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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY, NARRATIVE, AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION

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ABSTRACT

Within this comparative analysis, I will assess the role of intervention of the United States government in two carefully chosen case studies. The first concerns Latin America during the Cold War, with a focus on Operation Condor and the Chilean dictatorship. The second case will consider the War on Terror, specifically from its declared onset following 9/11 to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. My analysis will begin with a comprehensive description of both of these cases, as well as a preliminary look at how the cases were portrayed by the US government. I will then move onto an assessment of factors which, I will argue, establish strong parallels between the two cases. These factors include ideological binaries, ulterior motives, labelling of the narrative and double standards, media, and militarism and the CIA. I will bring these factors together to assert that they all comprise a paradigm which the US has operated within again and again to maintain its own economic prosperity and its status as global hegemon, regardless of the consequences. Finally I will examine the theory of the state of exception and apply it to the case studies at hand and to the general paradigm I see the US government employing. My analysis will end with an evaluation of the current state and situation of the countries involved in both of my case studies, express why an in-depth analysis of the paradigm I am arguing for is so important, and provide recommendations for how foreign policy can (and should) proceed differently in the future.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Background and Context 3

The Cold War in South America: Chile 3
The War on Terror: Afghanistan and Iraq 9

Chapter 2: According to the US Government 13

Operation Condor and the Declassification Project 13
The War on Terror and Military Intervention 17

Chapter 3: Ideological Binaries 21

Cold War: Communism and Capitalism 22
War on Terror: Terrorism and Democracy 25

Chapter 4: Ulterior Motives 28

South America 28
Middle East 30

Chapter 5: Labelling the Narrative 34

Illegal Actions and Double Standards 34
The Technological Age of War 37

Chapter 6: Media and the Condensation of Complex Issues 40

Chapter 7: Militarism and the CIA 44

Chapter 8: The US and the State of Exception 49

Chapter 9: Where Do Things Stand Now? 52

Chile 52
War on Terror 55

Epilogue 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY 62

Introduction

September 11th marks the day of two globally important events, and the key that joins those two moments of history is the role of the US government. The first 9/11 was the Chilean coup in 1973, which brought to power a brutal military dictatorship and marked the success of US involvement in the South American organization Operation Condor. About 30 years later, in 2001, the second 9/11 would mark the largest terrorist attack to date on US soil, and begin a long and deadly War on Terror. This paper will consider many facets of what made US involvement in both cases possible in order to show that US actions were neither justified nor legally acceptable. Ultimately, these case studies will lay the foundation for seeing a larger pattern of US foreign policy working within a particular paradigm based on a Western epistemology and involving the state of exception, all of which must be questioned.

Before beginning, it is important to note that this analysis will frequently revolve around the ideological theories of democracy, socialism, and communism, as well as extremist Islamic terrorism. I have intentionally made the decision to not provide definitions or strict parameters explaining any of these concepts for two primary reasons. The first is that these are all complex ideas, made even more complicated by the distinction of what they encompass theoretically, and (often contrastingly) how they are employed in reality. This leads to the second, and more important reason, which is that this analysis is not aimed at assessing the goodness or comparative elements of the aforementioned ideologies. I have not sought to address whether democracy is better than communism, nor if terrorism is a rational action. Instead, this analysis will consider the validity of the actions of the US government, which I will show often employ a

narrative based on stark ideological differences to establish the “us versus them” dynamic. As I have tried to remain objective in my presentation of these concepts, I hope readers will do the same.

Chapter 1: Background and Context

The Cold War in South America: Chile

In the era of the Cold War, the US' aversion to and fear of communism was omnipresent and all-consuming in political discourse. As a war of ideologies, the entire globe was the stage for the Cold War, with shifting localizations of Vietnam, China, the Middle East, Cuba, and so on. But though South America, and in particular the Southern Cone, was a significant part of this past, at the time of the Cold War it was kept out of the international spotlight to a significant degree, particularly concerning what role of involvement the US government played.

Following the successful Cuban Revolution in 1959[1], a wave of guerilla rebel movements started throughout Latin America, motivated by common key components of anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, nationalism, patriotism, and Marxist ideology. Although these movements were predominantly the result of long-growing grievances from social inequality and political repression, the US feared the possible spread of communism in what it viewed as its backyard. The first major initiative the US took in response to these fears was the creation of the Alliance for Progress (*Alianza para el Progreso*) in 1961 under the Kennedy administration. The goal of the initiative was to establish growth and development—based on democratic Western ideals—with the hope that economic and social improvement would diminish the existing revolutionary sentiment. Over the ten year period in which the Alliance was active, $80 million was invested toward the goals of establishing democratic governments, more equitable income distribution,

[1] It's important to note that the Cuban Revolution was not communist in its origin; rather, it sought to oust the current president for a variety of reasons centering around his corrupt government and the economic grievances under his rule. Following the revolution, President Castro eventually made a trade deal with the Soviet Union because the economy was plummeting (largely because the US had denied all financial aid to the country after the revolution) and Cuba began the transition into the southern hemisphere's first communist state.

land reform, and social planning (Columbia Encyclopedia 2005). After ten years, the Alliance for Progress had seen little success, both because of the waning commitment of the US government, and an unwillingness from Latin American nations to implement reforms that were put forward by the US (recall that anti-Americanism was one of the primary grievances) (Columbia Encyclopedia 2005).

By the 1970s, the political situation in many South American countries had polarized, as a slew of military dictatorships violently rose to power in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil. This was no accidental trend: the dictatorships of the Southern Cone were joined together by a covert transnational organization called Operation Condor which had the central goal of putting an end to leftist sentiment in South America. The organization was orchestrated primarily by Chile's dictatorship and therefore named after the Chilean national bird, a large Andean bird of prey. The specific functions of Operation Condor included:

> (1) The military could eliminate political opponents without the pesky inconvenience of due process of law or legal elections as the organization operated under the veneer of legitimacy portrayed to domestic and international audiences; (2) Condor shielded and disguised its criminality, that, if uncovered, could interfere with relationships with less fervent allies and affect economic benefits; (3) Condor's clandestine operations and outright atrocities could be attributed to rogue elements outside governmental control, thus avoiding scrutiny of survivors, human rights organizations or others who might seek to bring justice to the military dictatorships and their sponsors that countenanced the terror state; (4) Condor instilled terror and disorientation among populations where Condor operated. (Winslow 2019)

The objectives of the Operation were carried out by local police and military officers, but the more nefarious enforcers were the newly created secret police forces: DINA (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*) in Chile, Battalion 601 in Argentina, and DOPS (*Departamento de Ordem Política e Social*) in Brazil, to name a few (Winslow 2019). Citizens became targets not because of illegal actions, but on the basis of having opposing political ideas, and the modes of enforcement were severe, including targeted abductions, disappearances, interrogations, torture, and the movement of people across borders (McSherry 2001). Operation Condor was largely outside of the international spotlight, and as such was effectively operating completely outside of the law, but at least one external state knew about the covert organization. The US government was not only aware of Operation Condor's methods of action, but provided financing and training, and ultimately was supportive of its primary goal of eliminating all leftist sentiment in South America.

Chile provides a perfect case study to analyze intervention of the US government as the country shifted from democracy to a violent military junta. Not only is Chile significant as a founding leader within Operation Condor, but it is also a prime example of where extensive US involvement is a key element of the history. In addition, the case study can be considered with most, if not all, necessary information because it is one of the few instances in US foreign policy where all classified documentation was eventually published. The declassification—accumulating to over 23,000 documents from the White House, CIA, FBI, and Pentagon—was made public in its entirety on November 13th, 2000, roughly twenty years after the military dictatorship had ended (Kornbluh 2016, 203-15).

The involvement of the US government in Chile started in 1964 as Chile was in the midst of elections. Salvador Allende was on the US' radar as a potentially dangerous candidate, even though it was his third time running for presidency as the popular unity candidate ("Salvador Allende" 2019). He had big plans for Chile, of which the US' biggest concern was his plan to nationalize the copper industry which was at that point primarily owned by US corporations such as Anaconda and Kennecott, with private investments amounting to over $750 million (Kornbluh 2003, 5; Binder 1973). Eduardo Frei Montalva, one of Allende's opponents, ran as the Christian Democrat candidate, and with significant monetary aid from the CIA during his campaign, came out victorious in the election. Six years later, in 1970, Frei ran as the incumbent, and Allende campaigned for his fourth running season. The CIA, under the direction of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, initiated FUBELT, a covert operation intended to make it impossible for Allende to win yet again. Kissinger's order for the CIA, as discovered in the later declassified documents was to "make the Chilean economy scream" (Kornbluh 2003, 2). FUBELT invested $1.2 billion in grants and loans allocated to Frei's campaign, as well as funds wired to *El Mercurio*—the largest Chilean newspaper—to bash Allende's campaign and spread anti-communist propoganda (Kornbluh 2003, 5).

In spite of these efforts, Allende did win the 1970 elections, receiving 36.6% of the vote, and became the first democratically elected socialist president in the Western hemisphere. As promised, once president he expropriated US-owned copper companies (without compensation to foreign investors), increased wages in an effort to redistribute income, printed large sums of money to try to erase the fiscal deficit, and began establishing relations with China and Cuba ("Salvador Allende" 2019). US concerns about the country increased, and the Vioux Solution

was developed with the simple goal of causing enough instability and unrest in Chile that it would push the country toward a coup. A key element of the strategy was finding and aiding Chilean military officers who were in favor of a coup, which was an easy objective because there was already significant unrest in Chile (as reflected in Allende's narrow margin of election success).

The Vioux solution also entailed getting rid of opposition within the military, by any means necessary. The most notable case of this involved the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army, René Schneider. Though Scheider was not explicitly in favor of Allende, he was a strong constitutionalist and believed in an apolitical military. Because of these beliefs and his high rank, he posed the largest obstacle to a successful coup, and a plan was devised—between Chilean and US government officials, and to be carried out with help of the CIA—to kidnap General Schneider and blame it on leftists, further adding to the unrest within Chile. In a complex mess of miscommunications and intersecting interests, the kidnapping attempt went awry and ended with the death of Schneider (Kornbluh 2003, 22-25). In spite of the mishap, the death did not appear to be viewed as a significant mistake by the US, as reflected by a brief from the task force leaders stating, "the Station has done an excellent job of guiding Chileans to the point today where a military solution is at least an option for them" (Kornbluh 2003, 29). The CIA would later issue a series of statements denying its role and responsibility for the death of Schneider, but at the time, the main objective had been obtained.

Carlos Prats served as the new commander-in-chief of the army for a short period, but eventually resigned following a vicious smear campaign from *El Mercurio*, the Chilean newspaper funded largely by the US government; Prats, too, was not suitable for the coming

coup (Kornbluh 2003, 111). Following Prats' resignation, Pinochet was appointed as the new commander-in-chief of the Chilean army in August of 1973. Although his appointment was unrelated to US influence, he fit into the larger plans for a coup which was well underway, with right-wing officials in place within the Chilean army, navy, and airforce (Kornbluh 2003, 211). CIA agents in Chile were reporting all updates back to the US government, which now stood by, waiting for the coup. On September 11th, 1973, the military coup took place, overthrowing the democratically-elected government, and installing a military junta led by self-appointed Augusto Pinochet. The day also marked Allende's suicide in his office within the presidential palace La Moleda, and though many believe that his death was not a suicide, a more recent autopsy of his body in 2011 concluded that it was indeed suicide ("Salvador Allende" 2020).

The military dictatorship took swift actions against anyone perceived to be a political opponent, resulting in the torture, dissappearance, or murder of thousands of innocent people. In the first six weeks following the coup, roughly 1,500 civilians had been killed by the military, and it is estimated that by the end of the 17 year dictatorship around 3,197 citizens had been murdered (Kornbluh 2003, 153-54). The national stadium in Santiago was converted into a concentration camp, and in a nine day period in October of 1973 the stadium held a total of 7,612 prisoners (Kornbluh 2003, 154). The extent of the use of torture and infliction of fear on the Chilean population has far more grotesque details, but they do not serve the purpose of this analysis to explore in greater depth. Aside from the more violent aspects of the dictatorship, Pinochet also initiated new neoliberal and free-market policies which favored US interests, including selling many industries to private foreign investors (excluding the copper industry, which remained nationalized) (Dicken 2015).

The War on Terror: Afghanistan and Iraq

American presence and interest in the Middle East dates as far back as the First World War when the British were stationed in Iraq for the purpose of protecting oil interests. Since then, foreign policy has ranged from providing economic aid, to negotiating agreements, to military presence, and so on. But the terrorist attacks of September 11th marked a key turning point, primarily as the principal event which set in motion the War on Terror. The details of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are straightforward: militants associated with al Qaeda took control of four planes, with the intent of crashing them into four high-profile targets: each of the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and one failed attack thought to possibly be aimed at the White House. Between the four planes, nearly 3,000 people were killed across 78 nationalities ("9/11 Attacks" 2019).

Shortly after the attacks, the terrorist organization al Qaeda claimed responsibility, stating that the attacks were retaliation against the United States' support of Israel and involvement in the Persian Gulf War. Stephen Walt, an international relations expert, states three specific grievances given by Osama bin Laden when al Qaeda was originally created:

> "First, he accused the West—and especially the US—of constant and hostile interference in the Islamic world… second, he accused the United States of propping up corrupt and illegitimate dicatorships in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia… third, he blamed the United States for giving lavish, unconditional support for Israel and for turning a blind eye to Israel's harsh treatment of its Palestinian subjects." (Walt 2013)

But the scale of the tragedy and the position of the aggressor led the US to overlook the rationale behind the attacks—mainly, not wanting American influence in the Middle East—and instead President Bush would make it clear that the US government does not negotiate with terrorists.

The response in the wake of such a tragedy was worldwide solidarity, and not even a month after the attacks, on October 7, President Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with overwhelming support from the American populace and allied countries. OEF was set in motion after the Taliban—who were harboring al Qaeda—refused to extradite the organization's leader Osama Bin Laden to the US. The purpose of OEF was to lead an international effort to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan and destroy the terrorist organization al Qaeda. Although the US had sought support from the UN Security Council, the resolution stating that the UN would back up a necessary response, including one of force, did not explicitly authorize OEF, thus demonstrating the US government’s first semi-unilateral action in the War on Terror (Katzman and Thomas 2017, 6).

Major combat consisted mainly of US airstrikes on Taliban and al Qaeda forces, which were carried out by roughly 1,000 US special operations and CIA operatives (Katzman and Thomas 2017, 7). Aside from the airstrikes, most ground combat was between the Taliban and Afghani soldiers in coalitions such as from the Northern Alliance, a group of ethnic Pashtun anti-Taliban forces (“The US War in Afghanistan” 2019). The Taliban regime began its collapse after losing the important city of Mazar-e-Sharif in November of 2001, and soon thereafter the UN called for member states to assist in sending peacekeeping forces to promote stability in the region (Katzman and Thomas 2017, 6).

By 2003, the US focus had largely shifted toward Iraq, as the new point of interest in the ongoing War on Terror. The country was at the fault line of extremist groups, but also under suspicion of developing weapons of mass destruction. On March 20th, 2003, President Bush announced military operations in Iraq—namely Operation Iraqi Freedom—and by early April, the Iraqi army had been largely overwhelmed and subdued by outside forces. On May 1, 2003, both Afghanistan and Iraq were declared victories: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to major combat in Afghanistan from Kabul, and President Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln ("The War in Afghanistan" 2019, "The Iraq War" 2019).

Following the end of major combat, Afghanistan agreed on a new constitution, had their first democratically elected president, and seemed to be making strides toward democracy. But in 2006, peace and democratization were set drastically back by a violent resurgence of suicide attacks, fighting, and a collapse in governance. Meanwhile in Iraq, violence by resistance groups who were against US occupation began shortly after Bush declared "mission accomplished" to Operation Iraqi Freedom. By 2004, the Bush administration admitted that there was no intelligence that Iraq was trying to develop their own nuclear weapons, nor were there extensive stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons, thus redacting what had been the primary rationales and justifications for invading Iraq ("The Iraq War" 2019). Also in 2004, evidence of the human rights violations being committed inside the Abu Ghraib prison was released, causing an international controversy and further widespread disapproval of the war. Even with major combat over, troops would only start to be brought home from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009 to 2011 under the Obama administration.

This preliminary establishment of the two case studies and the respective involvement of the US government are by most accounts very distinct. However in the following analysis I will explore how narrative, ideological binaries, ulterior motives, media, and militarism are all wrapped up in the complexities of both case studies. All of these factors lend themselves to the assessment that these two cases are in fact very similar: the separation between two succeeding epochs further demonstrates how they both function within a consistent, continued paradigm of US foreign policy, which *can* and *should be* questioned.

Chapter 2: According to the US Government

Operation Condor and the Declassification Project

Assessing US involvement in Latin America during the Cold War only became truly clear following the Declassification Project, but a difficulty remains in assessing the global perception of Operation Condor and more specifically how the dictatorship in Chile was perceived throughout the timeline of events. To what degree was it in the international spotlight, given the extent of violence and human rights violations? Was there a widespread assumption that the US was involved? Was it difficult for the US government to string together a narrative that kept people in the dark concerning covert operations? An investigation into these questions would ideally include an analysis of the archives of prominent newspapers around the world and across all points of the political spectrum. But looking at the archives of three influential newspapers—The New York Times in the United States, The Guardian in Great Britain, and El Mercurio in Chile—provide a generally well-rounded idea of what narrative was being constructed concerning the events in Chile. Two time periods appeared to be most salient in looking through the archives: first, the years leading up to and following the 1973 coup, and second, from the detainment of Pinochet in London in 1998 to the commencement of the Chile Declassification Project in 2000.

At the time of the Chilean coup, the dominant narrative coming out of Washington could be described as impartial and uninvolved. Shortly following the coup, one New York Times article cites a Washington representative's official statement:

> Administration officials said today that President Nixon had received numerous reports in the last year of an impending military coup in Chile, and had decided against taking any

> action that would either encourage or discourage the overthrow of the Government of President Salvador Allende. (Gwertzman 1973)

This excerpt does show us that there were questions concerning the possibility of US involvement, which was to be expected given the US' involvement in Cuba, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic only decades earlier. However the limited number of these types of articles (only a handful of articles during prominent years of such an intensely violent regime) and the lack of further investigation indicated that questioning was not extensive, nor was it widespread in the consciousness of the American public. Across archived articles, the sentiment remained a consistent lack of concern, which was enough to generally dissuade further scrutiny: the possibility of a Chilean coup had been internationally known, support for a coup was the result of high polarization within Chile, the US played no part in either supporting or deterring a coup, and the US planned to engage with the military junta following other Latin American countries' example. This steady narrative came via statements from Washington representatives, which included White House Spokesman Gerald L. Warren and State Department Spokesperson Paul J. Hare (Gwertzman 1973). Another archived article from *The New York Times* quotes a Washington analyst reporting, "we [the US government] have no vital interest in Chile," yet also draws attention to the large sums of money US companies had tied up in Chilean resource industries (Binder 1973).

A *New York Times* article from 1974 described secret testimony from William E. Colby, Director of the CIA, that the Nixon administration had authorized $8 million toward efforts to make it impossible for Allende to govern (Birns 1974). Then in 1975, another article relayed that the Senate Intelligence committee found that the US government had encouraged the overthrow

of Allende, but without any direct involvement from the CIA or American Embassy; i.e. with "no strings attached" (Horrock 1975). This second article in particular demonstrates how the US government down-played past actions of questionable intention with the justification that intervention was warranted because of the threat Allende posed to the US—though what exactly that threat might have been is less clear. It seems there existed some degree of suspicion that the US government had greater involvement in the coup, yet there was no damning proof, and the story never broadened to have more mainstream, widespread interest . A significant question we are left with is: why wasn't there a stronger questioning and challenging tone by newspapers such as *The New York Times*, when even the limited information available seemed to suggest that there was more going on? One archived article from *The Guardian* describes that following the coup, news coming out of Chile was fragmented, indirect, and frequently interrupted, as a result of the very strict censorship of the press within Chile (Gott 1973). This lack of extensive, unaltered news substantiates how the US government was privy to significant control of the international narrative, which partially explains the ease of keeping the story largely in the dark.

The reason why news coming out of Chile was so fragmented and censored was because during the dictatorship, all opposition papers were banned, providing *El Mercurio*—the newspaper on the CIA payroll—unrivaled influence over the news within Chile (Carter 43). Looking back at the year leading up to the coup, *El Mercurio* had been close to shutting down due to mismanagement, even with substantial financial backing from the US which started in the 1960s. Because it was a right-wing newspaper focused on bashing Allende, it turned to the US for a larger bail-out, and in 1973, US expenditures on the newspaper ended up totaling $1.95 million (Kornbluh 2003, 91-92). CIA reports stated, "*El Mercurio* continues strong opposition to

the regime… publishing attacks against Allende attempts to nationalize banks, violations of press freedom, and land seizures" (Kornbluh 2003, 91). Regardless of the astronomically high price tag to just keep a newspaper afloat, the US' gamble ended up paying off and *El Mercurio* remained a key player and ally once the military junta took form.

The Chilean military dictatorship eventually ended in 1988 following a national plebiscite. But even after a new democratically elected president took office, Pinochet remained in government as commander of armed forces and senator until 1998, when he was detained during a trip to London and extradited to Spain ("Augusto Pinochet" 2019). The arrest of Pinochet and the subsequent planned trial brought about a wave of pressure for the US government to release documentation of any intelligence and information they may have had concerning the Chilean coup and subsequent dictatorship. A major reason for this was the possibility that US documentation could be used within Chile to finally try and bring to justice Chilean military officers responsible for illegal activity and human rights violations, since up to that point there hadn't been any significant legal action against those who enforced the military dictatorship. In February of 1999, the Chile Declassification Project was authorized by President Clinton, and despite conflict between the White House and the CIA, in November of 2000 the final declassification was released. Within the release, over 23,000 documents were published concerning Operation FUBELT, the CIA sponsored assassination of General Schneider, covert payments to El Mercurio, information on DINA and Operation Condor, and more (Kornbluh 2016, 203-15). The project marked one of the largest discretionary executive branch releases of records in American foreign policy history.

The Declassification Project was in the international spotlight, with newspapers such as The Guardian reporting the highlights; for example that Manuel Contreras, the head of DINA (the Chilean secret police), was on the CIA payroll[2] (Franklin 2003). Another key aspect of the declassified documents was a focus on incriminating instances which revealed the explicit efforts of the US government to keep their actions hidden. One CIA document from October of 1970 states, "it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup, [but] it is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG [US government] and American hand be well hidden" (Franklin 2003). Yet in spite of the overwhelming amount of incriminating evidence (which was successfully used in Chilean courts), significant actors within the US were never brought to justice or held responsible for their actions, which will be considered in more depth later in my analysis.

The War on Terror and Military Intervention

In contrast to the concealed US operations in South America during the Cold War, US foreign policy in the Middle East has been at the forefront of political discourse in recent history, particularly following 9/11. Within the Cold War, the Middle East was seen as a volatile but very attractive political arena, holding two-thirds of global oil deposits and as an attractive geographical region between Africa and Eurasia (Eisenhower 1957). In President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message in 1957, he makes three central claims which he describes as "indisputable facts:" 1.) the Soviet Union wanted control of the Middle East as a region in which

[2] This did not necessarily mean that the CIA was controlling Contreras; as head of DINA, he was leading the secret police, including their objectives and actions. Rather, the CIA financing showed that the US government was in support of the objectives of DINA, and also likely meant they had some access to Contreras for suggestions or ideas.

to enforce communism; 2.) The Soviets were willing to do whatever it took to get what they wanted; and 3.) the nations of the Middle East needed added strength from allied countries to maintain their independence (Eisenhower 1957). Eisenhower's speech uses strong rhetoric to relate the lawless and even evil nature of the Soviet Union, as "alien forces hostile to freedom," yet he remains clear that the US' objectives were purely of a peacekeeping nature, invested in freedom, rather than domination or servitude (Eisenhower 1957). At the end of his speech Eisenhower calls for support from the American people for his plans to undertake military assistance and cooperation in the Middle East, requiring $200,000,000 for the 1958-59 fiscal year. At the tail end of the speech, Eisenhower suggests that armed forces would only be necessary in the case of a Soviet attack on a nation in the Middle East. Four years later, in his Farewell Address, Eisenhower expresses a new tone of concern over the extent and implications of the military-industrial complex in the United States, particularly with respect to foreign relations in the Middle East. This is a warning cry that gets largely overlooked in the realm of American foreign policy, a point of analysis I will return to later in more depth.

The end of the twentieth century marked a shift toward a more aggressive American military presence in the Middle East, including operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm under the George H. W. Bush administration and a shift from supporting Saddam Hussein (as the US had under the Reagan administration) to viewing his regime as hostile and possibly developing nuclear weapons (Tristam 2019). With the terrorist attacks of 9/11, American foreign policy toward the Middle East took a jolting turn toward more extreme intervention, and a vital aspect of the change was public opinion. President George W. Bush's initial remarks following the attacks are filled with sentiments of solidarity for the great loss that took place that day. Though

he does bring up al Qaeda as the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, he maintains a very clear distinction that al Qaeda "practices a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics—a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam" (Bush 2001). In this speech—not only to the American people, but to the whole world—the notorious phrase, "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" is debuted, though with the very specific enemy established as al Qaeda and its supporters. The need for the War on Terror was purported to be not just for the sake of the US, but for the sake (and safety) of those in the Middle East who were subjects of Islamic extremism, and for the ideals of democracy and freedom themselves. But not long after this initial address, the complexities of the situation were washed away, leaving a more rigid and strangulating form of the "us versus them" dynamic that propels the War on Terror as we know it today.

Only a year after his initial speech, President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address describes the War on Terror—which he insists the US is "winning"—as a much more disseminated conflict, and one that is far from over. Al Qaeda was no longer the only enemy terrorist organization, and President Bush alludes to the much larger terrorist underworld, including Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Jaish-i-Mohammed. In addition, President Bush introduces the concept of the Axis of Evil: the states of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, all of which were seen by the US as sponsoring or aiding terrorist organizations and pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2002). Similar to President Eisenhower's depiction of the Soviet Union, President Bush spares no use of rhetoric in describing the regimes comprising the Axis of Evil as nefarious and lawless, as the name suggests. In contrast, the US is

perpetually characterized as a valiant hero: in President Bush's words, "it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight" (Bush 2002). Also mirroring Eisenhower's State of the Union message, Bush's speech winds down with a call to the American public to support the "necessary" measures for continuing freedom's fight: over $30 million per day with the main focuses of bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence. Though very significant, this overview of the initial stance of the US government at the onset of the War on Terror is only the prologue to what would become a much larger, more complex, and all-pervading conflict.

This introductory look at how the narrative was formed coming out of Washington, D.C. in both case studies shows one of the major ways the two cases vary: during the Cold War, efforts went toward trying to keep the US' involvement in South America concealed as much as possible, whereas during the War on Terror, media coverage concerning foreign policy in the Middle East is all-pervading. One way to view this shift is that the strategy of concealing events largely didn't work in South America during the Cold War because the eminent release of information (in this case, via the Chile Declassification Project) led to more significant backlash against the US government. In wake of this, the new strategy, as demonstrated by the War on Terror has been to get ahead of the narrative and steer it in whatever way is necessary to get and maintain support for US actions. However an analysis of the mechanisms at play in both cases will show how they are much more similar than it initially seems based on Washington reporting. And the first similarity to analyze is the role of ideologies.

Chapter 3: Ideological Binaries

The two 'phases' of world politics involved in these case studies operate within the same guiding parameters of the ideologies that defined the respective epochs. Independent of the progression of time, the US has seemed consistent in its own narrative. The foundational doctrines of the US are capitalism, neoliberalism, and democracy, and the US' position as a superpower is reliant on maintaining those guiding principles. The two case studies I am analyzing are defined at their onset by an external state, group of states, or organization showing power or influence in opposition to Western ideologies. In both cases, the response from the US to the threats is marked by creating a narrative of labeling the opposition as a formidable, lawless, and even evil enemy. But in order to effectively consider if this response from the US is justified in both case studies, the ideologies and binaries must first be considered.

In the context of the Cold War, the ideological enemy was communism, as embodied by the Soviet Union, which jeopardized the US capitalist economic principles. Once that arena of conflict had ended, with the US as the victor, the dialogue shifted to combat the new ideological threat: Islamic terrorism, defined by a hostility toward the West and democracy. In both cases, the ideological enemies are presented as a threat not only to the US, but generally the current world order. A further analysis will demonstrate how the US has consistently operated behind the guise of fighting a formidable enemy, when a significant motivating factor was furthering the US' own agenda and position as global hegemon. In reality, the US played an instrumental role in *creating* each of its ideological enemies in the way in which we know them today.

Cold War: Communism and Capitalism

Both case studies begin with the United States coming out of a previous engagement or conflict in a position of power and influence. Following World War II, the US was the ultimate world power: at that point it was not engaged in any active conflicts, and with only 5% of the world population, it controlled 35% of the world GDP, 47% of total industrial capacity, 22% of world economy exports, and 50% of stocks in private investments (Aguirre 2005, 17). It was from this position that the US launched into the war of ideologies against the Soviet Union. But although a battle of ideologies between communism and capitalism was at the forefront of the conflict, it was more generally a struggle between the two countries for economic, military, and influential superiority. In wanting global superiority, the US created the narrative that the world was in dire danger of falling into the grips of communism, but it was trying to stop this fate as both superpowers raced to establish influence over and alignment with more and more countries.

Russel H. Bartley takes a particularly radical approach in analyzing US actions and propaganda following World War II, asserting that the campaign was an effort to show "the universal validity of 'western' values and concomitant illegitimacy of Marxism in any of its multifarious guises" (Bartley 2001, 572). The ideologies that the US sought to promote within the Cold War were not limited to capitalism as an economic model, but also the American values of liberty, justice, and Christianity. One orchestrated scheme for furthering this propaganda was the creation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) in 1950, which was outwardly seen as an autonomous association of artists, musicians, and writers based out of Paris, who promoted the ideals of Western democracy and opposed communism in the Soviet bloc. In reality, the organization was created and directed by the CIA, including operations in 35 countries around

the world. Though not specifically nefarious, this covert operation falls into a larger pattern of the US government pulling whatever strings necessary to further their own agenda.

Within the US, significant measures were taken to ensure that communism would not be tolerated on home soil. In 1947, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was created in order to hold hearings to demonstrate to the public and international audience that the US was taking measures to keep the "red menace" out of the US ("Cold War History" 2019). In the heightened panic over communism within the US, rights were withheld, and people suspected of being communists or having leftist political beliefs were forced out of work. Most notably, thousands of federal employees were put under investigation and subsequently fired. This is a point of great importance, because having a government rid of left-leaning individuals would ensure that US foreign policy could take a drastic course in fighting communism with little opposition. Toward the beginning of the Cold War, the US public provided overwhelming support for the fight against communism, largely because the fear of nuclear weapons was so intense. But the particular reasons that communism itself was to be feared was less clear.

The Cold War moved through phases of focus in particular arenas of the world: from Europe to the Koreas to outer space to the Middle East to Vietnam to Cuba. Instances of US involvement and influence in other countries' affairs were not restricted to Chile and Operation Condor. The US acted as a resisting force to the Cuban Revolution and was involved in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Less than a decade prior, the US assisted in the overthrow of President Arbenz in Guatemala leading to a military dictatorship. Allegedly it was because Arbenz was soft on communism, but the US' involvement can be more accurately credited to Arbenz posing a threat to US economic interests (Kittleson et al. 2019). Later in the

Cold War era in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas (a Liberation group that was marxist, but denounced the communist faction in the country) overthrew the Somozas (an authoritarian dynasty that the US had helped put into power decades earlier). As a response, the US cut off all aid to Nicaragua and tried to mobilize an opposition group (Sabet 2013). A final example was the overthrow of the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammed Mosaddeq. The replacement was a reversion to the throne of the Shah, and US involvement in the affair was in response to Mosaddeq nationalizing the petroleum industry: a blow to US economic interests (Byrne n.d.)[3].

Amidst so many cases of US interference in other countries' affairs (not only in Latin America, but throughout the world), why did this same pattern continue happening? Though each of these cases was reported on in the media to varying degrees, awareness of what was going on—however widespread or limited—was outweighed by the power of the counter narrative of the US government, which was able to continue contorting international affairs to national interests. Edward Winslow asserts, "US interventions that established repressive military dictatorships in Latin America continued apace under the guise of "fighting communism" as the thinly veiled cover of establishing profit centers for US corporations and their allies among the ruling elites in the Americas" (Winslow 2019). In other words, interventions—including involvement with Operation Condor and the Army School of the Americas among others—were seen as necessary evils in ensuring that US economic interests were not harmed. Communism was a scapegoat: a name to attach to any opponent and immediately justify action against them. Since many of the actions taken were in diametric

[3] This final example, and the only example outside of Latin America, is valuable to include in particular because of how closely it mirrors the case of Chile, down to the democratically elected leader nationalizing natural resources and hurting US interests. The strong parallel is yet another demonstration of the paradigm the US has been and continues to operate within.

opposition to the US' position of defending democracy (as the system of government in which capitalism and neoliberal policies could thrive), any illicit actions were kept outside of public awareness as much as possible.

War on Terror: Terrorism and Democracy

Following the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States was once again in a position of immense power, and this time as the *only* standing global superpower. With capitalism and neoliberalism remaining the dominant economic practices, the values and principles of the US (and more broadly of the West) were also seen as the superior ideology: liberal democracy. As in the beginning of the Cold War, the goal remained to further export this ideology with the idea that all states, in all parts of the world, should be democratic. Even though the US strategy of concealing hypocritical and undemocratic foreign policy involving South America had come back to haunt them with the Chile Declassification Project, the War on Terror involved a similar element of leading a strong narrative heavily based in ideology, allowing them to conceal underlying motives and unwarranted illicit actions.

Melvin Goodman, a national security and intelligence expert describes, "the fall of the Soviet Union handed the U.S. a unique opportunity, as the surviving superpower, to lead the world toward a period of greater cooperation and conflict resolution through the use of diplomacy, global organization, and international law" (Goodman 2005). But the agenda of promoting democracy would quickly become more urgent, and more radicalized. The West, led by the US, became completely intolerant of any authoritarian regimes, associating them with Islamic extremism, terrorism, and weapons of mass destructions (WMD) (Fawcett 2013). The

shift in narrative made terrorism (particularly terrorism based on religious extremism) a deadly enemy, particularly in the wake of 9/11. A hysteria took shape, because people didn't feel safe against an enemy they did not really know about or understand. President Bush's approval ratings went from hovering around the mid 50s in the summer months of 2001, to reaching a record high of 90% following 9/11 ("Presidential Approval Ratings–George W. Bush" n.d.). Similar to fighting communism out of fear of nuclear bombs, the US populace rallied immense support for the War on Terror out of fear of terrorism. This support was instrumental in providing legitimization and justification for the extensive military-based intervention overseas that began shortly after the attacks of 9/11.

The Bush Doctrine comprised the central elements of foreign policy objectives for the War on Terror. Following 9/11, Washington's position was that President Bush's original campaign of taking a less interventionist platform on foreign policy was no longer a viable option. Instead, the Bush Doctrine was defined by preemption, unilateralism, military supremacy, and exporting democracy—by force if necessary. Ostensibly these objectives would ensure a safer world for all. Containment and deterrence weren't seen as enough against what was purportedly a lawless and evil enemy, and called for a more preemptive strategy. The attacks of 9/11 served as the baseline for showing how dangerous and destructive terrorist organizations could be. The narrative used to portray extremist Islamic terrorism would perpetuate this fear, and continually legitimize extensive military intervention. This rationale served as a major justification for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the two large-scale foreign policy initiatives that marked the beginning of the Bush Doctrine. The emphasis on military force as the

main mode of foreign affairs is also reflected in the dramatic increase in military spending, from $290.6 billion in 2000 to $606.5 billion by 2008 (Santos and Teixeira 2013).

Chapter 4: Ulterior Motives

Although both epochs have very warranted dangers, from the Soviet Union developing WMDs or terrorist organizations expanding within the Middle East, my argument centers on the fact that the enemies and sources of fear in both case studies were misconstrued and inflated by the US government. One way to evaluate to what degree this was the case, is by considering the motivation for the US government to inflate the fear of these enemies. In other words, what ulterior motivations existed?

South America

US involvement in Latin America dates far back, but the most relevant background to consider for the scope of looking at Cold War interventions is the Good Neighbor Policy, established by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933, which focused on sustaining a relationship of cooperation and trade with Latin America and the Caribbean, rather than a focus on interventionism through military action. This was a significant shift from previous policy, from the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and stayed more in line with American ideals of protecting democracy, freedom, and sovereignty. Following this agenda, in the 1950s the US government spent $6 million on efforts to make Latin America an increasingly important trading partner (Winslow 2019). However, many events became intertwined during the Cold War in Latin America—from the Cuban Revolution to the events in Guatemala leading up to the US-assisted coup—marking a major turning point in US relations with Latin America by making the US government increasingly desperate to keep communism from spreading into the US' 'backyard'. As mentioned in the background, one of the first measures taken by President

Kennedy in an attempt to deter revolutionary sentiment was the Alliance for Progress in 1961, a largely unsuccessful campaign. Following the failed initiative, the hysteria and fear surrounding the possible spread of communism in Latin America increased, and more importantly, US concerns over possible economic implications led to more extreme actions. Because much of the new policy—including involvement in Operation Condor and the Army School of the Americas––was antithetical to the alleged ideologies of the US, they were intentionally hidden from the international public eye. The US was able to construct a narrative that bolstered its international appeal in relation to other foreign policies of the Cold War, while keeping its involvement in the Southern cone of South America largely shrouded from international discourse.

Chile provides a case which demonstrates that ultimately the US was concerned only with its own well-being and would preserve its economic stability at whatever costs. This could not be more clear than in the efforts to keep Allende out of office, prior to and following his election. Only days after Allende assumed office, in a meeting with the National Security Council, President Nixon stated, "our main concern in Chile is the prospect that [Allende] can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success… No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it's safe to go this way" (Livingstone 2009, 56). The strong aversion to Allende's government stemmed partly from it being socialist, but Allende had no direct ties to the Soviet Union in the short time he was in office, which discounts the credibility of this claim and the serious actions it theoretically justified. The more important factors were the plans Allende had for the newly socialist Chile; plans which would largely push the US out of reaping financial benefits from the resource-rich country. Significant amounts of money, current and future, were at stake. One archived New

York Times article from 1973 states, “the expropriations, principally of United States-owned copper mines and International Telephone and Telegraph installations, have reduced United States investments from $750-million just before Dr. Allende came to power to under $70-million today” (Binder 1973).

Two weeks after the coup, Nixon gave formal recognition to the new military junta government, effectively disregarding the intense human rights violations that were occurring. Between 1974 and 1977, the US approved $186 million in economic assistance to Chile, the Inter-American Development Bank approved $237 million in credit, and the World Bank approved $66 million (Livingstone 2009, 62). It was irrelevant that funds were going to a brutal military dictatorship, because US influence led Chile back to a more favorable international status, at least in business and economics. In return, Pinochet introduced economic models that were guided by American neoliberal policies, as introduced by the Chicago Boys, a group of American-trained Chilean economics. In full circle, Chile was in a position to back US interests and maintain American dominance of the global economy: the primary goal of the US government.

Middle East

In contrast to Operation Condor in which all actions were well concealed, the publicized motivation of wanting to protect and promote democracy during the War on Terror originated from a valid position of needing to respond to the attacks of 9/11. However the need to respond to a real threat morphed into a flawed crusade of promoting democracy as a justification and positive spin on motivations of self interest. Ulterior motives are a key point in understanding

why US presence in Afghanistan did not start to decline following the ousting of the Taliban in 2001—which was the supposed primary goal of the initial invasion. Instead the scope of the war then expanded, spreading to Iraq, although Iraq was not directly related to 9/11 or al Qaeda. Even after major combat ended in both countries, the War on Terror continued to have no clear end in sight. This brings to light a significant contrast between the two case studies of this analysis: within Operation Condor, the objective of stopping the spread of communism in South America was attainable in the sense that the main objective was to win superiority over the Soviet Union and become the one standing superpower. In contrast, terrorism is a far more complex and dispersed "enemy" to be combating, and one which was *fueled* by the continued extensive US military presence that was meant to combat it.

The main driving force behind promoting democracy can be explained in part by the democratic peace theory, which predicts that democracies are less likely to engage in violent conflict with other democracies. Therefore, spreading democracy should decrease global conflict between countries. In a speech from 2003, President Bush stated, "democracy, and the hope and progress it brings, is the alternative to instability and to hatred and terror. We cannot rely exclusively on military power to assure our long-term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance" (Bush 2003). But the mode by which the US tried to enforce democracy was flawed from the onset. At a fundamental level, there was a lack of adequate consideration of the barriers and difficulties of regime change toward the Western version of democracy in non-Western countries. The role of cultural and historical factors in influencing regime change toward democracy has been a heavily contested debate, both within scholarship and in popular discourse. Scholars such as political scientist Samuel Huntington take the most

radical stance, asserting that Islam is not compatible with democracy; an assessment which has been heavily criticized by a majority of scholars in the field of political science, a criticism further substantiated by examples of successful Islamic democracies.

An alternate analysis introduced by Louise Fawcett, an international relations scholar, is that the mission of democratizing Iraq failed because the US government made assumptions about the region as illiberal and about democracy as a Western project, carried out a plan without considering local conditions, and ignored the possibility that democratization could take place from within (Fawcett 2013). Additionally, the mode in which the US sought to "promote democracy" was predominantly through military intervention, a significant element of this analysis which will be returned to. Finally, the motivations to promote democracy were not out of a commitment to help local communities that were being affected by authoritarian regimes, nor was it really because the US was seeking to protect home soil from further terrorist attacks. Statistical evidence of how things evolved throughout the War on Terror does not support these claims. Rather, it was because the authoritarian regimes and terrorist organizations were openly anti-American and anti-West, and therefore posed a threat to the US as the global hegemon.

The crusade to protect and promote democracy was used as a justification for extensive military intervention in the Middle East, and concealed many of the US' ulterior and less commendable motives. American intervention in the Middle East was primarily concerned with national security, economic interests, and maintaining the US as the unrivaled global superpower. The invasion of Afghanistan was generally seen as a swift victory in the first months of ousting the Taliban, and was therefore a successful reaction to 9/11 in showing that the US would not be bullied without consequences. But further involvement in Afghanistan and

involvement in Iraq were no longer truly responses to 9/11, despite what popular discourse said. Victor Hanson, a right-wing military historian, describes that Iraq was a perfect target because it has "accessible ports, good weather, flat terrain, a far more literate populace [than Afghanistan], and oil" (Hanson 2013). The possible development of WMDs—though this ended up being an unfounded claim—was another reason to inspire nation-building and in doing so, have the US in a position of positive collaboration with Iraq. There is also the matter of Iraq's rich oil deposits, though not necessarily because the US wanted access to the oil. Rather, it was because with Saddam Hussein in power, the wealth from the oil reserves would provide the petrodollar for the possibility to "undermine U.N. resolutions, seek to spike world oil prices or distort Western solidarity" (Hanson 2013).

Additional US influence and presence in the Middle East brings in further questions as to the validity of the agenda of promoting more democracy in the region. While the War on Terror was focused on the US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US was had drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan, supported Hamid Karzai's government in Afghanistan (in spite of known corruption), tolerated the military coup in Egypt, and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia (Walt 2013). A broader overview of foreign policy reveals that the US government did not have a steadfast dedication to the agenda of promoting democracy, but instead enacted foreign policy that allowed them to reap various benefits. The US took the position of global righteousness when an authoritarian regime or terrorist group threatened them, yet has shown no moral qualms while quietly colluding with dictators when it served their own interests.

Chapter 5: Labelling the Narrative

Illegal Actions and Double Standards

There are many points in the history of these cases where covert US actions and initiatives are inhumane, break both domestic and international law, and are based on hypocritical double standards. Some of these elements can be inferred from the already-established background of the two case studies, but it is important to go into more depth about three specific examples: selective labeling in the cases of the Army School of the Americas, black sites, and Guantanamo Bay.

The School of the Americas (SOA) was established in 1946 by the United States government as a means to promote better relationships among the militaries of the Americas, and was at that point called the Latin American Ground School (LAGS). The SOA would become the primary mode of fighting the Cold War in Latin America and developed sinister methods to achieve that goal (Goldstein 2005, 320). Eventually in 1996, pressure from the American public led to the release of Pentagon documents outlining what exactly had been happening at the Army School of the Americas, as well as identifying some of its graduates as notorious human rights abusers (Priest 1996). The SOA's purpose, according to a Department of Defense summary of a manual from the school, was to recruit and control informants, and counterintelligence agents could use "fear, payment of bounties for enemy dead, beatings, false imprisonment, executions and the use of truth serum" (Priest 1996). The manuals (also referred to as "torture manuals") instructed on methods of torture and abusive interrogation, included "near-drowning, forced

standing, confinement in coffin-size boxes as stinging insects were introduced, forced nudity, sexual violence, hanging in contored positions," and so on (Winslow 2019)[4].

The same repertoire of methods made a reappearance during the War on Terror, specifically in clandestine prisons and detention camps at Guantánamo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and at the offshore "black sites" used by the CIA. In 2005, these methods of clear and disturbing human rights violations came into the public eye, but the Bush administration justified them as "enhanced interrogation" techniques which were necessary against the dangerous criminals that were being held (Winslow 2019). By presenting alternate names, a range of nefarious actions were made more digestible for public discourse. *Enhanced interrogation for human incarnates of evil* provides a very different picture than *grotesque torture methods used against people who have been stripped of all human rights*. This same strategy of selective phrasing had been used prior to Operation Condor, when the CIA and US army put together "paramilitary irregulars" to counter the guerilla movements that began forming following the successful Cuban Revolution. By another name, these "paramilitary irregulars" were deathsquads of local men who would travel through regions searching for rebel groups and present an ultimatum: support the government and stop any rebel actions or be killed (Winslow 2019).

Black sites are yet another example of selective labeling that conceals atrocities being conducted by the US government. These locations are specifically not on US territory; they exist around the world in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and some parts of Southeast Asia,

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[4] In considering the role of accountability and responsibility, it is important to know that following the release of Pentagon documents, spokespeople of the Pentagon vaguely stated that "a lot of great changes" were being made, such as moving the SOA to Georgia, which would ostensibly have a "civilizing" impact (Priest 1996; Goldstein 2005, 321)). Despite significant demonstrations and an entire nonprofit organization dedicated to shutting down the Army School of Americas, the same institution still exists, but has changed its title to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.

and are operated by the CIA. Their offshore status provides haziness concerning their legal parameters, for example that the US government is not held legally responsible for actions at black sites in the same way they would be if the actions were occuring on US soil. Additionally, as clandestine prisons, prisoners can be detained and tortured completely off the record and without being afforded basic rights. One of the most infamous black sites was the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which came into the international spotlight after the severe human rights violations that were occurring there were exposed. Guantánamo Bay is another notorious US detention camp, located in Cuba, and is a similar US military operation. Contrary to a common misperception, these types of clandestine prisons did not originate during the War on Terror. They first appeared decades earlier in the context of the Cold War, existing in countries such as Germany, Japan, and the Panama Canal, and at that point were still an operation under the CIA. Prisoners were subjected to torture methods taught at the Army School of the Americas, and the extent of human rights violations was just as questionable and problematic as today, in places such as Abu Ghraib or Guantánamo Bay. One element of abuse in the initial clandestine prisons were experiments, such as Project MKUltra at the Panama prison, in which prisoners were subjected to drugs like LSD to try to develop a method of mind control (Winslow 2019).

The key element of what makes all of these clandestine prison operations possible is another form of specific labelling, meant to stretch limitations of the law. The third Geneva Convention outlines the rights of any prisoner of war (POW), at a fundamental level providing them protection from violence, indignity, and biological experimentation. The black sites operated by CIA operatives disregard the protection of rights by asserting that the men being held in the blacksite prisons are “enemy combatants” who do not qualify for the status of POWs.

With little substantiation for the distinction between POWs and enemy combatants, this labeling is just a means to side step protections that are meant to maintain a code of conduct in war—something that American soldiers benefit from—but that did not line up with the US' wanted course of actions. Once again, this demonstrates the US' willingness and ability to construct a narrative around the law in order to better serve its own interests.

The Technological Age of War

The same paradigm of selective labeling also comes into play concerning the ever-advancing technological age of war. Joshua Inwood and James Tyner, both geography scholars, describe the spatial changes to violence that result from newer technologies, where there is a disconnect between the people creating and manufacturing deadly weapons and the actual killing. Or between the soldiers and officers who order or complete a drone strike, and the in-time destruction and mutilation that comes from that drone. Inwood and Tyner state, "killing, particularly within the context of war, becomes abstract; people are no longer killed, but instead become victims of 'collateral damage' " (Inwood and Tyner 2011, 445), providing yet another example of a label that dissociates from the reality of what it is describing.

This focus on new technology is a key strategy of the Pentagon in particular, as a mode of war propaganda that celebrates "state-of-the-art killing technology" ("War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us to Death" 2007). The discourse over the state-of-the-art weapons being used in combat begins to sound like the dialogue of sports enthusiasts, where it's exciting to know all the players and their stats, and get a blow-by-blow of the game play. The documentary *War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us To Death* shows

clips of media coverage of wartime through a discourse of modern weaponry: the F-117 Stealth Fighter, the 2,000-pound JDAM bomb, the mother of all bombs the MOAB; or planes such as the F/A-18 Super Hornet or the A-10 Wart Hog. With this technical discourse, the purpose of these weapons and the reasons they are in use become a secondary element of importance to the excitement of the technology itself. Journalist Norman Solomon describes:

> There's a bias involved, where, because the United States has access to high-tech military weaponry, that somehow to slaughter people from 30,000 feet in the air or a thousand feet in the air from high-tech machinery is somehow moral, whereas strapping on a suicide belt and blowing people up is seen as the exact opposite. ("War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us to Death" 2007)

This disconnect or differentiation of standards is a result of the "us versus them" dynamic wherein the US is labeled as an advanced, moral defender of democracy, but the enemy is violent, uncivilized, and even a religious fanatic. In spite of the Pentagon's fixation on how advanced and superior modern day weaponry is, there are also significant discrepancies with the outcomes. One would imagine that advanced technologies would lead to fewer civilian casualties, given the more accurate ability to target specific combatants. But the exact opposite is the case. Looking chronologically at the biggest wars of recently history (and therefore also following the progression of advanced weaponry), during World War I, 10% of all casualties were civilians; during World War II, it was 50%; during the Vietnam War it was 70%; and finally during the Iraq war, civilian deaths made up 90% of all casualties ("War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us to Death" 2007). The beneficial change with more

modern weaponry is fewer casualties on the side of the US military, but this fact of unequal and even inhumane warfare is not advertised in the discussion of the newest high-tech bomb.

Chapter 6: Media and the Condensation of Complex Issues

The media plays a key role in promoting news through a specific lens and guiding public opinion. Alternatively, in the case of South America during the Cold War, it can also have the opposite effect: that of concealing actions by *not* reporting. Despite the common ideal of a free and independent press, popular media is often an aid—intentionally and unintentionally—of the government in propagating certain ideas and forming a particular narrative on any given event. In a time of war this is particularly emphasized through hyper-approval of the US military—and by extension the US government—because supporting the troops is seen as vital patriotism in a time of crisis. The beginning of the Iraq War is a good example of this, as it was a time when holding an anti-war or leftist perspective was seen as fundamentally disrespectful, unpatriotic, and un-American, and possibly even naive or incompetant since the war was portrayed in a light that made it seem absolutely necessary. Scholar David Meyer asserts that following 9/11, the US government constructed threats in situations where they saw potential for opportunity; "institutional actors enjoy both privileged access to mass media and additional material and institutional resources for promoting *their version* of events" (Meyer 2009, emphasis mine).

The same documentary mentioned previously, *War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us To Death,* also presents this perspective, and Norman Solomon describes how the media presents a selective view of reality. The documentary splices together clips of speeches and interviews with prominent politicians and experts iterating the same consistent narrative, demonstrating how uniform and tailored the story coming out of Washington is ("War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us to Death" 2007). One example used in the documentary relates to the justification for invading Iraq.

Prominent members of the US government at the time—including President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and others—are shown reporting with strong conviction that Saddam Hussein's government was not only linked to al Qaeda, but it was also developing WMD, biological and chemical weapons, nerve agents, cyber attacks, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles ("War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us to Death" 2007). And yet none of this ended up being true. In 2004, after the war with Iraq was well underway, the US government reported that there was evidence showing that Iraq did not have any WMDs (or any other significant stockpiles of weapons), and in 2006 released information that there was not (and never had been) any real evidence or proof linking Saddam Hussein's government and al Qaeda. Some critics believe it might have been an invented story to add further rationale for gaining popular support for the invasion of Iraq. If that was the strategy, it was largely successful: at the time of the invasion of Iraq there was support from 70% of the American populace as well as most liberal media (Hanson 2013)[5].

The War on Terror also provides an intriguing case study for looking at the role of misrepresentation—specifically overrepresentation—of certain news stories. The old news adage of 'whatever bleeds, leads' proves to be true in the context of terrorism. All acts of terrorism or attempted acts of terrorism are logged in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and between the years of 2011 to 2015 there were 110 cited incidents. Although Muslim terrorists perpetrated

[5] It's valuable to note that public support for war with Iraq rapidly fell, and there were significant protests in the coming years. But the initial (albeit fleeting) support was key for the first invasion, and continuation of the war followed in spite of lack of continued public support and later protest. This demonstrates how the business of war lacks reliance on the American populace (as a civilian-led military suggests it should be), and instead is guided by the interests of the economic and political elite.

only 12.4% of the attacks, they received 41.4% of the coverage during those years (Kearns et al. 2017). Additionally, if the perpetrator of an attack is Muslim, there are on average 449% more news stories covering the attack (Kearns et al. 2017). A large reason for this skewed reporting is the in-group out-group bias, wherein "domestic terrorism is often portrayed as a minor threat committed by mentally ill perpetrators, whereas terrorism influenced by radical interpretation of Islam is framed as a hostile outside force" (Kearns et al. 2017). This alone is troubling, but even more so are the consequences that this skewed reporting has on the US public. Following 9/11 there were increased hate crimes and workplace discrimination against Muslims and Middle Eastern people, and "radical Muslims" became one of the top three most despised groups in the US (Piazza 2014). Even the approximate third of Americans who did not report having a prejudice toward Muslims still reported having unfavorable views of Islam and thought Muslims were more intolerant of other religions ("Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West" 2012).

Media reporting raises a serious problem by producing one particular version of reality—often one that does not question its own government as much as it should—but presents it as *the* one and only truth. The problematic nature of this is compounded if the reporting includes a high bias against certain groups, resulting in the creation (or polarization) of prejudice within the American public. In spite of George Bush's words in his first public address following the attacks of 9/11, the nearly twenty years since the onset of the War on Terror have created a barrier between Western democracy and radical Muslim terrorists. There is a distinct lack of care put into making sure the world (and in particular the American public in this analysis of media coverage) understands exactly who the perpetrators of hate and fear are, and how the religion of

Islam is distinct from the small, radicalized version that resorts to terrorism. Rather than presenting a well-rounded, unbiased understanding of the facts, the events and developments surrounding the War on Terror were sensationalized, which both the US government and mainstream media profited from.

Chapter 7: Militarism and the CIA

Beyond considering the what, when, and why of these two case studies, it is now paramount to evaluate *how* the actions were made possible. I will argue that many of the institutions and individuals involved were part of a vast abuse of power, specifically concerning the role of the CIA, the US military, and the militarization of foreign policy.

As has been noted throughout the presentation of this analysis, the CIA has been a consistent actor behind covert operations in each case study. Such was the case in the formation of paramilitary irregulars in Latin America, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, in the events involved in bringing Pinochet to power in Chile, with airstrikes in Afghanistan, targeted assassinations (such as General René Schneider and Osama bin Laden), and in the operation of blacksites during both the Cold War and the War on Terror. However this roster of leading clandestine operations goes against the initial intended purpose of the CIA. The agency was originally established by President Truman in 1947 to be a governmental organization kept separate from the Pentagon, in the hope of deterring intelligence and military/combat from becoming mixed up (Gershman and Goodman 2005). Since the establishment of the CIA, its main operations have been analyzing intelligence, spying, special covert operations, and keeping up with scientific and technological advances in the field (Pringle 2020). Not only has the line become more blurred between CIA operations and operations of the US military, but the CIA has also developed an important role in shaping foreign policy, a factor which has varied among presidential administrations. One very concrete example which reflects the faltering distinction between the CIA and military is a statistic from 2005, when 90% of the $40 billion budget for

intelligence (i.e. what should be primarily for the CIA and FBI) was monitored by the Pentagon (Gershman and Goodman 2005).

The role of the US military has also expanded as it has developed into an increasingly powerful and influential organization of the United States. As of 2017, the US has 1.3 million military personnel on active duty, and 450,000 of those personnel were stationed overseas within that year (Toft 2017). To provide a comparative element to these figures, the US spends twice as much on military as China and Russia do combined (as the two countries right behind the US in having the largest and strongest militaries). Figures like this bring into question to what extent maintaining global military superiority is still reasonable. The power and influence wrapped up in making this degree of superiority possible should be questioned, particularly with respect to how military plays a key role in leading and shaping foreign policy within the US. As mentioned previously, Eisenhower's Farewell Address gives warning to what he thought would be a serious problem in the future, because he already saw it starting to happen: "in the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist" (Eisenhower 1961). The military-industrial complex had been forming prior to Eisenhower's address, but his warning became something of a rally cry for those opposed to expanding military influence. The military-industrial complex refers to what is sometimes called the "iron triangle:" the mutually beneficial relationship between government officials, legislators, and military-industrial firms (Weber 2020). This relationship becomes problematic when congressional leaders are politically and monetarily dependent on military

industries, the Department of Defense, and privately owned military contractors (such as Lockhead Martin and Northrop Grumman), thereby undermining democracy.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) conducted an analysis in 2013 of companies that profited the most from war, specifically looking at arms sales. Of the top 100 companies, 39 were in the US (accounting for 58% of total arms sales), and of the top 10, 6 are in the US (Dane 2015). The six top producers (with their total arms sales for the 2013 fiscal year in parenthesis) include: United Technologies ($11.9 billion), General Dynamics ($18.7 billion), Northrop Grumman ($20.2 billion), Raytheon ($29.9 billion), Boeing ($30.7 billion), and Lockheed Martin ($35.5 billion). Information is available from SIPRI on each of these companies' 2014 election cycle profiles, but to provide one example, Lockheed Martin (just one of the six mentioned companies) provided $4,132,497 in election contributions, and $14,581,800 in lobbying expenses (Dane 2015). In contrast to the immense sums of money that are taken in from arms sales (and then are accessible for influencing politics), the US public carries a heavy brunt of the US' debt through tax dollars. In 2015, every hour taxpayers in the US were paying $10.54 million for the total costs of wars since 2001, and every hour taxpayers were also paying $58 million for the Department of Defense (Dane 2015). These numbers do not add up, particularly when considering how little the War on Terror has done for the safety of the general public, both overseas and within the US. Within the dynamic of the military-industrial complex, military (and by extension, conflict and war) has become a business to be profited from, and policies are often constructed that line the pockets of men and women in the industries that profit from war, not necessarily in ways to serve the country's best interests (Weber 2020).

Another distinct aspect of modern day war comes as a result of the technological advances which have developed to address more complex international security problems: borderless terrorism, easier trafficking of drugs and workers, pandemic outbreaks, cyberattacks, and so on. Karl Eikenberry, a retired Army lieutenant general and previous US Ambassador to Afghanistan, asserts that the military has been put forward as a "catch all" solution to all problems, and he presents a number of primary factors which have contributed to the increased emphasis on military that we see today (Eikenberry 2013). One factor is the problematic nature of the military-industrial complex, as described above, wherein Congressmen may not contest deployment of armed forces since they don't want to risk being labeled as unpatriotic if they're up for reelection soon. Another problem he sees is a lack of grassroots opposition to unpopular military operations, which he argues is because the men and women going overseas are doing so willingly, in contrast to when the draft was in place during the Vietnam War (at which point there was significant anti-war protest). Eikenberry also makes a key point in bringing popular media into the dynamic of the military-industrial complex; much like Congressmen, journalists are less likely to be critical of active combat because they are reliant on strong relationships with senior-level military officials in order to continue getting information from their sources. Finally, a last observation Eikenberry makes is that since the end of conscription, there are fewer Congressmen and women with military experience[6], and the result is that those without military experience tend to default to whatever perspective or outlook senior military officers have, and above all show strong support for the troops. All of these factors come together and move the US as a nation further and further away from the ideal of a civilian-led military, as stated in the

[6] There is also a decrease in the number of Congressmen and women who have sons and daughters in the military.

Constitution, and instead toward becoming more and more entrenched in the military-industrial complex.

Chapter 8: The US and the State of Exception

The state of exception is a concept which originated from the legal theory of German political theorist Carl Schmitt, who contextualized the theory with reference to Nazi Germany[7]. Decades later, in 2005, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben developed the idea further in a book titled *State of Exception*, maintaining some focus on Nazi Germany but also propelling the theory to a new theater of analysis: US actions at the beginning of the War on Terror. The state of exception states that a 'sovereign' can exist and in times of crisis has the ability to suspend laws as it sees fit. Schmitt states, "the state of exception is always distinguished from anarchy and chaos and, in the legal sense, there is still order in it, even though it is not a legal order" (Agamben 165-66). In other words, the state of exception creates a new paradigm of "normal functioning" that is presented as what is right. As has been demonstrated within both of my case studies, the US not only presents their actions as the only course of action, but also as the righteous course of action, necessary for the survival of goodness and freedom in the entirety of the world.

In a further analysis using the state of exception to look at the War on Terror, author Jason Ralph argues that there is a spatial and temporal feature to American exceptionalism wherein a normative framework separates the "civilized new world" from the "uncivilized old world," and the hierarchical nature of the relationship justifies differentiation of treatment (Ralph 2009, 633). This is important in particular when considering the US government's aversion to even entertaining the idea of the validity of the Taliban as lawful combatants, or of al-Qaeda (and other large terrorist organizations) as having rational, valid grievances. There was much

[7] Schmitt was also a member of the Nazi Party in Germany during World War II, which has garnered him much criticism with respect to his theory.

more at play in the context of the War on Terror than the simple narrative of 'good versus evil,' wherein radical Islamic extremism could not be negotiated with, given the gravity of the threat it posed. Ralph describes the additional factors when he states:

> Schmitt's argument that liberalism leads to disproportionate violence only becomes relevant when liberalism is hijacked by nationalistic projects that find vindication in being the advanced guard of a universal idea… [it was the] synthesis between liberal universalism and American nationalism that encouraged the Bush administration to identify zones of exception. (Ralph 2009, 645-46)

The larger picture—which Ralph describes as American nationalism—incorporates much of what my analysis has covered, including the impact of ulterior motives, politics, the military-industrial complex, and more generally to the failed and unnecessary state of the war (which we can now see more clearly in hindsight).

Though the scholarship that I employed to describe the state of exception mainly pertains to the War on Terror (and that is the only major framework the theory has been used within, outside of Nazi Germany), I would make the case that it also applies to Operation Condor and US involvement in South America in more subtle ways. As my analysis has shown, elements such as the use of enhanced interrogation and blacksites, blatant lying about covert operations in the public sphere, and the construction of a specifically framed narrative are all elements in the state of exception: creating a new paradigm of the status quo. Therefore, the operations in the Southern Cone may constitute a less severe version of the state of exception (and on a much smaller scale), but both the actions within Operation Condor and the War on Terror demonstrate

the same framework of the US asserting its position as sovereign and employing the state of exception in response to what is perceived to be a threat to its status as hegemon (or sovereign).

This framework lends itself to delving into a greater philosophical analysis of the nature of conflict, ranging from considering power and violence and how they are or are not made valid, as well as an exploration of the problematic nature of our current world order being based on a Western-centric epistemology and reliant on the divisions between the developed and developing world. But that is an analysis for a different paper. The last important consideration for this argument is assessing where things stand now with respect to both of my case studies.

Chapter 9: Where Do Things Stand Now?

Chile

Assessing the long term outcomes of Operation Condor, specifically in the case of the Chilean dictatorship, can be broken into two primary points of analysis: 1.) Long-term, significant social, political, and economic changes; and 2.) If and how the US government was held responsible for their actions within Operation Condor and the success of such a brutal military dictatorship.

Chile is known today among economists as the pilot country which first demonstrated the success of neoliberal economic practices. However this perspective does not take into account Chile's past, including the brutality of the military dictatorship that enforced those neoliberal policies and the involvement of the US as a behind-the-scenes manipulator. The Chicago Boys were a group of Chilean economists who studied under Milton Friedman at the Chicago School of Economics. Upon returning to Chile during the dictatorship, they became the main advisors of economic policy under Pinochet, ensuring that Chile transitioned toward an economic model that followed US ideology and interests. This included abolishing the minimum wage, outlawing union bargaining, privatization of the pension system, abolishing taxes on the wealthy and business profits, slashing public employment, and privatizing a total of 212 industries and 66 banks (Palast 1998). The US State Department stated, "Chile is a casebook study in sound economic management;" Friedman called it the "Miracle of Chile;" and Friedman's colleague Art Laffer described it as "a showcase of what supply-side economics can do" (Palast 1998).

Despite this intense praise, the changes Chile saw were not positive. Journalist Gregory Palast draws attention to what the actual outcomes of the immense deregulation were: in just one

year during the dictatorship (1982-83) the GDP dropped 19%; the unemployment rate went from 4.3% in 1973 (directly before the coup) to 22% in 1983; real wages declined by 40% under military rule; the percentage of the population living in poverty doubled under the dictatorship, at its peak in 1990 resting at 40% (Palast 1998). Economists who see the impact of neoliberal policies in Chile under a more critical gaze agree that the two primary reasons Chile was able to bail itself out—and this was notably after Pinochet was forced to dismiss the Chicago boys—were the socialist policies put in place by Allende in his short time in office and the rapid shift toward Keynesian practices to jumpstart the economy. The most significant impacts were the agrarian reforms and nationalization of the copper industry, both of which were changes Allende made. Palast concludes, "Keynes and Marx saved Chile, not Friedman. But the myth of the free-market miracle persists because it serves a quasi-religious function" showing that neoliberal, laissez-faire policies "do" work (Palast 1998).

Arguments in favor of the neoliberal policies under Pinochet do persist, but it is significant to point out that these arguments often focus on the troubling state of the economy while Allende was briefly president. The economy remained struggling during the early years of the military dictatorship as well, only starting to shift prosperously in 1990. These arguments additionally never include describing the role of American influence, which played a significant part in Allende's struggles, because on top of natural discontent within the Chilean populace, the US was spending billions of dollars to make it impossible for him to govern. Further, once Pinochet assumed power, significant external funding (both from the US and from international organizations) began flowing into Chile again, but in spite of this it wasn't until the late 1980s,

when Pinochet was forced to change many of his economic policies, that the country started moving in the right direction once again.

It is also important to consider how those responsible for the dictatorship and the atrocities it committed—both Chileans and Americans—were or were not held responsible. Although Pinochet died before his trial could commence, with the help of the Chile Declassification Project, many Chilean military officials were brought to justice, including many of the high-ranking members of DINA and high-profile hitmen employed by Pinochet. But the accountability of US government officials is a very different story. By the time the Chile Declassification Project was completed, former President Nixon had passed away, but there was ample damning evidence to be used against other prominent members of the US government and the CIA. And yet this evidence wouldn't be necessary, because no trials ever happened. Of the many international lawsuits that were filed against US officials, the largest was a $3 million civil suit against Kissinger, Helms (Director of the CIA at the time), and some other prominent officials for the murder of General Schneider. A New York Times article from the time of the lawsuit cites human rights lawyers, explaining "lawyers say it is virtually impossible for a foreign court to compel former American officials to answer summons," which was the case for Kissinger and Helms who faced no trial (Rohter 2002).

Kissinger, as the man most in the hot-spot, faced no more accountability than impacted travel plans (notably including France, Argentina, and Brazil, as countries where he could not safely travel because of subpoenas and protests) and being called out in American media for his actions (Kornbluh 2003, 486-87). These problems were largely minor, and he carried on in his career to form Kissinger Associates, an international geopolitical consulting firm—something

that is darkly ironic looking back on his controversial past as Secretary of State. Ultimately, the burden of responsibility should have fallen on the US government to take measures to hold accountable the men in government who constructed and carried out the US' role in Chile's dictatorship. But this obviously never happened, perhaps mainly because there were no real negative implications of *not* doing it.

In 1977, an official from the US State Department, Brady Tyson, was tasked with constructing an apology on behalf of the US to Chile, and he presented a sincere and acknowledging apology to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Very shortly after, Tyson's statement was redacted by the State Department, on the grounds that it was not appropriate or accurate; it was arguably both of these things, but too sincere and genuine (Kornbluh 2003, 487-88). Much more recently, in 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the US, "now considers it was an error [to have supported the military coup]... [it was] not a part of American history we are proud of" (Rohter 2003). These words seem empty and bland, knowing that the US government never brought to justice those responsible for the illegal and inhumane operations carried out by its own high ranking officials. In addition, the *New York Times* journalist at the 2003 world briefing where this quote from Powell was spoken also notes that Powell's statement coincides with the US government trying to gain Chile's support in order to pass a new resolution against Iraq.

War on Terror

The War on Terror has become a point of seemingly never-ending conflict in the Middle East. The War in Afghanistan has now continued for 18 years, and the Iraqi Conflict has been

going on for 16 years. Outside of those two focal points of conflict, which my case studies have revolved around, long term conflict and military intervention of the US has also been sustained for great lengths in Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and other countries. What is to show for this ongoing War on Terror? Maintaining my focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the initial goals of promoting democracy, a Freedom House assessment showed these countries had made only "subtle democratic improvements, both changing from 7.0 (the most oppressive) before the interventions to 6.0 (still not free at all)" (de Castro Santos 2013). In Iraq, the short-term results of the war have been increased instability, growth of religious sectarianism, large-scale displacement of Iraqis, and disturbances to the balance of power as new actors seem to fill newly created power vacuums (Fawcett 2013). Similar dynamics exist in Afghanistan, along with a complete destruction of the infrastructure within the country, and serious problems for Afghani civilians, ranging from a higher risk of disease, to malnutrition, reduced access to healthcare, and so on. A census report from the Afghan Ministry of Public Health in 2009 reported that two thirds of Afghanis suffered mental health problems, and all Afghanis 18 and younger have only ever known war throughout their lifetime (Crawford et al. 2020).

Many experts view the War on Terror, in blunt terms, as a failure. A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, scholars at the CATO Institute, cite two primary reasons for the failure: 1.) an inflated assessment of the extent of threat facing the US; and 2.) the aggressive strategy of military intervention (Thrall and Goepner 2017). Thrall and Goepner cite a study that estimated $5 trillion had gone toward the War on Terror as of 2017, when the report was issued. However there have been few improvements in democracy in the region, and anti-American sentiment has only increased. Nor has the US destroyed or defeated al Qaeda, the Islamic State, or any other

global terrorist organizations. Instead, more jihadist groups have grown; the tumultuous state of war in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq provide the chaotic conditions that are ideal for a rise in terrorism. A large part of the problem is that the goal of defeating terrorist organizations has been flawed from the onset, because it is not feasible. As history has shown, even if one terrorist organization is momentarily stopped, it is likely to come back or have others take its place. The UN found that there was a 50% recidivism rate within 5 years of a terrorist organization being "defeated" *even in* successful cases of peacekeeping (Cordesman 2018). This reality is dangerous, particularly since the US has an "obsession with victory," as is argued by Thrall and Goepner.

National security analyst Anthony Cordesman states, "in case after case, the U.S. has moved far beyond counterterrorism to counterinsurgency, and from the temporary deployment of small anti-terrorism forces to a near 'permanent' military presence" (Cordesman 2018). This has been the result of having a war with no clear dominant strategy and no foreseeable endpoint. Cordeman contends that now US victories are marked by defeating key organized terrorist movements (even if the defeat is not sustained long-term), rather than by creating stable regions and states to truly end the war (Cordesman 2018). The fixation on 'winning victories' as well as the impact of ulterior motives and the military industrial complex (as already established within this case study) explains the overblown aggressive military intervention. And this rationale is also the explanation for the misdiagnosing of threat. Although terrorist attacks have skyrocketed since the onset of the War on Terror—going from less than 2,000 in 2001 to roughly 17,000 in 2015—this change is largely *because* of US interventions, although the change does not reflect any increased risk for Americans (Thrall and Goepner 2015). These terrorist attacks are

predominantly occurring in the war zones, adding to the destruction and violence that is already persisting in conflict areas. Additional support for this analysis comes from the fact that despite the increase in global terrorism, since the onset of the War on Terror there have only been 8 Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks on US soil with a total of 88 casualties (Thrall and Goepner 2017). In contrast to those 88 casualties, in the same time frame there have been over 230,000 people in the US killed by fellow Americans, and yet it is the formidable threat of radical Islamic terrorism that is at the height of the American conscious.

Epilogue

The case of US involvement in Operation Condor and the economic policies of Latin America during the Cold War is difficult to look back on with possible recommendations of how things could have been different or should be different in future similar scenarios. The whole ordeal was comprised of unjustifiably covert, illegal actions that eluded public awareness and averted taking responsibility. In contrast to that case study, the War on Terror does leave room to contemplate what other modes of foreign policy could have been, but weren't taken. Referring once more to Eisenhower's Farewell Address, in his concluding remarks he stated, "we must learn how to compose differences not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose" (Eisenhower 1961). Current academic literature assessing the failed War on Terror has presented a wealth of possibilities for how future military actions—if necessary—should proceed differently. Such options include more modest objectives, returning to multilateralism, ensuring long-term public support (possibly maintained through more transparency), utilizing nonmilitary tools (such as economic sanctions, diplomacy, negotiations, and freezing terrorist groups' assets), focusing on international diplomacy, prioritizing arms control and nonproliferation, and above all, viewing military force as a last resort (Toft 2017; Thrall and Goepner 2017; Gershman and Goodman 2005). This list is not a short one, so the *possibilities* for change are plentiful, however it would require a significant institutional shift away from the established status quo which is currently being held in place by powerful forces such as the military-industrial complex.

The US, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has shown itself to be an aggressor within the international realm, disregarding the core ideologies it stands behind in the public sphere, to do whatever is necessary to obtain its objectives behind the curtain. This portrays the

US less as a global hegemon and more as an international dictator. With the intense focus on military over nearly the past 20 years, the US now encounters the problem of other global powers once again gaining power (most significantly through economic prosperity), and many scholars note that we now seem to be returning to multipolarity. The state of US exception was not sustainable, and the declining period of the US as global hegemon gives rise to the question of whether a unipolar world really is a positive mode of international relations, as theories such as the Hegemonic Stability Theory suggest. Journalist Thanassis Cambanis maintains:

> Such a shift [away from the US as hegemon] would mean giving up on having an American say over every troubling policy or security dilemma worldwide. The United States would lose some of the benefits of primacy… Washington would thereby accept a meaningful loss of power, but better to do so by choice now than later by force of circumstance. (Cambanis 2020)

Ultimately the question to ask within the entire extent of this analysis is who is benefitting from American foreign policy and who (if anyone) is being unjustly hurt by it. In an ideal world, American foreign policy should serve first-and-foremost the whole of the American public. In the international realm, in order to maintain a positive standing, each government should follow the established rule of law and code of conduct. Instead, what we have seen from the United States is the vast abuse of power and privilege warranted by its position as global hegemon coming out of World War II. Specifically the economic and political elite of the US have benefited from the business of war and from the ruthless nature of foreign policy which has been necessary to maintain the status of the US. Through these two distinct epochs, the US operated within the same paradigm that is heavily dependent on polarized ideologies, the formation of a

specific narrative in the public sphere, and illegal covert operations that disregarded human dignity and human rights. A major reason this was possible is the state of exception employed by the US as hegemon, as well as the inherent unequal dynamics which exist between the West and the rest of the world.

This dynamic is of utmost importance because it applies to a much larger context than just US involvement in Chile's dictatorship within Operation Condor and the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are just two of many examples of the same paradigm which has played out in many diverse contexts. I chose these two specifically because they demonstrate the consistencies of US involvement in other states' affairs over a relatively continuous time frame, moving from one enemy to another. But there are a plethora of other examples of the same dynamics, ranging in scale and global significance. The most important factors, which I have sought to outline throughout my analysis, are how this paradigm is made possible again and again. History is constantly in the making, and as these two case studies demonstrate, the atrocities of the past will be repeated in a consistent cycle, unless there is more accountability. Many of the enabling factors for the paradigm I have described are big, institutionalized elements, ranging from politics of the military-industrial complex, to the role of popular media, and the complex natures of concealed and curated information. But by being more aware of key events of the past, we are more knowledgeable in looking at the present, and can learn to question what we are told by our government, the popular media, and other actors at play.

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ACADEMIC VITA

Erin Baumgartner

Education

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

B.A. International Relations and B.A. Global and International Studies

- Minors: German and Spanish
- Schreyer Honors College Scholar and Paterno Fellow
- GLIS Student Marshal

International Experience

Valparaíso, Chile *CIEE Study Abroad* *02/19-07/19*

- Completed a full Spanish-language course load during the semester with an emphasis on the history of Latin America and the current economic and political climate of Chile.
- Lived with a host family to learn about Chilean culture, family life, and practice Spanish at home.

Madrid, Spain *IES Study Abroad* *05/18-07/18*

- Completed two Spanish-language courses during the 6-week program, with an emphasis on accelerated language acquisition.
- Lived with a host family to learn about Spanish culture, food, and practice Spanish in a home-setting.

Cambridge, England *08/12-06/13*

- Completed a full year of secondary school in Cambridge, England.

Work Experience

UNESCO Youth as Researchers, *Researcher* *09/17-02/19*

- Collaborated with peers to perform research at PSU about social issues on campus.
- Focused projects on intersectionality and mental health, using research methods of surveys, focus groups, and one-on-one interviews.
- Presented documentary of findings at a public forum, allowing me to engage with the community.

Cafe Lemont, *Barista* *09/16–present*

- Balanced multiple shifts a week with rigorous school work
- Provided quality customer service in a fast paced setting.

Volunteering Experience

ESL Tutoring, *Tutor* *09/18-12/18*

- Volunteered as a student tutor for an ESL adult learner as part of an honors English Literacy course.
- Focused on reading, writing, and speech in preparation for the tutee to take her citizenship test.
- Developed greater patience, cross-cultural communication, and a friendship with my tutee.

UNICEF Penn State, *President, secretary, and member* *09/16-12/18*

- Engaged in advocacy and fundraising for UNICEF
- Attended the annual UNICEF Student Club conference in 2017 in Washington, D.C.
- Within the exec team, co-planned the semester, held weekly meetings and presented on relevant

topics, maintained organizational aspects of the club.

Shaver's Creek Environmental Center's Outdoor School, *Counselor* *09/2-10/4/2019*

- Spent a week working as a camp counselor for 60 4-6th graders, with a focus on environmental education and sustainability
- Gained responsibility and diligence taking care of a large group of young students.

Skills

- Language skills: English (native), German (advanced), Spanish (proficient)
- Proficient use of Microsoft Office Suites, Adobe Photoshop, Google Drive, and social media platforms