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EXPLORING THE LENGTH OF THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS BETWEEN
THE 95TH AND 114TH CONGRESS

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ABSTRACT

This research quantitatively studies the effect that various concepts of partisanship and ideology have on the length of the confirmation process for federal judicial nominees from the 95th to 114th Congress. By testing whether a government is unified or divided, the ideological distance between the president and the average Senate majority party member, the level of polarization within the Senate, and the ideology of the nominee, I found that the length of the confirmation process generally decreased when a unified government is present and the Senate is less polarized. My research helps mend the gap between research on lower courts and the Supreme Court, and aims to better explain the effect that ideology and partisanship from all three major stakeholders – the president, the Senate majority party, and the nominee – have on the length of the confirmation process.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

More often than not, the confirmation process of federal judicial nominees goes largely under the radar and unnoticed by the general public. Presidential and congressional elections and executive branch appointments tends to garner much more media and public interest than that of the appointments to our third branch – the judiciary. Despite the arguably greater and longer-lasting power that the individuals appointed to judgeships hold through their lifetime appointments, the vast majority of individuals have been apathetic to the federal judicial nomination process. However, in the past couple of decades, there has been much more media and public attention to the effect that partisanship has had on the confirmation of these nominees. President Reagan’s nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987 was one of the most notable oppositions of a nominee in recent history, and it was largely based on ideological differences. Bork was attacked as an ideological extremist that would tilt the Supreme Court rightward for years to come. His largest opposition mostly stemmed in pro-choice rights legal groups that believed he would vote to reverse *Roe v. Wade* – which was likely one of the causes for why the Senate confirmation process became such a partisan battle. On October 23rd, 1987, Robert Bork was rejected by the Senate, with fifty-eight Senators voting against him – including six Republican Senators.

More recently, a great deal of attention was drawn to President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court following the death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia in

February 2016. This opened up an interesting situation in which a Democratic president was given the chance to nominate a justice to the Supreme Court during a Republican-controlled Senate for the first time in 121 years. The Republican majority in the Senate ended up never having a vote on Merrick Garland, as they stood by their stated policy that no president should nominate anyone to the Supreme Court in their last year of office. This was a heavily controversial decision in the eyes of many, as it was perceived as a political game in order to avoid the possibility of affecting the Supreme Court's ideological balance for the many years ahead. With the death of Justice Scalia, a very conservative justice, an Obama appointee would have opened the door for the Court to have liberal leanings that would last a long time. Following this, the confirmation process has become much more prevalent to the public eye and we can see the effects of partisanship on this process. While this focuses mostly on the Supreme Court nominees, even the lower court nominees are beginning to face harder and harder confirmation processes.

Why do some federal judicial confirmation processes take longer than others, and does partisanship affect the process? In order to answer this question, I examine how four different dimensions of partisanship affect the length of a confirmation. First, I consider whether or not the confirmation process came at a time of either unified or divided government. Next, I focus on the effects of the ideological distance between the president and the Senate majority party. Third, I consider whether levels of polarization within the Senate over time affect the length of the confirmations. Finally, I consider whether a nominee's ideology affects the length of the confirmation process. My main arguments are that the length of the confirmation process will shorten under a unified government, and as the ideological distance between the president and the Senate majority party member decrease. Further, I argue that the length of the confirmation

process will lengthen as the ideological distance between the Senate majority party and the Senate minority party increases, and the process will lengthen as the nominee becomes more conservative. Through answering these questions that explore the multifaceted relationships in the confirmation process, this research can bridge the gap that exists in existing literature by including partisanship and ideology considerations for all three major stakeholders in this process.

Past research on the subject of the length of confirmation processes largely has two major variations from my study. First, most existing literature focuses on either the District Courts and Circuit Courts or the Supreme Court. While there are valid reasons for separating the analysis of lower courts from the Supreme Court, it is also important to look at the confirmation process as a whole. From this, we can draw larger conclusions about the entire contemporary judicial nomination process – and even potentially use that for further studies, such as a comparison to the executive branch nomination process. Further, existing literature does not focus on all three major stakeholders in the nomination process; meaning, the ideology of several key players in the executive, legislative, and judicial branch are not entirely accounted for in all studies. There is a gap in literature that explores the relationship when considering the executive branch (mainly President), legislative branch, *and* judicial nominee – and my research plans to address that.

My analysis confirms all but one of my hypotheses, although some of the models run contrary to expectations. I surprisingly discovered that the length of the process typically decreases for nominees that are more conservative. This study will conclude with a discussion of these results and areas of further research that these findings could be applied to in the future.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

The power bestowed upon the president of the United States in Article II, Section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution to nominate and appoint ambassadors, public officers, and judges of the Supreme Court, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, is one of the most important powers of our constitutional republic (McMillion, 2018).

Following the vacancy of a judicial seat, the president will usually discuss the vacancy with Senators prior to formally announcing a nominee. Once the candidate is nominated, the nomination is formally sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee. They will be responsible for holding hearings on the nominee. Witnesses will support or oppose the nomination, and senators will question the nominee's qualifications, ideology, and judgement. Following the hearing(s), the Judiciary Committee will vote on the nomination and send its recommendation (either that it be confirmed, rejected, or with no recommendation) to the full Senate. The full Senate will debate this nomination. United States Senate rules allow for unlimited debate, unless a cloture vote is passed, which requires 60 senators to vote in favor of ending debate. However, in April 2017, the Senate changed this rule to establish the cloture vote threshold to be 51 votes – which is sometimes referred to as the nuclear option. Once the debate ends, the Senate votes on the nomination. A simple majority of the Senators present and voting is required for the nominee to be confirmed. In the case of a tie, the Vice President, whom presides over the Senate, will cast the deciding vote (Georgetown Law, 2018).

More often than not, the Senate confirms a presidential appointee without hesitation. However, with lifetime appointments, and more attention to the impact these potential judges can have, the Senate has increased their scrutiny and extended the length of the confirmation process for federal judicial appointments. In an effort to further understand the factors affecting the length of the confirmation process, I draw upon literature that focuses on the nomination process, unified government, the partisanship of the president relative to that of the Senate majority, polarization in the Senate, and the ideology of nominees. Overall, much more is known about Supreme Court nominations relative to nominations for District and Circuit courts. I aim to change that imbalance in my project by explaining the variation in the time it takes to approve or reject all federally appointed judges.

Unified Government

In this section, I draw upon previous work completed by scholars and how they have described the effect of unified or divided government on the length of the confirmation process for a federal judicial nominee. Massie, Hansford, and Songer (2004) find that overall government dynamics are different under a unified government. They state that in a unified government the president will face less resistance when selecting nominees who reflect the president's policy position, as the Senate will be less likely to delay confirmation (Massie, et. al, 2004). Due to a separation of powers between the president and the Senate, the Senate can choose to move forward at the speed that they desire. In theory, a unified government would be able to get the president's formal nomination to the Senate Judiciary Committee faster, be moved through the committee and onto the floor in a quicker fashion, with a much greater chance of moving to

cloture and ultimately confirming the nominee. Being that the majority party would be in control of most of these proceedings, a unified government has a greater chance to navigate the process much faster than in a divided government.

The Senate Judiciary Committee plays a crucial role in this overall process. Under unified government, the committee chair has the ability to prioritize the nomination to the exact speed of their liking. If these choose to make this a top priority, the committee can hold hearings as soon as they have all of their information prepared and can provide their recommendation to the full Senate. Another part of the process within the committee is that of the blue-slip policy – the blue-slip is a paper that is issued by the committee to the home-state senators of where the president has nominated a judicial candidate. In recent years, the blue-slip has been either strengthened or weakened based on the likings of the Judiciary Committee Chair. For example, Judiciary Committee Chair Orrin Hatch (a Republican senator) stated that a return of a negative blue slip would not necessarily stop consideration of a nomination at the start of George W. Bush's presidency (a Republican presidency). In contrast, just a few years earlier, Chair Orrin Hatch had stated that a negative blue slip could block committee action under President Bill Clinton (a Democratic presidency). This reversal shows the flexibility of the Senate Judiciary committee in times of unified government and how they are the overall gatekeepers of the confirmation process (Sollenberger, 2010).

Further research especially emphasizes the importance of a unified government when evaluating the time elapsed between nomination to confirmation. According to Lott, J. (2005), a unified government reduces the length of the confirmation process for circuit court nominees by 52 to 60 percent, and it reduces the length of the confirmation process for district court nominees by 46 to 48 percent. Shipan and Shannon (2003) cite a similar figure found by Bond, Fleisher,

and Krutz (2002) that states the mean number of days to confirmation is twice as long under divided government in comparison to unified government. Holmes, Shomade, and Hartley (2012) cite Binder and Saltzman (2002) as finding an increased delay in the confirmation process for circuit nominees who would therefore shift the partisan balance of an already evenly balanced court. These many works give insight to the importance of unified government and how it can affect the overall confirmation process, but do not give insight on both Supreme Court and District/Circuit Courts in their articles, whereas my research aims to mend this gap.

Ideological Distance between the president and the Senate majority party

In this section, I bring attention to research completed by other scholars in the realm of describing the effect of a greater ideological distance between the president and Senate majority party on the overall confirmation process. With basic intuition, it makes sense for the length of the confirmation process to be shorter when the ideological distance is smaller due to the idea that like-minded politicians will share similar goals of wanting to place nominees with similar ideologies as they do on the federal benches. For example, a moderately conservative president will likely face shorter confirmation processes with a moderately conservative Senate than an ultraconservative president with a moderately conservative Senate. In a formal study looking at nominees to the Supreme Court, Shipan and Shannon (2003) find that the duration of the confirmation process does increase as the ideological distance between the president and the Senate increases. This work gives justification and empirical backing to basic intuition, however does not expand beyond the outreach of Supreme Court nominees. Further, my research will focus on solely the ideological distance between the president and the average Senate *majority*

party member, not the average Senate member. This distinction is important due to the emphasis I place above on the Senate Judiciary Committee and the power they have in essentially deciding if a nomination will continue onward or not.

In some instances, due to little information available for lower court nominees, the Senate will sometimes place their trust in the preferences of the president. Meaning, senators are likely to take presidential preferences into account when assessing an appointee that they do not have much information on. As the Senate diverges away ideologically from the president, the Senate will likely proceed more slowly. If the Senate is closer in ideology to the president, the Senate will ensure that they make it a swift confirmation (Binder and Maltzman, 2002). This more clearly addresses the aspect of lower courts, but again uses the overall Senate ideology in its measurement for ideological difference.

Johnson and Roberts (2004) explore an idea that investigates the importance of the ideological distance between the president's nominee and the Senate filibuster pivot. Another important aspect of the overall confirmation process is that of invoking the cloture vote. They hypothesize that the greater the ideological distance between the president and the Senate filibuster vote, the greater amount of political resources the president will have to use to secure confirmation for their nominee. They find that to be true – as the distance between the president's own ideology and the pivotal Senator increases, the president is more likely to make public statements in support of the nominee (Johnson and Roberts, 2004). This study finds relevance in the fact that cloture votes are a pivotal aspect of the confirmation process – if a president has to apply great deals of political capital just for the nomination have a greater chance at success, the length of the confirmation process will likely be longer. The extra time spent convincing the public and the senators will increase the length of the confirmation process,

as the senators will likely respond by using some of their political capital as well. The understanding of this political gridlock is crucial to the overall understanding of the federal judicial nomination process.

Senate Polarization

In this section, I largely draw upon literature that focuses on Senate polarization and the adverse effects that it has on the length of the confirmation process. Intuitively speaking, the closer the average member of the Republican Party is to the average member of the Democratic Party, the faster the confirmation process, due to the idea that there will be middle ground between them. Members below the average point in the minority will be willing to work with the members of the majority to pass through the nominee.

Whittington (2018) describes a very similar concept in his analysis of the confirmation process and the effect of Senate polarization. One of the most important aspects of the confirmation process is finding a path to 60 votes to invoke cloture. Whittington states that achieving this would be more manageable “if the more liberal wing of the Republican Party and the more conservative wing of the Democratic Party were largely in agreement and shared a similar perspective and electorate.” However, the gap between the Republicans and Democrats has increased drastically and creating a filibuster-proof majority requires a far reach into the opposing party (Whittington, 2018). Further, the minority party can also slow down the confirmation process by withholding blue slips from home-state senators and through threatening filibusters. Whittington claims that if the two parties had greater ideological overlap, these three tactics (not voting for cloture, withholding blue slips, and threatening filibusters) would not have

much power (Whittington, 2018). However, since the parties are so far apart ideologically, they are slowed down by the minority party's tactics.

Binder and Maltzman (2009) also support the idea that the increase in polarization has led to an increase in filibusters, and thus, an increase in the length of the confirmation process. They point to the example of the Democrats losing control of the Senate following the 2002 election and their usage of the filibuster to delay or block Bush's nominees that they did not like. Prior to that there were instances of contentious nominations but they were almost always confirmed -- especially the nominees to the lower courts. Binder and Maltzman (2009) directly point to the increase of the usage of these tactics to the increased polarization of the two parties. Further, they even implicate that prior to 2014, much of the variation in the fate of the judicial nominees was driven by the highly ideologically motivated players and parties in the executive and legislative branches that were abusing the rules of the game in an attempt to influence the makeup of the federal bench (Binder and Maltzman, 2009).

Lastly, Devins (2011) analyzes the many different aspects of party polarization and Congressional Committees. Through his research, he finds that party polarization has greatly affected the Senate Judiciary Committee, and thus transformed the process of confirming lower federal court judges. He describes the drastic upswing in the amount of time it now takes for the Senate to confirm judges, as well as an equally dramatic downswing in the confirmation rate of these judges. The increasing ideological gap between the parties has now resulted in consistent hard-fought battles over nominations to the federal courts. Due to the high-stake nature of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the committee itself tends to attract partisans that desire high-visibility (Devins, 2011). The consistent uptick in polarization within the Senate is continuing to

make the length of the confirmation process not only longer, but with a lesser chance of approval.

Nominee's Ideological Views

This section focuses primarily on judicial ideology and the many different ways in which it has been measured by scholars in the past. In recent decades, the Senate has debated the nominee's judicial philosophy or ideology in one way or another for almost all Supreme Court nominees and many Circuit and District Court nominees. Even in their statements on the floor, Senators will sometimes allude to the views of said nominee, and whether or not there fall within a broad range of acceptable legal thinking. During the presidency of George W. Bush, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee delved into the question of what role, if any, the ideology of a nominee should have in his or her confirmation process. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) stated it was clear that in the present day, the ideology of the nominee often is a significant factor in their confirmation process. He added that the current era "certainty justifies Senate opposition to judicial nominees whose views fall outside the mainstream and who have been selected in an attempt to further tilt the courts in an ideological direction." By way of contrast, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) stated that there:

"are myriad reasons why political ideology has not been – and is not – an appropriate measure of judicial qualifications. Fundamentally, the Senate's responsibility to provide advice and consent does not include an ideological litmus test because a nominee's personal opinions are largely irrelevant so long as the nominee can set those opinions aside and follow the law fairly and impartially as a judge."

In principle, these two drastic schools of thought exist. In practice, Senators of both parties have based some degree of their opposition to particular Supreme Court nominations on the idea that

that the nominee's ideology falls outside of the mainstream of legal thought or public opinion (McMillion, 2018).

Next, it is important to evaluate some of the different measures taken to score the ideology of the federal judicial nominees. Most notably, the Segal-Cover score was a composite measured the ideology of Supreme Court Justice nominees prior to their confirmation or rejection. The methodology for this score included measuring the rate at which four major newspaper editorials ascribed a position that the nominee held as "liberal," "moderate," or "conservative." (Segal & Cover, 1989). A notable shortcoming that is relevant in this methodology is their limited scope of only nominees to the Supreme Court, as well as its reliance on subjective coding and editorials. Students were used in the coding of nuanced editorials, while newspaper editorials in themselves are subjective due to bias present from the writer.

Further, Martin-Quinn scores are another measure used to determine the ideology of Supreme Court Justice nominees, with an important distinction in that these scores are post-confirmation. Martin-Quinn scores were created through dynamic ideal point estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods; each vote by a Supreme Court Justice since 1937 was coded on a liberal-conservative dimension in order to determine their ongoing ideology throughout their time on the bench (Martin & Quinn, 2002). There are several areas of improvement that this methodology needs. First, this measure relies only upon the cases that the justices have voted to hear; justices vote on what they want to hear based on personal ideology and whether they see value in hearing a certain case. In other words, it could be interpreted as a biased sample because their ideology is having a say in which cases they decide to hear, but this measure does not catch that aspect of their ideology. Further, the Martin-Quinn score sees a similar issue that the Segal-Cover score does in that it is reliant upon the somewhat subjective

coding of individuals that are forced to place multi-dimensional cases on a one-dimensional ideology scale.

While two of the most notable scores of judicial nominee ideology focus solely on nominees to the Supreme Court, Yung (2010) focuses on the ideology of judges on the United States Court of Appeals. He does this through measuring how often a federal Circuit Court judge agrees or disagrees with their fellow Democrat (liberal) or Republican (conservative) colleagues at both the Circuit and District Court levels (Yung, 2010). This measure is strong in the sense that it does not rely on subjective coding; however, I would argue this is not the best measure of ideology. A certain judge could be strongly liberal but extensive evidence presented in this specific situation could cause him to vote in a way that would appear conservative simply because he or she votes with his or her conservative counterparts.

Next, Bonica, Chilton, Goldin, Rozema, and Sen (2016) measure judicial ideology through judicial hiring behavior, thus creating Clerk-Based Ideology scores. In order to estimate these scores, they extend existing work that documents ideology of over 7,100 law clerks at the District and Circuit Court level from 1995 to 2004, and over 1,200 clerks from the Supreme Court from 1960 to 2015. Then, they estimate the average ideological composition of the clerks hired by that judge and re-scale them so that all judges are placed on a unidimensional scale (Bonica et. al., 2016). In my opinion, the shortcoming in this approach is that it assumes judges will only hire those that share a similar ideology or that it will be weighed the most in the hiring process. While I would believe that there is validity in assuming they will hire individuals that are similar to them in some sense, it could also be possible that they hire clerks that are on the same side of the ideological spectrum as them, not necessarily the same area of the ideological spectrum. In other words, it is likely that a conservative judge would hire conservative clerks, but

those clerks could be sprinkled all throughout the conservative side of the ideological spectrum in order to have a more robust and versatile staff.

Lastly, Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland create a comprehensive measurement of judicial ideology that allows for a more seamless comparison of the policy space between lower and higher courts. This score is called the “Judicial Common Space” (JCS) and provides a score for all justices and judges appointed since 1953. The Judicial Common Space score relies heavily on the NOMINATE scores from Poole and Rosenthal (2000) “of either the judge’s appointing President, or in the event that the president and the home-state Senator(s) are of the same political party, that of the senior co-partisan Senator (or an average of both Senators, if both are of the same party)” (Epstein et. al., 2007; Giles et al., 2001). Further, Boyd (2015) extended this methodology to create a score for District Court judges through the 113th Congress. One criticism of the JCS score is that it is static – they are measured based on the ideology of the politicians that appointed the judge and do not account for the changes in judicial behavior that may happen over time.

In summation, there are many different measures to determine the nominee’s ideology. However, as Fishman and Law (2009) state, there is one overall shortcoming that can be found in measuring judicial ideology. Being that judicial ideology relies upon a “murky and confused distinction between what is ‘legal’ and what is ‘ideological’ or ‘political,’” it is difficult for scholars to agree on which judicial behavior is “political” or “ideological” in nature, as opposed to what is “legal” in nature (Fishman & Law, 2009). This fundamental disagreement between what is ideological versus what is legal causes a great deal of trouble when discussing and measuring judicial ideology.

Chapter 3

Theory

All in all, there may be several factors that come into play when determining the various reasons for which a federal court nomination process may take varying degrees of time, but at the root of it all is partisanship. In my research I expect to see a relationship between the length of the confirmation process and four factors that derive from partisanship: 1) whether there is divided or unified government; 2) by how much the president and the majority party in the Senate vary ideologically; 3) the level of polarization in that Senate; and 4) the nominee's ideological views.

Hypothesis 1: Unified Government

In most cases, there tends to be political gridlock when the president and the Senate majority are of differing political parties. While this is most closely noticed in the legislative process, it is also quite obvious in confirmation processes to the courts. Between 1946 -2016, 36 nominations have been made to the Supreme Court: 20 of which occurred at a time of unified party control, and the remaining 16 were made at a time of divided party control. Seventeen of the twenty nominations that occurred at a time of unified party control were confirmed, two nominations were withdrawn, and one failed to invoke cloture. However, during the times of divided government, three of the sixteen have been outright rejected – Haynsworth in 1969, Carswell in 1970, and Bork in 1987 - and one nomination was left untouched – Garland in 2016.

Therefore, a divided government has a confirmation rate of 75%, while a unified government has a confirmation rate of 85% and no outright rejections (McMillion, 2016). Based on the history and existing literature, I believe that this greater likelihood to be confirmed due to a unified government will lead to a shorter confirmation process. When the president is nominating someone that aligns well with the Senate majority party's ideologies, the Senate will be incentivized to get that person confirmed sooner rather than later. Further, the majority party has the power to set the agenda for how the Senate sessions will go – leading those of the same majority party to push a confirmation through, while political opponents would want to drag out the process and bring more negative attention to the nominee. When more negative attention is brought to the nominee, the public will begin to pressure their senators to vote against such nominee. As such, my hypothesis for how the unity of government – either divided or unified government – affects the length of a confirmation is as follows:

The length of the confirmation process will likely be shorter if the president and the Senate majority party are of the same political party.

Hypothesis 2: Ideological Distance between the president and the Senate majority party

Intuitively, if the president and the majority party are close on the ideological spectrum, they will agree on more things and will work in a quicker, more collaborative fashion. Being of the same party in general is helpful, as history indicates that unified government confirms a greater percentage of Supreme Court nominees. However, intuitively speaking, it would make more sense that a president and the majority party would work better together if they were both moderate or both extreme (with respect to that party), as opposed to one of those two being

moderate while the other is extreme. Research has in fact supported this idea that a greater ideological distance between the president and “key gatekeepers in the Senate” contributes to a longer confirmation process for judicial nominees (Binder and Maltzman, 2002; Martinek, Kemper, and Van Winkle, 2002; Shipan and Shannon, 2003). These “key gatekeepers” include Senate majority leadership and other influential senators. However, for the sake of this project, all members of the majority party will be considered. The ideological score of each Senate majority party member will be added and averaged out to determine the “average” Senate majority party member. As reasoned above, the length of the confirmation process is affected by ideological distance between the president and the average Senate majority party member. Therefore, I hypothesize:

The length of the confirmation process will likely be shorter if the president and the Senate majority are closer on the ideological spectrum.

Hypothesis 3: The Level of Polarization in the Senate

Not only are the effects of polarization between the president and the Senate majority party relevant to the confirmation process as discussed in Hypothesis 2, but the polarization in the Senate itself is relevant to the length of the confirmation process as well. In other words, the ideological divide between the average Republican and average Democrat in the Senate is important to the length of the confirmation process. Research completed by Razaghian and McCarty (1999) discovers a strong correlation between the level of polarization in the Senate and the length of the confirmation process. It is important to note that this research was completed in relation to positions in domestic executive branch agencies rather than judicial appointments, but

there is still value in their robust study of approximately 5,000 nominations from the 49th to the 109th Senates (1885 – 2004). Though this was completed in domestic executive branch agencies, this is still helpful in observing the Senate's actions in a very similar situation. The correlation that they found was further strengthened during times in which there were divided government. Intuitively, the idea of a more polarized Senate taking longer to confirm a nominee makes sense. The further apart the average Republican and the average Democrat are on the political spectrum, the less likely that they will find compromise on nominees and want to push the nomination through in a timely manner. As such, my hypothesis for how the polarization of the Senate affects the length of a confirmation is as follows:

The length of the confirmation process will likely be longer if the overall level of polarization in the Senate increases.

Hypothesis 4: The Nominee's Ideological Views

Prior to the confirmation of a judicial appointment, there will often be hearings where the Senators will ask questions of the nominee. These hearings are where nominees are often grilled on their personal ideology and their thoughts of how a judge should behave on the bench. It is through these processes that the senators investigate how ideologically extreme these nominees are through extensive questioning on their interpretation of certain precedents and discussing their previous court rulings. In some cases, the senators decide they will have further confirmation hearings. These further hearings, or other methods of slowing down the confirmation process, are typically reserved for those judges that raise concerns about extreme ideology. For example, Democrats attacked Judge Robert Bork, a nominee of President Reagan,

as they claimed he was too ideologically extreme to sit on the United States Supreme Court. This then led to his nomination being defeated in a vote on the Senate floor. This was not the first, and certainly not the last, time that either party used the ideological extreme tactic to delay the pending nominee, or even use it as a method to attempt to make sure the nominee is not confirmed (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz, 2006). However, there is reason to believe that the length of the confirmation process for conservative judges could be longer than that their liberal counterparts. Being that many conservative judges interpret the Constitution in the eyes of the Founding Fathers and many side against cases that have widespread public support (such as *Roe v. Wade* and other civil liberty cases), I believe they will face longer confirmation processes. As such, my hypothesis for how the ideological views of the federal judicial nominee will affect the length of a confirmation process is as follows:

The length of the confirmation process will likely increase if the federal judicial nominee's ideological views are more conservative in comparison to his or her peers on the ideological spectrum.

Chapter 4

Methodology and Data

Methodology

In order to test my hypotheses, I focused on federal judicial nominations starting with President Carter (95th Congress) and ending with President Obama's second term (114th Congress). There were 1,848 nominations during this time period, thus ensuring that the data would lend itself to generalizations about the factors that affect the length of the contemporary confirmation process for federal judicial nominees. This time period was selected because the effects of partisanship over the past 40 years have become increasingly prevalent, and it is important to see how partisanship affects the judiciary – which is, in nature, not supposed to be political. During this time span, there have been 20 years of Republican presidents and 20 years of Democratic presidents. Further, about half of this time period is spent under divided government and half is spent under unified government. My unit of analysis for this study is each federal judicial nominee. A federal judicial nominee is therefore defined as any individual who has been nominated to serve on the District, Circuit, or Supreme Court.

In order to study the length of the confirmation process, I retrieved data about all federal judicial nominations from the president from the Federal Judicial Center (2019). The data set included information such as the day the nominee was officially nominated, and the day they were confirmed or denied. From there, I derived a new variable called “Length of Confirmation”

which was “Confirmation Date” – “Nomination Date.” This variable is the dependent variable. The average length of the confirmation process over this time period was 112.6531 days over this time period. The shortest confirmation process lasted just three days for Elizabeth Hallanan and the longest confirmation process was six hundred and thirty-nine days for William Fletcher.

Different data were used for my four independent variables (unified government, ideological distance between the president and the Senate majority party, the level of polarization in the Senate, and the nominee’s ideological views).

In order to measure unified government, I used both the White House (2019) and Senate (2019) website to determine the political party of the President and the Senate majority party at any given time to determine when the presidency and Senate majority were governed by the same political party. In most cases, unified government refers to president, House of Representatives, and Senate all being of the same party. For purposes of this study, being that the Senate is the only chamber of Congress involved in the confirmation progress, unified government is defined as the president and Senate being of the same party. During times in which the government is unified under this definition, it is coded as “1”; during times where there is divided government, this value is coded as a “0”. Of the twenty Congressional Sessions, eleven of them have been unified, eight have been divided, and one was both unified and divided. The 107th Congress was divided from January 3rd, 2001 until January 20th, 2001, unified from January 20th, 2001 until May 24th, 2001, and divided again from May 24th, 2001 until January 3rd, 2003.

To measure ideological distance between the president and the Senate majority party, I use DW-Nominate scores, which were obtained through VoteView (2019). Distance was

calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between the score assigned to the president minus the score assigned to the average Senate majority party member. The ideological scores range on a spectrum from -1.0 to +1.0; -1.0 is most liberal, while +1.0 is most conservative. Further, the ideological distance variable that was created ranges from 0.0 to +2.0, as it is an absolute value of the difference between their ideological scores.

To measure the level of polarization in the Senate, I use DW-Nominate scores again, which were obtained through VoteView (2019). The ideological scores range on a spectrum from -1.0 to +1.0; -1.0 is most liberal, while +1.0 is most conservative. For each Congress, starting with the 95th, every member of the Senate, and their ideology score, were compiled and separated by party. Once separated by party, the ideological scores of each party were averaged. Once averaged, I subtracted the average ideological score of the Republican members of the Senate minus the average ideological score of the Democratic members of the Senate. This polarization variable can also range from 0.0 to +2.0, as the positive Republican value and negative Democratic value always result in a positive value.

To determine the nominee's ideological views, the Judicial Common Space score, completed by Epstein, Segal, Martin, and Westerland (2007), and extended by Boyd (2015), was used. The values can range from -1.0 to +1.0, as they are meant to allow for comparison to the ideological values of senators and presidents. Despite there being 1,848 nominations during this time period, there were only ideological scores for 1,827 of these nominees, therefore leading to 21 less observations than expected.

Next, in an effort to better interpret the results in the context of the length of the confirmation process, three of the independent variables were manipulated. The values indicating

the ideological distance between the president and the average Senate majority party member, the level of polarization in the Senate, as well as, the nominee's ideological views were all multiplied by ten. Without this manipulation of the data, the coefficients for these variables would be difficult to translate in terms of days. The coefficients produced explain the change in length of confirmation as the values changes by 1.0; when in reality, with such a small data range of 0.0 to +2.0 or -1.0 to +1.0, a more realistic and noticeable change in these variables is 0.1. If the data is multiplied by ten, this allows for the coefficient to explain the change in the length of the confirmation process when the values changes by 0.1, rather than 1.0.

Data

As mentioned previously, data was compiled that encompassed the average ideological value of the members of the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. The average Democratic Party member ideology score was subtracted from the average Republican Party member ideology score to measure partisanship. Further, the average ideological value of the member of the majority party was then subtracted from the ideology score of the President. In Table 1 below, all of these values can be found. The bolded figure in each row describes the majority party during said Congress, which was used in the final calculation.


Table 1: Ideological Data for the 95th through 114th Congress

Congress	Average Republican	Average Democrat	Average Republican – Average Democrat	Presidential Ideological Score	President – Average Senate Majority Party Member
95	0.26902632	-0.3135606	0.58258692	-0.504	0.19043939
96	0.27663415	-0.3062833	0.58291748	-0.504	0.19771667
97	0.31018519	-0.2911915	0.60137667	0.692	0.38181481
98	0.30701818	-0.3015435	0.60856166	0.692	0.38498182
99	0.313833333	-0.3058085	0.61964184	0.692	0.37816667
100	0.31367391	-0.2945455	0.60821937	0.692	0.98654545
101	0.32263043	-0.2936071	0.61623758	0.557	0.85060714
102	0.31940909	-0.2993448	0.61875392	0.557	0.85634483
103	0.33726667	-0.2962456	0.63351228	-0.438	0.14175439
104	0.350509091	-0.3013958	0.6519049	-0.438	0.78850909
105	0.37287273	-0.311	0.68387273	-0.438	0.81087273
106	0.36310714	-0.2951957	0.6583028	-0.438	0.80110714
107 (1/20/01 – 05/24/01)	0.368	-0.30292	0.67092	0.693	0.325
107 (05/24/01 – 01/03/03)	0.368	-0.30292	0.67092	0.693	0.99592
108	0.35807843	-0.2913878	0.64946619	0.693	0.33492157
109	0.37834545	-0.3067609	0.68510632	0.693	0.31465455
110	0.39186275	-0.2997255	0.69158824	0.693	0.99272549
111	0.39902273	-0.3116119	0.71063467	-0.354	0.04238806
112	0.4439375	-0.3033333	0.74727083	-0.354	0.05066667
113	0.47143478	-0.3264746	0.79790936	-0.354	0.02752542
114	0.48105556	-0.333087	0.8141425	-0.354	0.83505556

In this table, the increasing polarization of the Republican Party's ideology is clear, whereas the Democratic party maintains a fairly consistent average ideology score throughout this near 30-year timespan. This leads to a substantial increase in the difference between the average member of each party. At the 95th Congress, the polarization between the two parties is

at its minimum: 0.58258692. At the 114th Congress, the polarizations between the two parties reaches its maximum of 0.8141425 – a difference of almost 0.3. The progression of the Senate’s polarization of this time period can be seen below in Figure 1. The line of best fit clearly illustrates the increase of Senate polarization over time.

Figure 1: Senate Polarization for the 95th through 114th Congress



Further, the “President – Average Senate Majority Party Member” column of Table 1 shows a concerning concept as well. The values range from either 0.0 to 0.4 or 0.75 to 1.0. Meaning, there is incredibly minimal middle ground when the president and the average Senate majority party member are of opposing political parties. The values are illustrated graphically in Figure 2. A great deal of this divide could be due to the ideology of the president though. As

seen in Table 2, the presidents tend to have much stronger ideological views than the average Senator that is a member of their political party.

Figure 2: Ideological Distance between the President and average Senate Majority Party member for the 95th through 114th Congress





Table 2: Presidential Ideology Scores

President	DW-Nominate Ideological Value
Carter	-0.504
Reagan	0.692
H. W. Bush	0.557
Clinton	-0.438
W. Bush	0.693
Obama	-0.353

Lastly, Figure 3 shows the length of the confirmation process of all federal judicial nominees that received a Senate vote between the 95th and 114th Congress. Starting at the 95th Congress, the process did not take more than 150 days to complete the process, and even had more completed within 100 days. As the time period progresses, it is a rarity to see more than a small percentage confirmed under the 50-day mark. Further, as a general trend, it is clear that there are several more nominees that go through significantly longer processes, and the overall process does appear to lengthen over time.

Figure 3: Length of all Completed Confirmation Processes for the 95th through 114th Congress



Analysis

I estimated nine different models throughout the study. The first four models include solely the length of the confirmation process along with one of the independent variables to see if they have any significance on their own, and to see how drastically they affects the confirmation process if they are significant. These models are important to include so they can be compared against models that include more independent variables.

The next three models focus on the including the nominee's ideological value along with each independent variable, since many other studies do not measure that against other important aspects of partisanship and ideology. Each model includes the nominee's ideological values and one other independent variable to determine how each of these are correlated.

The next two models are included to get an overarching idea how all of the variables interact when regressed together. The only distinction between Model 8 and Model 9 is that Model 8 omits the unified government variable. The idea behind this was that there may be more value in seeing how the ideological distance between the president and average Senate majority party member affects the results without also including if they are of the same party or not. This may lead to some overlap if both are included.

Model 9: Length of the Confirmation Process = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Unified Government + β_2 Ideological Distance Between the President and Average Senate Majority Party Member + β_3 Senate Polarization + β_4 Nominee's Ideological Views

Chapter 5

Results

Table 3 on page 31 details the regression output for Models 1 through 4. While looking at Model 1, the model reflects with statistical significance that the length of the confirmation process will be 33-34 days shorter with unified government. Intuitively, the confirmation process should decrease when the Senate and the president are of the same political party because their priorities will likely align. These priorities should extend to when the president is nominating federal judges and justices, as they will likely agree upon the desired ideology of a nominee.

Model 2 predicted with statistical significance that the length of the confirmation process will be about two days longer if the ideological distance score increases by 0.1. Though the president and Senate majority party may share the same priorities and that would likely make the process go more smoothly, as they become more ideologically distant from one another. Though this effect may be marginal during unified government, this could have a drastic impact during times of divided government. If the ideological distance between the president and the Senate majority party is near 1.0, which it was at during several Congressional sessions, this could lead to an increase of about 20 days in the confirmation process.

Model 3 is statistically significant and has a coefficient of 61.14779 for Senate Polarization – meaning, the length of the confirmation process will be 61 to 62 days longer if the Senate polarization increases by 0.1. As the polarization between the two major parties increases, this will make obtaining cloture votes more and more difficult to obtain. It could also lead to the

increase in filibusters by the minority party when debate begins. If the level of polarization decreases, it is more likely that the two parties will be willing to work together on filling judicial vacancies.

In Model 4, it is observed with statistical significance that the length of the confirmation process will be two to three days shorter if the nominee's ideological value increases by 0.1 – meaning it will decrease as the nominees become more conservative. These results are contrary to original expectations, but could be due to the higher level of party unity that is commonly accepted among the Republican party. Meaning, I would presume that Republican Senators are likely more willing to push for faster confirmation of a Republican president's nominee than Democratic Senators would be willing to push for a confirmation of a Democratic president's nominee. Further, Democratic Senators may value the ideology of a nominee less than Republican Senators. Democratic Senators may be willing to allow a conservative nominee through if he or she is rightfully qualified, while Republican Senators may care more about ideology of the nominee than the qualifications.

Table 3: Model 1 - 4 Regression Output

Dependent Variable: Length of the Confirmation Process				
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Unified Government (Unified)	-33.77823*** (4.017702)	---	---	---
Ideological Distance (IdDist)	---	1.891495*** (0.5732629)	---	---
Senate Polarization (SenPol)	---	---	61.14779*** (2.897991)	---
Judicial Ideology (JudId)	---	---	---	-2.770323*** (.5569052)
Constant	133.5269 (3.158347)	103.762 (3.34588)	-287.3834 (19.04291)	111.8098 (1.955032)
Observations	1,828	1,848	1,848	1,827
R ²	0.0369	0.0059	0.1943	0.0134
Adjusted R ²	0.0364	0.0053	0.1939	0.0128
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0010	0.0000	0.0000
Note: *p<0.1; **p<.05; ***p<0.01				

Table 4 on page 33 details the regression output for Models 5 through 7. Model 5 shows that the length of the confirmation process will be about thirty-six days shorter with unified government and the process will shorten by about four days as the nominee's ideological value increases by 0.1, while both of these have statistical significance. With both of these variables present, the process will become shorter by about five days in comparison to the original models; the process shortens by about three days in comparison to Model 1 when looking at the effect of unified government and about two days shorter in comparison to Model 4 when looking at the effect of the nominee's ideological views. This furthers the concept that presidential and Senatorial priorities extend to the judicial space. Also, this speaks to the power of a Republican-

based unified government – when including judicial ideology, we have a concept of what a Republican presidency and Republican Senate looks like, as Democratic presidents are likely not nominating conservative judges and justices during Democratic-controlled Senates.

Model 6 indicates that the length of the confirmation process will be about thirteen days longer when the ideological distance between the president and the Senate majority party increases by 0.1 and the process will shorten by about four days as the nominee's ideological value increases by 0.1. As mentioned in the analysis of Model 2, multiple times during this time period where the ideological distance between the president and the Senate majority party is near 1.0. This would mean that the process would lengthen 130 days during those instances. However, even in times of unified government where the ideological distance between the two is much less (only going to +0.4), this can still lengthen the process by up to 52 days. Further, this model is particularly interesting because it showcases the interaction of presidential, senatorial, and judicial ideology. From this, we can gather that it in the best interest of shortening the confirmation process, it would be best to have a very conservative nominee while the ideological distance between the president and Senate majority party is minimal – and likely both are controlled by Republicans.

Model 7 shows that the length of the confirmation process will be about 58 days longer when the Senate polarization increases by 0.1 and the process will shorten by less than a day as the nominee's ideological score increases by 0.1. However, the coefficient for nominee's ideological value does not hold statistical significance. The coefficient on Senate polarization decreases by nearly three in Model 7, in comparison to Model 1. Hence, when considering the ideological values of the nominee, the effect of Senate polarization decreases, but still has a significant impact on indicating that the process will lengthen if the Senate continues to polarize.

As seen during this time period, the average increase of Senate polarization is .01157 per year. At that rate, in about nine years, the average length of the confirmation process will lengthen another fifty-eight days, while considering the nominee's ideology. The level of polarization in the Senate is able to yield such substantial influence on the confirmation process because of the collaboration needed between the two parties during the process. Though the majority party clearly holds the most power in the process, the collaboration of the minority party is still necessary when invoking cloture to actually vote on the nominee. While the minority party cannot yield much influence in getting nominees rejected, they can certainly draw out the process by not cooperating during debate.

Table 4: Model 5 - 7 Regression Output

Dependent Variable: Length of the Confirmation Process			
Independent Variables	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Unified Government (Unified)	-36.21107*** (4.032168)	--- ---	--- ---
Ideological Distance (IdDist)	--- ---	13.381388*** (0.6252137)	--- ---
Senate Polarization (SenPol)	--- ---	--- ---	58.33672*** (3.077335)
Judicial Ideology (JudId)	-3.82537*** (0.5576517)	-4.260201*** (0.6174972)	-0.2815119 (.5258088)
Constant	134.6202 (3.180221)	96.36357 (3.45262)	-269.4997 (20.19381)
Observations	1,827	1,827	1,827
R ²	0.0552	0.0290	0.1758
Adjusted R ²	0.0541	0.0279	0.1749
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Note: *p<0.1; **p<.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 5 on page 36 details the regression output for Models 8 and 9. Model 8 is statistically significant and shows that as the ideological distance between the president and the average Senate majority party member increases by 0.1, the confirmation process lengthens by approximately five days. An increase in Senate polarization of 0.1 leads to an increase in the length of the confirmation process by about 62 days. Lastly, an increase in 0.1 for the nominee's ideological value surprisingly leads to a decrease in the length of time that the process takes by between two and three days. Model 8 is the most robust of all of the models, indicating that there is likely overlap between unified government and ideological distance between the president and Senate majority party. Further, Model 8 best explains the overall goal of this paper – we can observe the effect of president-Senate ideology, inter-Senate ideology, and judicial ideology, all in one regression. This helps us confirm the hypothesis that the process will increase when the ideological distance between the president and the Senate increase and that the process will increase when the level of polarization within the Senate increases. However, Model 8 gives final justification that the length of the confirmation process is indeed not longer for conservative judges or justices. Again, this is likely due to higher party loyalty by the conservative members of the Senate, as well as the possible difference in weight given to qualifications and ideology between the two parties.

In Model 9, a different story is portrayed in two variables, with all of them being statistically significant except that of the nominee's ideological value score. When including unified government, the length of the confirmation process is shortened nearly 89 days. Surprisingly, the length of the confirmation process is said to be shortened by between eight and nine days when the ideological distance between the president and the average

Senate majority party member increase by 0.1. An increase in 0.1 for Senate polarization and nominee's ideological value lead to an increase in the process by fifty-one days and about one day, respectively. As mentioned previously, Model 9 may include overlap between unified government and ideological distance between the president and Senate majority party. It is likely more valuable to see exactly how far apart they are on the ideological spectrum, not solely if they are the same political party. Within political parties there can be many different factions – for example, a moderate Republican president could have a Tea Party-leaning Senate. It is likely more valuable to account for how closely their priorities lie by measuring ideological distance, rather than simply whether or not some of their priorities are the same by using unified government. Further, ideological distance explains more when looking at all confirmations because it does a better job at understanding the times during which the government is divided. Rather than a “0” value for divided government as done with the first independent variable, ideological distance can describe exactly how far apart the president and Senate in terms of ideology.

Table 5: Model 8 and 9 Regression Output

Dependent Variable: Length of the Confirmation Process		
Independent Variables	Model 8	Model 9
Unified Government (Unified)	---	-88.88866*** (17.51888)
Ideological Distance (IdDist)	4.998395*** (0.5699381)	-8.426347*** (2.70574)
Senate Polarization (SenPol)	62.05426*** (3.044878)	51.38164*** (3.683966)
Judicial Ideology (JudId)	-2.325261*** (0.5654503)	0.5446454 (0.797109)
Constant	-316.6317 (20.50312)	-269.4997 (20.19381)
Observations	1,827	1,827
R ²	0.2091	0.1758
Adjusted R ²	0.2078	0.1749
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000
Note: *p<0.1; **p<.05; ***p<0.01		

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This study observes the impact that various components of partisanship and ideology have on the length of the confirmation process for federal judicial nominees. I accomplished this through creating an original data set of federal judicial nominees between the 95th and 114th Congress. My main hypothesis was that a confirmation process will be longer when there is not a unified government, a larger ideological distance between the president and average Senate majority party member, a higher level of Senate polarization, and a more conservative federal judicial nominee.

In each of the models in which I included unified government as a variable (Models 1, 5, and 9), my hypothesis was confirmed that the length of the confirmation process would decrease if the government was unified. Further, the models that included Senate polarization (Models 3, 7, 8, and 9) unanimously confirmed my hypothesis that the length of the confirmation process would increase as the Senate polarization increased.

However, the hypothesis that the length of the confirmation process increases as the ideological distance between the president and the average Senate majority party member increases is put into question. This variable was included in four of the models (Models 2, 6, 8, and 9) and only failed to show this relationship in one of them – Model 9. However, the results from Model 9 indicate that the model is flawed due to the overlap between the unified government and ideological distance variable. Though this model is the model that includes all

four independent variables – I still elect to confirm my hypothesis that the length of the confirmation process will increase as the ideological distance between the president and the average Senate majority party member increases because of the validity of and robustness of Model 8.

Next, my hypothesis surrounding the idea that more conservative nominees would face longer confirmation processes is almost certainly disproved. The nominee's ideological views variable was included in six of the nine models (Models 4 through 9). In all but Model 9, the coefficient for this variable is negative – indicating that the more conservative a nominee is, the fewer number of days the confirmation process will take. Again, the concerns with Model 9 lead me to elect to ignore this model, I reject the original hypothesis based on the fact that five other models indicate a negative correlation between the length of the confirmation process and the nominee's ideological views.

One major limitation of this study is that some would argue the time period that I selected does not fully encompass the drastic partisanship that has occurred over the past few decades. While partisanship and a focus on ideology in nominees has gotten much worse since President Carter, some scholars would argue that it did not *begin* with Carter. If I were to include decades of nominees prior to the 95th Congress, my project could have been strengthened.

Overall, the findings of this study show how varying aspects of partisanship and ideology of major stakeholders affect the length of the confirmation process. Further, this study helps mend the gap between research on lower courts and the Supreme Court and holistically provides an idea of the general length of confirmation processes for contemporary federal judicial nominees.

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Professional Experiences

Penn State Division of Development and Alumni Relations – Office of Volunteer Programs Intern

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- Developed proposal for Fundraising Volunteer LinkedIn Group page, and presented it to the entire 300-person division
- Led 20-person internship cohort in a 30-day crowdfunding campaign raising over \$2,500 for an Alma Mater Display
- Created and maintained volunteer websites for Colleges, Campuses, and Central Units in HTML based program iModules
- Assisted in planning, staffing, and creating a membership booklet for annual “Presidential Counselors” meeting and brunch

Penn State Division of Development and Alumni Relations – Honors College Development Intern

University Park, PA, August 2018 – Present

- Complete research on high net worth individuals to assist the Director of Development and the Dean before events
- Assist the Stewardship Coordinator in planning a recognition evening for donors of \$50,000 or more to the Honors College

Rep. Frank LoBiondo – District Office Intern

Mays Landing, NJ, May 2017 – August 2017

- Communicated on behalf of the Congressman with various district leaders in public servant roles to update internal databases
- Attended meetings regarding the future of healthcare and transportation with the Congressman

Leadership Experiences

2019 Class Gift Campaign – Executive Director

University Park, PA, April 2018 - Present

- Act as the Chief Liaison between University Development and the Class Gift Campaign
- Solicit and review over 200 gift proposals and Chair the Ballot Selection Committee
- Create yearlong goals for the organization
- Co-manage a \$50,000 budget used for programming with other organizations that share a similar mission

State of State 2019 Conference – Content Director

University Park, PA, March 2018 – Present

- Facilitate a conference that cultivates critical, yet constructive dialogue among all facets of Penn State
- Select and manage 13 student, faculty, administration, and alumni speakers
- Train a team of 5 committee members on how to improve the rhetoric of their speaker’s speech

The Presidential Leadership Academy – Member

University Park, PA, April 2017 – Present

- Cultivate leadership skills through classroom discussion, three leadership retreats, and a seven-credit honors curriculum, including ten two-hour case debates with the University President and a policy-driven class led by the Schreyer Honors College Dean

Student Handbook – Director and Editor-in-Chief

University Park, PA, December 2018 - Present

- Manage team of 10+ student-leaders in the creation of a handbook that is distributed to 7,000+ incoming freshman
- Edit and create content about academic and student life, on and off-campus life, and Penn State History

Penn State Alumni Association – Lion Ambassador

University Park, PA, January 2018 - Present

- Allocate the annual interest of a \$1 Million endowment to further the organization’s mission
- Engage generations of Penn Staters through campus-wide projects, initiatives, and philanthropic endeavors
- Lead professionalism “New Member Education” session for all incoming Lion Ambassadors

Skull and Bones Senior Honor Society

University Park, PA, October 2018 - Present