ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION ON MIGRANTS FROM HOST COUNTRY
RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Within countries such as those of the European Union, the United States, and Canada, sizeable proportions of migrants from war-torn countries with major internal conflicts have re-assimilated themselves into host societies for asylum and new economic opportunities. These populations have been given government subsidized benefits under refugee resettlement programs, which have been able to offer substantial assistance and relief for those who have recently become displaced from their home countries. Although the governments of the European Union member states, the United States, and Canada have provided refugee populations with robust sustainability and relief efforts to assimilate them, these efforts have not always been sufficient for these migrants to start a new life, and have thus added to situations of economic and social disenfranchisement among recently admitted refugees. Many of these people, moreover, have been left in a helpless situation with regard to the amount of assistance that is required for them to start a new life within their respective host countries. What has arguably manifested is a situation of economic marginalization for these people as soon as the relief programs are discontinued. Overall, this thesis project will argue and seek to quantify that although the EU, United States, and Canadian governments have provided migrant and refugee populations with robust relief and sustainability efforts to resettle them within the host country and society, the overall efforts may not have been sufficient for these refugees to sustain themselves economically. I also seek to examine which areas within resettlement frameworks should be focused on in order to help prevent migrant economic marginalization, and I find that proper educational attainment and job training seem to be the greatest factors in doing so.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Have migrant resettlement programs and resettlement processes produced economic marginalization among admitted and resettled migrant persons in many host countries?

Over 65 million people have recently been uprooted from their home regions and countries, which has been the largest mass movement of people as migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers since the displacement of people in the Second World War (Haas Institute Inclusiveness Index, 2016). Whether these migrants have been displaced due to war or internal conflict, famine, drought, environmental degradation, climate changes/destruction from severe weather patterns, disease, medical inaccessibility, or because they are interested in better economic opportunities and finding a better life, migrants have undoubtedly needed a new state to host and reintegrate themselves successfully. Such is the case in many nations that have volunteered to serve as a host state for these migrants.

A large amount of existing research focuses on how integrated refugees have become in certain host countries, with survey studies carrying a majority of the weight in research on the subject. Many of these surveys have been conducted in large countries such as the U.S. and Canada, with the European Union conducting general surveys to gather data on the general populace and not necessarily on migrant issues per se. Moreover, a vast amount of literature focuses on certain social issues, such as xenophobia, and provisional issues such as access to healthcare and access to employment. In a departure from existing work on refugee resettlement
processes, I argue that migrant resettlement programs and the resettlement process have created an economic situation that is very hard to recover from for migrants.

My research differs in that I will be focusing more broadly on the levels of migrant economic marginalization within certain host countries mostly in Europe, as well as Canada and the United States, in order to show how access to healthcare, living conditions, access to education, and employment, or the reverse side, unemployment, all within the context of migrant resettlement programs and the resettlement process have affected economic conditions for migrant persons. I use data gathered by the European Union in Eurostat, the European Union’s official database as well as migration data from the World Bank. What I have learned from my research is that education and training have the largest effects on migrants’ economic conditions within a host state. My research also shows that some countries have greater economic marginalization that others (see Appendix B).

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is defined as “[a] person forced to flee their country to escape persecution, war, or violence.” Resettlement for these refugees, moreover, has been defined as “the careful selection by governments such as the U.S. – for purposes of lawful admission – of vulnerable refugees who can neither return to their home country nor live in safety in neighboring countries” (UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR). There have been massive refugee crises within the world in the past decade, moreover, with many of the refugees coming from hotspot conflict zones in countries such as Syria, Iraq, and other high conflict states in the Middle East. For example, by the end of the year 2014, over 7.6 million people became internally displaced and around 3.7 million Syrian people fled the country since the conflict started (Ostrand 2015). It can be noted however, that according to the UNHCR’s annual asylum trends reports that during the timespan of the years...
2009 to 2013, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States were among the top five states receiving asylum claims, with the United States and the United Kingdom actually serving as the largest single-state bilateral donors of humanitarian aid for the Syrian refugee crisis (Ostrand 2015). With these claims has come the lawful resettlement of this demographic of migrant persons into a host country.

These populations have oftentimes been given host country, government subsidized benefits under refugee resettlement programs that have been substantiated by host government policies. These policies, however, have arguably ‘infantilized’ this specific demographic of people within the European Union, and possibly even in the United States, and Canada. The refugee assistance and assimilation programs have been able to offer substantial assistance and relief for those who have recently become disenfranchised from their home countries and societies as well as for those refugees who look for asylum in harboring states where greater economic opportunities often entail.

The main question in this matter after resettlement is that this subject area has not received enough substantial research, and that many of these admitted migrants are left in a helpless situation with regard to the amount of assistance that is required for them to start a new life within the host country. What has arguably manifested is a massive sentiment of economic and even social marginalization from this demographic as soon as the assistance and relief programs are not sufficient, or are simply discontinued on their behalf, as part of the overall resettlement framework. The growing situations of economic marginalization have also led to feelings of animosity among these vulnerable migrant populations toward their host states and their new governments, and it has been apparent that the resettlement systems do not always address this animosity. This paper will quantitatively examine migrant economic conditions in
most European states as well as Turkey, and qualitatively in the United States and Canada, through the context of the resettlement process and programs utilized in each host state. The paper will show how some of host states’ resettlement processes and programs have economically marginalized migrant persons, whereas others have not.
Chapter 2

Background

Sizeable proportions of migrants including refugees and asylum seekers from hot-spot countries with deep-seated internal conflicts, as well as labor migrants have re-assimilated themselves into nations such as the member states of the European Union and the Eurozone, the United States, and Canada, for asylum and new economic opportunities. The onset of this mass migration manifested principally from the Syrian refugee crisis, which first erupted in the spring of the year 2011. The refugee crisis really first occurred under the tumultuous Bashar al-Assad regime, and then further exacerbated by the emergence of the radical terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL), which had set up a caliphate or base of operations in a large geographic area in Syria and Iraq. The organization then severely persecuted local citizens and even recruited people from all over the world, including western states, to join its cause. ISIS caused the displacement of massive numbers of Syrian people, especially in the large Syrian metropolitan areas such as Raqqa, a city 160 kilometers east of Aleppo, where many Syrians fled north toward the border with Turkey causing a major border security and humanitarian crisis for Turkey and even the adjacent European Union. Many of these displaced persons applied for refugee status within Turkey, the EU, Canada, and the United States, among many other countries.

This factor is not considering the number of people who have become internally displaced and those who happen to live in a refugee situation in their home countries. The overwhelming number of refugees have been located in the Third World, however in the year
2001, 49% of asylum seekers had originated in Asia or the Middle East, whereas 30% originated in Africa, and 11% from Eastern Europe (Hatton & Williamson 2006). Moreover, to give an example figure, Western European countries have had the ability and willingness to host 1.7 million asylum seekers in the year 2001, whereas 646,000 were hosted in the United States and Canada during the same year. This factor has been ostensible as the United States aims to consider for resettlement at least half of the refugees referred by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) worldwide each year, which has become a major policy initiative for the U.S. both in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy (Bruno 2015). Figure 1 below shows where the majority of asylum seekers have originated from.

Figure 1: Countries of Resettlement Departures (2008-2016)

However, many of the refugees who fled into Syria have been given Turkish refuge in large resettlement camps, many of which have only provided the bare minimum of life sustaining provisions. The same can be said for many of the European Union member states that have chosen to accept and resettle refugees and migrant persons. A large proportion of refugees and migrants have come from North Africa during the spring and summer months of 2018, and many European Union member states have created tensions among each other as to whose responsibility it is to accept and properly resettle these people into their host societies.

**The Refugee Resettlement Initiatives & Process in the United States**

In the United States, laws tend to be stricter than the European Union’s and thus, may have a direct impact on the success of migrant resettlement into the U.S. and even entrance into the labor market. With regard to the strictness of refugee resettlement laws in the United States, it was the Refugee Act of 1980 that had given way for the President, during an emergency situation and during the succeeding time period of up to twelve months, to fix a number of refugees to for admittance into the United States (Haas Institute Inclusiveness Index 2016). With regard to the admittance of refugees and asylum seekers into the United States, the overall admissions of refugees had increased since Fiscal Year 2013, with admissions in Fiscal Year 2013, Fiscal Year 2014, and Fiscal Year 2015 declining just below each year’s 70,000 maximum refugee ceiling (Bruno 2015). In another instance, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security had issued that, for the 2013 fiscal year, 69,909 refugees were admitted into the United States, which was actually a 20% increase from the 58,179 refugees that were admitted and resettled in Fiscal Year 2012 (Bruno 2015). This intensified increase in the number of refugees admitted into
the U.S. in 2013 reflected better synchronization of security checks and medical checkpoints for asylum seeker families as well as major accumulation in staffing concentrations to assist with the increased number of migrants coming into the United States (Martin & Yankay 2014). The Fiscal Year 2016 refugee ceiling was 85,000, and actual admissions that year were just below that number, and moreover, the refugee ceiling for Fiscal Year 2017 had increased to 110,000 refugees, a major increase since FY2012 (Bruno 2015). This increase in the refugee ceiling demonstrates a change in policy to help share the burden from European Union member states and Canada as well as possibly indicating an economic capability to accommodate refugees. It has become evident that the number of refugees that are granted asylum into the United States has escalated upward by a 57% increase since the year 2015, however this increase also gives way to a major growth in spending and allocation towards the refugee assistance and resettlement programs within the United States.

The U.S. Department of State, while working with nine other prominent domestic resettlement agencies, states that with regard to the Reception and Placement Program for incoming refugees to the U.S., every week delegates sent from each of the nine agencies meet to review the biographic information and other case records sent by the overseas Resettlement Support Centers (RSC) to determine where a refugee will be resettled into the U.S. During this specific meeting, the resettlement agencies pair the particular needs of each incoming refugee with the specific resources available within a specific local community in the United States (U.S. Department of State, “The Reception and Placement Program”). The requirements for eligibility of refugee status revolve around those individuals who seek asylum, but are situated outside of the United States. With the incentives from the Department of Homeland Security, for a migrant to legitimately qualify for refugee status, a first applicant must first be of special humanitarian
concern for the U.S.; second, successfully meet the refugee classification as laid out in section 101(a)(42) of the INA; third, be admissible under the INA; and fourth, not be decisively resettled in any foreign country (Martin & Yankay 2014). There is however, a certain set of priorities that entail the urgency of refugee resettlement. The United States resettles refugees mostly due to the background of the country of origin of the refugees, as well as the urgency and importance of the individual refugee’s situation (Patrick 2004). Immigration policy is set by the federal government; however, state governments can also have a say in the policymaking process. Some U.S. states have had an impact by proposing their own policies to support or even resist federal immigration laws. For example, certain states have implemented jurisdictions that have been and are currently dubbed as ‘sanctuary cities’ by limiting compliance within federal immigration, of which there are approximately 320 such jurisdictions within the United States (Haas Institute Inclusiveness Index 2016).

One of the most interesting conceptions for the admittance of refugees and asylum seekers within a country is not simply based off the need to enter the country, but rather the bureaucratic prioritization for admittance, and then proper resettlement. These priorities are listed, according to the Migration Policy Institute, in the following hierarchical order: First, Priority One is for those refugees identified by UNHCR (or occasionally the State Department, through its embassies and consulates general) as in urgent need of resettlement. Refugees of any nationality are actually eligible for P-1 status. Moreover, Priority Two is for those refugee groups identified by the U.S. State Department, after consultation with the NGOs, UNHCR, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), as in particular need of resettlement as opposed to one of the other two ‘durable solutions.’ Priority Three is similar to the P-2 in that it is a group category for which only certain nationalities are eligible. However, P-3 is reserved for
certain family members of refugees already in the U.S. (Patrick 2004). It can be argued however, that the “special humanitarian concern” for the United States with regard to the acceptance of refugees into the country already demonstrates a certain level of administrative bias through objectivism, and thus may equate to a level of inequitableness solely in the overall reception process. Objectivism in this decision-making process for prioritization and refugee status realistically marginalizes the migrant through eliminating his or her voice in the overall procedure leading to the verdict of denying or dismiss protection within the host state (Chimni 2004). The prioritization of the statuses and needs of each refugee may not be as apparent as others, and as such, this creates a level of marginalization as some refugees may have a greater need to obtain asylum in the U.S. than others such as those refugees from Syria.

The resettlement program in the United States has entailed multiple initiatives, one of which has been enacted by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR), specifically within the Administration for Children and Families (ACF), which actually manages a transitional assistance program for provisionally reliant migrants who are refugees and asylum seekers, Cuban/Haitian entrants, and other specified groups of people (Bruno 2015). Moreover, according to the U.S. Department of State, the nine national resettlement agencies involved in refugee resettlement operations actually work to relocate the refugees in approximately 190 areas throughout the United States. Each agency headquarters maintains contact with its local affiliated agencies to supervise resources (e.g., translators, sizes and features of housing, schools with special services, medical care, English classes, employment services, etc.) that each affiliate’s communal can provide. The United States federal government, however, has given a considerable effort toward the appropriation of funds specifically for Office of Refugee Resettlement related initiatives, such as the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, which included specific allocations for the Departments of Labor, HHS, and Education, and other such related agencies, provided $1,674,691,000 for Office of Refugee Resettlement programs (Bruno 2015). The government-led initiatives for the refugees are vast and costly overall, and utilize effective means of stabilizing the newfound lives of these individuals. It is not to say that these programs are gifted completely, as the Resettlement Support Centers (RSC) work with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to move and reestablish the refugees to their new locales. However, the State Department notes that the overall cost of refugee transportation is stipulated as a loan, which refugees are forced to repay after they reestablish themselves within the United States (U.S. Department of State, “The Reception and Placement Program”).

These initiatives, however, may not be sufficient in their length in time of distribution that refugees need in order to fully and successfully assimilate themselves into their new harboring state. With the U.S. Department of State’s Reception and Placement program as an example, the program actually gives the resettlement organizations a one-time sum per refugee to assist with expenses during a refugee’s first few months in the U.S., however most of these funds go toward the refugees’ rent, furnishings, food, and clothing, as well as to pay the costs of agency staff salaries, office space, and other resettlement-related costs that are not donated or provided by volunteers (U.S. Department of State, “The Reception and Placement Program”). One of the key problems with this specific initiative is that it includes a one-time grant for each refugee, whereas in most cases, multiple issues of monetary assistance could be more desirable for refugees and asylum seekers, and thus be better able to help them to assimilate within their new host society. The State Department also mentions that the resettlement agencies are mandated to provide for the basic needs to support the migrant person for the first month after
arrival. This includes housing and food or a food allowance until other forms of assistance, such as public cash assistance and food stamps, can be easily retrieved by the resettled migrant (U.S. Department of State, “FAQ on Refugee Resettlement Benefits”). The forcibly displaced people that have relocated to the United States and Canada are generally affected by the same issues that occur in the lives of other refugees and asylum seekers elsewhere. These issues, however, which are most profound for newly admitted refugees and asylum seekers, include the declining real incomes and large personal investments in the migration process; disparities of incomes and opportunities between the place of origin and potential destinations; kinship networks that provide critical information and support; new experiences of ethnic tension and discrimination as an ‘outsider’; loss of one’s traditional social status; new language and educational impediments; and the overall weakening of traditional values in the face of powerful, foreign cultural aspects (Wood 1994). These issues in the resettlement and reintegration process have realistically led to major grievances within vulnerable migrant populations. It is also possible that the resettlement process and provisions have led to, or had an effect on economic marginalization, which will be analyzed empirically further in this thesis. The question that arises is, where exactly should the U.S., and other host states engaging in substantial levels of refugee resettlement, focus their monetary allocations in the resettlement process in order to circumvent potential migrant economic marginalization? Next, I will cover the resettlement processes and some of the initiatives within Canada and then the European Union’s migrant resettlement and reintegration framework, which will then lead into the review of relevant and recent literature on the subject.
The Refugee Resettlement Initiatives & Process in Canada

The migrant resettlement process into Canada differs significantly from that of the United States and the European Union. First, in order to be admitted and resettled into Canada as a refugee, the person must be referred from the UNHCR, a designated referral organization, or via referral from a private sponsorship group (Government of Canada, “Resettle in Canada as a Refugee”). In order to be referred, the person must fall into one of the two refugee classes: Conventional refugee abroad class; and Country of Asylum Class. The first regards those people who are outside of their home country or country of origin and are unable to return due to persecution based on race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or membership in a certain social group (Government of Canada, “Resettle in Canada as a Refugee”). This class of people can be regarded as a Convention refugee if they have the necessary funds to support themselves upon entering and being resettled into Canada, but they still need the UNHCR, a referral organization, or a private group to sponsor them (Government of Canada, “Resettle in Canada as a Refugee”). The second class regards those people who are outside of their home country/the country where they normally reside and have been seriously affected by civil war or conflict, and/or have been denied their basic human rights on a continuing basis (Government of Canada, “Resettle in Canada as a Refugee”). This class of people can be privately sponsored when entering into Canada, but will still need the UNHCR as a referral organization or a private sponsorship group for referral.

During the last ten years, Canada has engaged in the resettlement of over 10,000 refugees per year, which is a significant share of Canada’s annual intake of 20,000-35,000 migrant persons through resettlement (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). Canada, however, has two major refugee programs that are utilized in resettling asylum seekers. These resettlement programs
include the In-Canada Asylum Program (ICAP) that is tailored for persons seeking asylum post entering Canada, and the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program (RHRP), which is designed for persons seeking resettlement into Canada who are positioned outside of the country (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). Moreover, the federal Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) has enabled immigrant-serving agencies to assist newcomer migrants through the provisions of orientation, interpretations, referrals, and employment-related assistance services (Wayland 2007). Depending on the classification of the refugee, under the auspices of the RHRP, will depend on the type of assistance that person will receive from the state.

With regard to this classification, first are Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) who are entirely supported by the Government of Canada or Quebec for up to one year from the data of their arrival; second, are Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSR) who are supported by private or faith-based organizations that have signed an agreement with the government of Canada or Quebec, and are then identified for resettlement by the sponsors, though the government must approve the application for resettlement; and third, are Shared Sponsorship Programs, which include the Blended Visa Office-Referred (BVOR) Program and the Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). Moreover, the refugees under the BVOR program are classified by the UNHCR and referred to private sponsors by Visa officers, whereas the JAS program is designed to increase cooperative support between the government and private sponsorship agreement holders in providing for resettlement support (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). These differentiations are important, as Canada has resettled more Privately Sponsored Refugees than Government Assisted Refugees overall for the years 2004-2015.

Moreover, the government assisted refugees in Canada receive assistance through programs such as The Immigrant Loans Program (ILP), where government assisted refugees are
eligible for travel loans, which also cover medical examination if need be, as well as the acquisition of travel documents (i.e. passports), and transportation to the host state (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). Moreover, the Interim Federal Healthcare Program (IFCHP) gives government assisted refugees limited and temporary healthcare coverage, and through The Refugee Assistance (RAP), refugees and asylum seekers are eligible for income support, reception upon arrival and temporary accommodation, assistance in locating permanent accommodation, acquisition of household items, assistance in finding employment, and orientation towards Canadian life and culture (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). Interestingly, under the auspices of the RAP program, government assisted refugees (GARs) and migrant persons receive income support for up to one-year post arrival or until they are able to become self-supporting, and if they are not able to become self-supporting after the one-year period, they may be eligible for social assistance via the provincial governments. GARs are also given general orientation to living in Canada and are eligible to receive direct assistance in searching for available housing (Wayland 2007). Privately sponsored refugees may access some of the same services as those assisted by the Canadian government, such as transportation loans as well as federal health services, but not others such as federal income support, for example. Resettlement and integration programs in Canada are also included as a way to help integrate migrant persons into the overall Canadian society, and these are addressed further in the case study in this paper.

**Migration & Resettlement into the European Union**

After the Syrian refugee crisis, many member states within the European Union changed their policies on how many refugees they would resettle, as well as how much money would be
spent on resettlement and assimilation programs. Migration within and into the European Union
was not a new phenomenon by any means. The EU has been experiencing one of the largest
refugee crises in human history, with many migrants coming to the shores of Lampedusa, Malta,
Sicily, and land borders from Turkey, which include Greece and Bulgaria, and the pressures of
refugees coming to countries of first asylum such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, have shown
that the existing European asylum policy as many refugees can simply wander the EU-Schengen
space (Fernández-Huertas Moraga & Rapoport 2015). Many of the migrants have suffered
tremendous economic difficulties, especially in the southern EU states. For example, refugees in
particular in Southern Europe were oftentimes more worried about meeting their material needs,
whereas in states where these needs were normally met and programs exist, issues with
employment, quality of education, and suitability and location of the social housing that was
provided were very much often predominant aspects (Mestheneos & Ioannidi 2002).

Moreover, over 250,000 migrants apply for asylum within the EU each year, with the
number of applicants not being necessarily equally distributed among member states in the
Eurozone (European Commission, Refugee Fund 2019). Although there has been a major surge
in Syrian asylum seeker applications into the EU, as of the year 2016 – a key year in the Syrian
refugee crisis, this statistic has only amounted to 0.24% of the overall population, whereas the
distribution of asylum seekers in Lebanon has been approximated at 18.3% and in Jordan, 8.4%
(Aiyar et al 2016). The most significant aspects of the EU’s framework for post-admittance
migrants and asylum seekers into the common-border system, has been not only the proper
integration and resettlement of this demographic, but also the assurance that there will not be
dependency or marginalization of any kind in the new host societies. However, many negative
sentiments in refugees have manifested since resettlement, and were oftentimes compounded by
the enforced dependence and marginalization of asylum seekers in EU member states who have highly developed welfare systems (Mestheneos & Ioannidi 2002). The question then is, besides the individual country proposals in properly resettling migrants, what joint efforts have been established between member states to not only help “carry the burden”, since some states receive more refugees than others, but also to properly resettle and reintegrate this transient demographic within the EU as a whole?

**Figure 2: Resettlement Submissions Heatmap within European States (2008-2016)**

[Map showing resettlement submissions within European states]


The European Union has utilized strong internal mechanisms that have allowed for institutional capacity and expenditures on not only accepting, but also reintegrating, the refugee populations into the respective host state. However, the EU technically only two tasks, which
were to establish a common market and an economic and monetary union, and in order to achieve these undertakings, the EU activities include ‘an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital’ (Guild 2006). Moreover, the concepts of human rights were not originally a part of this doctrine, and as such, the European Court of Justice in the 1960s gave the first impetus to human rights concerns on the continent during the European Convention on Human Rights. It then occurred in the year 2001 that a case before the European Court of Justice was decided when the right of refugees to benefit from equal treatment in social security was finally petitioned, the European Court of Justice declined to interpret the regulation in favor of the refugees. However, Guild (2006) found that it was in this litigation that the court stated that the regulation requires the individual to have been affiliated to the social security system of more than one Member State in order to benefit, as refugees do not have a right of free movement they are trapped in one Member State and never have the prospect to become associated to the social security system of more than one EU member state. This was the first instance of apparent ‘inclusion’ of refugees and asylum seekers into the rights system of European Union law, however their it was also their paradoxical exclusion because of the territorial restrictions on their freedom of movement, which technically have the effect of interpreting them invisible in any sort of international law, especially that of the EU (Guild 2006). Another major issue that has occurred The European Council had also adopted its own policies and guidelines toward burden sharing, in that on 27 June 2014 the Council mandated that the European Union “needs an efficient and well-managed migration, asylum and borders policy, guided by the Treaty principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, in accordance with article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its effective implementation” (guideline 5)
and that “The Union’s commitment to international protection requires a strong European asylum policy based on solidarity and responsibility. […] The full transposition and effective implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is an absolute priority [and] it should go hand in hand with a reinforced role for the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), particularly in promoting the uniform application of the acquis.” (guideline 7; European Council 2014). Interestingly, there is nothing mentioned in the 2014 guidelines within the section on immigration regarding implementing standards to effectively recalibrate migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, into the European Union or Eurozone labor market.

Migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, have not been well acquainted within the EU asylum policy system, as it has not been able to address the challenges faced with the volume of asylum seekers. It also contains many legal concerns or deficiencies that have not been able to address refugee legal issues within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is the asylum system EU member states are to abide by since the establishment of CEAS in 1999. Moreover, the “Dublin-System”, which was implemented since the year 1997 where a refugee is mainly under the responsibility of the EU member state in which he or she first enters, or the country of first-entry. One of the legal issues or deficiencies with the Dublin System that may even have an impact on the economic marginalization of migrants is that a migrant who entered the EU in Greece from Turkey, and then moved to Belgium and stayed there illegally, would then be transferred back to Greece (Fernández-Huertas Moraga & Rapoport 2015). The Dublin System has also shown to prevent migrants from actually choosing their country of asylum in the EU, which has caused many of the migrants to avoid the legal restrictions and move about on their own before their claims had even been examined (Fernández-Huertas Moraga & Rapoport, 2015).
Now in contemporary human rights standards, the EU had first implemented what became commonly known as the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme (SOLID), that was first launched in 2007, to last the time period of the years 2007 to 2013, where around EUR 4 billion had been allocated for the EU’s border system through the EU Community’s commonly-shared SOLID program. The initiative had originally consisted of four main components that dictated the program’s effectiveness, including the External Borders Fund (EBF), the European Return Fund (RF), the European Refugee Fund (ERF), and finally, the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals (EIF) (European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, 2019).

One of the most relevant initiatives for the resettlement and proper integration of refugees and migrants into the European Union was the European Integration Fund (EIF), which also came to be known as the European Fund for the Integration of third-country Nationals, and which was established on 21 August 2007 by Decision 2007/435/EC, commonly referred to as the “Basic Act,” and still remained a central component of the Solidarity Programme. The Basic Act had established the EIF for the time period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013 and defined the objectives to which the fund contributes, the implementation arrangements, the available financial resources, and the distribution criteria for the allocation of the financial resources. It had also founded the EIF’s administration regulations and monitoring and control systems, which are based on the joint sharing of the responsibilities between the European Commission (EC) and the EU member states (European Integration Fund 2007).
Table 1. EU State Expenditure on the “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” Program (in EUR millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68.69</td>
<td>194.558</td>
<td>405.505</td>
<td>302.806</td>
<td>437.771</td>
<td>475.48</td>
<td>607.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earmarked</td>
<td>1.405</td>
<td>3.929</td>
<td>2.695</td>
<td>4.002</td>
<td>31.797</td>
<td>48.358</td>
<td>49.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>4.735</td>
<td>5.401</td>
<td>8.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>67.28</td>
<td>190.225</td>
<td>402.461</td>
<td>298.141</td>
<td>401.179</td>
<td>421.706</td>
<td>550.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (BE)</td>
<td>7.525</td>
<td>5.868</td>
<td>15.775</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>16.946</td>
<td>16.171</td>
<td>22.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (BG)</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>1.781</td>
<td>1.441</td>
<td>5.058</td>
<td>6.794</td>
<td>9.56</td>
</tr>
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<td>Czech Republic (CZ)</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>3.163</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>3.483</td>
<td>4.114</td>
<td>2.079</td>
<td>7.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (DK)</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>0.601</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>1.317</td>
<td>1.277</td>
<td>0.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (DE)</td>
<td>10.59</td>
<td>23.916</td>
<td>36.45</td>
<td>30.018</td>
<td>31.209</td>
<td>33.281</td>
<td>26.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (EE)</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>2.993</td>
<td>5.158</td>
<td>4.134</td>
<td>2.648</td>
<td>3.145</td>
<td>6.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (IE)</td>
<td>1.275</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>3.442</td>
<td>2.607</td>
<td>2.674</td>
<td>2.792</td>
<td>3.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (EL)</td>
<td>1.145</td>
<td>16.42</td>
<td>25.572</td>
<td>33.176</td>
<td>42.524</td>
<td>42.374</td>
<td>33.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (ES)</td>
<td>3.332</td>
<td>27.574</td>
<td>57.804</td>
<td>18.646</td>
<td>56.086</td>
<td>39.089</td>
<td>87.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (FR)</td>
<td>7.388</td>
<td>16.811</td>
<td>34.437</td>
<td>26.256</td>
<td>30.358</td>
<td>38.844</td>
<td>65.404</td>
</tr>
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<td>Croatia (HR)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (IT)</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>21.362</td>
<td>44.244</td>
<td>46.172</td>
<td>53.044</td>
<td>75.304</td>
<td>48.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (CY)</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>2.038</td>
<td>4.849</td>
<td>3.773</td>
<td>6.277</td>
<td>6.719</td>
<td>4.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (LV)</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2.198</td>
<td>4.282</td>
<td>3.085</td>
<td>2.946</td>
<td>4.178</td>
<td>4.757</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania (LT)</td>
<td>5.391</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>20.666</td>
<td>11.372</td>
<td>29.089</td>
<td>13.119</td>
<td>22.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (LU)</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.816</td>
<td>2.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (HU)</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>7.866</td>
<td>6.277</td>
<td>9.311</td>
<td>8.601</td>
<td>11.697</td>
<td>11.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta (MT)</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>10.635</td>
<td>7.288</td>
<td>6.901</td>
<td>18.289</td>
<td>17.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (AT)</td>
<td>3.051</td>
<td>3.427</td>
<td>10.546</td>
<td>10.036</td>
<td>8.845</td>
<td>11.139</td>
<td>10.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (PL)</td>
<td>1.279</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>13.837</td>
<td>7.924</td>
<td>9.422</td>
<td>17.715</td>
<td>18.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (PT)</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>3.271</td>
<td>7.619</td>
<td>4.561</td>
<td>5.099</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>8.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (RO)</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>1.155</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>7.963</td>
<td>10.866</td>
<td>13.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (SI)</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>6.626</td>
<td>6.235</td>
<td>5.505</td>
<td>4.872</td>
<td>5.461</td>
<td>4.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (SK)</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>3.164</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>4.626</td>
<td>4.157</td>
<td>3.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (FI)</td>
<td>1.724</td>
<td>3.899</td>
<td>9.255</td>
<td>5.304</td>
<td>8.733</td>
<td>12.014</td>
<td>19.135</td>
</tr>
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<td>United Kingdom (UK)</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>41.042</td>
<td>21.441</td>
<td>26.945</td>
<td>18.041</td>
<td>49.923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the SOLID program to function effectively, each country would implement funds through shared management and through national annual programs on the sheer basis of multiannual programming, and these programs would be prepared, monitored, and evaluated in partnership. Table 1 thus elucidates how much funding or expenditure each EU state specifically allocated towards the SOLID program for effective migration (European Commission, European Site on Integration 2016).

Since the EIF, under the auspices of the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme (SOLID), is such an important component for the overall integration of migrant people into the member states, there were many relevant components in this framework. The main objectives of the EIF had been to support and encourage the efforts made by the EU member states in facilitating third-country nationals of different economic, cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds to accomplish the conditions of residence and to facilitate their admission and full integration into European societies (European Integration Fund 2007).

Moreover, using the EIF program from 2007-2013 within the overall SOLID initiative as an example, which was given the total available sum of €825 million, member states were thereby determined by a quantitative formula through the Basic Act to receive €500,000 per year, with 40% being allocated in proportion to the average number of legally residing third-country nationals in the past three years, and 60% allocated for the amount of third-country nationals who had received the legal authorization to reside in the territory of a member state (European Integration Fund 2007).

Some of the most important provisions in the Basic Act that state the objectives for the EIF are the facilitation of the admission and assimilation procedures of third-country nationals, as well as the development of the integration process of newly-arrives migrants. These objectives
also further outlined increasing the capacity of EU member states to develop and evaluate policies for their integration and exchange information, best practices, and cooperative initiatives in migrant integration (European Integration Fund 2007). Moreover, the application of the EIF toward the respective target groups is most relevant, as it involves delineating and even defining as to who falls under the specific target group categorization. Thus, Article 1 of the Basic Act defines the target group members eligible for assistance under the EIF’s provision include:

Third–country nationals who are on the territory of a third country and who are complying with specific pre-departure measures and/or conditions set out in national law, including those relating to the ability to integrate in the society of this Member State fall under the scope of this Decision. Third-country nationals who have applied for asylum in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken, or enjoy refugee or subsidiary protection status, or qualify as refugees or are eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance with Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third–country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted shall be excluded from the scope of this Decision. Third-country national means any person who is not a citizen of the Union within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Treaty (European Integration Fund 2007).

This definition was very important for the historical context within the EU, and shows that each country not only had a moral obligation but also a community incentive towards migrant and refugee integration in their own domestic societies.

The Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme, moreover, was one of the more recent initiatives within the EU refugee and migrant integration framework, with the overall goal of
promoting non-discrimination, combatting racism, xenophobia, homophobia, and other such forms of intolerance (European Commission, Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014-2020). The initiative was in response to the inefficiencies in the previous programs from the years 2007-2013, which included the Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme, Daphne III Programme, and the Progress Programme: Anti-discrimination and Gender Equality Standards (European Commission, Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014-2020). All of these programs had actually expired in the year 2013 as well, thus the participating countries have inquired as to how to better the overall social aspect in integrating minority groups, especially that of migrants and refugees into their societies.¹ This program has been extremely relevant in the overall resettlement and further integration of refugees and migrants within the European Union’s context strictly because of the provisions regarding improvements in the quality of life for minority groups. A large amount of existing migrant research has looked into the effects of xenophobia and other such forms of discrimination in the overall resettlement process, and how that has negatively affected the average migrant’s integration, especially economic, within a new host country. Moreover, the amount of state spending that each European Union country allocated towards the Rights, Equality, and Citizenship Programme can be seen in Table 2 below.

Table 2: EU State Expenditure on the “Rights, Equality and Citizenship Program” (in EUR millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46.766</td>
<td>39.624</td>
<td>47.161</td>
<td>53.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earmarked</td>
<td>2.319</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU States</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>1.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>43.448</td>
<td>37.998</td>
<td>45.44</td>
<td>50.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.842</td>
<td>11.544</td>
<td>12.697</td>
<td>12.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>1.611</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.264</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.229</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.575</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece (EL)</td>
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<td>0.903</td>
<td>1.263</td>
<td>2.129</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain (ES)</td>
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<td>1.179</td>
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<tr>
<td>France (FR)</td>
<td>2.486</td>
<td>2.396</td>
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<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
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<td>5.757</td>
<td>4.601</td>
<td>5.279</td>
<td>5.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (CY)</td>
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<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>1.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (LV)</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (LT)</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.784</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (LU)</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (HU)</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.104</td>
<td>4.354</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.102</td>
<td>1.264</td>
<td>2.013</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.885</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (RO)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (SI)</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.193</td>
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<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (SE)</td>
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<td>0.744</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)</td>
<td>3.416</td>
<td>4.697</td>
<td>3.751</td>
<td>3.934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, one of the most important internal mechanisms within the European Union’s framework in dealing with high influxes of migrants, after the natural expiration of the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme (SOLID) in 2013, in dealing effectively with the integration and placement of all migrants, including economic/labor emigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers has been the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF). This program has been an international effort within the EU to promote the efficient management of flows of migration within the union’s framework for the years 2014 to 2020, with over EUR 3.1 billion allocated for this specific time period (European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, 2019).

Part of the framework of the AMIF program has come the underlying concern that migrant persons living in immigrant enclaves actually stalls refugee and asylum seeker integration and assimilation by decreasing the rate of host country skill accumulation (Per-Anders, Fredriksson & Åslund 2004). Moreover, many empirical studies have found a negative correlation between economic outcomes of European ethnic minorities and their living characteristics, including but not limited to segregation, immigrant density, or ethnic concentration (Per-Anders, Fredriksson & Åslund 2004). None of the host state expenditures on this program were equal – many were based on individual countries’ willingness to donate towards the funding of the program. Table 3 below illustrates the amount of funding each member state allocated towards this new program for the years 2014 through 2017.
Table 3: EU State Expenditure on the “Asylum, Migration and Integration” Fund (in EUR millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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Because the amount of spending changed via domestic policies based on each European Union country’s desire to allocate funding for the latter joint initiative, the figure below shows the changes over time of how much money each country allocated to this specific program with
the intent to better resettle and integrate migrants within the European Union. Now of course these important initiatives that are mentioned are on the international, intra-union scale. The programs do not necessarily imply individual countries’ allocation of funds on expenditures for domestic resettlement and integration programs on the individual country level. Figure 3 below shows the changes over time that the European Union member states engaged in allocation of funding for the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund. Although these funds have entailed common standards within the Eurozone community, they have not provided for individual member state resettlement provisional standards, and thus, there are major discrepancies as to which countries provide a better resettlement experience for migrants in the EU.

Figure 3: Changes in EU State Expenditure on the “Asylum, Migration and Integration” Fund
The European Union started to gather data on the economic conditions of migrants living in the EU common asylum system. The data gathering process originally came from the main indicator on the intersections between sub-populations of all Europe 2020 indicators on poverty and social exclusion, based on the original common survey known as the ECHP (European Community Household Panel) which used to be distributed within EU households under the gentleman’s agreement to attain information and data on economic conditions of residents, including migrant families (Eurostat, *Income and Living Conditions*, 2019). The survey then became the EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) instrument, launched in 2003, and is utilized under a common framework regulation by the European Council and Parliament, which also provides data for one of the variables that will be assessed in the quantitative section of this study. (Eurostat, *Income and Living Conditions*, 2019).

It was at the Laeken European Council in December 2001, when the EU sanctioned a series of common statistical indicators on social exclusion and poverty that are subject to a continuing process of refinement by the Indicators Sub-group (ISG) of the Social Protection Committee (SPC). These indicators are an essential element in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) within the EU to monitor the progress of member states programs that assist with poverty and social exclusion. In March of 2006, the European Council created a new agenda for the social protection and social inclusion processes. Although EU member states all have different policies on social inclusion, pensions, health/long-term care, they were able to agree on common objectives in this area, as well as common indicators so that they can compare best practices and measure progress (Eurostat, “Income and Living Conditions” 2019). A set of 14 headline indicators is complemented by specific indicators relating to three main areas: poverty and social exclusion, pensions, and health and long-term care. The indicators were ratified in 2006, and at
the Council on 17 June 2010, member states had created a new EU plan for jobs and inclusive growth, which became known as the “Europe 2020 Strategy.” The common strategy is to assist Europe in recovering from the economic crisis, with the issue of poverty being a major advance in the Europe 2020 strategy, with reduction of poverty to lift at least 20 million people, many of whom are migrant persons, out of poverty risk and general social exclusion (Eurostat, “Income and Living Conditions” 2019).

Moreover, in measuring the educational attainment for migrants within the EU, was first measured by the European Union Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS), which is distributed as a continuous quarterly survey with interviews consistently conducted over all the weeks in a quarter, with the annual data encompassing the four reference quarters in the year (Eurostat, “Participation in Education and Training” 2019). The EU-LFS Survey results cover the total population of European Union member states and covers all industries and occupations and is measured in and reported in percentages. The survey is also governed by legislative acts such as the Council Regulation (EC) No 577/98 of the European Council, Parliament, and Commission, which gives provisions on design, survey characteristics, and decisions making processes for distribution (Eurostat, “Participation in Education and Training” 2019). This survey is relevant because a majority of the literature has pointed to the fact that educational attainment has a direct correlation with income, and for the case of migrants living within the EU, measuring their educational attainment would be essential in order to help increase their income levels.

The next section will review the relevant literature on the topic of migrant marginalization as a general concept, and will then move into the theoretical framework in chapter 4, to show as to what factors most lead to migrant economic marginalization in a host country of resettlement.
Chapter 3

Literature Review

One of the largest concepts in migration and asylum seeking is where will these migrants or asylum seekers be resettled, and once they are resettled, what provisions will be granted to them by the host state? Will these necessities be sufficient for admitted asylum seekers to start a new life within the country that hosts them, and will they differ drastically from state to state? What are the implications of asylum provisions and resettlement programs for admitted migrants toward economic and social advancement? Have these programs on the other hand actually correlated with social and economic marginalization toward refugees? This section of the thesis project will give an overview of what the existing literature tells us about migrant social and economic marginalization and more generally, how it is affected by certain components in resettlement programs available to them on an international scale.

Economic Marginalization via Resettlement Programs

A number of different factors affect refugee resettlement policies across states. There is, of course, a distinction to be made between refugee admission and resettlement, as the resettlement process occurs after formal admission and vetting occurs. With regard to the initial admission processes, Bruno & Bush (2004) found that overseas processing of refugees is conducted through a system of three priorities for admission into the United States: Priority 1 entails cases involving persons facing compelling security concerns; Priority 2 comprises cases
involving persons from specific groups of special humanitarian concern to the U.S.; and finally, Priority 3 encompasses family reunification cases involving close relatives of persons admitted as refugees or granted asylum. This system is important because many other host states have similar levels of prioritization for asylum admissions. Making the overall distinction between refugee admission and resettlement is an important first step, because the admission process may be looked at on a case by case prioritization basis, with many refugees going through formal, standardized processes based on previous precedents. However, the provisions within host country resettlement frameworks therein will be what are most relevant for the purposes of this project.

Within host state policy formulation comes the amount of provisions that governments will allocate in their resettlement programs for admitted and resettled asylum seekers. A large part of the resettling process lies in the definition of who constitutes a refugee, as well as what provisions will be necessary for each refugee when they enter into the host country for resettlement, by looking at each situation on a case by case basis. For example, Simich (2003) found that there is a tendency to define refugees or asylum seekers themselves as the problem, and the resettlement system as the solution, however, this system operates within a problematic social context. Bureaucracies of governments, both federal and regional, oftentimes influence, or if not influence, implement the policies for refugee resettlement. Simich (2003) also found that conditions of resettlement are usually defined by national interests and interpreted by bureaucracies that manage the resettlement process, and often political and bureaucratic interests are at variance with refugee interests. Another major consideration of the resettlement policies is that the idea of “spreading the burden” has been used to form policies toward refugee populations in countries such as the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands (McDonald et al., 2008).
These states have been some of the largest intake countries for resettling refugees, and as a way to offset the amount of ‘burden’ that high influxes of refugees have caused for countries in the European Union, states such as the U.S. and Canada have taken in a large number of Syrian Refugees from the recent Syria Refugee crisis. In order to help integrate these migrants into Western Society, in the U.S. for example, many refugees have been assisted by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which has provided many different provisions within the U.S.’s contextual framework for asylum seekers.

Refugees and migrants may become marginalized economically through various deficiencies in the resettlement programs of host countries. Refugees are oftentimes left in a state of social and economic marginalization due to the fact that national security concerns dictate their level of acceptance as well as their placement and resource allocations. There exists a systematic need to assist asylum seekers in the host society, as a decrease in assistance during and after the resettlement process may be highly alienating. Brown, den Heyer, and Black (2014) found that there is a distinction by differentiating between a humanitarian discourse, preoccupied with a commitment to serving underdeveloped or neglected populations, and social and economic development discourse, to tackle the root causes of poverty and to promote sustainable, long-term improvements for refugees in developing societies. In this case, the humanitarian necessity of providing these sustainable, long-term improvements lies with the neglected population of refugees who have not been provided sufficient long-term resources in their new home. There has been a large offset of marginalization when humanitarian organizations are involved in the resettlement process. Jacobsen (2002) found that humanitarian programs working with national governments can increase economic security and shore up the respective rights for refugees in host communities.
How do Migrants Become Marginalized?

Refugees may become marginalized from the genesis of their asylum seeking, and there are many contributing factors that play into this phenomenon. Bauman (2007) finds that this is particularly the case as refugees are stateless, but stateless in a different sense as their statelessness is raised to an entirely new level by the non-existence of a state authority to which their statehood could be signified. Expatriate issues are undoubtedly difficulties of political and policymaking processes, as the programs for resettlement are mandated and enforced by the federal government. Malkki (1995) finds that this is especially the case with the recent Syrian refugee displacement as often refugees are perceived as a matter for international charity organizations, and not as a political and security problem, but that refugee problems are in fact intensely political.

Though the repatriation of refugees is an inherently political issue, resettled refugee populations, however, have been very much unable to assimilate socially and politically within the United States as well as in other Western states such as those of the European Union and Eurozone mainly due to the discordant amounts of assistance that they receive. Provisional deficiencies have been shown to cause grievances among the refugees against host countries, who’s governments have the ability to mandate refugee assignments for relocation. Gallagher & Schowengerdt (1998) also found that there is little transparency among international organizations as to whose mandate it is to advocate, facilitate, and evaluate the electoral participation of refugees in their host societies, and there is even less consensus on what priority ought to be assigned to the issue at the policymaking and operational levels. There are no standards or guidelines on how best to address the issue of refugees in elections (Gallagher & Schowengerdt, 1998). Kymlicka (1995) found that the power to admit or exclude refugees is
inherent in state sovereignty and essential for any political community, as every state has the legal and moral right to exercise that power in pursuit of its own national interest, even if that means denying entry to peaceful, needy asylum seekers. Kymlicka (1995)’s stance on this issue provides for a predetermined sentiment of alienation for refugees and asylum seekers, as there already exists the possibility of denial for asylum due to national interest.

Moreover, there are many factors that play into economic marginalization in the resettlement process. Refugees who have become recently assimilated into the United States oftentimes face social animosity for a variety of reasons. Jacobsen (2002) found that the problem of how long-term refugees should be assisted in new host countries is a major issue, one that has important implications for refugees’ abilities to assimilate or become marginalized in a new host society. One of the causes for this marginalization may be because of the lack of availability of the information landscape for their use, which is constructed around engagement with compliance and routine information related to learning to live and participate in a new society. Many of the resettlement policies differ drastically among host countries, with a lot of contextual factors indicating where and when refugees will be resettled. In using Australia as an example host country, Johnston, Vasey, & Markovic (2009) found that there are two main policies; temporary protection and regional resettlement of refugees, to demonstrate how official Australian government policies may negatively affect the integration experience of these new arrivals. Such policies have unintended consequences for support networks between refugees on different visa categories, and for social relationships between refugees and the broader host community and country, which in this case is Australia.

Regarding refugees who have been resettled in Australia, Kennan et al (2011) found that the information landscape in the host society is marginalizing because it appears unfamiliar,
complex, and difficult to navigate, and for refugees settling into Australia, new information practices may be required to enable them to find and understand information, resolve issues, and deal with daily circumstances which enable social inclusion and prevent social exclusion. This lack of information, in the forms of databases, information technology systems, and information networks, has also been the case in many large host countries, such as the U.S. and Canada, which has led to a major deficiency of economic advancement and social participation within refugees’ new host societies (Kennan et al, 2011).

**Features of Resettlement Programs that Lead to Economic Marginalization**

Economic marginalization can also come in finding employment, which is often of critical concern for admitted refugees into any new society. As Halpern (2008) explains, resettled refugees in the U.S., for example, obtained legal immigration status and were given monetary, medical, social, and employment assistance for only a limited time period. These assistance provisions, which vary across host countries and given for very limited time periods have occurred in various host states, often marginalize or disenfranchise refugees once the provisions are discontinued, which is a valuable component for my own research. The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the U.S. found that three indicators in integration were critical to economic self-sufficiency: economic opportunity (including occupation), language, and education (Halpern, 2008). Halpern (2008) also explains that in the context of the U.S., the programs are very state-specific, in that the benefits and services that refugees obtain depend on which state the refugee is resettled in and which specific program they are a part of. However, resettlement programs generally provide some sort of cash assistance, medical assistance, case
management, employability, social services, or even host country language training, however, these might not always be completely sufficient or equal in each state. The following areas are some of the major features in the refugee assistance and resettlement framework of host states that may lead to, or further exacerbate, economic marginalization in resettled populations in host countries.

**Number of Refugee Admissions**

When a potential host state chooses to admit refugees into its society, it has a humanitarian incentive to do so. This humanitarian incentive is generally based off of international pressure, public policy pressure, the participation in economic unions or blocs such as the EU where an open border policy and freedom of movement exists among the member states as well as most Eurozone countries, and even more deep-seated sentiments regarding intranational religious or moral convictions. Once refugees are admitted into a state, there also must be a way to properly resettle the population into the new host society through a variety of resettlement procedures, that often stem from taxpayer dollars and humanitarian aid. The number of refugees a state chooses to admit per fiscal year may be related to the state’s proximity to the origin state of migration or exodus, previously implemented refugee resettlement frameworks, or even economic success in the international market, as is the case of a host country like Germany.

One thing that should be mentioned regarding the amount of asylum seekers that a host country chooses to intake and then resettles can be related to its internal carrying capacity, which is relevant in how well the migrant, whether a refugee or asylum seeker, does economically within the host state. Another possibility that should be expected would be that a country that
spends more on migrant resettlement programs, whether they are internal or the EU’s “Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund,” then one could expect that they would have a better carrying capacity with an overall better resettlement program for migrants, and thus, less economically marginalized migrants. The concepts of carrying capacity and burden sharing can be seen in the UNHCR’s “capacity assessment,” as well as Thielemann et al.’s (2010) “combined capacity index” which captures if a host country takes in a large number of migrants based off of its ability to resettle them within host states (Moraga & Rapoport, 2015; Thielemann et al, 2010).

The number or ceiling of admitted refugees, as it is commonly referred to in political rhetoric, is oftentimes of great concern as it correlates to the amount of provisions and supplies that will be allocated to admitted and resettled asylum seekers. Stein (1983) argues that since 1975, the numbers of refugees being resettled are dropping sharply in response to both decreased need and increased domestic pressures within the major receiving nations to limit admissions, and with that, lower numbers of admittances by themselves are not a prime indicator of a decreased long-term commitment to resettlement. He finds that since 1975, the U.S. and Canada’s refugee resettlement programs have changed: They became institutionalized with new legislation and administrative structures; annual resettlement plans lead receiving countries to seek refugees in need rather than waiting for crises to develop; and the number of refugees accepted for resettlement has increased substantially. Stein (1983) also finds that there was growing disenchantment with refugee resettlement with political pressure to cap the numbers of admitted refugees. Now potential vulnerabilities may include reductions of government response in a timely manner to new refugee situations; introductions of single numerical ceiling for immigrants and refugees that would force refugees to compete for admission; reduction in annual quotas or admissions to levels that do not meet resettlement need; changes in the definition of a
refugee or criteria for resettlement; or failure to maintain institutional capability to respond to refugee situations.

Moreover, De Vroome & Van Tubergen (2010) found that the individual experiences of refugees with Dutch admission and integration policies form a final set of explanations of the refugees’ economic integration. For example, the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a sharp rise in the number of refugees who came to the Netherlands, which resulted in strong differences in the amount of time refugees stayed in a reception center. This containment in the Netherlands, due to the heavy inflow of refugees, led to an overall rise in economic marginalization in the refugee population. Ultimately, the number of refugees a host state admits may also be related to the presence of specific social networks such as the presence of family members in the host state, which also may have a profound impact on refugee success or marginalization.

**Presence of Family & Social Networks via Chain Migration**

A relevant component which has had a major effect on social inclusion and economic ascendancy is the lack of family and social network ties that refugees have. Jacobsen (2002) found that refugees’ economic activities help to recreate social and economic interdependence within and between communities, and can restore refugee social networks based on the exchange of labor, assets, and food. If there does not exist a proper social or family network, refugees will generally not succeed socially or economically, and thus will become marginalized (Young 2001; Ives 2007; Lamba & Krahn 2003). Lamba and Krahn (2003) contend that despite traumas associated with becoming a refugee, most adult asylum seekers remain part of at least some familial networks, and a minority are connected with extended family networks.
In discussing other issues that affect refugees’ social and economic opportunities, Young (2001) found that for recent refugees, personal resources are best at moderating migration stress, whereas for established refugees, social support and self-esteem restrain the correlation between life events and life satisfaction. Fantino & Colak (2001) explain that many of the cultural practices of refugees and their families are often misunderstood or disregarded in classrooms, hospitals, social services, and social life in the new societies that they are resettled in, which heavily marginalizes them. Similarly, Noh et al. (1999) found in their study with Refugees in Canada that further stressors in the resettlement process included perceived racial discrimination and depression. Noh et al. (1999) argue that educational programs are more effective than social deterrence as a method of reducing racism towards refugees. Simich, Beiser, Steward, and Mwakarimba (2005) in their qualitative study on social support for refugees in Canada, find that social support is perceived to play an important role in immigrant settlement and to have a positive impact on immigrant health, although immigrants face many systemic issues such as limited resources, lack of integration of policies and programs and constrict service mandates, also limit service providers’ abilities to meet the needs of refugees.

Discrimination in its many forms toward asylum seekers has also been a major factor that has not necessarily been countered within the resettlement framework of many host states. Refugees who reported that they had experienced racial discrimination had higher depression levels than refugees who did not (Noh et al., 1999). Young (2001) also explains that the most discriminated, economically marginalized, and high-risk groups in refugees, are specifically those who have become separated, divorced, or widowed. Thus, they should be monitored and targeted for interventions, since they are most in need of supportive functions in a new society. Another high-risk group for discrimination includes sexual minorities, and Brotman & Lee
explain that social workers can support refugee claimants seeking protection due to persecution based on sexual orientation, gender identity or both, by helping them construct their refugee narratives so that their sexual and gender identities will be heard and understood towards better social support.

Furthermore, Ives (2007)’s findings demonstrate the importance of interactions between refugees and host country citizens because they facilitate social inclusion and employment, which contributes to long-term self-sufficiency. With issues in job attainment in host countries, refugees were more likely to seek help from service providers, and generally small minority of refugees having no one to turn to, or they will solve their problems on their own (Lamba & Krahn 2003). Lamba & Krahn (2003) explain that refugees tend to handle money and personal issues by seeking assistance from familial networks, whereas health and occupation difficulties are typically sought from extra-familial networks in the host community. Refugee service providers should realize the range of ties that refugees need during resettlement, and thus, admission policies should also ensure that refugee families remain together, as well as expedite the family reunification process.

Within the process of refugee resettlement, often comes high levels of psychological and emotional distress that can be exacerbated by a variety of factors in the host country or society. These emotional effects will often likely affect economic marginalization for admitted refugees. Hence, refugee matters such as psychological issues as well as religion will fall upon private groups and individuals who are more familiar with refugee resettlement in the U.S. (Burwell et al., 1986). McSpadden (1987) found that refugees resettled in the Western U.S., for example, who had higher levels of depression and suicide generally correlated to their being culturally and ethnically dissimilar to U.S. cultures and ethnicities. However, refugees resettled by
congregations or volunteers oftentimes have higher levels of psychological well-being than refugees who are resettled by caseworkers or federal agencies (McSpadden 1987). These mental and emotional factors create positive feedback loops for economic opportunities and further psychological well-being, even into the greater scale of familial and social networks.

Similarly, Simich et al. (2005) explain that social support for refugees is perceived to play an important role in settlement and to have a positive impact on refugee health, although refugees face many systemic issues such as limited resources, lack of integration of policies, and programs that constrict service mandates also limit service providers’ abilities to meet the needs of refugees. Lamba and Krahn (2003) also explain in their study that refugees’ familial and extra-familial ties are associated with significantly higher employment. Lanphier (1983) explained that sponsorship of refugees has been a key determinant in the success of resettlement, but that without sponsorship, marginalization often occurs. The duration of sponsorship and the intensity of sponsor activities are important for preventing marginalization, and dependence upon the sponsor is quickly succeeded by friendship networks (Lanphier 1983). There is a need for greater advocacy for funding to support social connections between refugees and host country citizens to increase social inclusion in host countries (Ives 2007; Lamba & Krahn 2003).

Overall, there may not always be as much marginalization caused by the refugee resettlement programs, and from existing studies, there is often economic disenfranchisement and marginalization caused by mental and emotional stress. Prior studies looking at more historical accounts of refugees in various host countries find that there have been some very specific kinds of marginalization occurring with specific populations of refugees, which all contribute to economic marginalization.
Language learning assistance provisions are generally expected to be provided for refugees in host countries’ resettlement programs in order to facilitate refugees’ assimilation process. A lot of the literature has shown that host country language acquisition and higher wages are inextricably linked. In regard to refugee resettlement initiatives, Ives (2007), argues for that a reevaluation of resettlement policy is needed regarding language and employment and formal support for asylum sponsorships for asylum seekers, and also to include the voices of refugees in the actual resettlement programs themselves. In the resettlement context, Ives (2007) argues that State-provided assistance should be kept at less than market wages in order to ensure a greater reliance on the workforce and labor market than to aid receipt. Such support to refugees discourages long-term self-sufficiency and will serve to smooth their transition from resettlement program benefits to public assistance (Ives 2007). Lanphier (1983) from his past study found that with regard to economic adaptation, language instruction programs for refugees have to be scheduled flexibly in order to acclimate varied life patterns of refugees in entry level jobs. However, this is not always the case, and regarding lack of language training provisions in resettlement policies, there is oftentimes a disconnect for refugees to assimilate economically within a host country. Lanphier (1983) found that there exists marginalization for refugees undertaking language instruction for several months before job placements did not likely have training programs designed especially for them, as they become part of the mixture of newly-arrived refugees in the community. Tollefson (1985) explains that many adult refugees moving to primarily English-speaking countries do not learn English outside of ESL classes, thus at the outset of resettlement, they become marginalized linguistically.
Learning the host country’s language is the key to gaining employment, improving salary, successfully dealing with health issues, and to the overall resettlement process in many host countries (Tollefson 1985; Halpern 2008). Competence in the host language is by far one of the most important pre-employment skills and most important coping skills for cultural adaptation, and if instructional programs are facilitating language learning most effectively, they must use communicative curricula and methods (Tollefson 1985). Halpern (2008) found that certain key factors from the programs contributed to positive rates of employment: the multiple-wage earner strategy, strong coordination among refugee service providers, staff’s cultural competency, and the use of financial incentives.

**Amount of Foreign Humanitarian Aid for Refugee Assistance**

The amount of provisions as well as the amount of spending that a state engages in for the resettlement of a refugee and his or her family is oftentimes a costly approach for a country. The host countries that have been offering refugees asylum and resettlement under the auspices of the host government’s refugee policies are not always first world countries per se, or countries that have extremely high GDP’s. In fact, the top ten host countries for refugees in the fiscal year 2016 have been Turkey, Iran, Germany, Syria, Lebanon, Chad, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, and China (Haas Institute 2016 Inclusiveness Index, 2016), and some of these countries have been recipients or donors of humanitarian and economic aid to assist in forced migration and global displacement of persons as well as their integration in new host societies.

With regard to humanitarian aid and assistance, Pottier (1996) found that humanitarian agencies deal with multitudes of refugees and constantly wonder who is who, without a clear
answer, and these agencies continually fail to situate those who claim to speak for the majority of refugees. Rather than investigate the political scene in camps, humanitarian agencies adopt a learn-on-the-job approach even with aid. Moreover, Choi & Salehyan (2013) found that the consequences of hosting refugees for domestic and international terrorism, and argue that the infusion of aid resources provides militant groups with opportunities for looting and for attacking foreign targets. Choi & Salehyan (2013) also argue that the infusion of aid workers, food, shelter, and other humanitarian aid forms makes host countries more prone to terrorist attacks, as militants seek to exploit these resources. While refugee assistance is essential to forestall humanitarian catastrophes and should be lauded, without proper security measures in place, aid workers and the aid they provide are subject to attack, which may further marginalize refugees.

Overall, after looking at various studies in the literature, the findings are fascinating in that it seems that there is more economic disenfranchisement and marginalization caused by mental and emotional stress. Prior studies looking at more historical accounts of refugees in host countries find that there have been very specific kinds of marginalization, and that economic marginalization has occurred within specific populations of refugees. Although the literature discusses specific aspects of deficiencies in host countries’ refugee assistance and resettlement programs, there are undoubtedly other factors that may have an impact upon asylum seeker economic marginalization. This project will further look at the causes of refugee economic marginalization by examining specific variables including lack of education, poor living conditions, inadequate health care, and the lack of proper employment opportunities and provisions within host countries’ resettlement frameworks, with data from the European Union, Canada, and the United States. These variables will be further assessed in the following theoretical section, and then tested empirically in the data analysis section.
Chapter 4

Theoretical Argument

Marginalization of migrant populations caused by various factors and provisions entailed within refugee resettlement programs across countries is a complex relationship to observe. Government policies oftentimes dictate how much funding and resources will be allocated to the resettlement process in a given country. Lanphier (1983) found that initial allocation of resources therefore determines the successful sequence of service deliveries throughout the refugee resettlement process. Oftentimes these funds and resources will shift depending on the number of refugees a state decides to admit and thus resettle into the host society. After the Syrian refugee crisis, for example, many Eurozone states within the European Union shifted their policies regarding how much funding they would allocate toward the refugee resettlement and reintegration processes within the respective EU state. Moreover, Singer & Wilson (2006) found that refugees have access to large amounts of federal, state or provincial, and local support to assist them economically and socially, with such provisions as affordable housing, health care access, job training and placement, and language learning dominating the local service needs. Understanding how much effort a state will give in the general resettlement process, whether it is in funding towards backing the resettlement initiatives, allocation of individual refugee stipends, relevant government provisions entailed within the refugee resettlement framework, language learning services, increasing the presence of family and social networks, and occupational provisions and many other factors, all may play into the overall successful resettlement, or the lack thereof, and thus marginalization, of a refugee within a harboring host nation.

Integration has been another major component of successful resettlement policies and implementation. For example, Ager & Strang (2008) found that the key domains of integration
are related to four overall themes: achievement and access across the sectors of employment, housing, education and health; assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights; processes of social connection within and between groups within the community; and structural barriers to such connection related to language, culture, and the local environment. The components of the refugee resettlement initiatives that will be tested in this project will cover three of the areas listed within the findings of Ager & Strang (2008), which include access to health care, living conditions, education, and access across the sectors of employment, or provisions for employment opportunities that are above minimum wage, and jobs that will allow for occupational mobility for admitted and resettled refugees.

This section will outline my theoretical argument with regard to what aspects, or deficiencies, in the refugee resettlement programs of host countries most lead to economic marginalization from inefficient resettlement programs in states, generally, as well as the social factors that may predict the extent to which states allocate more or less funding toward the resettlement programs and the provisions for refugees therein. I will be focusing only on one element of the resettlement process – economic marginalization – and then in the analysis section analyze the data as to what will impact the levels of economic integration for refugees in a host society. I will describe the role of access to adequate health care, sufficient living conditions, education provision, and employment provisions in determining the level of economic marginalization refugees face in host nations, as these are most likely some of the most impactful variables on migrant economic marginalization. These factors will arguably increase economic marginalization and overall disenfranchisement in resettled refugee populations in their new societies, and will be tested with data from various European Union host countries in the analysis section.
Access to Healthcare

Economic marginalization amongst admitted and resettled refugee populations can be attributed to a variety of deficient contributing factors. Oftentimes, health care can be extremely expensive in states that do not utilize a socialist healthcare system where higher taxes fund the necessary medical tests that one might need. In the United States, for example, the healthcare system oftentimes relies on one’s own acquisition of health insurance, to incur the costs of medical treatment from private and public clinics. Most refugee host countries in the European Union, however, have utilized a socialist healthcare system where most forms of healthcare are covered financially by the state.

However, one form of marginalization in a host society can occur in the form of medical neglect, which may affect economic transitions for refugees. Taylor et al (2014) found that in the case of Iraqi refugees seeking U.S.-based asylum, the federal government provides resettled refugees with health insurance only for the first eight months after they arrive in the country, but after this 8-month period, refugees who do not qualify for Medicare or Medicaid must secure health insurance on their own. This independent acquisition of health insurance for refugees even after this 8-month period may be extremely difficult because of language and cultural barriers as well as healthcare facilities abandoning their liabilities toward vulnerable demographics. Taylor et al (2014) also found that one factor marginalizing refugees socially is from the state refugee health offices losing contact with refugees after the eight months of government-provided health insurance ends, as information about how refugees manage health conditions after their government-provided health insurance expires is not available.

Without the proper medical insurance coverage necessary to live a host country that does not utilize a collective healthcare system, like those of EU member states and Canada, refugees
are often forced to obtain their own methods of dealing with medical issues. Taylor et al (2014) found that for refugees, there can exist social marginalization at the outset, as before coming to the United States for example, all resettled refugees must complete a medical examination to identify individuals with communicable diseases of public health significance, and guidelines for the overseas medical examination are provided by the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC also recommends that newly arriving refugees obtain a domestic and intensive medical examination within 90 days of their arrival. Another issue that arises out of the CDC’s recommendation is how communicable diseases that are carried in admitted refugee populations affect the migrants’ resettlement, or in severe cases, access to medical insurance and adequate healthcare. These factors may demonstrate that the level of medical alienation starts at the foremost reception of refugees into the host state system, as institutionally-motivated medical testing occurs without the refugees’ ability to defer. Medical disenfranchisement of any kind, may in fact lead to economic issues, as healthcare without health insurance in the U.S. as well as in other countries is very costly in most cases.

Overall, access to healthcare for refugees may be included on a state-by-state basis, where the acquisition of medical insurance may or may not be included in the refugee resettlement program of the host country. If medical insurance is not included, the question then arises if there is adequate access to health care, and also if there are resources for admitted refugees to obtain health care in the host state. This argument thus leads to the following theoretical expectation:

\[ H1: \text{Host countries that have relatively less access to health care are likely to have more economically marginalized migrant populations.} \]
Living Conditions

One theoretical possibility is that the living conditions of refugees may cause or increase their level of economic marginalization. Geographic positioning in resettlement may lead to better employment opportunities, such as when migrants are placed in large suburban areas, where simply, more job opportunities exist. Refugee resettlement in large metropolitan areas in host countries may also offer asylum seekers more economic opportunities through occupational training and attainment than say, placement in suburban or rural regions. Singer & Wilson (2006) discuss that refugees have mostly been resettled in metropolitan areas with large foreign-born populations; in medium and smaller metropolitan areas, refugees have a high impact on the local population. Crisp, Jeff & Jacobsen (1998) find that with actual and potential refugee-hosting states, national and regional security is best reinforced by means of a dependable respect for international refugee law, as well as its provisions concerning the settlement of refugees at a reasonable distance from borders. One aspect of refugee resettlement, has been the construction of refugee camps adjacent to the borders with issue-area countries, such as the refugee camps in Turkey near the border with Syria, as well as in Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon to name the most prominent. A major recurring issue with these camps is that they lack in basic necessities for refugees to survive. Another issue has been the fact that many refugees have been forced to remain in the camps, as local and federal processing for resettlement can least for months, depending on the bureaucratic capacity and functioning in the host state. Moreover, the way in which refugee camps are established and managed needs to be re-examined, as there are many situations in which camps create problems for asylum seekers and their local hosts, and there are equally many ways in which the living conditions and safety of refugees who are accommodated in camps could be improved (Crisp, Jeff & Jacobsen 1998).
Another aspect of the living conditions in resettlement placement in host countries that can potentially marginalize economically is the lack of the ability to have freedom of movement, once refugees are placed in a new society. Jacobsen (2002) found that when admitted and resettled refugees are permitted to gain access to resources and the freedom of movement in the host country and can work alongside their hosts to pursue productive lives, they will be less dependent on aid and thus better able to overcome tension and conflict in host communities.

Refugees, once resettled into a new host country, often engage in moving or leaving their original resettlement housing due to family separation or lack of social support, the need to find new employment opportunities, and most often, inadequate living conditions. This movement, or uprooting once again after initial resettlement is known as secondary migration, and has been witnessed in many host states especially those in the EU and Canada. For example, Simich (2003) finds that the main problem with this secondary migration is that the bureaucratic imperative – filling predetermined refugee targets for various provincial communities – sometimes takes precedence over satisfying refugees’ needs for social support or better living conditions.

In many host countries such as those in the European Union as well as in Canada and the United States, refugees have been placed in special government-subsidized housing units that provide adequate or semi-adequate living conditions in the host societies. There are cases, however, when refugees move into government-subsidized housing that matches that of third world housing conditions. In these cases, migrants and asylum seekers may not have the ability to encounter basic necessities in such living conditions, and thus, may need to focus more time, energy, and resources that could have been spent toward educational or occupational attainment,
but instead, focus on improving refugee family domiciles or community residences. This argument thus leads to the following theoretical expectation:

\[ H2: \text{Host countries that provide relatively less than adequate living conditions are likely to lead to greater economic marginalization in migrant populations.} \]

**Education**

Another theoretical possibility is that education invariably affects refugee economic integration within the host society. If there are not adequate refugee educational provisions or standards set in place within the context of resettlement agendas, then economic relegation may occur. Reitz (1998) found that the refugee settlement experience was determined not so much by immigrant selection and short-term settlement policies but rather by large institutional structures such as the educational system, social assistance provisions, and the labour market in host states. In the United States, for example, Ives (2007) argued that the most influential directive affecting refugees is “self-sufficiency within ninety days”, as this has been the bureaucratic rhetoric shaping refugee employment policy. The catch here, in the case of the U.S. as well as other refugee host states that will be examined in the analysis section, is that prior educational background and former degree attainment has oftentimes not been applicable to refugee employment attainment and specialized job opportunities within refugees’ prior fields of study. A problem that arises out of this, is the fact that most of the refugees in the U.S., for example, begin at entry-level jobs, even if they have high-level skills or former higher education (U.S. Department of State, “The Reception and Placement Program”). The main issue that occurs overall is that there is a large proportion of refugees who do not move out of the entry-level jobs
and into higher, better paying positions, which thus infantilizes those refugees who actually have
degrees of higher education and skills obtained in work from their home countries. Furthermore,
Ives (2007) also indicates that regardless of adult refugee educational background, they
oftentimes found work in the lowest paying sectors, which was consistent with other studies
examining refugee education and employment in many large cities in Canada, Italy, the U.S., and
the United Kingdom.

Another question that arises dealing with education, is whether or not host states provide
education (for adults and minors) within host state public or private schools or solely education
in the refugee communities, or if there is any provision of education for refugees in the first
place. For example, Singer & Wilson (2006) argue that local resettlement agencies must partner
with other institutions like universities and high schools to develop programs that pair students
with refugees, as well as local agencies coordinating access to services and training into single
centers in metropolitan resettlement areas in order to decrease any possibilities of economic
marginalization. Ager & Strang (2008) contend that vocational training and education are usually
considered as key aspects of integration to the extent that such measures foster employability
either in general terms or through enhancement of specific language or work skills. Admitted
and resettled asylum seekers are oftentimes placed in large communities together where
education is solely oriented towards the culture, language and prior experiences of the refugee.
This may lead, however, to there being a lack of host country cultural integration because of the
high concentration of refugees in one area within the context of the host state. Thus, a new
question arises; are the refugee resettlement programs providing adequate education for refugees,
not only so that they can acquire necessary jobs, but also so that they can integrate culturally and
completely within the host state? This argument leads to the following theoretical expectation:
H3: Host countries that provide relatively less than adequate education for refugees are likely to lead to greater economic marginalization in migrant populations.

Employment Opportunities

Employment opportunities are arguably one of the most important first steps for refugees that are admitted and resettled into a new host country. In looking at various refugee resettlement initiatives, it is important to consider the provisions laid out in states’ policies that give way to economic and social mobility for refugees within a host state. One such theoretical possibility of marginalization under refugee resettlement policies is simply caused from deficiencies in host country occupational provisions. Wayland (2007) finds that as a result of declining labor market outcomes, overall economic well-being and income rates for refugees in Canada were declining in the years 1980 to 2000.

Moreover, Ives (2007), argues that a reevaluation of resettlement policy, generally, is needed regarding employment and formal training support for asylum seekers. In the resettlement context, Ives (2007) also argues that State-provided assistance should be kept at less than market wages in order to ensure a greater reliance on the workforce and labor market than to aid receipt. Such support to refugees discourages long-term self-sufficiency and will serve to smooth their transition from resettlement program benefits to public assistance (Ives 2007). For example, Darrow (2015) found that the second ORR employment program in the United States, the Voluntary Agency Matching Grant program, operates as a selective enrollment alternative to the basic EES program, and places programmatic emphasis on expedited employment and training. Overall, the main objective of this specific U.S.-based program is to help selected
refugees achieve “economic self-sufficiency” through job placement and training in the first four-to six-months after arrival while remaining independent of public monetary assistance provisions. Overall, employment has consistently been identified as a factor influencing many relevant issues, including promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of the host society, providing opportunity to develop language skills, restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance (Ager & Strang 2008).

Furthermore, Halpern (2008) found that certain key factors from resettlement programs contributed to positive rates of employment: the multiple-wage earner strategy, strong coordination among refugee service providers, staff’s cultural competency, and the use of financial incentives. Lanphier (1983) also found that early job placement and economic adaptation has characterized most refugee resettlement programs, however the programs often marginalize because such services do not involve as high a personnel intensive level of resources as those emphasizing other aspects of cultural or social adaptation, as they are simpler to mount in cases of high-volume intake. This argument thus leads to the following theoretical implication:

**H4: Relatively inefficient host country employment provisions are likely to lead to greater economic marginalization in migrant populations.**

States that have adopted resettlement policies that lack or have deficiencies in the abovementioned provisions are arguably those who have the highest numbers of economically marginalized refugees. I hypothesize that adequate access to health care per fiscal year in a host society and the occupational or employment provisions set forth in the refugee resettlement programs of host countries are going to be the most marginalizing economically for refugee populations. Provisions related to living conditions and access to education will have relatively
less effect on refugee economic marginalization, while still having an impact overall. In this project, refugee host countries of EU member states, the United States, and Canada will be studied quantitatively to test and see if there is a positive relationship of these variables on refugee economic marginalization. A qualitative case study on the United States and Canada will also be conducted to test the hypotheses followed by an economic restrictiveness index for migrants located in Appendix B. Overall, all four of the theoretical arguments likely vary across states and time, which will be measured in the following sections.
Chapter 5

Research Design

In order to test the hypotheses that were outlined in the previous section, I utilize a large-N empirical study and I also focus on two specific cases. I utilize quantitative regression analyses with data retrieved for the years 2008 to 2016 from certain key sources. State-year is the unit of analysis. The first year in the data, 2008, was chosen due to the limited availability of refugee and asylum seeker data that is actually available in databases internationally. However, 2008 also indicates a prime year because it was long enough before the Syrian refugee crisis and the migration crisis that occurred within the European Union member states as well as a prime year in the onset of the world financial crisis of 2007-2008. Having such distance is important because it shows substantial variation in preexisting migrants’ economic conditions, or economic marginalization, before the major onset of migrants moving into Turkey and Europe. The final year in the dataset, 2016, was utilized as the most updated and available year for data in the European Union community’s statistical database known as Eurostat. After this section I will discuss the results of the separate regression models, and use a qualitative case study on Canada and the United States to relate the statistical findings of the quantitative analysis to show what areas of overall resource allocation and government spending on migrant resettlement in those two particular host countries should be improved and focused upon.

Since state year is the unit of analysis, I utilize a sample size of a total of 29 countries, which include Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands,
Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. Non-EU member states, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, and Turkey, were utilized in the sample because of their geographic proximity to, and general cooperation with the European Union, and importance in overall migrant/refugee resettlement, transience, and further processing into the EU migrant integration framework

There has been substantial literature that has discussed the importance of Turkey in the refugee admittance and resettlement process, since it is considered ‘south’ of Europe, though bordering the EU. Turkey is also relevant in the context of migrant resettlement as a southern state because a massive proportion of asylum seekers and migrants in general have moved and resettled into Turkey, or simply migrated through Turkey into Greece and other EU member states as transient populations seeking an adequate host state and living conditions. Moreover, Switzerland, a non-EU and non-Schengen treaty signatory state with a very high GDP, was also utilized in the sample not only because of its relevant geographic position in Central Europe, but also because of its participation in the open border policy. This policy has had major implications on the transience of migrants into Switzerland’s metropolitan areas, such as Bern and Zurich, where substantial populations have been resettled. Countries such as Poland, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) were all removed from the initial sample size due to insufficient data for the variables being analyzed. This lack of data within Eurostat’s database could be for a variety of reasons, but most likely because of the fact that these states are recently admitted member states into the European Union. Thus, a lack of data on migration into the EU since the initial onset of the Syrian refugee crisis and other such

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2 The current 28-member States of the EU, as of 2019, are technically all parties to the UN Convention relating to the status of refugees in 1951 and its 1967 protocol, which is the Geneva Convention. Thus, ratification of the Geneva convention has been a requirement for state membership within the EU.
international migration crises have not been fully tabulated or integrated by each country’s respective consensus bureau.

There are however, some important limitations to the data that should be mentioned. First, there were many countries from the original datasets that had to be removed because of massive amounts of insufficient data, and some of these countries are geographically relevant in the case of migrant transience and further resettlement. As mentioned, data for EU member states such as Poland, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) were all removed from the initial sample due to insufficient data for the indicators and variables that were being analyzed in the regression models. Poland, a relatively large EU member state, as compared to Croatia, is an important state since it is a Schengen Treaty signatory, indicating that the free movement of migrants and people in general may have an effect on the country’s economy and overall population size. Thus, the loss of countries such as Poland and Romania is unfavorable in trying to accurately measure migrant economic marginalization in the EU. Croatia, a much smaller state in terms of economy, geographic size, and population, was not so detrimental in the loss of data because it has been a country with intense border and immigration laws and security, making its contribution to the case of migrant economic situations not very profound by any means. Macedonia, a non-EU country bordering Greece and Bulgaria, could have important in the data discussion due to proximity to Turkey, however, it is also a small state that is not part of the EU, nor is it a Schengen signatory.

In the research design, I use two dependent variables that reflect economic marginalization, and I run two separate regression models. The first model measures the effects

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3 Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia are members of the EU legally obliged to join the Schengen Area, however they are not yet members. Thus, their immigration laws are generally stricter than the Schengen signatory states.
on migrant income in host countries and the second the amount of risk for poverty and social exclusion. The first dependent variable comes from data retrieved from Eurostat, and is the mean equivalized net income of migrants from a foreign country (non-EU country) eighteen years of age and older who have been admitted and are living within the European Union member states as well as Turkey for the designated time frame of 2008 to 2016. Figure 4 below demonstrates the variation across countries over time for the mean net incomes in Euros, for migrants (which includes refugees from foreign countries living in the EU) for 2008 and 2016.

**Figure 4: Variation in Host States for Migrant Mean Equivalized net income, Euro**

The other dependent variable for the second regression model is risk of poverty and social exclusion rate. This variable’s data originally came from the main indicator on the intersections between sub-populations of all Europe 2020 indicators on poverty and social exclusion, based on the original common survey known as the ECHP (European Community...
Household Panel) which used to be distributed within EU households under the gentleman’s agreement to attain information and data on economic conditions of residents, including migrant families (Eurostat, *Income and Living Conditions*, 2019). The survey then became the EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) instrument, launched in 2003, and is utilized under a common framework regulation by the European Council and Parliament, which is now where the data for this variable is derived from (Eurostat, *Income and Living Conditions*, 2019). A set of 14 headline indicators is complemented by specific indicators relating to three main areas: poverty and social exclusion, pensions, and health and long-term care. (Eurostat, *Income and Living Conditions*, 2019).

The first independent variable, the extent of unmet needs for medical examination, was retrieved from Eurostat (2019). It is measured based on the self-reports of migrants, and is simply the percentage who indicate unmet needs for medical examination in the EU-SILC survey, which is a general population survey with health variables covering the public health sector (Eurostat, *Health Variables of EU-SILC*, 2019). Self-reported unmet needs for medical examination comes from a person’s own assessment of whether they needed examination/treatment, but did not have the means to attain it, or did not seek for it. This percentage of migrants who self-report their unmet medical needs in the EU and Turkey has increased over time. However, it is rather difficult to demonstrate graphically the number of migrants who have self-reported and how those numbers change over time and across states. Thus, the data for two years – 2008 and 2016 – are presented in Figure 5 below.
One of the major limitations with the variable of migrants’ self-reported unmet needs for medical examination due to cost is that it is exactly what it says it is, and thus, it does not account for those migrants and refugees who do not report their unmet needs for medical examinations due to cost within their respective host states. From the data, these numbers have increased in most countries, however, the extent is unknown since this statistic is only based on self-reported unmet needs and not total unmet medical examination needs for the entire demographic.

The second independent variable – the rate of overcrowding in migrant host communities – was retrieved from Eurostat (2019). It is based on features and living conditions of households, such as health and labour conditions, housing conditions as well as childcare related indicators. The data on the overcrowding rate illustrates a real change in migrants’ living
conditions over time and across states. There are still many cases where the overcrowding rate has remained rather constant or even increased, depending on the country. The rate of overcrowding can be seen visually for the years 2008 and 2016 in figure 6 below.

**Figure 6: Variation Across Host States in Migrant Overcrowding Rate**

Some of the relevant limitations to this variable are that it does not consider certain aspects of the host community, such as how many families are resettled in the same area, how blighted are the community dwellings, is there access to clean water, sanitation, food storage, etc. These are some of the other important factors in the resettlement process that should also be studied more profoundly, however, for the purposes of this project, only overcrowding rate will be utilized as the prime indicator for migrant resettlement community living conditions.

The next independent variable utilized in each regression model, the migrant unemployment rate, was also retrieved from Eurostat (2019), with the data collection covering all main labor market characteristics and all economic sectors. Moreover, the data is based off of
the annually-distributed European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), which offers population estimates for the main labour market characteristics, such as employment, unemployment, inactivity, hours of work, occupation, economic activity, and other labor related variables, as well as relevant socio-demographic characteristics, such as sex, age, education, household characteristics, and regions of residence (Eurostat, *LFS Series – Detailed Annual Survey Results (LFSA)*, 2019). The statistical unit of measurement for this variable is number of persons. Figure 7 below shows the changes in unemployment for migrants over time. The data also illustrates that southern European Union countries such as Greece and Spain have had the highest rates of unemployment among admitted migrants.

**Figure 7: Variation Across Host States in Rate of Migrant Unemployment**

Potential limitations towards the unemployment rate, or the changes in unemployment over time, include the fact that this variable does not discuss as to what the potential causes for
unemployment are within the context of each host country. One could assume that the domestic economy has a direct impact on this variable, which is why I control for certain domestic economic indicators such as GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) as well as GDP growth rate, both as control variables which will be outlined further in this section. The unemployment rate as a variable also does not ascertain as to how much government spending is allocated towards employment provisions within the context of each host country’s migrant resettlement framework. It may also be hard to project, based on the availability of data, as to what the unemployment rates for migrants were in the years after 2016, and especially in the current year.

The last independent variable, the participation rate of education and training, was also retrieved and tabulated from Eurostat (2019). This variable was first measured by the European Union Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS), which is distributed as a continuous quarterly survey with interviews consistently conducted over all the weeks in a quarter, with the annual data encompassing the four reference quarters in the year (Eurostat, “Participation in Education and Training” 2019). The EU-LFS Survey results cover the total population of EU member states and covers all industries and occupations and is measured in and reported in percentages. The visual representation of migrants’ attendance in education and training in the last four weeks can be seen below in figure 8. This figure shows the variation in attendance over time, as there is an obvious level of change in attendance for migrants living in their respective host states. Host countries such as Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and Norway seem to have the highest and relatively consistent numbers of migrants participating in education and training.
One of the greatest limitations to this data indicator is that it does not specify or discuss the implications as to why migrants are participating or not participating in educational or training programs within the host country. Moreover, it does not discuss the amount of educational or training provisions that each host country provides in the resettlement program, and it also does not mention as to how much state spending is allocated towards this specific indicator. For this indicator, I am solely looking at the participation rate in education and training for admitted and resettled migrants.

Within each regression model, I have also controlled for certain variables as they are highly important in the discussion of overall migrant economic conditions in each host country and they provide an adequate context of how migrants operate economically, or on the other
hand, are marginalized economically within a particular host state. The control variables can be seen more clearly in table 4 below.

**Table 4: Control Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee population by country or territory of asylum</td>
<td>World Bank (2019)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS)</td>
<td>Eurostat (2019)</td>
<td>Real expenditures are expenditures in national currency converted to PPS using PPPs, measured as a percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth rate</td>
<td>Eurostat (2019)</td>
<td>Nominal unit labour cost growth, measured as a percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Migrants having a longstanding illness or health problem</td>
<td>Eurostat (2019)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant population of employed persons (in 1000s of people)</td>
<td>Eurostat (2019)</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of general population at risk of poverty or social exclusion</td>
<td>Eurostat (2019)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rates</td>
<td>Eurostat (2019)</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe material deprivation rate</td>
<td>Eurostat (2019)</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The control variables that were retrieved from Eurostat are significant in the overall discussion of variables that may very well have an effect on the economic conditions of migrants within the European Union common asylum and resettlement system. The other relevant control variable that was mentioned in the literature review and was retrieved from the World Bank’s official database, includes the “Refugee population by country or territory of asylum”.

The refugee population within a host state invariably affects the economy, in most cases based on existing literature, there has been an “unfair” amount of burden sharing of refugees among EU member states, as of 2015, around 87% of the 1.3 million refugees in the EU have
been resettled in Germany, France, Greece, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Sweden (Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2015). Refugees and asylum seekers are people who have applied for asylum or refugee status, however, they have not yet received a final decision on their applications (World Bank Group, 2019). In figure 9 below, I illustrate the number of refugees within each host state to show the changes over time. This figure is solely the number of refugees and asylum seekers in each state. It can be clearly seen that Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are the most important states regarding refugee resettlement. Turkey had the greatest number of admitted refugees but was excluded from the graph in order to show better variation.

**Figure 9: Number of Admitted Refugees per Host State**
One of the limitations to this specific control variable is that it does not include the total number of migrants, also known as the internal migrant stock as either a percent of the population or the total net migration. The reason I did not include that instead of refugee numbers is because of missing data for every five years in the World Bank’s datasets for those specific indicators. Thus, this specific control variable leaves out the overall net migration. It also does not discuss where the refugees are coming from geographically, or where their country of origin is. According to the World Bank Group (2019), other limitations include the fact that it is difficult to collect accurate statistics on refugees and that most refugees are not aware of their need to register as a refugee, and some countries tend to overestimate the number of refugees. Moreover, most first world countries’ registries are positioned at the local levels, and thus data might not be centralized (World Bank Group, 2019).

Eurostat makes an important distinction in the data categorization for the indicators on “Migrants and migrant integration” section of the database, as for example it systematically categorizes data on migrants within the EU as either being based on ‘citizenship’ or based on ‘country of birth’ for each and every indicator. For the purposes of this project, the former category was chosen as being most accurate and relevant, as data retrieved for the former category would only include those migrants whose country of birth was in fact a European Union member state or Turkey, and not one of the major hotspot countries where refugees migrating to Europe had most likely originated from, such as Syria, Iraq, or those of North Africa, for example. Moreover, the data chosen for the variables also falls into the same lines of justification from the theory section, since I am seeking to measure what affects economic marginalization within a host state for those migrants and refugees who are seeking employment opportunities or
asylum within the EU and Turkey post resettlement and granting of asylum and even citizenship, in many cases.

Another important distinction in the data selection that was made, was to ensure that the indicators that were chosen specifically designated that the migrants were citizens of a “foreign country” first, as opposed to the “reporting country”, which drastically differentiates the statistical values for each indicator. This fact is because citizens of a foreign country, let’s say, Syrian refugees who became expatriates, are considered legitimate foreign statesmen, whereas citizens of the reporting country were included in separate datasets, however this would not be an accurate indicator because these are already permanent citizens of that host country. Though migrants from countries within the European Union may invariably migrate to other EU or Eurozone member states, they are or were at some point, considered citizens of a foreign country. This factor in the data specification and retrieval is acceptable for the purposes of this project because I am not looking into the demographic of the migrants per se, however I am looking at the fact that the individual is a migrant and thus, overall migrants’ economic statuses in each host country, no matter their specific country of origin.

The justification for utilizing the data from these sources is that they are both quite reputable. With regard to Eurostat, the migration integration section provides adequate information on the integration of migrants in host countries as it contains data on the aspects of employment, health, education, social inclusion, living conditions, active citizenship, as well as the number of asylum applicants and decisions on applications, residence permits, statistics on enforcement of immigration legislation, and even statistics on children in migration (Eurostat, 2019). These data figures make Eurostat not only highly accurate because of the joint sharing of statistical data between EU member states under the framework, but also because they often used
for population projections and demography used by the governments of EU member states. The World Bank’s data on refugees is highly reliable as well, and has an accurate listing of the number of refugees in nearly every country of the world. Thus, for the purposes of this project, the host states listed above were tabulated and utilized for the two regression models.

Moreover, since no measure in any model can be truly perfect statistically, decisions on which measures will be most accurate was an important step in the data analysis for migrant marginalization. For this project, the variables were selected based off of existing literature that discussed the importance of migrant and refugee access to healthcare, living conditions within the host state, provisional and post-resettlement employment, and overall training and education programs. These variables were oftentimes seen to have the greatest effect on refugee and migrant assimilation within the host state, if done correctly and provided similarly across the board, as based on the individual host country’s economic conditions. In the context of the European Union’s member states, and non-EU member states but Eurozone countries in the cases of Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, and Turkey, where economic cooperation and generally open borders has entailed, there would be a general expectation that migrants resettled in central Europe (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, etc.) would experience similar economic conditions due to their geographic centrality of resettlement as well as the higher GDP per capita and the GDP growth rates of those countries, as compared to southern or peripheral European Union countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus). Thus, I expect some countries to have more migrant economic marginalization than others.

In order to correct for potential limitations in the models because of there being only 28 states for the 2008-2016 time period in the state-year unit of measurement, panel data was utilized for both of the regression models. There are, however, some major benefits in utilizing
panel data, as opposed to other forms of data in linear regression models. First, the relevance of drawing upon panel data for the purposes of measuring the economic marginalization among refugee populations within the European Union’s member states as host countries as well as Turkey, is that it is good to use for repeated observations on a same cross section analysis. Some of the relevant aspects in using such panel data relative to cross-sectional data is that it is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Panel data also has a technical advantage in a way, as it can utilize both time and cross-section aspects and thus is able to provide more information as it can increase variation, increase efficiency, reduce collinearity, include more degrees of freedom, and it also has the propensity to detect for effects that are not necessarily possible to measure in cross-section or time series data analyses. Moreover, a lot of contemporary research in quantitative methods has shown that panel data is useful when one believes that cross-sectional regression results would be biased, which could oftentimes be due to omitted variables, specifically if it is credible that significant omitted variables are time-invariant. However, for the purposes of this project, there are no such omitted variables, especially those that are time-invariant. Rather, the explanatory variables of interest and the dependent variable do in fact vary over time. This is why my selected unit of analysis is state-year and why I chose to utilize panel data, as I see advantages in using it over time series alone for a single country or cross-sectional analysis in one selected year.

I estimate two separate models for each of the two dependent variables. The first model utilizes the mean equivalized net income of migrants of 18 years of age and older, and the second utilizes the rate of migrants’ risk of poverty and social exclusion, for migrants 18 years of age and older. I am curious as to see not only what indicators and variables have an effect on migrant income, but also as to what variables will increase the rate of poverty and social exclusion, and
thus, overall economic marginalization across time. The table that follows the equations presents the predicted relationships among the variables for each model. Thus, the equations for the two regression models follow, and I estimate the following statistical relationships:

**Equation 1**

\[ \text{Migrant Income} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Unmet needs for medical examination})_{it} + \beta_2(\text{Overcrowding rate})_{it} + \beta_3(\text{Unemployment Rate})_{it} + \beta_4(\text{Participation Rate in Education and Training})_{it} + \text{controls} + u_{it} \]

**Equation 2**

\[ \text{Migrant Poverty Risk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Unmet needs for medical examination})_{it} + \beta_2(\text{Overcrowding rate})_{it} + \beta_3(\text{Unemployment Rate})_{it} + \beta_4(\text{Participation Rate in Education and Training})_{it} + \text{controls} + u_{it} \]

**Table 5: Predicted Relationships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expected Relationship: Migrant Net Income (18+)</th>
<th>Expected Relationship: Migrants at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion (18+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unmet Needs for Medical Examination</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcrowding Rate</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation Rate in Education and Training</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6
Regression Results and Analytical Discussion

Below is a table of descriptive statistics for the variables in my models. The mean income of migrants within the European states and Turkey that are in the sample are rather incongruent, as in some countries such as Switzerland and the Scandinavian states, migrants have a much higher income. Some other variables, such as the number of employed persons within the general populace and the refugee population within each host country, vary drastically. The other variables that were utilized in each model, such as the Migrant Unemployment Rate, the Percent of Migrants at Risk of Poverty and Social Exclusion, Activity Rates, and even the Rate of Unmet Needs for Medical Examination, do not vary as much as initially expected.

I run two separate regression models for each of the dependent variables; Migrant Income and Migrant Poverty Risk. The results from these regression models are stated in Tables 7 and 8. For each of the tables, Model I is a panel data, pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model as is Model IV. Models II and III utilize a group estimation technique, which actually measures the differentiation of residuals from the variables’ means. I also included in Model IV, a regression with the inclusion of an extra variable – ‘EU Common Asylum Spending,’ which entails the total expenditure in millions of Euros from each EU member state on first the European Union’s “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Program” for the years 2008 to 2013, as well as on the European Union’s “Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund” for the years 2014 to 2016. The reason as to why I included these two programs specifically and combined the data
consecutively for the purposes of the regression model, was because of their provisions within
the asylum seeker and migrant resettlement process within the common framework of EU
member states. I chose not to include the data from the “Rights, Equality, and Citizenship
Program” (2014-2017) because of this program’s lack in fund allocation towards the
migrant/refugee resettlement process in the EU. Moreover, Model V utilizes a standard cross-
sectional linear regression model. Since no data was missing from the overall sample, the
number of observations remains relatively the same for each model, with general variation of ±1.
### Table 6: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Excess Kurtosis</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Observation Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Income</td>
<td>16251</td>
<td>603.4839941</td>
<td>5021</td>
<td>9730.9</td>
<td>0.56755</td>
<td>0.91769</td>
<td>46202</td>
<td>3208</td>
<td>49410</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Migrant Poverty Risk</td>
<td>34.86</td>
<td>0.694991636</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11.206</td>
<td>-0.26672</td>
<td>0.19963</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Unmet Needs for Medical Examination</td>
<td>3.0506</td>
<td>0.271998867</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.3858</td>
<td>4.9926</td>
<td>2.2485</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcrowding Rate</td>
<td>25.913</td>
<td>1.058501126</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.068</td>
<td>-0.018496</td>
<td>0.72697</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>9.0567</td>
<td>0.292304299</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.7133</td>
<td>2.8624</td>
<td>1.5866</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Education and Training</td>
<td>12.315</td>
<td>0.52201686</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.4173</td>
<td>-0.41051</td>
<td>0.84474</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Population</td>
<td>79937</td>
<td>16963.90402</td>
<td>2449</td>
<td>2.74E+05</td>
<td>67.471</td>
<td>7.6868</td>
<td>2869399</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.87E+06</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita in PPS</td>
<td>106.39</td>
<td>2.671817295</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>43.082</td>
<td>3.6192</td>
<td>1.5758</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth Rate</td>
<td>1.0042</td>
<td>0.240038353</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8705</td>
<td>7.6447</td>
<td>-0.0036402</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of migrants who have Illness</td>
<td>23.98</td>
<td>0.669912923</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>10.802</td>
<td>2.3257</td>
<td>1.388</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Persons in Host Society</td>
<td>7566.8</td>
<td>628.2874677</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10131</td>
<td>1.5797</td>
<td>1.6743</td>
<td>40007</td>
<td>157.7</td>
<td>40165</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of People at risk of Poverty/Social Exclusion</td>
<td>23.916</td>
<td>0.591755409</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>9.5418</td>
<td>4.6944</td>
<td>1.9213</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Rates</td>
<td>72.575</td>
<td>0.410957761</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>6.6265</td>
<td>1.1581</td>
<td>-0.60781</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Deprivation Rate</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>0.726972174</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.722</td>
<td>1.9983</td>
<td>1.491</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 below shows the first regression model’s results. Overall, I run four separate models to test the hypotheses. It can clearly be seen in the table that my hypotheses were more or less backed quantitatively. As per the regression results for the first model, Unmet Needs for Medical Examination actually has a very large effect on migrant income and has a positive coefficient, as it is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. This means that for every 1-unit increase in the percentage of unmet medical examination, this yields a ~113 Euro increase in Migrant Net Income. Participation Rate in Education and Training was also statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval and has a positive coefficient, as well as a very large positive effect on Migrant Income in each host state.

For Model IV to function in the software, I had to remove the non-EU member states, or simply, the states that have not contributed to the financial backing of these programs, which included Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey for each year (2008-2016). The results from the inclusion of these programs’ data as an independent variable are telling. First, the model has a very high $R^2$ which indicates that the model explains roughly 92% of the interaction between the variables. As a variable, EU Resettlement Program Spending has a positive coefficient, and is statistically significant, indicating that it does indeed have a positive effect on migrants’ income, specifically those of asylum seekers and refugees, within each EU member state where it has been implemented and utilized. The model shows its effectiveness in essence, and also demonstrates that other positive independent variables have a lesser effect, most likely due to the semi-reduced model. An interesting factor to consider for Models II and III with their within-group estimation, is that they help consider the differences between the states, and then between the years respectively. The financial crisis did indeed affect the Eurozone countries during the year 2008, which invariably affected admitted and resettled migrants in Europe, so this can be
Table 7: Modeling Migrant Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I (Pooled OLS)</th>
<th>Model II (Within Group Estimation – State)</th>
<th>Model III (Within Group Estimation – Year)</th>
<th>Model IV (Semi-Reduced Pooled OLS)</th>
<th>Model V (Standard Linear Regression)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Unmet Needs for Medical Examination Overcrowding Rate</td>
<td>112.672*** (4.45)</td>
<td>125.119*** (4.52)</td>
<td>113.185*** (4.66)</td>
<td>106.089** (2.36)</td>
<td>111.5008 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>-84.842*** (-9.99)</td>
<td>-75.7234*** (-9.18)</td>
<td>-74.0423*** (-8.29)</td>
<td>-92.5036*** (-10.8)</td>
<td>-86.4573*** (-4.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Education and Training Refugee Population</td>
<td>236.915*** (5.95)</td>
<td>213.913*** (4.81)</td>
<td>250.157*** (6.23)</td>
<td>195.420*** (11.1)</td>
<td>235.8446*** (5.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita in PPS</td>
<td>146.448*** (50.3)</td>
<td>146.361*** (46.6)</td>
<td>144.800*** (53.3)</td>
<td>122.728*** (38.3)</td>
<td>146.3107*** (18.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth Rate</td>
<td>-117.226** (-1.97)</td>
<td>-241.905*** (-5.22)</td>
<td>-249.353*** (-5.04)</td>
<td>-112.564*** (-4.60)</td>
<td>-118.9078* (-1.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of migrants who have Longstanding Illness Employed Persons in Host Society</td>
<td>-32.0965* (-1.67)</td>
<td>-40.5930* (-1.95)</td>
<td>-50.2148** (-2.26)</td>
<td>-51.4255*** (-3.36)</td>
<td>-31.6924 (-1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of People at risk of Poverty/Social Exclusion Activity Rates</td>
<td>0.0804*** (8.69)</td>
<td>0.0859757*** (7.26)</td>
<td>0.0311 (1.90)</td>
<td>0.0451 (1.56)</td>
<td>0.0798*** (2.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Deprivation Rate EU Resettlement Program Spending Constant</td>
<td>53.7625 (2.16)</td>
<td>67.9673*** (2.82)</td>
<td>115.456*** (4.24)</td>
<td>25.1801 (0.857)</td>
<td>50.7007 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134.711*** (6.79)</td>
<td>156.883*** (7.22)</td>
<td>113.118*** (5.93)</td>
<td>-1.4543 (-0.0743)</td>
<td>130.3362*** (2.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-12.2439* (-0.648)</td>
<td>-38.1340 (-1.77)</td>
<td>-48.9359** (-2.16)</td>
<td>-33.4913 (-1.40)</td>
<td>-10.5707 (-0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-8635.34*** (-4.67)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4218.98** (2.51)</td>
<td>-8159.93 (-1.64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8564351</td>
<td>0.8624674</td>
<td>0.8663494</td>
<td>0.9218721</td>
<td>0.8559</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122.77 (df = 12, 248)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T-values are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
imputed in Model III. Many of the variables are also statistically significant, which is interesting to consider given the overall slight differences between each model.

However, the Overcrowding Rate and the Migrant Unemployment Rate were statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval as well, which was expected. The coefficient for the Refugee population was unsurprisingly negative, however it was statistically insignificant. One could expect that the more refugees that there are in a host country, the less job opportunities are available for them. Moreover, GDP Per Capita in PPS as a control variable had a very high positive impact on the dependent variable, which was expected, as the larger the purchasing power standard among the general populace is in the host or resettlement country, it could then be expected that the migrant population would also have a somewhat proportional income.

**Figure 10: Scatterplots of Relationships between Model I Dependent Variables**

Other control variables, such as GDP Growth Rate and the Percentage of Migrants with a longstanding illness, and the Material Deprivation Rate all have negative coefficients as expected, however they are also statically insignificant independent variables. However, other controls such as the number of Employed Persons, the Percentage of the Populace at Risk of
Poverty, and the Activity Rate were all positive and statistically significant. These control variables, with the exception of People at Risk of Poverty, were expected to be positive. It could be that this variable is also positive because it creates a perception or a motivational factor of the need to find labor for newly resettled migrants into the host country, however it is hard to identify this specifically. Moreover, the $R^2$ for this model is relatively high, at ~85, which signifies that the model has about 85% explanatory power of interactions between the variables.
Table 8: Modeling Migrant Poverty Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I (Pooled OLS)</th>
<th>Model II (Within Group Estimation – State)</th>
<th>Model III (Within Group Estimation – Year)</th>
<th>Model IV (Sem Reduced Pooled OLS)</th>
<th>Model V (Standard Linear Regression)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Unmet Needs for Medical Examination Overcrowding Rate</td>
<td>-0.3284*** (-3.19)</td>
<td>-0.3464*** (-3.28)</td>
<td>-0.4340*** (-4.95)</td>
<td>-0.1452 (-0.725)</td>
<td>-0.3301 (-2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>-0.0165 (-0.467)</td>
<td>-0.0142* (-0.375)</td>
<td>-0.0121 (-0.278)</td>
<td>0.0004 (0.0115)</td>
<td>-0.0188 (-0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Education and Training Refugee Population</td>
<td>0.8243*** (6.86)</td>
<td>0.8867*** (7.90)</td>
<td>0.8927*** (7.56)</td>
<td>0.2405 (1.03)</td>
<td>0.8206*** (6.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Education and Training Refugee Population</td>
<td>0.5154*** (11.6)</td>
<td>0.5316*** (10.9)</td>
<td>0.6456*** (15.6)</td>
<td>0.0558 (0.370)</td>
<td>0.5138* (5.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita in PPS</td>
<td>0.0132*** (3.10)</td>
<td>0.0159*** (3.80)</td>
<td>0.0143** (2.29)</td>
<td>0.0013 (0.0567)</td>
<td>0.0130*** (0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth Rate</td>
<td>0.0728 (0.830)</td>
<td>0.0461* (0.281)</td>
<td>-0.0251 (-1.66)</td>
<td>0.2680 (1.30)</td>
<td>0.0703 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of migrants who have Longstanding Illness Employed Persons in Host Society</td>
<td>0.1108*** (3.19)</td>
<td>0.1150*** (2.89)</td>
<td>0.1037*** (2.78)</td>
<td>-0.0514 (-0.706)</td>
<td>0.1114** (2.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of People at risk of Poverty/Social Exclusion Activity Rates</td>
<td>-0.2834*** (-3.23)</td>
<td>-0.2888*** (-3.28)</td>
<td>-0.1171 (-1.01)</td>
<td>-0.0168 (-0.0777)</td>
<td>-0.2880*** (-3.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Deprivation Rate EURESettlement Program Spending Constant</td>
<td>-0.3078*** (-4.27)</td>
<td>-0.2966*** (-4.73)</td>
<td>-0.4125*** (-5.78)</td>
<td>0.1051 (0.623)</td>
<td>-0.3142*** (-2.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.8825*** (10.4)</td>
<td>0.8906*** (8.67)</td>
<td>0.8724 (6.34)</td>
<td>0.1225 (1.08)</td>
<td>0.8850*** (11.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34.02 (df = 12,248)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T-values are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
From table 8, it can be seen that the independent variables of Unmet Needs of Medical Examination and the Overcrowding Rates are both negative, as expected. However, from the regression analysis, the first variable is statistically significant but has a negative t-value, whereas the latter variable is not statistically significant and also has a negative t-value. The Migrant Unemployment Rate and the Participation Rate in Education and Training are both positive and statistically significant variables, and thus, have a small positive effect on Migrant Poverty Risk (and social exclusion risk), as expected from the hypotheses. However, GDP Per Capita in PPS has a positive effect on Migrant Poverty Risk as well, and is statistically significant, indicating that it too has a slight positive effect on the dependent variable, whereas GDP Growth Rate does not since its t-value is too low for it to be truly significant. The effect of the Migrant Unemployment Rate and the Participation Rate in Education and Training on Migrant Poverty Risk can be seen below in the following figures.

**Figure 11: Scatterplot for Relationships between Model II Dependent Variables**

The Percentage of Migrants having a Longstanding Illness and The Number of Employed Persons both have a positive relationship and have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. This is telling, for the first variable, as the number of migrants who come
into a country with some preexisting illness may not be able to work or provide basic living functions within a workplace or a living community, respectively. The number of employed persons may indicate that the more people are employed in a host country, the less work opportunities there may be for admitted and resettled migrants who are seeking work. Surprisingly, the control variable Percentage of People who are at Risk of Poverty has a negative coefficient, but is not significant since it has too small of a t-value, as does the Migrant Activity Rate. However, Material Deprivation Rate as a control variable has a large positive effect on Migrant Poverty Risk, and is statistically significant. This implication could mean that the more a migrant person is deprived of material necessities, the more they are at risk of falling below the poverty line within a given host state.

Technically in both of the models, my hypotheses were partially supported to some degree. For the first model, it is clear that Unmet Needs for Medical Examination and the Participation Rate in Education had very large, positive effects on the dependent variable of Migrant Income in each host country. This is significant because it shows that, unlike the prediction in my hypothesis, the first variable may have a positive effect on Migrant Income because there could be the incentive for higher amounts of self-care, or that migrant people will work hard to earn a substantial living to take care of sick members in a family or community. Moreover, the Participation Rate in Education and Training has a large positive effect because it is supported within the literature that the more education one has, the more income they will make. This is why it is so essential for host state resettlement programs to focus on education and training standards so as to provide a launchpad for their migrant populations to be self-sufficient after admission and resettlement into the host country.
Regarding the second model, my hypotheses were partially supported as well in that the Unemployment Rate and the Participation Rate in Education and Training both had a small positive effect on Migrant’s Poverty Risk. Thankfully, the unemployment rate was supported from my hypothesis, however it is interesting to see that the education and training participation rate has a small positive effect on poverty risk for migrants, as this could be for a variety of reasons. One such reason may be that it is not necessarily the right kind of education of training, as in, are there language learning incentives or provisions within the resettlement country’s framework? Just because a migrant person becomes trained and educated within the host state does not necessarily mean that their training was tailored to their prior occupational proficiencies, job history, or even fields of study. Also, GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) had a very large positive effect on Migrant Income in the first model, and a small positive effect on Migrant Poverty and Social Exclusion Risk in the second model. When included a model without controls, the main predictors were still mostly insignificant, which may actually suggest a possible case of either mismeasurement or misspecification within the model.

In table 9 below, I present a correlation matrix between the two dependent variables and the four independent variables. They are mostly positive, and some strong correlations between the variables, with a few weak, negative correlation coefficients as well. The rate of unmet needs for medical examination has a large effect when positive in table 11, which demonstrates that the higher the unmet needs for medical examination are in a given host state, the higher the migrant poverty risk. Moreover, the rate of education and training among resettled migrants also has a very large effect when positive in Table 9, which indicates that the more education and training participation and provisions exist in one of the given host states, the higher the migrant net income and the lower the poverty risk would be, as expected.
The Overcrowding rate is negative in both models; however, it is only significant in the first model, and thus has a negative correlation with Migrant Net Income, but a positive correlation coefficient with Migrant Poverty Risk. This is actually a puzzling coefficient, and may include the possible explanation of a more closely-knit network among migrants that would thereby explain the positive correlation coefficient in this case. The Unemployment Rate is negative in the first model and positive in the second, however, it has a similar negative correlation coefficient as the Overcrowding Rate to Migrant Net Income.

Table 9: Correlation Matrix Between Migrant Income, Migrant Poverty Risk & Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrant Net Income</th>
<th>Migrant Poverty Risk</th>
<th>Rate of Unmet Needs for Medical Examination</th>
<th>Overcrowding Rate</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>Rate of Education and Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Net Income</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-0.39616</td>
<td>-0.38241</td>
<td>-0.56000</td>
<td>-0.51455</td>
<td>0.65369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Poverty Risk</td>
<td>-0.39616</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>0.38877</td>
<td>0.29805</td>
<td>0.57412</td>
<td>-0.19665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Unmet Medical Examination</td>
<td>-0.38241</td>
<td>0.38877</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>0.34512</td>
<td>0.36887</td>
<td>-0.38162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcrowding Rate</td>
<td>-0.56000</td>
<td>0.29805</td>
<td>0.34512</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>0.23295</td>
<td>-0.33305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>-0.51455</td>
<td>0.57412</td>
<td>0.36887</td>
<td>0.23295</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-0.42026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Education and Training</td>
<td>0.65369</td>
<td>-0.19665</td>
<td>-0.38162</td>
<td>-0.33305</td>
<td>-0.42026</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One explanation for the lack of explanatory power in the models, could be because of the fact that European states and Turkey are not allocating enough spending towards their migrant educational and training programs. Migrants who may be left in a marginalizing economic situation post resettlement may be in the conditions they are in because of host countries’ lack of financial allocation toward migrant/refugee education in the resettlement process, as well as job
provisions on a general scale. The differences that are presented between the full data models as well as the semi-reduced model have some problematic implications. The semi-reduced model has a very high $R^2$ in the first model and a much lower $R^2$ in the second model, and many of the control variables that were utilized in each model came out to be statistically insignificant.

Most studies on migrant resettlement have been qualitative original research, mainly based off of surveys on the success of migrant and refugee resettlement, most of which have been conducted in the United States. There have been very few quantitative studies that have looked into the economic success, or on the other hand economic marginalization, within the resettlement framework of migrant host countries. The European states and Turkey serve as a prime area of focus for quantitative studies due to the availability of data via Eurostat and the World Bank, as well as the UNHCR’s data on refugees and their areas of resettlement. It becomes apparent however, that host countries should focus their efforts more towards education and training for occupations, proper and available medical treatment and provisions within the migrant resettlement framework, as well as employment provisions, as these all have major effects on migrant income within a host country, and thus, economic sustainability for the resettled migrant persons. These variables should also be an area of concern for the joint European Union initiative on migrant resettlement within the current “Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund”, as this ongoing initiative has the potential to shape the economic situation of migrant peoples across EU member states in a general manner. Moreover, the host states should focus their attention towards those factors that have the greatest effect on migrant poverty risk, such as unemployment and the rate of education and training for this demographic.
Chapter 7

Qualitative Case Study on U.S. & Canadian Resettlement Programs

In comparing the United States and Canada to European host states in terms of their asylum resettlement abilities based on both policy and economic conditions and how these relate to economic integration within each host country, some data should first be consulted in order to lay the appropriate framework. First, below is the database’s Migrant Control Policy index for the year 2010, demonstrating that the U.S. and Canada have a more restrictive migration policy as compared to Europe. This information is relevant for the index that I create at the end of the project in the appendix, as this foreground presents relevant data on the subject. The reason as to why 2010 was chosen was to show the level of restrictiveness before the major onset of the refugee crisis, as well as after the financial crisis of 2007-2008.

Figure 12: Migration Control Policy Index, 2010 (0 – Least Restrictive; 1 – Most Restrictive)
The next area of focus would be the asylum policy restrictiveness, which in this case was chosen for the year 2010, since this year was before the time of the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis and is an even year from my own sample size. The figure below, retrieved from the Migration Data Portal (2019), demonstrates that at that year, the refugee and asylum policies in the U.S. and Canada were only slightly greater than those of Europe’s, specifically in the European Union and the Eurozone.

**Figure 13: Asylum/Refugee Policy Index, 2010 (0 – Least Restrictive; 1 – Most Restrictive)**

The next and most relevant index that was retrieved from the Migration Data Portal (2019) is the labor migration policy Index, as this data gives the context for how well integrated
a migrant person can become within a host state. From the figure below, it can be seen that Turkey had one of the most restrictive policies in the year 2010, and that Canada had a slightly more restrictive labor migration policy.

**Figure 14: Labor Migration Policy Index, 2010 (0 – Least Restrictive; 1 – Most Restrictive)**


After examining these specific indices, the next section will present qualitative information on how the U.S. and Canada have dealt with their migration influxes, what the resettlement programs in each country have entailed, and how those provisions have related to migrant economic marginalization. Restrictiveness in a host country, whether it regards asylum and refugee acceptances, migration acceptances, or migrant integration could indicate an internal economic stability factor that is the basis for a host country’s willingness to accept a migrant person, and then to provide for that person under existing migration or resettlement framework.
The Process and Issues of Resettlement Programs in the U.S.

The process of resettling refugees in the United States for example is a local process, however the federal government provides necessary financial backing for refugees only for their first 120 days of being in the U.S. (Nawyn 2006). Societally speaking, the U.S. can be viewed as an augmentative society with many difficulties occurring for admitted and resettled refugees and immigrant populations. The augmentative social structures in the U.S. are likely to exact the price of assimilation in exchange for the privilege of admitting the migrant, and the degree of conformism which they would demand from refugees would depend on their social and cultural receptivity; monistic societies are less likely to be welcoming to migrants who adhere to their differing cultures than cosmopolitan societies with broader experiences with cultures (Kunz 1981). By looking at all of the major aspects of each country’s programs, the refugee resettlement programs in the U.S., amidst its provisions, may marginalize refugee populations by creating a system of economic marginalization and even economic dependence.

When replacement or resettlement first occurs in the U.S., the host community may not be completely receptive of the newcomer refugees. Personal refugee problems in the resettlement program involve a wide range of acculturation and culture-shock phenomena, as well as a variety of physical and psychological disorders (Zucker 1983). Regarding cultural deterritorialization, it is especially associated with migrant and diaspora communities, many of whom will employ a range of strategies to preserve and adapt their cultures to new conditions, including utilizing developments in transportation and telecommunications technology (Hopper 2007). For those refugees who struggle learning the host language, many find themselves excluded and isolated from basic human contact, and the ensuing loneliness may result in symptoms of depression or even responses of paranoia (Kunz 1981). Overall, it can be argued that the failure to overcome
the gap created by unaccustomed principles and cultural practices could lead migrant persons to inhibition and withdrawal from human contact (Kunz 1981).

Another factor that exacerbates marginalization is the idea of repatriation when dissatisfied with their newfound lives in host countries. Once refugee determination authorities in the United States began to rely on objective factors, as opposed to both subjective and objective factors in determining the status of a refugee or asylum seeker, the standard of voluntary repatriation had become greatly undermined in the U.S. (Chimni 2004). Subjective factors have even led to the cultural marginalization in the integration processes within the United States. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration found that a durable solution to the displacement of refugees and asylum seekers lies within the primary solution of repatriation, or going home when they are no longer at risk of persecution or other related forms of oppression (U.S. Department of State, “About RPM”). However, it has been contended that refugees are by definition ‘unrepatriable’ as long as a person satisfies the UNHCR’s classification of a refugee in the contemporary standards, the person technically remains ‘unrepatriable’ and thus actually benefits from the prevention of forced return to the country of origin (Hathaway 1996 & Chimni 2004).

Socially, refugees and asylum seekers oftentimes become disenfranchised from their home societies, then further alienated in their newfound locales of asylum, and then increasingly marginalized if desirability for return to their home countries manifests, especially because there are no further benefits from the ‘prohibition of forced return’ that are made available for assimilated refugees. However, only after one year of arrival into the U.S., refugees are required to apply for legal permanent residence, and five years after that, they are eligible to become naturalized citizens (Capps & Fix 2015). Thus, a large proportion of refugees becoming
naturalized citizens occurred during the specific 2009-2013 time period, which included around 59% versus the 44% for all other migrant persons in the country (Capps & Fix 2015).

Marginalization in the refugee assimilation process often stems from the systematic-managerial issues in the host country’s government. These issues especially, for example, originate from the foreign service officers in the U.S. State Department who see their duties that deal with refugees as being burdensome, and thus shows that this animosity has an effect on refugee rights standards and privileges. Human rights standards, especially those regarding refugees, are oftentimes constructed by government representatives such as diplomats and civil servants (Douzinas 2007). It has also been argued that within the State Department, diplomats and consular officials generally tend to feel that refugee work hampers overall career advancement, thus, the turnover in State Department officers assigned to refugees has resulted in very poor institutional memory (Zucker 1983). This poor institutional memory shows that refugee issues are low on the hierarchy of importance in foreign affairs overall, thus they have the highest propensity to marginalize refugees and asylum seekers. With respect to the federal resettlement programs of host countries, the core issues of systematic-managerial problems are that federal management of the resettlement program is fragmented and refugee management has a very low political priority (Zucker 1983). The low prioritization of asylum issues in government demonstrates a managerial deficiency in dealing with the issues of refugee resettlement from the genesis, and as such, may serve as a progenitor to social and economic marginalization.

Once in a host country, social and political participation in democratic principles can also be seen as an important way to assimilate newly received refugee populations, or migrant populations in general. Legislative decisions are made to reflect national security via majority
decision, and this decision-making often affects the admissibility of refugee populations into the U.S. and Canada. With regard to liberty or democracy of the minority, it signifies the rights of all individuals to pursue their preferences in areas where there is no justification for the majority to impose its preferences on others (Wallerstein 2004). Moreover, participation of certain subpopulations of minority groups such as refugees within the general electorate is especially valuable in post-conflict situations (Gallagher & Schowengerdt 1998). As a means of redressing discrimination and targeted violence and of promoting reconciliation, transitional elections benefit from the involvement of those groups that have been most victimized by conflict (Gallagher & Schowengerdt 1998). Social participation arguably yields sentiments of satisfaction and equality of participation from the citizenry; however, this may not be the case for refugee populations in a host country. If selectees are to enjoy fullest participation of the citizenry, refugees should have the same opportunity to exercise their franchise as residents, however, conditions and limitations are placed on their participation by virtue of their absence from their country of nationality (Gallagher & Schowengerdt 1998).

Admitted refugees face further political marginalization, as there is a major period of delay between their arrival and integration as full members of American society. However, after 12 months of placement in the U.S., refugees are required to apply for amendment of status to that of permanent resident alien, and after five years of being in the U.S., refugees may then apply for full citizenship, and employment authorization documents are actually given within a few weeks of arrival to the U.S. (U.S. Department of State, “FAQ on Refugee Resettlement Benefits”). Five years, however, may be a significant amount of time for full integration as citizens after the adjustment of status of permanent resident occurs. Moreover, refugees may have a preference as to which city and/or state they are to be resettled in, and although refugees
can indicate a preference, unless the applicant is joining close family members, it may not always be possible to honor the applicant’s resettlement location preference within the U.S. (U.S. Department of State, “FAQ on Refugee Resettlement Benefits”). Thus, chain migration may be a prime indicator for refugee success within the United States specifically, and is an area in which further research is could be conducted. Refugees may prefer relocation that extends beyond familial and social ties, such as that of prior knowledge of close friends or acquaintances who may assist them in the assimilation process as well as preference or knowledge of areas of a large ethnic diaspora that are the same as or similar to that of the refugees. The resettlement process does not make the profound social considerations for refugees as it does for citizens, such as basic political participation, and includes delayed citizenship and oftentimes non-preferential relocation, thereby further marginalizing refugees.

The employment side of refugee and migrant assimilation programs may infantilize new refugees as they are oftentimes forced to find their own occupations or start at the lowest rung in career paths sans regard to their prior skill or educational level. With respect to new employment opportunities within the U.S., the Reception and Placement Program dictates that refugees receive employment authorization upon arrival and are advised to find employment opportunities as soon as possible. Based on many years of experience, the U.S. refugee resettlement program has found that migrant persons learn English and begin to function much faster if they start work soon or immediately after arrival to the United States (U.S. Department of State, “The Reception and Placement Program”). Certain components laid out in the U.S. refugee assistance programs by the ORR include: The Individual Development Account program offers refugees a matched savings account that promotes for asset purchases fostering long term self-sufficiency and integration; the Microenterprise Development Program assists refugees lacking financial
resources to start a small businesses; the Refugee Agricultural Partnership Program gives opportunities for refugee families in agriculture and food sector businesses through partnerships (Halpern 2008). Refugee families that are eligible for their state’s Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program are not eligible to be enrolled in a State-administered program, however they could be enrolled in the Matching Grant or selected Wilson-Fish programs but can only be enrolled in one of ORR’s cash assistance programs in the U.S. (Halpern 2008). Overall, the Office of Refugee Resettlement spends approximately $600 million per year on refugees alone, with $350 million allocated toward the State Department’s Reception and Placement (R&P) Program (Capps & Fix 2015). These budgets unfortunately, however, have not increased to account for inflation or for increased resettlement of migrant persons, and federal funding under the R&P program covered merely 39% of the initial resettlement costs with the rest being covered by private resettlement agencies (Capps & Fix 2015).

The purpose of the Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program (MG) is to assist enrollees in achieving economic self-sufficiency via the provision of comprehensive case management and special services to lead toward employment of the refugee within 120-180 days after the date of eligibility in the program (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2014). In order to be eligible for the program which is a resettlement program initiated in each state where it operates, a migrant person must fall within the eligible populations meeting the minimum employability requirements, and must be enrolled within 31 days of becoming eligible to ensure adequate services are given and economic self-sustainability is achieved and maintained within the time period of eligibility (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2014). The program itself provides for certain employment services such as job development, job readiness and placement assistance, post placement assistance, job upgrades/professional recertification, self-employment assistance,
on-the-job training, as well as other forms of core maintenance such as food, housing, and transportation allowances, and cash allowance (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2014). One of the better provisions within the program is the English language training as well as health and medical services. For example, when English language training is designated as essential for the Self-Sufficiency Plan for employment, classes are offered at no cost and at times that will not hinder employment all in order to ensure effective service delivery for the refugee (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2014). After the U.S. Congress confirmed the program be designed to work with the Refugee and Cuban & Haitian Entrant Reception and Placement Program (R&P) in the 1986 Refugee Assistance Extension Act. About half of the funding for the program is funded via nine, mostly Christian-based voluntary agencies through cooperative agreements with the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and these agencies have provided the Matching Grant Program Services at 234 locations in 42 states. Moreover, the program has had some success however, as in FY 2012, 35,166 refugees received services and 71% of those completing the program achieved self-sufficiency, and in FY 2013 over 28,840 individuals were assisted via the program (ORR, “About the Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program”).

A problem that arises out of this portion of the reception program is that there are no predetermined job opportunities that are lined up for refugees. With regard to the amount of money that is provided for these new workers, the Reception and Placement Program of the U.S. Department of State provides a one-time grant of $425 per person to the resettlement agency, and this stipend is to be used to provide for basic needs during the first month of arrival (U.S. Department of State, “FAQ on Refugee Resettlement Benefits”). This amount of money is quite low for the necessities that refugees have, especially for those who are relocated into the urban
areas. However, benefit usage has declined with the length of residence. For example, during the 2009-2001 time period, less than one quarter of refugee households with at least a decade of living in the U.S. received food stamps, as compared to the 11% for people born in the U.S. and only 3% of refugee households received cash welfare benefits as compared to the 2% for U.S.-born (Capps & Fix 2015).

The only form of assistance that exists regarding the employment of the refugees is the government-issued authorization to work within the United States. However, the U.S. refugee resettlement system emphasizes self-sufficiency through employment, and refugee men are employed at a higher rate than U.S.-born persons (Capps & Fix 2015). The median household income for recent refugees, or those who arrived within the past five years, was around 42% of the median for the native-born population from 2009-2011, whereas those who arrived 10-20 years prior had a median income of 87% of that of the U.S. born population (Capps & Fix 2015). There are cases when this is simply not the case. As an example of over 60% of refugees in the U.S. from Bhutan, Burma, Iraq, Liberia, and Somalia during the years 2009-2011 had incomes that were below twice the federal poverty level (Capps & Fix 2015). This factor indicates a rising income and declining public benefit dependency among migrants and refugees, illustrates the overall self-sustainment and positive economic situation of this demographic over time (Capps & Fix 2015).

Education has also been an important factor in resettlement and avoiding economic marginalization. First, 75% of refugee adults in the 2009-2011 period actually had at least a high school diploma, which is above the 68% rate of other migrants but still below the 89% rate of adults born in the U.S.; and 28% of refugee adults had more than a four-year college degree which is about the same as the 29% of adults born in the U.S. and 27% of migrants with such
degrees (Capps & Fix 2015). These numbers should increase with the expenditure of state-level spending on education and programs that enhance educational quality and attainment.

Demographically speaking, it has been found that for some longer-term groups such as Iranians, Russians, and Vietnamese migrants have educational attainment levels as well as income levels that are at the same level or even exceed the U.S. average level (Capps & Fix 2015).

After examining the data from the analytical section, one of the most important aspects that pertain to self-sufficiency and overall income post-resettlement would be the proper attainment of education and training within a host country. Migrant persons, whether they are refugees, asylum seekers, have also gone through similar programs, and inherent benefits and issues within the programs, as well as within Canada.

The Process and Issues of Resettlement Programs in Canada

In resettling migrants after the Syrian refugee crisis, Canada’s Liberal Party’s majority government began to shift Canada’s stance on refugee and asylum seekers to be much more welcoming in general. As such, Canada made a commitment to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees by the end of the year 2015 and this specific goal was eventually reached by February of 2016 (Brewer 2016). Data on the refugee labor-market integration tends to be quite limited and often outdated, with most of the focus being on issues such as language learning and service needs because of mental health issues, trauma, and societal integration (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017).

Canada’s Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) has the inclusion of various allowances for refugee and migrant persons entering the country. Income support allowances can be basic and provided to all of the RAP recipients, however they can also range on a conditional
or circumstantial basis, as some allowances are a one-time provision whereas others are monthly (Government of Canada, “Resettlement Assistance Program”). The Canadian government offers the following allowances: food and shelter, staple, basic household needs, furniture and linens, utility installation, clothing, transportation, dietary, maternity-related, newborn, school start-up, special allowances, funeral or burial expenses, and child benefits and tax credits. Some of the most prominent allowances are the housing supplement for $100 per month for more than one person, the staple allowance which ranges from $175 to $1000 based on the family size, and the allowance rates for one-time basic needs, which range from $1330 to $3515. The amount of funding that is allocated for each allowance can be found on the Canadian Government’s official site, as these number have changed over time due to a variety of factors since the refugee crisis.

It may be so, however, that these allowances are not necessarily sufficient for migrant persons to start a new life in Canada. With regard to potential marginalization via Canada’s resettlement programs, Canada’s resettlement policies and certain aspects of its programs have been found to not be able to provide for many of the basic needs of refugees and migrants admitted into the country (Beiser 2006). For refugees who came to Canada between 1979 and 1981, research concerning the impact of pre-migration trauma; the mental health impact of social resources such as the like-ethnic community, refugee sponsorship programs, and language training; and individual coping strategies such as suppressing the past, can contribute to improving policy (Beiser 1987). Refugees who chose the Nostalgia and/or non-Atomistic patterns of time perspective in 1981 and again in 1983 evidenced elevated risk for depression (Beiser 1987; Beiser & Hyman 1997). It has been found that at the end of their first decade in Canada, refugees exhibited a greater tendency to reconnect the past with present and future than they had when they first arrived, and that temporal reintegration increases the risk for Depressive
Disorder or even precedes Depressive Disorder (Beiser 1987). The like-ethnic community, moreover, can sometimes work against societal exploration, so programs must provide refugees language and job training tools to assist them (Beiser 1987).

Moreover, the factors that have most facilitated social and economic adjustment for the migrants, personal resources were best at moderating migration stress, whereas for established refugees, social support restrained the correlation between life events and life satisfaction (Young 2001). The challenges on the overall mental and physical health of refugees leads to larger problems of marginalization, as refugees in Canada currently experience immense difficulty in becoming economically integrated. Poverty among new Canadian migrants has reached unprecedented levels and responsibilities for immigrant settlement, health and social services are underfunded and uneasily divided between national, provincial, and local jurisdictions within Canada. Moreover, refugees in Alberta that have familial and extra-familial ties were found to be associated with significantly higher employment (Lamba & Krahn 2003).

In network functions by analyzing personal health, financial, and labor market support provided to refugees by members of their familial and extra-familial networks, and they find that the patterns of regional differences show a possibility that variations in size and content of refugees’ social networks are actually primarily shaped by demographic factors. With regard to job and labor issues especially in finding employment opportunities, refugees in Canada have been found to be more likely to seek help from service providers and there was only a small minority of refugees from the sample population who reported having no one to turn to or they solved the problems themselves (Lamba & Krahn 2003). It has been found that most refugees and migrant persons do not tend to rely on some kind of social network during health issues, and overall, they find that refugees tend to handle money and personal issues by seeking assistance from familial
networks, whereas health and job difficulties are typically sought for assistance from members of extra-familial networks in the host community (Lamba & Krahn 2003). Canadian refugee service providers must realize the range of ties that refugees draw on during resettlement, and thus, admission policies should ensure that refugee families remain together as well as expediting the family reunification process in Canada.

Similarly, in examining the economic outcomes of Southeastern Refugees in Canada through personal interviews, there is a correlation with perceived racial discrimination and depression and the roles of coping and ethnic identity in conditioning the discrimination-depression correlation (Noh, Beiser, Kaspar, Hou, & Rummens 1999). Some arguments that are key to this is that educational programs are more effective than social deterrence as a method of reducing racism for refugees. Moreover, by using depression as a continuous dependent variable and discrimination as a dichotomous independent variable, that refugees in the sample who reported that they had experienced racial discrimination had higher depression levels than refugees who reported no such experiences (Noh, Beiser, Kaspar, Hou, & Rummens 1999).

For many refugees entering into Canada, being put on a waiting list is quite common and that many are forced to wait at least eighteen months or even years for that matter (Coates & Hayward 2005). Most of Canada’s refugees, moreover, are not even recognized as such until they have been living in the country for months or even for years after they have filed a claim for refugee status (Wayland 2007). The Canadian immigration and refugee policies, however, came under heavy scrutiny from U.S. officials in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, mainly for being soft on terrorism and convicts (Coates & Hayward 2005). For many of those refugees and asylum seekers who had not yet been granted permanent residence in Canada, researchers had utilized interviews in the Greater Toronto Area as well as a refugee survey sent out to
Convention refugees from each region of Canada. The most important findings have indicated that there is clear evidence of significant costs both to Canada and to refugees who are left in a state of “legal limbo,” and that during this state of limbo, many refugees face intense barriers to integrate into Canadian society (Coates & Hayward 2005). Canada’s refugee system has been regarded as highly inefficient and expensive, impeding refugee integration, and costing the Canadian government over $129 million on government transfers to Convention refugees in limbo (Coates & Hayward 2005). A key economic component in that automatic landing of refugees would drastically decrease the government transfers, saving the Canadian government over $101 million, and most importantly, they find that refugees lose over $334 million in forgone income due to barriers in the labour market (Coates & Hayward 2005). There may be a lack of research into Canada’s asylum seeker resettlement system, and that amidst the existing and extensive psychological studies already conducted on the effects of the Canadian assimilation system on refugees, an economic focus on research is needed to support arguments and to refute the anti-refugee assertions in the media.

However, Canada has now expanded many of its resettlement efforts, in order to ensure proper labor market integration and self-sustaining activity for refugees and migrant persons (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). The settlement services are funded by the Canadian federal government and provincial governments; however, Quebec took responsibility for its own resettlement services in 1991 and British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta, and Ontario have all negotiated their own agreements with the federal government (Wayland 2007). In Montreal for example, ROMEL (Le Regroupement des organismes du Montréal ethnique pour le logement) has an explicit mandate to deal with housing issues for the ethnic communities, whereas Toronto has the Immigrant and Refugee Housing Task Group (IRHTG), which helps to develop methods
to deal with housing issues for refugees and migrant persons (Wayland 2007). Further regarding housing in the resettlement initiatives, the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) which is funded by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, assists newcomers by providing support services for housing, referral services, and employment-related services. One of the issues with the ISAP program is that it does not have a specific mandate to address housing-related needs and the services exclude refugee claimants and Canadian citizens, as ISAP has eligibility requirements that target permanent residents and protected persons only (Wayland 2007). Thus, the program has its own flaws in the migrant resettlement and assimilation process. Moreover, Quebec has its own standards, as the government funds nonprofit organizations to provide services toward resettlement for new arrivals, such as housing services and information sessions, housing search support, and related front-line services, which are offered to permanent residents, those authorized to apply for permanent residency, and those whose refugee claims have been established (Wayland 2007). However, few ISAs are explicitly mandated to deliver housing-related services to migrant populations, with one exception being the New York Housing Help Centre, which has an ISA and area of operations in Toronto and has been able to assist around 10,000 people with housing each year (Wayland 2007).

Refugees and migrants have had mixed success, and their employment levels have caught up to native Canadians, however full integration still can take upwards of a decade, and refugees tend to have lower incomes thus making them more likely to rely on social assistance (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017). Two of the largest factors in proper refugee and migrant resettlement have been the introduction of language, as refugees with English or French proficiencies have been found to become more likely to be employed, and higher education, as this generally improves job acquisition and increases in migrant personal or household income (Wilkinson & Garcea 2017).
Canada’s resettlement effort should focus on long term initiatives and include key stakeholders which include the education system (Brewer 2016). Educational policy development has not actually kept pace with Canada’s rapid resettlement efforts, and school systems lack appropriate guidance in assisting migrant students (Brewer 2016). Another issue that has come from Canada’s resettlement context is that the federal government determines whether or not refugees gain admittance into the country, and allocated government-sponsored refugees to specific regions whereas education policy is managed at the provincial level as opposed to the federal level (Brewer 2016). With the increases in refugees and migrants into Canada, there should be new policies that could include specific distinctions for refugee’s needs as students, support language learning and recognize any language or academic barriers, recognize identity issues, and consider students at the local levels (Brewer 2016). Education overall, has been one of the best indicators for the success of integration for refugees and migrant persons into Canada, as well as other host countries.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

The migrant assistance and resettlement programs have offered many forms of assistance and provisions for those recently disenfranchised refugees and asylum seekers. Many of the refugees are left in a helpless situation as soon as the relief programs are discontinued on their behalf. This sustained and growing sentiment of economic marginalization has also led to sentiments of animosity among these vulnerable populations. Although the programs have provided the refugees with relief and sustainability efforts to assimilate them within the United States and Canada, these efforts may not always be sufficient for migrants to start a new life, especially within the European countries and Turkey that were examined in this study.

After examining the data and the qualitative analyses from recent literature on the subject of migrant economic marginalization in host countries, educational provision does in fact seem to be one of the leading factors in migrant economic success, or marginalization, in a new host country. Restrictiveness in a host country, whether it regards asylum and refugee acceptances, migration acceptances, or migrant integration could indicate an internal economic stability factor that is the basis for a host country’s willingness to accept migrants, and then to provide for these people under existing migration and resettlement frameworks. It may be that Europe, after the Syrian Refugee Crisis, felt obligated to resettle refugees and asylum seekers from the Middle East simply on the basis of moral and political grounds. However, once the initial onset of refugees subsided and the numbers came to be more or less consistent after the year 2011, have the European host states, Canada, and the U.S. actually been able to properly resettle and assimilate this demographic? It seems that after examining the data and literature, that not only do host states who admit large proportions of migrant persons not only have greater economic
marginalization, but that they might not be focusing on the most economically sustaining aspects of their migrant resettlement processes. These aspects most likely include access to education, or even more fundamentally, proper educational, language, and cultural training, as many sources have indicated that this has some of the greatest effects on migrant income within a host country.

After reviewing the data and the literature even further, the rate of education and the rate of unemployment have some of the greatest effects on migrants’ income in a host country. It is quite possible that countries will engage in less refugee acceptances if they are aware of the job prospects within the state that may be available for them. It is also possible that many European countries and the EU as a whole have not necessarily thought this factor through, as some of the greatest economic marginalization seems to be coming from countries where the most refugees and migrant persons are still housed within overcrowded mandated housing areas such as these in Germany, and especially within refugee camps along border areas, such as those of Turkey and Greece. In Appendix B at the end of this paper, it can be seen that some countries exhibit more economic marginalization than other countries, and intuitively speaking, it is quite possible that these countries have higher levels of migrants than they do employment opportunities for these people. This is especially the case in Turkey, where many refugees are still located in massive refugee camps, where almost no employment opportunities exist.

In the case of the United States and Canada, as flawed and disjointed as their resettlement policies are especially with regard to monetary stipends and the reviewing of chain migration, these countries have taken in less migrants and thus have exhibited lesser economic marginalization among their migrant communities for the 2008-2016 time period (see Appendix B), which is most likely due to migrants’ ability to find legitimate and sustainable employment opportunities after the resettlement provisions are discontinued. One possibility exists that could
be the focus of further research is the geographic size of the country. For example, the U.S. and Canada both have a massive geographic size as compared to the generally smaller European countries, and thus, the greater the size of the country and the more agricultural production there is, it is possible that there is less economic marginalization due to the possibility of rural employment, as is the case for many migrant workers in the United States. Another possibility that exists is that there could be more economic marginalization for countries that have taken in more refugees and migrant persons, although the data that I presented does not necessarily show this correlation. Germany for example, took in a massive number of migrant persons during and after the Syrian refugee crisis, and this may have had an effect on Germany’s migrant situation (see Appendix B for state-specific coding on migrant economic marginalization). On a broader scale, this could be a theoretical possibility and an area for further research.

Overall, there are many factors that have been influential in determining how successful a migrant person would be within a host state post-admittance and resettlement. Although the rate of education and the rate of unemployment have had the largest effects on migrant net income and migrant poverty and social exclusion risk, there are and could be, many further determining factors that have an influence on migrant economic marginalization. There is also the country-specific level of resettlement programs that should be examined more closely, as each country in Europe, for example, has its own way of determining how much state funding is allocated towards refugee and asylum seeker resettlement, among the larger joint-member state framework that has existed in the European Union.
Appendix A

Modelling the Effects of U.S. Education Spending on Migrant Economic Status

In order to further examine the case of the U.S. and Canada quantitatively, a further regression analysis was conducted. For this standard linear model, the dependent variable that was utilized was migrant household yearly income for the year 2016, and the independent variables consist of the amount of education spending per state.

The data for educational spending was retrieved from the database site known as Governing (2019), a database that includes data on U.S. state spending on certain state-run programs, such as education. The data for the number of migrant persons applying for lawful residence status into the U.S. was obtained from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (2019) database, and the data for the amount of state spending on the relevant TANF program and the amount of state spending on basic assistance for migrant persons was obtained from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2019).

I run two separate standard linear regression models, with the second having an extra control variable which is the amount of state spending on the TANF program for refugee and migrant families resettled into the U.S. There was not sufficient data for the other programs such as the Wilson-Fish and the Office of Refugee Resettlement grants, as these are federal programs and state funding data was not retrievable for the year 2016. Moreover, the same data for the variables utilized for Canada was not retrievable for the year 2016, thus the U.S. is the focus for this model. Due to the lack of data for other years from the various databases consulted, the year 2016 had the most data with 2017 following, thus for purposes of consistency, 2016 was the year of focus for the regression model.
Table 10: Modeling Migrant Income in the U.S. in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I (Standard Linear Regression)</th>
<th>Model II (Standard Linear Regression)</th>
<th>Model III (Pooled OLS)</th>
<th>Model IV (Pooled OLS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born Median Household Income</td>
<td>0.7520*** (11.5)</td>
<td>0.7448*** (10.4)</td>
<td>0.751238*** (1.728e+15)</td>
<td>0.744322*** (5.422e+15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total State Spending Per Pupil</td>
<td>-2.7278 (-0.724)</td>
<td>-3.0790 (-0.764)</td>
<td>-2.39455*** (-5.567e+13)</td>
<td>-2.73526*** (-3.612e+13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total State Instructional Spending Per Pupil</td>
<td>2.7789* (0.721)</td>
<td>3.1585* (0.762)</td>
<td>2.43605*** (5.343e+13)</td>
<td>2.80418*** (3.539e+13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total State Support Services Per Pupil Persons Obtaining Permanent Resident Status by State</td>
<td>3.4841** (0.900)</td>
<td>3.8924** (0.927)</td>
<td>3.15036*** (8.268e+13)</td>
<td>3.54589*** (4.514e+13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income 2016</td>
<td>-2561.40 (-0.817)</td>
<td>-2048.55 (-0.553)</td>
<td>-2709.03*** (-3.04e+14)</td>
<td>-2215.18*** (-1.451e+14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income 2016</td>
<td>0.0469 (0.634)</td>
<td>0.0645 (0.647)</td>
<td>0.0447*** (6.690e+13)</td>
<td>0.0616*** (4.082e+14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANF Benefits per State 2016</td>
<td>-1.3111* (-0.268)</td>
<td>-1.3111* (-0.268)</td>
<td>-1.2584*** (-3.291e+13)</td>
<td>-1.2584*** (-3.291e+13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2180.05 (0.631)</td>
<td>1766.65 (0.463)</td>
<td>2307.24*** (7.685e+13)</td>
<td>1909.06*** (9.156e+13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.915087</td>
<td>0.915232</td>
<td>0.913173</td>
<td>0.913279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.901264</td>
<td>0.899085</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Parameters</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>F (7,43) = 66.2</td>
<td>F (8,42) = 56.68</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T-Values are reported in parentheses: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

After running the regression model, the results are telling, as state expenditure on education has an overall effect on migrant income. As can be seen from table 10, total state instructional spending per pupil has a positive effect on migrant income in the U.S. for the year 2016, and total state support services also has a positive effect and is statistically significant for the model. This means that the more a U.S. state spends on instructional services and support services for each student, the greater the outcome of economic success is for migrant persons. Very few of the variables are statistically significant in the model, however those that are
somewhat statistically significant have relatively small effect on migrant income in the U.S., which was expected for the model. However, when the regression model was run as a panel data pooled ordinary least squares model, one without and one with the inclusion of the TANF Program’s data, the coefficients all become statistically significant, but with low t-values. The $R^2$ decreases slightly after running the model as a pooled OLS, however this decrease is essentially insignificant. Overall, the factors that most influence an increase in migrant income within the United States based off of educational standards at the state-level include total state instructional spending per pupil and the total state support services per pupil, as these seem to have the largest effect on the dependent variable and are statistically significant in some capacity in most of the models. The linear regression models are more useful and reliable that the pooled ordinary least squares models overall; however, they lack an explanation as to how prior training and education before entering the host country and thus U.S. states for job placement. These are the areas of education that states should focus their attention on, if they have a large migrant population that is disenfranchised economically.
Appendix B

Migrant Economic Restrictiveness Index

In modelling the economic integration for migrants, whether they are refugees, asylum seekers, labor migrants, or another type of migrant person, I create an index for the 2008 to 2016 designated time frame. Not only does this time frame correspond to the data analysis section, but it is also the time frame for which data is readily available. For the purposes of this project, Europe, Canada, and the United States are of principal concern, so as to compare their levels of migrant income as based on their resettlement programs.

The index is based primarily on the same methodology employed by Thielemann et al. (2010), where they create multiple indices measuring the amount of ‘burden sharing’ that EU member states encounter along their accepting and resettling of migrant persons. Their indices and their methodology both stem from EU member state migration policy as well as the broader EU migrant resettlement context. However, for the purposes of the indices that I have constructed, the data is based off of general trends in migrant economic situations, and is a direct reflection of the migrant resettlement programs. The 10-indicator index is based on two dummy variables as well as one dependent variable from the original datasets. When accumulated, the index ranges from 0 – the least economically restricting marginalizing, up to 10 – the most economically restricting or marginalizing.

In order to properly develop the index as an economic indicator for success or marginalization for migrants in host countries across time (2008-2016), I utilize the following methodology to estimate the value for each country for each year:
Regarding this methodology, the GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) was multiplied with the GDP growth rate of each country, and then aggregated with the admitted migrant population within each state. Furthermore, this value was then divided by the migrant net income for each host state, including the United States and Canada, and then coded respectively.

In order to measure the value of economic performance for migrants in host states, the values for each state and each year are coded on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 falling in the range of values of 100+, which in some cases, far exceeds 100, such as is the case of Malta or the Czech Republic which are extreme outliers in the data. This could be due to geographic position, i.e. Malta has served as a major transit point and zone of resettlement because of its geographic position, whereas the Czech Republic shares a large border with Germany, a country where many asylum seekers and migrants have been resettled in overcrowded government-mandated communities. Thus, many migrants may also [illegally] migrate from Germany into the Czech Republic.
Figure 15 below depicts the linear forecast for economic marginalization among host states after the year 2016. Although this only depicts the data for the index for one year, it also shows that host countries such as Turkey, the Czech Republic, and surprisingly even Germany and the United Kingdom all display high levels of economic marginalization among their migrant populations.

**Figure 15: Migrant Economic Marginalization in 2016 & Linear Forecast**

However, Turkey and the Czech Republic were countries that were major sources of asylum seekers in the 1980s (Hatton & Williamson, 2004). Thus, this compounding effect of
migrant and refugee intake during that time period may in fact be a source of this economic factor. This would be expected generally, especially in certain countries on a case-by-case level, such as Turkey, where many of the asylum seekers and refugee populations are still being held in resettlement camps along the border with Syria. Germany, however, took in a massive number of migrants since the Syrian refugee crisis, and thus the question remains if Germany’s resettlement policies have been ineffective in providing for basic needs, and also launching migrants into the workforce and overall labor market.

The following figures demonstrate the economic restrictiveness index in each European host country for which data is available, the United States, and Canada. The usage of a variable index may present some problems methodologically, however, the basis for the presentation of the country heatmaps below is simply based on existing data and literature. Moreover, because the coding rules are based off of this data, I had to ignore any discrepancies in individual member state’s resettlement programs and ensuing policy decisions, and in essence code only based on the migrant economic data. It is possible moreover, that the reason as to why the host states have similar code is because of the financial crisis that effected nearly all countries in the year 2007. The financial crisis may be a factor in migrant marginalization as states have not been able to recover in full or are still feeling the effects of the crisis, and thus, this has transcended to migrants’ economic status as well.
Figure 16: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2008
Figure 17: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2009
Figure 18: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2010
Figure 19: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2011
Figure 20: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2012
Figure 21: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2013
Figure 22: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2014
Figure 23: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2015
Figure 24: Migrant Economic Restrictiveness in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, 2016
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ACADEMIC VITA

Zachary M. Adams

THESIS
Title: Economic Marginalization on Migrants from Host Country Resettlement Programs: An International Comparative Policy Analysis
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Sophia A. McClennen
Honors Advisor: Dr. Eleanor M. Brown

EDUCATION

Master of International Affairs
Fall 2017 – Spring 2019
The Pennsylvania State University: School of International Affairs (SIA), University Park, PA
- Integrated Undergraduate–Graduate (IUG) Program – will graduate with both a Master’s Degree in International Affairs and a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science in May 2019
- Coursework: Diplomatic Theory, International Economics, Global Cultures, Multi-Sector Quantitative Analysis, Active Institutional Legal Framework, Colloquium, Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy, U.S. National Security
- Concentration: International Security Studies

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science
Fall 2014 – Spring 2019
The Pennsylvania State University: College of Liberal Arts, University Park, PA
- Coursework: Political Science, International Relations, War and Democracy, Security & Risk Analysis, Spanish, Underdeveloped Systems, Civil Liberty and Due Process/Constitutional Law, Political Research, Quantitative Political Analysis, Dictatorships, Modern European History, Water Sustainability
- Minors: Global Security, International Studies, and Spanish Language
- Schreyer Honors College, University Park, PA
  - Coursework includes: Honors Service Learning, Geography, Psychology, Non-Fiction English, International Affairs, Senior Thesis Workshop
  - Honors Thesis research includes economic marginalization of refugee populations
- Paterno Fellow – Penn State University Undergraduate Student Fellowship with an emphasis on community service, cultural studies, and study abroad

Penn State Harrisburg
Fall 2014 – Spring 2019
- Coursework included Political Science and all prerequisite course requirements
- Inducted into the Capital College Honors Program, Penn State Harrisburg in Fall of 2016

Penn State University Study Abroad in Andalucía, Spain
Summer 2017
- Coursework included Spanish Expression, Spanish Culture, and Spanish Literature
• Studied and lived in Ronda, Andalucía, Spain for a 7-week highly intensive Spanish language and cultural acquisition program

**Penn State University Study Abroad in Peru**  
**Spring 2016**  
- Coursework in Honors Service Learning and Spanish  
- Created an international service project proposal regarding microfinance loans and marketing schemes by working with Professors in Lima and Penn State engineering students to promote ecotourism in the Peruvian Amazon rainforest, Madre de Dios region

**Penn State University Study Abroad to Rome, Italy**  
**Spring 2015**  
- Coursework was in Political Science Ancient Roman Foundations

**JOB EXPERIENCE**

**Graduate Teaching Assistant – Penn State school of International Affairs (SIA) – Fall 2018**
- Graduate teaching assistant for International Affairs Global Cultures and Leadership course (INTAF 804) with Dr. Sophia McClennen at the Lewis Katz Building, State College, PA  
- Helped manage the Canvas course management system, graded student assignments, monitored class activities, assisted with in-class technology, helped domestic and international students with graduate research and writing techniques, assisted the Professor with technology issues

**UNESCO Youth as Researchers – UNESCO Chair in Rural Community, Leadership, and Youth Development, the Pennsylvania State University – Fall 2018**
- Received Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Training and Certification  
- Certified to research and work with human subjects through Social and Behavioral Human Subject Research (IRB)  
- Currently working with fellow Penn State graduate students to research a particular issue in diversity inclusion on campus  
- Our group is utilizing cross sectional and time series data to create regression analyses for a collaborative research initiative.

**Internship at the U.S. Embassy to Italy, U.S. Department of State**  
**Summer 2018**  
- Worked in the Environmental, Science, Technology, and Health (ESTH) Section  
- Job duties: reported on topics covered by the Embassy sections, edited materials produced by Economic Specialists, produced briefing books for congressional delegations and other high-level invitees, and drafted decision memorandum to the Ambassador  
- Enhanced the Embassy sections’ websites (classified and unclassified), met and escorted visitors, attended meetings and events outside the Embassy, and translated meeting dialogue  
- Other duties included assisting control officers with official visits of VIPs and congressional delegations, coordinating Green Embassy Programming, coordinating with the Management Section on Greening Diplomacy Initiatives, briefing mission employees on Green Embassy sustainable practices, surveying compliance with environmental objectives in the Embassy, and properly handling Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) and classified materials

**Student Ambassador for the School of International Affairs (SIA) – Fall 2017 – Spring 2019**
- Worked with the Director of Admissions and admissions team of Penn State SIA
- Gave in-depth presentations on SIA, gave tours in the Lewis Katz Building and campus, and engaged in correspondence and outreach with prospective students
- Utilized customer service, foreign language and cultural skills, and served at special events such as open houses and student orientations for prospective and admitted students

**Internship at the U.S. Department of State, National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) – Foreign Service Institute, School of Language Studies (FSI-SLS) – Fall 2016**
- Performed full-time administrative duties, communications and correspondence, database management, diplomatic support/research, and foreign language support/translation support
- Assisted language instructors in Information Technology matters for Distance Language Learning (DLL – Language learning processes for U.S. Foreign Service Officers abroad)
- Obtained Full Government Secret Security Clearance with the U.S. Department of State

**Legislative Intern for the Senate of Pennsylvania Summer 2016**
- Worked full-time for the Harrisburg Main Capitol Office of State Senator David G. Argall
- Performed extensive administrative duties, constituent communication, senatorial district correspondence and outreach initiatives.
- Assisted in policy drafting as well as legislation research and development
- Performed inter-office communications within the Pennsylvania Senate and the 29th Senatorial District offices
- Utilized comprehensive database management (SENNet), and served as staff assistant to Senate staff

**Internship at The Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) – Summer 2015 at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, The CLE Conference Center**
- Performed full-time administrative duties for the Continued Legal Education Courses (CLEs) for attorneys held at the PA Bar Institute’s facility as well as the 2015 Criminal and Estate Law symposiums in Harrisburg, PA
- Helped facilitate the customer service process by responding to calls and emails at the customer service department at the PA Bar Institute
- Assisted in the Bar Institute’s print shop in physical inventory of the attorney publications, as well as assisted with shipments, returns, and publication sales
- Collected & analyzed data on customer surveys to make effective changes in strategy and approaches based on customer preferences
- Utilized extensive IT skills, as well as assisted in work such office reorganization at the site, event planning, and streamlining the processing of attorney CLEs

**Administrative Assistant at Adams Healthcare, P.C. Spring 2012 – Spring 2019**
- Performed extensive patient communications and outreach, insurance company billing, and patient and meeting scheduling
- Performed tasks in on-site reorganization, filing, electronic database management, and general office management

**Penn State Harrisburg Housing and Food Services Employee Fall 2014 – Fall 2015**
- Worked Part-time at Penn State Harrisburg’s Stack’s Market in Middletown, PA
• Performed food preparation tasks, logistics, and event provision for meetings on the University Campus

**Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) Employee – Summer 2014 Employee, Mechanicsburg, PA, CLE Conference Center**

• Utilized exclusive printing technology at PBI Print Shop on site, obtained extensive experience in the printing press
• Streamlined, managed, and recorded physical inventory and shipments of attorney publications

**SKILLS**

• **Language:** English (native speaker), Spanish (professional proficiency), Italian (professional proficiency), Portuguese – Brazil and Portugal (professional proficiency), French (professional proficiency), Catalán, Dutch, Russian, and German (working levels)

• **Computer:** Microsoft Office: Word, Excel, Outlook, Publisher, Access, PowerPoint, OneNote, social media (Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat), File Maker, basic programming, digital photography, Photoshop, Google Drive, WordPress, Adobe

• **Data Analysis & Statistical Software:** Stata, RStudio, and OxMetrics/OxModel (PCGive)

**HONORS & AWARDS**

• Dean’s List – All semesters of undergraduate and graduate studies at Penn State University

• Honors Certificate of Achievement – Capital College Honors Program at Penn State Harrisburg, awarded May 2016

• Achievement Award for Outstanding Community Service - Kiwanis Club of Pottsville, Pennsylvania, awarded Spring 2014

• Liberal Arts Study Abroad Scholarship for Ronda, Spain study abroad semester - Summer 2017 Semester

• Recipient of two Schreyer grants - one for my study abroad trip to Ronda, Spain with Penn State University (International Immersion Fund), and the other for my internship at the U.S. Embassy to Italy.

• Recipient of the Merchant Family Undergraduate Scholarship Fund for the 2018-2019 academic year, Department of Political Science Scholarship

• Recipient of the Kim Anderson Memorial Scholarship for the 2017-2018 academic year, Department of Political Science Scholarship

• Recipient of the Lee Family Scholarship - Schreyer Honors College (Fall 2018-Spring 2019)

• Recipient of the Style Family Fund - Paterno Fellows L.A. Award (2016-2017)

• Recipient of the Jason & Martha Stone Hon Dietz Award (2017-2018)

**ACTIVITIES & SOCIETIES**

• Peer Mentor for the Penn State School of International Affairs (SIA), Fall 2018–Spring 2019

• Schreyer Honors College Scholar, Spring 2016–Spring 2019

• Paterno Fellowship, Spring 2016 – Spring 2019

• Global Ambassador for the Penn State Harrisburg School of Public Affairs

• Pi Sigma Alpha Beta Pi (ΠΣΑ) – National Political Science Honors Society, Spring 2017
• National Society of Leadership and Success (NSLS), Penn State Harrisburg Chapter, Fall 2015 – Current
• Green and Gold Society (Nativity B.V.M. High School Alumni Association)
• Participant in Homeland Security Seminar at Three Mile Island (TMI), Penn State Harrisburg – focused on nuclear disaster relief and history of the establishment of FEMA
• Served as Editor for alumni relations correspondence for the School of Engineering Formula SAE Club, Penn State Harrisburg
• International Affairs Association (IAA), Penn State Harrisburg – General membership
• Italian Student Society (ISS), University Park – Emphasis on Italian culture and language
• Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, University Park – Emphasis on Religious understanding
• Penn State Harrisburg Honors Student Council – General Membership until Spring 2016
• Comunidad Andina y Amigos, University Park – Emphasis on cultural understanding
• French Club, University Park – Emphasis on French culture and communication