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WILL IT BE OVER IN A FEW MONTHS?:
WEIGHING THE COSTS OF HEARTS AND MINDS VERSUS BLOOD AND GUTS

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ABSTRACT

The American strategy in Iraq and the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan both attempted to accomplish state making missions in countries with active enemy insurgencies. Both efforts hinged on separating the insurgency from their base of support in the population. The United States was able to do this in Iraq by providing security, infrastructure and other basic goods to the population thus lowering the population's incentive to support the insurgents. The Soviets attempted to separate the mujahedeen from their support through terror tactics targeted at civilians. Yet, the Soviet strategy actually increased the support for the mujahedeen groups once an influx of foreign aid strengthened the mujahedeen's position militarily. While both strategies would have eventually worked, the American strategy for winning the hearts and minds had much lower cost than a strategy of in which terror is used to suppress the population.

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To Dr. Doug Lemke
For talking me through the process of writing this paper

To those who have served in uniform

It will be over in a Few Months:
Weighing the Cost of Hearts and Minds versus Blood and Guts

Both the United States and the Soviet Union became bogged down in foreign

nations due to counterinsurgencies while trying to build effective and if possible

subservient, governments. Whereas the Soviets left Afghanistan with the clear

expectation that the government they emplaced in Kabul would fail, it appears the United

States may have built a successful government in Baghdad. In this essay, I investigate

these two cases to determine how nation building overcomes or succumbs to

insurgencies. I use these two cases to determine the saliency of four criteria for

determining success. These aspects are government building, force building, destroying

insurgents and winning the population. I find that infrastructure building and limiting

civilian casualties are more directly linked to success than is government building.

Additionally, I find that destroying insurgents is the least beneficial of the criteria.

Moreover, I discuss the link between nation building and a reduction in the population's

participation in and support for insurgencies. The two cases that are studied are the Soviet

Union's invasion of and subsequent war in Afghanistan, during which they tried to build

a socialist government in Kabul, and the United States' invasion, war and state building

mission in Iraq.

A Review of the Literature

Nation building, peace keeping and war making are interconnected by common themes. Most notably they are linked by parallel methods. While I focus on nation building in states with insurgencies, it is necessary to discuss state making and state formation in general since my theory mixes political science theory with aspects of military science theory. I do this in order to frame how states, coalitions of states, and international organizations try to rebuild governments and infrastructure around failed states. Modern theories about state building stem from the 1960s and 1970s when "it was closely linked with the idea of postcolonial modernization (Dempsey, 60,2001)." Yet, there is a logical gap between what drove state formation prior to the involvement of international organizations, super powers and coalitions with the state building theories and doctrine of today.

Some scholars, namely Charles Tilly, link state formation with the process of war making in Europe (Tilly,1990). Since Tilly, other scholars have extended his theory in order to apply it to the rest of the world. Tilly postulated that state structure expands in conjunction with war and the preparation for war modern state making theories emphasize stopping conflict and artificially imposing state structure. Till's proposition that states formed through the checking of internal and external rivals chiefly through war is not an acceptable route for the modern international community. Therefore, it seems as if modern state building is the antithesis of Tilly's process.

Although never explicitly stated by Tilly or modern scholars, the reconciliation between Tilly's state formation theory and modern state making theory seems to stem from the need for foreign powers to promote, and sometimes force, development to reduce the need for checking rivals. Additionally, Tilly's theory does not seem to

reconcile with state making in states with active insurgencies. In these states the government must grow and respond to the insurgencies or the state will become ineffectual. Governments that cannot respond appropriately often fail due to insurgencies.

Modern state formation theory is different from Tilly's and, other similar, propositions. This literature has expanded from western states and postcolonial states, and now encompasses state building in war torn states, newly born states and states destroyed by natural disasters. However, a large portion of this field of literature discusses state building within war-torn states. This literature addresses a wide spectrum of problems and suggests a number of different resolutions.

Most of the avenues to resolution fall under the broad category of liberal peace building. Barnett (2006) defines liberal peace building as "the belief that, to have legitimacy, the state must be organized around liberal-democratic principles and that because liberal democracies are respectful of their societies and peaceful toward their neighbors, they are the foundation of a stable international order" (p.88). While some scholars suggest radical alternatives, both liberal peace building and Barnett's suggested alternative put emphasis on government and infrastructure development as the key element of success.

Even though there is consensus among most scholars about the importance of development in the state building process, the actual implementation of state building theory has faced high rates of failure (Barnett, 2006,88). Some scholars suggest state building is almost impossible. Dempsey (2001,76) suggests that foreign intervention in countries already at war does not and will not reduce the likelihood of further conflict once the foreign intervener leaves. His theory extends to both peace keeping missions and

state building missions, yet my case studies indicate that failure is due to costs and not an inherent problem in state building. Case studies indicate an intervener becomes more likely to accept a situation that has some will fail due to increasing costs as time progresses.

While some scholars question the efficacy of state building, many believe that failure stems from the methods used. Specifically, these scholars discuss the effects of giving aid without oversight. Barakat and Chard (818, 2002) postulate that there is a gap between theory and implementation; they also suggest that interstate aid has remained largely the same since the 1970s. I work within the same logic that claims there is a gap between implementation and theory. As such it rejects Dempsey's larger argument that nation building is by-and-large fruitless. Inherent in my pursuit of the reasons why some cases fails and others do not is the understanding that success in state making depends on the foreign powers' willing to pay the costs of success. This cost is determined by the intervener's strategy relative to the composition of the state. Since no state is the same, approaches must be tailored to those differences.

In another field of literature, scholars retroactively attempt to determine what went wrong in specific cases. This literature often deals with the same recurring single cases. These individual, and occasionally dual, case studies are used to create a list of short suggestions that may only be accurate in the specific cases from which they were developed. Studies of multiple cases in the field of development in war torn countries are nonexistent. Additionally, there is also a lack of research connecting state development theory with counter-insurgency theory. There is research on state development within states suffering from civil war but there is a lack of research on development in states

with insurgencies. It is important to note that most state building missions are conducted in conjunction with military forces.

Conversely, counter-insurgency doctrine takes nation building into account. The trial and error method that has created today's counter-insurgency doctrine recognizes the importance of building stable, productive states. The United State military defines counter insurgency in Field Manual 3-07-22 as the "military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency" (fm,-07-22,2004,iv). Within Western counterinsurgency doctrine there is a focus on political, economic and civic development. Even in traditionally non-western counterinsurgency a premium is put on development to diminish the incentives for joining insurgencies. This is true for native insurgencies and insurgencies against foreign powers. Therefore, it is evident that nation building is a recognized part of modern counter insurgency.

Research Design

1.1

+ Indicates it adds to the costs, - that it lowers the cost, (+-) indicate little affect

In this paper I investigate why some state building endeavors in states with active insurgencies succeed whereas others fail. Conversely, I investigate why some insurgencies succeed or fail in countries that are being supported through foreign intervention. The methods used in counter insurgency and state building within a nation are the most salient factors that account for differences across cases. State building are more likely to succeed when support is given to supporting and building effective government, creating security for the population without collateral damage, and building infrastructure and jobs throughout the state. State building is significantly more likely to fail when an emphasis is put on destroying insurgents at the expense of this doctrine, because this substantially raises the costs for the intervener. Table 1.1 shows the relationship the number of troops and the overall cost for success and how intervening variable rise or lower that cost.

Methods determine levels of success or failure relative to the price the intervener is willing to incur in order to meet their objectives. I argue that strategies that focus on

separating insurgents from their base of support can work; but such strategies cost significantly more for the intervener. These factors are linked to population support for the insurgents. The intervener's main goal is to separate insurgents from their base of support in the population although this does not necessarily translate to the intervener trying to win the support of the population. Government development and strategic and tactical security are integral to the main goal of limiting the insurgent from their base of support in the population.

The Cases

I use a qualitative comparison of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan with that of the United States' experience in Iraq to show how each of the different doctrines affect success. These cases show that foreign powers engaging in counter-insurgencies succeed by gaining the support, or at the very least the apathy, of the population through increases in the quality of life and daily security. The cases also show that foreign powers lose by alienating the population through indiscriminate missions that produce civilian casualties and diminish the quality of life. Additionally, the cases show that producing casualties among regular insurgents has little or no positive effect on the likelihood of success in nation building.

Afghanistan and Iraq were used as cases for three key reasons. First, these cases have two distinctive strategies for nation building and counter insurgency. The strategy in each case seems to be directly linked to that case's outcome. Additionally, a shift in the strategy in Iraq resulted in a distinct change in the situation there. Second, counter insurgency and nation building in these states are linked. Finally, the cases were picked because my theory is being tested in Afghanistan today. The United States is actively applying what it learned in Iraq to Afghanistan.

Measures and Indicators

I use a number of different measures and indicators to show the relationship between insurgency levels and state building. The measures of state building are levels of state capacity. Changes in state capacity and ability of support the population are the indicators of the success and failure of state building, to include infrastructure such as highway building, state built irrigation systems, and other state run projects. Lastly, this category includes military and police training capacity and retention rates. Data about these found in media articles and press releases. I also investigated the effect of civilian casualties and levels of collateral damage on the cost of success. These data were procured from a number of different primary and secondary sources. The nature of the cases chosen means these measures could have been distorted by those who originally reported them.

Afghanistan

The Path toward Intervention

The events leading up to the Soviet invasion are important because they set the

stage for the relationship between the Soviets Union's strategy, insurgency levels, and the

formation of state infrastructure in Afghanistan. Additionally, many of the events will be

referred to in later sections as they are linked to my thesis's independent variables.

The government in Afghanistan has always been somewhat fragmented.

Historically, the various governments that have ruled from the capital have only loosely

controlled the surrounding countryside. Yet, those that control Kabul are recognized as

being the legitimate leaders of the state in the United Nations and various embassies; this

determines who controls foreign policy and incoming, legitimate, foreign aid. In the

midst of the Cold War, King Mohammed Shah of Afghanistan kept his distance from the

Soviet Union and discouraged communist parties in order to avoid the possibility of a

socialist takeover. Despite distancing efforts, two major events occurred that sent

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union on a collision course towards war.

First, the death of Stalin allowed the government of the USSR to begin to focus

on the central Asian states to the USSR's south. Second, concurrently, King Mohammed

Shah was replaced by King Zahir Shah with day-to-day operations under control of the

Prime Minister Sardar Daoud. Daoud would eventually use the military's officer corps to

take full control of the government in a soft coup in 1963. His foreign policy was

markedly different from Shah's in its relations with the Soviets. Additionally, Daoud

believed that Afghanistan's lack of intellectuals made a communist takeover unlikely; as

such he allowed the formation of an organized communist party, the People's Democratic

Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (Feltcher,262,1966). Under Daoud, the government started

courting the Soviets for low interest loans and grants for infrastructure development. At the same time, disillusionment with US foreign aid in conjunction with the revamped foreign policy, led to a shift in Afghanistan's alignment towards the Soviet Union.

Even as the USSR supported Daoud, they continued two decades of cultivating leftist groups in academia and government throughout the country (Coll,2001,39). Moreover, they began creating a shadow government within the PDPA. The PDPA under Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin led the Saur Revolution –a military coup– in which Daoud was assassinated in 1978. Taraki then took control of the government and Amin became the chairman of the Afghan Politburo. Although the level of Soviet support for the coup is contentious, the coup succeeded due to Afghan pilots using Soviet attack aircraft. After the PDPA seized control of Kabul, the USSR immediately granted recognition and began giving military and financial aid to the newly entitled Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Soviet aid and support and Taraki's domestic policies galvanized opposition to the newly formed government. The Soviets recognized that Taraki's rapid reforms were creating animosity toward the central government. This began a trend in which the Soviets advised the Afghan government to avoid radical socialist reforms. Meanwhile, they increased military and governmental aid. The Soviets stood by Taraki even as an insurgency exploded throughout most of the country. As this occurred, the USSR advised Taraki to deal with the worsening political fractionalization within his party. Specifically, they advised him to deal with Amin, who had aided him in overthrowing the previous government overthrow. Amin was suspected of plotting to stage another coup. This

internal conflict led to two -known- unsuccessful assassination attempts on Amin by those loyal to Taraki.

Taraki was unable to sideline Amin. Even though Moscow supported Taraki, Amin was able to marginalize, arrest, or assassinate Taraki's main supporters. Amin then had Taraki assassinated. The official story in Kabul was that Taraki died due to illness, although the truth was widely known throughout the country. Even though the KGB opposed him, Amin was viewed by most Afghans as a puppet of the USSR. By late 1979 discontent was increasing throughout the countryside. This led to large scale defections from the national Afghanistan army which bolstered the ranks of the growing Mujahedeen. By the Fall Afghanistan was receiving massive military aid in the form of weapons and air support.

As the rebel groups in the countryside became increasingly more problematic, Amin began asking for ever larger amounts of regular Soviet military units, suggesting the Soviets send Central Asian troops dressed as Afghans and Pakistanis. However, the USSR began invasion plans after Amin's forces required massive Soviet air power to prevent regime collapse after the defection of an entire Afghan army division. The defection of the 7th division of the Afghan Army convinced the Soviets that regular Soviet troops had to enter the country to provide security for a new regime, but quickly withdraw. The ensuing invasion began on 24 December 1979. By 27 December 1979, Amin had been assassinated and the Soviets controlled the country. The Soviets then installed Babrak Karmal, who was deemed a more conciliatory and popular leader. The overthrow of Amin after only one hundred days in power signaled the end of any independence Kabul had.

Building State Structure

The Soviet policy in Afghanistan had "continuous singularity" even as "Soviet leadership changed three times between the invasion and early 1985" in that the Soviets maintained the same strategy throughout the entirety of their counterinsurgency mission (Nyrop and Seekins, 1986,251). Their most immediate reason for the invasion was to give the socialist government in Kabul the opportunity to build a functional government and army. Transferring the responsibility of security and governance to the Afghans became the goal throughout the course of the occupation.

While direct Soviet intervention started in 1979, Soviet influence in Afghanistan's government started to increase well before Sardar Daoud took power. Daoud was willing to break precedent and work with socialists because he needed the support of leftist parties to maintain power in what amounted to an undemocratic government. Daoud was careful to limit Soviet forces to a small advisory role, but when he started courting rightists and Islamists to change his power base the PDPA began to plot his overthrow. This began a period of ever increasing Soviet involvement in the daily governmental affairs of Kabul culminating in what became a puppet government under Karmal. Immediately following the PDPA takeover, Kabul had some autonomy from Moscow. Both Taraki and Amin had some level of independence in making decisions, although this was not recognized by the population (Nyrop and Seekins, 1986,257). Specifically, Amin often ignored suggestions from Soviet advisors to moderate policies in the face of the growing insurgency.

Nevertheless, the Soviets were heavily involved in the Afghan government. Towards the end of Amin's regime Soviet officials were in charge of the day to day operations of the bureaucracy and were running the government. Even by the end of

Taraki's regime "nearly every ministry in the Afghan government had a Soviet advisor" (Goldman, 1984, p.384). After the invasion, every level of government was controlled via Soviet diplomats. Karmal was picked because he was popular throughout a large portion of the country and was seen as somewhat moderate. However, many scholars claim that the Soviets, understanding the risk of the government being seen as subservient, were able to "maintain the facade" of the government being independent (Nyrop and Seekins, 1986,258). While this may have been the case for observers; it seems the perception of the average Afghan was quite different.

After Daoud, the Afghans in the countryside viewed the subsequent leaders as puppets. It was clear throughout the occupation that the Soviets had a say in who was elected, and removed, by different means in Afghanistan. Although the Soviet level of involvement in Daoud's overthrow is contentious, it clearly occurred at a time when the KGB suspected him of moving Afghanistan's policy towards favoring the United States (Coll, 2004,39). Over the next two years after Daoud's overthrow, Taraki and Amin were both removed through violent means by leftist forces albeit Taraki was not removed at the request of the Soviets.

Towards the end of the occupation, as the Soviets looked for an exit strategy, they replaced Karmal in an attempt to choose a leader who could negotiate with the Mujahedeen groups. This was also an attempt to lure Pakistan, which was supporting the rebels, to the bargaining table. Pakistan only agreed to negotiate "if Moscow would replace President Babrak Karmal" (Harrison,1983). The resignation of Karmal led to "few political gains" and had little to no positive effect in "administrative and combat performance" (Karp,1986,1026). Nonetheless, the Afghan people viewed the switches

in government as interference from the outside. The constant changes in prime minister, often at the bequest of Soviets and without any regard for the will of the population, were one of the reasons the government was both ineffectual and out of touch with the average Afghani.

Another reason for the Afghan government's inability to function effectively was its constant internal rivalries. Taraki's and Amin's rivalry evidenced an older and longer lasting rivalry between the Parcham and Khulaq factions of the PDPA. Extreme fractionalization within the PDPA split support between the prime minister and the secretary of the Afghan Politburo. More problematic for the government was the series of attacks and reprisals that occurred between the two competing fractions. These attacks were in the form of firings, arrests, and assassinations. This had the net effect of weakening both the military and the government since effective officers and bureaucrats were often targeted.

Throughout the occupation the government was further weakened by limits on the roles noncommunist diplomats could play within the government. Noncommunist government officials, regardless of merit, were often wasted in diplomatic positions in irrelevant countries. All the while the Soviets tried to train new bureaucrats and officials to lead the government. This training began during Daoud's regime, well before the Soviet invasion. Before the invasion, socialist groups were cultivated at the University of Kabul so that a seamless transition to socialist policy could occur. After the Saur Revolution, thousands of Afghanis were trained within the Soviet Union to fill bureaucratic and political positions within Afghanistan (Collins,1985,139).

Even with foreign training from a superpower, hundreds of millions in loans, and hundreds of advisors, the Afghan government was ineffective and lacked major support. Additionally, socialism was not popular in Afghanistan since some socialist policies conflicted with tribal and religious laws. This was one of the main reasons for the emergence of the Mujahedeen. The population of Afghanistan despised the marginalization of religious leaders in Kabul and Herat. Furthermore, the ideals of communism and the socialist policies that were instituted enflamed the population. There were clear discrepancies between communism and the religious and tribal fabric of the Afghan population. The Soviets realized this and tried to combat it as military success stalled outside Kabul. First, they attempted to pay off clerics in the countryside, a reversal of the initial policy during the initial invasion. Second, they advised Karmal to slow socialist reforms in the countryside. Third, six years after the invasion they attempted to integrate non-communists into the government in order to widen Karmal's base of support (Inquirer Wire Services,1985). By 1985 popular support for the government was so low and its control of the population was so limited that these measures were ineffective.

Training the Force

While state building involves building national infrastructure and government structure, it also involves building effective police and military forces. This was especially important for the Soviets in Afghanistan as they prepared to transfer responsibility for the defense of the state to the Afghan government. The reasons for the Soviets' difficulty finding effective government officials also manifested itself in difficulty finding effective military and police leaders. Furthermore, the same corruption,

incompetence, and inexperience that plagued the government also plagued the military. On top of substandard military leaders, the Soviets had to recruit and retain soldiers to fill the rank and file of the Afghan military. Military-age males were hard to find and harder to retain.

Desertions have occurred in militaries throughout history. However, it was especially problematic for the Afghan government. Overall desertion rates were extremely high. A year after the invasion the Afghan army was about "30,000 men from a pre-invasion strength of about 70,000" (Auerbach,1980*). Over the course of the invasion the Afghan military lost significantly more soldiers to desertions than to combat losses. Yet, the rates were not as important as the types of desertions that were occurring. Afghanis were joining the military for a number of reasons, but for the most part they had nothing to do with national pride. Famine forced people to join for a meal, only to desert at the next harvest. More problematic for the militaries were those who joined on behalf of the insurgency. Men joined to gain intelligence, equipment, and training for their insurgent groups. Once they accomplished what they needed, they deserted. Additionally, after the Soviets entered the country, the central government started conscripting Afghans to bolster the ranks of the army. Yet, one diplomat reported that the "more unwilling Afghans the Babrak government conscripts into the Army, the more weapons get turned over to the rebels" (Auerbach,1980). This trend continued throughout the entire war.

Another problem for military units beyond individual deserters and traitors were entire unit desertions. Any loyalty in Afghanistan's units was born out of necessity and was not directed towards the government in Kabul. On 16 November 1986, a news wire reported from Afghanistan that "two colonels and four majors, were captured when 30 of

their men defected to guerrilla forces" (News Services and Staff Reports,1986). Hundreds of the company and field grade officers that were trained in the USSR were Muslim reactionaries and could not be relied upon since their loyalties were questionable at best (Coll,2001,43). Discontented, easily swayed, or ideologically motivated commanders often provoked the desertion of entire units.

Commanders, and units, deserted for numerous reasons whether religious, ideological or monetary; nonetheless unit desertions often led to the loss of entire provinces to insurgent groups. Annually, desertions led to the loss of thousands of troops and millions of dollars of equipment. Moreover, the actual Afghan force never formed into a worthwhile military. The strengthening insurgency was reciprocated by the weakening of the national army. Diminishing numbers and poor leadership meant that by the end of the occupation the Afghan Army could only be used as low level security forces leaving major missions to Soviet Forces.

Military Strategy

The Soviet plan was to supply the Afghan government and army with security so it could grow and eventually take over. With stability the state could grow and become responsible for its own security with limited Soviet influence. Soviet military assistance, however, may have been responsible for the original tribal uprisings that came to form the backbone of the Mujahedeen early in 1979. From the invasion all the way until the withdrawal, the Soviets' policy relied not only on stalemating the Mujahedeen but also on defeating them. The Soviets' original strategy was to control "the densely populated and economically valuable belt stretching from the northern gas and agricultural fields" (Karp,1986,1027). However, the USSR was never able to retain areas they had occupied

at the expense of major military operations; at the peak of Soviet involvement the Socialist Afghan government was a city state. By the time the Soviets left they had only established "tight control over Kabul and a somewhat looser presence in most other towns and major population centers." (Rubin,1989: 161). Additionally, the PDPA never controlled more than a third of the 18 million people living within the country (Halliday and Tanin 1998: 1367).

As the war progressed the Soviets were unable to stalemate the various Mujahedeen groups, even as increasingly more troops entered the country over the course of the occupation. By 1980, a year after the invasion, 85000 troops were in country yet "those troops now have less control over the major cities and roads than they did a year ago" (Auerbach,1980*). Two years later that number had swelled to between 90000 and 105000, yet they still did not control the entire country (Auerbach,1982).By 1985, the peak of direct military involvement, the Soviets had 115000 troops in Afghanistan; even this was not enough to prevent small unit attacks -in the form of mortars and rockets- on Kabul itself (United Press International,1985). The level of Soviet troops stagnated at 115000 until 1987 when they started to initiate an exit strategy (Kifner,1987).

On the strategic level the Soviets were unable to achieve their goal of creating security and expanding "their control in concentric circles around Kabul" (Auerbach,1982). Adding ten to twelve thousand more troops did not equal broad success. It may be that the Soviets never deployed enough troops to control the country effectively. At the time the population of the country was about 18 million people meaning that over the course of the occupation, the Soviets had a ratio of between 181

Afghans to every 1 Soviet soldier at the invasion and 156 to 1 at the height of the occupation. Adding to the problems of these numbers, Afghanistan was home to a well armed populace (although most had outdated British Enfield rifles left over from the British occupations in the 19th century). Also, the Hindu Kush Mountains, which dominate most of the country, were perfect for the hit and run tactics the Mujahedeen used. The mountains were a logistical nightmare for the Soviets and negated the effectiveness of the USSR's military since it was relied on massed armor.

While the USSR was unable to reach most of their strategic goals, they were only moderately more successful on the tactical level. They often lost key ground battles that had strategic importance. The Soviets had some military success destroying insurgents with the wide use of helicopter gunships. Helicopter gunships attacked rebels before they had a chance to melt back into the surrounding countryside after an attack. While the complex psychological effects of these raids will be discussed in the analysis section below, they were effective in destroying massed insurgent groups and controlling the countryside.

Additionally, the Soviets used indirect fire, specifically artillery, to eliminate "village strongholds" in order to limit "exposure of Soviet troops to enemy fire" (Jackson,2010,7). Indirect fire was also used as a way to engage with the Mujahedeen forces. The Soviets used seismic road sensors on popular weapon pipelines to detect enemy troop and equipment movement. The sensors would report the activity to an artillery battery which would then destroy the convoy. In one specific case they "destroyed two Toyota trucks, four pack animals and six men as well as destroying small arms and ammunition" (Jackson,2010,7).

The tactical success of air power and artillery often weakened their theatre level strategy as did the use of indiscriminate bombing. In May 1983 stories broke in the *New York Times* and other international newspapers describing sustained bombing of Afghan cities in order to demonstrate the "superiority of Soviet power" and break the will of the resistance (Gwertzman,1983). Additionally, Soviet attacks on insurgents often resulted in massive casualties. It seems that these types of attacks negatively affected the Soviets in three ways. First, they forced the average Afghan to support the Mujahedeen further. Sources in Afghanistan often reported that the Afghans often vowed revenge against Soviet atrocities with blood debts (Herald Wire Services,1983). Second, they pushed some insurgents further into the mountains where they were harder to engage. Finally, stories of the attacks furthered international condemnation of the occupation and support for the resistance.

Foreign Support and the Soviet Withdrawal

Some scholars, especially during the conflict, suggested that the Soviet Union's strategy was to depopulate Afghanistan to the point at which it could no longer offer any resistance. It seems that their hard nosed strategy was more likely an attempt to show the power of the Soviet military while maintaining the myth of Soviet invincibility; nonetheless, whether true or not, it leads to an interesting point. At the beginning of the war the population of Afghanistan was only 18 million people. By the end of the war one of every three Afghans was a refugee, displaced person, or dead. The Afghan economy was ruined due to the fighting, and famine was wide spread. In the mid-1980s the outlook for the insurgents was grim. Yet, the Mujahedeen kept fighting until well beyond the Soviet withdrawal. Their ability to do so was a result of the massive aid they received

from the United States and Pakistan. Foreign fighters and native Afghans massed in order to attack Soviet outposts and convoys then melted back into the surrounding villages and mountains. Eventually as they grew in strength, Mujahedeen groups began taking control of villages, towns and cities. For example, the Mujahedeen and Soviets fought over the city of Kandahar. Mujahedeen forces were able to take control of the city twice, only to lose it to large Soviet offensives. Yet, by massing into large groups the Mujahedeen became targets for helicopter attacks as well as other conventional forces. These attacks extended to population centers that were suspected of hiding suspected Mujahedeen groups.

By the end of 1980 the cause of finding a way for Afghan fighters to destroy Soviet attack helicopters had become prevalent in editorials and Congressional hearings. Between 1986 and 1987, the introduction of US stinger missiles, which were specially designed to shoot down Soviet helicopters, "forced the Soviet forces to abandon the helicopter gunship raids that were their best tactic against the guerrillas" (Kifner,1987). Additionally, Soviet helicopters were also integral in Soviet logistics, reconnaissance and communications and artillery (Soviet General Staff,2002,223). By limiting the Soviet's use of helicopters, the Mujahedeen limited the Soviet's capacity for war. Additionally, by reducing the threat from attack helicopters, the Mujahedeen were able to group and attack Soviet forces. For months at a time until the end of the occupation, the Soviets were losing an aircraft a day to the Mujahedeen. In Addition to Stinger missile systems, the various Mujahedeen groups were also receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in small arms, vehicles and humanitarian aid. This tilted the table against the Soviets, who began

looking for a quick exit strategy that would ensure an Afghanistan with a friendly policy towards the USSR (Coll, 2004, 158).

As the Soviets began the drawdown of troops, conciliatory gestures were made to some of the Afghan insurgent groups. The Soviets were not in any position to bargain as they had no battlefield successes and had already initiated a time table for withdrawal. The agreements made under the auspices of the United Nations were moot once the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. The Soviets attempted to mitigate this by replacing Barbak with the former secret police commander Najibullah. They bolstered his military through massive aid. With this aid Najibullah's force of 160,000 soldiers swelled to 200,000 by 1992. Yet this force was unable to stop the encroaching insurgent groups. Every year past the withdrawal of Soviets troops, the Mujahedeen moved closer to the outskirts of Kabul. The final demise of Najibullah's government in Kabul was delayed almost five years by massive Soviet aid and the willingness of the insurgent groups to fight each other. Nevertheless, by 1996, his government, which extended to the outskirts of Kabul, fell to the Mujahedeen.

Iraq

The Path toward Intervention

Like the Soviet relationship with Afghanistan, the American relationship with

Iraq preceded direct intervention. Although unlike the Soviets and Afghanistan, the

narrative of Iraq and the United States starts and ends with one Iraqi leader: Saddam

Hussein. The relevant narrative starts with the United States' involvement in the Iran-Iraq

War. Prior to 1975, Iran and Iraq had engaged in a low-level but prolonged struggle over

border areas and waterways. Heavy fighting was first reported mid-September 1980

around the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates. On 23 September Iraqi forces initiated

an invasion of Iran ending what had been a five year peace agreement over contentious

waterways and borderlands. At first, the much larger Iraqi force was successful in

moving into Iran. Saddam Hussein halted Iraqi forces at the cities of Ahvaz and

Susangerd inside of Iran, and began jockeying for a ceasefire. It seems that Saddam

Hussein believed the massive show of force would push Ayatollah Khomeini into an

Iraq-favored peace agreement. Instead, the conflict degraded into an eight year war of

attrition.

The Iran and Iraq War is relevant to my thesis for three reasons. First, the United

States covertly sold weapons to both parties. When this came to light internationally, it

further injured the US's image in both countries. Second, the war negatively affected the

militaries and economies of both countries. The war strained Iran's economy

considerably more so than Iraq's; nevertheless, Iranian suicide, artillery and, to a limited

degree, air attacks limited Iraqi oil production in border areas and limited Iraqi oil

exportation through the targeting of oil tankers. Third, the use of chemical weapons

started Iraq's decline into an international pariah state. United Nations officials confirmed

reports that Iraq had used mustard gas on Iranian soldiers and civilians. The use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, has been forbidden under the Geneva Protocol since 1925. Furthermore, it came to light that Iraq was building infrastructure to continuously produce chemical and biological weapons.

Wide spread combat operations in the Iran-Iraq War ended in a tentative cease-fire agreement in August of 1988. The final peace agreement occurred two years later, after Saddam had become involved in another conflict. Iraq made concessions to Iran in order to free up troops to reinforce its occupation force in Kuwait against a potential attack (Seib,1990). The dispute between Kuwait and Iraq started over the exportation rates and price levels of Kuwaiti oil. In the Summer of 1990, Saddam started to warn the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait to raise oil prices to competitive levels (Ibrahim,1990). Both countries had "been exceeding OPEC production quotas by wide margins for more than a year" (Ibrahim,1990). This escalated in July when Iraq positioned over 100,000 troops on the Iraq-Kuwait border. In early August 1990, oil talks stalled and Iraq invaded Kuwait, quickly destroying the Kuwaiti military, and establishing control over the country. Widespread international condemnation of the attack was instantaneous. As the United Nations, led by the United States, debated strategies to deal with Iraq, Saddam ridiculed the United States saying it was a "paper tiger" and would not commit to war. Furthermore, Iraq threatened to use chemical weapons if attacked. By December 1990, coalition troops began massing in Saudi Arabia as the United States Congress was moving toward the forceful removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

That same month leaders of "15 Iraqi opposition groups met [… to plan how] to topple the government of President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad" (Hijazi,1990). This

meeting of leaders from Saddam's opposition was intent on overthrowing his regime was

foreboding for three reasons. First, many groups that were represented at the meeting

were the same groups that would fight for Iraq after Saddam was removed over a decade

later. Present at the meeting were three Kurdish representatives, and a number of Shiite

Clerics and Arab resistance leaders (Hijazi,1990). Yet these leaders were detached from

the situation in Iraq. Second, the group suggested the "Persian Gulf crisis should be

resolved peacefully" and that it "posed a serious threat to Iraq and its unity"

(Hijazi,1980). This is important because a group whose purpose was to overthrow the

government suggested restraint. Third, thirteen years later at the start of Operation Iraqi

Freedom, the US initially planned to use some of the same exiled Iraqis to form a

coalition government in Iraq.

As the situation decayed prior to the Persian Gulf War, Saddam left the UN few

choices. As Iraq became more belligerent the UN became more impatient. At the end of

December 1990 the United States sent 16,000 more troops to the border of Iraq bringing

the total coalition troops to about 400,000. Additionally, the US began bolstering their

anti-Iraq coalition with Arab states through promises of debt forgiveness and security

promises. Concurrently, Saddam prepared suicide squads and called up reservists as he

prepared for a coalition attack (Iraq Preparing,1990). In November 1990, the United

Nation passed a resolution that Saddam had until 15 January 1991 to withdraw his forces

from Kuwait; otherwise they would authorize the use of force to remove him. Three days

before this deadline, the US Congress approved an attack on Iraq. Soon after the

declaration, the United States began a massive air war against military targets within Iraq.

On 24 February the ground war started when US forces led an attack on Iraq through the

desert. Over the course of the next few days, Iraqi losses were staggering as were the number of surrendering Iraqi forces. Saddam was given the option to withdraw his forces and surrender or be forced to leave Iraq. He conceded to these demands and signed a cease fire on the 28th. The ground war had lasted less than a week.

Even after the end of hostilities, tensions between Saddam and the US remained high. In a disastrous oversight, President Bush Sr. made a speech that seemed to imply the US would support the overthrow of Saddam. Unfortunately for the Kurds, this implication was not true. The resulting Kurdish uprising in the north of Iraq was quickly and violently quashed by Iraqi forces armed with poison gas in what is widely considered an act of genocide. Coalition forces had found weapons caches of chemical weapons. As such, part of the cease fire agreement gave the UN the right to inspect Iraqi compounds for banned weapons. The resulting battle with Iraq over access for weapons inspectors continued for the next decade.

Destroying the State

Unlike the Soviet's war in Afghanistan for which data collection is exceedingly difficult, the war in Iraq has received a lot of media attention. Much of my case study is based on news reports coming from Iraq, when a specific source is used it is noted otherwise I will not burden the reader with sources for information that received large media coverage. At this point it is important to note that the American counterinsurgency and nation building strategy in Iraq has not maintained continued singularity from the invasion to the beginning of the withdrawal of American combat troops. A dramatic shift in strategy occurred as violence exploded in 2005. At the time of the invasion, different brigade level commanders instituted different policies for their respective provinces. Additionally, whereas the First Gulf War started with a clearly defined exit strategy

meant to preserve the Iraqi government and avoid a hostile insurgency, the goal of

Operation Iraqi Freedom was regime change without foresight of an insurgency. Beyond

the invasion there was no plan for building a state and maintaining peace in Iraq

(Diamond,2005,27,A). Planners in Washington believed that the state structure would be

in place following the invasion and that government personnel would be willing to work

A comprehensive theatre level policy was not instituted until late 2004 when the

Ambassador to Iraq, Jay Garner, was replaced. The lack of strategy translated into a

disjointed effort to build government organizations. Different commanders within the

military and policy makers in the United States pushed for vastly different policies.

Furthermore, there existed a power struggle between military leaders and the Coalition

Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA was technically responsible for building a

government in Iraq yet it was understaffed and poorly led. Additionally, local military

commanders often failed to act on local problems because they mistakenly believed the

CPA was taking care of it (Chandrasekaran,2006,37). These problems were a critical

concern because the 2003 invasion completely destroyed any governmental organizations

within Iraq. With the exception of the US command structure, Iraq effectively had no

semblance of a government during the first year of the US occupation.

American planners in Washington who were focused on military success did not

take into account the nation building that would have to occur once the Iraqi military had

been defeated. The architects of the war plan in Washington and the civilian leaders on

the ground in country, chiefly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and two successive

American proconsuls in Iraq Garner and Albert Bremer III, underestimated the difficulty

of building an entirely new government in an ethnically fractionalized state with almost

no cross cutting societal cleavages. Moreover, the actual physical infrastructure of the state was "systematically looted, sabotaged, and destroyed" (Diamond,2005,10,A).

In addition to the lack of physical structure, a number of policies instituted by Rumsfeld and Bremer made the task of rebuilding a state structure more difficult. One of the policies that did so was the exclusion of Ba'athist party members from participating in the creation of an interim government, a policy that directly ignored the US's initial plan for governance in Iraq. While this excluded war criminals and collaborators from government, it also excluded upper and middle level managers of the bureaucracy and government organizations. Overnight 30,000 to 50,000 government officials lost their jobs and were banned from future employment in the new Iraqi government (Diamond, 2005,41,B). Proconsul Jay Garner, as well as a number of ranking military officials and policy experts, all disagreed with the decision to massively deba'athify what was left of the state government. Bremer's staff also stopped the reopening of various government facilities and factories by refusing to reopen government bank accounts (Chandrasekaran,2006,36). This limited success on the local level.

Furthermore, a 2003 article by the Democratic Principles Working Group discussed how any transition to democracy in Iraq must have some de-ba'athification but should not summarily dismiss all Ba'athists as it would "decimate the entire civil service, educational system, and other essential institutions" (Democratic Principles,2002,25). The suggestion, like many others in the report, was by and large ignored. Many of the people who were dismissed in the first months of Bremer's administration were only loosely members of the Ba'athist party; yet they were responsible for running the daily operations of the government. Ambassador Bremer's decrees and the physical chaos of

the war meant that the lower level state structure, both in terms of physical structure and personnel, had to be built from scratch as opposed to built around what preceded the invasion.

Bremer was replaced in 2004 just as sovereignty was ceremoniously transferred to the newly formed Interim Iraqi Government. His removal was due to American and British concerns that his timetable for drafting a constitution and transferring power to the Iraqi military and government was framing coalition forces as occupiers (Diamond,2005,26,B). Rumsfeld was removed less than two years later, following the first round of elections for a permanent government. Both replacements were precursors of a shift in strategy orchestrated by Rumsfeld's replacement Robert Gates. Rumsfeld's removal was perceived by the press as the first indicator of the coming strategy change. Gates, as well as politicians and senior military analysts, criticized Rumsfeld and the Pentagon for failing to "prepare adequately for securing Iraq after the invasion" (Cloud,2006). The new policy Gates began to institute in late 2006 combined the state building and military operations into a new counterinsurgency doctrine based on providing security, infrastructure and governance, - something a number of local level-commanders in the US military had already been doing.

The shift in strategy built on the interim government, called the Governing Council, which had gained sovereignty over Iraq in 2004. But it was a government that already appeared like a failure. At the beginning of 2005 American newspapers, politicians, and scholars were decrying the failure of US policy in Iraq. The Iraqi Interim Government, or Governing Council, was fractionalized and ineffective. Most decisions were being made by local leaders, military personnel or the CPA. Moreover, daily

bombings and targeted attacks on government officials deterred government officials from showing up to work during the peak periods of violence. Although sovereignty lay with the Council, Iraqis knew and resented that the CPA, not the new government, was the organization in charge of Iraq. Bremer's insistence on resisting local elections and instead appointing local leaders worsened the perceived legitimacy of the government. From 2005 to late 2006 it appeared mismanagement by US officials and the inability of the Iraqi government to compromise on almost anything had doomed the possibility of success in Iraq.

One Final Shot

With public support waning in the United States due to rising American casualties, it appeared the United States had limited time before public opinion at home would force a withdrawal of forces. There was little time to institute a change in strategy to reduce violence and transfer power to the government. Although much of the government success occurred due to the increased security, force training, and reconciliation that will be discussed below, it seems that Coalition pressure on the Iraqi government to compromise on major issues and hold local and national elections prevented the government from losing all legitimacy. Moreover, in the Fall of 2005 "only U.S. intervention prevented a breakdown in constitutional talks" over power sharing and governmental structure (Wright,2005). This was the beginning of threats by American officials linking the continuation of American support for the Iraqi government, to governmental progress.

Over the course of 2005 and 2006 Iraq broke into an ethnic civil war as the political process stalled. Between the insurgency and ethnic fighting, 2006 was more deadly for American soldiers than the initial invasion period. It was clear that without

immediate progress political parties would continue resorting to the use of armed militias to settle issues. Yet, while some officials in the Iraqi government advocated an American withdrawal, most understood that without American support their government would likely fail. Pressures on the government forced progress in terms of elections and compromise. American pressure was not the only reason for the success of the Iraqi government in 2007. Progress could not have occurred without gains in security.

A New Roll for the Military

In 2007 General David Petraeus, the author of the Army's current counter-insurgency strategy and the coordinator of the 101st's success is Mosul, Iraq, was chosen as the top military commander in Iraq. This occurred about the same time that an expert in Middle East policy, Ryan Crocker, was appointed the American Ambassador to Iraq (Abramowitz,2007). Both understood that every army, whether liberator or not, has a half-life beyond which it becomes viewed by the population as an occupier (Petraeus,2006,4). Once that occurs it becomes almost impossible to separate the insurgents their base in the population. However, it would seem that both intervened at a time when Iraq was destined for failure. The larger strategy was similar to what some local level military commanders had been doing since the beginning of the war. They expanded this strategy to the entire Coalition Force.

To allow the government time to make progress and build a capable Iraqi military, Washington decided to send five additional brigades, about 28,000 troops, to bolster the 130,000 troops already in Iraq. The additional troops also started a renewed offensive against Al-Qaeda (Associated Press,2007) Most of the additional combat troops were deployed to Baghdad and to Anbar province to prevent Al-Qaeda from having safe havens from which to attack. Yet unlike the Soviets in Afghanistan, the American

military in Iraq extended its roll beyond security and killing insurgents. Additionally, as the Iraqi government struggled to work together, the United States military began implementing and refining its strategy on the ground, a strategy based on providing security to the population, military and police of the country while using intelligence and limited force to find and destroy insurgents.

The idea of limited force in Iraq was a major sticking point for a number of battalion and brigade level commanders. The military limited the use of indirect fire and airstrikes, instead relying on precision weapons such as predator missiles, cruise missiles, helicopters, and smart bombs. When artillery was used it required high level clearance up to the brigade level. Rules of engagement evolved in units to prevent the shooting of innocent civilians in questionable situations. Additionally, the Armor and Field Artillery branches of the army often deployed to Iraq without bringing tanks or artillery pieces, since more often than not they ended up running ground level security patrols.

Furthermore, combat units were used to rebuild infrastructure on the local level. Starting fairly soon after the invasion Commander's Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP) funds were used for a variety of civilian-oriented projects. One major criticism of the CPA under Bremer, prior to the strategy change, had been that it stepped on the toes of local commanders who tried to improve local infrastructure thus limiting those projects (Chandrasekaran,2006,39). Units used this money to help build village schools, develop irrigation systems and revive local communities. Thousands of these types of projects were completed (Petraeus,2006,5). These types of projects were important both tactically and strategically. They were important tactically because they improved relations between soldiers and the people in their localities; strategically they were important

because they lowered the population support for insurgents who had a propensity for destroying US infrastructure projects.

This is not to say the US strategy was toothless. Rules of engagement were developed that allowed the shooting of cameramen who were watching US patrols, since that was a signal of an impending detonation of an improvised explosive device. While this undoubtedly created casualties, the United States had to maintain a delicate balance between American casualties and Iraqi casualties as too many of either would doom the war effort. Additionally, insurgents who directly engaged American forces were destroyed by massive shows of force. The battle of Fallujah and the Second battle of Fallujah saw the US Marines engaged with and destroying insurgents hiding in that town.

In the battles artillery and precision bombing were used to rout the insurgents quickly "achieving a textbook victory according to traditional U.S. doctrine" (Diehl,2004). Yet, often these shows of force were counter to what the US military was trying to achieve in Iraq as the local and international fallout for collateral damage was often not worth the destruction of a small number of insurgents. While there were limited civilian casualties in Fallujah, the property damage was massive (Diehl,2004). The city was almost entirely destroyed, affecting the US's image in Iraq and abroad. In this regard there seemed to be a balance between providing security for civilians and engaging insurgents. The United States attempted to mitigate the risks of these large scale attacks by avoiding hitting targets that would specifically enrage the population like Mosques and holy shrines.

Training the Force

Beyond, providing security, improving the lives of civilians, and engaging the insurgents, the Coalition Forces in Iraq were also tasked with training Iraqi military and

police forces. This was another key goal of the Surge: stem the violence long enough for Iraq's army and police to take over security for the state (Flintoff,2008). One of the major problems Iraq faced was the dismal state of its military and police from the invasion until late 2008. Prior to the invasion Iraq had, by Middle Eastern standards, a relatively strong, disciplined military of almost half a million active soldiers. The Iraqi Army was somewhat intact after their defeat in the invasion since large amounts of them had deserted, surrendered, or been captured by US forces. Whether part of that force could have been transitioned to a military that supported the Iraqi regime is debatable. However, to the dismay of key military leaders and policy makers, Bremer disbanded the entire force at the beginning of his tenure as ambassador (Diamond,2005,39,book). The dismissal had two negative results. First, those tasked with rebuilding a state structure in Iraq had to start from nothing in a similar to the problem rebuilding the Iraqi bureaucracy. Second, overnight the insurgency had half a million potential recruits who had military training and had recently became unemployed.

Success in Iraq was linked to rebuilding a military and police force capable of taking over from coalition forces. Insurgents and coalition forces both realized this from the beginning. Yet, at first, the United States military was unsuccessful in this endeavor. Furthermore, insurgents were able to dissuade people from joining through targeted, public attacks on Iraqi security forces. A September 2008 report to congress on the progress of the Iraqi military deplored the training and state of the military and police (Flintoff,2008). Additionally, there were reports that sections of the army were being used in political and ethnic reprisals. Five years after the invasion, the army consisted of 152,000 trained soldiers, less than half the prewar level (Flintoff,2008). However, by

2010 the military had reached some levels of success compared to the militaries of the Middle East through imbedded training and massive aid.

The creation of the Iraqi military was and is slow going, as the United States military reorganized a large portion of itself to train the Iraqi military. It began creating Military Transition Teams (MTT) and Special Police Transition Teams (SPTT) that consisted of regular army officers and senior non-commissioned officers. These teams were directly imbedded with Iraqi troops and were responsible for overseeing training and development. Additionally, coalition forces adopted a policy in which responsibility for security was slowly transferred to the Iraqi forces. They did this for a number of reasons. First, as time went on polls showed an increase in the number of Iraqis that said they supported attacks on US led forces. Conversely, the number who supported attacks on Iraqi security forces stayed relatively stable Average people were less likely to attack their neighbors and countrymen and more likely to attack the longer the intervener was there. Second, joint missions served as on-the-job training for green Iraqi forces. In September 2006 a poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes showed that 53% of Iraqis believed that Iraqi security forces would be strong enough to handle security concerns within a year" (New Poll Reports,2006) In a testament to the success of the Iraqi military and government, US forces withdrew from Iraqi cities in late 2009. Security forces became responsible for security with Americans relegated to advisory and support rolls.

Iraqi security forces were and are important to the growing success in Iraq. However, in 2005 it appeared that local militias would eventually come to dominate the Iraqi political and security process. Many of the militias were formed in the early months

of the war to prevent growing crime and ethnic violence in outlying cities and villages.

Others, like the Mahdi Army under Muqtada al-Sadr, grew as pseudo governments whose

goal was to dispel coalition forces. These types of militias often controlled entire cities

which then became no-go areas for US troops. Most of the major power players in Iraq

controlled an armed militia. Often when the political process stalled, fighting between

these militias would escalate. These militias became of particular concern as attacks on

coalition forces increased and the country descended into civil war. It became clear that

security in Iraq ultimately depended on the fate of these militias. Although it seems that

the US strategy regarding these militias was disjointed, it does seem to have worked. The

strategy became to attempt to reconcile with many of the more moderate Shi'a militias

while tactically engaging militias like the Mahdi Army.

Had it not been for three important factors most of the militias would still be

fighting today. These factors seem to have resulted, in part, from the American counter

insurgency doctrine. First, many of the militias became fed up with foreign insurgents

who were pushing Islamic Law at the expense of traditional tribal rules. Al-Qaeda and its

associated groups alienated the upper leaders of the militias to the point at which many

sought a cease-fire with the United States in order to attack Al-Qaeda. Second, a number

of Shiite clerics, namely the powerful Al-Sistani, vocally deplored outbreaks of violence

and counseled Shiite leaders towards peace. Additionally, when Sadr violated a ceasefire

against coalition forces, a group of clerics condemned him to the population. Third, the

United States was willing to reconcile with these groups. American diplomats and

military leaders paid off numerous militia leaders. Additionally, they agreed to

incorporate some militia forces into the Iraqi military and give job training to the rest.

Analysis of the Cases

At the Beginning

Afghanistan and Iraq are two different countries that present two different sets of

problems for nation building and counter insurgency. These types of problems suggest

that there is no magic number for a country regarding the costs associated with fighting

an insurgency or building a state. The most important factors that increase or lower the

cost of success are prior governmental experience, capacity, terrain, and prior intervener

popularity.

2.1

Makeup	Afghanistan	Iraq
Religious	Sunni Muslim- 80* Shi'a Muslim- 19% Other- 1%	Shi'a Muslim- 65%* Sunni Muslim- 32%% Other/Christian- 3%
Social Structure	Tribal	Tribal
Terrain	mostly rugged mountains* plains in north and southwest	mostly desert plains* mountains in north
Population at time of war	18 million	24 million
Size	652,230 sq km*	438,317 sq km*
Population Density	27 per km	54 per km

Source: CIA Fact book

The Soviets had governmental infrastructure before the invasion. They beheaded

the Afghan government at the highest level but then quickly replaced it. Additionally,

they had advisors, diplomats and loyal Afghans already in place before Soviet troops hit

the ground in 1978. When the United States went into Iraq, there was a complete absence

of state structure both physically and in regards to personnel. Additionally, they had little

intelligence regarding power players on any level of government. Furthermore, a decade

of sanctions had left Saddam's government bankrupt. Furthermore, the US disbanded the

remainder of Saddam's government after they invaded. Consequently, the US had to start

from almost nothing in building a government whereas the USSR had a framework to build upon.

The US had a distinct advantage in that Iraq had experienced a strong national government in the past. Prior to the Soviet intervention, Afghanistan had been controlled on the tribal level with little direction from Kabul. While Iraq's governance occurred on the national level and Afghanistan's occurred on the tribal level, both states felt the effects of their tribal and ethnic diversity. In Afghanistan inter-tribal fighting prolonged the dying socialist government after the Soviets left. In Iraq, this destroyed American gains in security and added to the costs of success. The United States had to spend more to provide security and bolster the government.

In terms of governance, it was also logistically easier to control the flat deserts of Iraq with the population mostly residing in major cities than it has been to control the sparsely populated and difficult mountains of Afghanistan. Terrain also translated into increased military costs as well. Afghanistan seems naturally harder to control then Iraq. The population is more dispersed and across much tougher terrain. Yet, military doctrine recognizes the difficulty in controlling the urban areas that characterize much of Iraq. Densely populated urban areas provide insurgents a safe haven from which to attack in a similar way that mountains do. Urban areas also limit the use of indirect fire and armor. Table 1.1 shows the densities, physical size and population of both Iraq and Afghanistan. The terrain and population density of both Afghanistan and Iraq raise the critical mass of troops needed for control and stability.

Another determining factor for the critical mass needed to provide security for nation building stems from the foreign power's reputation in the state prior to

intervention. Iraq and Afghanistan are similar in this regard as well. The Soviets had provided aid and loans for decades prior to their invasion. This aid was used to create a number of public works. The impact of this on the Soviet popularity in Afghanistan is unknown though the isolated Afghans most likely had little interaction with the Soviets.

Afghanistan has a long history of battling invaders. This history is not lost on the average Afghan. The USSR's complicity in the revolution and subsequent support of the unpopular socialist government framed the USSR as intervening in the affairs of the Afghan. It is no coincidence that as Soviet intervention increased so did the intensity of the tribal uprising. The intervention further framed the Soviets as invaders, not liberators. The United States faced a different sort of problem in Iraq. The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War framed the United States negatively prior to the invasion. Nevertheless, Saddam was also unpopular especially in the Kurdish and Shi'a sections of the country. Though this is not to say there was no nationalistic aspect to the resistance, years of war and devastating sanctions solidified feelings of Iraqi nationalism and identity especially in the Sunni dominated regions of the country. Additionally, at the beginning of the war, half of the population of Iraq believed that the United States invaded to secure oil (Diamond,2005,25-26,B). Nevertheless, the US had moderate success in framing themselves as the liberators of Iraq from Saddam Hussein. As such, the United States had an advantage over the Soviets prior the intervention in that they intervened to topple a widely-unpopular government instead of trying to prop on up. Overall, the United States and the Soviet Union had similar initial costs as interveners.

The Salient Factors

Makeup	Afghanistan	Iraq
Intervener Troops at peak	**115,000**	**158,000**
Population to Soldiers	**156 to 1**	**151 to 1**
Typical Fires Used after Invasion	**Artillery** **Mortars** **Indiscriminate Airpower**	**Precision Airpower** **Cruise Missiles** **Very Limited Artillery** **Limited Rocket Systems**
Combat Units Predominantly Used	**All Combat Arms**	**Limited to light/mechanized**

The military strategy for each country seems to be the most noticeable difference between the cases. Initially, both interveners linked success to creating security in order for the government and military to grow. Yet, the Soviets treated nation building almost entirely militarily. Security was linked to destroying the insurgents and their safe havens. This strategy relied on heavy handed military force which often created civilian casualties increasing civilian support for the Mujahedeen. The Soviets never tried to win over the population instead the undisciplined and poorly trained Soviet troops committed atrocities that created more animosity towards the Soviet occupation (Branigin 1983).

The United States also tried to destroy insurgents, but they limited collateral damage to avoid inflaming the population. In Afghanistan the Soviets used their military to conduct military operations against the insurgents. The United States used its military for both military and civilian operations. While this seems a less efficient usage of troops, it led to better overall military success. The Soviets' military oriented strategy never led to military success in terms of control of key terrain. Militarily, the United States was able to control more people with fewer combat troops.

Additionally, American military successes made conciliatory gestures to militias possible, without sustained battlefield success the Mujahedeen never had a reason to openly negotiate a workable ceasefire with the Soviets. To succeed, the Mujahedeen simply had to keep inflicting casualties on Soviet forces until the Soviet Union was unwilling to pay the cost. As such, the Mujahedeen they had no incentive to negotiate openly. Mujahedeen entered into cease-fire agreements with the Soviets but they used these times to rearm to continue fighting the next season (Branigin,1983). The Soviets continued to allow cease-fires because they could not decisively defeat the insurgents in major battles.

As both interveners tried to control the terrain they also attempted to build government infrastructure. The Soviets, and for a while the United States, supported an ineffectual government not chosen by the people. The original Iraqi government of Iraqi expatriates was ineffective and unpopular. Karmal's government in Kabul was both less effective and less popular. Both interveners recognized this yet they reacted in different ways. The Soviets reacted by replacing Karmal with someone they thought would be more popular domestically. But, Karmal's replacement was also seen as a puppet. The United States reacted by forcing local and national elections. These elections coincided with the emergence of, and very well may have increased, ethnic fighting within Iraq as groups jockeyed for control. Yet, the 2006-2007 Surge created enough stability that groups addressed complaints within the political realm serving to frame the Iraqi government as representative of the people instead of as a puppet government. Even though both governments were fairly ineffective for most of their existence, the creation

of an independent representative government created an outlet for tensions in Iraq that did not exist in Afghanistan.

The conditions prior to the invasion, the governmental success and the military strategy are important as stand-alone factors towards the total costs of success. However, their combined impact on the population is more important than either individually. The conditions prior to the invasions are important but not the most salient factors in success. Building and supporting a government is important but only if it can demonstrate progress towards increasing the lives of the people it governs. Overall, the military strategy is important but a strategy that provides security for the locals and frames the insurgents as aggressors is more beneficial that simply killing insurgents.

All three are important together, because they affect the population's will to support the insurgency. The Surge era-CPA and American military were considerably more effective than the Soviets in creating separating the insurgents from their base of support. The Soviets built infrastructure in Afghanistan, but it was meant to ease the logistics of intervention. The United States built schools, sewage plants, irrigation and other public goods whereas the USSR built roads, airports, railways and natural gas pipelines. This is indicative of the larger strategies for separating the insurgency from its support.

The Soviets used terror tactics such as helicopter attacks, carpet bombing and indiscriminate infantry attacks to persuade the population that the only course of action that led to safety was to stop supporting or taking part in insurgent activities. Eventually this tactic would likely have worked, as the will of the average person would have been broken. At some point the population of Afghanistan would have been so depleted that

they would be unable to offer a serious resistance. This is evidenced by a decrease in insurgent activities prior to the influx of massive American aid. However, the time and human costs of this strategy are much greater than the American strategy in Iraq. The United States strategy was to buy off the population. This was done by rebuilding local infrastructure.

Blood and Guts Costs more than Hearts and Minds

It appears that the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan and the American strategy in Iraq are undeniably different, as maybe the fundamentals of the states themselves. However, both interveners were fundamentally trying to achieve the same ends albeit by almost opposite means. Both strategies attempted to separate the insurgency from its base of support in the population. The Soviets attempted to do so by using massive military force and intimidation to stop the population from supporting the insurgents. For example, in 1983 sources reported that villages were warned against supporting the insurgents, when twenty complained about a Soviet indirect fire attack they were all executed (Claiborne,1983). These types of atrocities were typical of the broader Soviet strategy.

The Americans used a different method than the Soviets to limit support for the insurgents. The Americans tried to increase quality of life while maintaining security thus making it less appealing for the population to support the insurgency. Put another way, the Soviets tried to force people to stop fighting or face extermination. Coalition forces in Iraq made themselves almost indispensable to security and development, thus framing the insurgents as the force threatening the population. Polls indicate that the longer the intervention lasted the more Iraqis supported a US withdrawal. Counter-intuitively, this

may prove the US strategy worked, as time went by more Iraqis actively started supporting their own government hence framing the United States as unnecessary.

It may be that both strategies would work. The decay of the Soviet Union and the massive influx of American, Saudi, and Pakistani support for the Mujahedeen broke the USSR's will to continue fighting in Afghanistan. The rising casualties, cost, and home front dissent were not worth the original gains from intervening in Afghanistan. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet politburo was looking for an exit strategy that involved reconciliation and transfer of responsibility. Yet, the Soviets never reached the critical mass of troops needed to provide stability in Afghanistan due to the strategy they used; something the United States was able to achieve in Iraq by committing 28,000 extra troops in the 2007 Surge. As can be seen by table 2.2 the USSR had a similar numbers of soldiers in Afghanistan as US numbers in Iraq at the peak of the Surge yet the USSR comparably achieved very little.

Conclusion

        The Soviet strategy for building a state and fighting an insurgency in Afghanistan is not unusual nor was it novel. It is a strategy that has often been used by armies going back to Alexander the Great. The United States strategy is relatively innovative in how it deals with insurgents. The comparison of the cases points to a number of major finding about the costs of fighting an insurgency using either a hearts and minds or a blood and guts strategy. It clearly costs more for an intervener to build a state through coercion than it is to build a state through buying off the public. Both strategies require a certain amount of forces to succeed but a strategy that tries to win the population through building a representative government, local infrastructure and increased security costs significantly less. Another in-depth study needs to be done that compares the different Division Commanders in Iraq to one another in order to determine how the variations between their policies affected counterinsurgency and state building on the local level.

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The Pennsylvania State University	May 2010
Schreyer Honors College	QPA: 3.91/4.00
Major- Bachelor of Science, Political Science	MGPA: 3.94/4.00
Minor- History, Military Science	
Language- Arabic	

Employment History

Lifeguard

Whitemarsh Valley Golf and Country Club, PA	2006-2009

Pro Shop Attendant

Manufacturers Golf and Country Club, PA	2003-2006

Volunteer

Abington Pediatrics Association, PA	2006

Activities

Penn State Altoona Sophomore Class President	2007-2008
Army ROTC Program	2006-Present
Adjutant General for 300 cadets in charge of	
Formals, Attendance and Rosters	2009-Present
Volunteer, Penn State Leadership Seminar	2006
Volunteer, "Operation Salute in State College"	2006
Volunteer, "Read Across America"	2007
Graduate Mountain Warfare School	2008
Graduate Leadership Development Assessment Course	2009

Honors and Awards

Superior Cadet Award for Academic Excellence	2007,2008,2009
Inducted into the National Freshman Honor Society	2006