AID TO WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT EFFORTS AS AN APPROACH TO COUNTERTERRORISM: A TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Can aid to women’s empowerment efforts aid counterterrorism efforts? Due to the consensus that the average terrorist is male, little research exists on how bettering women’s position in society could decrease terrorism. Not only are women active members of terrorist organizations—the number of women taking on violent roles in these organizations is increasing, and they have historically played an integral part in terrorist recruiting. Aid to women’s empowerment efforts may either bolster women’s social and economic position, lessening their support for terrorist organizations, or encourage recipient governments to fight terrorism within their own spheres of influence (or both). This theoretical approach justifies using statistical inquiry via a time-series negative binomial regression analysis to evaluate whether or not aid to women’s empowerment efforts has an effect on terrorism. Terrorism as the dependent variable is approached at two different angles—as transnational terrorist incidents exported by the aid recipient country, and as all incidents (whether domestic or transnational) occurring in the aid recipient country. The results of the analysis support the theory that aid to women’s empowerment efforts may decrease the amount of transnational attacks that an aid recipient country exports. Discouragingly, this study also concludes that the aid may lead to more frequent attacks occurring in the aid recipient country.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The effectiveness of aid distributed abroad is always a point of interest and relevant debate in the increasingly globalized international system. Many of the nations that receive the most aid, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, and Nigeria, are also the nations that are the most crippled by terrorism. This is reasoning enough to measure the extent to which these massive amounts of aid are effective as a method in the counterterrorism toolbox. Countering terrorism is the United States’ main National Security interest and will remain so for the conceivable future. This is of great consequence due to the United States’ influence in the international arena and specifically among other countries allocating development aid. Since U.S. interests are often preeminent, it is beneficial to policy makers worldwide to have access to reliable studies that can lead decision-making when it comes to aid for counterterrorism purposes.

There is a decent selection of studies exploring the effectiveness of aggregated aid as a counterterrorism tool, but scholars just began to explore disaggregated aid in the past decade. It is for the most part agreed upon that aid can be an effective way to exercise soft power to counter terrorism under the right circumstances. Another general consensus that has been reached is that aid to certain sectors is more beneficial than to others. Be that as it may, scholars have yet to compile an exhaustive list of sectoral level aid goals that can translate into a decrease in terrorism because in-depth research simply does not yet exist. So far, mostly just broad sectors
like health or education have been found to be effective targets for aid. This study takes a completely fresh approach regarding the sector in question.

Aid to women’s empowerment efforts has been a prevalent sectoral level goal of donor nations for the past four decades, but most scholars interested in the counterterrorism potential of aid overlook it since the average terrorist is male. This could be a major mistake, as women have always played essential roles in terrorist recruiting and supported terrorist movements in a variety of non-violent ways. These supporting roles are often just as important as the violent ones that typically get attention from the media. Aside from this, in recent years, women are increasingly becoming active violent members of terrorist organizations. Within many larger terrorist movements, the number of female suicide bombers has been increasing.

With this knowledge in mind, it seems counterintuitive not to study aid to women’s empowerment as a sectoral level goal that could have the added benefit of countering terrorism. Whether or not the aid achieves its purpose of bolstering women’s position in society, which may disincentivize joining or supporting terrorist organizations, there is a possibility that it decreases the frequency of terrorist incidents by inducing recipient governments to fight terrorism within their spheres of influence. Consequently, through the use of statistical analysis, this study attempts to evaluate whether or not aid to women’s empowerment efforts has any significant effect on terrorism.

The frequency of terrorist incidents will be approached from two different angles— as the amount of attacks perpetrator(s) from the aid recipient country export to different countries, and as the total amount of terrorist attacks of any type that occur in the aid recipient country. A series of regression analyses will examine the potential for a relationship between attack data
gathered from reputable databases such as ITERATE and the Global Terrorism Database and women’s empowerment aid data from the AidData database.

My analysis reveals a very complicated relationship between women’s empowerment aid and terrorism. Although the data optimistically show that the aid may decrease the amount of terrorism the recipient country exports, it also reveals that it could increase the amount of attacks occurring within the aid recipient country. This may force donor governments to question whether or not this type of aid is being allocated in the best way possible. Regardless, this study may lead policy makers to reevaluate the intended outcomes of aid.

Transnational terrorism, which is the defining term for perpetrators from one country exporting aggressions to another, is generally higher profile and has greater economic consequences (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008). Therefore, the negative relationship between aid to women’s empowerment and transnational terrorism will be of interest to many developed nations that make up the donor group. Transnational terrorism often incites the most fear in these nations because of high profile attacks of this type, the foremost of which is 9/11. The question these donor countries will have to face is whether or not a decrease in transnational terrorism justifies inciting more terrorism in the aid recipient countries. This brings up a greater debate within the international relations community about state intentions and ethical inclinations. Irrespective of what side of this debate one subscribes to, the donor governments ultimately decide whether to allocate the aid or not. Therefore, the following study avoids trying to decode their intentions and simply endeavors to provide a solid foundation to aid decision making.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Currently, only a handful of studies concentrate on the effect of disaggregated aid (i.e. aid broken down into its specific sectoral level allocations) on terrorism. Literature of this type seems to unanimously point to the fact that aid allocated towards the right sectors may lead to a reduction in terrorism. However, women’s development has never been used as a sector of focus in these scarce previous studies, so no information exists on whether or not it is one of the effective ones to target. It can be assumed that information about the effectiveness of aid to women’s issues is nonexistent thus far because the narrative is and has always been that the average terrorist is male. This discounts not only women’s engagement in terrorism (whether violent or non-violent), but also the important role women play in facilitating male engagement. Although it is still true that the average terrorist is male, women are becoming increasingly engaged in terrorism in both non-violent and violent roles and have always played a significant role in terrorist recruitment.

Due to the current disconnect between studies about aid effectiveness and studies about women in terrorism, I have chosen to divide my literature review into two separate sections. First, I will explore the fairly narrow and scarce selection of literature that focuses on the effectiveness of aid as a counterterrorism tool. In the second part, I will explore scholarly articles that lend credence to the assumption that focusing this study on women is both timely and relevant, and that a relationship between women’s level of empowerment and incidents of terrorism could exist.
Why Focus on International Aid as a Counterterrorism Strategy?

In contrast to a selection of literature by economists that questions the effectiveness of development aid in any context, Azam and Thelen (2010) find that international aid could have an even more pacifying effect on terrorism than military intervention. Although their theory is based upon the incentive aid provides to the recipient government to fight terrorism (and not the actual developmental effects of the aid), they confirm that aid earmarked for certain sectors (in this case education) can be successful. Young and Findley (2011) more directly build upon this sectoral-level argument by analyzing whether aid targeted towards certain sectors is more effective than others. The sector-level results indicate that foreign aid targeted towards education, health, civil society, and conflict prevention decreases terrorism. This cross-national, longitudinal study represents a launching point for other researchers who have chosen to focus on disaggregated aid, and this is apparent in the use of similar methodology and data sources throughout following literature.

Despite these encouraging findings, it is important to note that Azam and Thelen (2008) question whether or not the developmental effect of aid on the sectors it is allocated towards is actually what decreases incidents of terrorism. They suggest it is possible that what matters is not the tangible effect that aid has on the public, but the message aid sends to the receiving government. That is to say, aid can be used as a means to induce local governments to fight terrorism within their spheres of influence. Boutton (2014) similarly suggests that the relationship between aid and terrorism exists because of the changes in state governments’ behavior upon receiving the aid. However, in Boutton’s (2014) view, the recipient countries often simultaneously abuse the aid and inflate the level of threat in order to receive more. Young and Findley (2011) more optimistically put forth the idea that since aid is at least partially
fungible, the improvements it leads to in certain sectors can allow the recipient governments to direct their own resources to fighting terrorism. Sometimes, the aid is explicitly “tied”, meaning that the aid donors allocate towards certain sectors is contingent on the recipient government’s increased focus on using its own resources for counterterrorism (Bandyopadhyay 2011).

This idea of correlation not causation is important to keep in mind when considering the conclusions drawn from the following research. Regardless, it is clear from the previous research presented in this section that there is enough evidence to pursue the aid-terrorism link. Whether this link exists because of the tangible effect of aid on the public or the message (which may or may not be overt) that one country exercising soft power sends to the recipient will be impossible to determine.

More recently, scholars have been honing in on a wider variety of sectoral level aid purposes, and in doing so are rejecting the generalization that all disaggregated aid reduces terrorism. In a dual examination of both aggregated and sectoral-level aid, Ben-Itzhak (2015) again confirms that certain types of aid become statistically significant negative predictors for terrorism. Focusing on twenty-seven indicators of socio-economic and political deficiencies, aid to address sixteen was found to correlate negatively with frequency of terrorist incidents. However, like various studies that question the poverty-terrorism connection, (Bravo and Dias 2006, Piazza 2006, Blomberg and Hess 2008, Krueger and Malekova 2003, and Drakos and Gofas 2006) Ben Itzhak (2015) supports the view that economic development can increase terrorism. Although there is a positive correlation between terrorism and the human development index along with “individual indices of bettered life,”(Ben Itzhak 2015, 98), this relationship is nonlinear (mirroring Enders and Hoover 2012, Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012, and Blair et al. 2013). That is to say, incidents of terrorism appear to increase up to a certain level of
development, with countries ranking in the middle on the human development index experiencing an uptick in terrorism. Another finding worth stating is that an increase in income disparity was found to increase incidents of terrorism. Whether economic development increases or decreases wealth disparities depends on the specific case.

Determining the specific cases and contexts in which aid decreases terrorism, and possibly more importantly the contexts in which aid increases terrorism, is becoming a focus as of late. Boutton (2014, 2016) does this by looking at the regime type of aid recipient governments. The results reveal that aid flows to personalist regimes (specifically U.S. aid, but since the U.S. is the most generous aid allocator by dollar amount the results can be generalized) increase terrorist activity. These regimes see foreign aid as a “fee” for taking counterterrorism into their own hands (relating back to implicitly or explicitly “tied” aid), but they seldom make any progress in eliminating terrorism and even perpetuate it because they rely on a constant security threat for their own financial survival. Boutton (2014, 2016) applies to the findings of any aid-terrorism study because even if a negative relationship is found policymakers should still question which nations to send aid to.

In agreeance with Boutton (2014, 2016) and Ben-Itzhak (2015), Kilhoffer (2016) finds that development aid has a “mixed relationship” (Kilhoffer 2016, v) with terrorism. What is of interest in this study is the discovery that development aid seems to have no effect on terrorist group duration. Boutton (2014) agrees only when the aid recipient has interstate rivals. However, when the state has no interstate rivals, Boutton (2014) finds a decrease in group duration.

Offering a more apprehensive view on aid as a counterterrorism method, Azam and Thelen (2012) find that foreign aid is an effective counterterrorism tool in the source country, but could attract more attacks in the host country. Similarly, Boutton and Pascoe (2018) find
evidence that areas with foreign aid projects are more at risk for transnational attacks. In other words, aid decreases the amount of transnational attacks originating from an aid recipient country, but may adversely affect the number of attacks in the country in which they occur.

As a whole, the aid-terrorism literature can be described as conditionally optimistic. The regime type of the recipient country, subsequent economic development up to a certain level, and resulting or existing income inequality can cause an increase in terrorist incidents. Additionally, aid to a country that hosts transnational attacks can encourage more of this type of attack in that country. Despite these few conditions, it is universally agreed upon that aid to certain sectors can lead to a decrease in attacks. Numerous sectoral-level aid purposes that have been found to reduce terrorism have been highlighted over the last decade or so. Despite these relatively encouraging findings that aid to particular sectors is conducive to peace, no research focusing on a possible relationship between aid to women’s empowerment and terrorism has been conducted.

Given the indefinitely increasing engagement of women in terrorist activities and the crucial roles they play in terrorist organizations (whether this refers to encouraging males to take up arms or being active in violent missions themselves) which will be discussed in the following section, it is of the utmost importance to highlight the sectoral level goal of aid to women’s empowerment. If women indeed engage in terrorism for the same reasons as men as Fink, Barakat, and Shefet (2013) suggest, it would be counterintuitive not to allocate money towards women’s empowerment assuming that aid can have a negative effect on terrorism. As it is, women in many societies often experience even more subjugation than men. The perceived limitations that cause men to take up arms are often even more drastic in the case of women because of their repressed position in most societies. Women exposed to the Salafist movements that terrorism often derives from are among the most repressed, furthering the point that they
may have even more of a reason to engage than the men around them. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to establish studies to guide policymaking going forward.

**Why Focus on Aid to Women’s Empowerment?**

There is no shortage of literature that explores the role of women in terrorism. What lacks is a perception of threat by security agents, policy makers, and the media, who despite this breadth of literature view female operatives through “stereotype gender lenses.” Due to the “weaker sex” stereotype, female operatives are often deemed aberrant and irrational rather than terrorist even by the scholars who study them (Agara 2015).

In an early attempt to shed light on the effect of stereotypes about women on the study of women in terrorism, Hoogensen (2005) sheds light on gender biases in the public view of female terrorists. Hoogensen recognizes that previous scholars assumed without any evidence that female terrorists act out of emotional motivation. The notion of terrorists as rational actors was already widely accepted in the academic community, but since the average terrorist is male, it was selectively ignored in the case of of women terrorists. Hoogensen (2005) designates societal assumptions that women should be nurturing and caring (therefore docile) as a possible catalyst for women’s involvement in terrorism. The suggestion is that women see violent behavior as a way of resisting their restrictive prescribed roles in society. Therefore, Hoogensen (2005) is the first to indicate that female terrorism is not the result of behavioral expectations of gender—that women are nonviolent by nature, so they only initiate violence when irrationally emotional—but the result of an active choice to rebel against this view of the average woman as nurturing and docile itself.
Garrison (2006) reflects Hoogensen’s (2005) work by also avoiding bias derived from gender stereotypes. In rejecting the view of women as emotional actors as Hoogensen (2005) suggests, Garrison’s (2006) theory is in direct contrast with previous studies. In past studies, the sexist assumption that women are emotionally unstable actors connoted instability, but this study offers the opposite opinion—that women are better terrorist operatives than men. Garrison (2006) describes female terrorists as more unwaveringly dedicated to the cause than their male counterparts. This seemingly radical hypothesis that women are “better terrorists” is attacked within the context of society’s expectations of gender. The theory is based on the fact that women do not constitute the majority of actively violent terrorists, so security personnel will perceive less of a threat and will also be less likely to search suspicious women because of the view of women’s bodies as taboo in many Muslim countries. Although not concluded in the text, this study could be perceived to suggest that an increase in female empowerment may lead to a decrease in female operatives. When the view of women as non-violent nurturers becomes more obsolete as development efforts (which usually strive for gender equality) reach them, females may lose the operational “advantage” based on perceptions of femininity that Garrison explains.

While Garrison (2006) suggests that elevating women’s position in the public eye could cause a decrease in female engagement, Berko and Erez (2007) find evidence supporting the idea that females engage in terrorism as an attempt to elevate their position in society. This may cause the two studies to appear to be contradictory. However, providing women with economic opportunities and other resources could provide an alternative to seeking liberation on an individual level through engaging in terrorism. Women who engage in terrorism usually play a supporting role, one that is ultimately subservient to men, even when they embark on a suicide bombing (Berko and Erez 2007). The subjugation many female terrorists are trying to overcome
exists even among the ranks of a terrorist organization, and they often find that out to their dismay. Therefore, the provision of a reliable alternative way of rejecting traditional gender roles may be enough incentive for disengagement.

Although Berko and Erez (2007) define typical female engagement in terrorism as ultimately a supporting role, Cragin and Daley (2009) assert that these “secondary” roles (as facilitators, propagandists, and the group’s historical conscience) are equally crucial to the success of terrorist movements. Cunningham (2007) suggests that although non-violent, these activities provide pathways to militancy for male supporters of jihadist movements. Therefore, an extremely important turning point in the literature is when Herman (2010) warns of the consequences of counterterrorism efforts based on the assumption that the average terrorist is male. In recent years, females have been assuming more active roles in terrorist organizations in order to circumvent the shortsighted counterterrorism strategies that Berko and Erez (2007) highlight. Therefore, the idea of women as supporting actors may be somewhat outdated, and Herman (2010)’s suggestion to avoid solely male-focused counterterrorism strategies is even more relevant.

As briefly mentioned in the first part of this literature review, Fink, Barakat, and Shefet (2013) theorize that the reasons women engage in terrorism sometimes have nothing to do with gender nuances, and are often the same reasons men engage. Although Hoogensen (2005) encouraged following studies to reject gender biases, these studies were still based upon a clear separation between male and female motivations for engaging in terrorism. Fink, Barakat, and Shefet (2013) assert that the reason women engage in terrorism isn’t always or isn’t only to overcome gender-specific roles and subjugation. Instead, their study concludes that female terrorists are trying to overcome the same perceived societal subjugation that motivates men to
engage in terrorism. One expression of this non-gender-specific societal subjugation is economic. Based on Fink, Barakat, and Shefet (2013), both men and women engage to derive economic benefits they feel they are barred from based on the current state of society. As it is, women often enjoy less economic benefits than their male counterparts, so based on this theory they should be even more prone to joining terrorist organizations. Yet, because counterterrorism strategy has been focused on the common narrative of young male terrorists, past strategies have resulted in cuts to the resources of women’s groups that bolster their earning potential.

In an attempt to tie together the two sections of this literature review, Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2013)’s findings will suffice. Their study questions whether or not development aid encouraging women’s participation in the community (a Women in Development goal) has any tangible effect on women’s position in society. The findings derived from a case study in Afghanistan suggest that although positive effects on the level of acceptance of women’s participation in the community can be observed, there is no effect on women’s roles in household decision-making or in broader society. The latter section of this literature review shows that the vast majority of studies propose that women engage in terrorism in an attempt to better their position in society, whether in response to gender specific grievances or the same grievances that lead men to engage. If Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov’s (2013) findings can be applied to other countries that experience terrorism it would indicate that aid to women’s development goals does not lead to a reduction in terrorism because it does not lead to the elevation of women’s status in society. However, the study emphasizes that the findings only reflect observation in the short term. Not only will the study proposed here span around four decades of data, but based on the ample evidence presented in this literature review for both a relationship between women and
terrorism and (although conditional) aid and terrorism, the theory behind linking aid to women’s development efforts with a decrease in incidents of terrorism easily unfolds.
Chapter 3

Theory

In the following, I will explain my primary hypothesis—that aid to women’s development efforts correlates with a decrease in incidents of transnational terrorism perpetrated by citizens hailing from the aid recipient countries. I will also offer justification for an additional hypothesis—that aid to women’s development efforts correlates with a decrease in terrorist incidents occurring within the aid recipient country. Although transnational terrorism is the focus of my study because it is generally higher profile and has greater economic consequences, it would be unreasonable to leave domestic terrorism out of the analysis because most terrorism is domestic (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008).

First, it is of the utmost importance to define terrorism for the purpose of this study because a single widely used definition of terrorism simply does not exist, even among agencies in the U.S. government. In its most basic form, a transnational terrorist incident is an incident occurring in one country that is either perpetrated by a group or individual from another country or involves victims (or potential victims) outside of the country’s borders. More precisely, transnational terrorism is defined for the purposes of this study as “the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications
transcend national boundaries,” (Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, and Flemming 2014). By this definition, transnational terrorism must be carried out by principally autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they receive some degree of support from sympathetic states (Mickolus et al., 2014).

As was previously mentioned, a combined measure of domestic and transnational incidents occurring in a given country will act as another dependent variable. Domestic terrorist incidents are incidents that are entirely contained within one country’s borders. That is, the perpetrators initiate the attack from within a country and the victims and other effects such as property damage are within the borders of that same country. For the purposes of this alternate dependent variable, the following definition of terrorism will be utilized: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation,” (START 2018). Additionally, for an incident to be considered terrorism it has to apply to all three of the following attributes: it must be intentional, entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence, and the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors (which means acts of state terrorism are not included). Finally, at least two of the three following criteria must be met: “the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal...there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims, [and] ...the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities,” (START 2018).

Aid to women’s development efforts has a less straightforward definition. Data on both bilateral and multilateral aid to countries experiencing terrorism and/or producing terrorists will be included, because there are no grounds to say whether or not one type of aid works better than
the other when it comes to countering terrorism. Broadly, development aid is defined as government aid that is designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, not including loans and credits for military purposes. Official Development Aid may be provided either bilaterally or by a multilateral development agency, and it includes both loans where the grant element makes up at least 25% of the total (“soft” loans) and the “provision of technical assistance,” (OECD 2018). Aid that qualifies for the independent variable in this study has to be committed towards WID (Women in Development). Women in Development is somewhat of an abstract concept, as there are numerous definitions and methods of mainstreaming that are employed in the movement. These are too numerous to list here. However, the UN in 1990 more broadly defined the purpose of the programs and strategies adopted for WID as “to demonstrate and draw attention to the role of women, to include matters pertaining to women on the political agenda, to create political will to enhance the role of women, to find ways and means of achieving this, [and] to apply these methods globally and nationally,” (“Women In Development” 1992, 3). Aid to women in business projects and programs, WID institutional capacity building, promotion of and support to WID groups and networks, and conferences and seminars for WID purposes are all aid purposes that will be focused on in this study.

With the independent variable and two dependent variables defined, I will now more concretely lay out the hypotheses I referred to in the introduction paragraph of this section in order to move away from definitions and delve into the actual theory.

H1: If aid from abroad committed to women’s development efforts in a country increases, then incidents of terrorism perpetrated by citizens of the aid recipient country in other countries will decrease.
H2: If aid from abroad committed to women’s development efforts in a country increases, then incidents of terrorism occurring in the aid recipient country will decrease.

The theory behind H1 and H2 is similar, as it is difficult to separate the causes of transnational terrorism versus all terrorism or domestic terrorism in general. For the most part, counterterrorism scholars have for many decades accepted the idea, confirmed by Azam and Thelen 2010, that international aid could have an even more pacifying effect on terrorism than military intervention. Although backed by a carefully executed study, this was in no way a shock to those in the academic world who focus on counterterrorism. Years of military intervention in nations both plagued by terrorism and producing transnational attackers (the two typically go hand in hand) has shown that utilizing hard power may not be the most effective way to combat terrorism. In fact, it could have the opposite effect. It is no secret that military intervention often results in casualties among innocent civilians. Even in more precisely targeted strikes such as those executed with drones, local people who have no connection to terrorist organizations are faced with death. This collateral damage helps terrorist recruiting because terrorist groups looking to add to their ranks don’t need to work hard to propagate enemy nations (usually Western nations) as evil. Those who did not support terrorist organizations previous to losing family and friends as a result of military intervention will obviously be more likely to believe claims that the intervening nations are evil. Eventually they too may risk their own lives to join the terrorist cause whether the motivation is revenge or because they perceive it as protecting their livelihood. This creates a frustrating cycle that those in the counterterrorism realm are all too familiar with.

Development aid is exactly what it sounds like--funds that are meant to help the recipient country develop. Assuming the aid has its intended effect, the recipient country could become a
less viable breeding ground for terrorism. Terrorist movements can begin because of grievances stemming from a government’s inability to provide economic means for citizens (either as a whole or specific disadvantaged groups that view themselves as discriminated against) to better their position. The lack of legitimacy this establishes can lead angered civilians to lash out in order to seek change or even entirely replace the existing regime. Although the relationship between economic development and terrorism is highly debated, Blomberg and Hess (2008) find that economic progress in low-income countries decreases transnational terrorism and also domestic terrorism (in both high and low income countries). Although they find economic development can increase incidents of transnational terrorism in high income countries, these countries represent the donor group and not the recipient group in this study. Therefore, if aid successfully facilitates development, analysis should show a negative relationship with the main dependent variable.

Research shows (with certain limitations which were discussed in the literature review) that aid targeted towards the right sectors can lead to a reduction in transnational terrorist incidents (Young and Findley 2011), and I am suggesting that women’s development is one of these sectors. Previous researchers have failed to focus on women not just when it comes to the aid-terrorism nexus but in counterterrorism studies in general because the average terrorist is and always has been male. This discounts women’s increasing roles as fully engaged violent members of terrorist organizations. More importantly, this discounts the secondary roles they have traditionally played and as a majority still play today, roles that are equally as important as the ones that stereotypical violent male terrorists play (Cragin and Daley 2009). Women have historically played—and currently do play—a huge part in recruiting male terrorists, and without constant recruitment these violent organizations could not survive.
Many studies have theorized that women engage in terrorism because they see it as a way to rebel against how they’re viewed by society—as docile and nurturing homebodies. If this is true, and if aid commitments have their intended effect of allowing women to contribute more to the economy and furthering their status in both the household and the public eye, I expect women would no longer engage in terrorism. Additionally, as women’s status becomes more equal to men’s, people may view them as equally as capable terrorists and they will lose their operational advantage as suicide bombers. From 2016 to 2017, the number of female suicide bombers increased by about 78% (Mendelboim and Schweitzer 2017). There is nothing indicating that this trend will not continue without carefully tailored intervention.

Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2013)’s case study suggests that society’s view of women does not change as a result of women’s development aid, but it does show that women do become more engaged in the community. Therefore, although the way they are viewed by society may not change, the effects of development aid could provide an alternative way of seeking and expressing their empowerment. Women who engage find they are subservient to men even among the ranks of a terrorist organization, so a reliable alternative way to seek liberation could encourage disengagement or make women less likely to engage in the first place.

Aid to women’s empowerment falls under the definition of “development aid”, which according to Ben-Itzhak (2015) could potentially increase terrorist events because economic development may exacerbate income inequality (and associated grievances). However, one can infer that empowering women may have the opposite effect. Although this is merely speculation, adding another potential earner to a low-income family could only help poorer subsets of the population bridge the gap. If the aid does end up decreasing disparities in wealth it could prevent
certain groups or the population as a whole from deeming themselves subjugated by the current regime (and inciting violence as a result). It could also prevent specific ethnic, religious, or cultural groups that experience higher poverty rates from fostering grievances against groups who are better off than them.

Although my main hypotheses predict a negative relationship between aid to women’s development efforts and terrorism, the possibility of a positive relationship must also be considered. We must consider the potentiality that effectively utilized aid to women’s development efforts could cause terrorist groups to retaliate. Extremist Muslim terrorist groups enforce strict limits on women who live under their influence. Often, these women are not even permitted to visit a market without the presence of a man, let alone become contributors to the economy. If aid flows start to influence infrastructure for women’s groups and or girls’ schools and in general increase female participation in society outside of the household, terrorist groups may direct attacks in response. This applies more to the combined measure of all terrorist attacks because it includes domestic attacks, but if terrorist leaders perceive a Western influence in the tangible results of the aid it could also apply to transnational attacks.

More broadly speaking, we have to consider all of the “conditions” (outlined in the literature review) that may cause aid to have a positive relationship with terrorism. There is a chance that empowering women could lead to countrywide economic development, which according to Ben-Itzhak (2015) could increase terrorism in countries ranking towards the middle of the human development index. Additionally, according to Boutton and Pascoe (2018), aid to a country that hosts transnational attacks can encourage more of this type of attack within that country. This will certainly apply to the findings for the models using the GTD dependent variable of all terrorist attacks occurring in a country. Finally, Boutton’s (2014, 2016) theory that
aid to personalist regimes increases the occurrence of terrorism is very relevant to the international system today and has the potential of effecting results in this study. Personalist regimes seem to be becoming more and more prevalent, not always taking the traditional form of a dictatorship (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017). Correspondingly, Freedom House in 2018 marked the 12\textsuperscript{th} consecutive year of decline in global freedom (Freedom House 2018).
Chapter 4

Analysis

Variables

Although the study being proposed here focuses sectoral aid-terrorism analysis in a way that is unprecedented, the methodology closely follows that of its predecessors. The unit of analysis is country-year, which seems self-explanatory but is the status quo for a multitude of relevant reasons. Aid commitments are reported on a yearly basis and subsequently recorded by the institutions that house the data by year. Aid is either committed to a sectoral level goal in a specific country or to a multilateral institution. Since terrorism does not arise from nor is perpetrated within a multilateral institution, countries are the natural units of analysis. Additionally, incidents of terrorism are recorded by country because national borders form the basis for the difference between the definitions of commonly recognized types of terrorism (e.g. transnational terrorism by definition is terrorism perpetrated by a person or organization from one country outside of the borders of that country.). A country-year format, although the only logical choice, has the added benefit of allowing future researchers to easily hone in on a single country for a mixed-methods analysis utilizing both quantitative analysis and case study.

Deciding what data to use in order to operationalize the main dependent variable of transnational terror attacks was straightforward. ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) is focused solely on terrorist incidents that fall under the definition of transnational, so it effortlessly captures the main dependent variable at the highest level of validity. The data can be accessed in a country year format where the country is the nation of origin of the attack (not where it occurred). This makes the most sense for the purposes of this
study because the theory behind this study is that the aid may decrease motivation to commit acts of terrorism, so the focus is not at all on the outcomes of the attacks. The goal is to capture the effect of aid to women’s empowerment on the frequency of perpetration of terror attacks, so it only makes sense to look at attacks originating from the aid recipient countries. It would be counterintuitive to include data for transnational terrorism where it actually occurs, because aid to that country would have no sway in the occurrence of an attack since the group or individual responsible resides in a different country. ITERATE’s data has a high level of reliability as it is collected from an “exhaustive” search of a diverse range of sources including major media, research (relevant manuscripts and scholarly publications), and official government chronologies. These sources have all been used consistently since the inception of the database (Mickolus et al. 2004).

The alternate dependent variable, which concerns all attacks occurring in a country regardless of the designation of the attack, is derived for the purposes of analysis from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by START (The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). The GTD is a compendium of all identifiable terrorist attacks and their attributes, regardless of whether the attack (or attempted attack) is domestic or transnational. START’s exhaustively records any and all attacks in a given country, contributing to the high validity of the GTD as a measure. The consortium collects attack information using open-source reports from a variety of media sources that are determined to be credible. From 1970-1997, this collection was done in real time, however from 1998-2007, it was retrospective. After 2007, the collection switched back to real time and this is the current collection method. Efforts to collect a complete enumeration of terrorist attacks from the retrospective collection period were impeded by the fact that certain media sources have since become unavailable, but
“efforts were made to assure the continuity of the data.” This inconsistency, along with improvements in methodology that were made when the data was moved to START in 2012, affect the reliability of the measure. However, as the most comprehensive unclassified database of terrorist attacks, the GTD has developed a reputation as a reputable source for those seeking answers about the phenomenon of terrorism (START 2018).

Operationalizing the independent variable of aid to women’s empowerment efforts was also fairly straightforward because only one database contained aid purposes specific enough to establish validity. Few data sources contain unambiguous purposes for the commitments, as they are typically grouped within broad categories such as health, education, etc. within the coding scheme. Additionally, few databases include a comprehensive set of donors from which aid reporting is recorded. AidData 3.1, a research release by the College of William & Mary, not only covers ninety-six donors but also has an abundance of specific sectoral codes. One of these codes specifies aid to Women in Development, including multisectoral Women in Business (WIB) projects and programs, institutional capacity building, promotion of and support to WID groups and networks, conferences, seminars, etc., and other unspecified activities relating to WID. This level of preciseness when it comes to aid purpose clearly captures the independent variable in a way that no other aid commitment database is able to. In general, AidData is the most comprehensive project-level database containing international development finance information, so the choice was obvious. The data is collected directly from over ninety funding agencies including the OECD Creditor Reporting System database, donor annual reports, project documents from bilateral and multilateral agencies, agency websites and databases, and other data gathered from donor agency sources. The utilization of so many primary sources speaks to
AidData’s high level of reliability which has made it the choice of countless researchers concerned with development aid (Tierney et al. 2011).

In order to account for factors other than aid to women’s empowerment that may have an effect on terrorism, a series of controls will be employed in the statistical analysis. These controls are consistent with the standard for quantitative terrorism analysis, and among them are Polity IV’s executive constraints and political participation measures. What sets Polity IV apart is its attempt to be responsive to short-term fluctuations in the level of democracy or autocracy. Many studies in the field of terrorism indicate that periods of fluctuation could cause terrorism or vice versa, so Polity is known as a reliable source for authority characteristics of states. The executive constraints variable is operationalized as “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectives,” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017, 28). This definition confirms that Polity’s variable has high validity as a control variable in this study since scholars tend to agree that the amount of terrorism in a country may be positively affected by how much power the executive has. However, the reliability of the measure is less than perfect. Polity IV codes executive constraints on a scale from one to seven, which attempts to be sensitive to the wide range of differently functioning executive systems that exist. However, executive power sometimes varies from year to year based on changing political circumstances and dynamics. No matter how well defined the requirements for designating a given government as any particular number from one to seven are, this makes it difficult to objectively place certain countries in certain years on the scale. The political participation variable (scaled from one to ten) has the same reliability issue. Polity IV defines it as the degree of organization and institutionalization of political participation and more broadly “the extent to which alternative preferences for policy formation and leadership roles can
be pursued in the political arena,” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017, 71). This is a highly valid measure for a control variable because there is a general consensus that governments that allow their citizens more say in policy formation and leadership experience less terrorism in their spheres of influence.

Another standard variable to control for is existing armed conflict in the countries experiencing terrorism and containing groups and/or individuals perpetrating terrorism. Measures for both civil and international wars from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset during the years aid commitments were made will be included in this analysis. The data represents Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s joint survey of all countries for conflicts. International wars are simply defined as those occurring between two or more states while civil wars are those occurring “between the government of a state and one or more opposition groups without intervention from other states,” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 12). For an armed conflict to be counted in the data, there has to be twenty-five or more battle-related deaths in a year. The research institutions utilize the Militarized Interstate Dispute Database and KOSIMO to ensure major events were not missed. However, the information varies when it comes to level of precision, and it only includes events when they can be determined with certainty. This creates a bias because conflicts in less developed countries are more difficult to ascertain, adversely affecting the reliability of the two variables. The validity of UCDP/PRIO’s civil and international wars variables as a control for armed conflict is high, as civil and international wars encompass most forms of armed aggression that could be occurring in a country (and having an effect on terrorism) during the years of analysis (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) will provide the necessary measures to control for GDP and population, which are other standard controls in quantitative
literature using terrorism as a dependent variable. Azam and Thelen (2008) assert that there is “no compelling argument for deciding whether ODA should be measured per capita or as a ratio of GDP,” and a decade later this is still a toss-up (Azam and Thelen 2008, 385). Therefore, I have chosen to use population and GDP as standard controls in order to scale aid commitments by both the recipient’s GDP and population. WDI’s sources include national statistical agencies, central banks, and customs services, and this variety of relevant sources establishes the data’s high level of validity. WDI is a standard choice for cross-country comparable data on development as the World Bank is very transparent about its collection methodology (and its unavoidable limits). Statistical systems in developing countries are often very limited and vary widely in their coverage and methods which affects reliability in any case, but World Bank has employed a variety of intuitive methods to standardize the data. A natural log measurement with a base of ten will be applied to the population and GDP variables from WDI. This is a standard way to deal with a highly dispersed measurement and will account for inevitable lapses in aid reporting. Although aid flows occur each year, they are sometimes reported for some years and not others, and the log will address the resulting unevenness in the data (World Bank 2019).

The final set of controls are regional dummies in order to account for cultural and spatial effects that are specific to major world regions. This is a standard practice in studies with a country-year unit of analysis, as it holds constant the major region that each country in the analysis resides in.

In concluding the discussion of the control variables that will be included in the analysis, is important to mention that some scholars have deemed it necessary to control for militancy prevailing in some groups within a country’s population, which is notoriously difficult to measure. Measures of things like mountainous terrain and oil exports have been used to control
for this before, but sufficiently capturing “militancy” is currently impossible. Therefore, I have chosen to avoid explicitly trying to track this abstract concept. Incidents of terrorism often by their very nature exhibit the “militancy” of the perpetrating group.

**Methodology**

In order to test for a relationship between the independent and control variables and terrorism, a series of regression analyses are employed. Specifically, negative binomial models are used (as is standard in the literature) due to the over-dispersed nature of the observed counts of terrorist attacks. In other words, it is impossible to come across a negative number of attacks and there are many instances of zero attacks. Therefore, a standard ordinary least squares test is not appropriate for the purposes of this study.

Within all models, the independent variable is lagged by one year to account for the effects of aid. In other words, it is unlikely that aid allocated to a country will have an immediate effect—any conceivable effects will occur in the future. Although it could be argued that the lag should be two years, three years, etc., employing too long of a lag would beg the question of which previous year’s aid commitment relates with the number attacks. Additionally, the swiftness of the application of aid to intended projects (or for that matter whether or not the recipient government uses the aid correctly at all) depends on the recipient country, so it is difficult to argue for any specific amount of lag time. Lagging the independent variable also helps account for endogeneity by confirming that aid in the year it is committed is predicting terrorism in the next year.
For each of the two dependent variables, four different regression models are run in Stata (totaling eight models in all). The first is a naive model that evaluates the possible relationship between terrorism and the lagged variable of aid to women’s empowerment without any controls, just as a preliminary test. Following that is the same model but including all of the controls (executive constraints, log GDP, civil wars, etc.). Next is a model that uses an aggregate measure of all aid allocated to a country in a year (regardless of purpose) as the independent variable. The purpose of this is to compare the results to those of the previous model in order to evaluate the effectiveness of disaggregated aid versus all aid. The hope is that this comparison will confirm the argument that aid is more effective when it is allocated towards certain purposes. The final model includes total aid as a control variable to account for aid to women’s empowerment efforts as a percentage of total aid.
Chapter 5

Results

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated by People from Aid Recipient Country</td>
<td>6,945</td>
<td>1.25054</td>
<td>5.087456</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks Occurring in Aid Recipient Country</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>15.65523</td>
<td>71.59548</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid for Women’s Empowerment (log)</td>
<td>8,564</td>
<td>4.525571</td>
<td>4.283714</td>
<td>2.302585</td>
<td>19.52479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated Total Aid Commitment (log)</td>
<td>9,344</td>
<td>14.1576</td>
<td>7.900717</td>
<td>2.302585</td>
<td>24.87009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>6,205</td>
<td>4.218533</td>
<td>2.324</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>6,205</td>
<td>3.548751</td>
<td>1.094245</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Wars</td>
<td>6,479</td>
<td>.2486495</td>
<td>1.053261</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Wars</td>
<td>6,479</td>
<td>.0842723</td>
<td>.6246935</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>6,418</td>
<td>33.49281</td>
<td>2.251527</td>
<td>28.06241</td>
<td>40.2132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>6,425</td>
<td>25.70359</td>
<td>1.751808</td>
<td>20.9837</td>
<td>31.00419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>8,455</td>
<td>.1517445</td>
<td>.3587943</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>8,455</td>
<td>.0656416</td>
<td>.2476693</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>8,455</td>
<td>.0448255</td>
<td>.206933</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>8,455</td>
<td>.0113542</td>
<td>.1059558</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>8,455</td>
<td>.0282673</td>
<td>.1657453</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>8,455</td>
<td>.1244234</td>
<td>.3300835</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for each variable included in the regressions, the results of which will follow. The table leads off with both dependent variables, followed by the independent variable of aid to women’s empowerment and then the measure for total aid. Descending below in the first column are all of the controls. For each variable, the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are displayed.

The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables capturing the frequency of terrorist attacks warrant some discussion. As was mentioned previously, domestic terrorism happens much more frequently than transnational terrorism, which explains why the mean for the ITERATE dependent (around 1.3) is so much lower than the mean for the GTD dependent (around 15.7). In other words, for the countries and years included in the analysis, the average number of transnational terrorist incidents perpetrated by people hailing from a given country is around 1.3 per year. This low number reflects the countries that produce no transnational terrorism in a given year, which is a frequent occurrence in the data since transnational terrorism is a rarer phenomenon than domestic terrorism. The maximum number of incidents arising from a country in a given year, however, is much higher at 133. This divergence, along with the relatively high standard deviation, shows the aforementioned over-dispersed, right-skewed nature of attacks. The standard deviation for the GTD variable is much higher, so there is even more dispersion between the average of around 15.7 attacks occurring in a country per year and the maximum of 1,649. This maximum reflects Israel in 1986, which experienced the most frequent incidents of terrorism on record.
Table 2: Transnational Attacks by Perpetrator Nationality Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated by People from Aid Recipient Country</th>
<th>[1]</th>
<th>[2]</th>
<th>[3]</th>
<th>[4]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid for Women’s Empowerment (log)</td>
<td>-.015*</td>
<td>-.030**</td>
<td>-.030**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated Total Aid commitment (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints (log)</td>
<td>.099***</td>
<td>.083***</td>
<td>.097***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation (log)</td>
<td>.135**</td>
<td>.154**</td>
<td>.125*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Wars</td>
<td>.123**</td>
<td>.125**</td>
<td>.124*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Wars (log)</td>
<td>.353***</td>
<td>.379***</td>
<td>.356***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>.100*</td>
<td>.125**</td>
<td>.095*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>.563***</td>
<td>.525***</td>
<td>.569***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean (log)</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>1.48***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.113)</td>
<td>(.114)</td>
<td>(.114)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia (log)</td>
<td>.567**</td>
<td>.534**</td>
<td>.537**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.175)</td>
<td>(.174)</td>
<td>(.175)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.206)</td>
<td>(.207)</td>
<td>(.206)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>-.447</td>
<td>-.421</td>
<td>-.441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.303)</td>
<td>(.303)</td>
<td>(.303)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>-1.35***</td>
<td>-1.34***</td>
<td>-1.35***</td>
<td>-1.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.366)</td>
<td>(.368)</td>
<td>(.366)</td>
<td>(.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa (log)</td>
<td>1.85***</td>
<td>1.87***</td>
<td>1.85***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.122)</td>
<td>(.122)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-19.6***</td>
<td>-19.5***</td>
<td>-19.5***</td>
<td>-19.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.857)</td>
<td>(.900)</td>
<td>(.898)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>6,945</td>
<td>4,723</td>
<td>4,723</td>
<td>6,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square</td>
<td>2.70*</td>
<td>888.63***</td>
<td>880.50***</td>
<td>888.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p ≤ .000     ** p ≤ .01     * p ≤ .1

Table 2 contains the results for the four models using the dependent variable from
ITERATE, which is the number of attacks perpetrated by people hailing from the aid recipient
country. Model [1], the naïve model, shows a statistically significant negative relationship
between the number of transnational attackers originating from a country and aid to women’s
empowerment, which is an encouraging start. However, the Pseudo-R² is 0.0002, indicating that
the dependent variable only explains 0.02% of the decrease in attacks. Adding in the relevant
controls seems to remedy this, as in Model [2] the negative relationship is also significant and
the Pseudo-$R^2$ is 0.077, which means that aid to women’s empowerment efforts accounts for around 7.7% of the variation in exported attacks. Although accounting for 7.7% of the decrease in attacks does not seem like much, terrorism is very idiosyncratic and when considering all of the potential factors that play into this phenomenon, this percentage is noteworthy. Interestingly, Model [3], which includes only aggregate aid for the independent variable, does not show a statistically significant relationship between aid regardless of sector and the measure of transnational terrorism. Adding in total aid as a control for the independent variable of aid to women’s empowerment in Model [4] leads to results almost identical to Model [2], as both the p-score and Pseudo-$R^2$ are the same and the coefficients nearly match as well. The Chi Square for models [2], [3], and [4] are high, indicating that the models are predictive.

As for the controls, all aside for a couple of the regional dummy variables are significant for a positive relationship.

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As for the controls, all aside for a couple of the regional dummy variables are significant for a positive relationship.
The above table, Table 3, is set up the same way as Table 2 except the results are for models using the GTD measure as the dependent variable. Just to reiterate, this measure includes all attacks occurring in the aid recipient country, regardless of whether they are domestic attacks or if they are transnational attacks originating from a different country. The main difference from
Table 2 that can be spotted immediately is that the relationships shown are positive aside from some of the dummy variables. This could indicate that aid to women’s empowerment in a country increases terrorism in that same country.

The naïve model [5] is significant as in Table 2, but unlike in the last table has a Pseudo-$R^2$ similar to that of the following three models. Model [6], with the inclusion of the control variables, is also significant. The Pseudo-$R^2$ is 0.079, indicating that aid to women’s empowerment could account for 7.9% of the increase in terrorist events, and the Chi Square is high, indicating that the model is predictive. An intriguing difference between Table 2 and Table 3 is that neither Model [7] or [8] (set up the same way as [3] and [4]) display a statistically significant negative relationship. Again, it seems that total aid (models [3] and [7]) has no statistically significant relationship (whether negative or positive) with terrorism but aid to women’s development does (models [2], [4], and [6]). Model [8], however, appears to be an outlier. Adding total aggregated aid to the controls in this model seemed to decrease the significance as opposed to Model [6], which is exactly the same minus total aid as a control. It is interesting that adding this aggregated aid control in Model [4] (the same as Model [8] except analyzing the ITERATE dependent variable) made little to no difference while in Model [8] it rendered the relationship insignificant.

Every control aside from political participation and some of the dummy variables shows significance at the highest level for a positive relationship. As opposed to in Table 2, political participation is not significant and the coefficient is negative.
Chapter 6
Discussion

The results support H1, as all three models with aid to women’s empowerment as the independent variable and transnational attacks perpetrated by people from the aid recipient country as the dependent ([1], [2], and [4]) have a statistically significant negative relationship. Therefore, this study provides sufficient evidence that aid to women’s empowerment may be among the sectoral level goals that help counter transnational terrorism. These findings also support Azam and Thelen (2012), as they likewise conclude that foreign aid can be an effective counterterrorism tool in the source country.

The results also lend credence to the argument that aid allocated towards the right sectors is more effective than aggregated aid as a whole. The measure for total aid, when used as the only independent variable (models [3] and [7]), was not significant when tested with either of the dependent variables. On the other hand, the disaggregated measure of aid to women’s empowerment was significant in five out of the six models in which it acted as the main independent variable (models [1], [2], [4], [5], and [6]). Moreover, Model [4], in using total aid as an additional control and still producing results almost identical to those of Model [2], supports the notion that aid to women’s empowerment is effective as a percentage of total aid given to a country in a year.

Although there is support for H1, all evidence seems to contradict H2. Any significant relationships between terrorist attacks occurring in a country and aid to women’s empowerment received by the same country were positive, indicating that aid to women’s empowerment may
increase domestic terrorism or incidents of transnational terrorism occurring in the aid recipient country, or both (although as previously described it seems to decrease the amount of transnational attacks an aid recipient exports). These findings line up with the literature, as Azam and Thelen (2012) and Boutton and Pascoe (2018) find that foreign aid could attract more transnational attacks in the aid recipient country, so even if aid hinders domestic terrorism the overall level of terrorist activity in that country does not decrease. Put differently, this study supports the theory that areas with foreign aid projects are more at risk for becoming the host nation for transnational attacks.

The results of this study surely provide evidence that aid may increase terrorism within the aid recipient country since Model [6], which included all the controls, shows significance in the positive direction. However, Model [8], which uses total aid as an additional control, is not significant at all, indicating that aid to women’s empowerment as a percentage of total aid may not have any noteworthy positive effect.

Finally, the results displayed in tables 2 and 3 lead one to wonder whether or not the standard control variables used are sufficient in capturing the exogenous factors that may be affecting the frequency of terrorist incidents. Most of the controls are at a higher level of significance in Table 3, which uses the GTD version of the dependent variable that includes domestic attacks (which make up the majority of all attacks occurring in a country). This begs the question of whether or not the controls that are standard in the quantitative literature cater more towards domestic terrorism than transnational terrorism (however, researchers are typically only concerned with whether a relationship is significant or not, and not the actual level of significance). Conversely, the measure for political participation is not significant at all when
tested against the GTD measure, but is significant for the ITERATE dependent. This is a fairly interesting development. Changes in methodology are definitely worth exploring in the future.

In order to conclude the discussion of the results, it is imperative to cover the limits of the research that has been presented. First and foremost, the endogenous nature of the aid variables could have been addressed more thoroughly, possibly using the methods of Azam and Delacroix (2006), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Additionally, as was mentioned in the variables subsection of the analysis, some scholars will argue that there should be an explicit control or set of controls for the militancy parameter. Both endogeneity and militancy were addressed in this study, but not as methodically as possible.
Conclusion

The results have made it clear that aid to women’s empowerment efforts may decrease the flow of transnational attacks originating from an aid recipient country, but could adversely affect the number of attacks occurring within that same country. What is less clear is whether or not it is specifically women’s empowerment aid that has this undesirable effect, as the results show that this type of aid as a percentage of total aid may not have any noteworthy effect.

As was stated in the theory section, a possible explanation for the tentative results indicating that the frequency of attacks may go up is terrorist retaliation to a visible increase in infrastructure for women. Whatever the reason, if aid to women’s empowerment efforts could indeed lead to an increase in domestic attacks in the recipient country and even make it a more desirable venue for transnational attacks, policymakers should re-evaluate this type of aid. Whether “re-evaluate” refers to more closely monitoring how the aid is used by the recipient government or rethinking the monetary value of the commitments is up to donor interpretation.

The somewhat discouraging aspect of this study has the potential of being entirely ignored. This is a possibility due to the fear transnational terrorism incites in many donor governments as a result of high-profile incidents of this kind that have occurred within their own national borders. It is conceivable that donor countries will only take into account the evidence that aid to women’s empowerment could decrease the amount of transnational terrorism a country exports. Future research should focus on how this type of aid and other aid purposes affect the flow of transnational terrorist incidents that actually occur in the donor countries.
Subsequent research should also break down women’s empowerment efforts into more specific goals such as infrastructure, efforts to encourage political participation, business courses, etc. Not only would this allow policymakers in donor countries to pinpoint exactly where to spend their money, but it could reveal which aid purposes cause an uptick in terrorism in the recipient countries (assuming not all aid purposes relating to women’s empowerment do, and assuming some donor countries care).

Despite some discouraging findings, the results of this study can definitely be considered optimistic as a whole. Although the focus here is on aid as a counterterrorism tool, donor countries that allocate aid to women’s empowerment solely with the intention of helping women may be more careful about unintended negative effects on the recipient country going forward. Additionally, donors who choose to use this type of aid as a method of reducing the amount of transnational attacks a recipient country exports can employ it in tandem with other counterterrorism tools. These accompanying counterterror practices can work within the recipient country to remediate domestic terrorism that may result from the aid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Ben-Itzhak, Svetla G.D. 2015. “Foreign Aid and Terrorism: When is Aid Effective in Reducing Terror?” Department of Political Science, University of Kansas.


EDUCATION
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Schreyer Honors College
Bachelor of Arts in International Politics, National Security Concentration  Aug 2015-May 2019
Understanding how power operates within and between states; discovering approaches to managing threats to the U.S. and international system
Bachelor of Arts in Chinese
Developing a working knowledge of Chinese language and understanding important aspects of Chinese culture with emphasis on contemporary China

G-8 Summit Simulation  Aug 2017-Dec 2017
Threat of Terrorism and Crime
• Worked in a group to disseminate weekly intelligence documents from various governments
• Wrote weekly intelligence reports as documents revealed developments in a planned attack
• Researched and mapped terrorist organizations
• Debriefed over 75 people on the command structure, financing, weapon, date, and location of a planned attack

Is Our Anxiety Sponsoring Terrorism?  Aug 2017-Dec 2017
Writing in the Social Sciences
• Studied fear of terrorist attacks in college age individuals by distribution of survey via social media
• Analyzed results comprehensively by utilizing graphs and percentages derived from collected data
• Delivered a presentation on research design and findings in order to raise audience awareness of implications
• Composed research paper including all components of APA format supplemented by policy recommendations

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
Global Terrorism Database General Associate  Aug 2018-Present
• Worked independently and remotely after completion of internship program while simultaneously pursuing two degrees
• Efficiently and accurately recorded information about worldwide domestic and international terrorist attacks
• Investigated open source attack information to code up to 29 variables per incident related to casualties and consequences

DIA National Security and Intelligence Seminar  Aug 2018-Aug 2018
Attendee

- Selected out of more than 2,000 students in the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence
- Completed a ten-day seminar consisting of panels and presentations by Intelligence Community professionals
- Networked and participated in career building with members of multiple agencies in the IC
- Analyzed simulated intelligence relating to unrest in the Levant in a large group setting
- Prepared concise summaries of intelligence under strict time constraints while underscoring U.S. policy objectives

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)

Global Terrorism Database Intern  
Jun 2018-Aug 2018

- Systematically coded terrorism attack information related to casualties and consequences
- Analyzed over 1,400 open source publications about domestic and international terrorist attacks
- Effectively collaborated with fellow interns to brief the office about significant terrorism developments
- Simulated a strategically planned terrorist attack during a red teaming exercise
- Employed Excel pivot tables to maneuver, organize, and analyze the more than 120 variables in the GTD

Leadership

National Society of Leadership and Success  
Jan 2017-Present

- Inducted into the nation’s largest leadership honor society based on academic achievement and leadership potential
- Engaged in group deliberation to advise and track progress towards academic and professional goals
- Enhanced leadership skills via interactive seminars led by accomplished moguls from various fields

Paterno Fellows  
Aug 2015-Present

- Selected for program offered jointly by the College of Liberal Arts and Schreyer Honors College
- Committed to accelerated coursework, thesis, internship, ethics study, and leadership/service
- Broadened knowledge and capabilities for use in solving more dynamic challenges

Additional Skills

- Limited working proficiency in Mandarin Chinese
- Experience using Stata and R coding languages for statistical analysis in a class setting and for thesis research
- Ability to utilize Excel pivot tables to correlate and analyze variables in a data set of any size
- WordPress blogging experience in both academic and professional settings