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State-Making and Bellicose Theory in the Republic of Turkey

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the implications of the dominant theory of state making in political science — Bellicose theory — within the Republic of Turkey. In examining this theoretical understanding of how states grow and develop, this research describes the specific means by which the modern Turkish state came to be. This is achieved by lending a critical eye to existing scholarship that supports the use of Bellicose theory, while also acknowledging its many shortcomings. Upon doing so, this research employs a case-study methodology that utilizes an extensive historical contextualization of Turkey's state formation to provide a practical dimension to the theory. In doing so, this thesis uses Bellicose theory's four-part analytical structure to come to several conclusions about the condition of the modern Turkish state.

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## Chapter 1

### Research Motivations & Project Introduction

What makes a state strong? How do states get strong? Does war make states? These questions have fascinated politicians, leaders, academics, and historians for centuries, though the answers to the questions take on several different forms. Consequently, the very nature of the state as a political entity is aimed at improving itself and efficiently maximizing its power in a way that enables it to achieve its strategic ends.<sup>1</sup> Bearing this in mind, it is undoubtable that any measurement of state strength, be it qualitative or quantitative, is subject to intense scrutiny given the matter's largely subjective nature.

An initial gut reaction to the question of state strength likely elicits a desire to simply 'look to the numbers' for our answer. While this is likely the best starting place for providing a general glance at a state's relative effectiveness, such a reliance on quantifiably observable phenomena is certain to miss the forest for the trees. Just as the biggest and strongest kid in the schoolyard might appear outwardly to be the most formidable, anyone who has walked a playground knows that this is not always the case. Additionally, research in a variety of disciplines attempting to assess a state's strength commonly falls victim to the implicit biases that inevitably arise due to the researcher's own lived experiences.

Having said this, it is still the case that the task of defining what makes one state stronger than another is perhaps most simplistically understood through warfare. While somewhat archaic and antiquated in our era of asymmetrical conflicts, the direct competition of state power is nowhere clearer than behind the rifle or sword. In terms of objective measurement, battle results, spoils of war, and casualty counts often tell an irrefutable tale. Despite this, such a simplistic notion of strength is not particularly helpful in an era

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Dusza, "Max Weber's Conception of the State," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 3, no. 1 (September 1989): 79, <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01430691>.

of relative peace and conflict resolution which occurs primarily through acts of diplomacy. It is readily apparent that the modern state is much greater than its military might alone.

On its surface, people implicitly understand this concept: one would hardly say that a state incapable of collecting taxes, inept at maintaining public order, and absent a court system is as strong as one that possesses these basic attributes of statehood. Although it is more difficult to define strength in such a non-conflictual manner, doing so is immensely important should political scientists hope to understand where nations structurally succeed and fail in relation to one another. Given the interconnectedness of modern states amidst a globalized and highly dissimilar socio-economic backdrop, this task is tremendously difficult. The vast differences in manifestations of power amidst the myriad of states across the globe paired with the complex historical contexts each state lies within makes the task of assessing state strength objectively impossible, yet even more worthwhile.

While a definitive answer relies upon personal preference and prioritization of certain attributes that an individual sees as important, the study of state-making seems to provide the comprehensive sort of analytical framework we are looking for. Per the Pennsylvania State University's own Douglas Lemke, "State-making (SM) scholars focus on the process by which states come into existence, prosper or stagnate, expand or contract, persist or decline. The main strength of this approach is the rich context it provides about the connections between events. A weakness is that cumulative knowledge is difficult to achieve."<sup>2</sup> Bearing this in mind, a consideration of the multitude of potential avenues for describing how effectively a given country does the activities and duties of a state can be found via a theoretical state-making analysis. When informed by a relevant historical analysis of state development and growth, one can reasonably attain a thorough understanding of a state's pathway towards modernity.

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<sup>2</sup> Douglas Lemke, "State-Making Lessons For International Relations Research," *Perspectives on Politics* 17, no. 4 (December 2019): 1099, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719000987>.

For the sake of this project, I will utilize the dominant theory in the state-making field: bellicose theory.<sup>3</sup> This analytical framework was developed in 1985 by Charles Tilly and effectively makes the claim “War made the state, and the state made war.”<sup>4</sup> While I will discuss this framework at length later, Tilly’s four-part theory has effectively defined the field since its inception. His logic, which posits that state entities must succeed at four essential activities — war making, state making, protection, and extraction — has provided political scientists from across the world with a unique starting place for comprehensive considerations of state power.

Despite this, Tilly’s logic is not devoid of significant and notable critiques. One such assessment which has stood the test of time pertains to bellicose theory’s shortcomings when assessing regional state-making processes outside of Western Europe. Various state-making scholars specializing in various regions of the world have offered that Tilly’s work is not sufficient to consider the often unconventional or expedited timeframes by which states outside of Europe have developed. One such region of particular importance is the Middle East. Although the territory has been settled since Biblical times, many of the modern political entities that govern populations in the region are less than a century old. Provided such a frequent upheaval and common changing-of-hands of regional authority, it is evident that Tilly’s framework is to be treated with a degree of scrutiny when applied to the region. Despite this, there is undoubtedly still a significant amount to be gleaned from such an application on specific states within the region.

To analyze this concept of state power in a globalized world, I will attempt to impose Tilly’s theory upon one unique case study detailing the formation of Turkey. The Republic of Turkey, which evolved from a formerly Muslim, dynastic state under the Ottoman Empire’s authority, was established in the years following World War I upon the destruction of the old seat of power.

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<sup>3</sup> This theory is known by many names throughout relevant literature. While bellicose theory is the most common name for Charles Tilly’s analytical framework, it is also known by the monikers “Bellicist Theory” and “State Formation Theory.”

<sup>4</sup> Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–91.



Turkey was selected for a variety of reasons, though chief among them is a personal interest in the affairs of the state. That aside, its inclusion in the Middle East has forever offered something of an anomaly for state-making scholars. Turkey is not a worldwide leader in oil production and exportation, nor does it retain a significant economic benefit from energy industries. Its diversified economy, though highly agricultural, more so resembles those of Western Europe and falls in line with the general trend of Tilly's theory.<sup>5</sup> Further, Turkey is heavily influenced by Western spheres and is ever important to the worldwide geopolitical order, a longstanding ally to the United States. Further, Turkey stands alongside many Islamic states as a unique case that is constitutionally committed to strict secularism, despite a clear influence of ethnoreligious characteristics within its political discourses. Given the country's unconventional placement amidst a largely uniform region dominated by oil-producing, Arab states, Turkey is suitable for a bellicose theory analysis given its apparent similarities to many Western powers.

A central aim of this project will be to provide a new, perhaps more 'worldly' answer to the question raised at this introduction's start: what makes a nation strong? From here, this project seeks to determine if Turkey, a state with numerous surface-level similarities to Western nations, bears any notable differences from the traditional path of state development. Notably, this will not afford a conclusion as to whether bellicose theory can be rightfully applied to the region broadly, as such a determination is well beyond the scope of this consideration. Instead, this analysis will enable a detailed discussion of a unique case while subtly assessing the legitimacy of Tilly's "Four Essential Activities." Upon doing so, this project will ultimately attempt to provide a satisfactory 'state-making story' for the Turkish people.

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<sup>5</sup> Andrew Robert Lee Trexler, "A Bellicist Theory of War-Making and State Power in the Modern Middle East" (Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University, 2014), 57, <https://doi.org/10.14418/wes01.1.1049>.

## Chapter 2

### Framework & Literature Review

#### Part I: Introduction

Across political science and history academia, it has proven incredibly difficult to define what makes a state ‘powerful’ in a broad and generalized sense. Of course, this challenge arises in large part from the great depth that such a question possesses when considering the infinite number of possible responses. To some extent, how a researcher analyzes or attempts to assess the strength of a state or state-like entity inevitably exposes their biases and values. An analysis assessing state strength as a function of the military might inevitably demonstrate a clear weakness in measuring the countless other aspects that contribute to the overall cohesiveness of the country. Likewise, solely quantitative methods of analysis focusing on single metrics like tax extraction or aggregated statistics like the Correlates of War Project’s Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) are incredibly helpful on the surface, though such indicators are only utilized fully when accompanied by a qualitative contextualization.<sup>67</sup>

While these focused analyses prove indispensable for providing depth and specificity of findings, they ultimately miss the mark when attempting to provide a practically applicable, qualitative consideration of each state’s developmental position. Bearing this in mind, Charles Tilly’s framework known as “bellicose theory” provides a meaningful structure by which such contextually supported conclusions about state-formation can be garnered.

In this chapter, I begin by establishing some definitions of key terms that will make numerous appearances throughout my work. Following this, I will lay out Tilly’s analytical framework that I will use to conduct the bulk of my analysis. Within this portion of the literature review, I will primarily focus on

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<sup>6</sup> Correlates of War Project Data Team, “National Material Capabilities (v6.0) — Correlates of War,” Folder, Data Access, 2021, <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>.

<sup>7</sup> David J. Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965,” *Peace, War, and Numbers*, 1972, 19–48, <https://www.owl.net/~stoll/P570/sbs.pdf>.

providing a look at the background surrounding Tilly's work while fleshing out his four "essential activities" of the state. Finally, I will describe notable critiques of Tilly's theory as they relate specifically to its application to Middle Eastern states.

## Part II: Key Terms & Definitions

Before diving into the bulk of the analytical framework, it is vital that I first define the terms that will bring such a theory to life.

### *"State"*

The first, and perhaps most pivotal, of my definitions is that of the "state." There are countless conceptions of what composes the state as a political unit, though none are as notable or lasting as that espoused by famed sociologist Max Weber.<sup>8</sup> First proposed towards the end of the first chapter of his 1968 book *Economy and Society*, Weber famously wrote: "A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order within a given territory."<sup>9</sup>

Breaking down his simplified definition into its various parts reveals the complexity that it possesses. Weber defines a "compulsory political organization" earlier in his text as a binding claim or one that applies to all people within a defined territorial unit.<sup>10</sup> He notes that this condition indicates that individuals do not have a choice in their participation in such an infrastructure, thus creating a case of "imposed order in the most definite sense."<sup>11</sup> Weber's definition continues by remarking on the importance

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<sup>8</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 1 (University of California Press, 1968), <http://archive.org/details/MaxWeberEconomyAndSociety>.

<sup>9</sup> Weber, 1:53.

<sup>10</sup> Weber, 1:15.

<sup>11</sup> Weber, 1: Ibid.

of “continuous operations,” thus indicating an ability to isolate a specific birthplace for many of the states worldwide. This will be of the utmost importance throughout this article’s case studies which espouse a clear point of genesis for the modern Turkish state. Further, Weber’s definition acknowledges that though many failed or dying regimes formerly possessing state status may persist after death in new governing apparatuses or infrastructure, there is something profoundly important about maintaining continuity of rule.

Putting aside these important, yet preliminary, aspects of the state, the most fundamental portion of Weber’s definition arises from the latter half of it. Ultimately, to effectively exercise authority and establish rule of law, an administrative entity must possess the consent of the governed (“legitimacy”) to exercise force and impose its collective will.<sup>12</sup> Such a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force implies that it is the sole party responsible for resource extraction, maintenance of internal and external security, and the application and administration of justice and rule of law. Of course, this also makes it abundantly clear that a state’s authority (“sovereignty”), or ability to exercise its right to interfere in the lives of its population, is limited to clearly demarcated geographic territory.<sup>1314</sup>

Bearing this in mind, every state currently included and recognized by the United Nations wholly satisfies this definition. Despite this, such international recognition is not required to attain state status as some definitions of statehood imply.<sup>15</sup> This point is particularly relevant for scholars looking to analyze present circumstances in the Middle East. Per this definition, the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip along the southern border of Israel qualifies as a state despite failing to receive an acknowledgment of such status from international entities.

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<sup>12</sup> Dusza, “Max Weber’s Conception of the State,” 76–77.

<sup>13</sup> R. J. Holton and Bryan S. Turner, *Max Weber on Economy and Society* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2011), <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203831632>.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,” Project MUSE - Chapter 1: Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 1999, 3–4, <https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1430460>.

<sup>15</sup> Correlates of War Project Data Team, “National Material Capabilities (v6.0) — Correlates of War.”

Although this definition has been debated, expanded, contested, and rebuked by numerous scholars, it is irrefutable that such a conception has stood the test of time for good reason.<sup>16</sup> Regardless of the various critiques of this method, this definition is employed largely due to the fact that it is virtually identical to the one employed by Tilly in his “War Making and the State as Organized Crime.”<sup>17</sup> While perhaps not technically correct, throughout this article any use of the term “country” ought to be considered synonymous with “state.”

### **“State Power”**

Pulling from Weber’s definition of the state and Krasner’s conception of sovereignty, placing a label on something as amorphous and subjective as “power” is virtually impossible from the onset given the infinite multitude of means of interpretation. Recognizing this predicament, it is vital to note that countless indicators of state power do exist throughout the literature. While an exhaustive discussion of these indicators is not within the scope of this project, I will note relevant ones that will be employed throughout.

Much of my thinking is informed by the extensive discussion of state power, which he terms “state capacity,” in Cullen S. Hendrix’s article “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict.”<sup>18</sup> Throughout this seminal article, Hendrix provides a compelling justification for the use of numerous empirical and theoretical indicators of state capacity. He argues that

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<sup>16</sup> For an expanded discussion of the terminological crisis onset by the task of defining the “state” amidst Weber’s definition, see Hendrik Spruyt, “The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems of Change,” Project MUSE, 1994, chap. 1, <https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/2703265>; Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (1991): 77–96, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1962879>; Charles S. Gochman, “Interstate Metrics: Conceptualizing, Operationalizing, and Measuring the Geographic Proximity of States since the Congress of Vienna,” *International Interactions* 17, no. 1 (May 1, 1991): 93–112, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629108434771>; Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Retrospect and Prospect,” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 31, no. 2 (2008): 109–24, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2008.00204.x>.

<sup>17</sup> Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 170–75.

<sup>18</sup> Cullen S Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (May 2010): 273–85, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310361838>.

state power arises in three distinct areas: “military capacity,” “bureaucratic administrative capacity,” and the “quality and coherence of political institutions.”<sup>19</sup> Using these three indicator groupings, he argues that one can classify nearly all the various activities of the state.<sup>20</sup>

Hendrix’s conclusions provide empirical and theoretical justifications for the utilization of several isolated, or single-data point, indicators of state development. Throughout his article, Hendrix evaluated 15 unique operationalizations of state capacity that he found persisted throughout the literature. Among these indicators, he isolated the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) “bureaucratic quality” indicator as the preeminent mechanism for assessing a state’s bureaucratic and administrative capacity.<sup>21</sup> Although this is the preferred mechanism, he notes that a valid stand-in for this measure can be found in *(log) GDP per capita* due to its wide availability. Though he notes that *(log) GDP per capita* likely captures other more plausible and specific indicators for administrative capacity and obfuscates findings to a degree, it will serve my project’s qualitative discussion well when considering how effectively a government’s internal apparatus functions.<sup>22</sup>

While this measure will be utilized at length throughout my work to describe a state’s ability to exercise authority over extractive actions, I will also employ a measure of what is known as *relative political capacity* (RPC) to discuss a state’s ability to extract resources from its population in addition to what is predicted.<sup>23</sup> This measure considers the ratio of a state’s actual to predicted tax revenue (indicated by *total taxes/GDP*) and provides a numerical indication of a state’s ability to attain resources from its population.<sup>24</sup> This assessment of state strength has numerous benefits. First, it demonstrates a great deal about the actualized legitimacy of the state. Because one can presuppose that all taxation is necessarily coercive to

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<sup>19</sup> Hendrix, 274.

<sup>20</sup> Hendrix, 274.

<sup>21</sup> Hendrix, 283.

<sup>22</sup> Hendrix, 277.

<sup>23</sup> Ali Fisunoglu et al., “Relative Political Capacity Dataset 2.4 Codebook.Pdf” (Harvard Dataverse, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NRR7MB/KQQRFO>.

<sup>24</sup> Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman, “The Unfinished Agenda,” in *Political Capacity and Economic Behavior*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 1997); Ronald Tammen and Transresearch Consortium, “Relative Political Performance Data Set Documentation Version 2.1,” no. 2.1 (2013): 367.

some degree, a state's ability to tax above (or below) expected rates provide a solid indication of how relevant the government is in the lives of its people. Further, this measure controls for wealth effects, placing the governments of wealthier countries alongside less-developed nations.<sup>25</sup>

Aside from the indicators discussed by Hendrix, I will also utilize two outside sources to define state strength. The most widely utilized composite indicator of state power arises from the Correlates of War Project's Composite Index of National Capability (CINC).<sup>26</sup> This measure uses six indicators — military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population — with each figure represented as a dimensionless percentage of the world's total. In doing so, each country's calculated CINC score represents their overall 'strength' as a numerical fraction of 100. This method will provide my project with a useful starting place for head-to-head comparisons between states despite its crude reliance on solely quantifiable phenomena.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to this, I will consider the American Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index — which annually scores nearly all UN member states on a scale of 0-120 based on 12 different 10-point indicators describing a state's fragility.<sup>28</sup> I will also utilize two other aggregated measures — Freedom House's "Freedom in the World" database and the United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI) — to determine the lived conditions of a state as a result of its development.<sup>29,30</sup> Both of these datasets provide numerous indicators describing things like living conditions, economic experiences, the proliferation and

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<sup>25</sup> Fisunoglu et al., "Relative Political Capacity Dataset 2.4 Codebook.Pdf."

<sup>26</sup> Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

<sup>27</sup> Meredith Reid Sarkees, "COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars," Correlates of War, 2021, <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/the-cow-typology-of-war-defining-and-categorizing-wars/@@download/file/COW%20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> "Methodology | Fragile States Index," accessed March 23, 2022, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/>. These indicators are as follows: (1) "Security Apparatus," (2) "Fractionalized Elites," (3) "Group Grievance," (4) "Economy," (5) "Economic Inequality," (6) "Human Flight and Brain Drain," (7) "State Legitimacy," (8) "Public Services," (9) "Human Rights," (10) "Demographic Pressures," (11) "Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons," and (12) "External Intervention."

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Index (HDI) Methodology," HDI Methodology, 2021, <https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.

<sup>30</sup> Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Research Methodology," Freedom in the World, 2022, <https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology>.

realization of rights, and political autonomy, among other factors, which will allow me to qualitatively contextualize how powerful a state truly is.

Finally, I will employ compiled statistics from Global Firepower, an independent state strength evaluator, to supply basic facts about a country's military might.<sup>31</sup> While there are numerous issues with their financial indicators, their basic statistics on manpower and technological armament are compiled directly from state-issued sources, the CIA World Factbook, and various research papers on each reported state.<sup>32</sup>

### *“The Middle East”*

Although this term faces similar disputes amongst academics as to where one ought to draw the borders culturally, politically, and geographically, for the sake of this project I will rely on a rudimentary and



**Figure 1: The Middle East**

popularized conception of the region. Sometimes colloquially referred to as the “Near East,” this region is primarily composed of the lands surrounding the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>33</sup> Bearing this in mind, this inclusion in the region within this project is limited to these 18 states: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Global Firepower Editorial Staff, “2022 Turkey Military Strength,” accessed March 27, 2022, [https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country\\_id=turkey](https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=turkey).

<sup>32</sup> Global Firepower Editorial Staff.

<sup>33</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Middle East: History, Map, Countries, & Facts,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East>.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.



### Part III: Charles Tilly's Bellicose Theory: A Framework of State-Development

While there exist numerous theories of state formation throughout the state-making niche of political science research, none are more fundamental than Charles Tilly's bellicose theory. His theory, which evolved out of his historical and sociological work focused on how modern Europe came to be, arises from a short chapter published in 1985 titled "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime."<sup>35</sup> In short, Tilly claims that war (or the threat of war) catalyzes the creation of better-made states across the "European experience."<sup>36</sup> Although by Tilly's admission this theory was crafted to solely consider the state-making experiences of Western Europe, political science researchers have applied his framework to virtually every region of the world and type of state imaginable.<sup>37</sup>

The basic claim made by Tilly's theory is as follows:

The trimmed-down argument stresses the interdependence of war-making and state-making and the analogy between both of those processes and what, when less successful and smaller in scale, we call organized crime. *War makes states, I shall claim.*<sup>38</sup>

War makes states. On the surface, this claim is intuitive, blunt, and exposes the inherent simplicity that has undoubtedly contributed to the lasting nature of his central argument. From this, the basic premise espoused by Tilly's work is that states that are better at "making war" would be the best-made states. While this politically realist statement certainly does not align with the moral and ethical norms that have proliferated

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<sup>35</sup> Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime."

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Although the list of projects extending Tilly's theory to various regions of the world are vast, some notable examples include Sorenson Georg, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World," *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (2001): 341–54; Cameron G. Thies, "National Design and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa," *World Politics* 61, no. 4 (2009): 623–69, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40263535>; Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (2008): 27–56, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25481929>; Ian S. Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 653–83, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2703502>; Douglas Lemke, "Intra-National IR in Africa," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 1 (2011): 49–70, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23024584>; Lemke, "State-Making Lessons For International Relations Research."

<sup>38</sup> Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," 170.

worldwide in the post-WWII era, a basic historical consideration of his argument is met with surprising validation.<sup>39</sup>

Historically speaking, Tilly's theory is directly derived from his analysis of European state formation. In his 1990 book titled *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990*, Tilly built upon the central claim of his 1985 work when he wrote: "war made the state, and the state made war."<sup>40</sup> This statement comes as a response to his initial question in the book about how Europe, a continent littered with countless principalities, feudal lords, and state-like entities just a thousand years prior, could realistically consolidate political power to such a degree that would make possible our modern map filled with large nation-states.

Tilly argued that amidst a medieval world of uncertain state boundaries and ill-formed, often competing, political units, "war-making" served as the central competition mechanism between such powers. From this competition came the formation of nation-states that began to consolidate their territorial holdings to monopolize the use of force, accumulation of capital, and extractive capabilities within a given region. From here, states that were unable to 'compete' in a scene dominated by power maximization and wealth accumulation were thus swallowed up by states that could do so more effectively. Ultimately, Tilly argues throughout his book that this process continued in a vicious, predatory cycle up to the modern-day, thus leaving us with our current state boundaries.<sup>41</sup>

Of course, this process of rapacious state-formation experienced a marked decline in the modern era when compared to the days of conquest common throughout the Middle Ages and Enlightenment.<sup>42</sup> Realizing this, Tilly united the wisdom of his historical analysis with a political consideration of each successful political unit upon the conclusion of war. In searching for characteristics or developmental

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<sup>39</sup> Lingyu Lu and Cameron G. Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East," *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 2 (2013): 239–53, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23563141>; Lemke, "State-Making Lessons For International Relations Research."

<sup>40</sup> Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 2–3.

<sup>41</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990*.

<sup>42</sup> Georg, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World."

attributes that defined successful states, Tilly came to establish four “essential activities” of the state.<sup>43</sup> These activities, he argued, formed the basis for describing what “states do” and bear a close resemblance to the framework of state capacity espoused by Hendrix.<sup>44</sup> In this respect, Tilly describes four “essential activities” that a state maker ought to excel at to craft a well-made state. In his own words, they are as follows:

- (1) War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force.
- (2) State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories.
- (3) Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients.
- (4) Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities — war making, state making, and protection.<sup>45</sup>

Figure 2 is pulled directly from Tilly’s 1985 work and demonstrates how this cycle evolves.

Given this categorical determination of what the state does, one can instantly recognize parallels with the employed definition of the “state” as conceived by Weber’s 1968 text.<sup>46</sup> Tilly notably remarks that “all four depend on the state’s tendency to monopolize the

concentrated means of coercion.”<sup>47</sup> The state, as Tilly put it, is primarily conceived and organized to eliminate rivals — both domestically and abroad — thus facilitating the extraction of economically viable resources. In turn, this extraction enables the state to further expand and improve upon its war making, state making, and protective abilities, leading to the establishment of all the things that we have come to associate with the state. Ultimately, this process of territorial, forceful, and economic monopolization eventually develops into a well-formed state if given enough time to iterate and chances for competitive success.




Figure 1: The Four "Essential Activities" of the State

<sup>43</sup> Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 181.

<sup>44</sup> Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity.”

<sup>45</sup> Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 181.

<sup>46</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 57.

<sup>47</sup> Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 181.

Getting into each of the activities more directly elucidates a great deal about the intuitive and comprehensive nature of this framework even in the modern-day. It is not without worthy cause that Tilly organized the activities as he did. The first three, each prominently featuring the phrase “eliminating or neutralizing” at their beginnings, are directly concerned with a state’s ability to facilitate some form of the legitimate use of force.

Central among these, Tilly’s “state making” posits that through the elimination of domestic competitors/rivals, a state increases its level of authority, legitimacy amongst citizens, and the ability to act uncontested in its territory.<sup>48</sup> Considering this, Tilly wrote: “a territory populated by great landlords or by distinct religious groups generally imposed larger costs on a conqueror than one of fragmented power or homogenous culture.”<sup>49</sup> This is directly tied to “protection,” which claims that state makers must be able to ensure safety and order for their population. This presupposes a state’s capability to maintain some sort of stable economy, rule of law, and functional peace-keeping measures.

Flowing from this, “war making” involves the elimination of foreign competitors in “territories in which they have a clear and continuous priority as wielders of force.”<sup>50</sup> This allows a state with substantial coercive means, usually in the form of a strong military, to maintain its core area while enjoying returns from exercising its power on others via interstate war. Such a process empowers a state to conquer territory and consolidate its holdings, thus increasing the stability of its core area. Tilly critically acknowledges that while states may not be embroiled in an eternal state of interstate warfare, a genuine threat of such conflict is sufficient to produce similar developmental effects.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> While Tilly’s naming of this activity coincides with the name for state-development literature throughout political science academia, the two terms are not synonymous. For the sake of this project, the unhyphenated form of “state making” makes reference to Tilly’s activity, while the hyphenated “state-making” describes the field of study more broadly. This structure is consistent with applications and usage throughout the literature.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 182. See also Lu and Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East.”

Finally, “extraction” is concerned with a state’s ability to collect resources, often in the form of taxes, from its population to pay for the other three essential activities. To some extent, this is the most important activity of the state. Without the ability to practically fund the state’s desired geopolitical and domestic ends, the state as an administrative unit is rendered useless and devoid of teeth to meaningfully exercise its will. This speaks to the importance of *relative political capacity (RPC)* in evaluating state capacity.<sup>52</sup> To extract resources from its citizenry, it is critically important for a state to possess an overwhelming acknowledgment of its legitimacy, substantial coercive means to enforce said extraction, or as is most common, a combination of both. Furthermore, for a state to succeed at extraction it must first possess institutions and an administrative organization competent enough to attain political legitimacy, or an ability to ‘read’ its citizenry via adequate census taking.<sup>53</sup>

#### **Part IV: Critiques of Tilly & Applications to the Middle East**

While Charles Tilly’s somewhat infamous bellicose framework has formed the theoretical crux of state-making research since its publication in the mid-1980s, it has not done so without its fair share of fierce critics. The very fact that this theory maintains academic validity and extensive empirical justification amidst the countless quantitative, historical, and theoretical rebukes of its logic ought to serve as a preliminary testament to its wisdom. Despite this, I would be remiss to not acknowledge some of the glaring shortcomings expounded upon throughout the 35+ years of scholarship following its initial publication.

There exist two distinct camps upon which I will classify critiques of Tilly’s framework. The first camp is filled with scholarship that outright rejects Tilly’s ultimate thesis that “war makes states.” These works generally conclude that his work is reductionist, euro-centric to a point of incomprehensibility, and altogether incorrect in describing how states both come into existence and facilitate their continued survival.

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<sup>52</sup> Kugler and Arbetman, “The Unfinished Agenda.”

<sup>53</sup> Lemke, “State-Making Lessons for International Relations Research,” 10.

The second camp, which is significantly larger than the first, is filled with scholarship that generally accepts the premises of Tilly's claims but disagrees with the specific applications of his theory to specific state-making experiences. As Tilly acknowledged some of the limitations of his theory from the onset, it is entirely unsurprising that such a robust collection of scholarship has formed.

In addressing the first camp of dissenters, perhaps the most notable and frequently cited critique arises from Georg Sørensen's 2001 article, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World?"<sup>54</sup> In this project which directly addresses Tilly's framework laid out in his 1985 chapter, Sørensen conducted a qualitative critique of bellicose theory's logic. In this, he considered the question of why war seemed to "make states" in early-modern Europe but "break states" in the post-WWII/post-colonial world.<sup>55</sup>

His criticism evaluated how specific conditions throughout the international system may have changed which could have plausibly modified the path followed by more recently developed states. In this respect, Sørensen pointed out that the conditions at hand are likely not 'bad leaders,' 'insufficient time' to develop, or the 'negative effects of colonialism,' and instead that the discrepancy in state-making arose because of widespread changes concerning norms of international behavior. He argued that in the post-colonial world, civil wars are much more common and highly counterproductive to state-making compared to the interstate wars of early-modern European states. Further, he claimed that foreign powers are much more likely to economically interfere with and politically influence post-colonial states, thus hindering a developing state's ability to meaningfully extract resources from its citizens. Finally, Sørensen claimed that norms against conquest and violent, coercive border changes diminished the importance of "war making," while norms against genocide removed a state's ability to unilaterally eliminate domestic competitors ("state making").

In addition to Sørensen's 2001 critique concerning the general nature of Tilly's argument, several other critiques have arisen concerning the general nature of bellicose theory. Taylor and Botea (2008), in

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<sup>54</sup> Georg, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World."

<sup>55</sup> Georg.

their “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State Making in the Contemporary Third World,” found that Tilly’s theory proved the opposite of his famed “war makes states” claim.<sup>56</sup> Similar to Sørensen, their qualitative analysis found that within third-world or less-developed nations, war has a negative developmental effect on state-building. This assertion is repeated several times throughout the literature, with the most notable cases arising from Spruyt (1994), Ayoob (1995), and Herbst (2000).<sup>57</sup>

Despite these critiques, all of those cited utilize conditions vastly different from those in Turkey to disprove Tilly’s thesis. For Sørensen, Taylor & Botea, Spruyt, and Ayoob, each of them cite state-making conditions in Africa and East Asia as illustrative of Tilly’s shortcomings. Bearing this in mind, many of their critiques, despite their validity amidst these significantly more fragile and less developed states, are unable to effectively capture the legitimacy of employing such a framework.

In terms of its direct applicability to the Middle East, numerous scholars have attempted to apply bellicose theory’s principles to the region. Though these projects have produced results of varying degrees of effectiveness, chief among them includes the critique that Middle Eastern military expenditures in pursuit of some ‘war making’ activity are unproductive and counterproductive in many cases. In Barnett’s (1995) *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel*, he argues that extensive militarization in Iraq through the Gulf War ultimately led to a disastrous economic situation and ineffective armed forces.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, Sadowski’s (1993) *Scuds or Butter?: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East* claimed that war making or the pursuit of Middle Eastern militarization is a

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<sup>56</sup> Taylor and Botea, “Tilly Tally.”

<sup>57</sup> Spruyt, “The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems of Change”; Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament State Making Regional Conflict and the International System* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995),

[https://www.rienner.com/title/The\\_Third\\_World\\_Security\\_Predicament\\_State\\_Making\\_Regional\\_Conflict\\_and\\_the\\_International\\_System](https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Third_World_Security_Predicament_State_Making_Regional_Conflict_and_the_International_System); Jeffrey Herbst, “The Challenge of State-Building in Africa,” in *State & Power in Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 11; James A. Robinson, “States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey I. Herbst: A Review Essay,” ed. Jeffrey I. Herbst, *Journal of Economic Literature* 40, no. 2 (2002): 510–19, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2698386>.

<sup>58</sup> Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/29596>.

futile process.<sup>59</sup> In this respect, she offers that such a bellicose pursuit of state development via war-making has led to a fixation on military might in the region at the expense of economic and civil development.

Aside from these critiques of Middle Eastern militarization strategies, Ian Lustick's (1997) "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective" provides perhaps the best support for the application of Tilly to the Middle East.<sup>60</sup> In his analysis, he comments on the notable absence of a hegemonic regional power in the region. In light of this, Lustick argued that such a fractured center of power is the result of the relative absence of interstate wars in the region. This absence of war, however, is no fault of the Middle Eastern powers that he claims have been forced to resort to economic power grabs given the appearance of western norms of non-intervention and against conquest. In light of this, Lustick argued that external rents via economic instruments and external interdependence with other world powers have ultimately rendered a new set of bellicose circumstances for the states of the region. In this respect, Lustick asserts that the utilization of Tilly's theory within the Middle East is wholly valid, though he rightly asserts that such use requires a re-evaluation of the importance of interstate war or 'war making' in the equation given its virtual absence from the region.

Such a conclusion is supported by Trexler (2014) in his "A Bellicist Theory of War-Making and State Power in the Modern Middle East" which provides extensive justification for the application of Tilly to the Middle East.<sup>61</sup> In this, he found that the Turkey-PKK conflict perfectly demonstrates the valid use of bellicose theory and provides holistic support for Tilly's thesis. Aside from this direct parallel to my project, Lu & Thies (2013) in their "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East" provides a compelling quantitative analysis arguing in support of Tilly's assertion that the preparation for war, not just war itself, is sufficient to produce meaningful developmental gains in a state.<sup>62</sup> This is further supported by Theis'

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<sup>59</sup> Yahya M. Sadowski, *Scuds or Butter?* (Brookings Institution Press, 1993), <https://www.brookings.edu/book/scuds-or-butter/>.

<sup>60</sup> Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers."

<sup>61</sup> Trexler, "A Bellicist Theory of War-Making and State Power in the Modern Middle East."

<sup>62</sup> Lu and Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East."



(2004) "State Building, Interstate, and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Postcolonial Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000."<sup>63</sup>

### **Part V: Conclusions & Takeaways**

For the sake of this project, Tilly's general claim of "war makes states" will be juxtaposed alongside his four essential activities, thus creating a sufficient analytical framework for evaluating the modern Turkish state. In this respect, the state's modern form will be evaluated using a variety of state power indicators as specified earlier in this chapter. The use of such statistics and indicators will be informed by a historical consideration of each of the modern states' relevant political development. Using this information, I will then consider if Turkey succeeds at each of Tilly's four essential activities. Ultimately, I will establish a consensus as to how well his framework describes the state-making experiences of Turkey.

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<sup>63</sup> Thies, "National Design and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa."

## Chapter 3

### State-Making in the Republic of Turkey

#### Part I: Introduction

The Republic of Turkey is among the most unique and geographically vital states throughout world history. Situated as the bridge – and frequent wall – between Asia Minor, Europe, and the Middle East, it inhabits what has historically served as the world’s most critical point of confluence. A rudimentary understanding of 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup>-century geopolitics provides credence and support for this premise.<sup>64</sup> Per the Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Turkey is bounded on the north by the Black Sea, on the northeast by Georgia and Armenia, on the east by Azerbaijan and Iran, on the southeast by Iraq and Syria, on the southwest and west by the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea, and on the northwest by Greece and Bulgaria.<sup>65</sup>

Even today, the Turkish state’s placement amongst former Soviet satellite states, Middle Eastern oil producers, and NATO allies sympathetic to the West continues to color the experiences of their state makers and nation builders. While undoubtedly home to a uniquely Turkish history and culture dating back to the Ottoman Empire’s formation in 1299, it has historically served as the unofficial border between countless cultural differences, ethnic divides, and political philosophies across continents.<sup>66</sup> As such, the story of their state formation contributes in large part to the unique attributes and characteristics that have come to define Turkey today. As a highly militarized and highly religious, yet secular, republican parliamentary democracy, Turkey stands alone in the Middle East as a distinct *mélange* of Middle Eastern and Western culture and political life.

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<sup>64</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Turkey and NATO,” NATO - Declassified: Turkey and NATO - 1952, accessed March 26, 2022, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_191048.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_191048.htm?selectedLocale=en).

<sup>65</sup> Dewdney, J. C. and Yapp, . Malcolm Edward. "Turkey." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey>.

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Throughout this chapter, I proceed first by providing a brief, relevant history of modern Turkey's state development. In doing so, I provide the necessary context for an evaluation of the current government apparatus via Tilly's four essential activities. Because Tilly's framework relies heavily on the influence of interstate war on the formation of state power, I pay notice to such events throughout Turkey's history. In the third part of this chapter, I impose Tilly's framework on present circumstances using a variety of state power indicators. These distinct parts will permit me to come to general conclusions concerning the condition of the Turkish state at the end of this project.

## **Part II: A Historical Overview of Turkey**

To its very core, the present-day Republic of Turkey is the direct ancestor of the once illustrious and vast Ottoman Empire. Founded in *c.* 1299, the Ottoman Empire was created by a consolidation of Turkish tribes in Anatolia and, at its peak, governed, controlled, and administered most of the Arab and Muslim world.<sup>67</sup> By the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman Empire reached its cultural and political peak under the dynastic rulers Selim I (r. 1512-20) and his son Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-66).<sup>68</sup> By the rule of Selim I, the Ottoman Empire had expanded to such a point of global dominance and cultural significance that the dynastic sultans had adopted the title of caliph, or spiritual head of Islam, in addition to their political offices.<sup>69</sup> In this respect, one can readily identify the conspicuous degree of intermingling between the political, religious, and cultural Arab life that the Ottomans came to represent.

Following its golden age under Süleyman I, the Ottoman Empire began a period of decline stretching from the late 16<sup>th</sup> century to its eventual death following the Allied victory in World War I.<sup>70</sup> Throughout this nearly four-centuries-long period of decline, the Ottoman Empire lost large swaths of

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<sup>67</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Ottoman Empire: Facts, History, & Map," 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire>.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Library of Congress Federal Research Division and Helen Chapin Metz, "Turkey : A Country Study," Library of Congress Archives, 1996, [https://www.loc.gov/resource/frdcstdy.turkeycountrystu00metz\\_0/?st=gallery](https://www.loc.gov/resource/frdcstdy.turkeycountrystu00metz_0/?st=gallery).

territory and authority throughout Persia, the Balkans, Arabia, and Hungary.<sup>71</sup> Their various losses throughout the Russo-Turkish Wars of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries and stark defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912-13) diminished the empire to a husk of its former self by the start of World War I. As a result, the formerly united Arab world was reduced to a fractured and piecemeal arrangement of Muslim-oriented states that we have come to recognize on the map today. Called the “sick man of Europe” due to its decrepit situation toward the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman’s decision to side with the Germans in World War I proved to be its death blow.

Following their loss in 1918, numerous treaties brokered by the victorious Allied powers spelled the end of the empire.<sup>72</sup> From 1919 to 1923, the former Ottoman territories throughout Asia Minor, Arabia, and the Balkans were partitioned amongst colonial western powers. By mid-1920, a parliamentary body, the Grand National Assembly, had formed with the aims of establishing a legitimate basis of political action divorced from the now lame sultanate.<sup>73</sup> Such a goal was realized in 1921 when the assembly posited through the Fundamental Law of January 20, 1921, that national sovereignty now belonged to the newly constructed legislative body. Following this, the Grand National Assembly adopted its official moniker of “Turkey” and appointed Mustafa Kemal the head of its executive council. By November of 1922, Kemal and his supporters had succeeded in their aims of abolishing the sultanate. Following the comprehensive settlement contained in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the modern-day Turkish borders were effectively set in Anatolia.<sup>74</sup>

On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly declared Turkey to be a republic and, though it retained the Muslim caliphate until March 1924, succeeded in its stated goal of founding a new state in Anatolia. Although he had already attained status and political popularity similar to Washington in

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<sup>71</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Turkey: Demographic Trends,” Turkey, accessed March 7, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/Demographic-trends>.

<sup>72</sup> Library of Congress Federal Research Division and Metz, “Turkey.”

<sup>73</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Turkey: Constitutional Framework,” Turkey, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/Demographic-trends>.

<sup>74</sup> Library of Congress Federal Research Division and Metz, “Turkey.”

America's founding by this point, Mustafa Kemal was elected president by the assembly in October of 1923.<sup>75</sup> The first Turkish republican constitution was quick to follow in April 1924. Notably, the original constitution retained Islam as the state's official religion until 1928 when Kemal and his liberal wing of the assembly established Turkey as a purely secular state.<sup>76</sup>

In the years that followed, the role of Mustafa Kemal at the helm of the newly formed republic was critical for the development of the state as we know it today. From his election in 1923 to his death and transition of power in 1938, the national assembly was effectively an autocratic instrument of Kemal's will. Though his methods would be classified as anti-democratic, this condition facilitated Kemal's aims which were focused almost entirely on domestic affairs throughout his presidency.<sup>77</sup> Upon the first assembly's dissolution in 1923, Kemal took steps to effectively eliminate his many political opponents from legislative bodies that formed in its place, thus ensuring that his political ambitions would stand virtually unopposed until 1950. Despite the antithetical nature of this amidst Kemal's republican vision espoused in 1923, the importance of this continuous period of development cannot be understated. It allowed for secular Turkish political institutions ample time to develop uninterrupted by political upheaval often characteristic of newly formed states.<sup>78</sup>

Kemal's policies and vision for the Turkish state were based upon six distinct principles, all of which are indicative of the inward-facing political change he hoped to induce. They included republicanism, secularism, statism, populism, nationalism, and revolution as things that ought to be realized should Turkey develop into the Western power, he envisioned it as.<sup>79</sup> Though each of these principles is worthy of detailed explanations, the effect of such a comprehensive re-formation of Turkish life brought with it an overwhelming sense of national unity, rapid advances in economic growth and capital attainment, and a

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<sup>75</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Kemal Ataturk: Biography, Reforms, Death, & Facts," 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kemal-Ataturk>.

<sup>76</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Turkey: Constitutional Framework."

<sup>77</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Kemal Ataturk: Biography, Reforms, Death, & Facts."

<sup>78</sup> Tanel Demirel, "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 1 (2004): 127–50.

<sup>79</sup> Demirel, 136.

further deterioration of Islam's position in state affairs. The effect of this was a state that by Kemal's death in 1938 was culturally homogenous and viewed as legitimate by the vast majority of Turkish citizens.<sup>80</sup>

Mustafa İsmet İnönü picked up where Kemal left off following his election in 1938. A close friend of Kemal and an integral part of his government throughout his political rule, İnönü critically expanded upon Kemalist principles from 1938 to his transfer of power in 1950. Throughout this time, Turkey effectively 'began' its military history.<sup>81</sup> Though Kemal's policies were almost wholly concerned with domestic reform, İnönü began to rapidly expand the size and technological capabilities of the Turkish military in 1939. Before this point, military expenditures took up approximately one-quarter of the overall state budget; by 1939, İnönü had increased defense expenditures to over half of the annual Turkish spending, a trend that continued until the end of World War II in 1945.<sup>82</sup> Together with Turkey's staunch adherence to military neutrality throughout World War II, despite its modest contributions to the Allied Power's war efforts, these two occurrences jettisoned Turkey to a place of geopolitical significance in the post-WWII era.

Bearing this foundational history in mind, a step-by-step walkthrough of Turkey's history following this point would prove neither useful nor relevant to our treatment of Tilly's framework. At this junction, it is sufficient to provide an overview of major events and aspects of Turkish history to inform our discussion of the present-day state.

With respect to Turkish military history, the list of major interstate conflicts it has engaged in is notably short. Putting aside its war of succession and independence from the end of World War I to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the Turk's virtual abstention from World War II allowed it to experience a

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<sup>80</sup> Clive Foss, "Kemal Atatürk: Giving a New Nation a New History," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 5 (2014): 826–47, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24585890>.

<sup>81</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (1999): 152–86, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284043>.

<sup>82</sup> Mustafa ULUÇAKARAR and Ali ÇAĞLAR, "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Turkey," *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 14, no. 55 (2017): 41–57, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26406873>.

period of foreign neutrality until the Korean War.<sup>83</sup> In February 1952, Turkey was admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), symbolically committing itself to Western values while simultaneously committing itself to the collective defense of other member states.<sup>84</sup> Following its admission to NATO, Turkey contributed modest numbers of arms and troops to the Korean War effort until its end in 1953, though it suffered just 731 casualties in the conflict.<sup>85</sup>

In July of 1974, Turkey mobilized military forces and sent them to nearby Cyprus, which had undergone close to a decade of internal political strife before this point.<sup>86</sup> In doing so, Turkish forces occupied close to a third of Cyprus and defied numerous U.N. resolutions urging their withdrawal from the area.<sup>87</sup> Although Ankara claimed that such a move was done to protect Turkish sovereignty, close to a quarter of the population of Cyprus (142,000) was forcibly relocated because of this military action. Though this affair pales in comparison to the scale of international conflicts, it did result in the mobilization of forces culminating with Turkey retaining close to a third of Cyprus' territory, with troops still stationed in the area to this day following the cessation of such spoils.<sup>88</sup>

Bearing this in mind, Turkey has not meaningfully engaged in any genuine instance of interstate conflict like that described by Tilly's tagline of "war makes states." Despite this, Turkey has undoubtedly made significant state-making advances because of its military might and strategic alignments. While their avoidance of direct conflict engagement is telling of the Turkish commitment to at-home affairs, it is critical to note that the state is not devoid of military might by any means. Provided its unique position amidst three vastly distinct 'cultural continents,' Turkey is the only Middle Eastern state, and perhaps the only Asian nation depending on how it is classified, to serve as a member of NATO.<sup>89</sup> Its participation in NATO

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<sup>83</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Treaty of Lausanne | Summary, Terms, & Facts," 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923>.

<sup>84</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Turkey and NATO."

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> ULUÇAKARAR and ÇAĞLAR, "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations."

<sup>87</sup> "The Future for the US and Turkey," Middle East Institute, accessed May 6, 2021, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/future-us-and-turkey>.

<sup>88</sup> Demirel, "Soldiers and Civilians."

<sup>89</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Turkey and NATO."

qualifies it for Article 5 protection – namely collective defense – as specified in the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>90</sup> To date, Turkey maintains the second-largest standing army in NATO, second only to the United States, and the 15<sup>th</sup> largest active-duty military worldwide.<sup>92</sup><sup>93</sup> Though they are not a nuclear power in their own right, Turkey is one of five nations worldwide to house United States supplied nuclear warheads.<sup>94</sup>

Such a condition serves as a demonstration of the close relationship shared between the United States and Turkey following World War II. From their inclusion in NATO in 1952 to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, relations between Turkey and the United States proved to be mutually beneficial to both parties. Throughout the Eisenhower Administration, the U.S. and Turkey cooperated to play a sizable role in Iran, Israel, and Jordan. This enabled both parties to effectively work together to contain the influence of the Soviet Union in states like Syria, Iraq, and Egypt that were oriented towards the Soviets at the time. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis under President John F. Kennedy demonstrated perhaps the clearest validation of the close strategic partnership between the two states. At the time, the U.S. was hosting Jupiter ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads in Turkey given its relative closeness to Moscow. This effectively indicated that the Turks were willing to wage nuclear war on its soil as a result of its strategic ties with the United States.<sup>95</sup>

From 1974 onward, U.S.-Turkey relations waxed and waned as the Middle East was engulfed in several armed conflicts. Of note, the Turkish government under then-President Turgut Özal supported the United States' efforts in the Gulf War. Given that Turkey bordered Iraq, the economic effects of the war paired with the threat of regional instability again made the two geopolitical powerhouses convenient

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<sup>90</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Collective Defence - Article 5," NATO, February 25, 2022, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm).

<sup>91</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, April 10, 2019, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm).

<sup>92</sup> World Population Review, "Military Size by Country 2022," 2022, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-size-by-country>.

<sup>93</sup> Global Firepower Editorial Staff, "2022 Turkey Military Strength."

<sup>94</sup> Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Turkey Country Spotlight," *The Nuclear Threat Initiative* (blog), 2022, <https://live-nuclear-threat-initiative.pantheonsite.io/countries/turkey/>.

<sup>95</sup> "The Future for the US and Turkey."



partners. Throughout the Gulf War, Turkey effectively served as the American base of operations and enabled the widespread aerial campaign that occurred throughout the conflict.

While Turkey's military engagements internationally have been limited, unfortunately, the same cannot be said of internal armed disputes. A culturally homogenous population, the Turkish government's persecution of Kurdish peoples has contributed to a nearly four-decades-long internal conflict with the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Often termed the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, this non-conventional dispute has its grounds in the initial formation of the Turkish state and has persisted throughout the country's history. At its peak, large-scale violence between Kurdish nationals and Turks took place beginning in 1984 and persisting into the 1990s, resulting in the deaths of over 37,000 people combined from both sides.<sup>96</sup> From 1991-95, Amnesty International estimates that the Turks mobilized over 500,000 troops in their fight against the PKK.<sup>97</sup> Though not quite a civil war due to the PKK's classification as a terrorist organization, this violence has resulted in the death of thousands of Kurds and Turks alike over nearly half a decade of conflict. Presently, the International Crisis Group estimates that the Turkey-PKK conflict has claimed the lives of 3,700 PKK militants, 593 civilians, and 1,322 Turkish security forces from 2015 to date.<sup>98</sup>

Aside from its conflict with Kurdish populations, internal conflicts in Turkey have taken on a variety of forms. While numerous periods of political violence occurred throughout the 1960s and 70s, none brought with it the same level of carnage as that experienced from 1976-80. Amidst unresolved economic and social concerns throughout the 1970s and political turmoil between members of the conservative Justice Party (AP) and liberal Republican People's Party (MHP), violence erupted in Turkey in an unprecedented form.<sup>99</sup> From 1976-80, it is estimated that between 5,000-6,000 Turks were killed as a result of such political

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<sup>96</sup> Associated Press, "Turks Charge Kurds with Inciting Hatred," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/23/AR2007022301909.html>.

<sup>97</sup> Amnesty International, "Turkey Archives," Turkey 2021, Amnesty International, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/>.

<sup>98</sup> International Crisis Group, "Turkey's PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer," 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer>.

<sup>99</sup> ULUÇAKARAR and ÇAĞLAR, "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations."

violence, with various newspapers reporting an average of ten politically-motivated assassinations a day during this time.<sup>100</sup> This violence ultimately stressed Turkish institutions so much that violence could only be quelled upon the military's initiation of the 1980 Turkish coup d'état.

Such an event as the 1980 coup is common throughout the history of the Turkish republic. Throughout the history of the modern state, the Turkish military has maintained a unique status as the "true guardian of the Republican State and its founding principles of nationalism, republicanism, laicism, populism, reformism and statism, all expounded by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk."<sup>101</sup> Per Tanel Demirel's explanation of this fragile relationship between political society and the military, the Turkish military has maintained something of a 'guardianship' over the republic since its inception in 1923. This guardianship brings with it various privileges and abilities for the Turkish military that appear virtually unfathomable in other western democracies. The primary power granted to the military in this respect is the ability to effectively depose and unilaterally reorganize the government should it perceive that it is not adhering to the principles on which the state was founded. Throughout its history, such power has generally been utilized amidst periods of political upheaval and disagreement between members of the military and government concerning the direction of the state.

Such an integration of the praetorian civilian-military relationship as in Turkey has likely catalyzed the widespread public unrest that has come to define domestic political life there from 1960 onward.<sup>102</sup> Throughout the nation's history, there has been a total of nine attempted or successful events classified as coup d'états, with the most notable of which occurring in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997.<sup>103</sup> The first coup in 1960 grew out of a political dispute caused by the Democratic Party's perceived violation of secularism and restrictive press censorship of political opponents. This prompted the Turkish military to step in and effectively topple the government, with prime minister Adnan Menderes executed and the then-president

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<sup>100</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Turkey: Demographic Trends."

<sup>101</sup> Demirel, "Soldiers and Civilians," 128.

<sup>102</sup> ULUÇAKARAR and ÇAĞLAR, "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations."

<sup>103</sup> Al Jazeera Editorial Team, "Timeline: Turkish Coups," News, July 16, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/16/timeline-a-history-of-turkish-coups>.

and members of the cabinet all jailed for their role in the calamity. From May 1960 to 1965, Turkish politics were wholly dominated by the military, with General Cemal Gursel assuming the power of both the president and prime minister during this time and a new constitution arising in 1961.

Following the first coup in 1960, another followed shortly after in 1971 amidst economic hardships and widespread inflation. Though bloodless in nature and often referred to as a “coup by memorandum,” this event demonstrated the extensive power and legitimacy granted to the Turkish military as a unique, vested political entity. Though the military did not rule from the bully pulpit as it had following the 1960 coup, it did intervene in the political process directly and facilitate the creation of a right-wing MHP caretaker government that governed the state from 1971 to 1973. That said, the political motivations of the military were directly acknowledged in this case, with Al Jazeera’s timeline detailing the history of Turkish coups remarking:

...the military intervened once again, an effort to “restore order”, it said. Memduh Tagmac, the chief of the general staff, gave a memorandum to the prime minister, Suleyman Demirel. It accused his government of driving the country into anarchy and demanded the formation of a “strong and credible government ... inspired by Ataturk’s views.”<sup>104</sup>

In this respect, the military may have sought to alleviate the unrest of the era, though it did so to no avail. Throughout the 1970s, Turkey had 11 different prime ministers, continually failed to form a legitimate coalition government, experienced intense economic stagnation, and realized near-constant domestic violence between political opponents.<sup>105</sup> Though this did lead to a significant modification of the 1961 constitution, it did so via a widescale curtailment and dissolution of civil liberties and freedoms.

Amidst this, the military attempted to restore domestic order a third time in 1980 following the intense political violence that had ensnared the country. In September of 1980, military officials broadcast directly via Turkish television networks that they would unilaterally institute martial law and dissolve the government. Following this, the military proceeded to quickly execute 50 people and arrested some 650,000 people via trial by military tribunal, per the Grand National Assembly’s 2012 investigation into the

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<sup>104</sup> Al Jazeera Editorial Team.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

matter.<sup>106</sup> Additionally, 1.68 million Turks were blacklisted from public life nationwide, 14,000 Turks had their citizenship revoked, 4,000 teachers and judges were dismissed, and 30,000 others lost their jobs as a direct result of this coup.<sup>107</sup> Amidst the onset of martial law in 1980, newspapers in Turkey were altogether barred from publication for 300 days consecutive days.<sup>108</sup> The impact of this coup, together with the introduction of a new constitution approved by a nationwide referendum in 1982, demonstrated the stark departure from western democratic ideals that had persisted in years prior. Ultimately, this coup did halt further political violence, though such bloodshed was soon replaced by the rise of the PKK.

The last notable coup occurred in 1997, often called the “postmodern coup,” following overwhelming gains made by the intensely religious Islamist Welfare party in the 1995 election. Recognizing their anti-secular policies and positions, the military intervened in 1997 and issued a memorandum like that delivered in 1971. In this, the military issued what it called “recommendations” to the seat of political power, many of which were concerned with the radical preservation of secularism in Turkey.<sup>109</sup> As a result, the Welfare Party was banned nationwide and the group’s prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, was forced to resign. Despite this, this coup arose without the suspension of the constitution or dissolution of the parliament characteristic of the three that preceded it.

By this point, the Turkish government had, in effect, grown and developed into its modern condition. From 1995 to the present day, Turkey has experienced extensive democratic backsliding into an authoritarian form reminiscent of the Ottomans of old. In the next section, I discuss this modern occurrence as well as a variety of other attributes of the Turkish state.

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<sup>106</sup> Grand National Assembly of Turkey, “Parliamentary Research Commission Report: November 2012” 1 (2012): 732,

[https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/bitstream/handle/11543/2782/ss376\\_c1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&\\_x\\_tr\\_sl=tr&\\_x\\_tr\\_tl=en&\\_x\\_tr\\_hl=en&\\_x\\_tr\\_pto=sc](https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/bitstream/handle/11543/2782/ss376_c1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&_x_tr_sl=tr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc).

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians.”

### Part III: Modern Turkey and the Four Essential Activities

When generating a collective picture of the state, the history of Turkey's Ottoman foundations, unstable democratic institutions, fragile civilian-military relations, and frequent civil unrest provide the necessary context to an already complicated political makeup. Provided all its weaknesses, Turkey still stands among the world's greatest powers and serves as a bastion of cultural, military, and economic might in the Middle East.

For the Turkish people, the experience of pervasive external political pressure and cultural bombardment catalyzed the establishment of a distinctive form of constitutionally enshrined secularism in 1928.<sup>110</sup> Prior to its codification, this intense adherence to secularism served as a central impetus for the state's movement away from its Ottoman legacy under Kemal Atatürk.<sup>111</sup> To this day, the internal political maneuverings and party platforms in the state's parliamentary system are often defined wholly or at least in part by this doctrine of secularism.<sup>112</sup> This is made all the more poignant by the near homogenous Islamic religious composition of Turkey. Despite apparent difficulties in gauging the true religiosity of its citizens, the Turkish government reports that 99% of its citizens are Muslim.<sup>113</sup> Though more conservative estimates place the number of actual Muslims in the country between 90-97%, it is indisputable that Turkey is a state highly influenced by religion despite its avowed commitment to separation of church and state.<sup>114</sup>

It is this very religiosity in large part contributes to its institutional destabilization and process of democratic backsliding towards authoritarianism. While the 2003 election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the prime minister role is considered the most significant starting place for such a process, it is evident that from the first 1960 military coup onwards that the status and authenticity of Turkey's democracy have long

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<sup>110</sup> Foss, "Kemal Atatürk."

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid: 826.

<sup>113</sup> Joshua Project, "Turkey: Joshua Project," Joshua Project, 2022, <https://joshuaproject.net/countries/TU?page=1>.

<sup>114</sup> <https://joshuaproject.net/countries/TU?page=1>

possessed a fragile nature.<sup>115</sup> The juxtaposition of such weak institutions alongside an internally fractured national opinion concerning the role of religion in the political process has often left the military to settle such disputes. This circumstance was worsened following widespread anti-government protests in the streets of Turkey's urban centers in 2013.<sup>116</sup> In response to such unrest, Erdoğan's government in the assembly, per his directive, extensively limited internet access to western media, arrested journalists, and imposed staunch censorship and heavy penalties on sedition nationwide.<sup>117</sup>

Upon Erdoğan's 2014 election to the presidency, the first Turk to ever be elected via popular support, his stranglehold on Turkish politics was given yet another opportunity. A failed military coup d'état in July of 2016, which cited an erosion of secularism under the Islamist populism of Erdoğan as chief among their concerns, emboldened the president to take unprecedented steps to quash the rebellion.<sup>118</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the event, approximately 45% of the Turkish military command was detained, every university dean, as well as 15,000 teachers, were fired nationwide, and some 77,000 other Turks were arrested for their perceived role in the event. The *New York Times*' Editorial Board went so far to label Erdoğan's response as a "counter-coup," and remarked: "...there is little doubt that Mr. Erdogan will become more vengeful and obsessed with control than ever, exploiting the crisis not just to punish mutinous soldiers but to further quash whatever dissent is left in Turkey."<sup>119</sup>

As the *Times* predicted, Erdoğan responded with even more government censorship and ultimately succeeded in reforming the Turkish political system entirely using the popularity he gained from curtailing such dissent. In 2017, Erdoğan utilized the political capital he garnered in 2016 to modify the Turkish political process from a parliamentary, coalitional government to an executive presidential system via

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<sup>115</sup> Al Jazeera Editorial Team, "Turkey's Failed Coup Attempt: All You Need to Know," July 15, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/15/turkeys-failed-coup-attempt-all-you-need-to-know>.

<sup>116</sup> Özge Zihnioğlu, "The Legacy of the Gezi Protests in Turkey - After Protest: Pathways Beyond Mass Mobilization," Carnegie Europe, October 2019, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/10/24/legacy-of-gezi-protests-in-turkey-pub-80142>.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> "Turkey: Baseless Charges Over Landmark 2013 Protests," *Human Rights Watch* (blog), March 25, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/25/turkey-baseless-charges-over-landmark-2013-protests>.

<sup>119</sup> The Editorial Board, "The Counter-Coup in Turkey," *The New York Times*, July 16, 2016, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/opinion/the-counter-coup-in-turkey.html>.

popular referendum. In this respect, Erdoğan has successfully capitalized on political unrest to strengthen the office of the president, largely at the expense of other democratic institutions.<sup>120</sup>

Bearing these modern occurrences in mind, one can be certain that the imposition of Tilly's essential activities on the modern state is sure to render interesting results.

### ***War Making***

The first of Tilly's essential activities, war making involves the elimination of external rivals in territories where a state does not possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In operationalized terms, this often involves interstate war or large-scale military conquest, something that our historical contextualization notes that Turkey does not utilize widely. To date, Turkey has engaged in a number of relatively small military operations. Of note to the modern state is its 1974 invasion of Cyprus, a small mobilization of troops to Afghanistan in 2003 to counter Al-Qaeda, and modest support for UN action in Bosnia and Kosovo throughout the 1990s.<sup>121</sup> All told, these three events account for virtually no territorial gains to date and have not led to any increases in territory like that described by Tilly.

Despite this, such a war making process has undoubtedly contributed to an elevation of the Turkish position worldwide, despite their relative intangibility amidst a framework that is largely concerned with realizable gains. As noted prior, Tilly makes it clear that gains can be attained from preparation for war, something that Turks are rather fond of despite their resistance to foreign engagement. As the second-largest armed force in NATO and as a possessor of numerous U.S.-supplied atomic bombs, it is evident that the military strength of Turkey has provided it with a seat at the geopolitical table in several respects.

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<sup>120</sup> Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Political Leadership in the Transition to Democracy," in *Political Leadership Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, 1st ed., Comparative and Historical Perspectives (Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2022), 117–55, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv27tctmb.9>.

<sup>121</sup> Republic Of Türkiye Ministry of National Defence, "Brief History of the Turkish Armed Forces," General Staff, 2022, <https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=History>.

Per Global Firepower's military strength assessment database, Turkey's military is considered the 13<sup>th</sup> strongest worldwide on a cumulative basis.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, their 775,000 total military personnel, 1,057 total aircraft (9<sup>th</sup> worldwide), and 24<sup>th</sup> highest defense budget, which accounts for an annual \$9.69 billion (USD) in spending, undoubtedly places them as a worldwide military powerhouse. Of course, such a force pales in comparison to their alliance support garnered via NATO membership and Article V protection. Building on this, the Correlates of War (COW) Project's most recent 2021 update to their Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) formula renders a score of 0.01479, or 0.015%, of worldwide state capability. This places Turkey in the top decile of nations worldwide per this indicator, obviously signaling intense military and economic development capabilities.<sup>123</sup>

The impact of such power-maximization is undoubtedly felt by nations worldwide. Since 2020, the central government in Ankara has engaged in an intense process of military modernization and armament in an effort to counter sanctions imposed by traditional Western allies in NATO.<sup>124</sup> As of late, relations with longtime allies, the United States and Germany, have been strained in light of reports detailing human rights abuses in the PKK conflict as well as the pernicious trend of democratic backsliding that has occurred under Erdogan's administration. Recognizing this, the Turkish government has committed itself to work towards a condition of armament self-sufficiency and independence to counter defense-acquisition sanctions imposed by members of NATO.<sup>125</sup> The results of this program — which was initially embarked upon following a similar imposition of sanctions in light of its aggression in Cyprus in the 70s — have catapulted the domestic Turkish defense production agencies to the forefront globally.<sup>126</sup> Although it has

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<sup>122</sup> Global Firepower Editorial Staff, "2022 Turkey Military Strength."

<sup>123</sup> Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." This data is sourced from the National Material Capabilities (v6.0) dataset.

<sup>124</sup> Benjamin Brimelow, "Turkey Is Building New Ships, Tanks, and Missiles to Boost Its Military and Send a Message to the Rest of NATO," Business Insider, August 6, 2021, <https://www.businessinsider.com/turkey-is-modernizing-its-military-to-send-message-to-nato-2021-8>.

<sup>125</sup> Rachel S. Cohen, "Biden's Pentagon to Keep Turkey Out of F-35 Program," *Air Force Magazine* (blog), February 5, 2021, <https://www.airforcemag.com/bidens-pentagon-to-keep-turkey-out-of-f-35-program/>.

<sup>126</sup> Ayşe Betül Bal, "Ukraine to Buy 5 More Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Drones in 2021," Daily Sabah, November 27, 2020, <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/ukraine-to-buy-5-more-turkish-bayraktar-tb2-drones-in-2021>; Brimelow, "Turkey Is Building New Ships, Tanks, and Missiles to Boost Its Military and Send a Message to the Rest of NATO."



historically armed its air force using NATO-supplied and US-produced planes and helicopters, such vehicles have been short of supply following the Turk's decision to purchase the Russian-produced S-400 surface-to-air missile system in July 2019.<sup>127</sup> Following the imposition of such supply sanctions, Turkish defense industries rapidly developed and expanded their domestic production of bombers, fighter planes, reconnaissance aircraft, and attack helicopters.<sup>128</sup> This trend has been accompanied by a similar one within the production of Turkish warships for the navy and tanks for its army.

Ultimately, such a process goes to show that the Turks have cultivated war making capabilities that are independently derived and directly tied to their state-making successes despite their outward resistance to engaging in conflicts abroad. Further, the story in this portion of the analysis speaks volumes in support of Lu and Thies's consideration concerning the political benefits inferred by a process of war making in a vacuum.<sup>129</sup> Of course, such a tale also offers a direct counterpoint to Sorenson's critique of Tilly in the modern era, thus indicating that there remains at least some validity to a bellicose framework even amidst contemporary international norms and state-making conditions.<sup>130</sup>

### ***State Making***

The story becomes significantly more complicated for Turkey when considering state making. Tilly's state making posits that through the elimination of domestic competitors/rivals, a state increases its level of authority, legitimacy amongst citizens, and the ability to act uncontested in its territory. While one can be certain that the Turkish government acts altogether uncontested in its territory, the numerous military coups from 1960 onward paired with their crumbling or absent democratic institutions have rendered the domestic situation rather precarious into the present day.

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<sup>127</sup> Humeyra Pamuk, "U.S. Suggested Turkey Transfer Russian-Made Missile System to Ukraine," *Reuters*, March 20, 2022, sec. World, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-suggested-turkey-transfer-russian-made-missile-system-ukraine-sources-2022-03-19/>.

<sup>128</sup> Pamuk.

<sup>129</sup> Lu and Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East."

<sup>130</sup> Georg, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World."

With a 2020 (*log*) *GDP/capita* of \$8,536.43, Turkey is well below the world average of \$10,918.70, though solidly above the Middle Eastern and Arab World averages of \$6,534.40 and \$5,612.70, respectively.<sup>131</sup> All told, this measure of annual economic output per person is perhaps most telling when compared with its all-time high in 2012 of \$12,614.78 just before the attempted coup in 2013. The years following Erdogan's election to the Presidency in 2014 have shown a continuous downward trend of per-person economic output, perhaps indicating some degree of qualitative correlation between weakening faith in the government, deteriorating institutions, and financial conditions. Considering this, the story told throughout the "state making" section of this analysis is given even more justification.

A good starting place for an evaluation of Turkey's institutional development arises via two sources, HDI and the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index. The United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI) indicates a value of 0.820, or 52<sup>nd</sup> worldwide, for Turkey.<sup>132</sup> On the surface, this indicates that while Turkey is doing well among the whole of countries worldwide, it struggles when compared head-to-head against other highly developed, Western states. Despite this, across their thirteen categorial determinations of state development, they possess no notable areas of significant weakness relative to other states worldwide, thus indicating that their overall development is altogether shorter along than comparable world powers.<sup>133</sup>

The story is given significantly more specificity when referencing the FFP's Fragile States Index, which annually scores nearly all UN member states on a scale of 0-120 based on 12 different 10-point indicators describing a state's stability in various categories.<sup>134</sup> Of importance to Tilly's state making

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<sup>131</sup> World Bank, "GDP per Capita (Current US\$) - Turkey," DataBank, 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2020&locations=TR&start=1960&view=chart>.

<sup>132</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "Turkey: Human Development Reports," Human Development Indicators, 2022, <https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR>.

<sup>133</sup> The indicators are separated into thirteen distinct categories which are as follows: health, education, income/composition of resources, inequality, gender, poverty, work/employment and vulnerability, human security, trade and financial flows, mobility and communication, environmental sustainability, demography, and socio-economic sustainability.

<sup>134</sup> The Fund For Peace, "Fragile States Index and CAST Framework Methodology," Fragile States Index, 2022, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/2017/05/13/fragile-states-index-and-cast-framework-methodology/>. These indicators are as follows: (1) "Security Apparatus," (2) "Fractionalized Elites," (3) "Group Grievance," (4) "Economy," (5) "Economic Inequality," (6) "Human Flight and Brain Drain," (7) "State Legitimacy," (8) "Public Services," (9)

activity is the FFP's three "Political Indicators," which include measures of "state legitimacy," "public services," and "human rights and rule of law." Among these indicators, states considered 'more fragile' score closer to ten in each category, with a total score of 120 indicating the most fragile of states worldwide. In its most recent 2021 report, Turkey scored a 7.30/10 in state legitimacy, 5.40/10 in public services, and 8.00/10 in human rights for a combined average of 6.64/10 in this category.

Notably, following 2013's institution shattering coup attempt, public services saw a marginal decrease in quality from its 2012 high point of 6.00, while state legitimacy saw an even greater decrease from its 2012 high point of 6.20. This decrease in state legitimacy provides a clear look at Turkey's failure at state-making and protection. Perhaps most interestingly, in light of the apparent abuses facilitated by the Erdogan regime post-2013, human rights saw an increase from its 2011 historical low of 5.20 to a 2021 score of 8.00, indicating a tremendous decrease in institutionally granted and realized rights nationwide.<sup>135</sup> All told, these indicators describe a realization of state legitimacy and rights that is highly in flux for the Turkish people. Although it is a cumulative measure of a state's fragility amidst all 12 factors, it is relevant to point to Turkey's significant increase in their 2021 composite score of 79.70 (85<sup>th</sup> most fragile worldwide) versus their 2012 composite of 76.60 (57<sup>th</sup> most fragile worldwide) provided that most of their losses occurred in the institutional development aspects.<sup>136</sup>

This finding sees tremendous support in Freedom House's 2022 Freedom in the World score.<sup>137</sup> This measure, which views liberal democracy as the supreme form of government, evaluates states annually and assesses a score out of 100 using two categorial metrics: political rights (0-40) and civil liberties (0-60). Each category contains numerous questions, with possible scores from 0-4 in each, that detail the lived experiences of citizens living in a state concerning various aspects of an ideal liberal democracy. Upon

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"Human Rights," (10) "Demographic Pressures," (11) "Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons," and (12) "External Intervention."

<sup>135</sup> The Fund For Peace, "Turkey: Country Dashboard," Fragile States Index, 2022, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Research Methodology."

calculating such a composite measure, Freedom House then further specifies states as “Free,” “Partially Free,” or “Not Free,” given such indicators. To many researchers, this scale provides a useful evaluation of the genuine application of democracy in a state alongside a measure of institutional development.

In this respect, Turkey solidly finds itself in the “not free” classification of states worldwide, scoring a cumulative 32/100 given its measly 16/40 and 16/60 in political rights and civil liberties, respectively.<sup>138</sup> Per Freedom House’s designation, Turkey is severely lacking in numerous aspects of its state making activity, with the most glaring issues arising from its corrupt and authoritarian electoral processes devoid of meaningful checks and balances, a complete absence of governmental transparency, and widespread curtailment of civil rights involving free expression, assembly, and redress of grievances. Furthermore, Freedom House notes that rule of law in modern Turkey is little more than an instrument of the executive’s will, with virtually no appearances of independent, apolitical courts, no meaningful guarantees of due process, and no protection from the illegitimate use of force on behalf of the government.

Of course, both the FFP’s Fragile States Index as well as Freedom House’s Freedom in the World scores tell a story of Turkish state making institutions that are under threat. Bearing such scores in mind, it is evident throughout numerous modern occurrences that their conclusions find irrefutable support detailing the ever-lessening degree of legitimacy granted to the Turkish state apparatus. In June of 2021, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), via its control over the nation’s Constitutional Court, effectively shut down the state’s second-largest opposition party, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP).<sup>139</sup> This process, which was orchestrated to eliminate urban opposition to Erdogan’s administration, has strengthened the AKP’s urban support system extensively by universally excluding voices from the political process. In a similar chain of illiberal events, the prominent Turkish political prisoner Osman Kavala has been continually denied due process rights in light of his alleged participation in a government coup attempt. Despite his acquittal in 2020, he has continued to remain in Turkish custody, largely due to the antithetical

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<sup>138</sup> Freedom House, “Turkey: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2022, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2022>.

<sup>139</sup> Freedom House.

nature of his message to Erdogan's own. While just one case, Kavala's circumstances have served as a symbolic flashpoint for Turkish liberalization advocates nationwide in their efforts to expose the absence of due process within their nation.<sup>140</sup>

Similarly, numerous instances of political corruption and illiberal behavior have defined the AKP's political rule following the 2016 coup attempt. In response to such events, Erdogan's party facilitated the introduction of a 2017 constitutional referendum in support of a new presidential system in Turkey. The process, which would have signaled a dramatic shift away from the governing status quo in virtually any other legitimate democracy worldwide, effectively eliminated the role of the prime minister within domestic politics. As a result, the president became the chief national authority, thus increasing the office's political capital and power immensely. Flowing from this, the now-empowered Erdogan administration took the unprecedented step to hold a presidential election in June 2018, though it was initially slated for November 2019, citing a state of emergency that continued to grasp the country following the 2016 coup attempt. Turkish experts have noted that such a movement of the election date was altogether strategic, as the move allowed Erdogan to circumvent the imposition of term limits in the 2018 referendum and serve a third term lasting until 2028 should he continue to see popular support.<sup>141</sup> Further, Freedom House reported: "The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) strongly criticized the [2019] election, reporting that electoral regulators often deferred to the ruling AKP, and that state-run media favored the party in its coverage. The OSCE also noted that Erdoğan repeatedly accused his opponents of supporting terrorism during the campaign."<sup>142</sup> All told, such a minor glimpse into the political life of Turkey indicates the tight grip that the AKP possesses within the political system alongside their more corrupt and illiberal means of engaging in the process.

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<sup>140</sup> Freedom House.

<sup>141</sup> Selim Erdem Aytaç, "Effectiveness of Incumbent's Strategic Communication During Economic Crisis Under Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from Turkey," *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 4 (November 2021): 1517–23, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000587>.

<sup>142</sup> Freedom House, "Turkey."

Bearing this in mind, it seems that presently Turkey is failing, at least to a degree, in state making. Though its HDI demonstrates that it at least possesses the basic developmental means to facilitate institution strengthening, pervasive corruption and authoritarian tendencies have made such a capability a moot point. Given that the FFP's indicators rarely change by such remarkable degrees, the present circumstances considering Erdogan's anti-democratic tendencies have created an altogether more fragile Turkish state. Freedom House's indicators further support this exposition.

### *Protection*

This claims that state makers must be able to ensure safety and order for their population. This presupposes a state's capability to maintain some sort of stable economy, rule of law, and functional peace-keeping measures. Provided that it is directly tied to the discussion in the state making analysis above, many of the assertions there bear no need for repeating.

That aside, the historical contextualization seems to cast doubt on Turkey's ability to succeed at protection. The most notable example of this appears when considering the Turkish state's conflict with the PKK. Provided the widespread loss of life and ongoing nature of such violence to the present day, it is evident at least from a surface view that the state has struggled to protect its citizens from violence. The same can be said of its historical failure to avoid eruptions of political violence like that which occurred from 1971-75.

Indeed, I would also offer that the very status of the military as a 'guardian of the republic' also casts doubt on the state's ability to meaningfully protect its citizens from abuse and harm. Given the exceedingly common occurrence of attempted or successful coup d'états, it is evident from the onset that Turkey has struggled to place genuine limitations on its armed entities. This lack of central oversight, paired with a military apparatus that often acts on political ambitions, and a court system devoid of significant guarantees of due process, altogether combine to create a condition of frequent turmoil in domestic affairs.

The FFP's Fragile States Index supports this assertion in the modern-day. Its measure of protection is incredibly telling via its "Security Apparatus" measure. The FFP described this indicator when they wrote:

[Security Apparatus] considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition.<sup>143</sup>

Bearing this in mind, there is perhaps no better explication of Tilly's state activity. In this respect, Turkey saw its fragility increase sharply from 2006 (6.4/10) to 2017 (8.3), with its present 2021 value sitting at 7.2 (57<sup>th</sup> most fragile worldwide).<sup>144</sup> These exceedingly high values seem to indicate that the Turkish government is failing at protection to an extensive degree, a claim that is similarly backed by the various instances of armed civil unrest that seem to cyclically engulf the country.

Turkey's failure at protection is supported by the historical contextualization provided in this chapter, though it also sees extensive support in the unequal administration of justice through the state. As noted in the *State Making* section above, Turkey's central government grants no genuine guarantee of due process to its citizens. Accordingly, Amnesty International reports that Turkey's armed forces and protective units regularly use torture on political prisoners, with Kurds and leftists receiving the vast majority of such treatment.<sup>145</sup> Within the Turkish judicial process, reports of torture or abuse while in custody are not consistently and systematically investigated, ultimately leaving police forces with a blank check to facilitate cruelties on its citizens if they fall in line with the political orthodoxy.<sup>146</sup> Likewise, Turks must tread lightly when exercising their civil liberties in opposition to the government. In 2021, the Turkish government publicly noted that it uses its protection capabilities to actively monitor the social media

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<sup>143</sup> The Fund for Peace, "C1: Security Apparatus | Fragile States Index," 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/c1/>.

<sup>144</sup> The Fund For Peace, "Turkey: Country Dashboard."

<sup>145</sup> Amnesty International, "Turkey Archives."

<sup>146</sup> Amnesty International.

accounts of over 45 million of its citizens.<sup>147</sup> All told, it is apparent that the Turks struggle to maintain protective legitimacy given its frequent application of unnecessary or cruel state-sponsored force.

### ***Extraction***

Perhaps the most important of the four activities, extraction is concerned with how well a state can gather resources from its population to facilitate the execution of the other three activities. In light of this, it seems that Turkey has experienced extensive hardships in this respect as of late.

With a 2020 (*log*) *GDP/capita* of \$8,536.43, Turkey is well below the world average of \$10,918.70, though solidly above the Middle Eastern and Arab World averages of \$6,534.40 and \$5,612.70, respectively.<sup>148</sup> All told, this measure of annual economic output per person is perhaps most telling when compared with its all-time high in 2012 of \$12,614.78 just before the attempted coup in 2013. The years following Erdogan's election to the Presidency in 2014 have shown a continuous downward trend of per-person economic output, perhaps indicating some degree of qualitative correlation between weakening faith in the government, deteriorating institutions, and financial conditions. Considering this, the story told throughout the "state making" section of this analysis is given even more justification.

Building on this, the FFP's Fragile State Index includes two relevant economic indicators which effectively garner a unique look at how well a state is managing its extractive activity. The first of these indicators, "economic inequality," has significantly improved from the project's start in 2006 when Turkey scored an 8.6/10, to 2021 when it scored a 4.7/10. This marked improvement is likely a result of Erdogan's populist tendencies and largely low-middle class support base, as he has made strides towards economic wealth redistribution throughout his tenure in office. Turkey's most stable point in its "economy" indicator, a cumulative look at how fragile the economy is in a given year, occurred in 2006 (4.10/10), with 2021

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<sup>147</sup> Freedom House, "Turkey."

<sup>148</sup> World Bank, "GDP per Capita (Current US\$) - Turkey."



seeing a notable increase to 5.30. In this respect, Turkey has experienced slight increases in its economic fragility, though the story of this is perhaps best captured by other indicators.

Ultimately, the true test of Turkey's extractive capabilities arises from an evaluation of relative political capacity (RPC). Per the Transresearch Consortium's (TRC) RPC dataset, they utilize a metric called "RPC" or "Relative Political Extraction" to describe the basic extractive political capacity of a state's government apparatus compared to expected tax revenue. They describe their RPE metric as follows:

RPE approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals... To calculate RPE, we establish a baseline economic model and assume that the unexplained variance between the predicted values and tax effort is due to the political capacity of the subnational unit relative to others.<sup>149</sup>

Per this metric, Turkey succeeded most in its extractive activities in 2016, when it had an RPE of 0.693. This means that its ratios of general government tax revenues/GDP, total mining revenues/GDP, agricultural revenues/GDP, the value of exported goods and services/GDP, and GDP per capita were at their cumulative historical high points at this time. Compared to the dataset's all-time RPE high point of 2018 France (0.899), it is clear that there is a significant gap between Turkey's extractive capabilities and the most highly developed members of the western world.

Notably, Turkey's RPE low points all seem to coincide with significant social strife in the state. In 1962, just two years after the state's first military coup, Turkey's lowest ever RPE value was estimated at 0.203. In 1970, just one year before the 1971 military coup, Turkey's RPC saw its second-lowest RPE value of 0.212. In the aftermath of the carnage of the 1980 coup, 1983 saw a similarly low RPE of just 0.233. In the years leading up to and immediately following each of these events, it is relevant to note that RPE saw marked decreases in virtually every instance of civil strife, indicating an apparent connection between state making, protection, and extraction within Tilly's framework in Turkey. Interestingly, in 2012 (0.680) and 2013 (0.662), RPC did not experience the same drastic falloff as was experienced in other instances of civil unrest, though the movement between years can likely be attributed to the events of 2013.<sup>150</sup> Most recently,

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<sup>149</sup> Fisunoglu et al., "Relative Political Capacity Dataset 2.4 Codebook.Pdf," 11.

<sup>150</sup> See arpc\_2020 dataset.

Turkey reported an RPE of 0.641 in 2018, perhaps indicating that the effects of democratic backsliding are being felt nationwide amidst economic hardships.

All told, it seems that Turkey's extractive capabilities, at least functionally speaking, are directly influenced by the other three essential activities. Historically speaking, as institutions deteriorated, so too did the nation's ability to fund its monopolization of force in other areas. All told, Turkey seems to be presently struggling to maintain a stable economy amidst a precarious, fragile political background.

## Chapter 4

### Project Limitations & Relevant Conclusions

In a 2004 speech at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then prime minister of Turkey, when asked about the developmental path towards democracy in his state, soundly remarked: "Even as we ought to accept that each country would progress with a different method and speed toward that goal, the standard for the expected end-state should not be lowered."<sup>151</sup> Such a statement, amidst a Western audience largely in support of democratization and aware of his illiberal past, appeared dubious at best to the largely unconvinced crowd. One can only assume that given the critical response of participants in that meeting, at least one member was aware of a similarly telling quote that arose in the earlier half of Erdogan's political career. In the mid-1990s as the mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan was notoriously quoted as saying: "Democracy is like a tram. You ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off."<sup>152</sup>

At this point in history, it seems that Erdogan and his Turkish state have reached their metaphorical 'destination' of sorts along their century-long state development story. Of course, such a metaphor begs the pressing and ever-important question of Turks facing such an upheaval of their political system: upon reaching the 'end-point' for democracy, what ought to serve as the replacement? To Erdogan and his base of support amongst older, rural, conservative Turks, the answer appears to be some form of authoritarianism. Marked by illiberal processes of state censorship, an unequal administration of justice that often runs along political lines, extensive military power maximization, and rhetoric espousing the outright demonization of political opponents and cultural pariahs, Erdogan's administration strikes me as a textbook example of a modern-day autocrat amidst fledgling democratic institutions.

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<sup>151</sup> Alvin Powell, "Erdogan Calls for Cooperation," *Harvard Gazette* (blog), February 5, 2004, <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2004/02/erdogan-calls-for-cooperation/>.

<sup>152</sup> Prof Jenny White, "Democracy Is Like a Tram," Turkey Institute, July 14, 2016, <https://www.turkeyinstitute.org.uk/commentary/democracy-like-tram/>.

In this respect, I see the tremendous influence of the historical context provided in Chapter 3 bleeding into the modern application of the Turkish state. Given its Ottoman foundations, one can readily identify the parallels between Erdogan's Turkey and the military empire of old. As religion takes on a re-surgant mainstream acceptance in Erdogan's populist policies and legislation, one can readily identify a yearning population of frustrated Turks that hope for a return to the 'good old days' of Turkish politics. Such a sentiment is further bolstered by his Ottoman-esque, politically realist strategy of power magnification via military might. To some extent, it seems that Erdogan envisions himself as a modern-day sultan.

While this process is not sure to end poorly for the Turks, it undoubtedly spells the end of an era of Turkish political idealism rooted in democratic, Western values. In its return to an autocratic, authoritarian system of governance, one can rightly question whether the struggles for political representation that have so plagued Turkish history have produced any meaningful results in the modern-day. Whether or not this is the case is not for this project to determine. That said, it stands repeating that the easily modifiable framework and foundations upon which all Turkish politics occurs are undoubtedly fragile. Such a fundamental fragility, when presented alongside the tenuous civilian-military relationship that persists to date, exposes a picture of a state that has numerous barriers to overcome should it hope to find lasting stability. Of course, this does not mean that their institutions are non-existent, nor does it indicate that such processes cannot be profoundly improved for the better in time. Despite this, if history is any indication of where the state is heading, it appears that the Turks are in for several difficult decades.

As Chapter 3 has surely indicated, generating a collective picture of the developmental story of any state, especially one as complex and tempestuous as Turkey, is an enormous task. As the historical analysis indicates, the Turks have had no shortage of political upheaval throughout its development. Such processes, from the Ottomans onward, are often marked by drastic modifications to the political system and widespread domestic strife. Ultimately, it seems that while the Turks have succeeded in building a state possessing geopolitical significance and economic strength, they have failed miserably in the process of

building institutions to support such ambitions. From their court systems devoid of political independence to their military that is empowered with an uncheckable, illiberal veto on the system at large, Turkey has altogether failed at protection and state making to an extensive degree.

That said, the story is altogether complicated when considering the other two of Tilly's activities, war making and extraction. For the former, it seems that Turkey has ultimately succeeded in its war-making capacities. Its continued inclusion in NATO serves as the clearest indication of such a success. Further, the very fact that Turkey has been able to altogether avoid foreign conflict despite its apparent military might validates this claim. As the adage goes, often the best offense is a good defense. It seems that Turkey's war making ability has created a form of regional deterrence that has ultimately aided its developmental and global aims rather significantly. In terms of extraction, the Turks have experienced varying successes throughout their history. Despite this, more so than any other activity, the success of extraction is wholly contingent upon their ability to maintain governmental legitimacy and some semblance of public order. As indicated, Turkey has and continues to struggle with such a task. Further, the downward trend of RPC/RPE that has occurred as of late signals trying times financially for the Turkish Republic. The impact of this amidst struggling institutions and illiberal executive behavior could realistically prompt social unrest and upheaval unlike any other in Turkish history.

One could ultimately beg the question at this point of whether Turkey failed in the process of state-making, to which only time and future political restructurings could offer a sufficient answer. In my personal view, it seems that the Turkish experiment retains notable shortcomings and significant barriers it must overcome if it is to achieve its full potential on the global stage. It is increasingly rare worldwide for a state to be as homogeneously composed as Turkey. Despite such a boon, the state in no way seems to have capitalized on such a demographic and religious consistency for the better. Rather than utilize their similarities to bridge gaps and find common ground via the political process, Turks seem to repeatedly fall victim to their weak system.

The number of things that this thesis does not do still vastly outnumber the things it does provide to the research community. At most, this analysis shows that the Turkish state is remarkably distinct in its execution of Tilly's essential activities. Despite this, this project neither proves whether such an imposition of these activities on any state is correct nor does it indicate whether war *actually* makes states. While I am still on the fence as to whether or not this is correct, this analysis provides some degree of credence to Sørensen's 2001 critique of Tilly's methods. In the case of Turkey, it seems that war *has not* made the Turkish state, though it did contribute in large part to its initial genesis and formation as a world military power.

I will be the first to readily acknowledge the massive over-simplifications of politics, history, culture, economics, and general life as a Turk that this project falls victim to. To some extent, this is unavoidable given the length of such work and the resources that I have at my disposal. That said, I am confident that should such an analysis be conducted again, similarly intelligent and rational individuals may arrive at a conclusion on Turkey's state development that is wildly different from my own.

All told, while Tilly's framework possesses notable holes and shortcomings in its descriptive power, it similarly provides a compelling means to organize a quasi-comprehensive evaluation of a state's development from start to finish. This thesis is unfortunately not of sufficient depth to make a judgment as to the validity of Tilly's overall claim. Despite this, such a framework is undoubtedly useful, at the very least, for providing a means of considering what states in their amorphous iterations *actually need to do* to succeed. In this respect, it is my sincere hope that Turkey can both learn from its history and take a clear, unbiased look at itself in the next few years. Without such a process, I fear that the future is assuredly bleak for Turks.

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## EDUCATION

**The Pennsylvania State University, Schreyer Honors College**  
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Political Science (Honors); B.A. in Philosophy  
Minor: History; Certificate: Leadership & Ethics

**May 2022**  
University Park, PA

*Awards:* Fulbright U.K. Program Finalist, President's Freshman Award, Dotterer Award Recipient

## SIGNIFICANT EXTRACURRICULAR EXPERIENCE

### University Park Undergraduate Association (UPUA)

**January 2019 – Present**

*Chair of the Academic Affairs Committee (since May 2021)*

*University Park, PA*

- Advocate on behalf of over 46,000 undergraduates as the primary student liaison between the university administration, faculty, and staff on all matters of academic policy
- Represent nearly 2,000 Schreyer Honors College students in Penn State's undergraduate student government
- Maintain a student-focused voice as the lead Student Senator within the University Faculty Senate and Administrative Council on Undergraduate Education (ACUE)
- Managed a budget of \$10,000 to provide free test preparation materials to student organizations

### UPUA Student & Organization Rights Advocates (SORA)

*Executive Director (since May 2020), Rights Advisor (since January 2019)*

- Advise students and organizations accused of conduct code violations through investigations, conduct board hearings, sanction reviews, and appeals
- Promote student's due process rights, transparent conduct proceedings, and administrative accountability
- Collaborate with students, administrators, and university entities including Title IX, Residence Life, Student Legal Services, UPUA, and Greek Life to expand the accessibility and impact of the organization
- Facilitated an eightfold increase in student conduct cases assisted over one academic year

### Presidential Leadership Academy at Penn State

**April 2019 – Present**

*Selected Member*

*University Park, PA*

- Collaborate with a cohort of 30 diverse leaders from various disciplines during weekly sessions on critical thinking and creative problem solving led by the Schreyer Honors College Dean and University President
- Gain perspective on socio-political issues and decisions by interacting with local leaders on two annual trips
- Headed a team consisting of Academy members and Schreyer Honors College administrators to implement a general education course offering that will provide students with practical cooking instruction and credit hours

## RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE

### Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE)

**June 2021 – August 2021**

*Summer Intern*

*Philadelphia, PA*

- Researched speech codes, campus policies related to due process and student conduct, state and Federal statutes, and Supreme Court opinions to assist in FIRE's on-campus advocacy and litigation efforts
- Organized a three-day summer conference with over 120 attendees from universities nationwide to inform and educate students on FIRE's mission and work
- Provided exceptional insight and research into peer conduct advising organizations at American universities, enabling the rapid expansion of FIRE's Student Defenders program curriculum and resources

### Campaign of Nick Pisciotano for PA-38

**May 2020 – August 2020**

*Campaign Staffer & Public Policy Researcher*

*West Mifflin, PA*

- Played an integral role in aiding with constituent contact, issue identification, and fundraising efforts to assist in Nick Pisciotano's 2020 candidacy for the 38<sup>th</sup> Representative District of Pennsylvania
- Undertook several long-term public policy research projects, including a major analysis into the proposed Mon-Fayette Expressway which includes a consideration of the socio-economic implications for the community

### Ballotpedia

**August 2019 – October 2019**

*Editorial Intern*

*Worked Remotely from State College, PA*

- Gained extensive experience in non-partisan political writing for broad audiences in an unsupervised, results-focused workplace
- Researched various Federal, state, and local political systems, candidates, statutes, and pertinent public opinion polls to author and edit numerous articles on Ballotpedia's site
- Trained in methods of fact-checking, bias avoidance, use of an employer-specific modification of the AP Stylebook, database use, and format-based online coding using basic HyperText Markup Language (HTML)

### Friday & Cox LLC

**May 2019 – August 2019**

*Legal Intern & Research Assistant*

*Mount Lebanon, PA*

- Prepared a variety of legal drafts by assembling and organizing information including complaints, declarations, demands, discovery requests, responses, deposition summaries, and other pleadings
- Acquired experience in legal research from the plaintiff perspective through studying statutes, constitutions, regulations, court opinions, and including precedents and reasonings