, 72). The coup caused Chávez to create more clientelistic ties with the electorate, eventually resulting in the *misiones* programs.

For the opposition, the coup represented a critical miscalculation because it undermined their democratic reputation, sacrificed the approval ratings they had carefully amassed in the months leading up to the incident, and caused an internal rift between those who called for popular referendum and those who wished to fight Chávez through the courts (McCoy 2004, 289-290). Because the electoral caudillo had been legitimized through free and fair elections, the installment of an anti-Chávez autocrat destroyed society's perception of the opposition, and

Chávez returned to power less than two days later (Brookings 2010, 23). All opposition forces were also forced to contend with the pejorative “*golpista* (coupmaker) label” (Corrales and Penfold 2007, 102).

Model 2.3 captures this break in opposition party reputation by including a post-coup dummy variable. The data in Table 1 support the suggestion of decreased opposition support after the coup—in elections which occurred after Chávez was removed from office, the opposition received approximately six percentage points lower than what they could have earned before the coup, *ceteris paribus*. All other explanatory variables maintain significance, although the relationship between effective number of parties and opposition vote changes directionality once again. With a Pearson R^2 value of 0.33, Model 2.3 best explains the data at hand.

CONCLUSION

Altogether, the data presented in this work seem to support three of the four structural hypotheses suggested by the literature. Model 1, although limited in scope, demonstrated the link between penetration of *Barrio Adentro* outpatient clinics and opposition party support: as more clinics become available per capita, opposition support decreases to a statistically significant degree. Nonetheless, the model captured only one facet of the clientelistic linkages between the electoral caudillo and his supporter.

Models 2.1 through 2.3 provide limited support for the second hypothesis which correlates high quality of life with higher rates of pro-opposition voting. Years of Potential Life Lost (YPPL) proved to be an ineffective proxy, and never showed statistical significance in any of the models. However, each model showed a significant negative link between proportion of elderly voters within the *municipio* and pro-opposition voting. For hypotheses 1 and 2, better proxy measurements are required before more definitive conclusions can be reached.

Hypothesis 4, which examined the effects of opposition movement fragmentation on total opposition vote-share, never showed statistical significance in the hypothesized direction. This could be an artifact of a model design which groups all opposition movements together for a dependent variable and was thus unable to capture the full internal power dynamics which result from fragmentation.

The most significant result of this analysis is the validity of hypothesis 3, which ties clientelistic networks and voting results from the previous regime to opposition weakness under an electoral caudillo. The negative coefficient for this hypothesis reaches a high degree of statistical significance throughout all iterations of Model 2, indicating that the electoral caudillo is strongest wherever his predecessors also maintained significant support networks.

Finally, the significance of the post-coup variable merits further scholarly attention. As mentioned in the previous section, the opposition movement suffered as a whole due to their transgression of the democratic institutions maintained by the electoral caudillo. In their analysis of democratic weakness in Latin America, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan (2005, 42) noted that authoritarian power seizures are currently unacceptable to the international community. Although the authors' discussion centered specifically upon the potential set of actions available to powerful presidents, analysis set forth within this work suggests that the same lesson should be applied to the opposition actors who are attempting to remove the leaders from power. The pre-coup and post-coup experience of Venezuelan opposition groups demonstrates that an electoral caudillo must be defeated within an electoral sphere, as long as the integrity of democratic voting structures is unquestionable to a degree which appeases international observers. Despite the prevalence of the internal power asymmetries and manipulation which were discussed in the initial portion of the paper, the opposition groups lost in "free and fair"

elections, and were therefore offered little external political recourse for action. Therein lays the anomaly of an electoral caudillo, who exploits the democratic process to legitimize and perpetuate his narrow political interests. Opposition leaders preparing to challenge Chávez in 2012, as well as all political groups attempting to curb the power of other electoral caudillos, should keep this lesson in mind.

APPENDIX A: VARIABLE SPECIFICATION AND CODING PROCEDURES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Opposition Strength – *Opposition*

Researchers have not yet assembled individual-level databases which track vote history as well as other political, demographic, and social characteristics, so they are forced to rely upon ecological datasets²⁰, aggregating vote totals in a specified geographic unit (Lupu and Stokes 2010, 94). This course of action invites problems of ecological inference. In an effort to minimize these methodological concerns, I follow Lupu and Stokes in analyzing *municipio*-level²¹ variables in an ecological dataset, minimizing the bias.

The high degree of electoral volatility which characterizes voting in Venezuela since the victory of Hugo Chávez Frías in the 1998 presidential elections poses a problem for researchers who are attempting to track support for opposition. Alliances crumble, and party platforms are undependable, nebulous, or nonexistent. Acknowledging these difficulties, the vote percentage shared by all parties, groups, and coalitions not aligned with the electoral caudillo were aggregated as the dependent variable *opposition*. This operationalization is relatively unaffected by the party instability. Data was gathered from the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (National Electoral Council, CNE), its predecessor the *Consejo Supremo Electoral* (Supreme Electoral Council, CSE), as well as josebhuerta.com²².

²⁰ Ecological inference can be problematic because information about individual behavior is lost when aggregated across geographic areas. This makes statistical inference about the individuals difficult.

²¹ Venezuelan *municipio* is roughly analogous to a county in the United States, and should not be confused with “municipality,” which is geographically much smaller.

²² For more specific information about information sources, please contact the author.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Residents per Barrio Adentro clinic (log) - *logppBarrio*

To test the first hypothesis, information was gathered from the 2007 *Perfil Socio-Económico de los Municipios* (Socio-Economic Profile of the *Municipios*) which included 2005 data about *misiones*' prevalence within each *municipio*. There are 28 *misiones* currently listed on the government's website, each serving a different purpose for the society's underprivileged populations. However, this analysis includes only information pertaining only to the four *misiones* included in the profile.

The *misión* program began with *Barrio Adentro*, which Chávez established shortly before the 2004 presidential recall referendum in an effort to gain more votes. It provides primary healthcare for some of the poorest sectors of society through *ambulatorios* or small out-patient clinics (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 64; MSDS 2004). The variable *logppBarrio* indicates the log-transformed number of people in the *municipio* represented per medical clinic.

Misión Ribas is an education program which helps adults work towards a high school degree (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 64). The log-transformed proportion of the *municipio* population enrolled in the program is represented by the variable *logpctRibas*.

To counteract hunger, *Misión Mercal* delivers subsidized food staple products to underprivileged citizens. *ppMercal* indicates the number of people in the *municipio* per *Mercal* establishment. Finally, *Misión Vuelvan Caras* (now *Misión Ché Guevara*) aims to instill upon its participants the importance of the social and economic values which constitute the “basis of the Bolivarian revolutionary project” (“*Municipio*”). The log-transformed proportion of each *municipio*'s population enrolled in the program is represented by *logpctCaras*.

As the *misiones* become more prominent within the *municipio*, by enrolling larger proportions of the population or decreasing the overall number of establishments within the area—larger proportions are involved in *Ribas* and *Caras*, or each *Mercal* market or *Barrio Adentro* ambulatory clinic serves less people—the literature suggests that opposition support will

be lower. Table 1 reports the resulting coefficient when each variable is regressed on the *Opposition* for the 2006 presidential election—a preliminary test of the predictive capacity of these variables.

Variable	Hypothesized Direction	Coefficient (Standard Error)
<i>logppBarrio</i>	+	4.23*** (1.11)
<i>logpctRibas</i>	-	-3.33* (1.96)
<i>logppMercal</i>	+	2.65*** (0.70)
<i>pctCaras</i>	-	15.67 (10.91)

* p=.10, ** p=.05, ***p< .02

Table X shows that increased prevalence of *Barrio Adentro* and *Mercal* establishments within *municipios* is correlated with lower levels of opposition support to a statistically significant degree. The Pearson R^2 correlation between *logppMercal* and *logppBarrio* was calculated to be 0.38, so only one was chosen for the analysis to avoid autocorrelation between independent variables. Thus, prevalence of *Mercal*, as the longest-running *misión*, became the proxy measure for government funding in each *municipio*.

Years of Potential Life Lost - *YPLL*

Clearly, poverty data would be ideal for testing the effects of individuals' socioeconomic status on voting habits. However, these figures are only available at a sub-state level during census years (2001, 1990, etc.). To test this hypothesis over the entirety of Chávez's tenure office, Years of Potential Life Lost (YPLL) served as a proxy for local quality of life. The YPLL

measure was taken from the INE chart titled “*Promedio de años potenciales de vida perdidos*” (Average years of life lost) for each state in the sample. Year 2007 was substituted for year 2008 due to restrictions in data availability.

Elderly

To calculate the proportion of residents over age 65 in each *municipio*, the number of residents over 65 was divided by the total population. All data were gathered from the INE table “*Población total estimada al 30 de junio, según grupos de edad, 1990 – 2015*” (“Total population estimated on June 30, according to age groups, 1990-2015”).

1989 AD and COPEI VOTE - *Vote1989*

The totals for the 1989 mayoral elections were copied from the official *Consejo Supremo Electoral* (CSE) publication of results. The percentages obtained by AD, COPEI, and MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*, Movement for Socialism; the third largest party) are shown in Table X.

TABLE A2: MUNICIPIO-LEVEL RESULTS FOR 1989 MAYORAL ELECTIONS (%)

	<i>COPEI</i>	<i>AD</i>	<i>MAS</i>
Mérida			
Alberto Adriani	34.06	28.15	8.26
Andres Bello	53.08	42.33	2.24
Antonio Pinto Salinas	51.66	42.79	5.55
Aricagua	64.97	35.03	0
Arzobispo Chacon	68.53	29.42	1.97
Campo Elias	42.97	44.14	6.63
Caracciolo Parra Olmedo	48.95	41.94	2.65
Cardenal Quintero	36.44	61.13	2.36
Guaraque	65.31	6.2	0.9
Julio Cesar Salas	53.45	41.24	5.31
Justo Briceno	66.55	31	2.44

Libertador	42.23	39.53	7.08
Miranda	39	51.64	9.29
Obispo Ramos de Lora	49.25	46.77	3.4
Padre Noguera	64	35.87	0
Pueblo Llano	47.08	50	2.92
Rangel	49.77	45.43	4.55
Rivas Davila	39.09	30.93	0
Santos Marquina	36.28	37.35	26.36
Sucre	54.15	38.36	5.08
Tovar	50.95	33.91	10.56
Tulio Febres Cordero	42.34	46.88	9.38
<hr/>			
Táchira			
<hr/>			
Andres Bello	40.03	46.85	13.12
Ayacucho	45.47	39.57	14
Bolivar	11.34	50.32	22.65
Capacho	41.24	45.52	13.24
Cardenas	44.06	39.4	14.28
Cordova	32.83	52.59	14.59
Fernantez Feo	35.23	45.17	14.23
Garcia de Hevia	22.59	36.54	32.47
Guasimos	37.11	40.8	10.79
Jauregui	34.74	39.09	26.17
Junin	22.9	47.22	29.87
Libertad	38.05	41.06	20.89
Libertador	39.71	38.85	16.98
Lobatera	29.47	54.87	15.66
Michelena	41.18	47.17	11.65
Panamericano	50.77	40.91	8.32
Pedro Maria Ureña	12.84	45.88	5.52
Samuel Dario Maldonado	41.47	42.05	16.48
San Cristobal	20.38	50.7	21.93
Seboruco	68.49	23.6	7.16
Sucre	59.43	37.78	2.79
Uribante	50.92	31.93	17.15
<hr/>			
Trujillo			
<hr/>			
Bocono	39.96	48.83	3.26
Candelaria	43.49	49.49	7.02
Carache	60.87	34.25	4.39
Escuque	23.28	29.62	17.63
Miranda	33.13	43.26	13.41
Monte Carmelo	37.65	55.07	3.9
Motatan	32.03	45.31	6.13

Pampan	58.03	38.46	1.91
Rafael Rangel	31.44	41.05	6.74
San Rafael de Carvajal	31.81	47.48	5.58
Sucre	38.56	51.36	5.65
Trujillo	39.38	48.76	3.56
Urdaneta	54.3	40.09	5.61
Valera	36.64	47.74	9.97
Zulia			
Almirante Padilla	40.74	44.64	4.64
Baralt	38.87	32.95	16.49
Camibas	35.85	42.99	15.46
Catatumbo	40.53	42.58	8.88
Colón	27.92	44.96	14.59
Jesús Enrique Lossada	45.07	34.77	9.82
Lagunillas	36.61	24.98	18.53
Machiques de Perijá	34.69	32.35	4.01
Mara	50.26	39.82	9.92
Maracaibo	42.84	27.62	24.19
Miranda	29.44	46.78	4.35
Páez	28.44	37.19	0
Rosario de Perijá	35.52	38.47	10.25
Santa Rita	44.74	46.48	3.51
Sucre	36.82	39.5	4.44
Urdaneta	50.19	42.4	5.98
Valmore Rodríguez	20.26	37	3.04

Source: CNE (1991)

Between 1989 and the time period included in the analysis, certain borders of all three states were redrawn, bringing the total number of *municipios* from 75 in 1989 to 93 in 1998. To ameliorate the problem, states which resulted from a split were both assigned the same 1989 vote percentage. For example, *municipio* Bolívar in Trujillo was originally a *parroquia* of Rafael Rangel, but was separated by the state legislature in 1995 (“Parroquias de Venezuela”). Thus, both Rafael Rangel and Bolívar were coded with the same 1989 vote percentage. Table X summarizes all the geographic changes and coding decisions.

TABLE A3: SUMMARY OF MUNICIPIO CHANGES BETWEEN 1989 AND 1998

<i>Municipio</i>	<i>Nature of Change</i>
Mérida	
Zea	Separated from Tovar in 1992
Táchira	
Antonio Romulo Costa	Separated from Seboruco in 1995
Francisco de Miranda	Separated from Jaúregui in 1995
Independencia	Formerly Capacho
Jose Maria Vargas	Separated from Jaúregui in 1995
Rafael Urdaneta	Separated from Junín in 1995
San Judas Tadeo	Separated from Panamericano in 1998
Simon Rodriguez	Separated from Samuel Dario Maldonado in 1995
Torbes	Separated from San Cristóbal in 1995
Trujillo	
Andres Bello	Separated from Miranda in 1995
Bolivar	Separated from Rafael Rángel in 1995
Jose Felipe Marquez Cañizalez	Separated from Miranda in 1995
Juan Vicente Campo Elias	Separated from Boconó in 1995
La Ceiba	Separated from Sucre in 1995
Pampanito	Separated from Trujillo in 1995
Zulia	
Francisco Javier Pulgar	Separated from Colón in 1995
Jesús María Semprún	Separated from Catatumbo in 1995
La Cañada de Urdaneta	Separated from Maracaibo in 1989*
San Francisco	Separated from Maracaibo in 1995

Source: "Parroquias de Venezuela," *Barboza (2009)

Opposition Effective Number of Parties - NP_{Opp}

The effective number of parties (NP) is calculated as follows: $NP = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$ where p represents the proportion of opposition votes earned by each coalition (Laasko and Taagepera 1979).

Postcoup

The post-coup variable was coded as 0 for all elections prior to 2002, 1 for all elections after.

Data were obtained from the CNE.

Control Variables

Population

The population data were taken from the INE table “*Población estimada por municipios y parroquias, al 30 de junio, 1990-2015*” (“Estimated population per *municipios* and *parroquias*, on June 30th, 1990-2015”) for each state. The baseline of the estimate is the 2001 census data.

Urbanization

The urbanization proxy was calculated by dividing the population residing in the capital of the *municipio*, also included in the “Estimated population” table, by the population of the entire *municipio*. The capitals were determined by consulting the INE list of *municipios*, *parroquias*, and *capitals*. Urban sprawl located outside the legal boundaries of the capital were not counted due to lack of population information below the *parroquia* level. See Appendix C for a list of all *municipios* and *parroquias*, as well as specific information about which areas were designated as the capital.

Abstention

Abstention data were also drawn from the CNE, CSE, and josebhuerta.com.

APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY

Table B1 shows a correlation matrix of all variables included in the statistical analysis. A discussion of each model's specification follows below. After each model was estimated, the results were tested for autocorrelation using Stata's *estat vif* command, and for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan Test (*estat hettest*) For descriptions of all variables, see Appendix A.

TABLE B1: CORRELATION MATRIX OF ALL VARIABLES

	Opposition	logppBarrio ^a	YPLL	Elderly	Vote1989	NPopp	Population	Abstention	Urbanization
Opposition	1								
Logpp Barrio ^a	0.06	1							
YPLL	0.05	0.15	1						
Elderly	-0.14	-0.45	-0.31	1					
Vote1989	-0.14	-0.31	0.04	0.26	1				
NPopp	-0.14	0.17	0.03	-0.1	-0.01	1			
Population	0.06	0.33	-0.03	-0.09	-0.22	0.002	1		
Abstention	-0.43	-0.02	0.04	-0.13	-0.12	-0.53	0.09	1	
Urbanization	-0.004	0.15	-	-0.03	-0.09	-0.02	0.05	-0.06	1

Note: N = 916, except for correlations containing logppBarrio where N = 180

Model 1

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Opposition} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{logppBarrio} + \beta_2 \text{YPLL} + \beta_3 \text{Elderly} + \beta_4 \text{Vote1989} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{NPopp} + \beta_5 \text{Abstention} \end{aligned}$$

In Model 1, the control variables measuring population and urbanization were excluded to avoid problems with degrees of freedom. The analysis was completed using the 2006 presidential election results as the independent variable because, as mentioned elsewhere, the strongest opposition parties abstained from voting in the 2005 national assembly elections, precluding this particular contest from inclusion in the first model. Table B2 shows the results of post-estimation commands indicating no heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the model.

TABLE B2: POST-ESTIMATION TESTS FOR MODEL 1		
Breusch-Pagan	Prob $> \chi^2$	0.65
VIF	Elderly	1.67
	logppBarrio	1.43
	NPop	1.08
	Vote1989	1.18
	YPLL	1.23
	Mean VIF	1.32

Model 2.1

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Opposition} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 YPLL + \beta_2 \text{Elderly} + \beta_3 \text{Vote1989} + \beta_4 \text{NPop} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{Population} + \beta_6 \text{Urbanization} + \beta_7 \text{Abstention} \end{aligned}$$

Model 2.1 contained all variables identified in hypotheses 2 through 4, as well as the control variables for population size, urbanization, and abstention. Table B3 shows the results of post-estimation commands indicating no heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the model.

TABLE B3: POST-ESTIMATION TESTS FOR MODEL 2.1		
Breusch-Pagan	Prob $> \chi^2$	0.57
VIF	abstention	1.44
	Elderly	1.22
	NPop	1.41
	Population	1.06
	Urbanization	1.02
	Vote1989	1.16
	YPLL	1.12
	Mean VIF	1.21

Model 2.2

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Opposition} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 YPLL + \beta_2 \text{Elderly} + \beta_3 \text{Vote1989} + \beta_4 \text{NPop} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{Population} + \beta_6 \text{Urbanization} + \beta_7 \text{Abstention} \end{aligned}$$

Model 2.2 contains the same independent variables as Model 2.1, but excludes the 2005 legislative elections from analysis. Table B4 shows the results of post-estimation commands indicating no autocorrelation in the model. Due to heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors were used in the analysis.

TABLE B4: POST-ESTIMATION TESTS FOR MODEL 2.2		
Breusch-Pagan	Prob > χ^2	0.00
VIF	abstention	1.22
	Elderly	1.22
	NPop	1.12
	Population	1.08
	Urbanization	1.04
	Vote1989	1.17
	YPLL	1.12
	Mean VIF	1.14

Model 2.3

$$\text{Opposition} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 YPLL + \beta_2 \text{Elderly} + \beta_3 \text{Vote1989} + \beta_4 \text{NPop} + \beta_5 \text{Population} + \beta_6 \text{Urbanization} + \beta_7 \text{Abstention} + \beta_8 \text{Postcoup}$$

Model 2.3 contains the same independent variables as Model 2.2, with a dummy variable indicating if the election took place after the 2002 coup. Table B5 shows the results of post-estimation commands indicating no autocorrelation in the model. Due to heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors were used in the analysis.

TABLE B5: POST-ESTIMATION TESTS FOR MODEL 2.3		
Breusch-Pagan	Prob > χ^2	0.00
VIF	abstention	1.26
	Elderly	1.23
	NPop	1.22
	Population	1.08
	Postcoup	0.81
	Urbanization	1.05
	Vote1989	1.18
	YPLL	1.14
	Mean VIF	1.14

APPENDIX C: MUNICIPIOS, PARROQUIAS, AND CAPITALS

Locations coded as capitals are italicized. Source: INE

TABLE C1: MÉRIDA

Capital: Mérida

Municipios: 23

Parroquias: 82

Municipio Alberto Adriani

Parroquia Presidente Betancourt

Parroquia Presidente Páez

Parroquia Presidente Rómulo Gallegos

Parroquia Gabriel Picón González

Parroquia Héctor Amable Mora

Parroquia José Nucete Sardi

Parroquia Pulido Méndez

El Vigía

El Vigía

El Vigía

El Vigía

La Palmita

Mucujepe

Los Naranjos (a)

La Blanca (12 de Octubre)

Municipio Andrés Bello

La Azulita

Municipio Antonio Pinto Salinas

Parroquia Capital Antonio Pinto Salinas 1/

Parroquia Mesa Bolívar

Parroquia Mesa de Las Palmas

Santa Cruz de Mora

Santa Cruz de Mora

Mesa Bolívar

Mesa de las Palmas

Municipio Aricagua

Parroquia Capital Aricagua 1/

Parroquia San Antonio

Aricagua

Aricagua

Campo Elías

Municipio Arzobispo Chacón

Parroquia Capital Arzobispo Chacón 1/

Parroquia Capurí

Parroquia Chacantá

Parroquia El Molino

Parroquia Guaimaral

Parroquia Mucutuy

Parroquia Mucuchachí

Canaguá

Canaguá

Capurí

Chacantá

El Molino

El Viento

Mucutuy

Mucuchachí

Municipio Campo Elías

Parroquia Fernández Peña

Parroquia Matriz

Ejido

Ejido

Ejido

<i>Parroquia Montalbán</i>	<i>Ejido</i>
<i>Parroquia Acequias</i>	<i>Acequias</i>
<i>Parroquia Jají</i>	<i>Jají</i>
<i>Parroquia La Mesa</i>	<i>La Mesa</i>
<i>Parroquia San José del Sur</i>	<i>San José</i>
Municipio Caracciolo Parra Olmedo	Tucaní
<i>Parroquia Capital Caracciolo Parra Olmedo 1/</i>	<i>Tucaní</i>
<i>Parroquia Florencio Ramírez</i>	<i>El Pinar</i>
Municipio Cardenal Quintero	Santo Domingo
<i>Parroquia Capital Cardenal Quintero 1/</i>	<i>Santo Domingo</i>
<i>Parroquia Las Piedras</i>	<i>Las Piedras</i>
Municipio Guaraque	Guaraque
<i>Parroquia Capital Guaraque 1/</i>	<i>Guaraque</i>
<i>Parroquia Mesa de Quintero</i>	<i>Mesa de Quintero</i>
<i>Parroquia Río Negro</i>	<i>Río Negro</i>
Municipio Julio César Salas	Arapuey
<i>Parroquia Capital Julio César Salas 1/</i>	<i>Arapuey</i>
<i>Parroquia Palmira</i>	<i>San José de Palmira</i>
Municipio Justo Briceño	Torondoy
<i>Parroquia Capital Justo Briceño 1/</i>	<i>Torondoy</i>
<i>Parroquia San Cristóbal de Torondoy</i>	<i>San Cristóbal de Torondoy</i>
Municipio Libertador	Mérida
<i>Parroquia Antonio Spinetti Dini</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Arias</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Caracciolo Parra Pérez</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Domingo Peña</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia El Llano</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Gonzalo Picón Febres</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Jacinto Plaza</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Juan Rodríguez Suárez</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Lasso de la Vega</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Mariano Picón Salas</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Milla</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Osuna Rodríguez</i>	<i>Mérida</i>
<i>Parroquia Sagrario</i>	<i>Mérida</i>

Parroquia El Morro
Parroquia Los Nevados

Municipio Miranda

Parroquia Capital Miranda 1/
Parroquia Andrés Eloy Blanco
Parroquia La Venta
Parroquia Piñango

Municipio Obispo Ramos de Lora

Parroquia Capital Obispo Ramos de Lora 1/
Parroquia Eloy Paredes
Parroquia San Rafael de Alcázar

Municipio Padre Noguera

Municipio Pueblo Llano

Municipio Rangel

Parroquia Capital Rangel 1/
Parroquia Cacute
Parroquia La Toma
Parroquia Mucurubá
Parroquia San Rafael

Municipio Rivas Dávila

Parroquia Capital Rivas Dávila 1/
Parroquia Gerónimo Maldonado

Municipio Santos Marquina

Municipio Sucre

Parroquia Capital Sucre 1/
Parroquia Chiguará
Parroquia Estánquez
Parroquia La Trampa
Parroquia Pueblo Nuevo del Sur
Parroquia San Juan

Municipio Tovar

Parroquia El Amparo

El Morro
Los Nevados

Timotes

Timotes
Chachopo
La Venta
Piñango

Santa Elena de Arenales

Santa Elena de Arenales
Guayabones
San Rafael de Alcázar

Santa María de Caparo

Pueblo Llano

Mucuchíes

Mucuchíes
Cacute
La Toma
Mucurubá
San Rafael

Bailadores

Bailadores
La Playa

Tabay

Lagunillas

Lagunillas
Chiguará
Estánquez
La Trampa
Pueblo Nuevo del Sur
San Juan

Tovar

Tovar

<i>Parroquia El Llano</i>	<i>Tovar</i>
<i>Parroquia San Francisco</i>	<i>Tovar</i>
<i>Parroquia Tovar</i>	<i>Tovar</i>

Municipio Tulio Febres Cordero	Nueva Bolivia
<i>Parroquia Capital Tulio Febres Cordero 1/</i>	<i>Nueva Bolivia</i>
Parroquia Independencia	Palmarito
Parroquia María de la Concepción Palacios Blanco	Las Virtudes
Parroquia Santa Apolonia	Santa Apolonia

Municipio Zea	Zea
<i>Parroquia Capital Zea 1/</i>	<i>Zea</i>
Parroquia Caño El Tigre	Caño Tigre

GACETA OFICIAL DEL ESTADO MÉRIDA. LEY DE REFORMA PARCIAL DE LA LEY DE DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO TERRITORIAL DEL ESTADO MÉRIDA. N° 89 Extraordinario, de fecha 29 de Junio de 1998.

1/ El Instituto Nacional de Estadística utiliza con fines operativos censales, el termino Parroquia Capital, el cual se aplica en algunos casos al ambito territorial donde se localiza la capital del Municipio, el cual según Gaceta Oficial del Estado no le asigna jerarquia politico administrativo, ni descripcion de su respectiva poligonal.

(a) Los Naranjos, capital de la Parroquia José Nucete Sardi del Estado Mérida, es la misma capital de la Parroquia Francisco Javier Pulgar del Estado Zulia. La población de este centro poblado, fue asignada al Estado Zulia, respetando el lindero trazado en las cartas de Cartografía Nacional N° 5842 de fecha 1976

TABLE C2: TÁCHIRA

Capital: San Cristobal

Municipios: 29

Parroquias: 54

Municipio Andrés Bello	Cordero
Municipio Antonio Rómulo Costa	Las Mesas
Municipio Ayacucho	Colón
<i>Parroquia Ayacucho</i>	<i>Colón</i>
Parroquia Rivas Berti	San Félix
Parroquia San Pedro del Río	San Pedro del Río
Municipio Bolívar	San Antonio del Táchira
<i>Parroquia Bolívar</i>	<i>San Antonio del Táchira</i>

Parroquia Palotal
Parroquia Juan Vicente Gómez
Parroquia Isaías Medina Angarita

Municipio Cárdenas

Parroquia Cárdenas
Parroquia Amenodoro Rangel Lamús
Parroquia La Florida

Municipio Córdoba

Municipio Fernández Feo

Parroquia Fernández Feo
Parroquia Alberto Adriani
Parroquia Santo Domingo

Municipio Francisco de Miranda

Municipio García de Hevia

Parroquia García de Hevia
Parroquia Boca de Grita
Parroquia José Antonio Páez

Municipio Guásimos

Municipio Independencia

Parroquia Independencia
Parroquia Juan Germán Roscio
Parroquia Román Cárdenas

Municipio Jáuregui

Parroquia Jáuregui
Parroquia Emilio Constantino Guerrero
Parroquia Monseñor Miguel Antonio Salas

Municipio José María Vargas

Municipio Junín

Parroquia Junín
Parroquia La Petróleá
Parroquia Quinimarí
Parroquia Bramón

Palotal
El Recreo
Las Dantas

Táriba

Táriba
Palo Gordo
La Florida

Santa Ana

San Rafael del Piñal

San Rafael del Piñal
Puerto Teteo
San Lorenzo

San José de Bolívar

La Fría

La Fría
Boca de Grita
Orope

Palmira

Capacho Nuevo

Capacho Nuevo
El Valle
Peribeca

La Grita

La Grita
Pueblo Hondo
Sabana Grande

EL Cobre

Rubio

Rubio
Río Chiquito
San Vicente de la Revancha
Bramón

Municipio Libertad*Parroquia Libertad*

Parroquia Cipriano Castro

Parroquia Manuel Felipe Rugeles

Municipio Libertador*Parroquia Libertador*

Parroquia Don Emeterio Ochoa

Parroquia Doradas

Parroquia San Joaquín de Navay

Municipio Lobatera*Parroquia Lobatera*

Parroquia Constitución

Municipio Michelena**Municipio Panamericano***Parroquia Panamericano*

Parroquia La Palmita

Municipio Pedro María Ureña*Parroquia Pedro María Ureña*

Parroquia Nueva Arcadia

Municipio Rafael Urdaneta**Municipio Samuel Darío Maldonado***Parroquia Samuel Darío Maldonado*

Parroquia Boconó

Parroquia Hernández

Municipio San Cristóbal*Parroquia La Concordia**Parroquia Pedro María Morantes**Parroquia San Juan Bautista**Parroquia San Sebastián*

Parroquia Dr. Francisco Romero Lobo

Municipio Seboruco**Capacho Viejo***Capacho Viejo*

Hato de la Virgen

El Pueblito

Abejales*Abejales*

Puerto Nuevo

El Milagro

San Joaquín de Navay

Lobatera*Lobatera*

Borotá

Michelena**Coloncito***Coloncito*

La Palmita

Ureña*Ureña*

Aguas Calientes

Delicias**La Tendida***La Tendida*

Boconó

Hernández

San Cristóbal*San Cristóbal**San Cristóbal**San Cristóbal**San Cristóbal*

Macanillo

Seboruco

Municipio Simón Rodríguez**Municipio Sucre***Parroquia Sucre*

Parroquia Eleazar López Contreras

Parroquia San Pablo

Municipio Torbes**Municipio Uribante***Parroquia Uribante*

Parroquia Cárdenas

Parroquia Juan Pablo Peñaloza

Parroquia Potosí

Municipio San Judas Tadeo**San Simón****Queniquea***Queniquea*

Mesa del Tigre

San Pablo

San Josecito**Pregonero***Pregonero*

La Fundación

Laguna de García

Patio Redondo

Umuquena

GACETA OFICIAL DEL ESTADO TÁCHIRA. LEY DE REFORMA PARCIAL DE LA LEY DE DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO-TERRITORIAL DEL ESTADO TÁCHIRA. De fecha 26 de Enero de 1998. N° Extraordinario 444

TABLE C4: TRUJILLO**Capital: Trujillo****Municipios: 20****Parroquias: 93****Municipio Andrés Bello***Parroquia Santa Isabel*

Parroquia Araguañey

Parroquia El Jagüito

Parroquia La Esperanza

Santa Isabel*Santa Isabel*

Araguañey

El Jagüito

El Gallo

Municipio Boconó*Parroquia Boconó*

Parroquia El Carmen

Parroquia Mosquey

Parroquia Ayacucho

Parroquia Burbusay

Parroquia General Rivas

Parroquia Guaramacal

Parroquia Vega de Guaramacal

Parroquia Monseñor Jáuregui

Boconó*Boconó*

El Carmen 1/

Mosquey 1/

Batatal

Burbusay

Las Mesitas

Guaramacal

Vega de Guaramacal

Niquitao

Parroquia Rafael Rangel
Parroquia San Miguel
Parroquia San José

San Rafael
San Miguel
Tostós

Municipio Bolívar

Parroquia Sabana Grande
Parroquia Chereguíe
Parroquia Granados

Sabana Grande
Sabana Grande
Altamira de Caús
Granados

Municipio Candelaria

Parroquia Chejendé
Parroquia Arnoldo Gabaldón
Parroquia Bolivia
Parroquia Carrillo
Parroquia Cegarra
Parroquia Manuel Salvador Ulloa
Parroquia San José

Chejendé

Chejendé
Minas
Bolivia
Torococo
Mitón
Sabana Grande
Las Llanadas

Municipio Carache

Parroquia Carache
Parroquia Cuicas
Parroquia La Concepción
Parroquia Panamericana
Parroquia Santa Cruz

Carache

Carache
Cuicas
La Concepción
El Zapatero
La Cuchilla

Municipio Escuque

Parroquia Escuque
Parroquia La Unión
Parroquia Sabana Libre
Parroquia Santa Rita

Escuque

Escuque
El Alto
Sabana Libre
La Mata

Municipio José Felipe Márquez Cañizales

Parroquia El Socorro
Parroquia Antonio José de Sucre
Parroquia Los Caprichos

El Paradero

El Paradero
La Placita
Los Caprichos

Municipio Juan Vicente Campo Elías

Parroquia Campo Elías
Parroquia Arnoldo Gabaldón

Campo Elías

Campo Elías
Las Quebradas

Municipio La Ceiba

Santa Apolonia

Parroquia Santa Apolonia

Parroquia El Progreso

Parroquia La Ceiba

Parroquia Tres de Febrero

Municipio Miranda

Parroquia El Dividive

Parroquia Agua Santa

Parroquia Agua Caliente

Parroquia El Cenizo

Parroquia Valerita

Municipio Monte Carmelo

Parroquia Monte Carmelo

Parroquia Buena Vista

Parroquia Santa María del Horcón

Municipio Motatán

Parroquia Motatán

Parroquia El Baño

Parroquia Jalisco

Municipio Pampán

Parroquia Pampán

Parroquia Flor de Patria

Parroquia La Paz

Parroquia Santa Ana

Municipio Pampanito

Parroquia Pampanito

Parroquia La Concepción

Parroquia Pampanito II

Municipio Rafael Rangel

Parroquia Betijoque

Parroquia La Pueblita

Parroquia Los Cedros

Parroquia José Gregorio Hernández

Municipio San Rafael de Carvajal

Parroquia Carvajal

Parroquia Antonio Nicolás Briceño

Santa Apolonia

Zona Rica

La Ceiba

Tres de Febrero

El Dividive

El Dividive

Agua Santa

Agua Caliente

El Cenizo

Valerita

Monte Carmelo

Monte Carmelo

Buena Vista

Casa de Tabla

Motatán

Motatán

El Baño

Jalisco

Pampán

Pampán

Flor de Patria

Monay

Santa Ana

Pampanito

Pampanito

La Concepción 2/

Pampanito II 2/

Betijoque

Betijoque

Las Rurales 3/

Los Cedros 3/

Isnotú

Carvajal

Carvajal

La Cejita

Parroquia Campo Alegre	Campo Alegre
Parroquia José Leonardo Suárez	Las Mesetas
Municipio Sucre	Sabana de Mendoza
Parroquia Sabana de Mendoza	Sabana de Mendoza
Parroquia El Paraíso	El Paraíso
Parroquia Junín	Junín
Parroquia Valmore Rodríguez	Valmore Rodríguez

Municipio Trujillo

Parroquia Andrés Linares

Parroquia Chiquinquirá

Parroquia Cruz Carrillo

Parroquia Matriz

Parroquia Monseñor Carrillo

Parroquia Tres Esquinas

Trujillo

San Lázaro 4/

Chiquinquirá 4/

Santa Rosa 4/

La Plazuela 4/

Matriz 4/

San Jacinto 4/

Tres Esquinas

Municipio Urdaneta

Parroquia La Quebrada

Parroquia Cabimbú

Parroquia Jajó

Parroquia La Mesa

Parroquia Santiago

Parroquia Tuñame

La Quebrada

La Quebrada

Cabimbú

Jajó

La Mesa de Esnujaque

Santiago

Tuñame

Municipio Valera

Parroquia Juan Ignacio Montilla

Parroquia La Beatriz

Parroquia Mercedes Díaz

Parroquia San Luis

Parroquia La Puerta

Parroquia Mendoza

Valera

Juan Ignacio Montilla 5/

La Beatriz 5/

Mercedes Díaz 5/

San Luis 5/

La Puerta

Mendoza

GACETA OFICIAL DEL ESTADO TRUJILLO. REFORMA PARCIAL DE LA LEY DE DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO TERRITORIAL DEL ESTADO TRUJILLO. De fecha 03 de Julio de 1996. N° Extraordinaria.

1/ Para efectos estadísticos, las localidades El Carmen y Mosquey forman parte del área urbana de la ciudad de Bocono.

2/ Para efectos estadísticos, las localidades La Concepcion y Pampanito II forman parte del área urbana de la ciudad de Pampanito

3/Para efectos estadísticos, las localidades Las Rurales y Los Cedros forman parte del área urbana de la ciudad de Betijoque

4/ Para efectos estadísticos, las localidades San Lazaro, Chiquinquira, Santa Rosa, La

Plazuela, Matriz y San Jacinto forman parte del área urbana de la ciudad de Trujillo.

5/ Para efectos estadísticos, las localidades Juan Ignacio Montilla, La Beatriz, Mercedes Diaz y San Luis forman parte del área urbana de la ciudad de Valera.

TABLE C4: ZULIA

Capital: Maracaibo

Municipios: 27

Parroquias: 107

Municipio Almirante Padilla

Parroquia Isla de Toas

Parroquia Monagas

El Toro

El Toro

San Carlos

Municipio Baralt

Parroquia San Timoteo

Parroquia General Urdaneta

Parroquia Libertador

Parroquia Manuel Guanipa Matos

Parroquia Marcelino Briceño

Parroquia Pueblo Nuevo

San Timoteo

San Timoteo

Ceuta

Mene Grande

El Venado

El Tigre

Pueblo Nuevo

Municipio Cabimas

Parroquia Ambrosio

Parroquia Carmen Herrera

Parroquia Germán Ríos Linares

Parroquia La Rosa

Parroquia Jorge Hernández

Parroquia Rómulo Betancourt

Parroquia San Benito

Parroquia Arístides Calvani

Parroquia Punta Gorda

Cabimas

Cabimas

Cabimas

Cabimas

Cabimas

Cabimas

Cabimas

Cabimas

Palito Blanco

Punta Gorda

Municipio Catatumbo

Parroquia Encontrados

Parroquia Udón Pérez

Encontrados

Encontrados

El Guayabo

Municipio Colón

Parroquia San Carlos del Zulia

Parroquia Moralito

Parroquia Santa Bárbara

San Carlos del Zulia

San Carlos del Zulia

El Moralito

Santa Bárbara

Parroquia Santa Cruz del Zulia
Parroquia Uribarri

Municipio Francisco Javier Pulgar

Parroquia Simón Rodríguez
Parroquia Carlos Quevedo
Parroquia Francisco Javier Pulgar

Municipio Jesús Enrique Lossada

Parroquia La Concepción
Parroquia José Ramón Yepes
Parroquia Mariano Parra León
Parroquia San José

Municipio Jesús María Semprún

Parroquia Jesús María Semprún
Parroquia Barí

Municipio La Cañada de Urdaneta

Parroquia Concepción
Parroquia Andrés Bello
Parroquia Chiquinquirá
Parroquia El Carmelo
Parroquia Potreritos

Municipio Lagunillas

Parroquia Alonso de Ojeda
Parroquia Libertad
Parroquia Campo Lara
Parroquia Eleazar López Contreras
Parroquia Venezuela

Municipio Machiques de Perijá

Parroquia Libertad
Parroquia Bartolomé de las Casas
Parroquia Río Negro
Parroquia San José de Perijá

Municipio Mara

Parroquia San Rafael
Parroquia La Sierrita
Parroquia Las Parcelas

Santa Cruz del Zulia
Concha

Pueblo Nuevo El Chivo

Pueblo Nuevo El Chivo
Cuatro Esquinas
Los Naranjos

La Concepción

La Concepción
La Paz
Jobo Alto (Kilómetro 25)
San José

Casigua El Cubo

Casigua El Cubo
El Cruce

Concepción

Concepción
Kilómetro 48 (Santo Domingo)
La Ensenada
El Carmelo
Potreritos

Ciudad Ojeda

Ciudad Ojeda
Ciudad Ojeda
Campo Lara
Picapica
Lagunillas

Machiques

Machiques
Las Piedras
Río Negro
San José

San Rafael de El Moján

San Rafael de El Moján
La Sierrita
Las Parcelas

Municipio San Francisco*Parroquia San Francisco*

Parroquia El Bajo/

Parroquia Domitila Flores

Parroquia Francisco Ochoa

Parroquia Los Cortijos

Parroquia Marcial Hernández

Parroquia Jose Domingo Rus 1/

San Francisco*San Francisco*

El Bajo

El Silencio

Sierra Maestra

Los Cortijos

Sur América

Urbanizacion El Caujaro

Municipio Santa Rita*Parroquia Santa Rita*

Parroquia El Mene

Parroquia José Cenovio Urribarri

Parroquia Pedro Lucas Urribarri

Santa Rita*Santa Rita*

El Mene

Palmarejo

El Guanábano

Municipio Simón Bolívar*Parroquia Manuel Manrique*

Parroquia Gibraltar

Parroquia Heras

Parroquia Monseñor Arturo Celestino Alvarez

Parroquia Rómulo Gallegos

Tía Juana*Tía Juana*

Gibraltar

San Antonio

Santa María

Caja Seca

Municipio Valmore Rodríguez*Parroquia La Victoria**Parroquia Rafael Urdaneta*

Parroquia Raúl Cuenca

Bachaquero*Bachaquero**Bachaquero*

El Corozo

GACETA OFICIAL DEL ESTADO ZULIA . LEY DE REFORMA PARCIAL DE LA LEY DE DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO TERRITORIAL DEL ESTADO ZULIA. De fecha, 08 de Marzo de 1995. N° 256 Extraordinaria.

1/ Creada según Gaceta Municipal del Municipio San Francisco Estado Zulia. Extraordinaria N° 180 de fecha 14 de Octubre de 2006. Conformada con parte de las Parroquias Domitila Florez y Los Cortijos

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EDUCATION

The Pennsylvania State University

August 2006-May 2011

M.A. in Political Science

- Comparative Politics, International Relations minor
- Advisor: David J. Myers

B.A. in International Politics and International Studies

- Minor in Spanish Language
- Schreyer Honors College
- Member of Integrated Undergraduate–Graduate Program, which allows accelerated honors students to complete both their undergraduate and graduate degrees in five years, earning both degrees at the end of the fifth year.

QUALIFICATIONS

- Granted clearance for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret–Secure Compartmented Information
- Extensive training in statistical analysis and familiarity with SPSS, STATA, and R
- Fluency in Spanish, intermediate reading proficiency in Portuguese
- Coursework in Mandarin Chinese, German and Italian

WORK EXPERIENCE

Pennsylvania State University

September–November 2010

Student Coder for Correlates of War (COW) Project for Political Science Department

- Reviewed and evaluated data generated from a newly-developed computer program to determine its efficacy

U.S. Department of State

June–August 2010

Intern for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Opinion Research, Americas Division

- Assisted with survey research and analysis for the Americas
- Published two reports within the Intelligence Community, one as sole author and one as co-author

Pennsylvania State University

July 2009

Political Science Department Undergraduate Employee

- Assisted Professors Michael Berkman and Erik Plutzer with editing their book, *Evolution, Creationism and the Battle to Control America's Classrooms*

HONORS

- Robert J. Mowitz Endowed Internship Fund (Summer 2010)
- Dean's List (Fall 2006-Spring 2008; Spring 2009-Spring 2010)
- Bruce R. Miller and Dean D. LaVigne Scholarship in the College of the Liberal Arts (Spring 2010)
- Phi Beta Kappa Society (Spring 2009)
- Ruth C. Silva Scholarship for Academic Excellence in the College of Liberal Arts (Fall 2009)
- Thomas R. Dye Scholarship for Academic Excellence in Political Science (Spring 2009)
- Pi Sigma Alpha Political Science Honors Fraternity (Spring 2008 – present)
- President's Freshman Award for Academic Excellence (Fall 2006)

ACTIVITIES

Pennsylvania State University Marching Blue Band 2007-2008 2009-2010

Trombone Player

- Attended practice up to thirteen hours each week to prepare for performances

Education Abroad August 2008-May 2009

- Attended Venusa Institute of Modern Languages in Mérida, Venezuela
- Researched opposition party formation for honors thesis

Schreyer Honors College Mentor 2007-2008

- Led informational tours for prospective honor students
- Assisted incoming Schreyer freshmen in scheduling and orientation