

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

*Dios, Patria, Fueros y Rey: Thomistic and Greek Political Philosophy as Applied Through
Spanish Carlism*

VICTOR FUENTES
SPRING 2022

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for baccalaureate degrees
in Philosophy and Political Science
with honors in Philosophy

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Brady Bowman
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Thesis Supervisor and Honors Advisor

Christopher Moore
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Classics
Faculty Reader

* Electronic approvals are on file.

ABSTRACT

The political philosophy of both the ancient Greek philosophers (such as Aristotle) and the scholastics (such as Thomas Aquinas) formed the basis for much of the political landscape throughout Europe from the advent of Christianity to the Era of Enlightenment. With the advent of new political ideas, the philosophies of the ancients gradually fell out of use. One example of how these more ancient philosophies persisted in the era of liberalism is Spanish Carlism, a legitimist political movement that arose in Spain in the early 19th century in response to the liberalization of the Spanish throne and persists to this day. Carlism, despite their never having maintained sole political control of Spain, adhere to an ideology rooted in the ancient principles. The four tenets of Carlism—*Dios, Patria, Fueros y Rey* (God, country, charters, and king)—are derived from the ideas expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas. This thesis explores these relationships, arguing that Carlism represents an application of Aristotelian and Thomistic political philosophy in a modern context.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
Preface.....	1
Chapter I.....	4
Chapter II.....	9
Chapter III.....	16
Chapter IV.....	21
Conclusion.....	30
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	32

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Brady Bowman for serving as my thesis supervisor and honors advisor; your advice and assistance throughout the thesis writing process has been invaluable.

Additionally, I would like to extend my thanks to Dr. Christopher Moore for agreeing to serve as the reader for my thesis. Your comments have helped to strengthen this argument for this thesis, and for your assistance I am extremely grateful.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my parents, Alfredo and the late Cheryl Fuentes, for instilling in me a love of learning and of writing. The inquisitiveness you fostered in my youth has borne fruit now and has given me a great appreciation for a discipline such as philosophy.

I would also like to thank the Reverend Fathers Ananias, OSB, and Michael Wolfe— your witness has inspired me to pursue ever deeper the Catholic Faith, a sentiment which formed the basis for this thesis.

Finally, I wish to extend my gratitude to my fiancée, Olivia Tota, for your support through this thesis writing process occurring concurrently with wedding planning. I also wish to thank all those who helped support and inspire me, especially Mr. Vincent Birch, Mr. Weston Gardner, and Mr. Patrick Murphy. It is my sincere hope that they and all who may read it may benefit from the insight this thesis provides.

Preface

Any understanding of western Christian political philosophy is incomplete without the study of both the Greek and Thomistic philosophers. As much of the history of western thought can be understood as informed or influenced by the Catholic (and later Protestant) Churches, it stands to reason that those philosophers who exerted such influence on western thought would exert similar influence on the realm of the *polis*— that is, the practical, secular application of their more philosophical works.

Through their various writings, philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas wrote various commentaries on the ideal society, describing the role of the state in matters of morality, politics, and economics. Through these writings emerge notable trends foreign to the ears of one familiar solely with contemporary notions of post-Enlightenment politics— hierarchical societies largely absent of a democratic process, relying heavily on institutions of power to maintain order and morality in society. Aquinas notably likens governance to that of a ship blown about in the wind: “[the ship] would never reach its destination were it not brought to port by the skill of the pilot” (De Regno 6). Further, this understanding paints society not as a mere collection of individuals living in a community by mere happenstance. Instead, society is likened to the family, with each member having a vested interest in living and acting for the betterment of the society as a whole. Consequently, those who rule bear this responsibility over the ruled: to treat those they rule as not just lower social classes to be exploited for the benefit of higher classes, but as a father treats children— guarding them, protecting them, and ensuring for their well-being. In short, the common good becomes the temporal end of society. Aristotle writes: “For even if the good of the

community coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community”(Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b6). Equipped with this knowledge, it becomes clear that the ideal society, according to those aforementioned philosophers, is one which works towards the common good. By examining the moral, political, and economic applications of this end, one can begin to understand what this “ideal society” would look like.

Naturally, with this knowledge, the question arises: what does an application of this philosophy look like? While one could examine the various kingdoms that exerted influence in the Christian west in the period from the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century till the eve of the French Revolution, the most ardent political movement persisting from the early 19th century to the present day, Spanish Carlism, represents perhaps the best application of these political philosophies in the modern era. Despite never securing significant power in Spain themselves, Carlists have long advocated for the institution of a system largely reflective of earlier western political thought, beginning first as a movement reacting to the advent of a liberalism that threatened the Spanish crown and, once liberalism had become the dominant philosophy of Europe, as a counterrevolutionary movement (Chodakiewicz et al. 11-14), representing the political old guard of monarchical Christian Europe. Marked by their distinctive red berets, the Carlists of Navarre notably fought several major conflicts in an effort to enthrone their political philosophy in Spain: first in a series of doomed Carlist Wars and later as a major component of General Francisco Franco’s victorious Nationalist coalition in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. After the Civil War, Carlists largely fell into disfavor with the Franco regime, which was forced to balance myriad right-wing ideologies and political movements to establish a system of

governance. However, Carlists continue to advocate for their philosophy today– one grounded in the political traditions of antiquity.

Chapter I

In order to best understand the political philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas, it is imperative to consider a fundamental principle—the structure of government. When describing the various ways in which humans can govern themselves, the philosophers identify one system that, they argue, is superior to the others. This chapter explores the philosophers' commentary on the various forms of government and their belief as to which form is ideal. Both philosophers describe their ideal system of government as a monarchy, albeit one that incorporates elements of various other political structures to prevent tyranny.

A race of creatures prone to war, strife, and suffering requires a vessel by which to ensure peace and tranquility in social life. According to Thomas Aquinas, the purpose of government is to ensure the “intrinsic end of human society” (Crean and Fimister 155):

“The welfare and safety of a multitude formed into a society lies in the preservation of its unity, which is called peace. If this is removed, the benefit of social life is lost and, and, moreover, the multitude in its disagreement becomes a burden to itself. The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore, is to procure the unity of peace.”

Aquinas identified peace as the standard by which political structures can be evaluated. Therefore, to the Thomist, in as far as a political structure can best ensure stability and peace, it can be understood as successful. According to this standard, Thomas weighs the merits of different styles of government. Primarily, he notes in *De Regno* that it is government by one man that brings about the best form of securing unity and peace in society. He explains: “Now several [rulers] are said to be united according as they come closer to being one. So one man rules better than several who come near being one” (De Regno 18). Here, using his example of a ship being driven by a singular pilot Aquinas is arguing that unity in society is ensured by unity in governance—and the primary method by which this occurs is by maintaining rule of one. Likening this phenomenon to

the social organization of bees, who, Aquinas notes, have “one king bee” (De Regno 18), he argues that rule by one is an artificial imitation, by humans, of the state of nature. Consequently, if this rule by one is the ideal state for human governance, other forms of government can be successful only as long as they ensure the unity present in a government by one. Therefore, government of a few—aristocracy—is better than polity, or rule of the many, as this better ensures unity, which is consequently better than rule of the multitude. Notably, Aquinas does not comment on the methods by which power may be acquired by a ruler— he is silent on the notion of hereditary, elected, or appointed kingship.

Aristotle also speaks of kingship in his *Politics*, noting five types of kingship, each with distinctive modes of rule— providing further distinction than Aquinas. The first type of kingship Aristotle notes is that which is identified in the Spartan constitution (*Politics* 3.14, 1285a3). This kingship is likened to that of a generalship, ideal for a society as militant as Sparta. The Spartan kings enjoyed little sovereign power, acting instead as wartime leaders, managing all aspects of warfighting; the only sovereign power a Spartan king possessed, for example, is that of putting his subjects to death for cowardice in the face of battle. This king, notes Aristotle, may be hereditary or elected. The second form of kingship is a hereditary, ancestral tyranny, where a tyrant rules over his subjects, who tolerate his rule “without resentment” (*Politics* 3.14, 1285a16), by virtue of his rule being ancestral. Similarly, the third form of kingship is an elected tyranny, seen “among the Greeks of old” (*Politics* 3.14, 1285a29), like that of the hereditary tyranny, only differing because the rulers are elected by the people. The fourth system of kingship, which Aristotle describes as existing in “heroic times” (*Politics* 3.14, 1285b3), is the royal monarchy. In this institution, the king maintains political legitimacy by virtue of his benevolent actions towards his subjects, being willingly accepted by their subjects because of a history of benevolence across generations of

rulers; thus, the subjects expect their rulers to act in a certain just way, and the rulers then act accordingly. The fifth and final form of kingship is that of a total monarchy, where the sovereign power enjoys total rule over all aspects of state management, as opposed to the “heroic” kings, who over time relinquished some power. This fifth form of kingship is likened to household-management by Aristotle (*Politics* 3.14, 1285b20). By analyzing his commentary on these forms of monarchy, the good and bad of each system becomes apparent

Aristotle goes on, in Book IV of the *Politics*, to enumerate four kinds of oligarchy and four kinds of democracy. The first form of democracy noted by Aristotle is that of a democracy where *all* who have acquired enough property to vote have the right to participate in the political system. A second form is that where those who can vote is determined by those who are born into the eligible classes, while a third form of democracy is where those who participate is determined by those who are free. Finally, the fourth form of democracy is that where the “mass of the poor” have the right to sovereignty and where all participate (*Politics* 4.6, 1292b21). As for oligarchy, Aristotle notes four forms, with an increasingly smaller circle of oligarchs in proportion to the amount of wealth each owns (*Politics* 4.6, 1293a10).

Building on Aristotle, Aquinas continues by illustrating the effects of unjust governance. Unjust governance, according to Aquinas, is governance which departs from a focus on the common good and instead serves the private good of those who rule. It is because of the immense power enjoyed by a tyrant that enables him to oppress his subjects according to his desires. An unjust monarch, or tyrant, is therefore worse than an unjust aristocracy (oligarchy), which is “more harmful than democracy” (*De Regno* 21). Conversely, as the power enjoyed by each individual in the multitude of a democracy is less than that of an oligarchy or a tyranny, when considering unjust governance, “democracy is the most tolerable” (*De Regno* 23). Thus, while utilizing different

distinctions, both Aristotle and Aquinas speak to the various levels of each of the three systems of government.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas believe that the ideal system of governance lies in a “mixed polity”, rather than a pure monarchy (Crean and Fimister 158). A mixed polity consists of a medium between monarchy and aristocracy. Aquinas, referencing Aristotle, explains in the *Summa Theologiae* (Summa Theologiae I-II q. 105 a.1):

“For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingship, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their leaders.”

Aristotle, in Book III of *Politics*, speaks to this phenomenon by noting the pragmatic concerns of the rule of one. Were society to be led by only one, “there will be much that he cannot easily supervise” (Politics 3.16, 1287b8), necessitating the existence of a bureaucratic class of aristocrats who partake in the ruling process as ministers of the king, acting not simply as administrators but also as confidants. Further, by the people “having the right to choose their rulers” (Crean and Fimister 159), harmony is reached, drawing from the desirable qualities of each of the three systems of governance while utilizing the benefits of the others in order to safeguard against the dangers of any one system. Notably, this does not necessitate a democratic process, but rather the “election” of a leader by the consent of the governed, which does not require that ballots be cast in order for a leader to be supported by his people. In this form of governance, the excesses of any one system are limited— the king is protected from tyranny, the aristocrats from oligarchy, and the people from mob rule.

Therefore, it becomes evident that, for Aquinas and Aristotle, the ideal system of government is a monarchy. However, due to the inherent nature of humans, such a system could be rife for manipulation or abuse were a nefarious actor to ascend to the throne, thus necessitating

a median between pure monarchy and the other systems of governance. Through this system, the common good can be worked for, the people protected from unjust rule, and social unity ensured.

Chapter II

After having explored Aristotle and Aquinas' perspectives on the various forms of government, the social order must be considered. This chapter seeks to explore the concept and purpose of society as articulated by Aristotle and Aquinas. Primarily, a society is a relationship between various individuals oriented towards a common goal (which could be as mundane as a gardening club or as serious as a sovereign nation). The idea of a common goal becomes central to the thought of the philosophers; they argue that the ultimate purpose of human society is perfection (Aristotle) or Godliness (Aquinas). Human society, they argue, reflects the most basic unit of human relationships— the family. Consequently, politics is merely an extension of this relations, and it is the duty of rulers to act as “fathers” over their subjects. Additionally, because the temporal end of society is subjected to the Church, the secular government is bound to ensure that the rights of the Church are protected. Finally, this chapter details the philosophers' concept of just and unjust law.

In order to understand the proper social aspect of society—that is, the proper relationship between individuals and the ends to which social life is ordered—one must consider what it is that constitutes a society. According to Cream and Fimister, “a society exists when several beings so act that each makes it part of his aim that both he and those with whom he is grouped achieve something good by their activity... ‘a union of intelligent beings acting for an end’” (Crean and Fimister 11). Thus, the reasons that humans elect to form societies can essentially be understood as for the benefit of one another. Not all human relationships, therefore, constitute a society. Those who wear glasses may bear some trait in common, but their commonality is merely one of happenstance, rather than a mutually beneficial association. Groups such as athletic teams, clubs, cities, etc. are therefore all societies— the members of each organization, to varying degrees,

participate in assuring the “good” for both themselves and their fellow group-members. With this comes, as Cream and Fimister explain, the distinction in the bonds which unite a member to a society— citizenship in a country is markedly different from membership in a group of friends. They divide this distinction into two categories: juridical and non-juridical. A juridical society, they explain, is one whereby membership constitutes a subscription to various “rights and duties” (Crean and Fimister 13) inherent to that society— for example, citizenship in a country entails adherence to the laws of that nation. A non-juridical society, then, is a voluntary society where there are no legal duties or rights entailed by membership— a group of friends does not have a claim to make laws, nor the ability to enforce them. With this understanding, the purpose and end of human society can now be discussed.

According to Aristotle, the formation of the state is a mere extension of smaller associations which constitute human society: first the family, then the village, and finally the state itself. Aristotle conceives each of these three associations as encompassing those beneath it; the family is the smallest unit, while the village consists of an association of families, and the state an association of villages. Consequently, each of these associations reflects the same structure and purpose of the others. As “each man has power of law over children and wives” (Politics 1.2, 1252b15), so do the rulers of the “settlements” and society bear the rights of power and the duties of rulership over their subjects. The end to which those in leadership—from the family to the state— must work, is to secure the “good life” and perfection of their subjects. Aquinas, writing from the Christian perspective, echoes this idea: “he [the king] is to be in the kingdom what the soul is in the body, and what God is in the world” (De Regno 81). Regarding the end of society, Aquinas writes that “for men form a group for the purpose of *living well* together, a thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and *good life* is virtuous life. Therefore, virtuous life

is the end for which men gather together” (De Regno 92). Aquinas continues by describing this virtuous life to be oriented towards the “enjoyment” and “possession” of God (De Regno 92)—what Aristotle deems perfection, Aquinas describes as the orientation to God. It is this supernatural and extrinsic end that therefore constitutes the perfect end of human society. However, not all human associations can be understood as orienting the members towards perfection or God; friends who gather to play cards on Friday evenings could talk about any number of things that do not orient them towards the supernatural but are instead focused merely on the temporal. This society, then, can be understood to have imperfect ends. That is not to say that these societies have “bad” or intrinsically evil ends— they are simply imperfect in as far as they deviate from the perfect, supernatural, extrinsic end of society.

The state, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, consists of a collection of smaller institutions, each building on one another in an umbrella-like fashion: the state consists of the village, the village of families, and families of individuals. This concept of the state forms the basis for the Christian principle of subsidiarity that Pope Pius XI describes in his 1931 encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* as the principle of allowing matters of governance and societal responsibility to be handled at the smallest, most subordinate level (*Quadragesimo Anno* 80). That which is proper to the family ought to be handled by the family, the village handled by the village, and the state handled by the state. While the discipline of children, it would be argued, is most efficiently and thus best handled at the most direct (legitimate) authority—the family—a declaration of war can only be the realm of the state, as this power that can only be done at the level of a sovereign state. This principle highlights not only the inherent distinctions within a human society, but also the differing roles within each realm of society. These distinctions in roles and functions, the philosophers argue, represent the essence of human nature itself, namely the traditionally different

roles of men and women, the relationship of parents to children, and natural differences in people's abilities and skill sets (which, they would argue, predisposes certain individuals to leadership and certain individuals to servitude). So then does the state contain within it different components with proper authority over individuals or bodies of individuals.

Naturally, with the introduction of the concept of proper authority comes the question: what constitutes authority? Authority, write Crean and Fimister, is "often defined as a right to command" (Crean and Fimister 32). How then does a society determine who has the legitimate authority to rule? Surely, it can easily be understood that the father has authority over his children, but the question becomes much more nuanced when considering the case of the governance of a state. Importantly, the father enjoys authority over his children independent of his merits as a parent or any other qualification— he maintains his authority simply by virtue of his role as father, one who has begotten his children and thus has headship over them. Cream and Fimister argue that the nature of authority in a juridical society is defined by the preexisting law (Crean and Fimister 33) ; law consequently derives much of its legitimacy from tradition. In a non-juridical society, authority is much less defined; a group of friends may naturally look to one individual as a leader, a soccer team may elect one member as a captain, and a social club may establish an executive board in a manner which they please, as they are under no obligation to enter the association and thus can fashion it as they please. In a society based in law, however, Cream and Fimister argue that the authority of a ruler comes through law. Using the example of the Catholic Church, they illustrate this principle. The Church, they argue, had its head (the apostle Peter) ordained by its founder, Jesus Christ. By giving Peter the authority to act as ruler of the Church and the legitimacy to determine the manner for the selection of his successors, Christ gave Peter's successors the authority to determine the selection of their successors (Crean and Fimister 34).

Importantly, Aquinas writes that the temporal order is subject to the spiritual order (De Regno 15):

“The ministry of [the Church] has been entrusted not to earthly kings but to... the Roman Pontiff. To him all the kings of the Christian people are to be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. For those to whom pertains the care of intermediate ends should be subject to him to whom pertains the care of the ultimate end, and be directed by his rule.”

Here, Aquinas states that the Church maintains care of the ultimate end of man, his spiritual life and relationship with God. It is the job of temporal rulers, who maintain care of the intermediate, imperfect end of man to support those who are tasked with the salvation of souls and the *Opus Dei*, the work of God. In this regard, temporal rulers maintain “legitimacy” only in as far as their laws conform with the purpose of the Church— to lead souls to God. This sentiment is echoed by the Church Father Tertullian (Apology 30):

“Let the emperor make war on heaven; let him lead heaven captive in his triumph; let him put guards on heaven; let him impose taxes on heaven! He cannot.”

Of course, it is possible for rulers to oppress the Church, as has happened numerous times throughout history. These laws represent a bastardization of legal power rather than a legitimate exercise of authority. According to Crean and Fimister, it is not licit for a ruler to enact legislation that hinders the mission of the Church (Crean and Fimister 115); any action against the Church is a violation of her natural rights and is therefore an illegitimate action. On the contrary, Aquinas argues that it is the duty of the state to support the Church in her mission. This symbiotic relationship formed the bedrock for Christendom, as evidenced by numerous instances of papal coronations of secular rulers. This principle applies both in Catholic states, where the government professes and recognizes the Catholic Church as its particular religion, and in contemporary secular states. Crean and Fimister write that “the Church can nevertheless claim from the temporal power those rights which are due to her under natural law, as they are due outside Christendom to

any religious body which does not act or teach contrary to the natural law itself” (Crean and Fimister 220). Because the Church teaches that her divine law is a fulfillment and in continuity with the natural law, the Church therefore must enjoy the rights of any other religion to teach, preach, and worship, among other things. However, this state is undesirable (Crean and Fimister 107), as it represents the reduction of the Catholic Church to the level of all other religions while the state remains a passive observer of religious practice. Nevertheless, the temporal rights of the Church would be protected. Ideally, the state serves to promote and protect the Church, honoring her as the religion of that particular locality— the absence of this is therefore a deficiency and the absence of a due good.

Reflected in this concept is the philosophers’ teaching concerning law itself. Primarily, Aristotle notes in *Nicomachean Ethics* that to law can be just by law is not always just by nature (Nicomachean Ethics 5.7, 1135a10). Thomas elaborates, describing law as “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated” (Summa Theologiae I-II q. 90 a. 4). The four tenets identified by Aquinas form the basis for discerning just and unjust laws. Primarily, a just law must be rational, meaning that it must conform to human experiences and logic. This law must serve the common good, which Aquinas argues is “happiness” in a community. Quoting Aristotle, he argues “we call those legal matters ‘just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic” (Summa Theologiae I-II q. 90 a.2). Thirdly, law must be enacted by one who has the proper authority over a community (which is understood as one who has a legitimate, legal right to rule). Finally, it must be promulgated so that all citizens may know of and follow it. If a law lacks any of these four marks, it ceases to possess the force of law and should not be obeyed— one who does not obey an

unjust law incurs no “legal” (that is, proper or justified) penalties for their disobedience, as an unjust law ceases to possess the binding force of law.

Chapter III

Although Aristotle and Aquinas wrote relatively little concerning the proper governance and regulation of the economy when considering their writings on political structures and governance itself, they advocated numerous principles which later philosophers and theologians applied to this question. Chief among these is the principle expressed earlier– that it is the duty of governments to ensure that their citizens grow in virtue. This necessitates that the marketplace be structured according to two guiding principles: justice and temperance. The medieval guild system afforded workers a means by which they could practice their craft in relative autonomy and ensure their rights were protected (and consequently avoided the competition of a free marketplace); much of the later work written about economic virtue arose from those writing during the industrial revolution, who applied Aristotelianism and Thomism to answer the questions of the day. It is in this historical context that Carlism becomes relevant.

Justice

To Aquinas, political economics is governed primarily by the virtue of justice. According to the virtue of justice, the laborer possesses rightful dominion over the fruit of his labor, thus rendering a right to private property, as one can own their labor’s fruits only if it can be properly understood as *theirs*, to be used as they see fit. As he says in the *Summa*- “it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property” (Summa Theologiae II-II q. 66 a.2) His reasoning for this claim is threefold: that men take more care in procuring for themselves goods that are for themselves and not for the community, that order is ensured if each man has his own proper care for things, and that a more peaceful state is attained if man has care for his own- rendering him content (Summa Theologiae II-II q. 66 a. 2). He earlier explains that man’s right to possess goods stems from his natural dominion over the earth: “man has a natural dominion over

external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above.”

(Summa Theologiae II-II q. 66 a. 2)

These reasons can be traced to Aristotle, who writes in *Politics* that “there is an immense amount of pleasure to be derived from the sense of private ownership... nature meant this to be so” (*Politics* 2.5, 1263a40). Therefore, since it is in accordance with the natural law for man to possess property, it follows that it is the duty of a just government to protect that right.

If justice in the economic realm is the rendering of all due goods, a chief perversion of this virtue is usury. Usury, or the lending of money at interest, “leads to inequality which is contrary to justice” (Summa Theologiae II-II q. 78 a. 1). Aristotle also strongly condemns usury when discussing the honest earning of “goods”: “Very much disliked also is the practice of charging interest; and the dislike is fully justified, for the gain arises out of currency itself, not as the product of that for which currency was provided” (*Politics* 1.10, 1258a38). Because the loaning of money at interest generates a sort of parallel economy whereby a monied class is able to multiply their wealth without the production of any tangible effect, usury represents an affront against honest labor. Further, usury represents a sort of ownership of the lendee by the lender, who is compelled to give to his creditors compounding interest in an attempt to pay his loan. Pope Leo XIII, applying the principles of Aristotle and Aquinas, wrote in his 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum* that the violations of human dignity occurring as a result of the growing industrial revolution (*Rerum Novarum* 3)

“has been increased by rapacious usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is nevertheless, under a different guise, but with like injustice, still practiced by covetous and grasping men. To this must be added that the hiring of labor and the conduct of trade are concentrated in the hands of comparatively few; so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the laboring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself.”

Here the pope argues that usury en masse represents what Aquinas calls tyranny. Those who commit usury are, like the tyrant, acting not for the common good but for their own private good (De Regno 21). “Since a tyrant, despising the common good, seeks his private interest, it follows that he will oppress his subjects in different ways according as he is dominated by different passions to acquire certain goods” (De Regno 23). Such economic tyranny represents an offense against those who labor and is consequently a sin against justice.

Temperance

Despite a natural right to private property, a man must exercise temperance if he is to live a life of virtue. Temperance can be understood as self-restraint or moderation. Excesses in the possession of material goods do not bring about virtue; rather, these excesses can bring about the demise of those who possess them: “For what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul? Or what exchange shall a man give for his soul? (Matthew 16:26)” Aristotle writes similarly that (Politics 7.1, 1323a38)

“External goods, being like a collection of tools each useful for some purpose, have a limit: one can have too many of them, and that is bound to be of no benefit, or even a positive injury, to their possessors.”

Importantly, neither philosopher claims that external material goods are intrinsically evil.

Per Aristotle (Politics 7.1, 1323b21):

“He is blessed and happy not on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature.”

Because man has a right to private property and the possession of goods is not intrinsically evil, societies must maintain a holistic approach regarding their members; rather than the economy serving as simply a marketplace where goods and services are bought and sold, the governance of an economy ought to take as its primary end the edification of its members. As there is glory in

honest work, the rights of those who labor must be protected and secured. Historically, this occurred through guild systems— networks of workers in a single trade forming associations to promote and protect their craft. Pope Pius XI reflects this principle in his encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* (83):

“Those who follow the same industry or profession—whether in the economic or other field—form guilds or associations, so that many are wont to consider these self-governing organizations, if not essential, at least natural to civil society.”

The right of workers to organize around a common interest falls under the domain of temperance because this fact ensures that workers can preserve their own well-being against affronts that may be made by those who practice usury. Rather than be reduced to mere units in a transactive process, guilds allow workers to exercise their collective strength to preserve their dignity and demand of the monied classes a level of deference and respect of the human person. This fulfills their natural rights according to justice and necessitates on behalf of employers a certain level of charity, a charity which recognizes in the worker both their inherent human dignity and their rights as individuals. This charity also build virtue in the monied classes, as it compels them to maintain a certain detachment from their worldly possessions and subjugate these material goods to justice and the common good.

Chapter IV

Few traditionalist political movements in Europe have enjoyed the long term success of the Spanish Carlists. Born out of a succession controversy in the 1820s, which saw King Ferdinand VII change the laws of succession to ensure his daughter, Isabel, ascended the throne over his brother Don Carlos (hence the origin of the name *Carlistas*), conservative reactionaries fought in a slew of conflicts in an effort to combat the liberalization of the Spanish crown. Promised the possibility to transform the government if they supported the new claimant to the throne, Spanish liberals clashed with Carlists in a series of wars which reflected many of the struggles occurring elsewhere in continental Europe (Chodakiewicz et al. 9). Despite never attaining success on the battlefield in the 19th century, Carlism as an ideology persisted in Northern Spain through the Spanish Republics, developing a political philosophy rooted in both Spanish customs and Catholic tradition. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), various right-wing factions converged in opposition to the liberal Second Spanish Republic (1931-1939), which was formed after the deposition of King Alfonso XIII in 1931. These factions, which included the nationalistic military, the fascist *Falange Española de las Juntas de Offensiva Nacional Sindicalista* (Spanish *Falange of the Councils of the National Syndicalist Offensive*), and the traditionalist Carlists, gained power after the fall of Madrid in March 1939 and the unconditional surrender of the Spanish Republican forces (composed of various left-wing ideologies) on April 1, 1939. Carlist *requetes* (militias), identified by their distinctive red berets and devotion to *Nuestra Señora de Montserrat*, formed a key component of Francisco Franco's victorious forces. Despite this contribution to the successful war effort, Carlism competed unsuccessfully with the other right-wing ideologies for a place at the table in Franco's Spain, leading to Carlist philosophy never being fully implemented. Nevertheless, Carlism as a political ideology persists in Spain to this day.

Carlist political philosophy contains four key pillars, each of which form a foundational aspect: *Dios* (God), *Patria* (Fatherland), *Rey* (King), and *Fueros* (Charters). Each pillar incorporates some aspect of the philosophy of Aquinas and Aristotle; the four pillars are distinct yet interconnected, illustrating the complexity of enacting such a philosophy in the real world. Analyzing each of these pillars clarifies the influence of the philosophers on Carlism.

Dios

God and the Catholic Church form a fundamental pillar of Carlism— so much so that the rest of Carlist political philosophy can truly be understood only in this context. The Catholic Church has played a prominent role in Spanish history dating from the travels of the Apostle James into the northern regions of the country to *Los Reyes Católicos* (the Catholic King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella) and the spreading of Catholicism throughout the Americas by the Spanish Empire. To Carlists, Catholicism is central to the Spanish national identity. Catholicism is so central to the identity of the Carlist that Carlos VIII is said to have remarked that “it is possible to be a Catholic without being a Carlist, but not to be a Carlist without being a Catholic” (Asociación de Intelectuales Tradicionalistas Españoles 17).

By *Dios*, Wilhelmson explains, the Carlist means “Catholic confessionality of the State, religious unity of the nation, and legal and economic freedom of the Church” (Chodakiewicz et al. 14). These three principles reflect nearly perfectly those expressed by Aquinas. It becomes clear when analyzing this tenet of Carlism that the subjugation of the temporal order to the spiritual order is made manifest— one point expressed by the Spanish Traditionalist Intellectuals in *The Future of Spain* (18) reads:

“Roman Catholicism with separation of Church and State, the latter respecting the liberty of the former and giving her... protection.”

In a Carlist society, the Church would maintain control over matters proper to it: the appointment of bishops, the training of priests, the liturgy, canon law, etc. The state would not interfere with such things, instead dealing with its own proper matters: the making and enforcement of laws, the levying of taxes, the waging of wars, etc. These roles are distinct, yet each entity would work in tandem towards the goal expressed by the philosophers: the virtuous life and the “possession of God”. When both institutions work towards a common goal, the unity expressed by Aquinas and Aristotle is also present— there exists a “unity of purpose”, in contrast to competing realms and goals or the existence of a public and private life for each citizen. Further, should any of these institutions neglect a proper duty or overstep a boundary, the other may correct the error. The Concordat of 1953, a pact signed between the Vatican and the Spanish State under Francisco Franco, ensured that Catholicism would become the official state religion and in turn receive state funding in return for (among other things) the restoration of the *Patronato Real* (the historic privilege of Spanish monarchs to veto the appointment of clerics)¹. With this, the state enjoyed the right to prohibit clerical appointments from Rome while the Church received legal protection and recognition. The signing of this document represented a visible declaration to Spain and the world of the unity between the Spanish state and the Catholic Church, illustrating the primacy of religion for which Carlism, and Aquinas, advocate.

Patria

The idea of an identity tied to the fatherland is a near-universal ideal that is evident across nearly every country and continent; in this regard, Carlism is not unique. However, as mentioned earlier, the Catholic identity is central to the Spanish identity, so much so that the Civil War of 1936 was

¹ See “Franco’s Concordat”.

branded as a crusade against communism and an effort to preserve the Spanish identity against usurpers who sought to transform Spain into something she was not. The appeals to the Spanish fatherland are rampant throughout Carlist propaganda; most notably, the Carlist banner bears a jagged red St. Andrew's Cross on a white background, a symbol known in Spain as the *Aspa de Borgoña*, the Burgundy Cross. This flag had served as the naval ensign for the ships of the Spanish Empire and was a historic symbol of the House of Habsburg, Spain's historic ruling family. Additionally, the flag was used by the Spanish *Tercios*, infamous columns of pike-and-shot infantry who dominated the battlefields of Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. By adopting this symbol, Carlists evoke the glories of a Spain "upon which the sun never set" in an age in which she served as one of the world's most powerful nations.

However, Carlism's identity as a uniquely Spanish phenomenon is expressed not merely through propaganda. Wilhelmsen notes that "'Fatherland' conveyed independence from foreign domination, respect for the Fundamental Laws or constitutive principles that had bound the nation together for centuries, and vigorous political institutions that had grown out of Spain's specific needs and characteristics" (Chodakiewicz et al. 14). The most important fruit of a strong national identity, the unity mentioned earlier, is evident in this tenet of Carlism as well: "Our politic program and government system are so typically Spanish, so positive and original that, with or without the dynastic question, Spain would have the greatest sympathy for the Carlist regime" (Asociación de Intelectuales Tradicionalistas Españoles 6). Just as the philosophers argue that the legitimacy of law is rooted in tradition, so is the legitimacy of a social philosophy rooted in its adherence to the traditional values of a people. Carlism understands that the Spanish identity is rooted in local customs (a concept to be analyzed when discussing *fueros*). This can be likened to a form of kinship, similar to that discussed by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Countrymen are

more than just individuals living in the same town, city, or region— they are brothers, sons of the same fatherland who share a common history and heritage. Aristotle describes this bond in the context of friendly and familial relationships in *Nicomachean Ethics* (8.12, 1161b18):

“Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence a sort of other selves), while children love their parents as being born of them, and brothers love each other as being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical with each other (which is the reason why people talk of ‘the same blood’, ‘the same stock’, and so on). They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing, though in separate individuals. Two things that contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing and similarity of age; for ‘two of an age take to each other’, and people brought up together tend to be comrades; whence the friendship of brothers is akin to that of comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound up together by derivation from brothers, viz. by being derived from the same parents. They come to be closer together or farther apart by virtue of the nearness or distance of the original ancestor.”

In the case of Carlism, the “original ancestor” Aristotle describes is Spain herself; by drawing upon the shared history of both Spain and her individual lands and kingdoms, Carlism argues for an understanding of the nation as an extension of the family, also harkening to Aristotle’s principle that the state ought to function as an extension of the family.

Rey

Perhaps the most notable influence of Aquinas and Aristotle on Carlism lies in the idea that Spain ought to be governed by a monarch. Carlism is not just a monarchical philosophy, advocating for the institution of a monarchy in place of a liberal system of governance— Carlism is a *legitimist* philosophy, arguing for the restoration of a rightful monarch over a usurper. This places Carlism in a unique position among right-wing “monarchical” movements; most other movements of the time served as reactions to the liberalization of society and governance, rather than as arguments for the rightful heir to a throne. Carlism, however, advocates for more than just the restoration of a particular king— to the Carlist, governance ought to take particular form and the state ought to serve particular and distinct ends.

As mentioned earlier, Aristotle and Aquinas both argue that monarchy is the ideal form of governance, with a “mixed-polity” that incorporates monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy as the ideal monarchy. This mixed-polity is represented almost perfectly in Carlist system, which incorporates all three elements to form their ideal governmental structure. Carlism advocates for a representative monarch who has both “legitimacy of origin and legitimacy of exercise” (Asociación de Intelectuales Tradicionalistas Españoles 18). Legitimacy of origin is the rightful claim to the throne while legitimacy of exercise means the king “accepts and makes oath to defend all privileges, laws, customs and liberties of the different kingdoms and provinces” (Asociación de Intelectuales Tradicionalistas Españoles 18). Illustrating the aforementioned claim that Carlism seeks to not simply restore the proper lineage to the Spanish throne but rather serve a political philosophy, Wilhelmsen notes that when the second Carlist king, Carlos VI, died in 1861, the legitimists rejected the next prince in line for succession because he was an avowed liberal (Chodakiewicz et al. 15). Consequently, similar to the fourth kind of monarchy described by Aristotle, the Carlist king enjoys legitimacy by virtue of both his actions and those of his ancestors. Furthermore, this monarch is not absolute, as he answers to the Cortes, a representative body consisting of three distinct estates: nobility, local representation, and community. The nobility, composed of titled aristocrats, clergy, military, and intellectuals, would be elected “by the chapters of the diocese, faculties, [and] Royal Academies” (Asociación de Intelectuales Tradicionalistas Españoles 18-19). Local representation would consist of mayors and regional parliaments, while community consists of an elected body representing the working classes. Through this system, the king would execute and enforce laws— but not without consultation from the Cortes. The Carlist king also consults a Council of Nobles composed of illustrious men (Chodakiewicz et al. 32). Cathay explains that the Cortes would not function as a modern legislative body, but instead as a

sort of consultative approval mechanism: “their approval would be requisite before taxes could be levied or appropriations approved and for any modification in the fundamental laws of the kingdom” (Chodakiewicz et al. 32). The king, therefore, maintains authority and jurisdiction while simultaneously being prevented from tyranny through his various consultative bodies. This system balances the unique history of Spain; traditionally, Spain consists of various kingdoms and regions, each with its own culture, values, and traditions. This system would ensure that each region is represented. This is in contrast to a monarchy such as that of England, which the Spanish liberal-turned-conservative political philosopher Juan Donoso Cortés describes as existing “neither to rule nor to govern: it was, purely and simply, to be adored” (Wilhelmsen 167). Rather than serving as a mere figurehead, the Carlist king enjoys royal sovereignty.

Therefore, the Carlist governmental system embodies all three aspects of the philosophers’ political thought: there is a king who serves as the acting visible head of the government, there is an “aristocracy” of advisors who the king consults in governmental matters, and there is an elected representative body in order that the people may have some voice in their governance. While it is clear that the Carlist structure is monarchical, the Council of Nobles and the Cortes incorporate elements of the other forms of government to form a system that accounts for the unique traditions and political culture of Spain. This “mixed-polity” is perhaps the most clear evidence that Carlism is an application of Aristotelian and Thomistic political philosophy.

Fueros

The fourth and final tenet of Carlism are the *Fueros*, or “regional rights” of the various localities within Spain. The concept of regional rights forms a major component of Carlism; *fueros* “implied subsidiarity and particularism in the legislation..., in autonomous government, and in administrative decentralization” (Chodakiewicz et al. 15). This ideal incorporates numerous

aspects of Aristotelian and Thomistic political philosophy. However, in order to understand the relationship between the two philosophies, one must first understand the notion of *Fueros* as conceived in the Spanish mind.

The most notable instances of *Fueros* can be found in the northern regions of Spain from which Carlism originates. William T. Strong, in his article *The Fueros of Northern Spain* published in *Political Science Quarterly*, writes that *Fueros*, in a general sense, constitute an extrajudicial privilege or immunity granted by a sovereign to a particular region (Strong 317). These privileges were granted by kings to various localities and regions to allow them some measure of autonomy in their governance. These charters extended back centuries to before the unification of the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile and the unification of Spain (Strong 317), forming a core part of the Spanish and regional identity.

Fueros offer an insight into a contemporary application of the principle of subsidiarity (the notion that government ought to be decentralized to the highest degree possible and legal matters handled at the smallest possible level) discussed earlier. Through the granting of these charters, kings respected the local autonomy of the various towns in their kingdoms. Matters that were proper to the region were granted by kings, ensuring that those who knew best to govern themselves were allowed to do so. In this capacity, the king functioned as the father alluded to earlier— as a father allows his children freedom in certain aspects of life, so the king allowed regions autonomy to preserve their identity. These charters also prevented tyranny on behalf of the kings, as the *Fueros* necessitated a certain respect for the respective regions. Kings could not violate these charters, as it was written that any violation incurred a commensurate (and legal, per the terms of the charters) response from the region or town. Just as a child who incurs the unjust wrath of his father has a right to retaliate, so would towns and regions enjoy this right to self

defense: “It is written ([Exodus 22:2](#)): “ ‘If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood.’ Now it is much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life” (Summa Theologiae II-II q. 64 a. 7).

In addition to their guarantee of autonomy in governance, *Fueros* also ensured a number of economic rights for the citizens of localities that signed them. The guarantees of the Basque *Fueros* offer an example of these protections. Strong writes that these charters guarded against usury by ensuring that “The person of the debtor was inviolable, as well as his house and horse” (Strong 328). Further, the region was protected largely from the excessive levying of royal taxes or imposts—the only money that was sent to the king was done at the free discretion of the local *juntas* (Strong 329). Finally, the charters ensured freedom of commerce, allowing workers to ply their trades without unjust interference or excessive taxation- in accordance with the aforementioned principle of justice. Strong describes *Fueros* and their importance in Spain succinctly and clearly (329):

“The importance of these Spanish town charters can hardly be overestimated, from the standpoint of either social or political history. They throw the clearest light in the domestic life of the time, and they mark an important stage in the development of the national state. The communes of Spain were of greater antiquity than those of other countries of modern Europe, Italy perhaps excepted. Through the fueros the members of these communities gained all the security that law could give them for their persons, their honor, and their property. No person fully enrolled on the list of citizens could be punished with loss of life or limb, nor deprived of his property, except by sentence of a court of law in conformity to the fuero... of his town. If a king issued an order contrary to this privilege, anyone who executed the illegal mandate was liable to the lex talionis.”

The *Fueros* therefore incorporate the private ownership expressed by the philosophers and ensured autonomy for each town and region of Spain, leaving them able to enjoy sovereignty over immediate political and economic matters; this represented a safeguard against practices such as usury. Further, the notion that a king must not be obeyed if he violates the *Fueros* speaks to

Aquinas' concept of just law— the king in this instance could be argued to be violating the tenet of a just law which argues that a law must be promulgated by one who has “care of the community”. Here, the king is overstepping his proper boundaries to encroach on the rights of the charters and could rightly incur a proportionate response from his subjects.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the ideas of the Spanish Carlist movement can be traced to the principles expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas. These philosophers, arguing that the duty of government is to ensure the growth of virtue and the “holiness” of its citizens, described the ideal government as a mixed-polity that incorporates monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy in the pursuit of governance that strives for the common good. They also describe the importance of patrimony- that the king ought to function not as a mere ruler but also as a father, ensuring the well-being of his subjects through his policies. Additionally, the state must be subjected to the Church, as the Church’s ends are “higher” than the ends of the state– though the two institutions share a similar end, albeit one temporal and one spiritual. Finally, they argue that the guiding principles of the economy must be justice (the rendering of due goods) and temperance (in this instance, avoiding the love of money to the detriment of the common good).

Carlism, through its principles of *Dios*, *Patria*, *Rey*, and *Fueros*, implements these principles into a modern political philosophy. *Dios*, or God, incorporates the primacy and rights of religion into society, with Catholicism forming the bedrock of Carlist thought and the rights of the Church valued highly by Carlists. *Patria* speaks of the love of the fatherland and its autonomy– incorporating a sort of familial and ancestral relationship such as the one advocated by the philosophers. *Rey* incorporates the king, who maintains regal sovereignty while incorporating the elements of the mixed-polity of the philosophers through the *Cortes* and Council of Nobles. Finally, *Fueros* incorporates regional sovereignty and autonomy while protecting the economic rights of localities, ensuring that citizens do not become victims of the tyrants of which Aquinas writes. These laws further provide citizens legal recourse in the event of an encroachment of these

rights. All told, Spanish Carlism represents a modern application of ancient political philosophy in a movement that persists to this day.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aquinas, Thomas. *De Regno: Ad Regem Cypri*. Translated by Gerald Phelan, The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949.
- Aquinas, Thomas. *The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920.
- Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by J.A.K. Thomson, Penguin Classics , 2004.
- Aristotle. *The Politics*. Translated by T.A. Sinclair, Penguin Classics, 1992.
- Asociación de Intelectuales Tradicionalistas Españoles. *The Future of Spain: Spanish Carlism Before the World*, University of California Libraries.
- Chodakiewicz, Marek Jan, and John Radzilwski, editors. *Spanish Carlism and Polish Nationalism: The Borderlands of Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Leopold Press, 2003.
- Crean, Thomas, and Alan Fimister. *Integralism: A Manual of Political Philosophy*. Editiones Scholasticae, 2020.
- The Holy Bible: Douay-Rheims Version*. Saint Benedict Press, 2009.
- Leo XIII. “Rerum Novarum .” *Rerum Novarum (May 15, 1891)* | *LEO XIII*, 14 May 1891, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html.
- Pius XI. “Quadragesimo Anno .” *Quadragesimo Anno (May 15, 1931)* | *PIUS XI*, 14 May 1931, https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html.
- Strong, Wm. T. “The Fueros of Northern Spain.” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1893, p. 317., <https://doi.org/10.2307/2139647>.
- Thelwall, S., translator. *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*. Edited by Alexander Roberts et al., vol. 3, The Christian Literature Publishing Company, 1885.
- Wilhelmsen, Frederick D. *Christianity and Political Philosophy*. The University of Georgia Press, 1978.

“Franco's Concordat .” *Franco's Concordat (1953 | Concordat Watch - Spain*,
http://www.concordatwatch.eu/showtopic.php?org_id=845&kb_header_id=34561.

ACADEMIC VITA

EDUCATION

The Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA
College of the Liberal Arts | Schreyer Honors College December 2020 – May 2021
B.A. in Political Science and Philosophy Class of May 2022
Minor in History

INVOLVEMENT

Students Teaching Students University Park, PA
Student Instructor December 2020 – May 2021

- Designed and taught a one-credit course (RLST 197: The Roman Liturgy Since 1900) for spring 2021 semester
- Prepared syllabus, gave weekly lectures, and graded assignments
- Conducted extensive research and analysis to provide students with excellent lecture material and additional resources if requested

Penn State Latin Mass Society University Park, PA
Founder/President September 2020 - Present

- Founded the nation's first student organization for traditional Catholics
- Increased weekly Mass attendance from 5-7 in 2018-2019 to 50+ in Spring 2021
- Coordinated and organized numerous service events, Masses, and charity functions

Chick Evans Caddie Scholar University Park, PA
Scholarship Award Recipient March 2018 - Present

- Selected as one of 960 scholars in the nation to receive 4-year full tuition and housing from the Western Golf Association
- Awarded highly selective scholarship based on excellent academics, outstanding character, strong caddie record, and financial need

WORK EXPERIENCE

Penn State Baseball University Park, PA
On-Field Student Manager August 2021- Present

- Facilitated organized and efficient team practices by ensuring timely set-up of equipment and machines
- Gathered and entered game data into team database using programs such as Yakkertech and Trackman

Kohl's Springfield, VA
Store Management Intern June 2021 – July 2021

- Gained personal leadership experience by supervising teams of associates to ensure timely and professional completion of tasks
- Analyzed data identify areas for improvement, increasing Amazon return receipt coupon redemption rate from 23.1% MTD in June to 30.8% MTD in July
- Served as manager on duty of a Kohl's store with \$17 million in annual revenue, ensuring efficiency across all facets of store

The First Tee of Greater Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
Programming Intern May 2019 - August 2019

- Provided excellent golf and life skills instruction to participants of The First Tee of Greater Washington, D.C.
- Organized and entered participant and donor data into the First Tee database
- Acted as a representative of the First Tee staff to donors at fundraising events that raise over \$200,000 annually

Sankaty Head Golf Club Siasconset, MA
Caddie June 2015 - August 2018

- Delivered strong communication skills and excellent customer service to all members and guests
- Collaborated with other staff to ensure rounds run efficiently and respect traditional standards
- Encouraged new caddies to develop pace of play and proper protocol for each round

SKILLS & AWARDS

- **Skills:** Public Speaking, Research, Writing, Analysis, Conversational Spanish, Microsoft Word and PowerPoint