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African IGOs and Democracy

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to research and understand the effect that three prominent African intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have on democracy, by looking at the election observers they deploy and the charters they implement. My research question is what effects do the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have on democracy in Africa. In light of this, democracy should be flourishing on the continent. Data showed that the election observation reports differed from the media findings with the reports finding the elections to be free and fair more frequently than media with the same election. The Kappa Statistic confirmed this finding by showing that this difference is not due to chance, however, the p value was not large enough for this finding to be statistically significant. There was slight democracy growth with all five indicators using the difference of means test. However, democracy growth for each indicator never exceeded .05, so the growth is extremely relatively minimal on a scale of 0 to 1.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to research and understand the effect that three prominent African intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have on democracy. My research question is what effects do the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have on democracy in Africa. . It accomplishes this by looking at the election observers they deploy and the charters they implement. To answer this question, I will be examining the charters each of these IGOs implement and their member states agree on abiding by. These charters -- the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the AU African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections -- outline mechanisms, such as election observation missions, to foster democratic practices within the member states. In light of these charters, democracy should be flourishing on the continent.

However, many observers claim that African IGOs are not as effective as they should be nor are they critical enough of African governments' democratization protocols. There is some credibility to these claims. African IGOs credibility in the international community tend to pale in comparison to other IGOs. The disconnect between established and credible democratic promoting organizations such as the EU and these African intergovernmental organizations calls into question what democracy means in Africa. In fact the EU has clear policies that effect Africa's democratic develop. The EU's rhetoric and actions have been effective in creating

policies and initiatives related to peace, democracy, and security. The EU's African Peace Facility helped decrease the number of conflicts on the continent, making the EU an IGO in which effectiveness is clear, more so than the AU. However, on its own, the AU receives harsh criticism for not being efficient enough on democratic matters (Rein 2017, 522-555). This idea guided the formation of my research question.

My research question is important because it could potentially explain the errors of the political process on the continent. Since the end of colonialism, governments in African states have been characterized as "weak," meaning they fail to address the concerns of citizens and due to extreme corruption. A government is supposed to provide structure to a society, but because of these governments' inability to function, people are suffering politically, socially, and economically. From human rights violations to extreme poverty, many Africans have been living in unstable conditions and deserve to see a change in their lives (Glenn 2014, 1476-1477). High levels of democracy diminish corruption within governments, while low levels of democracy have higher levels of corruption (McMann, Seim, Teorell, et al. 2019, 1-4).

Therefore, the question that my project has real-life implications for governments within Africa. However, without understanding the political factors that may influence the conditions within the country there will be no way to find a solution to the problems that exist. IGOs claim to be organizations that create better lives for people by making countries adhere to certain rules, promote peace, cooperate amongst one another, and foster common social and economic norms in members (Harvard Law School). This is done in these charters by requiring member-states to adhere to decentralized government, constitutional powers, and promotion of democratic culture. My research question is a way to see if democracy really has fostered in these counties that face political turbulence by using the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC.

For the quantitative analysis, I will use A kappa statistical analysis to see how far the election observation reports veer from how the media characterized the election and use a difference of means test to see the changes of democracy in each member state, pre and post entry into force. African IGOs tend to be more lenient when observing elections than the media. The implications of this is that the IGOs are not holding their member states accountable. I also conduct an in-depth qualitative analysis of 2 elections. My multi-mode research design allows me to demonstrate the specific workings of certain undemocratic governments in Africa while still having the potential to be generalizable to all countries that are a part of the organization.

This thesis will build off of the current literature in many different fashions. For one, it will build on the work of scholars who analyze how the African Union responds to certain events including elections and election observers. The thesis will build on this work by doing an empirical study of the African Union's responses and adding democratization into the question, rather than a qualitative analysis. While scholars have researched IGO charters and election observation separately, I will be using both charters and election observation in my analysis. Because of this, the results of the thesis will contribute something new and relevant to the field. Additionally, scholars have not examined the three IGOs I will be doing my research on together. This makes for a unique project.

Chapter 2

Background

The African Union was originally the Organization of African Unity (OAU). African leaders formed the OAU out of a desire for a pan-Africanist Africa after decolonization in 1963. African leaders anticipated the problems ahead such as tribalism and European interference and hoped that the OAU could be an organization where they could devise a plan to move forward with a singular African identity. The OAU would also work towards the social, economic, and cultural development of Africa. However, the OAU did not explicitly state its concerns with human rights or democracy in its initial literature. It would be until 1981 when the OAU revised its founding charter and included a human rights resolution. The lack of democracy within early OAU literature and ideals is striking and speaks to the organization's internal divide amongst more radical, leftist African rulers and the more free-market African rulers. Eventually, in 2001, OAU members enforced the constitutive act of the African Union, which created the African Union and dissolved the OAU.

The failures of the OAU would guide the formation of the African Union. The OAU refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the member-states out of respect of sovereignty, even in instances of civil war (Kufuor 2005, 130-134). The African Union wanted to ensure cooperation and peace on the continent and so they created a stronger legal backing and political institutions within the organization to ensure that the failures of the OAU would not follow. The AU created the Assembly which oversees the compliance of members. They created commissions to evaluate the success and failures of the decisions the AU implements. The AU

Principles grant the AU permission to intervene in its member-state internal conflicts if the situation is extraordinarily troubling in regard to violence and human rights. In milder scenarios, the AU can sanction member-states for poor behavior. As laid out, the origins of the AU were not necessarily related to democracy or democracy promotion (Wiebusch, Aniekwe, Oette, Vangenginste 2019, 7-11).

In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the international community began to experience a power shift. The fall of the Soviet Union and the era of communist influence brought about fervor for more democratic ideals in Africa politics such as credible elections, peaceful transitions of power, constitutional norms, and more progressive beliefs on human rights. The AU soon converted to more idealistic language and attitudes about democracy on the continent. In 2004, they created the AU Peace and Security Council which investigated and oversaw member-state democracy violations. Three years later, the AU solidified their commitment to democracy with their adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance.

The implementation of this charter uses a multi-level governance approach. On the continental level, AU institutions including the Assembly, the Peace and Security Council, the African Peer Review Mechanism, the Executive Council, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Pan-African Parliament, the AU Commission, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the New Partnership for Africa's Development are the implementers of the charter (Wiebusch, Aniekwe, Oette, Vangenginste 2019, 96-99). The regional organizations are supposed to enhance synergy with the process of charter implementation. They are responsible for coordinating the implementation of the charter and monitoring the participation of civil organizations in the charter.

On the national level, the charter requires government branches, bureaucracies, media, administrations, and any other relevant institution to promote democracy. Since its enforcement date in 2012, there have been improvements to the AU democratic functioning. For example, the charter which provides the mechanism for election observation has improved how these missions are carried out. The missions are carried out by election experts rather than seasoned diplomats, there are legal and media experts present at the mission, the observations are longer, and there has been a standardization observation methodology and assessments.

Additionally, the document has been used against its democratically failing member-states in a legal context. African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights used the charter in its proceedings with the Ivory Coast due to post-election violence and grave human rights abuse in 2010-2011. On the institutional side, African Union has been diligently implementing the charter to promote democracy; on the member-state side, there has not been sufficient consistency. Countries with more resources and stronger democracy such as South Africa and Nigeria have put resources into implementing this charter. But more authoritarian governments as well as those dealing with conflict or conflict recovery have not put as many resources into implementing the charter, making state response varied across the continent (Wiebusch, Aniekwe, Oette, Vangenginste 2019, 98-101).

Unlike the AU that has its roots in political optimism, ECOWAS was born out of necessity in 1975. In the 1970s, the living conditions in African states were poor. Almost 25 percent of the food Africa consumed was imported because they exported too many of their crops to other countries and various natural disasters destroyed much of their production. This, combined with prevailing identity cleavages, the rise of “military men,” and the inability of central governments to exert control over large swaths of people and territory, resulted in African

countries becoming increasingly reliant on international aid. In other words, they were “weak” compared to their European counterparts in that they suffered from a lack of autonomy and state capacity (Tilly 1992).

Indeed, the hope from the initial excitement of decolonization had failed and African leaders realized they had to make a change. Particularly in West Africa, leaders believed that economic integration was the way to end this reliance on international aid and come out of this period of economic failure and poverty. ECOWAS’ initial goals were to promote development in agriculture, transport, energy, natural resources, commerce, and all other fields of industry. They wanted to ensure economic stability and raise the standard of living in their countries while developing closer relationships within the region (Edi 2007, 23-29).

Similar to the African Union, ECOWAS was not born out of a desire to promote democracy, human rights, or any other democratic ideals. But with the shifting ideals in the 1990s, ECOWAS was influenced by the post-Cold War “wave towards democracy.”

Scholars argue that this is in part due to globalization; democracy and market liberalization were inseparable and could not succeed without the other. Globalists argued that democratic ideals created a stable economic environment that promised success. With democracy and liberal markets becoming the standard in the world and world organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank making adherence to this new economy a precondition for investment, ECOWAS decided to make democracy a part of its platform. ECOWAS institutionalized democracy through the 2001 Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy. The protocol ensured respect for human rights, increased efforts to promote peacekeeping, and the consolidation of democratic government. The protocol required the use of armed forces and the police in the promotion of democracy within states, particularly in response

to attempts to overthrow governments. It required election observation missions to member-states, which was notable because international financial donors tended to require free and fair elections as a prerequisite. This protocol has managed to prevent major crises in the region; however, the success of liberal democracy is still debated (Basuri, Salawu, Mashud, and Adepoju 2019, 4-10).

The Southern African Development Community was created in 1992 with the goal of economic development similar to ECOWAS. In post-colonial Africa, regional integration became an essential part of countries' plans for not only economic growth but to also promote peace and cooperation among members. Additionally, the SADC was created for security alliances among member states. The SADC created a forum to address conflict and prevent inter-state violence that could result in regional instability.

While the economic and security origins are similar to ECOWAS and the AU, what sets SADC's origins apart is a history of democracy (Mlambo and Ogunnubi 2018, 1-3). Before the SADC in 1980, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference was created in protest of South African apartheid. Democracy was a part of the original charter in which it implored member states to promote and integrate democracy in their governments. The SADC also would allow the organization to intervene in extreme instances of human rights violations, coups, and other threats to legitimate governments. The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and a Code of Conduct for Election Observers were created to ensure democratic elections because the SADC considered elections to be evidence of democracy consolidation. However, democratic identity is not necessary for membership and SADC has had member states join that did not consider themselves at the time. So, while

democracy was suggested, it was not a deal-breaker for SADC (Van Der Vleuten 2010, 750-754).

Chapter 3

Literature Review

Why Do Countries Join IGOs?

In international relations, scholars of election observation have explained how there are incentives for countries to join IGOs and comply with their IGOs norms and values. For one, countries with IGO membership benefit from the social incentive of status within the international community along with legitimacy. This can help a country gain power in the international community and influence policies that are in their favor (Miller, Welch, and Vonasch 2019, 114-115). As African countries do not hold as much power in the international community as the Western and East Asian countries, IGOs present them with an opportunity for prestige growth. IGOs also present an opportunity for military alliances. This in turn lessens the number of military conflicts between member-states through network convergence and burden-sharing (Kinne 2013, 660-662).

Additionally, the global system rewards countries who participate in it with financial incentives. Member-states of IGO are rewarded with trade agreements, foreign investments, and economic exchange. Countries who are a part of IGOs are also more likely to receive foreign aid from donors including NGOs. This aid can be used to help a member-state with development, humanitarian responses, and other areas where large lump sums of money is necessary (Swiss, Liam, and Longhofer 2016, 1769-1771). For countries in Africa, with GDP rates that are much

lower than that of the rest of the world, this incentive is relevant to their countries survival. Not only are their incentives, but there are also punishments for a country whose behavior does not reflect the values of that IGO. These social punishments include a loss of prestige, influences, advantageous diplomatic relations, investments, and foreign aid. Therefore, membership to an IGO is often vital for African countries (Miller, Welch 2016, and Vonasch, 116-177).

Failures of IGOS- African IGOs

IGO membership is beneficial for member states. However, in regard to African Union, it is not always successful in making their member states adhere to their democratic values. By analyzing the AU's charters, scholars of the African Union have found that the mechanisms within are too vague. For example, member states are expected to hold elections and invite election observers, but the IGO does not explain how the member state should conduct its election process. Meaning, each country's Electoral Commission decides the process and ongoings of their country's election and can choose whether or not to take the AU's recommendation for election processes. The African Union heavily relies on democratic institutions to change the democratic culture in Africa rather than establishing its mechanism to create this change. This issue stems from the AU requiring its member states to create a legislative framework that creates democratic culture programs and activities without specifying which state organization should be implementing these new programs (Tieku 2009, 83-85). Additionally, the AU has no mechanism to prevent and punish member states from manipulating the constitutions in an undemocratic fashion due to the institutional permeability, capacity deficiencies of the organization, and political context (Kane 2008, 52-58). These failures are important to the overall democratic projection of member states because the IGO is supposed

hold member-state accountable for undemocratic doings, but the AU does not. Therefore, the institutional failures of the African Union are a factor in the democratic outcomes of the member states.

Why Do Countries Appear Democratic?

The reasons countries appear democratic is similar to why they join IGOs; there are incentives. Western countries and NGOS tend to be democracy promoters, and their aid is often contingent on a country either being a democracy or working towards being a democracy. Tie this to the democratic peace theory/US foreign policy. Democracy promoters created and increased benefits relying on democratization and increased criticism within the international community of those who do not adhere to democracy.

So, countries that are not completely democratic appear to be democratic so that they can receive these incentives and avoid criticism (Hyde 2011, 356-260). Additionally, in emerging markets, foreign investors want to invest in countries that are democratic because there is less political risk for the corporation (Jensen 2008, 1042-1047). Acceptance in the international community is often conditional to a country's democratic status. International organizations Therefore these incentives motivate countries, democratic or not democratic, to signify that they are a democracy and prove their democratic credentials (Hyde 2011).

Why Do Countries Call Election Observers?

The relevance of election observance in the international community is due to the belief that elections are a clear marker of a democracy, particularly in African countries. There is positive change that results from election-related activities, which suggests that the holding of

elections in Africa leads to more democracy, not vice versa (Lindberg 2006, 142). This occurs because citizens gain and retain awareness of their role in their country's political system. After this awareness of their role, these citizens are more likely to use democratic mechanisms. With the citizens' use of democratic mechanisms, the elites will be more likely to uphold democratic principles to be risk averse. These democratic principles allow for civic organizations and the media to exist without scrutiny. Additionally, with new democratic principles come new democratic institutions (Lindberg 2006, 146-150). Therefore, a country having elections and giving democracy promoters access to their elections gives a country more legitimacy within the international community.

Countries often prove their democratic credentials by calling for election observers. Democracy promoters cannot easily observe another government's commitment to democracy. If an incumbent government did not invite election observers, that signals to the true-democrat that this country is not democratizing. Therefore, election observation is an ideal way for a democratizing country to prove their credentials to the democratized by having the democratic processes of a country on view.

While a country calls for election observation as a means to publicly prove their democratic values, a country may conduct a dubious election while being observed. Scholars have found that election observers fail to detect election fraud and manipulation. Observers are often unable to detect irregularities in elections. Not only are there irregularities and fraud, even with the presence of observers, but violence in elections also still occur. Observers that have multiple objectives such as deterring fraud, pursuing peace, and remaining impartial, are not able to make impacts on elections as strategic actors. The presence of observers in fraudulent elections increases the likelihood of post-election violence (Daxecker 2012, 512-514).

Additionally, observers who try to prevent post-election violence do more damage and are less effective than impartial observers (Luo and Rozena 2018, 156). Observers being impartial prevents more violence, however, it does not hold the country accountable for an undemocratic election. The lack of substance in election observation is easily taken advantage of by countries who do not intend on democratizing. It is easy for countries to invite election observers to a country because they can signal towards being democratic and transparent, while in action be undemocratic.

Failures of Election Observance

Scholars have shown that adherence to international norms with election observation does not necessarily mean that a country enforces or even values free and fair elections. Sometimes observers can even worsen already dire situations in elections. But because of the incentives that the international community gives countries for inviting election observers, the violence and instability worsened by observers is not relevant to these countries. There is an overall agreement that election observance does not lessen manipulation, fraud, protest, and violence (Hyde 2011, Daxecker 2012). While there is an overall agreement in the field about the lack of efficiency of election observance, the main disagreement is whether or not the failures of election observance come from the individual observer error or the system itself of how election observers are invited and employed. Scholars tend to stray away from studying election observers deployed by African intergovernmental organizations because they have been proven to be the least effective of the different election observers. This is due to the observer's unwillingness to report abuses that occur during elections. The African Union Charter does not provide a mechanism to allow for election observers to have more independence or autonomy,

meaning they are beholden to the “will of the state.” There are no set criteria for choosing observers, so there can be an issue with impartiality (Kane 2008, 52-58). With this in mind, undemocratic governments continue in their undemocratic practices (Tieku 2009, 83-85). This disconnect is one motivation for this study (Daxecker 2012, 510).

Chapter 4

Theory

I am interested in looking at whether the IGOs effectively and accurately serve as election observers, and also at whether joining the IGO affects the level of democracy in a country. This is to see these IGOs' soft approach to their member states' undemocratic practices. I will be examining the election observation reports from 2000-2019 and will be looking at the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. I chose these charters because they lay out the democratic values of the IGO and because they are the most well-known IGOs in the region.

Critics of the AU argue that the main issue with their involvement in Africa is that they do not do enough to promote democracy. When there are elections in Africa, some organizations often criticize these elections for not being democratic and often being corrupt. However, when the AU sends its election officials they are pleased with the processes of the elections and claim that the elections were democratic. Scholars have found that the AU and ECOWAS election observation reports tend to be the least accurate. There has not been an as vocal condemnation of SADC's election observers, however, the most credible organizations tend to be based in Europe or Asia (Aniekwe and Atuobi 2016, 29-32). Scholars argue that the international benefits for democratic elections give electoral autocrats the incentive to invite international observers and manipulate elections to minimize international criticism (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009, 394).

Hypothesis 1: The three IGOs are likely to mischaracterize the elections of their members relative to reports from objective observers.

The rationale for Hypothesis 1 is based on two arguments. First, scholars have found that IGOs have a wide variation in their response to member states' violations of democracy. This inconsistency in IGO response has a poor effect on member states' commitment to democracy (Donno 2010, 596-601). Second, the argument explains that democratizing governments allow election monitors to observe their elections to reap the benefits from the international community for being democratic, rather than doing so to ensure democratic practice (Hyde 2011). In this case, African governments join the IGOs and agree to their democratic mechanisms to adhere to international norms, but do not actually practice democracy. And the IGO enforcement of democracy is not always consistent. Therefore, I predict that there will lower levels of democracy in member states.

Hypothesis 2: Countries that ratify organization charters are likely to have lower levels of democracy post-charter enforcement date than they had pre-charter enforcement date.

The reason why election observance and organization charters are necessary independent variables is because they are both ways in which these IGOs can promote democracy. For the African Union, ECOWAS, and SADC, all of their charters claim to promote democracy. This paper will call into question the idealism of these charters. To test the hypothesis, it will compare democracy levels changes from pre-entry into force to post-entry into force for variance. According to scholars this idealism acts as a smoke screen for countries to pretend they are democratic when they are not. Therefore, the entry into force of charters and election observation do not increase democracy overall.

Examining the IGO membership is important in order to understand the relationship to democracy. Membership to at least one of the three IGOs is necessary to examine this relationship. This is to ensure that there is variation in the findings. Secondly, the country would

have had to have and have a significant election within two years of the entry into force of the characters. This is to ensure that the election is reflected in the democracy score and that there is ample time for change.

Levels of Democracy

Levels of democracy are defined by the four components that a country's institutions uphold; therefore, levels of democracy are based on the country's performance in these five components. The electoral component describes holding leaders accountable to citizens through periodic elections with the competition. The electoral component is the most integral part of defining democracy. The liberal component involves the protection of all citizens' rights through civil liberties and laws that limit the government's ability to infringe on such rights. The participatory component is the participation of citizens in the political processes that exemplify the values of direct rule. The deliberative component describes the dialogue amongst citizens that influences political decisions and values instead of other coercive methods. The egalitarian component is the acts of the governments that promote civil liberties through means such as education, resources, and health. This is different from democratization because that is the process by which an authoritarian government transitions to a democratic government. The higher the score, the higher the level of democracy. However, there are many different explanations for what democracy is. While this concept includes a set of principles that translate into government actions, some scholars have more minimalist beliefs. Alvarez et al. define democracy as a regime where government offices are filled by contested elections. Contestation occurs when the opposition has a chance of winning an office in an election. Similarly, Vanhanen defines democracy as a political system with two dimensions, which include

competition and participation. For this paper, a more detailed definition of democracy is used because the components of democracy are all values each of the IGOs hold, and therefore its members should adhere to this definition.

Levels of democracy examines the democratic qualities of a regime regardless of whether it identifies as a democracy or not. This paper will examine the levels of democracy because in the 90s, many countries in Africa went through democratization, however, the quality of these democracies remain dubious. In this paper levels of democracy will be used as a way to measure the success of these three IGOs democratic mechanisms including their charters and election observation. These IGOs are supposed to be democracy promoting entities, IGOs claim to be organizations that create better lives for people by making countries adhere to certain rules, promote peace, cooperate amongst one another, and foster common social and economic norms in members.

Election Observance

Election observation is the process in which an IGO deploys observers who witness a country's election period and report on the findings. Election observation is supposed to ensure that elections are free and fair. They ensure that their members have quality elections by upholding election norms. The reports from these election observation missions should be either in approval of the election or be critical of the mishaps or fraud that occurred in the election. Election observation is a variable in this paper because some scholars consider elections to be an indicator of democracy and is the most visible form of direct action from these organizations that promote their ideals. By examining each IGO's election observation reports,

there are potential discrepancies in how the IGO viewed the election as opposed to how the election turned out.

Charters

An IGO charter is a document that lays out the legal framework of that organization and includes rules, regulations, and principles that all members of the organization agree to. These charters will lay out the organization's structure for internal proceedings and the expectation of member states. In order for a charter to be in effect in a country, the country has to ratify the charter into their law. Therefore, these charters are based on consent from the member state and the IGO. Charters are relevant to this work because it is the indication catalyst for democratic change in a country.

Chapter 5

Methodology

Testing the Hypotheses: Multivariate Approach

The data used to test Hypothesis 1 comes from multiple sources. I have collected 40 AU election observation reports, 20 SADC election observation reports and 15 ECOWAS election observation reports. This data collection was limited due to the unforthcoming nature of these organizations. After collecting these reports, I coded them based on how the election observation report characterized the election. For a report to be coded as free and fair, had to conclude that the election observed stated that an election expressed the will of the people, was credible, transparent, in accordance with legal framework, free, fair, and had political participation. A report had to have three of seven criteria to be coded as such. For an election report to be considered not free and fair, it had to observe violence, intimidation, fraud, low voter turn-out, candidate withdrawal, inconsistencies, no competition, jail competitors, no opposition, candidate receipt of more than 60% of the vote, and incumbent misuse of campaign funds. For an election to be coded as not free and fair it had to meet five of the seven criteria. This coding criteria is based on multiple scholars' criteria on election "free and fairness." (Bishop and Hoeffler 2016; Lindberg 2006) In total, to be categorized, the document had to make about 40% of the criteria. I chose these criteria because they describe the quality of the election with dimensions that address election malpractice and electoral integrity. Then I obtained three media reports of the same elections the observers covered. These articles came from reputable news organizations and

detailed the ongoings of the elections. Reputable news sources are ones that are well known in the journalism field, include an international section, are transparent about sources, corrects errors, and detailed the election in a balanced fashion. The sources included CNN, Al Jazeera, DW, Reuters, AfricaNews, BBC, The New York Times, and the Washington Post. I coded these articles based on how they characterized the election with the same criteria as the election observation report. To measure the statistical differences in agreement between the election observation reports and the media articles I will run Cohen's kappa statistical analysis using Minitab. This determines interrater reliability. When Kappa equals 1, perfect agreement exists, when Kappa equals 0, the agreement is the same as would be expected by chance, and when Kappa is less than 0, agreement is weaker than expected chance, which is an anomaly.

The data used to test Hypothesis 2 comes from multiple sources. Firstly, I obtained the democracy score from the Variety of Democracy database. The data has been collected from the Egalitarian Democracy Index, Electoral Democracy Index, Liberal Democracy Index, and the Participatory Democracy Index. I used these indices to operationalize democracy because they directly reflect the concept of democracy as defined in the theory section. I collected data from the entry into force date for all three charters, between 2000 and 2020. all three IGOs passed charters pertaining to democracy and these charters will frame the time period for the democracy analysis. This gives ample time for the charter to come into effect in a country. The date of entry into force on each of the IGO's websites.

The democracy indicators are reliable and based on factual information that can be reproduced consistently because of its objectivity. However, the indicators are based on the subjective opinion on a country. This is the main weakness of this measure. While the opinion may be an expert's opinion, there is still the possibility that the opinion on a certain subject

varies significantly. When the opinion differs a country's, democratic score can go up or down, which gives the potential for an unreliable measure. However, due the widespread use of these indicators in this field, I believe that this weakness is not large enough to discard it. It is a valid measure because it measures the exact concepts that it defines in its codebook and as defined in my theory. It defines the multi-level principles of democracy and based on the indicators and indices on these levels. It is ideal for this project because its democracy measures go beyond elections and have a more well-rounded approach for each of the indicators. Because I will be comparing democracy pre- and post- entry, I will use a difference of means tests.

Variables

For Hypothesis 1, outcome measure is the assessment of the election. the variable that will explain differences in the assessments is the observer. For Hypothesis 2, the outcome measure is the level of democracy, and the variable that will explain the difference is charter entry.

Unit of Analysis

For Hypothesis 1, the unit of analysis is the election. This is because For Hypothesis 2, the unit of analysis is the country year. This is because I analyze election reports, democracy score, and media findings based on each member-state of the IGO. This unit of analysis makes the most sense because in order to see how IGOs affect democracy, on the continent, I have to look at the countries themselves. Countries are supposed to execute democratic practices that their IGO promote, therefore this is the most reasonable unit of analysis for this study.

Chapter 6

Quantitative Analysis

Election Observance Analysis

AU Findings




Figure 1

Media Findings




Figure 2

ECOWAS Findings




Figure 3

Media Findings




Figure 4

SADC Findings




Figure 5

Media Findings




Figure 6

Figures 1 through 6 show that all three IGOs characterized more elections as free and fair than not free and fair in their reports. Meanwhile, the inverse is the case with the Media, characterizing more elections as not free and fair rather than free and fair. For all collected reports, there was not one election in which the media characterize the election as free and fair and the IGO characterized the election as not free and fair. Most elections, the two appraisers disagreed on election free and fairness, and this large discrepancy that I found in my research is why the Kappa Statistic is used to statistically understand whether or not these discrepancies are arbitrary or not.

Assessment Agreement

# Inspected	# Matched	Percent	95% CI
38	19	50.00	(33.38, 66.62)

Matched: All appraisers' assessments agree with each other.

Figure 7

Figure 8

Fleiss' Kappa Statistics

Response	Kappa	SE Kappa	Z	P(vs > 0)
0	-0.0351254	0.162221	-0.216528	0.5857
1	-0.0351254	0.162221	-0.216528	0.5857

For the AU's election observation reports compared to the media reports of the same elections, the Kappa Statistic is less than zero. This means that the agreement is weaker than expected chance. The Standard Error for the Kappa Statistic measured that the precision of the estimate is precise because it is less than 1. However, the P value is greater than 0.05, therefore, there is not support for this finding being statistically significant. So, while agreement between the two appraisers is statistically weak, it is not statistically significant to confirm Hypothesis 1 for the AU.

Assessment Agreement

# Inspected	# Matched	Percent	95% CI
15	7	46.67	(21.27, 73.41)

Matched: All appraisers' assessments agree with each other.

Figure 9

Fleiss' Kappa Statistics

Response	Kappa	SE Kappa	Z	P(vs > 0)
0	-0.2	0.258199	-0.774597	0.7807
1	-0.2	0.258199	-0.774597	0.7807

Figure 10

For ECOWAS's election observation reports compared to the media reports of the same elections, the Kappa Statistic is less than zero. This means that the agreement is weaker than expected chance. The Standard Error for the Kappa Statistic measured that the precision of the estimate is precise because it is less than 1. However, the P value is greater than 0.05, therefore, there is no support for this finding being statistically significant. So, while agreement between the two appraisers is statistically weak, it is not statistically significant to confirm Hypothesis 1 for ECOWAS.

Assessment Agreement

# Inspected	# Matched	Percent	95% CI
19	8	42.11	(20.25, 66.50)

Matched: All appraisers' assessments agree with each other.

Figure 11

Fleiss' Kappa Statistics

Response	Kappa	SE Kappa	Z	P(vs > 0)
0	-0.170868	0.229416	-0.744798	0.7718
1	-0.170868	0.229416	-0.744798	0.7718

Figure 12

For SADC's election observation reports compared to the media reports of the same elections, the Kappa Statistic is less than zero. This means that the agreement is weaker than expected chance. The Standard Error for the Kappa Statistic measured that the precision of the estimate is precise because it is less than 1. However, the P value is greater than 0.05, therefore,

there is no support for this finding being statistically significant. So, while agreement between the two appraisers is statistically weak, it is not statistically significant to confirm Hypothesis 1 for SADC.

Levels of Democracy Analysis

Correlation: v2x_polyarchy, v2x_libdem, v2x_partipdem, v2x_delibdem, v2x_egaldem

	v2x_polyarchy	v2x_libdem	v2x_partipdem	v2x_delibdem
v2x_libdem	0.967 0.000			
v2x_partipdem	0.950 0.000	0.938 0.000		
v2x_delibdem	0.964 0.000	0.969 0.000	0.941 0.000	
v2x_egaldem	0.943 0.000	0.954 0.000	0.905 0.000	0.951 0.000

Cell Contents: Pearson correlation
P-Value

Figure 13

I ran a correlation analysis on the entire data set to understand the relationship of the indicators. There are multiple observations for each country, so the data are not completely independent. For the four democracy indicators, we find that there is a strong, positive correlation between all of them. When one country has a high score for one of the democracy indicators, it will likely have a high score for the rest of the indicators.




Figure 14

Figure 14, which takes a random sample of half of the countries in Africa shows that over a twenty-year period, the majority of countries' democracy scores in egalitarian democracy only decreased or increased slightly. This is to show the growth trend for egalitarian democracy. On a

scale of 0 to 1, on an interval from low to high, the majority of the countries do not go beyond .3, meaning that only egalitarian democracy has been partially implemented in these countries.

Some outliers include Mauritius, which averaged a score of 0.66 over the 19 years, up until 2020 where the score dove down to 4.9 and Somalia whose score never grew past 0.09. Tunisia grew significantly with a jump from 0.2 in the early 2000s to 0.62 by 2011 and has been scoring above average ever since. Seychelles showed a healthy growth in this indicator with a score increase of 0.1 over the 2020 years when the average growth was less than 0.1.

Paired T-Test and CI: 2000 egaldem, 2020 egaldem

Paired T for 2000 egaldem - 2020 egaldem

	N	Mean	StDev	SE Mean
2000 egaldem	55	0.2520	0.1434	0.0193
2020 egaldem	55	0.2838	0.1423	0.0192
Difference	55	-0.0317	0.0928	0.0125

95% CI for mean difference: (-0.0568, -0.0067)

T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs \neq 0): T-Value = -2.54 P-Value = 0.014

Figure 15




Figure 16

The difference of means test is used to show the statistical relationship of the two means in addition to the trend seen in Figure 14. The egalitarian democracy indicator mean in 2000 was 0.25 and by 2020 it grew to 0.28. For the Difference of Means tests, the estimate for 2000 and 2020 mean difference for the egalitarian indicator is -0.032. For a 95% confidence level, the mean difference is between -0.057 and -0.001. These statistics are negative because the 2000 mean is smaller than the 2020 mean, but the democracy levels were lower in 2000 than they were

in 2020. These findings are statistically significant because the P value is greater than 0.05. Both the findings and the statistical significance do not support Hypothesis 2.




Figure 17

Figure 17 shows the participatory democracy indicator over a twenty-year period. Two thirds of the countries never exceed 0.2 while the remaining one third are between 0.2 and 0.55. Scatterplot 2 has more variance than Scatterplot 1. Participatory democracy has been partially implemented in these countries in the sample, meaning that direct democracy via elections is not consistent on the continent. Again, Mauritius is an outlier on the high end, which averaged a score of 0.53 over the 20 years, up until 2020 where the score went down to 3.9. Eritrea's score never rose past .01. Scatterplot 2 has a significant variation, with countries such as Sao Tome and Principe, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Namibia all being consistently above average, however never reaching outlier status. Most countries did not see a significant decrease in democracy score except for Madagascar which took a significant dive down 0.17 points.

Paired T-Test and CI: 2000 partipdem, 2020 partipdem

Paired T for 2000 partipdem - 2020 partipdem

	N	Mean	StDev	SE Mean
2000 partipdem	55	0.2113	0.1259	0.0170
2020 partipdem	55	0.2480	0.1174	0.0158
Difference	55	-0.0367	0.0955	0.0129

95% CI for mean difference: (-0.0625, -0.0109)

T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs \neq 0): T-Value = -2.85 P-Value = 0.006

Figure 18




Figure 19

The difference of means test is used to show the statistical relationship of the two means in addition to the trend seen in Scatter Plot 2. The egalitarian democracy indicator mean in 2000 was 0.21 and by 2020 it grew to 0.24. For the difference of means test, the estimate for 2000 and 2020 mean difference for the egalitarian indicator is -0.037. For a 95% confidence level, the mean difference is between -0.063 and -0.011. These statistics are negative because the 2000 mean is smaller than the 2020 mean, but the democracy levels were lower in 2000 than they were in 2020. These findings are statistically significant because the P value is greater than 0.05. Both the findings and the statistical significance do not support Hypothesis 2.




Figure 20

Figure 20 shows the deliberative democracy indicator over a twenty-year period. Three fourths of the countries never exceed 0.3 while the remaining one fourth are between 0.3 and 0.8, making this scatterplot have more variance than the previous two. Deliberative democracy within government has been partially implemented in these countries but is on the low end. Again, Mauritius is an outlier on the high end, which averaged a score of 0.78 from 2000 to 2012, then from 2012-2019 it had an average score of 0.75, and in 2020 it took a large dive down to 0.55. Eritrea, score never rose past .03. Tunisia experienced exceptional growth, jumping from just under 0.1 from 2000-2010 to 0.7 in the next decade, which is the largest growth of any country not only on this indicator but for all 4 indicators. Similarly, to Scatterplot 2, Sao Tome and Principe, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Namibia is consistently above average, with a minor dips and growths throughout the twenty-year period, however there are no exponential changes. The some of the average countries such as Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and Eswatini changes in score are so miniscule that the representation on the graph almost appear straight. Other average scores such as Somaliland, Togo, Zanzibar, and the D.R. Congo have several dip and growth of no more than 0.04.

Paired T-Test and CI: 2000 delibdem, 2020 delibdem

Paired T for 2000 delibdem - 2020 delibdem

	N	Mean	StDev	SE Mean
2000 delibdem	55	0.2735	0.1826	0.0246
2020 delibdem	55	0.3197	0.1678	0.0226
Difference	55	-0.0461	0.1326	0.0179

95% CI for mean difference: (-0.0820, -0.0103)

T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs \neq 0): T-Value = -2.58 P-Value = 0.013

Figure 21




Figure 22

The difference of means test is used to show the statistical relationship of the two means in addition to the trend seen in Scatter Plot 3. The deliberative democracy indicator mean in 2000 was 0.27 and by 2020 it grew to 0.32. For the difference of means test, the estimate for 2000 and 2020 mean difference for the deliberative indicator is -0.046. For a 95% confidence level, the mean difference is between -0.082 and -0.01. These statistics are negative because the 2000 mean is smaller than the 2020 mean, but the democracy levels were lower in 2000 than they were in 2020. These findings are statistically significant because the P value is greater than 0.05. Both the findings and the statistical significance do not support Hypothesis 2.




Figure 23

Scatterplot 4 shows the liberal democracy indicator over a twenty-year period. Three fourths of the countries never exceed 0.3 while the remaining one fourth are between 0.3 and .75, making this scatterplot similar in composition to Scatterplot 3. Liberal democracy within the state has been partially implemented in these countries but is on the low end. Again, Mauritius is an outlier on the high end, which averaged a score of 0.72 from 2000-2019 and dove down to 0.5 in 2020. Eritrea never rose past 0.015. Tunisia and Seychelles experienced exponential growth over the twenty-year period while Sao Tome and Principe and Namibia sustained an above average score with minor dips and growth. Interestingly, Gambia grew from 0.12 at the beginning of 2000 and peaked at .41 at 2015, sustaining a slightly higher score for the remaining years. This democracy growth is similar to Tunisia but is less visible because .41 is only slightly higher than the vast majority of the countries in this sample.

Paired T-Test and CI: 2000 libdem, 2020 libdem

Paired T for 2000 libdem - 2020 libdem

	N	Mean	StDev	SE Mean
2000 libdem	55	0.2491	0.1818	0.0245
2020 libdem	55	0.2931	0.1762	0.0238
Difference	55	-0.0440	0.1300	0.0175

95% CI for mean difference: (-0.0792, -0.0089)

T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs \neq 0): T-Value = -2.51 P-Value = 0.015

Figure 24




Figure 25

The difference of means test is used to show the statistical relationship of the two means in addition to the trend seen in Scatter Plot 4. The liberal democracy indicator mean in 2000 was 0.25 and by 2020 it grew to 0.29. For the difference of means test, the estimate for 2000 and 2020 mean difference for the liberal democracy indicator is -0.044. For a 95% confidence level, the mean difference is between -0.079 and -0.009. These statistics are negative because the 2000 mean is smaller than the 2020 mean, but the democracy levels were lower in 2000 than they were in 2020. These findings are statistically significant because the P value is greater than 0.05. Both the findings and the statistical significance do not support Hypothesis 2.




Figure 26




Figure 27




Figure 28




Figure 29




Figure 30

During the twenty-year period in which three democracy charters were implemented by IGOs, there was overall minimal change to the democracy scores for each of these indicators, although the change resulted in slightly higher democracy scores. The region that experienced an upwards trend was West Africa, while South Africa experienced scores have mostly stayed consistent. East Africa experienced some growth between 2000 and 2010, but that growth leveled out better 2010 and 2020. Western and Southern African both had higher starting scores in 2000 of around 0.33 and grew to 0.4 by 2020. Countries such as Ghana and South Africa are exemplary democracies in those regions, consistently scoring around 0.7 over the twenty-year period. However, they are outliers. Typical countries like Nigeria and Zambia scores remained around 0.4 for the twenty-year period, with dips no greater than 0.04. Outliers on the lower end include Zimbabwe which is a dictatorship and did not meet the Central Africa has stayed mostly the same, except for the slight spike in democracy growth in 2017 onwards. East Africa and Central Africa had the lowest starting scores in 2000. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia, scores were consistently around .0.15 for the 2000s and grew to 2.6 by the next decade. Other countries in this Region like Somalia and Equatorial Guinea below 0.1 for most of the twenty-year period. Somalia made gains to 0.17 by 2020, but Equatorial Guinea never surpassed 0.1.

Chapter 7

Qualitative Analysis

To investigate these findings, I chose two elections to do a case study for this qualitative portion. The purpose of this case study is to provide an example that shows the conditions in which both appraisers agree and where they diverge in their assessment of the election. One case confirms Hypothesis 1 while the other does not. I used the US Department of State (DOS) Human Rights Reports to describe the activities of the election and then compare how the media framed these activities as opposed to the IGO. The DOS reports serve as the baseline of information for each election. The 2016 Ugandan Presidential, Legislative, and Local elections do not confirm the hypothesis since both the IGO and the media had similar findings and described an election that was not free and fair. The 2013 Zimbabwean Presidential, Legislative, and Local elections were a typical case in that the IGO characterized the election as free and fair, while the media did not.

Department of State: Uganda 2016 Election

Uganda, a country located in East Africa has a constitutional republic and has been under a one-party rule and with a single president since 1986. Uganda's constitution calls for the country to hold free and fair elections every five years. President Yoweri Museveni and his party The National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, were up for re-election in 2016. The election planning phase was already plagued with violations of electoral freedoms. In 2015, the government passed an amendment to the 2015 Local Government Act which instructed officials

to line up voters behind a symbol or image of their preferred candidate. This legislation was in direct violation of the constitution which gives citizens the right to a secret ballot (DOS 2017, 19-20). Then in December 2015, the NRM party-controlled senate changed the constitution by passing a bill that removed the Presidential age limit, allowing President Museveni to run for a fifth five-year term (DOS 2017, 3). These decisions outraged citizens and they took to social media to air their complaints. The Uganda Communications Committee attempted to intimidate the public from posting by releasing a statement that said that those who post “illegal and/or offensive content” risk being arrested and prosecuted (DOS 2017, 13).

Election campaigning activities were corrupt as well. Local journalists reported bribery, alteration to ballots and overall results, ballot box stuffing, and people voting multiple times. The police intimidated voters. During the election season, the police regularly abused Besigye supporters and other opposition supporters, publicly beating unlawfully (DOS 2017, 20). The Ugandan Electoral Commission was biased and not transparent. The media environment of the election was skewed towards President Museveni and the NRM party. While the radio stations, newspapers, and television channels are privately owned, government officials from the ruling party own many rural television channels that restrict certain political content. Local media reported that President Museveni urged radio hosts to not allow any opposition candidates that were campaigning against his government. During the campaign season, the police monitored all forms of media and abused and arrested several journalists for their reporting. Additionally, media personnel said that the NRM party would call them, urging them to not print stories that were critical of the party (DOS 2017, 14). All arrested parties have the right to challenge their arrest in court, this right was rarely upheld.

The election process itself was chaotic. Election materials were delivered late, resulting in many Ugandans not voting. Districts in which the opposition had significant support, had delays upwards of eight hours. The capital, Kampala, experienced such delays and extended the voting time by 3 hours. The election resulted in President Museveni receiving 61 percent of the vote. The NRM party received 70 percent of the 413 legislative assembly seats. Uganda has 29 registered political parties. (DOS 21-23) The main opposition candidate for the presidency, Kizza Besigye, did not have the chance to contest the election because the police placed him under house arrest. Besigye won 36 percent of the vote. The law warrants all opposition candidates ten days after the results to contest the election, and due to house arrest during that crucial period, Besigye could not access any lawyers to file a contestation. Although Besigye could not contest the election, the third-place candidate Amama Mbabazi filed a legal contestation to no avail. The Supreme Court upheld the results of the election, acknowledging there were changes to the electoral law, however, those changes did not significantly affect the results of the election. After his freedom from house arrest, Mbazai was later arrested and put on trial for treason in May 2016 for pretending to take the presidential oath of office (DOS 2017, 9). The Uganda Human Rights Committee (UHRC) noted that reported human rights cases were up by 16 percent. Seventy-three percent of the complaints were against the police force. Typical complaints concerned torture, mistreatment, cruel and unusual punishment, and violations of personal liberties due to arrests. The UHRC attributed the sharp increase in violence to the election and the treatment of the opposition (DOS 2017, 26).

African Union: Uganda 2016 Election

The Ugandan report characterizes the Ugandan election as not free, and fair using convoluted language and lacked the congratulatory language typically expressed in the AU reports. Rather than explicitly saying the election was not free and fair, the report describes the election as “not without shortcomings” and “not in line with international practice” (AU 2016, 5).

The AU report did not acknowledge the undemocratic pre-election decisions as described in the DOS report. The changing of the constitution and the amendment to the Local Government Act were not listed in the report. Instead, it described the activities that occurred during the election. The AU report lists delays up to 5 hours and insufficient voting materials that impeded Ugandan’s ability to vote (AU 2016, 13). It reported significant police presence at the polls which they described as creating a “tense atmosphere” (AU 2016, 5). The report described how the government recruited people to join the police specifically to intimidate the opposition parties and their supporters (AU 2016, 11). The AU expressed concern over the arrest of Besigye and other opposition members seven times in the report, making note that this was intimidation and that it impeded freedom. The report denounced the government’s shutdown of social media saying it was an “infringement of freedom and information” (AU 2016, 5). The report describes the unequal reporting of candidate coverage in the media, favoring President Museveni. The report describes the President using government funds to campaign as unfair, however, it does not delve into how these funds were used or the reported bribery like in the DOS report. Rather than reported ballot box stuffing like the DOS report, the AU report states that there were instances where the ballot boxes were not empty during election opening, nor were the boxes sealed properly. During counting, the AU report discloses that while there were inconsistencies in the ballot counting process such as empty ballot boxes before counting, lack of procedure for

determining an invalid vote, and disruption during the count in some areas, they were overall satisfied with the counting process (AU 2016, 14-16). One of the few positives of the election aspects the report states were the lack of widespread violence (AU 2016, 19).

Media Reports: Uganda 2016 Election

The media's objective reporting of the election corroborates the findings in both the DOS and the AU report but lacks the criticism of the DOS report and the recommendations of the AU report, due to its objective nature. Reuters, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, and the BBC, highlight that the incumbent has been in power for over thirty years, the incumbent received over sixty percent of the vote, the inconsistency with the ballots, delays in election material, and inaccurate counting of the votes, and the arrest of Besigye. These articles also described failed election reform that was supposed to pass in Parliament. In these articles, writers used language such as sham, shambolic, fraudulent, flawed, and lack of transparency (Dzirutwe, Honan and Biryabarema, Kavuma, Al Jazeera Staff, BBC). Rather than frame this language as fact, the media framed the language as allegations. The media reporting provides first-hand accounts of citizens, unlike the reports. Al Jazeera showed a private house where the opposition claimed ballot-rigging occurred in Kampala. The Guardian cited polling that said that only 40% of Ugandans believed the election to be free and fair and only 41% of Ugandans believed that elections could remove an incumbent (Kavuma). The opinion pieces written on the elections use more critical language, which is much stronger than the critical language used in the DOS report. The New York Times and the Washington Post describe President Museveni as a dictator, a word which neither the AU nor the DOS report used. One article states, "It is no longer fashionable for rulers to appear to be authoritarian, the argument goes, so government after

government has undertaken the trouble and the expense to legitimize its grip on power by organizing elections, or constitutional referendums, that few people inside or outside the country say are anything close to democratic” (Green). Both the New York Times and the Washington Post, address the 750 million dollars in aid the US gives to Uganda which neither the AU nor the DOC report addressed (Green, Gettleman, WP Editorial Board). The Washington Post’s Editorial Board criticizes the US complacency over the clear miscarriage of democracy which was the 2016 election.

Characterization of the Uganda 2016 Election

By shining a light on the secret ongoing of the election and including first-hand accounts of the citizens experiences, the media reports were able to characterize the election more accurately. The media reports matched the content in the DOS reports, and this corroboration supports the claim of the media of accurately portraying each election more accurately. The media’s ability to accurately describe the ongoings of the elections may have slightly been curbed by the Ugandan government’s arrests of journalists, shut down of social media, and control over the media, but the truth about the election still came. On the other hand, the African Union, as an IGO, has the ability to condemn these corrupt and unjust actions made by the Uganda government in the report, but the report lacked the serious tone necessary for such actions. Still, the African Union agreed with both the DOS, and the media reports on the fact that the election was not free and fair in a veiled manner, therefore the AU accurately characterized the election, making this an atypical observation.

Department of State: Zimbabwe 2013 Election

Zimbabwe is a constitutional republic in southern Africa that has been under a one-party rule and with a single president since its independence in 1980. The constitution requires that every five years, the government holds a free and fair election. The President, Robert Mugabe, and his political party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), were up for reelection in 2013. Before the election began, some issues appeared to cause unfairness. The Global Political Agreement GPA required the government to write a new constitution in 2009, and the constitution was not signed by the three major parties until 2012. In May 2013, just two months before the election, the constitution became law. The ZANU-PF wielded their power over the other two opposition parties and arrested and intimidated the opposition and manipulated their input to the new constitution (DOS 2014, 34). The constitution was supposed to be grounds for free and fair election but was corrupted by the ZANU-PF actions. During the pre-election period, President Mugabe refused to respect the inclusive government mandated by the SADC Global Political Agreement and did not consult the two opposition parties on decisions that influenced the election (DOS 2014, 1). The Constitutional Court quickly changed the date of the election to July 2013. This date allowed the ZANU-PF to go forward with the election, without passing the SADC pre-election political, legal, security sector, and media reforms. Additionally, the other pre-election laws that were supposed to pass to ensure the fairness of the election did not. The Parliament was supposed to pass a law that reflected a constitutional change of required citizenship for voting, however since it was not passed, a small subsection of the population with foreign ancestry could not register to vote (DOS 2014, 25).

In Zimbabwean cities with significant opposition support, there was voter disenfranchisement on a large-scale. The ZANU-PF bribed rural village chiefs to gain more voter support by giving the chiefs benefits such as vehicles, farms, and houses. The Zimbabwe

Electoral Commission (ZEC) was not transparent nor independent and was made up of ZANU-PF supporters from the security sector (DOS 2014, 14-15). The ZEC did not perform the necessary duties to ensure a fair election such as giving the opposition parties an electronic copy of the voter registration. They broke the law and did not respond to the opposition parties' formal complaints about the mail-in voting, the observing media and biases, and the distribution and count of ballots. Mugabe won the election with a little more than 61 percent of the vote while the ZANU-PF won with 66 percent of the vote. The voter rolls were dubious at best; it included a large percentage of centenarian voters and a small percentage of young voters. Additionally, the voter roll had a slant towards the ZANU-PF (DOS 2014, 30-33). Officials and the police restricted the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) by preventing them from holding some of their rallies, abusing and intimidating opposition supporters. On the extreme end, MDC-T members were kidnapped and abused to threaten them, and the police did not punish these actions (DOS 2014, 4-7). The police and the army, who are supposed to be apolitical by law, outwardly supported the ZANU-PF and even a few ran for candidates under the party. When the police arrested and abused opposition supporters, they subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by law. Human rights groups reported some of these torture methods including burning, whips, sleep deprivation, and solitary confinement. The government did not prosecute ZANU-PF supporters who beat and killed opposition supporters. Because of the violence against the opposition and Mugabe cementing a unitary government, the opposition weakened significantly.

All foreign actors, including international observers and journalists, were required by the government to apply for a license to observe the election and had to be vetted. Even though these journalists met the country's rules and criteria, the government prevented them from covering the

election. Foreign diplomats were allowed to observe with a team no larger than five people, while local observer groups had no maximum number (DOS 2014, 33). Zimbabwe prevented western election observers from observing the election and only allowed the SADC and the AU to observe. Both of these IGOs characterized the election as free and fair. The only media coverage of the election was local media, both government-controlled and private, that approved and supported President Mugabe.

The African Union: Zimbabwe 2013 Election

The AU does not criticize Zimbabwe's election as much as the DOS. The AU report does mention and raises concerns about the exclusion of the Zimbabwean with foreign ancestry in their report, however, the reports claimed that there was not enough evidence on the scale of this exclusion and reported that the voter registration roll grew by 1.2 million people (AU 2013, 13). The AU report did not mention any of the violence that DOS suggested the ZANU-PF supported committed during the electoral campaign season. It does not mention the altered election timetable set by the ZANU-PF that breaks the GPA. Instead, the report described any conflict as "minor skirmishes" and then proceeded to praise the political parties for encouraging peace amongst supporters (AU 2013, 14). The AU report detailed that the media coverage of the election was heavily in favor of the ZANU-PF, however rather than condemning this, the report proceeds to praise the improvements in election ads from all the parties. The AU report notes that the election day was free of violence and compared this to the chaotic 2008 election and the vicious and deadly aftermath (AU 2013, 23). The AU praises the ZEC for conducting the election with integrity and said that the ZEC execution of the election was in line with AU principles (AU 2013, 11). This report does not mention the ZEC being composed of ZANU-PF

party members or allies like the DOS suggested. The report condemned the Registrar of General Voters because it gave the ZEC the voter rolls only two days before the election which prevented the process of voter verification. This resulted in a significant number of voters being turned away on election day because they could not verify their names on the voter roll to the correct voting ward. Additionally, a high number of voters were turned away for being at the wrong polling place because of the ZEC's late publication of voting stations. The report also condemned the ZEC for printing 35% ballots above the number of registered voters when the international practice is only printing 5-10% above the number of registered voters and noticed that the unused ballots are unaccounted for. Also, the ballot books had missing ballot papers which raised concerns. The AU questioned the high number of voters- around 20 percent- who were assisted either by police officers, presiding officers, or electoral officers. These officers could influence a voter's ballot and impede on their freewill. Even with these flaws in the election, the AU decided that they were not enough to completely invalidate the legitimacy of the election (AU 2013, 16-19).

Media Reports: Zimbabwe 2013 Election

Unlike the AU, the media reporting describes the Zimbabwean elections as rigged for the incumbent because of his power over the state. The objective reporting including the complaints by the oppositions and the details of the lawsuits he made to contest the election. The media did include the allegations of fraud regarding the voter rolls and with the polling stations.

Additionally, other instances of fraud that were not alleged in the DOS report were the voters who may have voted for the wrong candidate because the photos of the candidates were blurry, making it difficult to know who who is and choose the right mark. Similar to the AU report,

media reporting describes the violence of the 2008 elections and said that the violence and intimidation in 2013 were much less prominent (Miles-Tendi, Marima, Karimi and Mavhunga). A BBC article with firsthand accounts from voters explains how varied the positions voters held in this election. One voter said, “If we don't make history in this election, we will never do it again. This is the time to say farewell to the old man Mugabe and wish him well in his endeavors” (Zimbabwe Election 2013: Voting around the Country). Another voter explained that she trusts Mugabe because of his decades of experience. Like the DOS, the media reports heavy police presence during the election and after. CNN characterized the election as stolen, fraudulent, and flawed citing two critics of the AU and the SADC for characterizing the election as free and legitimate, John Kerry, former Secretary of State, and William Hague, British Foreign Secretary (Karimi and Mavhunga). The Washington Post published several opinion pieces that were critical of the government titled “Zimbabwe shows how to steal an election,” “Zimbabwe needs fair election and freedom from Mugabe,” and “A Zimbabwe election that is neither free nor fair” (WP Editorial Board).

Mischaracterization of the Zimbabwe 2013 Election

The AU’s lack of criticism of the 2013 election supports the claim that IGO is more likely to mischaracterize the election than the media reporting. In this election, there was clear ballot stuffing, corruption by the Electoral Commission, propaganda via state-owned media, and unfair advantages for the incumbent and his party as stated in the DOS report. However, the election reports did not address these flaws in a substantial manner, and instead the report was more congratulatory rather than critical. This differed from the media reports which corroborated the findings with the DOS report, and even included incidents of corruption that the DOS did not

include. This supports the claim that the media were able to characterize the elections more accurately. The African Union's failure to criticize flawed elections is common for the AU, making this a typical observation.

To answer the question under which election conditions the IGO and the media findings differ, a few extreme components are at play. In the case of Uganda, the outright arrest of the opposition candidate, clearly an undemocratic action, brought on the criticism of the IGO, DOS, and the media. Museveni's shutdown of social media is evidence of clear silencing of the masses, that infringes on the rights to expressions which also offended the IGO, DOS, and the media. Lastly, the extreme delays in the Ugandan elections weakened the people's ability to vote to such an extreme extent that the IGO, DOS, and the media had to find fault with the election. However, even with the correct characterization of the election, the AU finding fault with the election was not enough to prevent the continuation of a dictatorship or deter corrupt elections for Uganda in the future. In the case of Zimbabwe, there was evidence of clear corruption and infringement of rights, but not to such a large extent that impeded most citizens' ability to vote. The corruption of the ZANU-PF and the ZEC which the DOS and the media emphasized, made for a dishonest election. But because Zimbabwe had just recovered from a massive civil conflict due to a prior election in 2008, the AU's judgment of the election was in continual comparison to that flawed election, making the 2013 election a "free and fair" election, even with questionable election activities of the ZEC. In this case, there was a clear mischaracterization of the Zimbabwean election made by the AU, which impacted the election by giving it legitimacy only within regional African politics. Both of these case studies exemplify that election observation reports by the African Union do not go far enough in rejecting anti-democratic elections which is not good for the health of elections in these countries.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

In summary, the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC role in democracy promotion is statistically undetermined. Data showed that the election observation reports differed from the media findings with the reports finding the elections to be free and fair more frequently than media with the same election. The Kappa Statistic confirmed this finding by showing that this difference is not due to chance, however, the p value was not large enough for this finding to be statistically significant. This is due in part to the limited sample size of the election observation reports. Hypothesis 2 was not proven because there was slight democracy growth with all five indicators using the difference of means test. However, democracy growth for each indicator never exceeded .05, so the growth is extremely relatively minimal on a scale of 0 to 1. When examining the election observation reports from the two elections, we find that the AU only criticizes an election if there are extreme acts of democracy violations. Typical election fraud and violence are easily ignored by the AU, while the media will expose such fraud and violence. Overall, the slow growth of democracy on the continent and the difference between the election observation reports and the media findings show that the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC methods for democracy promotion are unreliable. For future scholarship on this topic, there should be collaboration between the IGO and scholars, so that the sample size of election observation reports is larger. This paper adds to the quantitative scholarship; however, it can be improved upon with more election observation reports. In terms of policy implications in Africa, this paper shows that there needs to be a new approach to both democracy promotion and election observation by these three IGOs. Democracy growth has been incredibly slow for the continent even with the emergence of these charters. Election observation missions do not incentivize

governments to hold uncorrupts elections nor do the reports accurately characterize the mishandling of the elections. The current charters and regulations for election observations should be revised and the IGOs should develop a more assertive and authoritative implementation plan with resources for the member states. The current lax approach to democracy is not enough to change the trajectory of the continent.

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ACADEMIC VITA

Uchenna Nwodim

EDUCATION:

The Pennsylvania State University, Schreyer Honors College
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Minor in African American Studies and Art History
GPA 3.94/4.0. Expected Graduation Date: May 2021
Phi Beta Kappa, Lambda Chapter

RELEVANT COURSES:

- Introduction to Thesis Research
- Quantitative Political Analysis
- Rhetoric and Civic Life

EXPERIENCE:

- | | | |
|---|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Participatory Budgeting Project | Intern | Summer 2020 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Spearheaded the update to the organization's product. Enhanced and improved product based on client feedback and data. Removed and replaced outdated qualities of the product. | | |
| HUB-Robeson Center | Desk Attendant | August 2019-Present |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provided students and guests a high level of customer service. Responded to questions regarding events, answered phone calls, sorted mail, and performed other administrative tasks. | | |
| Pattee Library | Library Assistant | August 2018-Present |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Organized and shelved microfilm and microfiche using The Library of Congress shelving system. Maintained the archives by keeping it in an up to date physical format. Performed other tasks such as maintaining microfilm records, preparing reports, and data entry. | | |
| McCourtney Institute of Democracy | Poll Coder | March 2020-Present |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Coded response data for the Mood of the Nation Poll using QDA Miner. | | |

RESEARCH:

- | | | |
|--|---|--------------------------------|
| Rock Ethics Institute | Psychology and Criminal Justice Fellow | January 2019-March 2020 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Designed and conducted experiments to analyze multilevel data from a psychological perspective in order to view social disparities in criminal justice. | | |
| Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Project | Intern | Summer 2019 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Investigated civil rights violations that occurred between 1930-1970 in the Jim Crow South. Analyzed historical data and used data to find living relatives of victims. Wrote reports and a podcast episode on findings. | | |

LEADERSHIP:

- | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| American Political Science Association | Ralph Bunche Scholar | Summer 2020 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Chosen to be a part of a five week intensive program that introduces undergraduate students to doctoral studies in political science. Participated in professional development workshops, lecture series, and data analysis workshops. | | |
| MLK Commemoration Committee | Co-Director | January 2020-Present |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Planned, coordinated, and executed events on campus that celebrate the life of Dr. King. | | |
| Palmer Museum of Art | Student Ambassador | August 2018-Present |

- Planned, coordinated, and executed monthly events that increased student attendance to the museum. Collaborated with museum administration to increase the museum's social media presence.

Institute for the Study of Adult Literacy
2019

Tutor

August 2019-December

- Tutored English language learner for 3 hours every week.

Residence Association

Housing and Food Liaison

September 2017 – May 2018

- Informed residence life coordinators about the concerns of residents, brainstormed food recommendations, reported housing complaints, and created solutions to housing problems.