

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatant Reintegration in Post-Civil War States

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SPRING 2021

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for a baccalaureate degree
in International Politics
with honors in International Politics

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ABSTRACT

Why do some post-civil war states establish a durable peace while others remain stuck in a cycle of violence? Post-civil war states have many obstacles to overcome even after an agreement for peace is reached. Ex-combatants often threaten the legitimacy of the post-conflict government, therefore threatening the overall stability in the state. A solution to this threat becoming popular for use in post-civil war states is implementing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. DDR programs function to first reduce the physical threat of ex-combatants and then streamline their transition back into society. There are many other mechanisms available for post-conflict governments to implement in order to pursue justice and establish peace, often referred to as transitional justice mechanisms. These mechanisms include amnesty (impunity), exiles (forced or voluntary retreat of individuals from a certain side of the conflict from the country), prosecutions (judicial accountability measures), purges (removing individuals from a certain side of the conflict from public office positions), reparations (providing resources or support for victims of the conflict), and truth commissions (an extrajudicial process that aims to get the full story of the conflict). I am interested in the potential for DDR programs and transitional justice mechanisms to interact in ways that reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence in post-civil war states. Since it has been found that focusing on reconciliation in the context of transitional justice yields the best results, I conduct a Cox Proportional Hazards model, complimented by a case study on the conflict in Colombia, to see if this logic holds true with DDR programs. I find that post-civil war states which implement both a DDR program and at least one grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism have a lower likelihood of returning to conflict than those that do not.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my thesis supervisor, Dr. Cyanne Loyle, I greatly appreciate the resources and insight she provided me at every step of the process, especially when it came to the quantitative aspect of my study. I could not have turned my thesis into a legitimate research project without her support. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Marie Hojnacki and the political science thesis workshop for providing me with feedback and guidance for every chapter. I would like to thank the Public International Law and Policy Group for giving me the opportunity to serve as a research intern and get the exposure to the post-conflict statebuilding field that inspired the question for my thesis. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends for their encouragement.

Chapter 1

Introduction

“It is one thing to end the armed conflict and another to build peace”

(Sergio Jaramillo, High Commissioner for Peace, Colombia 2016)

Civil wars fueled by ethnic, ideological, and other sources of deep-rooted social fragmentation have been rising. In many cases, the hostilities between individuals from opposing sides continue to fester after the official end to the conflict. This can be seen in the case of the Colombian conflict that started in 1966; for about half a century, the state has been plagued with violence and instability. Since the 1980s, several ceasefire and other peace agreements have been made, but unsatisfied combatants from the state’s many paramilitary groups continue to provoke unrest on the ground, threatening the possibility for such agreements to reach their potential. The conflict is responsible for the death of over 260,000 people, disappearance of 120,000, and the displacement of over 8.1 million, with hundreds continuing to be harmed and displaced even after the 2016 peace deal (Colombia Reports 2019). This is not unique to Colombia; armed rebels pose a threat to peace deals today in Libya, Yemen, Mali, Burundi, and other states across the globe. Situations such as these inspire the question of why some post-civil war states are able to establish a durable peace, while others remain stuck in a cycle of violence?

In an attempt to answer this question, it is important to think about the main challenges many states still face after signing a peace agreement. Ranging from economic and infrastructural damage, to societal trauma, the list can seem to go on and on. In acknowledging the complexities of conflict and its impact, my thesis begins from the understanding that armed

ex-combatants are one of the greatest threats to peace in post-civil war states (Williams, Dicker, Paterson 2018). Especially after a civil war, when all the sides to the conflict have to figure out a way to live peacefully in the same state, it is imperative that the post-conflict government find a way to ensure that ex-combatants don't have the motivations or the means to return to violence (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). While armed and unaddressed, these individuals threaten the legitimacy of the post-conflict government and the safety of civilians, therefore hindering long term peace and stability. Additionally, if ex-combatants perceive that the agreement was not suitable to them, there is a risk of them departing from the peace deal and returning to violence (Walter 1999). In response to the recent increase in intrastate conflicts that lead to such problems, the United Nations and other organizations have begun to turn to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs (Goebel & Levy 2020). These programs involve three stages to address the threat and grievances of ex-combatants and are considered essential to combining the pursuit of peace with the establishment of a strong security sector capable of enforcing rule of law in the post-conflict state (Brahimi Report 2000). DDR programs aim to first disarm ex-combatants and reduce the cycle of arms, continue by separating the ex-combatants from their leaders, and finally work to streamline a transition for ex-combatants to rejoin as contributing members of society by providing them with job training and related resources.

The idea of providing ex-combatants with the training, resources, and sometimes even finances, to support their re-entry to society after they have just engaged in violence is unsettling to many, especially the victims of such violence. This sentiment is reflected in the fact that the reintegration stage of DDR is often not given as much attention as the other two steps (Brahimi Report 2000). However, getting the ex-combatants to agree to disarm and demobilize, requires

established trust between the government and members of rebel groups, supported by incentives for participation (Human Rights Watch 2005; Bandeira 2008; Goebel & Levy 2020). Similar to other post-conflict processes, the success of DDR programs relies on the ability for the post-conflict state to sufficiently build confidence between former warring parties, as well as prove their commitment to a peace process that is perceived as fair (Walter 1999).

DDR is just one mechanism in a list of policy options utilized in post-conflict states to advance towards a sustainable peace. Another mechanism is transitional justice, which includes processes that work to achieve peace through championing justice and reconciliation among all members of the post-conflict state. There are many different mechanisms to achieve transitional justice, but they can be classified as opportunity-motivated mechanisms, which serve to demonstrate and consolidate the post-conflict government's power (opposition prosecutions, purges, exiles) and grievance-motivated mechanisms which function to address and prevent grievances on all sides of the conflict (amnesties, comprehensive trials, reparations, and truth commissions). Many post-conflict states implement at least one transitional justice mechanism in their pursuit of a durable peace, however there is evidence that implementing the grievance-motivated mechanisms leads to a lower likelihood of conflict recurrence than those aimed at consolidating state power (Loyle & Appel 2017).

Considering the instability and high levels of tension and distrust in a post-civil war state, the new government must be very careful in their attempts to achieve justice and peace. With many different post-conflict peace and justice processes at their disposal, special attention must be paid to the ways in which the different processes can interact with each other both positively and negatively. It is important for states to carefully choose which post-conflict peace and justice processes to implement, in order to prove their commitment to peace and ensure that every group

feels that the state will actively keep their interests in mind. A 2010 United Nations report suggests that linking transitional justice mechanisms to DDR would allow each process to inform the other, shaping both of them to be more effective at achieving their shared goal of durable peace (Seesay & Suma 2009; Guidance Note of the Secretary-General 2010).

My thesis explores that suggestion further. My hypothesis is that states which implement both DDR and at least one grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism (amnesty, comprehensive trials, reparations, truth commissions) will have a lower likelihood of conflict recurrence. This is based on the notion that a post-conflict government that puts a concerted effort towards achieving peace and justice, has a better chance for durable peace. However, confidence between warring parties and civic trust in the government underscore the success of the post-conflict government in fulfilling the processes necessary for durable peace. Therefore, I expect that a post-conflict government's outward prioritization of reconciliation, rather than of power consolidation, will foster the necessary trust between the ex-combatants, civilians, and the new government. This is especially important considering the caveat that the reintegration step of DDR is often not fulfilled—restraining from implementing opportunity-motivated mechanisms will ensure that ex-combatants do not perceive that they are being actively disenfranchised. Additionally, certain grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms also cater to victims, ensuring that civilian populations do not perceive the government as dismissive of their troubles.

Even though DDR programs have become popular for use in post-civil war states, their impacts and effectiveness have mostly been tested through case studies that focus on implementation and technical issues, and the impacts of the program on the individual level (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). My thesis will contribute to the field by providing a quantitative evaluation of DDR programs' impact on conflict recurrence, using a Cox

Proportional Hazards model to test my hypothesis. Following the suggestion of DDR scholars, I compliment my quantitative study with a case study of the situation in Colombia, to evaluate the specific ways in which the synergies between transitional justice and DDR have the potential to impact the likelihood of conflict recurrence. (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010; Banholzer 2014). While the United Nations and other leaders in the field have discussed the potential for DDR and transitional justice to work together, my thesis provides an empirical test of that suggestion. My use of mixed methods to study both DDR programs and transitional justice mechanisms demonstrates that while DDR on its own reduces the likelihood of conflict recurrence by 50%, the likelihood of conflict recurrence gets reduced by 80% when a state implements both a DDR program and at least one grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

The ending of a civil war leaves states with a multitude of issues to address, from repairing damaged infrastructure to rebuilding its political systems; the to-do list is expansive and complex. The intersection of the many issues the post-civil war state is left to deal with is what leads many states to a conflict trap, where it seems impossible to stop the cycle of violence (Collier 2007). In fact, a UN Peacekeeping report from 2015 found that 42% of civil wars have returned to conflict after peace negotiations (Cockayne & O'Neil 2015).

Conflict Recurrence

There are many acknowledged factors that contribute to the likelihood that a post-civil war state will return to conflict. Most often noted are economic conditions; Collier finds the importance of post-conflict economic development as an indicator of conflict recurrence (Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom 2008; Collier 2007). This factor is relevant because it may not only impact the resources the state is able to put into rebuilding and addressing grievances, but also the opportunities for civilians and ex-combatants to work and participate in the society. Peace agreements which include power sharing institutions between the new government and former rebels, promote feelings of security among ex-combatants, leading to a lower likelihood of conflict recurrence (Hartzell & Hoodie 2003). Further, the presence of third party or international actors can play a role in contributing to the legitimacy of post-conflict processes, fostering trust between the state and civilians to decrease the likelihood of perceived injustice (Walter & Snyder

1999; Banholzer 2014). Common in each of these factors is the attempt to gain legitimacy and trust for the post-civil war government in the eyes of both civilians and ex-combatants.

Civil wars most often do not end in victory, but with cessation of hostilities achieved through a peace agreement (Banholzer 2014). In addition to outlining processes for promoting justice, rule of law, and reconciliation, peace agreements often include provisions to require the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, commonly referred to as DDR.

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration

The United Nations' Brahimi Report is one of the initial studies that evaluated the function of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR), determining that such programs are an essential aspect of combining the pursuit of peace with the establishment of a strong security sector capable of enforcing rule of law in the post-conflict state (Brahimi Report 2000; Banholzer 2014). A major takeaway from this report is that the reintegration aspect of DDR is historically not given the same attention as the other steps. This is a problem because disarmament and demobilization have forced ex-combatants to make concessions, so without the incentive of a streamlined transition back into society, there may not be much to prevent ex-combatants remobilizing once the program ceases (Goebel & Levy 2020; Brahimi Report 2000). Reintegration has been rendered controversial because it provides ex-combatants with things like housing, money, job training, education, and psychosocial support, which has been found to be offensive to victims, especially considering they are likely also in need of the same assistance (Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009; Banholzer 2014; Sesay & Suma 2009; Goebel & Levy 2020).

The main goals of DDR are: socio-economic development, preventing crime and violence, stimulating civic participation, and healing the trauma induced by war (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). DDR includes three distinct stages, and each stage should be addressed holistically and fully, which is known to be difficult due to the variety of stresses on the state and the limitations of the implementing actors (United Nations). While DDR is an integral step towards achieving stable peace, a review of the cases indicates that even DDR programs laid out in peace agreements are often not executed effectively, especially when it comes to the reintegration stage, which has been rendered the most “vital” (Goebel & Levy 2020) aspect of the state building process (Sesay & Suma 2009; Bandeira 2008). Every study done to evaluate DDR, has agreed that DDR is most effective when it is done as a voluntary process (Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009), which requires established trust between the government and members of rebel groups (Human Rights Watch 2005; Bandeira 2008; Goebel & Levy 2020).

The majority of research into DDR programs relies on insights gained from case studies, rather than systematic evaluations that span across states and regions (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). The Swedish government agency for peace, security, and development, The Folke Bernadotte Academy (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010), created a report summarizing widely accepted claims about the effects of DDR programs, most importantly laying out suggestions for future research on the topic. The authors conclude that most of the research into the programs is focused on implementation and technical issues, while very few are empirical studies that evaluate a wide array of programs. Most work focuses on the effects of DDR on an individual level without making connections to the impact on conflict recurrence. In their focus on conflict recurrence, Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis claim that DDR contributes to reducing conflict recurrence by reducing the availability of weapons, disrupting the social networks

between ex-combatants and leadership, providing economic opportunities to ex-combatants, and building confidence between formerly warring parties. The authors offer that due to the heterogeneity between DDR programs, they are difficult to study empirically, adding that the difference between the program's intention and implementation can contribute to empirical difficulty in the evaluation of DDR programs. It is for this reason that conclusions from statistical studies on DDR not be overstated, and be complemented by case studies (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010; Banholzer 2014).

Transitional Justice

The United Nations refers to transitional justice as the “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation” (UN Secretary-General 2004). In a paper by Binningsbø et al. (2012), the authors establish that prosecutions, truth telling commissions, reparations, amnesty, purges, and exiles are among the post-conflict justice processes most often included in an evaluation of the interactions between justice, truth, and peace after conflict (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates & Elster 2012). There is disagreement on which transitional justice mechanisms will lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence, with some scholars finding that certain mechanisms yield better results than others (Vinjamuri & Snyder 2015; Loyle & Appel 2017).

Economic development, the history of rule of law, and democracy are factors that greatly impact a state's ability to implement transitional justice (Fletcher, Weinstein & Rowen 2009). With each transitional justice mechanism, the state is limited in regard to the public's perception

of its legitimacy, as well as its likely limited access to resources given the damage done by the conflict (De Hoon 2020). These findings highlight the core difficulty for states implementing transitional justice— established trust and economic development are required in order to gain the levels of trust and economic development necessary for durable peace. In a quantitative study, Loyle and Appel (2017) distinguished between transitional justice mechanisms aimed to consolidate state power, referring to them as opportunity-motivated mechanisms (opposition prosecutions, purges, exiles), from those aimed at addressing the grievances of the populations (amnesty, truth commissions, reparations, comprehensive prosecutions), and found that grievance-motivated mechanisms led to a lower likelihood of conflict recurrence than opportunity-motivated mechanisms. This idea is supported by a finding that using prosecutions to establish state legitimacy can reinforce power hierarchies in a way that can exacerbate grievances, especially among former warring parties (Thomson 2011).

DDR with Transitional Justice

The main goal of the transitional post-conflict period is to establish a durable peace by means of restoring trust in the government and eradicating motivation for violence (De Hoon 2020; Loyle & Appel 2017). It has been suggested that states take a holistic approach in regard to addressing the aftermath of conflict; each mechanism for change must be made with consideration of the others to ensure every process for peace and justice meets its potential (De Hoon 2020). A main obstacle for the government is the fact that it must at the same time establish trust in its institutions, while it recreates and rebuilds them (Vinjamuri & Snyder 2015;

Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). Without established trust, the effort put into post-conflict justice will not be recognized (De Hoon 2020).

Since transitional justice mechanisms and DDR programs are both common policy options that aim to reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence, and it has been suggested that it is best when post-conflict processes work together, there are grounds for exploring the potential for these two processes to interact. While it is rare that the two are linked in peace agreements, the foundation for their connection exists (Sharp 2015; Goebel & Levy 2020; Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009; Seesay & Suma 2009; Williams, Dicker & Patterson 2018; United Nations 2010).

Since DDR is a voluntary process, incentives are necessary, and non-liquid incentives are preferred (Goebel & Levy 2020). For example, Colombia was able to convince 95% of its largest rebel group, the FARC, to disarm and demobilize by promising amnesty in exchange for participation in the program (Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009). The downside to this approach is that many civilians do not appreciate the amnesty for ex-combatants, creating a problem of perceived justice (Williams, Dicker & Patterson 2018; Piccone 2019). It has been suggested that certain transitional justice mechanisms, such as prosecutions, purges, or exiles, may actually hurt the incentive to join DDR programs by creating resentment between the ex-combatants and the new government, as was the case in Iraq after the purging of the Ba'athist party (Johnson 2020), and in Sierra Leone where prosecutions hindered reintegration (Sesay & Suma 2009). This leads to my argument that grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms may actually increase and encourage participation in DDR programs, by creating a sentiment of peace between the parties, rather than further entrenching resentment by flaunting state power.

A 2010 United Nations report suggests that linking transitional justice mechanisms to DDR would allow each process to inform the other, shaping both of them to be more effective

(Sesay & Suma 2009; United Nations 2010). Since it has been demonstrated that addressing the grievances of the population through transitional justice, yields a greater likelihood of durable peace (Loyle & Appel 2017), it makes sense that tying those processes into ones aimed to squash motivations to arm and mobilize against the government, would allow each process to better achieve their shared goal of reducing the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Approach

While the literature on conflict recurrence and post-conflict peace and justice processes are vast, there is no concrete answer to why many post-civil war states are unable to achieve durable peace. However, the common themes in the literature suggest that post-conflict governments who are able to build enough trust amongst both former rebel groups and the civilian population, will have the most success in their pursuit for peace.

After a civil war, all the sides to the conflict have to figure out a way to live peacefully in the same state, making it imperative that the post-conflict government find a way to ensure that ex-combatants don't have the motivations and means to return to violence (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). Around the 1980s, the international community decided to put money and effort into disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in an attempt to address the perceived risks ex-combatants pose to the post-civil war state if they remain armed and angry (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). Even though there have been many willing donors for such programs, their impacts and effectiveness have just started to be empirically tested (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). In addition to DDR programs, the post-conflict state is encouraged to implement other processes aimed at achieving justice and peace. Transitional justice mechanisms are commonly implemented to achieve durable peace, however there are several mechanisms involved in this category, and some have been found to be more effective than others. I argue that implementing both DDR programs and grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms will reduce the likelihood that a post-civil war state returns to conflict.

Reducing Conflict Recurrence

While scholars have long debated the main factors contributing to conflict recurrence, many argue the importance of addressing the men with guns, noting them to be the greatest threat to peace, being that they have the means and have turned to violence before. It is for this reason that addressing the motivations that caused these individuals to initially take up arms against the state, is fundamental. This includes assuring the former rebel groups that the new state wants to include them and will treat them in a way that they perceive is fair. Perception is an integral aspect in establishing a stable peace. In order to secure rule of law and restore faith in the state's institutions, the post-conflict government must establish itself as not only strong and capable, but also legitimate and trustworthy, in the eyes of both ex-combatants and civilians. If the new government or newly rebuilt institutions are not respected or considered unstable, conflict becomes much more likely (De Hoon 2020).

Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration: Addressing the Men with Guns

Upon returning home from armed conflict, ex-combatants are faced with many obstacles. From an economic standpoint, the end of the civil war has left them unemployed and cut off from their social capital. These predicaments would be difficult for anyone, but it becomes a concern for the state when individuals who are known to be comfortable with and capable of turning to violence in response to such hardships are faced with them (Banholzer 2014). It is for this reason that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs gained popularity for use after civil wars in recent years. The idea behind their implementation is that providing the ex-combatants with resources for job training and employment opportunities, once they have put

down their arms and cut ties with their former rebel groups, will decrease their motivation to return to violence, while also making such action more difficult (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). An important aspect to note of DDR is the fact that it is most often, and arguably is most effective, when it is done as a voluntary process (Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009). Therefore, there must be incentives for the armed groups to hand in their weapons and agree to rejoin society. On the other hand, this means that the state and new government must take great care to ensure the ex-combatants perceive their actions as trustworthy and committed to the peace process. Action otherwise would harm the incentive to join or remain in DDR programs, thus hurting the prospect for stable peace.

Disarmament— typically the first step in DDR— aims to physically remove the weapons from circulating in the state, therefore it is often laid out in peace agreements as a precondition for peace. This stage of the DDR process is meant to reduce the likelihood the group returns to violence, since they will no longer have the arms to support them. Further, disarmament serves a symbolic meaning to prove that the group is committed to the peace process.

Demobilization is the effort to disperse the armed groups and prevent them from planning or staging further violence. This stage of the DDR process serves to disrupt the ties between the ex-combatants and their commanding officers, as to make mobilizing more difficult. After demobilization, ex-combatants are left cut off from their social capital, leaving them vulnerable at a socioeconomic level. This is addressed in the reintegration stage, which is the process of reintroducing the ex-combatants back to their communities as productively contributing members (Goebel & Levy 2020). While this stage of the DDR process is thought to be rooted in economic opportunity theory, it has been found that individual opportunity costs are not actually what motivates individuals to join a rebel organization or enact violence (Collier & Hoeffler

2004). Therefore, a greater emphasis on the value of DDR programs, specifically the aspect of reintegration, should come from the fact that such a process establishes the opportunity for confidence building. With the intention to build confidence between the state and ex-combatants, DDR programs work towards durable peace by creating an opportunity to establish faith in state institutions and rule of law.

An important factor to keep in mind when exploring the effects of DDR on a durable peace would be the economic status of the state. If a state has a poor economic status, and there are no jobs or opportunities for the newly reconciled individuals to return to, then a major aspect of the DDR program will not be achieved. This is often partially rectified by the financial assistance of the United Nations or other international donors.

Approaches to Transitional Justice

The goal of transitional justice is to address the legacies of a conflict. Mainly, transitional justice serves as the vehicle to reconciliation, justice, and eventually peace among all those living in the post-conflict state. There are many mechanisms used to implement transitional justice, and in many cases more than one is employed. I adapt the position of other scholars that claim there are two types of transitional justice mechanisms: grievance-motivated and opportunity-motivated (Loyle & Appel 2017). Grievance-motivated mechanisms are functioned to focus on the grievances of individuals in a post-conflict state, both ex-combatants and civilians, that have potential to disrupt the peace if left unaddressed. The mechanisms that fall under this category are truth commissions, reparations, amnesty, and comprehensive prosecutions¹. It is important to

¹ Comprehensive prosecutions to refer to prosecutions sent from the post-conflict government that hold their own side accountable for crimes committed during the conflict. (Loyle & Appel 2017)

not only cater to the civilians, but also the ex-combatants, as those are the members of society that pose the greatest threat to peace (Williams, Dicker & Paterson 2018). The other potential way for transitional justice mechanisms to establish durable peace is by serving to entrench state power. The mechanisms used in this method are opposition prosecutions², purges, and exiles. In these opportunity-motivated mechanisms, the post-conflict government uses its power to disenfranchise its opposition, to consolidate its power and prove its capabilities to the state. It has been found that implementing grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms will most reduce the likelihood of returning to conflict (Loyle & Appel 2017).

Grievance-Motivated Mechanisms

Truth-telling commissions refer to a process in which victims and perpetrators of violence tell the stories of their experiences of the conflict, with the aim of informing the government and justice sector of the reality of the situation, in order to assure justice, as well as foster reconciliation within the community. Since truth commissions may offer an opportunity for not just victim participation, but also that of ex-combatants, they have the potential to be an inclusive process that provides the population an opportunity to gain an informed perspective. Truth commissions are beneficial because they not only ensure victims that their grievances are addressed, but they also ensure ex-combatants that the new state encourages their participation and is willing to hear what they have to say. This is important because combatants are often victims of the conflict as well. It was found that every time a truth commission has been implemented, there was not a return to conflict in the state (Loyle & Appel 2017). Truth commissions are effective, arguably, because by being an inclusive process they function to

² Opposition prosecutions to refer to prosecutions sent from the post-conflict government that are only aimed at the losing sides to the conflict. (Loyle & Appel 2017)

build trust in the state institutions and government, which has been regarded not only as one of the most difficult, but most important, underpinnings to the success of squashing motivation for conflict recurrence. However, not following truth commissions by other processes such as trials or reparations, has the potential to delegitimize the government's commitment to peace (Vinjamuri & Snyder 2015).

Reparations include any financial, psychosocial, educational, property restoration support along with other resources meant to restore stability among civilian populations. While reparations are an important aspect of restoring the civilians' trust in the government, it must be acknowledged that a post-civil war state is likely facing great economic setbacks which may limit its abilities in every mechanism, but especially one that relies on providing the population with resources that the state itself may not have a plethora of (De Hoon 2020).

Amnesty refers to the impunity granted to ex-combatants or armed groups. Amnesty is very common after civil wars, especially when there is the presence of a peace agreement, because it excuses crimes committed during the conflict, outside of those hostilities that must be prosecuted such as genocide or crimes against humanity, which is often favorable for both sides of the conflict (United Nations 2010). Amnesty can often upset certain populations in the state, if they perceive that someone who harmed them is not met with justice. This was the case in Colombia after the largest rebel group, the FARC, was given amnesty for their crimes during the over 50-year conflict. The result was civilian violent pushback to ex-FARC members' reintegration into society (Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009).

Prosecutions refer to the trials conducted in order to achieve justice among those who were victimized during the conflict. Comprehensive prosecutions include instances where the government not only holds ex-combatants accountable for their crimes, but specifically members

of their own coalition. By acknowledging its own role in the atrocities of the conflict, comprehensive prosecutions allow a way for the post-civil war government to demonstrate its commitment to accountability. This may not only increase the government's legitimacy in the eyes of civilians but may increase the ex-combatants' trust in them as well.

Opportunity-Motivated Mechanisms

In some cases, the post-conflict government may pursue prosecutions for all parties involved in the conflict other than its own, which can risk increased animosity between the groups, but also solidifies the power of the new government (Loyle & Appel 2017). Along with this, without established trust in the judicial system, such a mechanism would not go far in terms of providing the population with much needed justice (Vinjamuri & Snyder 2015).

Purges include the removal of members from the new opposition parties from public office positions. Similarly, exiles refer to ex-combatants' voluntary or forced retreat from the state. They aim to deepen the legitimacy of the new government and its institutions, however, may have the effect of deepening the polarization between the new government and the losing sides to the conflict— especially since most purges are directed only at the losing side (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates & Elster 2012). If ex-combatants are removed from their jobs, they may be more likely to return to conflict. This was the case after the de-Ba'athification conducted by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after the toppling of the Hussein regime. Former members of the Ba'athist party joined al-Qaeda, and eventually ISIS, due to their resentment towards the western influence in purging them from their former livelihoods, as well as the lack of other employment means (Johnson 2020).

Hypothesis:

In order for a post-civil war state to achieve durable peace, it must prioritize reconciliation within all the different actors in the state, but especially those with prior experience with violence. This is supported by the fact that implementing grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms has been demonstrated to reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, while also aimed to reduce conflict recurrence, put ex-combatants in a vulnerable position with the state. Therefore, an active effort must be put towards ensuring ex-combatants that the post-conflict government will act in ways that they perceive as fair.

H1: Implementing both grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in post-civil war states will reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

My hypothesis is based on the idea that the more concerted an effort a post-conflict government takes towards peace, the more the government demonstrates its commitment to the peace process. There is an understanding that implementing certain transitional justice mechanisms can lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence. Further, international donors have been operating under the understanding that implementing DDR programs in post-civil war states will contribute to reducing the likelihood of conflict recurrence. It can be argued then, that if a state puts the effort into both mechanisms, there will be a reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence. However, the new government must not only prove commitment to the peace process, but also prioritize reconciliation rather than consolidating their power, in order to truly build confidence with former rebel groups. Doing so will likely encourage ex-combatants to trust that the new government will consider their grievances, while also encouraging reconciliation

between the ex-combatants and civilians. Specifically, including reparations and truth commissions in conjunction with DDR programs will prevent civilians from resenting ex-combatants for receiving benefits, especially in the reintegration step of the program. Further, since it has been noted that reintegration is a step not often fulfilled, and the first two stages of DDR have cost ex-combatants, restraining from implementing opportunity-motivated mechanisms will ensure that ex-combatants do not perceive that they are being actively disenfranchised.

The argument behind why grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms are effective at reducing the likelihood of conflict recurrence is very similar to that of why DDR processes may do the same. Both processes have a shared goal of reducing the likelihood of conflict recurrence, and both do so by addressing the populations' grievances. Since DDR mostly caters to ex-combatants and transitional justice to civilians, implementing each will ensure that as many groups as possible feel acknowledged by the post-civil war state. Each process cannot achieve durable peace on its own, there are many factors that affect whether or not a conflict recurs, therefore it is logical to strive to take a holistic approach. This means, having different processes complimenting and informing the other will allow each of them to reach their greatest potential.

Further, transitional justice mechanisms are in the position to impact the levels of trust the ex-combatants have in the new government, and possibly their participation in DDR programs. Often, ex-combatants demand amnesty in exchange for participation in DDR programs, which can be seen in the cases of Colombia and El Salvador (Segovia 2009; Jaramillo, Giha & Torres 2009). In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the post-conflict government ensured ex-combatant participation in the DDR program by waiting to pursue prosecutions until after the

program began (United Nations 2009; Sesay & Suma 2009; Jaye 2009). Another example of the impacts of pursuing DDR and transitional justice is the purged Ba'athist members joining Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Purging established that the state did not want to include the group, and even cost members their jobs—discouraging participation in DDR and increasing their likelihood of turning back to violence. On the other hand, if the new government is seen as too giving to the ex-combatants, it may hurt their legitimacy in the eyes of formerly victimized civilian populations. This occurred in Rwanda, where the state provided reinsertion benefits to ex-combatants, but nothing for genocide survivors, causing increased resentment (United Nations 2009). The United Nations suggests designing DDR in conjunction with a reparations program for civilians, in order to rectify the benefits ex-combatants receive in the reintegration phase of DDR (United Nations 2010). This approach was adapted by East Timor, where the reintegration stage of DDR was tied to the truth commissions and reparations programs, ensuring both victim and ex-combatant participation in the truth commission, therefore allowing for the reintegration and reparations programs to be designed accordingly (United Nations 2009).

My study contributes to the post-conflict peacebuilding field by providing an empirical evaluation of DDR programs' impact on conflict recurrence. Even though DDR programs have become popular for use in post-civil war states, their impacts and effectiveness have mostly been tested through case studies that focus on implementation and technical issues, and the impacts of the program on the individual level (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). Following the suggestion of DDR scholars, I compliment my quantitative study with a case study to investigate important nuances further (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010; Banholzer 2014). Additionally, while the United Nations and other leaders in the field have discussed the potential for DDR and transitional justice to work together, my thesis provides an empirical test to that suggestion.

Chapter 3

Research Design

Why do some post-civil war states return to conflict while others are able to maintain a durable peace? My hypothesis suggests that post-civil war states that implement both disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and at least one grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism, will have a lower likelihood of returning to conflict than those that do not. I adapt the research approach of similar studies that have been conducted to evaluate the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on conflict recurrence, in order to explore the additional impact of DDR. My theory is based on the notion that emphasizing reconciliation by building trust between ex-combatants, post-conflict government, and civilians will reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Commitment to reconciliation can be indicated by the types of processes that the post-civil war government chooses to implement. A way to build confidence between parties is to take as holistic and asserted an approach as possible— meaning attempting to implement both a transitional justice process(es) and a DDR program. I explore these ideas by looking at whether or not there was a presence of each in a post-civil war-episode.

DDR Data

To measure the use of DDR in post-conflict states, I use a list provided by scholars from the Swedish government agency for peace, security, and development (The Folke Bernadotte Academy) of 56 DDR programs in post-civil war contexts, between 1953 and 2006 (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). This list is the most comprehensive list of DDR programs available, while other data sources for DDR include only those programs which were supported or

implemented by the United Nations. The post-civil war- episode is coded with a (1) if there was a DDR program, and a (0) if not.

A limitation in measuring or comparing DDR programs is that there is often a difference in the program that was laid out in formal legislation, and what actually gets implemented.

Specifically, states often put minimal effort towards fulfilling the reintegration step.

Additionally, all programs may differ from each other in prominent ways such as what actors are involved in implementation, the sequencing, the amount of money and resources put into it, and even the specific plans for the program. It is for these reasons that empirical studies comparing the success of DDR programs are limited in validity, and great consideration must be taken for each state's specific conditions surrounding the process. My thesis accounts for this by including a case study, allowing for a more in-depth exploration of the specific conditions and factors that can impact the success of such programs in securing peace.

Transitional Justice Data

To measure the use of transitional justice following armed conflict, I use the Post-Conflict Justice (PCJ) Dataset (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates & Elster 2012), which codes six transitional justice mechanisms (purges, exiles, prosecutions, amnesty, truth-telling commissions, and reparations). This dataset includes all conflicts from 1950-2006, coding for whether or not a post-conflict justice process was implemented within 5 years after the end of the conflict and includes data on who the target and senders of each process are, in order to ensure that such processes were used in direct relation to the conflict episode of interest. With the differentiation for the target and sender of each process, I am able to test for the specific impacts

of processes aimed at addressing grievances. Using the target and sender information, I was able to follow the research design of Binningsbø et al. to create a grievance variable. The grievance variable is a dichotomous variable that codes (1) for any instance where there was an implementation of a truth commission, reparations, amnesty, or comprehensive trials, and (0) if none were implemented. Since this dataset builds upon the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, with each using the conflict episode structure, it is set up in a way that makes it straightforward to test the direct impact of these mechanisms on conflict recurrence. This dataset is the most comprehensive in terms of providing information for different processes and by only including processes that directly relate to the conflict of interest.

Limitations

There are potential limitations in joining the DDR data with the PCJ dataset. The PCJ dataset is concerned with conflict episodes and the processes that are implemented in response to the conflict as a whole, within 5 years. On the other hand, DDR programs are often aimed at specific rebel groups within the main conflict, and some programs can begin before the conflict ends. If a DDR program is only directed at certain groups, or if multiple DDR programs are implemented following a single conflict episode, there will be discrepancies in the data, which uses a dichotomous variable to determine only if there was the presence of a program at all. Therefore, only 44 of the 56 programs were used in the analysis. Additionally, there were 9 post-civil war episodes that had DDR and transitional justice, but the transitional justice mechanisms were not included in the analysis because they were not implemented within the 5-year window following the conflict. These were mostly cases in which the DDR program was implemented

prior to the official end to the conflict and include Iraq, Nepal, Burundi, Colombia, Philippines, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The case study in the following chapter addresses this by exploring the case of Colombia.

Variables

Following the structure of the PCJ dataset, my unit of analysis is the post-civil war-episode year as coded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The data includes 154 civil war episodes between 1950-2006. In line with the definition of a civil war from the Correlates of War project, a conflict episode is coded as a civil war if it involves violence inside the metropole of the state side of the conflict, participation from the national government, and has had over 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year during the conflict (Jones, Stuart & Singer 1996). UCDP has a low battle death threshold and therefore includes conflicts with low intensity violence, so I look specifically at civil wars because DDR programs were created to address situations in which all sides of a highly destructive conflict have to live within the same state.

My dependent variable is the duration of post-civil war peace— meaning the probability that peace fails in a given year, given it has survived up to that year. In line with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a post-civil war episode is coded as peace failing if there were 25 battle-related deaths within one year, after the period of peace that followed the end of the conflict. Out of the 154 conflict episodes, there were 83 instances of conflict recurrence.

My independent variables include the presence of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration programs, and presence of transitional justice mechanisms. In order to test for the impacts of DDR and grievance transitional justice mechanisms together, I created a DDR &

grievance variable that assigns a (1) to instances in which there was both the presence of DDR and at least one grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism, and a (0) if not. By creating a variable that accounts for both DDR and grievance-motivated transitional justice together, in addition to a DDR variable and a grievance variable, I am able to effectively evaluate the specific impacts on conflict recurrence for each.


I control for conditions in a post-conflict state that have been determined to have a strong influence on conflict recurrence. These include number of battle deaths as a proportion of the population (Fortuna 2004; Hartzell & Hoodie 2003) and the natural log of the duration of conflict measured in months using data from Binningsbø et al (2012) (Hartzell & Hoodie 2003). I also account for the number of rebel groups in the conflict (1-4) from the UCDP/PRIODACD (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Loyle & Appel 2017). I include an ethnic war variable to control for whether the conflict was based on an ethnic incompatibility (1 if yes 0 if no) (Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom 2008). Using the Correlates of War data for the number of military personnel, (Singer, Brenner, Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987) I control for the size of the army (Fortuna 2004, Loyle & Appel 2017). In line with Loyle & Appel (2017), I include a Cold War variable (1 if after 0 if before) (Kreutz 2008), a regime type variable (1 if > 6 on net-Polity scale 0 otherwise) (Marshall & Jagger 2002), and a power-sharing variable (1 if yes 0 if no). Using data from Kreutz, I control for whether the conflict ended in victory (1 for decisive victory 0 otherwise) (Fortuna 2004) and whether the conflict ended in a peace agreement (1 if agreement present 0 otherwise) (Hartzell & Hoodie 2003). From Gleditsch et al (2002), I include GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth (natural log of each) to control for the impact of the state's economy (Collier et al 2008; Fortuna 2004).

Chapter 4

Results & Analysis

Out of the 154 Civil War episodes included in my analysis, 76 (49.3%) of them employed at least one transitional justice mechanism, 44 (28.6%) implemented a DDR program, 27 (17.5%) implemented at least one transitional justice mechanism and a DDR program, 22 (14.2%) implemented at least one grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism and a DDR program, and 12 (7.8%) implemented at least one opportunity-motivated transitional justice mechanism and a DDR program. The map below showcases instances of post-civil war states. The state is colored light blue if there was no implementation of a DDR program, blue if there was a DDR program, and dark blue if there was both a DDR program and at least one transitional justice mechanism implemented in a single post-conflict episode period. This map demonstrates that DDR programs have been used after civil wars in all regions of the world.

Figure 1. Map of Civil Wars 1950-2006



It is important to note that DDR programs are relatively new to use in post-conflict contexts, and while becoming more popular since the 1990s, are employed at a lower rate than transitional justice processes. This is important because it may impact the ability to accurately evaluate the impact of DDR programs on conflict recurrence on a large scale.

Empirical Results

I use a Cox Proportional Hazards model with robust standard errors clustered around the country in order to test my hypothesis. The results are presented as hazard ratios, which can be understood as increasing the likelihood of conflict recurrence if a hazard is greater than 1, while hazard ratios below 1 decrease the likelihood of the hazard (conflict recurrence) occurring. For example, a hazard ratio of 1.2 indicates an increase in the likelihood of a hazard occurring by 20%, while a hazard ratio of 0.2 indicates a decrease in the likelihood that a hazard occurs by 80%. Since I expect the presence of both a DDR program and grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism to decrease the likelihood of conflict recurrence, I expect a hazard ratio lower than 1. In order to ensure that it is the synergy between DDR and transitional justice processes that impact conflict recurrence, I also test the impact of DDR and grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms alone on conflict recurrence. In Table 1., the hazard ratios for DDR, grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms, and DDR with grievance-motivated mechanisms, are all less than one and statistically significant. This indicates that all are associated with a lower likelihood of conflict recurrence than states that don't implement them.

Table 2. Determinants of Conflict Recurrence

	Model 1 <i>DDR</i>	Model 2 <i>Grievance PCJ</i>	Model 3 <i>DDR with Grievance PCJ</i>
DDR	0.504** (0.155)	–	–
Grievance PCJ	–	0.273*** (0.082)	–
DDR & Grievance PCJ	–	–	0.196*** (0.072)
Victory	0.361** (0.123)	0.342** (0.106)	0.339** (0.116)
Peace agreement	0.402** (0.178)	0.613 (0.276)	0.656 (0.247)
Power-sharing	0.646 (0.285)	0.463** (0.150)	0.507* (0.175)
Battle deaths	1.55e+08 (2.30e+09)	1.58e+17** (2.87e+18)	5.40e+13* (7.96e+14)
Duration	0.980 (0.101)	0.902 (0.095)	0.944 (0.101)
GDP growth	0.173* (0.157)	0.157** (0.131)	0.174* (0.158)
GDP (lag)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)
Democracy	0.763 (0.368)	0.721 (0.337)	0.747 (0.367)
Number of rebel groups	2.010*** (0.323)	2.349*** (0.352)	2.185*** (0.363)
Cold War	1.460 (0.305)	1.451 (0.390)	1.592* (0.420)
Military personnel	0.762 (0.131)	0.715** (0.113)	0.740 (0.136)
Ethnic war	0.959 (0.217)	1.281 (0.263)	1.020 (0.233)

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < 0.01


The hazard ratio of 0.504 indicates that a state which implements DDR reduces the likelihood of conflict recurring by about 50% ($1 - 0.5 = 0.5$; $0.5 \times 100 = 50\%$), while the hazard ratio of 0.273 indicates that grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms reduce the

likelihood of conflict recurrence by about 73%, and a hazard ratio of 0.196 shows that DDR with grievance mechanisms reduce the probability of returning to conflict by about 80%. This suggests support for my hypothesis that states which implement a DDR program and a grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism are less likely to return to conflict than those that do not.

Additionally, several of the control variables are statistically significant in their impact on conflict recurrence, with victory, presence of a peace agreement, power-sharing agreements, GDP growth, and army size decreasing the likelihood of conflict recurrence, and battle deaths, number of rebel groups, and conflicts that started after the end of the Cold War predicting higher likelihoods of conflict recurrence.

The hazard ratios provide an indication that DDR, grievance mechanisms, and DDR combined with grievance mechanisms, can each serve to reduce the chance of a state returning to conflict, with DDR combined with grievance mechanisms having the greatest impact. In order to further demonstrate each policy combination's impact on conflict recurrence over time, I present survival functions in Figure 2. The graph shows that DDR on its own is not a strong indicator for stable peace. In fact, from 6-20 years, a state that implemented only a DDR program and no grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism can be more likely to return to conflict than if they implemented neither. The graph supports the findings demonstrated in Table 1, that post-civil war states which implemented both grievance mechanisms and DDR have a much higher likelihood for stable peace than states that only implemented DDR or chose to implement neither. The graph supports the theory that addressing grievances is important in attaining a durable peace.

Figure 2. DDR and Grievance PCJ Impacts on Conflict Recurrence Over Time



Implications

These findings suggest that while DDR and grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms together can reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence significantly, the impact of DDR is not as great as the impact of the grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism. This finding possibly reflects the fact that many DDR programs do not follow through with the reintegration step, which has the potential to hurt the trust ex-combatants have in the new government, further entrenching resentment. Future research can test this by collecting new data which differentiates DDR programs that conducted the reintegration step from ones that did not. Overall, the results of the analysis suggest support for the theory that a post-conflict government

that addresses the grievances of the population can reduce the chance that their state falls back into violence.

It is important to keep in mind that there may not be enough data on DDR, or instances that DDR has been implemented to accurately test its impacts on conflict recurrence, therefore additional studies should be conducted as more DDR programs are implemented over time. It should also be taken into consideration that it may not be the mechanisms or DDR programs themselves that impact whether or not conflict recurs, but the conditions in the post-civil war state that influenced the government to choose to implement both. For example, choosing to implement a grievance-motivated mechanism along with DDR could point to the fact that the post-civil war government was fundamentally more interested in building confidence with former rebel groups. Therefore, the impact would not come from the programs or processes themselves, but the post-conflict government's demonstrated willingness to work with rebel groups. In order to evaluate the functions of the programs and their implementation in practice, I explore the case of the civil war in Colombia, specifically as it relates to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group. This case study allows for a more in-depth understanding of the conditions that may make a post-conflict government more inclined to implement certain mechanisms as well as the impacts of their implementation.

Chapter 5

Case Study: Colombia

The quantitative analysis suggests that post-civil war states which implement both a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program and at least one grievance-motivated (amnesty, reparations, truth commissions, comprehensive trials) transitional justice mechanism have a reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence. However, there are many factors that contribute to conflict recurrence, and each conflict should be analyzed with its specific contexts in mind. Further, it is important to investigate the specific ways in which DDR programs and transitional justice mechanisms interact with each other in order to understand their potential impact on conflict recurrence more thoroughly. In this chapter, I evaluate the synergies between DDR and transitional justice in the context of the Colombian conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that began in 1966 and officially ended in 2016. Every conflict is unique, and the Colombian civil war distinguishes itself in several different ways. In fact, Colombia is the only civil war in the PCJ dataset that had 4 or more rebel groups. This is important because while I focus on the most prominent anti-government group, the FARC; there still remains an on-going, low-intensity conflict with the National Liberation Army (ELN).

Conflict History

The state of Colombia has been engaged in civil conflict for the greater part of the last century. Following the end of La Violencia (1948-1958), a right-wing party took power and excluded other groups from power-sharing, specifically leftist and indigenous groups. In response, leftist leaders organized various communities in several impoverished areas in the

state, specifically along the countryside and the Andes, aiming to defend those disenfranchised by the government's capitalist agendas (Stanford University 2019). Around the late 1960s, several leftist, indigenous, and pro-democracy groups became militant, including: the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Maoist Popular Liberation Front (EPL), the April 19th Movement (M-19), and Quintin Lame. The emergence of these groups and the attacks that followed are noted as the beginning of the 1966 conflict. The groups engaged in fighting with the Colombian military and its right-wing paramilitary groups, the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), for decades. Unfortunately, about 82% of the 260,000 victims of the war were civilians, with the AUC being responsible for half of those deaths. The most prominent rebel group in the state, the FARC, controlled a third of the territory in Colombia by the 1980s. They grew by offering social services and military training to sympathizers, and generated income by kidnapping for ransom and dominating the drug trade.

The Colombian conflict is complicated, it is at the same time a war of left vs right ideology and democratic vs authoritarian values, with added elements of identity (indigenous people) and organized crime (drug trade) (Bell, O'Rourke, Matzner 2015). With several rebel groups staging attacks, the conflict that began in 1966 was devastating, causing the government to attempt ceasefires and negotiations as early as the 1980s. However, large scale mistrust between parties and the continuation of violence, inhibited many agreements from reaching their potential.

Peace agreements in the late 1980s were successful in demobilizing the M-19, EPL, and Quintin Lame movements, however violence between the government and the FARC, ELN, and AUC continued to escalate (Bell, O'Rourke, Matzner 2015; BBC 2018). A 1984 peace deal with the FARC allowed the group to establish a political party, the Patriotic Union (UP). However

elected officials from the UP party were victims of assassinations and kidnappings by government-aligned groups like the AUC, eliminating any trust that was formed by the agreement, encouraging the FARC to return to violence (Stanford University 2019). In the late 1990s, violence became so outstanding that ¼ of the population marched to demand peace, sparking a resumption of peace negotiations. Peace talks were unsuccessful with leftist groups, but President Uribe, elected in 2002, formed an agreement with the AUC to take advantage of their assistance in cracking down on leftist violence. This was successful in weakening the FARC and severely weakening the ELN, but it only generated more resentment and mistrust.

Prospects for peace heightened in 2010, with the election of Juan Santos to the presidency. After many years and many broken ceasefire agreements, the Santos Administration was able to reach an agreement with the FARC in 2016.³ Today, the FARC has officially disarmed, demobilized, and became a political party. While the 2016 agreement has made major strides at decreasing the group's threat, there remains a concern for dissidents in the region. In recent years, former demobilized FARC members have been the targets of violence themselves, as some communities feel that the group got off too easy with the peace agreement (Otis 2020). This is interesting, considering the apparent acceptance of peace with the AUC, who was responsible for many more civilian casualties than the FARC.

In the first elections since the official end to the conflict with the FARC in 2018, the right-wing candidate won by a small margin, reflecting an increased sympathy for leftist policies. Still, right-wing leadership poses a threat to the FARC, which can be seen in the fact that great attention was paid to disarmament and demobilization, with minimal effort towards

³ Peace talks with the ELN were not prioritized as the group's destruction on account of the AUC made them less of a threat; the peace negotiations attempted in 2017 were halted due to continued ELN violence. Today, what remains of the group is active in Venezuela (Stanford University 2019).

reintegration. In the next section, I examine the ways including and linking DDR and grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms stabilized the prospect for peace in Colombia.

DDR with Transitional Justice in the 2016 Havana Peace Agreement

While there were many different agreements and provisions outlining disarmament and demobilization throughout the conflict, I will focus on the Havana Peace Agreement that officially ended the conflict with the FARC in November 2016. This agreement acknowledged, “The various mechanisms and measures for truth, justice, reparations and non-recurrence, inasmuch as they are part of a system that seeks a comprehensive answer for the victims, cannot be interpreted in isolation. They will be interconnected through relationships of conditionality and incentives to gain access to and maintain any special justice treatment, always based on the acknowledgment of the truth and responsibilities” (Havana Agreement 2016 p.139).

A common obstacle in beginning the DDR process is establishing the necessary trust between the government and the rebel group that allows rebels to feel safe enough to turn in their weapons without fear of violence from the state. States have taken different approaches in establishing this trust, but Colombia provides an example of using transitional justice mechanisms to aid in this necessary confidence building. The Havana Peace Agreement lays out the processes and bodies that make up what the agreement refers to as the “Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparations, and Non-Repetition”. For the purposes of this case study, I focus specifically on the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Recurrence Commission, Special Jurisdiction for Peace, and the reparations measures for victims.

The agreement is set up in a way that fosters conditionality between the different mechanisms and goals it pursues. For example, one of the main terms of the agreement was that the FARC provide a list of all its members to the government in order to begin the DDR process. This is a risk for the FARC because members may fear subjection to violence or forms of justice pursuits. To reconcile this, the list of members is exchanged with conditional amnesty for every name on the list, given they have not committed war crimes or crimes against humanity⁴, and given the ex-combatants continue to participate in the various transitional justice processes. Tying amnesty to the DDR process was successful considering FARC leadership provided the list of members and completed the disarmament and demobilization processes for 13,185 out of the estimated 14,000 members by 2017 (Colombia Peace 2020).

Due to the long history of the conflict and the several failed attempts at peace, the government was aware that the FARC would be highly unlikely to agree to enter a disarmament process that gave the government control of their weapons. Therefore, they commissioned the United Nations to facilitate the disarmament process, giving them control of the arms— which the FARC was comfortable enough to accept. The demobilization process was territory-based, meaning there were several Transitional Location Zones for Normalization (TLZN) throughout the state so that members could be located near their homes. The ex-combatants had to remain in the TLZNs during the 6 month disarmament and demobilization process, after which they had the option of returning home, or remaining in the zones, which converted to reincorporation camps. The agreement took the opportunity to use the TLZNs as spaces to integrate transitional justice mechanisms into the DDR process.

⁴ Crimes of such caliber are never eligible for amnesty under international law

The Truth, Coexistence and Non-Recurrence Commission describes the extrajudicial process of investigating events that took place during the conflict and their implications. This truth commission takes a holistic approach and the terms of the agreement require both FARC and government involvement in addition to civilian participation, with specific focus on the indigenous people who were disproportionately affected by the conflict. Notably, there was an acknowledgement that members of all sides may be victims, regardless of their role in the war. The commission began in 2018 and will release its final report in November 2021 (Colombia Peace 2020). So far, thousands of testimonies have been delivered, including ones from political leaders who served during the war, who had to answer questions about their involvement with paramilitary groups like the AUC and the drug trade. Members of the FARC were given space to express their victimization and lingering security concerns. In addition to participation from the warring sides, civilians and civil society groups expressed their experiences in hundreds of table discussions and participated in capacity building workshops aimed to facilitate coexistence.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) functions as the judicial component to the comprehensive system, however it was designed to serve restorative, not punitive justice. This unit ensures that eligible ex-combatants are granted amnesty so long as they participate in the necessary processes outlined by the agreement. By 2019, almost all of the ex-FARC cases were heard by the JEP, however sentencing will not begin until the end of the truth commission. Ex-combatants or leaders of the FARC who are found guilty of crimes not covered by the amnesty such as murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence will be given a sentence “proportionate to the degree of voluntary or collective contribution of each person to the truth” (Article 5.1.2). This clause encourages ex-combatant participation in the truth commission, promising that those who admit to their crimes, acknowledge their victims, and contribute to reparations, will receive a

reduced sentence. This adds legitimacy to the truth commission and creates space for social reconciliation prior to ex-combatant reintegration into communities. While nothing can truly repair the damage and trauma induced by the war, having ex-combatants acknowledge their role and offer reparations to the populations they have hurt is a major step towards reconciliation.

Considering the exceptionally large toll civilians took in the conflict, both the government and the FARC are responsible for providing reparations for victims. Reparations are designed based on the findings in the truth commission, therefore encouraging victims to tell their story in order to receive the benefits. Providing reparations is difficult given the damage of the conflict; the peace agreement adjusts to this in several ways. First, while FARC members were in the process of demobilization in the TLZNs, they were required to return property and other material assets accumulated during the war, back to the victims. Providing victims with reparations directly from ex-combatants clearly aims towards reconciliation. In addition to material reparations, the government reparations system set up units to focus on returning internally displaced peoples and opportunities for psychosocial support. By 2020, about 1 million of the 8 million victims eligible for government reparations had received them (Colombia Peace 2020).

In addition to participating in the truth, justice, and reparations components of the comprehensive system, ex-combatants also receive the education and training of their choice to prepare for their reentry into society. The peace agreement outlines the promise of a monthly payment to individuals so long as they cooperated in the processes, to compliment the healthcare, educational, and psychosocial support and opportunities also available to them. By providing the ex-combatants with similar resources as victims, with the caveat that ex-combatants turn in their arms, demobilize, and acknowledge and repair for their crimes; the potential for either side to

feel disenfranchised is reduced. Finally, although government-facilitated reintegration has proven to be slow, the plan laid out in the agreement is that ex-combatants will continue to work on reparations even once they are no longer in the zones. This will take the form of rebuilding infrastructure, clearing mines, substituting illegal crops for others, helping to find missing persons, and contributing to environmental initiatives like reforestation. By tying reintegration directly to opportunities for reparations, the ex-combatants are able to find jobs that contribute productively to statebuilding, thus also benefiting victims and the state as a whole. While most ex-combatants have chosen to opt-out of the national reintegration program, many joined a FARC-run reintegration program, the Social Economies of the Common (ECOMUN). This program allows ex-rebels to formulate their own government-approved and funded projects individually or collectively. Today, 70% of these projects are focused on rural development, and almost all have received government funding (Colombia Peace 2020).

Lessons Learned

There are several ways in which the Havana Peace Agreement capitalized on the potential for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes to interact with grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms in a way that fosters reconciliation to reduce the likelihood of conflict recurring. Specifically, providing amnesty in exchange for entry into the DDR program can be noted as one of the reasons for the success in disarming and demobilization of about 95% of the group. Further, since amnesty benefits are only provided so long as the individual maintains engagement in the transitional justice process, the state was able to gain more involvement, therefore more legitimacy, in their truth commission and reparations

programs. Even though the state-run reintegration program was minimally fulfilled, the government was able to financially support projects that both employed ex-combatants and contributed to addressing civilian grievances relating to rural development. While it is still too early to tell if long-term peace will be sustained in Colombia, the policies laid out in the Havana Peace Agreement provide an example to other states on ways to pursue peace and justice in complementary ways, to ensure that both civilians and ex-combatants feel included in the post-civil war state.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

There are two theories for the best way for post-conflict states to stabilize their prospects for peace. The first of which focuses on consolidating the power of the post-conflict government to establish rule of law and delegitimize opposing groups— reducing the capabilities of such groups to challenge the new government. The other claims that prioritizing reconciliation between former warring parties and civilians by addressing each group’s grievances will diminish motivations to take up arms against the state. A post-conflict state must find the right balance between these two approaches in order to achieve a durable peace. On the one hand, the government must secure legitimacy by ensuring opposition groups are not easily able to jeopardize rule of law; while on the other, they must ensure that their efforts in that regard do not go so far as to entrench grievances to fuel further resentment. The balance becomes even more complicated when considering how to prevent civilian resentment during this process. There are many policy options for post-conflict states to consider in order to achieve this balance. Recent literature suggests that implementing specific transitional justice mechanisms aimed to address grievances makes durable peace more likely than implementing mechanisms to consolidate state power. My thesis builds on this literature by evaluating the additional effect of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs in conjunction with grievance-motivated transitional justice processes. The theory behind this is that DDR programs serve to decrease the physical and potential threat of ex-combatants, while grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms foster necessary reconciliation.

I use the Post Conflict Justice Dataset and data from the Folke Bernadotte Academy to conduct a quantitative test to the suggestion that implementing both a disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration program and a grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism will reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence. The results of the analysis indicate support for my hypothesis, with post-civil war states that implement both a DDR program and at least one grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanism having an 80% reduction in their likelihood of returning to conflict. Through the case study of Colombia, I demonstrate specific ways in which the DDR programs and transitional justice mechanisms can interact and the implications that follow. While it may be too soon to determine whether or not the synergies between DDR and transitional justice produced a durable peace for Colombia, this case can be used as an example for legislators to evaluate the potential for the processes to work together to share information and achieve their common goal of conflict reduction.

The results of my study suggest that while grievance-motivated mechanisms on their own make returning to conflict less likely, the added effect of DDR programs makes peace even more durable. This supports the theory that while it is important to ensure that ex-combatants no longer pose a physical threat to the safety of the state and civilians, it is especially important to respond to the grievances of all members of the state. Specifically, in order to sufficiently minimize the threat of ex-combatants, disarming and demobilizing them is not enough, and great attention and effort must be put towards confidence building. Otherwise, there will be less motivation on the side of the ex-combatants to engage in the DDR process, or the peace efforts that follow. The case study of Colombia demonstrates that one way to encourage ex-combatant participation in the peace process is by exchanging participation with amnesty (where eligible) or reduced sentences. By achieving ex-combatant participation in truth commissions and reparations programs in addition to DDR programs, each process was able to gain legitimacy, potentially making their impacts more profound.

Having both a DDR program and grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms may impact the likelihood of conflict recurrence in several ways. Due to the limitations in my study, it is possible that it is not these programs themselves, but the conditions that make policy actors more likely to agree to prescribe these programs that reduces the likelihood of returning to conflict. For example, in the case of Colombia, the government likely recognized that the high levels of mistrust and the several failed attempts at peace would require policies that would limit the possibility of increasing resentment. Further, the relative strength of the rebel groups could impact their ability to negotiate policies that are more favorable to them.

As DDR programs are relatively new for use in post-civil war states, scholars should continue their efforts into analyzing the program's impacts on conflict recurrence. Specifically, scholars should examine the differences in the impacts of DDR programs that complete reintegration from those that leave that stage unfulfilled in order to test the theory of addressing grievances in regard to DDR programs on their own. Future research should also focus on whether there are specific conditions in the post-civil war state that make it more likely for a government to implement both a DDR program and grievance-motivated transitional justice mechanisms. Further, effort should be put towards evaluating the impacts of the sequencing of DDR and the transitional justice mechanisms to provide a more specific roadmap to policy actors. In addition to sequencing, attention should be put towards exploring more opportunities to link DDR with transitional justice mechanisms in ways that increase information sharing and confidence building. By taking a holistic approach that addresses grievances effectively, the prospects for peace in post-civil war states may become stronger, reducing the possibility of conflict and the suffering that follows.

Appendix A

DDR & Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Post-Civil War States (1950-200)

Country	Start Year	End Year	Rebel Groups	DDR	Transitional Justice
Bolivia	1946	1946	Popular Revolutionary Movement		
China	1946	1949	Peoples Liberation Army	X	X Exile, Purge
Greece	1946	1949	DSE		X Exile
Indonesia	1946	1949	Indonesian Peoples Army		
Iran	1979	1988	KDPI		
Laos	1946	1953	Lao Issara		
Philippines	1946	1954	HUK		X Trial
Philippines	1969	1995	CPP		
Philippines	1999	2006	CPP		
Lithuania	1946	1948	BDPS		X Exile
Ukraine	1946	1950	UPA		X Exile
Vietnam	1946	1954	Viet Nam doc lap dong minh hoi		
Taiwan	1947	1947	Taiwanese insurgents		
Hyderabad	1947	1948	CPI		
Madagascar	1947	1947	MDRM		X Exile, Opposition Trials
Paraguay	1947	1947	Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists)		
Burma	1948	1992	KNU		
Burma	2005	on-going	KNU		
Burma	1948	1988	BCP, leftist organisations		
Burma	1990	1992	ABSDF		
Burma	1948	1988	Arakan Insurgents		
Costa Rica	1948	1948	National Liberation Army		X Exile
India	1996	2012	PWG, MCC, CPI-M		
Malaysia	1948	1957	CPM		
South Korea	1948	1950	Leftist insurgents (e.g. Inmin-gun: Peoples Army, military faction)		
Yemen (North)	1948	1948	Opposition coalition		
Yemen (North)	1962	1970	Royalists		X Exile
Burma	1961	1992	KIO		
Guatemala	1965	1995	MR-13, FAR, EGP, PGT, ORPA, URNG	X	X Exile, Amnesty, Reparations, Truth Commission, Comprehensive Trials
Israel	1949	1964	Palestine insurgents		
Israel	1965	1996	Palestine insurgents, PLO groups, Fatah, PIJ, Hamas		
Israel	2000	on-going	Fatah, PIJ, Hamas, AMB		
China	1950	1950	Tibet		
China	1956	1956	Tibet		
China	1959	1959	Tibet		X Exile
Indonesia	1950	1950	Republic of South Moluccas		X Exile
Thailand	1974	1982	CPT		
Kenya	1952	1956	Mau Mau		
Cuba	1956	1958	Movimiento 26 De Julio: 26th of July Movement		X Exile, Purge, Opposition Trials

Indonesia	1953	1953	Darul Islam Movement		
Indonesia	1958	1961	PRRI, Permesta movement, Darul Islam Movement		X Amnesty, Opposition trials
Morocco	1953	1956	Istiqlal		
Tunisia	1953	1956	National Liberation Army		
Algeria	1954	1962	FLN, MNA		X Amnesty
Argentina	1973	1977	ERP, Montoneros		X Exile
South Vietnam	1955	1964	FNL		
India	1956	1959	NNC		
India	2005	on-going	NSCN (I-M)		
Cameroon	1957	1959	UPC		X Amnesty
Iraq	1959	1959	Nationalists		
Iraq	1991	1996	SCIRI		
Iraq	2004	2012	Al-Mahdi Army, Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna, TQJBR, various groups	X	
Lebanon	1958	1958	Independent Nasserite Movement /Mourabitoun militia		
Lebanon	1975	1990	Lebanese Army (Aoun), Lebanese Forces, Syria	X	X Exile, Amnesty, Opposition Trials
Laos	1959	1961	Neutrals, Pathet Lao		
Laos	1963	1973	Pathet Lao, North Vietnam		X Comprehensive Trials
Angola	1961	1974	MPLA, FNLA, UNITA		X Amnesty
Burma	1960	1970	SSA, SSIA		
Burma	1976	1988	SSNPLO, SSRA, MTA, PSLO		
Burma	1993	1995	MTA		
Burma	2005	on-going	SSA/s		
Ethiopia	1976	1991	TPLF, EPDM, OLF, EPRP, EPRDF	X	X Exile
Nepal	1996	2006	CPN-M/UPF	X	X Truth Commission
France	1961	1962	OAS		X Exile, Amnesty, Opposition Trials
Iraq	1961	1970	KDP		X Amnesty, Reparations
Iraq	1973	1993	DPK, PUK		
Ethiopia	1962	1991	ELF, ELF factions, EPLF	X	
Guinea-Bissau	1963	1973	PAIGC		X Amnesty
Sudan	1963	1972	Anya Nya/SSLM		X Amnesty
Congo/Zaire	1964	1965	CNL		X Exile
Congo/Zaire	1996	2001	RCD, RCD-ML, MLC, Rwanda, Uganda	X	X Truth Commission
Mozambique	1964	1974	Frelimo		X Exile, Purge
Burundi	1994	2006	Palipehutu-FNL, CNDD-FDD	X	
Chad	1965	1990	Various groups, Libya, Military faction, MOSANAT, Islamic Legion, MPS	X	X Exile
Chad	1999	2002	MDJT		X Amnesty
Chad	2005	2010	RAFD, RDL/FUCD, UFDD	X	X Amnesty
Colombia	1966	on-going	EPL, M-19, FARC, ELN, Faction of FARC, Faction of ELN, MAO, Quintin Lame	X	X Amnesty, Reparations, Truth Commission, Opposition Trials
Dominican Republic	1965	1965	Military faction		X Exile, Amnesty
Indonesia	1976	1978	OPM		X Exile
Peru	1981	1999	MRTA, Sendero Luminoso		X Truth Commission, Opposition Trials

India	1966	1968	MNF		X Exile
South Africa	1966	1988	SWAPO	X	X Amnesty
Syria	1979	1982	Muslim Brotherhood		X Amnesty
Cambodia	1967	1969	KR		
Cambodia	1970	1975	FUNK, North Vietnam		X Amnesty
Cambodia	1978	1978	KNUFNS, Vietnam		
Cambodia	1979	1998	KR, KPNLF, FUNCINPEC	X	X Amnesty
Nigeria	1967	1970	Republic of Biafra		X Exile, Amnesty
Guinea	2000	2001	RFDG		
Philippines	1970	1990	MNLF, MILF	X	
Philippines	1993	2006	MNLF, MNLF faction, ASG, MILF	X	X Reparations
Sudan	1983	2006	SPLM/A, JEM	X	X Comprehensive trials
Pakistan	1971	1971	Mukti Bahini: Liberation Force		X Amnesty, Opposition trials
Sri Lanka	1971	1971	JVP		X Amnesty, Opposition trials
Sri Lanka	1989	1990	JVP		
Uganda	1978	1979	Military faction, UNLA , Tanzania		
Uganda	1981	1991	Various organizations, UPA, UDCA	X	X Amnesty
Uganda	1994	2007	UDCA/LRA	X	X Opposition trials, reparations
United Kingdom	1971	1991	PIRA	X	
El Salvador	1979	1991	ERP, FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC, FMLN	X	X Purge, Amnesty, Truth Commission
Oman	1972	1975	PFLOAG/PFLO, South Yemen		X Amnesty
Rhodesia	1972	1979	ZANU , ZAPU	X	X Amnesty
Chile	1973	1973	Military faction		X Exile, Purge, Amnesty, Opposition Trials
Bangladesh	1974	1992	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini		X Amnesty, Reparations
Pakistan	1974	1977	Baluchi separatists		X Amnesty
Pakistan	2004	on-going	Baluch Ittehad, BLA		
Angola	1975	1995	South Africa, FNLA, Zaire, MPLA faction, UNITA	X	X Amnesty
Angola	1998	2002	UNITA	X	X Amnesty
Ethiopia	1975	1983	WSLF		
Ethiopia	2004	2018	ONLF		
Indonesia	1975	1989	Fretilin	X	
Morocco	1975	1989	POLISARIO		X Amnesty
Mozambique	1977	1992	Renamo	X	X Amnesty, Reparations
Afghanistan	1978	2001	UIFSA, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, Po	X	
Afghanistan	2003	on-going	Taleban	X	
India	2006	on-going	NLFT		
Nicaragua	1978	1979	FSLN		X Exile, Purge, Opposition Trials
Nicaragua	1981	1989	Contras/FDN	X	X Amnesty, Reparations
Somalia	1981	1996	SSDF, SNM, SPM, USC, SSDF, USC-faction	X	
Somalia	2004	on-going	SICS	X	
Iran	1979	1982	Mujahideen e Khalq		
Iran	1986	1988	Mujahideen e Khalq		X Amnesty
Iran	2005	2018	Jondullah, PJAK		
Liberia	1989	1995	INPFL, NPFL	X	X Amnesty

Liberia	2000	2003	LURD	X	X Exile, Amnesty, Truth Commission
South Africa	1981	1988	ANC, PAC, Azapo	X	
India	2003	on-going	UNLF		
India	1983	1993	Sikh insurgents		
Sri Lanka	1983	2001	TELO, PLOTE, LTTE		
Sri Lanka	2005	2009	LTTE		
Cameroon	1960	1961	UPC		
Turkey	1984	on-going	PKK/Kadek/KONGRA-GEL		
Yemen (South)	1986	1986	Faction of Yemenite Socialist Party		X Exile, Amnesty, Opposition Trials
India	1989	on-going	Kashmir Insurgents		
India	1990	1991	ULFA		X Amnesty
India	1994	2006	ULFA		
Indonesia	1990	1991	GAM		X Opposition Trials
Indonesia	1999	2005	GAM	X	X Amnesty, Truth Commission
Rwanda	1990	1994	FPR	X	X Exile
Rwanda	1997	2002	PALIR		
Sierra Leone	1991	2000	RUF (Kamajors)	X	X Amnesty, Reparations, Truth Commission, Comprehensive Trials
Croatia	1991	1991	Republic of Croatia, Croatian irregulars	X	X Comprehensive Trials
Algeria	1992	2006	MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA, GSPC		
Azerbaijan	1992	1994	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia		X Comprehensive Trials
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	1995	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars	X	X Reparations
Egypt	1993	1998	al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya		X Opposition Trials
Georgia	1992	1993	Republic of Abkhazia		X Reparations
Tajikistan	1992	1996	UTO	X	X Amnesty
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993	1994	Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian irregulars (Croatia)	X	X Reparations
Russia	1994	1996	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)		X Purge, Amnesty, Reparations
Russia	1999	2007	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)		
Yemen	1994	1994	Democratic Republic of Yemen		X Exile, Amnesty, Opposition Trials
Pakistan	1995	1996	MQM		X Reparations
Congo-Brazzaville	1997	1999	Angola, Ninjas, Cocoyes, Ntsiloulous	X	X Amnesty, Reparations
Guinea-Bissau	1998	1999	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	X	X Exile
Kosovo	1998	1999	UCK, Belgium, Canada, Czech Rep ,Denmark ,France ,Germany ,Greece ,Hungary ,Iceland	X	X Amnesty, Reparations, Truth Commission, Comprehensive Trials
Ethiopia	1999	2011	OLF		
Central African Republic	2006	on-going	UFDR		
USA/ Afghanistan	2001	2002	al-Qaida (The Base)		X Opposition Trials
Ivory Coast	2002	2004	MJP, MPIGO, Forces Nouvelles	X	
Thailand	2003	on-going	Patani insurgents		
Israel	2006	on-going	Hezbollah		

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ACADEMIC VITA

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EDUCATION

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Studied the Arabic language, Islamic fundamentalism, refugee mental health, and Jewish philosophy

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Research Assistant, Penn State Political Science Department *University Park, PA | 2021*

- Code large quantity of data from Twitter on Labelbox to facilitate machine learning
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Research Intern for Public International Law and Policy Group *Washington D.C | 2019*

- Contributed research, wrote abstracts, and wrote the "Legacies of Conflict" section introduction chapter for *The Post Conflict State Building Handbook*, published by Edward Elgar
- Prepared conflict update briefs for senior staff to be presented at interviews and think tank events
- Managed communication platforms; created and distributed weekly "Getting Downtown" newsletter
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Senator Cory Booker's Office Summer Intern *Newark, NJ | 2018*

- Worked closely with necessary parties to handle constituent casework regarding immigration
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- Led a group project involving legislative research on marijuana legalization
- Participated in the planning and execution of community engagement events hosted by the Senator

Intern for Superintendent of Elections Office *Hackensack, NJ | 2016-2018*

- Actively assisted in the registering of new voters, learning and working through the processes for primary and general elections.

Parano and Associates Field Intern *Bergen County, NJ | 2016-2017*

- Participated in grassroots politics and community outreach for campaigns at local, state, and federal levels

Senate Majority Leader Loretta Weinberg Summer Intern *Teaneck & Trenton, NJ | 2016*

- Helped to address constituent needs, such as facilitating the exchange and distribution of newly discovered Holocaust artifacts
- Conducted legislative research on reducing food waste in NJ

ACTIVITIES & SERVICE

Post 21 Club Social Media Strategist / Provides resources and community to autistic adults *2020-Present*

Lit Corps Tutor / Designed and taught lesson plans for two adult ESL learners *2018-2019*

Restorative Justice Initiative Club Member / Provides supportive programs to those incarcerated or directly impacted by the justice system in the Centre County, PA area *2017-Present*

SKILLS

Language: Modern Standard Arabic (advanced reading and writing; basic speaking)

Computer Proficiency in: Mac, PC Programs: Microsoft Offices, iMovie, Squarespace, Stata, Tableau