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THE SUSCEPTIBILITY COMPLEX: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO RADICALIZATION EFFORTS

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism and radicalization studies have drawn the attention of experts, researchers, and government officials from around the world. One of the emerging fields into the realm of national security is Anthropology, which seeks to address these research concerns through raw, qualitative research of groups, societies, and individuals whom have exhibited a predisposition to or adoption of radical ideology. Of particular interest, is the individual and contextual factors that may increase an individual or a group's susceptibility to radicalization efforts. One of the means by which anthropologists achieve this research agenda is through ethnographic study. In this work, seven ethnographic works are analyzed in detail to identify risk factors associated with the radicalization processes of individuals and groups of varying ethnic, religious, and contextual backgrounds. This work will argue that there are identifiable individual and contextual factors that increase one's susceptibility to radicalization, such as experiences with trauma, marginalization, and social injustice, just to name a few. Analysis reveals, however, that the individual and contextual factors that increase one's susceptibility to radicalization efforts varies by the level of analysis in which they are studied. This paper argues that a multi-layer, analytical approach is necessary for future radicalization studies.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's transnational ability to recruit vast numbers of individuals from the comforts of their homes to join the global jihadist movement has created a perplexing dilemma for analysts and for national security policies. The security concerns and physical and human casualties that arise from terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State, have aroused the attention of anthropologists whom seek to understand the underlying processes involved in radicalization to extremist groups, and ultimately, to violence. Due to the complexity and ethical dilemmas, however, that arise from ethnographic study of radical and violent groups, the literature is limited, but nonetheless, invaluable. Under those circumstances, this paper utilizes seven ethnographic works to analyze the underlying factors at play in radicalization processes. The basis for this analysis is drawn from a series of individual and contextual factors introduced by government officials and expert researchers at a 2015 conference hosted by the United States Department of Justice's affiliate, the National Institute of Justice. The risk factors presented at the conference are used as a foundation for comparison and are applied to the analyses of the case studies delineated. In doing so, this paper seeks to compile ethnographic research to then present a summary of the factors involved in the susceptibility of groups and individuals to radicalization processes.

Background

The George Washington University's pioneering publication, "The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq," revealed that since 2011, seventy-two Americans have traveled, or have attempted to travel, to Syria or Iraq to join the jihadist movement. These individuals, the majority of whom are citizens or permanent residents of the United States, hail from more than twenty states; with the highest number of

participants coming from Minnesota, Virginia, and Ohio. Eighty-eight percent of the travelers are male. Upon their arrival in the Middle East, 81% of the travelers are known affiliates of the Islamic State (the remaining 19% of travelers are affiliates of other jihadist groups). Using this data, the George Washington University's Program on Extremism has classified the individuals within one of three distinct categories: pioneers, networked travelers, and loners. The GWU team identified pioneers as some of the earliest, foreign arrivals in Syria or Iraq, as well as those who had previously attained experience in coveted areas such as military training, bomb making, and technological skills. These individuals often acquire leadership positions. Networked travelers are those with just that: social networks. These travelers possess connections with friends, family members, or other individuals linked with jihadist groups. These networks help facilitate their travel abroad.

The final group, the "loners," is arguably the most analytically troubling group to understand: these individuals do not have a connection with other jihadists nor do they possess any known, close personal connections abroad. Rather, these individuals specifically rely on connections from online sponsors, especially those acquired through social networking sites. Such was the case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis, a 28-year-old resident of Alexandria, Virginia, whom joined ISIS as a fighter. According to the Department of Justice's public release, Khweis traveled from the United States in December of 2015 and thereupon partook in an intentionally 'round-about' means of reaching Syria. Using software and applications on his phone, Khweis concealed his movements and online activity as he traveled from country to country, before arriving in Turkey. These applications enabled Khweis to privately and securely communicate with ISIS members in order to reach his final destination: ISIS occupied territories in Syria. Upon arrival, the Department of Justice reports that Khweis knowingly and willingly filled out forms, which included personal details such as his name, skill sets, and his agreement to serve as a suicide bomber. For a period of two and a half months, Khweis participated in religious training, attended lectures, watched inspirational videos, and provided funding for other ISIS members before he was deployed to Tal Afar, Iraq. Khweis was captured by Kurdish forces in March 2016 and was later returned

to the United States where he was then sentenced to twenty years in prison for providing material support to the Islamic State.

In the cases of foreign nationals travelling to join the Islamic State, the ‘how’ and logistics are more readily identifiable. Experts and government officials can concretely acquire paper trails, track online profiles, and monitor individual movements. They can pinpoint travel departures and destinations, provide evidence of communications and interactions, and prosecute accordingly.

On the other hand, the question of ‘why,’ is a psychologically, sociologically, and anthropologically perplexing phenomenon. The debate involves questions such as: Why do moderate individuals come to abandon the status quo, their lives, and normative behaviors in favor of violent and deviant behaviors (Kruglanski, Webber 2018). Where does that capacity for violent behavior originate? (Glowacki 2016). Why do individuals adopt, and even practice, behaviors that they were raised to condemn? These questions remain largely unanswered, but through the contributions of multi-disciplinary analyses, our understanding of the processes involved in extremist groups is coming into sharper focus more than it ever has before.

One of the foundational principles of these analyses is an understanding of radicalization. The very definition of radicalization, however, is contended by scholars, and often differs from one source to another. Randy Borum, a professor of strategy and intelligence studies at the University of South Florida, wrote an article for the *Journal of Strategic Security* in which he presents the problems with defining radicalization (2011). According to Borum, one of the key difficulties surrounding the conceptualization of the term is the indistinct delineation between “extremism” and “radicalization.” In forums and national security discourse, the terms may be used interchangeably, but Borum asserts that clarification of terms is necessary, and that the connotations and contexts of the definitions have the ability to influence the ways in which national security concerns are addressed. In particular, Borum challenges the common definition of *extremism* (a deviation from the norm) for its flippancy, as the connotation delegitimizes the severity of extremist actions and consequences. Furthermore, the academic defines radicalization as the “process of

developing extremist ideologies and beliefs” (Borum 2011: 9). For the purposes of this paper, Borum’s definition of “radicalization” will be used.

Another term Borum discusses is *action pathways*, which he maintains is an important consideration in radicalization studies. “*Action pathways*” is a term used to refer to “the process of engaging in terrorism or violent extremist actions” (Borum 2011: 9). As such, *action pathways* and *radicalization* are terms that fundamentally describe two distinct processes.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Due to the prominence of terrorist activity in the media and political conversations, our understanding of radicalization has developed significantly within the past two decades. Despite these advances, there is not a universal definition of radicalization. Instead, definitions vary by nation, security agency, from department to department, and from researcher to researcher. One definition from the United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy defines radicalization as "the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism" (House of Commons, 2011).

Another definition from the United Kingdom's Home Office's program CONTEST defines radicalization as "the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups" (2011).

The Canadian non-profit organization, the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) defines radicalization as "a process whereby people adopt extremist belief systems – including the willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence – with the aim of promoting an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation."

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's article, "Don't be a Puppet: Why Do People Become Violent Extremists," does not provide a concrete definition of radicalization, but simply provides a rather vague summary:

"No single reason explains why people become violent extremists, but it often happens when someone is trying to fill a deep personal need. For example, a person may feel alone or lack meaning and purpose in life. Those who are emotionally upset after a stressful event also may be vulnerable to recruitment. Some people also become violent extremists because they disagree with government policy, hate certain types of people,

don't feel valued or appreciated by society, or they think they have limited chances to succeed.”

Consequently, the subjects most often cited in radicalization studies and programs are groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. The groups delineated are a few of many organizations that are classified as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This list is maintained by the Bureau of Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (2018). As these groups pose an active threat or are known to have the intention and capacity to engage in terrorist activity, they circulate amongst the leading academic journals and national security reports. Additionally, national and international summits are held to discuss potential security threats, as well as to examine the most recent research that may positively contribute to counterterrorism efforts. For instance, in late July of 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice's program, the *National Institute of Justice*, held a conference in Arlington, VA for government officials to meet with leading academic experts. The five national security and justice programs present at the conference included local, state, and federal representatives, as well as nongovernmental partners, from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015).

During the conference, the groups in attendance individually presented their studies, and amongst the data presented, were what the participants referred to as “facilitators of radicalization to violent extremism” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015: iv). These facilitators included variables such as identity processes, group dynamics, grievances, search for meaning, and triggering events. During the following discussion, there were two significant agreements recorded. First, participants agreed that there are *several* facilitators that contribute to radicalization (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015: 12). This agreement challenges dated models that consider radicalization processes from a single-factor viewpoint.

Second, the conference participants agreed that the process by which an individual is radicalized to violent extremism varies considerably by individual, group, and cultural context (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015: 12,13). Although individuals may experience radicalizing efforts from the same source, the

process by which one is radicalized may vary significantly from case to case. The ideology that serves as the mechanism for radicalization also affects that ways in which recruits experience the transformation.

The conference compiled a second dataset that addressed the factors that may increase individual susceptibility to radicalization, and the possible implications (Table 1). The data below in Table 1 is taken from the report, *Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.*, issued by the National Institute of Justice following the conclusion of the conference (2015: 9).

Table 1. Potential Risk Factors for Individuals Radicalizing to Violent Extremism: Individual Factors.

Risk Factor	Potential Implication
Experiencing identity conflict	Being drawn to a strong group identity that can resolve this conflict
Feeling there is a lack of meaning in life	Being attracted to a belief system that purports to have all of the answers
Wanting status	Being drawn to opportunities to prove oneself to be heroic, brave and strong
Wanting to belong	Being drawn to joining a tight-knit group
Desiring action or adventure	Being drawn to participating in dangerous, illegal, and/or violent activity
Having experienced trauma	Being vulnerable to those promise recompense or revenge.
Having mental health issues or being emotionally unstable/troubled	Being vulnerable to others' influence

Being naïve or having little knowledge of religion and ideology	Being open to fringe religious and ideological interpretations.
Having strong religious beliefs	Being drawn to those who claim to be guided by religion.
Having grievances	Being drawn to those who promise to address these grievances
Feeling under threat	Being open to engaging in activities that purport to remove this threat.
Having an “us versus them” world view	Being ready to view those outside one’s group as enemies.
Justifying violence or illegal activity as a solution to problems	Being open to joining with those who engage in violence and illegal activity.
Having engaged in previous criminal activity	Being open to joining with those who promise recompense or revenge against those who discriminate or oppress.

In addition to the individual factors that may increase or decrease an individual’s risk of radicalizing, the participants of the conference identified contextual factors, as well. Table 2 exhibits these findings, which are once more collected from the report from the National Institute of Justice (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015: 10). The factors in Table 1 and Table 2 will serve as variables for consideration and comparison in the analyses to follow in this paper.

Table 2. Potential Risk Factors for Individuals Radicalizing to Violent Extremism: Contextual Factors

Risk Factor	Potential Implication
Stressors	Being drawn to explanations that blame others for one's situation.
Societal discrimination or injustice	Being drawn to those who promise recompense or revenge against those who discriminate or oppress.
Exposure to violent extremist groups or individuals	Viewing violent extremists as less extreme.
Exposure to violent extremist belief systems or narratives	Viewing violent extremist belief systems and narratives as less extreme.
Family members or others in violent extremist network	Identifying with violent extremists and viewing them as less extreme.

As determined by experts and researchers at the Arlington conference, radicalization is not a singular factor or event. Rather, radicalization is a process that varies by individual, group, ideology, and context. As Borum mentions, the original models proposed during the mid-1900s tended to study radicalization from one analytical level, such as the individual, group, network, organization, mass movement, sociocultural context, and international and interstate contexts (2011). These levels were analyzed individually, so multi-layer analyses were relatively uncommon. At the time, however, researchers were rather swayed by the time in which they lived, as one of the earliest leading theories had argued that terrorism was a “condition” experienced by “crazy people” (Borum 2011: 14). Although there are those who may still argue that terrorists are crazy, demented, or sick, terrorism studies have advanced markedly since the 1960s.

Just as researchers determined that there is not a singular pathway process of radicalization, so too did experts realize that terrorism studies were not the sole responsibility of one discipline. Rather, the various political, social, and psychological factors at play enabled experts outside of Political Science and Justice studies to develop their own research ideas. In reference to Borum's work once more, there are an array of social science theories "for understanding the radicalization process and the social-cognitive mechanisms by which they might facilitate violent action" (2011: 15). These models by no means solve terrorism and radicalization dilemmas, but instead provide a sound foundation for further inquiry. Not one theory can answer all the questions posed, but may contribute to a broader understanding

Social Movement Theory

A *social movement* is defined as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (McCarthy, Zald 1987: 2). This theory emerged during the 1940s in order to address the reasons why individuals identified with an active cause under stressful conditions. The theory originally proposed that a social movement arose from "irrational processes of collective behavior" and effectively produced an environment of tension and dissension in response to their political, economic, and social conditions (Borum 2011: 17).

Modern adaptations of the theory, however, suggest that the processes involved within a social movement are more rational than researchers formerly thought (Borum 2011: 17). During the 1980s and 1990s, academics argued that the motivations were in fact "rational" as they determined that survival is the principal driving factor. As Klandermans and Oegema suggest, it is necessary for a movement to grow, add new, as well as replenish, lost members, and to circulate its agenda to the best of its abilities (1987). In relation to recruitment, researchers have found that recruiters "operate as 'rational prospectors'" (Borum, 2011; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1999). In the most basic sense, recruiters first must actively search for individuals whom they believe will adopt and then later act upon the movement's

agenda. In this two-step process of recruitment, the secondary step is for the recruiters to then provide information, inspiration to motivate, and then persuasion to convince potential recruits to join (Borum, 2011; Dubouloz and Wilner, 2010: 38). The connection that a recruiter is able to build and maintain plays a critical role in a recruiter's ability to successfully recruit a member to his organization. If a member is unable to build a viable connection with the potential new member, the link between organization and the member may be weak or may fail altogether (Borum 2011).

In more recent years, theorists have offered numerous amendments to the social movement theory, as research continually adapts to the changing conditions and events. For the sake of brevity, those sub-classifications and amendments are not delineated, but one may refer to Randy Borum's work in the *Journal of Strategic Security* for further study.

The field of social psychology also figures prominently in terrorism and radicalization studies. Gordon Allport, one of the field's founding members, described social psychology as “an attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals is influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others” (Allport, 1954; Borum, 2011: 20). As Borum succinctly summarized, a few of social psychologists' key contributions to “intergroup conflict and dynamics” are as follows:

1. Inclusion within a group contributes to the adoption of extremist ideology: Individual attitudes have a higher chance of becoming more extreme when experienced in a group environment. Furthermore, in general, group opinions are typically more extreme than those of the individual.
2. Groups are typically more biased and irrational in their decision-making processes: The process of group decision-making is a phenomenon that Borum refers to as “groupthink:” an experience in which reaching a collective agreement is of more importance to the group's decision-making process than the actual decision itself.

3. In-group/out-group bias: Within a group context, individuals tend to positively identify with members of their own group. As a consequence, group members tend to perceive others with a negative association. Members, therefore, generally identify others as either being a member of their group, or an outsider (Borum, 2011; McCauley and Segal, 1987).
4. Membership incentives: An individual's decision to join a group is motivated by an individual's perception of benefits and rewards offered by the group. The perceived rewards depend upon the individual context (Borum 2011; McCauley and Segal, 1987).
5. Group norms: Groups impose an internal set of norms and regulations amongst its members, which serves to enforce certain behavioral expectations from its members. These norms and regulations may pressure individual cooperation through social consequences and physical coercion, such as the offering of rewards or punishment (Borum, 2011; McCauley and Segal, 1987).

The concepts delineated above offer a complementary contribution to the other models and theories previously mentioned. The critical understandings gleaned from social psychology comes from the field's analysis of the *group* rather than individual. Whereas the social mobilization theory, and the findings from government representatives and expert researchers, focused on the individual aspects of terrorism and radicalization, the social psychologists seek to understand the behaviors and workings of the group itself. These are important aspects to consider when attempting to understand why individuals choose to join groups, and ultimately, why these individuals behave the way they do once they become members.

Chapter 3

Terrorism and Anthropology

Due to the indefinite nature of terrorism and its causes, the field has remained relatively open to different approaches, which has permitted anthropologists to enter the fields of national security and radicalization studies. Although this discipline tackles political and social topics and events that are highly charged, anthropologists' strongest contributions to terrorism studies are a result of the neutral lens through which they view the world. As Paul Magnarella, a member of the Legal Counsel AAA Committee for Human Rights, wrote for *Anthropology News* in 2003, "anthropologists, interested in studying terrorism, must develop a politically neutral, social scientific concept of terrorism," in order to avoid the traps that other scientists are susceptible to. In maintaining a neutral perspective, Magnarella further argues that the principle research agenda for anthropologists in the field is to "search for the causes and motivations of persons, organizations, and states engaging in terrorism" (2003: 6). One of the key methodologies that anthropologists utilize to achieve this agenda is ethnographic study.

Ethnographic Studies

As ethnographic works are the basis of comparative analyses throughout this work, a brief introduction to ethnography is necessary. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines "ethnography" as a "descriptive study of a particular human society or the process of making such a study." Ethnography is not a study that one conducts from behind his desk, but rather "requires the complete immersion of the anthropologist in the culture and everyday life of the people who are the subject of his study" ("ethnography"). The "immersion" described is truly that – ethnographic field work requires one to

disregard both his inherited and acquired cultural contexts in order to understand that of the people he studies. As with almost every other subject study, it is near impossible for one to be completely unbiased, and one's cultural context will inevitably follow him into the field. It is necessary, however, for anthropologists to combat that internal bias and to extend his understanding beyond that which is familiar to him.

Dr. Luke Glowacki, an associate professor of Anthropology at the Pennsylvania State University, has remarked upon the “ethical dilemma of studying warfare in and of itself” (2018). For instance, during his study of the Nyangatom, an agro-pastoralist people in southwestern Ethiopia and southeastern Sudan, Dr. Glowacki recalled one experience in which a group of Nyangatom men returned from a raid during which they had killed a young child (2019). From his own cultural context, this was a troubling experience and one that, as a Westerner, he condemned (2019). Nonetheless, his position as an anthropologist required him to remain neutral, uninvolved in the community's activities, and to treat the subjects with respect. Looking back upon his experience, Dr. Glowacki maintains that there is “nothing inherently different” between radical, violent groups and nonviolent groups in regards to ethnographic research (2019). In fact, Dr. Glowacki argues that as an anthropologist, he does not conduct ethnographic research of a violent, radical group any differently than he does a nonviolent group. Despite the practical concerns for personal safety, to study a violent group any differently than a nonviolent group permits a biased framework to permeate throughout the duration of the study.

Another valuable aspect of ethnography is that it results in raw data. In today's modern age of technology and media, information is subject to distortion. Terrorist activity is often reported within an hour of occurrence, the details reported incompletely, and occasionally inaccurately. Due to the casualties often associated with terrorist activity, these media-reported events are politically and emotionally charged. National and local community leaders condemn the individuals involved through their political rhetoric, which albeit unintentionally, provokes powerful responses from not only the affected communities, but from people globally. As seen in the rhetoric of President George W. Bush, following

the terrorist attacks of September 11th, public condemnation of attacks can contribute to an “us” versus “them” attitude, which may snowball into secondary emotions of hatred and fear.

Once an ethnographic study is completed, impermissible usage of the research can lead to an ethical dilemma. To conduct an ethnographic study, anthropologists are required to receive informed consent from the people participating in their study. Informed consent requires the anthropologist to educate his participants on the details and implications of the study, so participants are aware of the nature of the research. Once returning from a study, however, some research is vulnerable to exploitation from other researchers or officials who seek to use the data for purposes beyond what was explicitly delineated to participants. This concern principally arises due to the value of the ethnographic research, as it is rather difficult to acquire raw data of radical and violent groups. Research will remain vulnerable to extracurricular uses until legislation is enacted in order to protect the rights of the participants.

Chapter 4

Methodology

This paper utilizes primary, ethnographic accounts for a secondary compilation and comparative analysis of the social, political, and economic conditions underlying communities and individuals susceptible to radicalization efforts. This paper will utilize multi-layer analyses to address individual, group, and contextual factors. Furthermore, the focus of this paper is not solely terrorist organizations. Although there are case studies that do address terrorist organizations, the purpose of this paper is to more broadly identify factors that increase one's susceptibility to radicalization. By identifying these variables, this paper seeks to broaden one's understanding of radicalization by introducing new perspective through ethnographic studies.

Seven cases studies are discussed in detail throughout this paper. The first work, "British and Lebanese Prisons: Are They Fertile Breeding Ground for Terrorism," by Salim Yaacoub explores the relationship between criminals and their susceptibility to radicalization during imprisonment in Britain and Lebanon. In the second, "Identity Constructions and Dayak Ethnic Strife in West Kalimantan, Indonesia," Anika König's research provides a glimpse into the processes that occur in identity formation, and the radicalization of entire ethnic groups that occur when subjected to social turbulence at the hands of a clearly identifiable "other." Thirdly, Thomas Pierret and Mériam Cheikh delve into the life-story of Ahlam al-Nasr, a 19-year old woman who narrated her experiences with the Islamic State via twitter and her journals, in their work "I am Very Happy Here: Female Jihad in Syria as Self-Accomplishment." Pierret and Cheikh's analysis provide valuable insight in the influence of the risk factors of familial

networks, one's upbringing, and exposure to extremist ideology in terms of increasing one's susceptibility to radicalization. The fourth work, "My Son – A Terrorist? (He was such a gentle boy)" is a comparative case study of Mohammed Atta, the pilot of the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center, and Sayyid, a man whose story the author believes is comparable to that of Atta. The analyses of these disillusioned individuals argue for the importance of individual and contextual factors in one's susceptibility to radicalization. Scott Decker and David Pyrooz's work, "Gangs, Terrorism, and Radicalization," defends that many of the factors that contribute to gang membership, also drive individuals' susceptibility to radicalizing forces. Consequently, the authors maintain that gang members are more susceptible to membership with an extremist group than those without a prior criminal background. The fifth case, "Terrorism and Women: A Study of Terrorism and Tribal Women of Jharkhand," is presented by Dr. Dinesh who studies the connection between illiteracy and affiliation with terrorist groups. This work challenges traditional notions of high educational attainment of terrorists by introducing contextual factors, such as illiteracy and poverty, that increase one's susceptibility to joining an extremist group. The last case study, Peter Waldmann's "The Radical Community: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Background of ETA, IRA, and Hezbollah," explores the individual and contextual factors that increase an ethnic or religious group's susceptibility to radicalization. This study provides valuable ethnographic insight into understanding the underlying causal factors that lead to the rise of prominent extremist organizations such as Hezbollah, ETA, and IRA.

The analyses of these accounts required an objective mental framework and was guided by the variables delineated in Table 1 and Table 2. The analyses, however, were not conducted as a checklist of those variables. Rather, the variables were utilized as guidance in order to more readily identify potential factors from the case studies. Again, the identification of these variables is not intended to justify violent action, and this paper should be considered with limited regard to emotional responses.

Chapter 5

Case Studies

British and Lebanese Prisons: Are They Fertile Breeding Ground for Terrorism?

In the Fall 2018 *Journal of Strategic Security*, Salim Yaacoub presents profiles from British and Lebanese prisons. Yaacoub explains that the basis for this comparative analysis of the radicalization processes in Lebanese and British prisons stems from the designation of prisons as “hotbeds” for radicalization. Yaacoub highlights this particular connection between Britain and Lebanon, as Lebanon has served as a global pathway for extremists traveling from the Levant into Europe. As such, the processes of radicalization that occur within Lebanon affects those in Britain, as well as the security of both countries. This relationship between Europe and the Middle East via Lebanon became particularly apparent in 2011 following the onset of the Syrian War. Furthermore, the processes that occur within these prisons provide a glimpse of understanding into how individuals become “networked terrorists.” A summary of Yaacoub’s profiles, and specific case references, are delineated below.

British Prisons

Yaacoub cites an increase in evidence of radicalization processes occurring in British prisons through specific case references. He highlights the case of Michael Coe, a gang member, whom converted to Islam and then upon his release assumed the identity of Mikael Ibrahim. While in prison, Mikael Ibrahim came into contact with Anjem Choudary, a radical Islamist preacher who was convicted for inciting support for the Islamic State and for attempting to convert Britons to the terrorist organization’s cause (Yeginsu, 2018). Upon his release, Mikael Ibrahim acted on Choudary’s behalf. Kevin Gardner, a British citizen imprisoned from 2006-07, adopted an extremist ideology and changed his name to Abbas

Shafiq. While still in prison, Shafiq planned an attack against a British military base. Jordan Horner, known as Jamledin in extremist circles, was imprisoned in 2013 after trying to establish Sharia Law in London. During his imprisonment, Horner utilized the prison, as what he referred to as a “fertile breeding ground,” to radicalize numerous individuals to his extremist Islamist ideology (Yaacoub, 2018: 82). Lastly, Yaacoub highlights the case of Khalid Masood, the Westminster killer, whom was also radicalized while in prison.

Lebanese Prisons

Yaacoub cites the significant overcrowding of Lebanese prisons as a condition fostering radicalization. Roumieh, the largest prison in Lebanon, functioned at approximately 300% capacity as of 2017 (Ghanem, 2014). Additionally, Yaacoub references a report of 1100 prisoners being placed in a block, specifically designated for Islamist extremist, that had a maximum capacity of 400 (Ghanem, 2014). Under these conditions, Yaacoub finds it of little surprise that in 2015, the Islamist extremist block launched a mutiny. During this time, relationships and alliances were formed between terrorists and prisoners from other blocks.

The violent and overcrowded conditions at Roumieh led the Lebanese Interior Minister to claim the prison as “an operations room for ISIS” (Yaacoub, 2018; van Tets, Fernande, 2015). Not long after, a suicide attack that was carried out in Northern Lebanon was discovered to have been planned from within Roumieh. A subsequent raid of the block of the Islamist extremists uncovered technology and equipment that enabled prisoners to communicate with outside actors.

As Yaacoub states, “radicalization has no simple cause and effect” (2018: 85). The case examples from within British and Lebanese prisons include individuals from all different facets of society, and there is not one concrete profile for a conclusive economic, political, or social background assessment. The analysis of the prison processes has also shown that some of the most common explanations for radicalization may not necessarily apply to prisons. In terrorism studies, Yaacoub references “socio-

economic deprivation, including low education attainment, unemployment, and underemployment” as some of the most common factors (2018: 80). Prisons, however, are unique environments, and as a result they can foster rather different conditions. In the prison “bubble” environment, individuals may experience “isolation from the outside world, a perceived sense of victimization, the need for belonging, a sense vulnerability” (Yaacoub, 2018: 80). When introduced to radical individuals, and then with prolonged exposure, secondary attitudes such as “socio-economic frustration and lack of self-fulfillment, along with bitter experiences of racism, discrimination, and Islamophobia” may result in sympathy or identification with violent, radical ideologies (Yaacoub, 2018: 81).

It is important to note, however, that it is not the ideology of violent extremism alone that is responsible for the radicalization of individuals, but rather the *context* in which an individual comes into contact with a radical ideology. As Yaacoub states, prisons are an “ideal atmosphere” for radical members to introduce their ideologies to others by “playing on certain prisoners concerns and feelings to gain their trust, garner their support, and recruit them” (2018). It is therefore of importance to consider the ability of a radicalizer to establish such relationships with would-be recruits. Yaacoub cites examples from British prisons, in which radical Islamists are known to have manipulated new prisoners’ concerns and fears by “offering food, friendship, and spiritual support” (2018: 81, 82). Islamist prisoners in Lebanese prisons are known to form relationships with new prisoners by offering friendship and protection in order to earn their trust. In doing so, radicalizers offer other prisoners an escape from isolation through friendship.

The individuals most likely to form these relationships with radicalizers are those who have previously committed criminal activities, especially imprisoned gang members. Such cases are evident in both Lebanese and British prisons, as gang members seemingly associate more often with radicalizers as the relationships offered most clearly mirror those feelings of comradery that they experienced within the gang prior to imprisonment. The connection between gangs and radicalization will be studied in further detail in a later case study.

Identity Constructions and Dayak Ethnic Strife in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

The Western media may portray it as such, but not all radicalization efforts are the result of extremist religious agendas. In West Kalimantan, an Indonesian province, ethnic tensions that had simmered between the native Dayak population and migrant Madurese since the 1950s, erupted into a violent conflict in 1996. The conflict originated with a fistfight between Dayak and Madurese youth in December and continued into the following February before the violence eventually tapered off. Although the exact number of fatalities is unknown, estimates range from tens to thousands, with the Madurese accounting for the majority of the casualties (Human Rights Watch 1997; König 2016). During her two-year field study from 2007 and 2009, Anita König collected ethnographic data of these groups from the West Kalimantan village, Nobo, a decade after the conflict had subsided.

Prior to the conflict, the village of Nobo had been occupied by Madurese and Dayaks populations, but the Madurese were forced to flee to escape the violence and had not returned at the time of König's study. Upon her arrival, König identified that the majority of the town's population was composed of Kanayatn Dayaks, which constitute the largest subgroup of Dayak ethnicity. The Kanayatn subgroup, however, is rather loosely defined and there is not one just one understanding of its ethnic, linguistic and cultural makeup.

According to König, the people of Nobo understand their ethnicity based "on the notion that Dayaks are the indigenous population of Borneo," and that this identity can be broken down into subgroups (Bamba, 2008: 9; König, 2016:124). The way in which an individual then chooses to identify depends upon situational context and to whom the individual is speaking: the more knowledge one possesses of the region and culture area, the more specific the Dayak's ethnic identification (König, 2016).

The aspect of Dayak ethnic identification that manifested most prominently in the 1996-1997 conflict, however, is their perception of an 'us versus them' (König, 2016). In relation to outsiders, there is a clear distinction between those who are Dayak, and those who are not. König traces this perception to

the political and economic division that arose between the Muslim Malays and non-Muslim Dayaks prior to the onset of violence. Under the administrations of Malay sultanates, non-Muslim Dayaks did not enjoy the benefits and privileges experienced by their Muslim neighbors, and as such, “being Dayak constituted a disadvantage” (König, 2016: 125). Beyond the differences that were engrained in the political structure, Malays speak different languages, uphold different traditions, and practice different religions than that of their Christian Nobo Dayak counterparts. The tensions between Dayaks and Madurese, however, exceed those experienced with Malays. König states that this difference is due in part to the cultural bridges that Malays and Dayaks have formed through intermarriage and religious conversion (2016). According to the Nobo Dayaks, however, the Madurese have resisted such efforts, refuse to participate in Dayak celebrations and have maintained a more static ethnic identification that contributes to a Dayak perception as being treated by Madurese as inferior (König, 2016).

As evident from above, the cultural conditions at the time of the 1996-1997 conflict were already considerably tense and engrained in the historic and collective memory. Accordingly, the perception of the ‘other’ was firmly established in Dayak identity prior to the conflict. Thus, the conditions at the time of conflict were predisposed to division, and therefore, contributed to the formation of a pan-Dayak ethnic identification. Individuals and communities solidified their relationship as Dayak through a conceptual framework of ‘oneness’ in the face of adversity. This solidification of identity enabled the Dayaks to then transform the perception of the ‘other’ to that of an enemy.

The formation of a pan-Dayak ethnicity is not a traditional radicalization process. When facing discrimination and inferiority, the conflict certainly did radicalize otherwise nonviolent communities toward violent action. During the process, Dayaks “incorporated historical, reinvented and invented elements” in order to create an image and social message of Dayak power, in which they utilized traditional images of violence to their advantage (König, 2016: 133). The utilization of taboo images of violence, however, was not merely symbolic, but also manifested in the actions of Dayak individuals and communities during the conflict, as well. In doing so, the Dayaks transformed their social status from one

of inferiority to that “of the new Dayak self-assertiveness on the non-Dayak population” (König 2016, 133).

“I Am Very Happy Here” *Female Jihad in Syria as Self-Accomplishment*

The phenomenon of seemingly content citizens abandoning the comforts of their homes and countries to join terrorist organizations abroad is perplexing. In a 2015 study for the *Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World*, Thomas Pierret, a lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, and Mériam Cheikh, a doctoral candidate from the Université libre de Bruxelles, presented the case study of Ahlam al-Nasr. As a Syrian national, Ahlam al-Nasr announced her departure to join the Islamic State via Twitter in 2014. Prior to her arrival in Syria, Ahlam al-Nasr was a well-known advocate for the Islamic State, and was known by her Twitter handle, “Ahlam al-Nasr the Damascene” (Cheikh and Pierret, 2015).

As it may already be apparent, this case study is not a traditional ethnography, but as terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State have shown, radicalization processes are occurring at unprecedented rates via the Internet and social networking sites (Séraphin, Divina, and Ghayda 2017). As violent extremists and terrorists continue to change their tactics to circumvent security efforts, and to reach a broader audience, anthropologists such as Cheikh and Pierret have realized the necessity of adapting with them. Thus, for the purposes of this study, some, but not all, aspects of their research were conducted in the digital realm.

Cheikh and Pierret’s study of Ahlam al-Nasr was made possible by the activist’s internet activity, as well as through her written journals that she composed throughout her time with the Islamic State. As the authors note, the journal they acquired access to “offers detailed insight into the young woman’s background, motivations, worldview and stance on gender relations” (2015: 243). In relation to the nature of their work, it is rather unusual that researchers are able to garner such a perspective from the individual herself. In researching and interviewing known and suspected terrorists, the ability to learn from the

individuals is severely limited by circumstances and the individual's willingness to cooperate to name a few.

In some instances of women freedom fighters, traveling abroad and joining organizations serves as a means of female and self-empowerment. As the authors summarize, by participating in a social movement, the very engagement outside of the traditional, domestic sphere allows women to challenge previously accepted gender roles and norms (Cheikh and Pierret, 2015). In particular, Islamic movements following the Syrian conflict, are characterized by an idea of "Islamic feminism," in which women may criticize "patriarchal values in the name of a 'truer' understanding of religion" (Cheikh and Pierret, 2015: 244). Rather interestingly, the authors note that these factors are not applicable to the case of Ahlam al-Nasr. Instead, upon her arrival to Syria, Ahlam al-Nasr was married and assigned a strictly domestic role of providing for the male fighters. Her mission was also not a challenge to parental authority – she arrived in Syria with her mother, father and seven siblings (Cheikh and Pierret 2015). According to the George Washington University's analysis of foreign travelers, al-Nasr would be classified as a "networked traveler" due to these familial connections. In the case of al-Nasr, however, her family connections facilitated her travel rather than *motivated* it. As for her motives, the authors claim that the autobiographical aspects of her journals indicate that Ahlam saw "her jihadi career as a wholly coherent personal trajectory" (2015: 245). Ahlam saw her very arrival to Syria as moving to a new homeland, the Caliphate, in which she "joined a community of like-minded foreigners" (Cheikh and Pierret, 2015: 247). Throughout her journal, Ahlam on multiple occasions, encourages others to move to the Caliphate by cleverly offering incentives. One of the main incentives is belonging to the Caliphate itself – which promises an idealized Islamic state, in which members are free to practice their religion devoutly and amongst their brethren.

Another interesting element in the case of Ahlam al-Nasr is her family background, which challenges common misconceptions of foreign nationals joining terrorist networks. Whereas many are predisposed to believing that poor education and financial discomfort are primary motivations for

membership in extremist groups, Ahlam's case proves otherwise: Ahlam hails from a wealthy family of the Syrian bourgeois. Her immediate family is highly educated and her grandfather is a prominent religious scholar. Other members in the periphery of her lineage had even acquired good-standing with Syria's President, Bashar al-Asad (Cheikh and Pierret, 2015). Ahlam's mother was also a well-known jihadi ideologist within prominent Syrian circles in Damascus, and Ahlam herself was well-educated. It is to her religious upbringing in "mainstream Damascene Islamic tradition" that she attributes her radical ideology (Cheikh and Pierret, 2015: 250). As the authors note, however, there was no evidence of violent activity by Ahlam's family (2015: 250). Instead, her family's radicalism manifested mostly in anti-Americanism and anti-Consumerism attitudes, which Ahlam remarked in her journals, was a source of tension between her family's ideology, and their frustrations with "practical realities" of the modern age (Cheikh and Pierret 2015, 250).

Additionally, Cheikh and Pierret identify Ahlam's desire to "live in God's Kingdom on Earth" as one principle motivation for moving to the Caliphate. Whereas the Islamic State of Iraq, ISO's predecessor, recruited members by calling for attack against their brethren's suppressors, ISO appealed to highly religious individuals by announcing the Caliphate and the possibility for an idealized, Islamic existence (Cheikh and Pierret, 2015: 256). Another motivation the authors identify is security from "criminals," and from the "police of the 'tyrants'" that Ahlam claims caused her to experience a perpetual sense of fear of arrest and prosecution while living in Syria (2015: 256). By joining ISO, the Caliphate provided Ahlam with an escape from that unwelcome reality.

In order to appeal to a broader audience, however, the authors identify key messages within her journal that advertise religious freedom, protection from prosecution, and the preservation of Islamic values. As Cheikh and Pierret remark, "life in the Caliphate is not only secure, it is also synonymous with freedom and self-assertion" (2015: 257). In essence, ISO promises recruits an idealized world of fulfillment, safety and freedom. Therefore, propaganda such as Ahlam's, are imperative in understanding the successes of ISO's recruitment campaign. In the particular case of Ahlam, she received perceived

benefits by joining ISO in Syria. In turn, ISO capitalized on her education and religious zeal, to recruit other members to sustain their mission through her journals. For these reasons such as this, the authors are relatively certain that the journals are not entirely of her own design and were utilized by ISO as a recruitment tool. As a consequence, the validity and truthfulness of her journal entries must be questioned. If her journals were manipulated by recruiters, Ahlam's writings may very well reflect a heavy bias, and relay the messages that ISO wanted her to convey; not her own.

Hence, the case of Ahlam is rather difficult to decipher. In considering the risk factors and potential implications delineated in Table 1 and Table 2, Ahlam's situation more closely identifies with contextual factors rather than individual ones (except for those pertaining to having strong religious beliefs). In fact, Ahlam's case exhibits four of the five contextual factors. From her journals, Ahlam clearly expressed a fearful existence in Saudi Arabia: she lived in fear of arrest and prosecution at the hands of "the police of the tyrants." The promises made of life in the Caliphate would have provided Ahlam a sanctuary from her present condition, and an escape from societal injustice. Furthermore, Ahlam's prolonged exposure to extremist ideology through family, culture, and social media may very well have created a predisposition for and increased her susceptibility to radicalization.

"My Son – a Terrorist?" (He was such a gentle boy)

Unni Wikan, a researcher from the University of Oslo, spent over thirty-years studying the living conditions of Cairo's urban poor. One of the areas he studied was a *hitta afrangi* (a foreign area) in the outskirts of the city, which also happened to give home to the family of Mohammed Atta – the pilot responsible for flying the first plane into the World Trade Center on September 11. When Wikan began his research into Atta's upbringing and background, the interviews he held with those who had known him were not surprising. Atta's neighbors recalled him as a "well-behaved and pleasant young man," and his father was in disbelief that his son could have ever committed a crime that horrific (Wikan, 2001:

117). Wilkan recalls Atta's father saying that when Mohammed was a child, he reprimanded him for being so quiet and kind; even going as far as telling the young Atta he needed to "toughen up" (Wikan, 2001; 118).

Mohammed's neighbors unanimously referred to the family as one that always "kept its door closed" – a common phrase used by Egyptians, meaning a family that avoids trouble (Wikan, 2001: 118). Atta's father defended that he was a good role model for Mohammed, and that did the best he could – he kept his son off the streets, and raised a polite, kind, and well-mannered man. When reflecting on his son's behavior, Mohammed's father argued that his son was almost too kind, to the point where his kindness was a weakness. It was this weakness that the real enemy, the United States, exploited. According to his father, Mohammed was incapable of such wickedness, and he suggests that it was a conspiracy put forth by the United States, a case of identity fraud, or that Mohammed was still alive, but imprisoned (Wikan, 2001).

One of Mohammed's professors from university recalled positive memories from his time with Atta. He remembers him as "an extremely nice guy...religious and reserved, but highly intelligent" (Wikan 2001, 120). As Wikan shrewdly points out, Mohammed's kindness and gentle-manner was not merely a "family allusion;" it was his genuine character (Wikan, 2001; 120). Nor does Mohammed's father remember his son to be particularly interested in politics. Instead, his father claims that his son abided by his teachings – focusing on "work, home, and family" (Wikan 2001, 121). According to his peers from university, however, Mohammed increasingly vocalized his criticisms of President Mubarak, his regime, and the corruption that benefited Mubarak and his officers at the expense of the Egyptian people. One classmate remembers Mohammed calling Mubarak and his men "fat cats," and that Atta resented Egyptian's relationship with the United States, as well as the President's suppression of domestic religious groups (MacFarquhar, 2001; Wikan 2001: 121). When considering the testaments of those who knew him, Wikan believes that Atta was clearly disillusioned with not only the trajectory of his nation, but with himself, as well. At the age of 33, Atta had never married, which was highly unusual for an

Egyptian man like himself – one who also was well-educated. Fluent in German, Arabic, and English, Atta graduated from Cairo University and then proceeded to study abroad in Hamburg, Germany (Wikan, 2001: 121).

Wikan never had the chance to speak to Atta, as his life was just one of the many he took on September 11. Wikan, however, proposes a comparative study of Atta's story with that of a man that he knows only as Sayyid. Sayyid is the same age as Atta at the time of his death, 33, and lives in Giza with his wife. To the best of Wikan's knowledge, Sayyid is still only a religious fundamentalist and has never acted violently upon his beliefs, but the author nonetheless believes that Atta and his radicalization may be better understood after having listened to Sayyid's. Having known Sayyid since he was one, Wikan knows considerably more of Sayyid's life than Atta's. Wikan describes Sayyid as having grown up in one of the poorer areas of Giza, and his father supported his family as a taxi driver until his mother's inheritance enabled them to maintain a stronger financial position (2001). From an early age, Wikan attests to both Sayyid's diligence and intelligence, but also to his lack of social graces and his rather sulky personality (2001: 123).

After four years of higher education, Sayyid fulfilled his military service before returning to Cairo as an elementary teacher, but his salary from this occupation could not support a marriage. Refusing to provide private tutoring, a prevalent condition of the Egyptian education system, Sayyid instead chose to move to Saudi Arabia for better prospects. But in refusing to exploit the poor through Egypt's public education system, Sayyid found himself once more faced with corruption in the form of bribery, which was demanded of him if he wished to be accepted within the new society (2001). Thus, not only did Sayyid find himself disillusioned with his native country, but he then found himself refused access to Saudi Arabia, as well. Nonetheless, Sayyid illegally entered Saudi Arabia and remained underground for two years before returning to Egypt where he wed a woman of his family's choice (Wikan, 2001). Upon his return, however, Wikan writes that Sayyid was refused then too by the Egyptian education system, and now he works peddling clothes.

Although his exposure to fundamentalist organizations while in Saudi Arabia may have contributed to his adoption of fundamentalist ideology, his parents believe it was the rejection and disillusionment he experienced that has most influenced his trajectory. Faced with a recession, limited economic and social mobility, a strangled and overcrowded labor market and disillusioned within his own country, Sayyid's situation is not unique. As Wikan argues, "the recruits to Islamic fundamentalist movements come generally from backgrounds like Sayyid's" (2001: 124). These recruits are often "educated, intelligent, disillusioned young men of middle and lower-middle class who have been denied" the privileges or rights they believe they deserve (Wikan, 2001: 124). Both Sayyid and Atta possessed similar conditions and experiences, and it is a combination of these factors that may have increased their susceptibility to radicalizing factors.

Gangs, Terrorism and Radicalization

As the Director of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the Arizona State University, Dr. Scott Decker's research agenda has taken an alternative route to traditional radicalization studies. Dr. Decker and doctoral candidate, David Pyrooz, tackle radicalization studies by studying organized, criminal groups such as street gangs. In 2011, Decker and Pyrooz co-authored an article for the *Journal of Strategic Studies* in which they argue that "there is more convergence across criminal and extremist groups than divergence," and that understanding gang structures and group processes "can inform our understanding of extremist groups." In their study, Decker and Pyrooz analyze groups from the conceptual framework of group dynamics, "because understanding how individuals organize themselves is a key issue in the study of radicalization" (2011, 154). As with any comparative analysis, Decker and Pyrooz maintain that the degree to which groups successfully radicalize members varies from group to group, and that in studying gangs, the *context* of a group's radicalization processes is of considerable significance.

Decker and Pyrooz argue that the organizational structures of gangs are a necessary factor to study, as this then permits an understanding of why individuals behave in ways within the group that they otherwise would not. The authors refer to this concept as “group process.” The effectiveness of radicalization and group process; therefore, varies accordingly with a group’s structure, which Decker and Pyrooz conceptualize as a continuum. At one end of the spectrum, those groups that are strictly, well-organized are known as *instrumental-rational*, while those at the other extreme, are known as *informal-diffuse* (Decker and Pyrooz, 2011: 154).

According to Decker and Pyrooz, the instrumental-rational concept “identifies a vertical structure to gangs that enables them to enforce discipline among their members and effectively define and achieve group ends” (2011: 155). Among groups characterized as instrumental-rational, there is evidence of frequent, mandatory meetings, a strict hierarchy, higher rate of coordination, written rules and regulations, as well as participation in political and institutional processes (Decker and Pyrooz, 2011). On the other hand, the informal-diffuse perspective characterizes “gangs as self-interested groups who mostly sell drugs to profit themselves, not their gang” (Decker and Pyrooz, 2011: 155). Whereas instrumental-rational groups are defined by their strict maintenance of order, hierarchy and coordination, informal-diffuse groups are much more fluid and flexible in their organization. Among these groups, leadership is not established, but rather situationally performed, membership is not long-lived, and they lack official rules and regulations (Decker and Pyrooz, 2011). Furthermore, members of informal-diffuse groups more often act for personal gain, or in the defense of, or in participation with friends and alliances. (Decker and Pyrooz, 2011). Accordingly, Decker and Pyrooz remark that members of these groups are drawn to gang affiliation in a similar process as the individuals who are drawn to terrorist organizations: for “peer affiliation” (2011: 155).

In order for a group to be classified as a gang, Decker and Pyrooz maintain that certain characteristics must be present. The key components Decker and Pyrooz identify that distinguishes gangs from other types of criminal associations are as follows:

1. Symbolic goals
2. Flexible organizational structure that resembles the age cohorts within the group
3. Cooperation and leadership are not long-lived
4. Weak membership that contributes to “transitory” membership patterns
5. Identification with and defense of a territory that the group holds of particular importance

In analyzing the differences between terrorist organizations and gangs, Decker and Pyrooz first cite the work of Marc Sageman, whom describes terrorist groups as lacking strong leadership, loose bonds to the collective group, transitory membership, and who participate in activities beyond the agenda of the organization (Sageman, 2004). In comparison with the key characteristics of gang identification, Decker and Pyrooz defend their assertion that there are significant similarities between gangs and terrorist groups. Furthermore, the authors maintain that Sageman’s understanding of the structural organization of terrorist groups aligns more closely with that of the informal-diffuse gang dynamic.

The authors’ study revealed that gangs do not possess the characteristics of radicalization that terrorist groups do, but that they are, nonetheless, violent. In fact, Decker and Pyrooz find that on a per capita scale, gangs are generally more violent and participate in more criminal activities than terrorist organizations. Nonetheless, the characteristics exhibited by gang members and terrorists prior to inclusion within a group share similar qualities. For instance, gang members are often marginalized individuals in search of meaning and identity. Consequently, the susceptibility factors that inspire individuals to seek memberships in gangs, may similarly drive terrorist recruitment processes. As a result, these shared behaviors and characteristics raise security concerns regarding these individuals’ susceptibility to

radicalizing forces. If an individual is susceptible to gang inclusion, he may be just as susceptible to radicalization. This is particularly evident from the study of British and Lebanese prisons, in which Yaacoub found that gang members are especially vulnerable to the exposure of extremist ideology and to radicalization efforts if imprisoned.

Terrorism and Women: A Study of Terrorism and Tribal Women of Jharkhand

According to a 2001 census, Dr. V.N. Dinesh identified the population of Jharkhand, the twenty-eighth province of the Indian Republic, as 51.53% male and 48.47% female of a population of 26,945,829 (Dinesh, 2011: 10; Singh, 2002). Of a population of 7,087,068 of those identified as “tribal” by the census, 50.32% are male and 49.68% female (Dinesh, 2001: 10; Singh, 2002).

Despite the similarities in the demographic percentages, the starkest differences between the tribal and non-tribal populations of women arises in the discrepancies of the literacy rates. According to the author, most of the tribal women have achieved such poor literacy that they are essentially unaware of their domestic rights. Furthermore, these women are more commonly the victims of domestic violence, as well as “enmeshed by terrorist outfits in the region as they are quite unable to understand or realize the serious and dangerous aspects of being a member” of a terrorist organization (Dinesh, 2001: 11).

The women within these tribal communities are of poor economic backgrounds and are often impoverished and destitute. The author further describes their demographic makeup as one of an “undeveloped society in remote countryside,” in which daily survival is dependent upon a hunter-gatherer lifestyle or partial subsistence agriculture (Dinesh, 2001: 11). When faced with a preconditioned environment of poverty and illiteracy, women within these tribal communities are susceptible to the terrorist organization that infiltrate their societies and recruit members by offering necessities and a sense of security. Dinesh asserts that poverty is indisputably an underlying factor that facilitates radicalization efforts and recruitment by terrorist organizations in the region, but that the illiteracy of tribal women

further increases their susceptibility (2001). Dinesh further argues that it is the high rate of illiteracy that is “the basic cause of their attraction and attachment to the terrorist organization” (Dinesh, 2001: 11). The rates of illiteracy, however, vary considerably by 1) the district to which the women belong, and 2) the tribal community with which they identify. An abbreviated table of the percentage of women literacy is shown in Table 3. A few of the sample districts were eliminated for the sake of brevity but may be found in their entirety in Dinesh’s publication.

Table 3. Percentage of Women Literacy by District

Survey Number	District	Percentage of Women Literacy
1	East Singhbhum	57.95
2	Dhanbad	52.93
3	Ranchi	52.77
4	Bokaro	47.17
5	Hazaribag	43.15
6	Gumia	40.56
7	Lohardaga	39.88
8	West Singhbhum	34.81
9	Koderma	34.03
14	Godda	27.98
16	Sahibganj	26.78
17	Garhwa	22.91
18	Pakur	20.44

According to the census, the state-literacy rate claims that 35.07% of women are literate, versus 64.93% of men in Jharkhand (Singh, 2002). Table 3, however, shows that except for three districts (East

Singhbhum, Ranchi and Dhanbad) the literacy of women falls below 48%, with a significant proportion of the districts falling well below the 35% rate reported by the state. This literacy rate, however, does not include members of tribal communities, where the author points out, the literacy rate of women is dramatically lower than that reported by the state (Dinesh, 2001: 11; Singh, 2002). Therefore, an abbreviated table for comparison of women literacy by tribal community is provided below in alphabetical order (Table 4).

Table 4. Women Literacy in Percentage by District

Survey No.	Tribal Community	Literacy in Percentage
1	Asur	0.08
2	Baiga	0.02
3	Banjara	0.01
4	Bathud	0.02
5	Bedia	0.66
6	Binjhia	0.15
7	Birhor	0.03
8	Chero	0.92
9	Chik Baraik	0.82
10	Gond	1.92
12	Ho	9.62
14	Kharia	3.57
23	Munda	18.98
24	Oraon	24.71

26	Santal	26.19
28	Sabat	0.03

Of the thirty original tribal communities from the census, sixteen are represented above (Table 4). Of the thirty communities, twenty have a literacy rate below 1%; equivalent to 67% of tribal communities holding a women literacy rate below 1% (Table 4). Of the included communities, Munda, Oraon and Santal tribes have considerably higher literacy rates (Table 4). In comparing the literacy rates of non-tribal women and tribal women, it is evident that non-tribal women are considerably more literate than tribal women (Table 3 and Table 4). It is for this reason, Dinesh claims that many tribal women are recruited by the Naxalites, with little to no understanding the consequences of this affiliation (2001).

In order to better understand the relationship between tribal women in Jharkhand and the Naxalites, a brief introduction of peasant-led rebellions and the rise of communist groups in India is necessary. In 1967, India's peasantry of West Bengal launched a revolt against local landlords (Pletcher). Although the revolt itself was not successful, it nonetheless inspired a snow-ball affect throughout northeastern India, in which communist movements arose to challenge the status quo (Pletcher). These communist movements eventually led to the establishment of political parties, but undaunted, rebel groups, specifically the Naxalites, have continued violent campaigns throughout India. These Naxalites groups "generally have claimed to represent the poorest and most socially marginalized members of Indian society" and abide by Maoist doctrine (Pletcher). The Naxalites mobilize their campaigns primarily through guerilla warfare against targets such as landlords and politicians, as well as soft-target, infrastructure (Pletcher).

In doing so, the Naxalites have successfully established bases throughout eastern India, primarily in remote, forested areas (Pletcher). One of the largest territories held by the Naxalites is Jharkhand. As such, despite the various political and economic factors present in the Naxalite cause, the high rates of illiterate women in the tribal communities of Jharkhand have emphasized how illiteracy can increase the

susceptibility of individuals to radicalization processes. Especially when considering those individuals whom are so poorly educated that they do not understand the consequences of their choices, and once engrained within the group, are unable to escape without fear of death, sexual abuse, or torture.

Thus, the radicalization processes that occur in the tribal populations in Jharkhand are more accurately attributed to contextual than individual factors, but this is not a concrete assessment. Due to rampant illiteracy and the destitute conditions, the application of traditional, contextual factors is not one hundred percent accurate. Although they do experience the risk factors, such as exposure to violent extremist groups, extremist beliefs, and stressors, the ways in which Jharkhand's tribal women *experience* these variables differs considerably from the previous case studies. This discrepancy in experiences can be attributed the destitute conditions and the literacy; as "joining" terrorist organizations is not only often forced, but women are not able to comprehend the consequences of this affiliation. Rather, the organization is perceived by the women more so as a provider and source of security from the turbulent political and social conditions in which they were born.

The Radical Community: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Background of ETA, IRA, and Hezbollah

For a 2005 publication of *Sociologist*, Peter Waldmann analyzes the "the support base of territorially bound terrorist groups," which he refers to as the radical community (239). Waldmann's radical community is composed of three groups: the IRA, the Basque ETA and the Lebanese-based organization, Hezbollah. The premise of Waldmann's thesis, is that under certain conditions (which will be summarized below), minority populations or marginalized segments, will "regress" in development from an "open society" to a "closed community" (2005: 240). Despite the high costs associated with the regression, Waldmann argues that it is "functional" for these groups, in the way that it enables them to maintain a sense of identity, defend social cohesion, and to mutually endure "the sufferings and persecution awaiting them as they are labeled supporters of terrorism" (2005: 240).

For a radical community to successfully form, Waldmann identifies four necessary factors:

1. The ethnic or religious community must have experienced an attack by a state or by another collective actor. In Northern Ireland, it was the Protestant violence against the Catholic denomination, and later the British, as well. In Lebanon, Waldmann claims that it was Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982 that successfully radicalized the Shiite population. Prior to the Lebanese Civil War, Shiite communities had welcomed Israeli forces in hopes that the foreign power would free them from the burden of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). When it became evident, however, that the Israeli forces were not departing willingly, the Shiite population adopted a defensive identity of resistance. For the Basque region of Spain, its civilians were subject to invasion by the Franco regime, and later occupation, following the Franco victory in the Civil War of 1936-1939. During the later period of the Civil War, the Basque region had allied with the Republican forces, which ultimately lost to the Franco regime. As such, the Basque region was subjected to occupation, in which they lost “traditional privileges” and “all symbols and manifestations of the Basque culture were banned from the public sphere” (2005: 241, 242).
2. The second criteria for the establishment of a radical community is “the lack of force, such as the state or another institution, willing and able to help and protect the minority under attack” (Waldmann, 2005: 242). In Northern Ireland, the B-Specials, a subgroup of the British-established police force, allied with the Protestants; thereby, eliminating Catholic hopes for British aid. Instead of receiving support from the British, the Catholics had acquired another enemy. In Lebanon, the state itself was too weak to support the various religious and ethnic groups present at the time the conflict broke out. During the Civil War, from 1975 to 1990, the various religious and ethnic groups were responsible for independently establishing their own military forces, as they were well-aware that the state of Lebanon was incapable of

- providing protection. For the Basques, it was the Spanish state that attempted to exterminate them.
3. Waldmann's third condition is subdivided into two theses. The first sub-thesis is that there be a "minimum of spatial concentration, of compactness of settlements, for a radical community to come into being" (2005: 242). Within these tighter conglomerations of ethnic or religious minorities, "territory lends continuity and stability to armed resistance and legitimates it much more than ideology can" (2005: 243). The concentrated territory, however, is not a viable condition for the emergence of radicalization if an auxiliary space is not present. As the second sub-thesis for Waldmann's third condition, a radical community's territories require a space for both militant and recreational activities, planning, and a place to which its members can retreat for safety from persecution (2005).
 4. Waldmann's final condition necessary for the formation of a radical community is a collective and fundamental sense of solidarity, which includes the "acceptance of a common identity and destiny by the respective population" (2005: 243). This solidarity manifests in an identity that shares a common history of myths and memories; forming a collective memory of history. In Northern Ireland, families pass along tragic narratives of British atrocities from generation to generation. For the Basques, they had been living in a "Golden Age" as a people before the Spanish arrived and destroyed it by subjecting them to authoritarian rule. In Lebanon, the Shiites have a complex history of ethnic and religious myths that have "exercised a strong influence on the whole community, and lent it a sense of dignity, empowerment, and self-esteem" (Rosiny, 1996: 140; Waldmann, 2005: 244).

Waldmann defends that it is of importance to realize that these communities were not "traditional" communities at the time of radicalization (2005: 244). Instead, they were "hybrid" societies, with various modern and traditional characterizations, that at the time of attack, regressed to a traditional

way of life. In the process, they abandoned modern institutions and norms in favor of a historic way of life. This traditional way of life fostered closed communities that identified with their shared history and heritage.

Once having understood the ways in which radical communities emerge, Waldmann then presents three traits that are defining characteristics of radical communities. First, radical communities tend to place greater value upon the well-being of the group than the individual. The collective identity within the group transcends the ethnic or religious bond and is apparent in the subunits of the radical community, such as in the clan or family, village or district, or congregation to which an individual belongs (2005: 246). Rather ironically, the second characteristic of these communities is that the individual is the backbone and foundation of its structure. An individual “fulfills various functions... [and] opens channels of information and communication” in which personal contacts and relationships are a basis of shared understanding between members, and a means of forging mutual relations through trust (2005: 246).

The third characteristic typical of radical communities that Waldmann identifies is that “‘ascribed’ role patterns dominate over ‘achieved’ ones” (2005: 246). As he further explains, the family to which one is born, the age group to which he belongs, his gender, and his village are all important aspects of one’s ‘ascribed’ role in the community” (2005: 246).

Also, of importance, Waldmann remarks, is that when under pressure, these traits are strengthened, as the community flexes its unity in response to external forces. Simultaneously, internal control is increased over members through means of manipulation and marginalization to dictate behaviors and actions (Waldman 2003: 116; Waldmann 2005). Waldmann argues that one of the principle means of control within radical communities is the assertion of a Manichean worldview; a view that argues for an “us versus them” attitude, and anyone who is not a member of the group is an enemy (2005).

Waldmann’s work highlights the importance of contextual factors that not only contribute to the formation of radical communities, but to the ways in which the community maintains and preserves inner

organization, as well. In analyzing Waldmann's work, the understanding of risk factors is more applicable if the group is studied collectively. In this case, the individual, contextual factors are applied to the group (Table 3). For instance, Waldmann specifies that the ethnic or religious group must have experienced an attack by a state or another collective actor, which can be classified as a "stressor" (Table 3). In this context, the stressor can be applied beyond an individual-level, and to the collective experiences of Waldmann's "Radical Community." Thus, individual risk factors are not exclusive, but rather may be applied to multi-level analyses, as well. This analytical framework is considerably more inclusive in understanding the processes that may radicalize or increase a collective group's susceptibility to such influences.

Chapter 6

Discussion

The case studies presented enforce the necessity of a multi-level analytical framework for terrorism and radicalization studies. In considering the processes that occur within British and Lebanese prisons, individuals who had engaged previously in criminal activity appear more likely to identify with a radical ideology not only while imprisoned, but once released, as well. As a demographic of their own, prisoners appear more susceptible to radicalization due to the number of risk factors applicable to their situations. For instance, prior to, or during imprisonment, prisoners are likely to exhibit behaviors of wanting to belong, holding grievances, and having an “us versus them” attitude. Once introduced to prolonged exposure with extremist groups and extremist beliefs, not only are prisoners likely to establish feelings of trust or friendships with inmates, but prisoners are susceptible to adopting the ideologies they are exposed to. This particularly evident in Roumieh, where individuals fostering experiences of discrimination and injustice, and feelings of isolation and marginalization, are quartered in overcrowded conditions with likeminded individuals with whom they form sympathies and relationships.

In the case of Mohammed Atta, individual risk factors prevailed in understanding his radicalization process. Although the exact details are unknown, the observations made by acquaintances regarding his frustrations with the corruption in Egypt indicate an individual with grievances. Well-educated and well-traveled, it would be of little surprise if he came into contact with other likeminded, well-educated individuals who mutually promised they could bring about change to their situation. Furthermore, during conditions of limited economic and political mobility, it is possible that his place within Egyptian society provoked the belief that violent or illegal activity could solve his problems. Contextually, Atta evidently perceived himself as experiencing social injustice at the hands of Mubarak’s corrupt regime.

Atta's purported experiences are reinforced by Wikan's study of Sayyid. Also, a disillusioned Egyptian man, Sayyid struggled creating an identity for himself as a teacher within Egypt's corrupt educational system. These grievances, the need to belong, and potential traumatic experiences very well may have increased Sayyid's susceptibility to the fundamentalist ideologies he was exposed to while in Saudi Arabia. Although Wikan does not know Sayyid to have acted violently, his fundamentalists beliefs are not a far cry from those held by extremist groups, and thereby, he is ideologically more susceptible to violent extremism.

In regards to the Dayak conflict in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, the radicalization of an ethnic population is most likely attributed to historical tensions, social discrimination and injustice, as well as a triggering event. As seen in the Arab Spring, an individual's actions and grievances, with whom others can identify have potentially far-reaching consequences. In such a way, the Dayak population was not radicalized in a traditional sense, but rather the ethnic community was mobilized into violent action through a similar process as those individuals who succumb to radical ideologies. This purported connection between ethnic identification, radicalization, and violent behaviors is in need of further study, as it may contribute to understanding the group processes involved in civil conflicts.

Of the case studies discussed, that of Ahlam al-Nasr most clearly illustrates the implications of familial and social connections on one's susceptibility to extremist ideology. Raised in Saudi Arabia, al-Nasr was exposed to a fundamentalist ideology from an early age, and her parents are known to maintain hold such believes. Therefore, it is not illogical that Ahlam would be susceptible to adopting those ideologies, as well.

Decker and Pyrooz's study revealed significant connections between the group processes that occur within gangs and terrorist organizations. The authors found that the individual factors that drive individuals to join a gang, also increase one's susceptibility to radicalization. These individual factors include, but are not limited to, an individual's wanting for identity and meaning in life, as well as marginalization within society. Whether an individual then chooses to identify with a gang, other criminal

association, or extremist group largely depends upon the context of his experiences with radicalizers and ideology. Decker and Pyrooz's study, however, found that once an individual has identified with a gang, his susceptibility to radicalization increases. This relationship is most clearly illustrated in the case studies of gang members, who once imprisoned, have higher rates of radicalizing by an extremist ideology than those without a criminal background, or connection to a criminal association.

A comparative study of the districts of Jharkhand revealed that high illiteracy rates among women correspond with increased affiliation with terrorist organizations. Dr. Dinesh, the author of the comparative study, found that the districts of Jharkhand with predominantly tribal populations had significantly higher illiteracy rates than those of a different demographic. The rampant illiteracy, in addition to economic depression and severe poverty, are factors Dr. Dinesh identifies as driving forces in tribal women's affiliation with terrorist organizations. When offered safety and resources by extremist groups, the tribal women often accept the protection and join ranks with the organization. These women, however, are unable to understand the consequences of such an affiliation, and even if they do, they cannot leave without fear of death or abuse. Thus, although many Islamic extremists are often well-educated, Dr. Dinesh's study revealed the flip side of the education debate: in certain circumstances, such as those in Jharkhand, illiteracy is positively connected with terrorist affiliation. Hence, one's susceptibility to radicalization varies significantly by one's context within society.

Contextual factors also appear prominently in Waldmann's work, in which he identifies principle conditions that facilitate radicalization. All three groups of Waldmann's "radical community," experienced a stressor: specially, a situation in which they were attacked by an identifiable "other." As such, during formative processes of each group, their development incorporated that distinct "other:" an explicit entity that the group blames for its troubling circumstances. Secondly, these groups were not protected by their state. As a manifestation of social discrimination, the Irish Catholics and the Spanish Basques were intentionally targeted as a minority population. The Irish Catholics were prosecuted by their Protestant neighbors and intervening British forces. The Basques experienced intentional

prosecution at the hands of the Spanish regime, and the state of Lebanon was too weak to support any ethnic group under its protection. Within these contexts, “individual” factors may apply to the group as a collective entity. For instance, the social discrimination experienced by individuals of these ethnic groups may have increased their risk of experiencing an identity conflict. In such a way, these individuals were drawn to a group to which they could identify and seek protection from (Table 3).

Furthermore, the physical atrocities experienced by these radical groups certainly increased their susceptibility for radicalization. Isolated and physically vulnerable, unity within a group that promised recompense for their suffering would have been an attractive choice to individuals who not felt under threat, but also those that had experienced trauma by the state or another collective actor (Table 3). As in many of the other case studies delineated, a group’s ability to clearly identify an “other,” which creates an “us versus them” world view, is a strong, risk factor for increasing one’s susceptibility to radicalization.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Radicalization is a dynamic process that varies considerably by the individual, context and ideology involved, and it is a concern that poses a unique challenge for national security and terrorism studies. Due to its complexity, radicalization studies require a multi-level and adaptive analytical framework, as there is not one, all-encompassing answer. By utilizing the contextual and individual risk factors proposed by government officials and top experts in the field, this paper sought to avoid those errors, and to adopt a more comprehensive analytical approach. In the ethnographic studies discussed, at least one, if not more, of the risk factors introduced in the literature review were evident. In one outlying case, that of the tribal populations of Jharkhand, the analysis suggested two, alternative variables, poverty and illiteracy, that were not present in the other studies. This difference may be due to the fact that tribal women did not necessarily volunteer to join terrorist organizations, but rather were coerced to do so in order to acquire the resources and protection they needed in order to survive. This study, therefore, may serve to further research regarding the dynamics and processes experienced by native, nonparticipant populations when they are exposed to radical ideology and extremist groups. Despite the differences in the degree of voluntary (or lack thereof) participation, the study of tribal women in Jharkhand reinforces the need for a flexible approach to radicalization studies.

This paper was written with the intention of acquiring a glimpse into the processes involved in how individuals are radicalized. Although this question remains largely unclear, it is nonetheless evident that there are identifiable factors at play. An individual does not simply wake up one morning and decide to become a terrorist. It is a process, and one that is influenced by contextual and individual factors that increase his susceptibility to radicalizing forces.

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ACADEMIC VITA PEYTON RHIANNA MORRIS

Education

The Pennsylvania State University, Schreyer Honors College

University Park, PA

2014 – Present

Bachelor of Arts in International Relations, Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology

Arabic Minor and Art History Minor

- IC Center for Academic Excellence: Selected for and attended the June 2017 National Security Analysis and Intelligence Summer Seminar.
- Arabic Language, Arabic Grammar, and Arabic Culture: Strengthened cultural understanding; acquired Arabic language proficiency in reading, writing, and oral presentation.
- US Government, International Relations, Comparative Politics, American Foreign Policy
- Middle Eastern History, International Relations of the Middle East, and Terrorism: Extensively studied and wrote upon the successes and failures of decapitation strategies and the cultural, economic, and political factors contributing to the susceptibility of individuals to radicalization.
- Paterno Fellow: A gateway honors program that enables students with a liberal arts curriculum to enter the Honors College, while also acquiring leadership, media skills, and global experience.
- Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society Member: ranked in the top 7.5 percent of senior class

Experience and Employment

Fauquier County Sheriff's Office

June 6, 2016- Aug 4, 2016

78 West Lee St. Warrenton, VA 20186

- Unpaid Intern, 30 hours/week
- Organized employee applications for supervisor review and coordinated applicant interviews
- Designed a database for officer accreditation
- Increased the proficiency rate of summons' entry by eliminating the Professional Standards Division's two-month backlog
- Produced a comprehensive manual for members of the office
- Analyzed video footage and phone records
- Handled classified documents
- Assisted investigators with case research

Employee at Homestead Farm

May 11, 2013-Present

8382 Burwell Rd. Catlett, VA 20119

- Hours ranged from 10-60 a week (depended upon seasonality and school)
- Entrusted with the care and handling of 36 horses
- Knowledgeable of equine health; knowing how and when to address concerns (i.e., contacting emergency veterinary services)
- Communicating with owners and management during stressful situations
- Improved conditions for the horses and maintained an above average standard
- Conflict resolution: problem-solved owners' concerns regarding their horses, amongst each other, and with management.

Leadership and Volunteer Work

Penn State National Security Honor Society

March 28, 2016-Present Member in University Park, PA

- Improved relations with fellow chapters from across the nation. Strengthening alumni networks to provide opportunities for members.
- Recruited a strong, young base of members during a transitional period in the chapter's history

Virginia Dressage Association – Northern Virginia Chapter

March 13, 2010-Present Volunteer in Northern Virginia

- 12 hours / week on a bi-monthly basis (annual variation)
- Performed various duties at a moment's notice – flexible to the needs of the volunteer coordinator
- Responsible for documenting the judge's comments accurately
- Maintained confidentiality
- Performed duties objectively and without bias
- Won Volunteer of the Year: recognized for hard work and dedication to the chapter

United Services Organizations

June 13, 2017 – July 4, 2017

Intern - Volunteer at Washington Dulles International Airport

- 6 hours / week
- Authored new standardized forms, guidelines, and procedures for visitors
- Inventoried donations
- Prepared badge renewal submissions
- Provided guidance and aid to visitors
- Managed donor recognition/thank you letters for their contributions to the Organization

National Museum of the Marine Corps

June 12, 2017 – July 10, 2017

Volunteer in Triangle, Virginia

- 8 hours / week
- Served as a hospitality ambassador
- Provided directions and advice on how to maximize one's experience at the museum
- Expressed a desire to give back to our service members and their families
- Contributed to a positive and respectful environment

International Experiences

- Global Education: Italy, Switzerland, Iceland, France, Russia, Germany
- International Peace and Conflict Summer Seminar/Study Abroad: Marburg, Germany (July 22-August 19, 2017): concentration on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

