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Why Does the United States Continue to Engage in Endless Wars?

DAVID NGUYEN
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Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Roseanne McManus
Associate Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Gretchen Casper
Associate Professor of Political Science
Honors Adviser

* Electronic approvals are on file.

ABSTRACT

The United States have been directly involved in two prolonged wars in the past century where it ultimately withdrew its troops and the sides which it supported were swiftly defeated. In released documents of these two wars, the Vietnam War and the Afghanistan War, it has been revealed that the United States had prior knowledge that defeat was assured long before they withdrew. This begs the question: why would the United States bear this burden of remaining in these prolonged wars where it has little hope of victory? This paper will be analyzing the effectiveness of Congress in ending such wars and the influence that reputation may have upon the United States remaining in prolonged wars. It will explore the power of the Executive in order to prolong involvement in such wars and potential incentives to do so.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The United States has been involved in numerous wars, but two wars stand out as the longest in American history: the Vietnam and Afghanistan Wars. Each war lasted for nearly two decades, at a cost of thousands of military and civilian casualties trillions of dollars, and yet ended in defeat for the United States. According to the Watson Institute, since the beginning of the Afghanistan war in 2001, about 241,000 people have been killed in the Afghanistan and Pakistan war zone, with more than 71,000 of those casualties being civilians (Brown, 2021). The Afghan war was not only costly for the Afghans, but also for the United States, with over 7,000 U.S. troop casualties and 8,000 contractor casualties. This war has also had devastating impacts on the United States society, with four times as many United States service members dying by suicide than in combat during the entire occupation of Afghanistan. The Vietnam War cost the equivalent of \$1 trillion by the modern day dollar value and inflicted the of killing 58,220 American soldiers and wounding 153,303 more (Amadeo, 2022). The Northern Vietnamese lost 1.1 million soldiers and the South lost 250,000. Vietnam lost a total of 2 million civilians. The effects of this war are still being felt today. Compensatory benefits for Vietnam veterans and families still cost the United States \$22 billion a year.

These wars pose a puzzle, not only because of their cost and duration, but because in the cases of both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States government received prior information from its intelligence personnel that it was losing the wars. Yet it elected to maintain its presence in the territories of Vietnam and Afghanistan for years to come, before predictably withdrawing, failing to accomplish its goals and watching everything it accomplished quickly unravel after withdrawal. Moreover, the United States seemingly did not learn its lesson in Vietnam because it repeated the same pattern in Afghanistan only a few decades later. To many people, this is appears to be an irrational course of action

I aim to research the rationale for why the United States elects to remain in extended wars where it ultimately is defeated. It is not only important to research this topic to understand why the United States invested so many economic resources into these wars in which it ultimately failed to accomplish

its goals, but also to understand why the United States maintained its presence despite the astounding number of foreign civilian casualties, domestic troops and contractors. It is also important to research this topic to understand how the United States represents its people and their interests.

It was shown, especially in the case of Vietnam, that the United States maintained its presence in foreign territory for an extended period of time, despite the unpopularity of this policy amongst the people. During the Vietnam war, massive protests across the nation erupted in opposition to the war. Anti-war demonstrations marched on college campuses across the nation and protested many different targets, including the Pentagon, Presidents Nixon and Johnson, and the draft (WGBH, 1996). These protests started as early as 1965 yet the United States did not withdraw from Vietnam until 1975. These protests became more and more intense and prevalent, but instead of listening to the will of the people, the United States government held its stance on the war and retaliated on its own citizens. As early as 1967, police officers turned violent against anti-war protestors, and May of 1970 marked the instance in which the National Guard fired on Kent State University student protesters, killing four of them. Regardless, the American government still maintained its position on the war, ignoring the thousands of protests erupting across the nation and instead tried to get its side of the story out to universities through the support of pro-administration groups. However, these groups could never match the intensity or numbers of anti-war demonstrations and ultimately, legislation started denouncing these demonstrations outright. Therefore, this research is critical to understand the rationale of the United States to remain in these wars, going as far as to pass legislation to silence demonstrations of the people.

This question is also important to answer because the answer is generalizable. Vietnam was the first major war that the United States lost. The failure of Vietnam was an instance of international American embarrassment and one that was recently repeated in the war in Afghanistan. Therefore, this topic has already been shown to be generalizable as it can be applied to these other wars and potentially any attempted wars that the United States might wage in the future.

This research focuses specifically on the ability of Congress to end long wars. While there might be some reason to think that Congress has the incentive to end long wars, especially when there is evidence that the US cannot win, I argue that Congress in the United States does not have enough power to effectively check the President for purposes of ending unpopular wars. While the Executive is placed

in the position of individual scrutiny and faces the pressures of gambling for resurrection, Congress is also restrained in its ability to end wars due to the pressures of domestic politics and political power as well as the power of the Executive over foreign policy.

After reviewing the literature and laying out my theory, this thesis will test the support for my expectations in case studies of the Vietnam and Afghanistan war. I find in the cases of Afghanistan and Vietnam that Congress is indeed ineffective at stopping the President, and only under extensive pressures from Congress and the public and years of effort, as well as if the President is in agreement with Congress, can wars finally end. Thus, the independent influence of Congress is quite limited.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

What causes nations to engage in long extended wars? The longer a war transpires, the more resources are wasted on it, the more land and infrastructure, and the more lives are lost. A popular quote in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* states "there is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare." Rationalist literature has modeled war as a bargaining process and under a rationalist perspective, shows how each country's utility for continuing versus ending a war can change based on the costs of war and the probability and utility associated with winning or losing. Under such perspective, the changes in the costs of war may have an important impact and actions that cause the costs of war to increase or become more than a nation can sustain may lead nations to move more towards a negotiated settlement. However, this also leads to credence towards the opposition, where a reduction in costs may proceed to prolong the conflict. What is known under rationalist literature is that both nations must agree upon their relative probabilities of winning and the overall outcome to reach the ideal outcome and succession as a necessary condition to terminate the war.

Modern literature has also reasoned through models of war of how wars both begin and fail to terminate due to incomplete information. Fearon claims that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to war under the rationalist perspective (Fearon, 1995). Wagner (2000) uses a two-sided limited war model to show that states may fight to send or acquire information to the opposition in hopes of obtaining a more favorable bargain, and war ends when both sides reach their expectations and agree upon their relative power. However, it is important to acknowledge that although sides may have access to the same problem, their beliefs may diverge, leading to a continued inconsistency that may lead to the continuation of war. Rationalists believe that eventually this divergence in belief will eventually converge through the increase of knowledge via fighting, and once both sides learn enough through fighting, the fighting can stop. In terms of longer wars under the rationalist perspective, Smith and Stam (2004) predict that longer wars will make future disputes less likely to escalate to conflict and will shorten any future conflicts which do occur. However, the phenomenon of longer wars is still puzzling under such a perspective as the United

States has engaged in two long twenty-year wars in a century, losing support of the theory of longer wars making future disputes less likely.

William Arkin has come the closest to studying my research question, focusing his research on the modern-day perpetual war machine, which he claims is a deeply entrenched and invisible system that is dominant within the United States government and society (Atkins, 2021). Arkin spoke about how the fighting never ceases, despite continual declarations of success and the vast sums of resources that the United States pours into its wars. The author included how the media plays a very key and important role in the perpetuation of war and works actively to divert attention from the ending of wars. The author also argued how countries have become more dangerous and became victims of the United States's perpetual wars and how the United States adopted this culture. They develop a comprehensive definition of perpetual war and how it thrives using cases such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. He then identifies the practitioners who supported and protected the perpetual war machine, who built the system and who operated it so that it can continue to grow. The author concludes that civil society has become increasingly detached from all things military, creating an easier environment to continue the war, with the status quo discouraging change and a lack of ability to view bottom-line assessments of whether the continuation of the conflict is achieving its objectives. Arkin speaks about the effect that the media had on the continuance of perpetual wars as well as the importance of military corporations in advocating for those wars which tie into my independent variables of reputation and the growth of the military-industrial complex.

A continuation of this theory is proposed by Leoni Connah, who argues that the United States and its Western allies have misused narratives for a "Just War" to legitimize an external intervention in Afghanistan and compares this intervention and justification to its inevitable failure in nation-building (Connah, 2020). The article provides both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the United States' intervention in the case of Afghanistan which includes an analysis of the strategic objectives of the United States military as well as the necessity of intervention. The author begins by analyzing the perceived threat of future acts of terrorism following the events of 9/11/2001 on the American public, furthering the justification and pressure for the United States to enact retribution to be seen as a just

purpose. Then the support for the United States' ideological conquest and support to pursue the war. The author does a qualitative analysis surrounding President Bush and spiritual rhetoric surrounding the war such as the notion that President Bush was chosen from God and how the War on Terror became a religious duty in the eyes of the public. This is significant as it shows an explanation for why public opinion might be so high for war, especially in the initial religious excitement, despite the high cost of war. The study then shows how the War on Terror acted as a mechanism for jihadists to unite against American crusaders, furthering the narrative that this became a religious war for the United States. Thus the author argues that the purpose of the War on Terror was purely constructed as being in the best interest of the United States to reaffirm American identity. This correlates to the reputation of the United States amongst its citizens and lies a foundation for why the knowledge of losing a war may still allow a country to continue fighting in that war. The author overall found that continued military operations would generate further conflict and further resources for the United States and although have damaged the moral reputation of the United States, initially raised the patriotism and military appetite of the American people.

Other authors, such as JD Caverley, have studied why the United States has done so poorly in these wars and ponder the questions of why democracies, particularly the United States, pursue a poorly suited capital-firepower intensive military doctrine that is poorly-suited for combating insurgencies and over long periods of conflict (Caverley, 2010). Caverley begins their study by reviewing previous attempts to explain democratic counterinsurgency practices, including strength signalling strategies, before laying out a competing theory of the median voter and cost distribution of conflict. Specifically, the article focuses on the development of the United States' strategy in the Vietnam War during the Johnson administration. It also draws attention to the cases of the United States' involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as a comparison and a failure to inform subsequent conduct of counterinsurgency after defeat. The author argues that a wealthy democratic nation such as the United States will bear the costs of fighting an insurgency with firepower despite diminishing prospects of victory because this condition of moral hazard of being on the right side of war and fighting for "justice" makes supporting a capital-intensive military doctrine and small wars of choice rational policies for the median voter. They argue how some of these wars are not truly about defeating the enemy, but merely simply a vector for domestic

politics and domestic politician's own interests, ignoring the costs for their own political strategies. The author studies how to avoid conscription, where the median voter will demand that a larger amount of the military budget go toward the purchase of capital such as military equipment and technology and by doing so, continued military capitalization will reduce the likelihood of a future draft. The author concluded that public opinion is related to the cost of labour in war but is positively inclined towards spending capital, despite knowing or perceiving that the war would end in defeat. This conclusion explains why the United States would remain in a war long after decreasing the number of troops such as can be seen in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

Some authors speak about the strategic decisions that countries make during the course of war or about war itself. Hendrik Spruyt qualitatively examines the strategic decision that the United States and some other countries employ to build a reputation within a war or through military strength and pressure to use as a prevention tactic against rebellion from other countries and to warn other countries of the commitment and casualties that they will face if they were to wage war against the United States (Spruyt, 2005). This book has a section on the Vietnam war and why the United States delayed withdrawal for the amount of time that they did and how remaining in Vietnam could serve as a deterrent to Laos and Cambodia from an uprising. However, this dynamic can also be found and compared to several other countries occupied by a foreign force. The author argues that political fragmentation in the imperial center allows more opportunities for occupying groups to delay territorial withdrawal. The author tests his hypothesis with several case studies, including Dutch, France, Israel, Vietnam, and Portugal. Finally, the author concludes that fragmented politics provide more opportunities for hard-liners to veto concessions to nationalist and secessionist demands, making violent conflict more likely and withdrawal from a territory more difficult.

Other arguments as to why nations continue to engage in endless wars despite knowing their outcomes and incurring heavy costs point to domestic politics. Goemans (2000) argues that domestic politics can interfere with the ending of wars and regime leaders may face losing of power if they lose a war. This can lead to the adoption of a strategy of increasing their war aims despite predictions of loss in an attempt known as gambling for resurrection. Downs and Rocke (1994) extend further upon this theory, incorporating a model which points to evidence that the worse the conflict outcome and

asymmetry in information between the regime executive and voting public, the more the removal rate of executives who are unsuccessful at war are expected to be. They also cite data showing that leaders who initiate and lose a costly war stand an 80% chance of being replaced and the probability of replacement increases with the severity of defeat. This leads to decisions that extend war if a regime is losing, where if the executive makes peace in the case of loss, removal may be inevitable as the losses may already have passed the removal threshold and the alternative of escalation becomes more attractive as the greater variance of conflict holds out the better possibility of raising the threshold to stay in office until other methods cause the executive to lose office, leading the burden to fall upon the next executive. Downs and Roche raise the problem of limited liability within the executive. Limited liability plays the role of showing that the constituency will be determined to expel the executive from office for the poor performance of a loss and as such, an executive will then have little to risk in the way of further punishment by gambling for resurrection and may gain the right to stay in office if the gamble is successful. Croco (2011) lends credence to this theory and explores how culpability affects a leader's war termination calculus. Croco argues that not only do the actions a leader takes at the beginning of a war, either by initiating, supporting, or perpetuating it, will affect the leader's behaviour and the audience costs, who wish to make the leader responsible for the participation and the results of the war, but also that the pressure to win will pass onto replacement leaders. The pressure to deliver a promised outcome can extend beyond the initial hysteria, and once it does, that pressure can pass to subsequent leaders and those leaders will have strong incentives to avoid settling without a win. If subsequent leaders refuse to bear such a pressure, the domestic opposition will lead at the opportunity to target a leader who has led their nation to defeat.

Finally, Ikle also proposes a theory about long-running wars. Ikle recognizes the immense division within a government for having to make peace at the cost of major concessions, which can cause intense internal struggles. The costs that are endured thus far in the war must come due and that payment may come from domestic struggles. The political faction responsible for making those concessions will not only face ridicule from the population and a loss of power, but may even be charged with treason for backing down and betraying the sacrifices that have been made on the battlefield. Even those who do want peace, will have differing points of views on how to pursue peace. Ikle also touches upon the

difficulty of negotiating during war. There is the fear that an offer for negotiation would signal weakness to the enemy, the concern that soldiers and civilians would lessen their war efforts if they believe peace is near, or even the possibility of betrayal or appearing to betray their allies. In this, due to the stubbornness of executives to negotiate, this causes when negotiations do start to have an adverse reaction from their populous and soldiers once negotiations become unavoidable. This may cause a political downfall on the executive on the back of their military downfall, clearly being an unwelcome decision.

While there are a multitude of suspected reasons for why the United States continued their efforts of warfare in Vietnam and Afghanistan across the literature, three variables appeared the most often with significant rationales for each of them. These pieces of literature all come to a similar consensus that reputation is a significant factor in the United States' role of staying in Afghanistan and Vietnam. Specifically the reputation of the United States itself, the president, and the public opinion of the people. In sum, rationalist literature suggests that wars should end once the outcome is obvious (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000). Some authors have explore reasons why this might not be the case, including the military industrial complex and government rhetoric (Atkins 2021; Connah 2020; Caverley 2010), reputation (Spruyt 2005), leadership incentives that are different from the incentives of the population (Goemans 2000; Downs and Rocke 1994; Croco 2011), and government divisions (Ikle 2005). However, little research has considered the role of the legislature in prolonged wars. Can legislatures, such as the US Congress, restrain the ability of executives to fight prolonged wars?

Chapter 3

Theory

Discussed in the literature review were multiple different theories and models which may help in explaining why countries continue to fight prolonged wars even when they are losing; however, a theory that is missing from this literature is the effect of legislatures on how executives and governments terminate long wars. I will offer a theory about this, specifically on the ability of Congress to influence the termination of prolonged US wars. While other factors such as civil-military relations, the military-industrial complex, reputational concerns, and public opinion also matter, I argue that considering the role of Congress is important. While there are some reasons to think that Congress could have the ability to bring long wars to an end, I theorize about several reasons why this ability is not realized. In the view of the legislature's ability to terminate wars, there is the possibility that Congress has the incentive and ability to bring wars to an end. In the United States legislature, Congress has the authority to restrict the president in terms of budget and their war powers as granted in the Constitution and further legislation. This allows Congress powers to declare and conduct war and covers matters beyond the authorization of military and naval operations to support economic measures with impact on private citizens. With these powers, Congress may also hold a certain authority on the President, pressuring the executive to continue or terminate the war. In addition to these formal powers, Howell and Pevehouse (2007) find that Congress can restrain the president by influencing public opinion.

Congress also maintains a unique position where it can be more free from the dangers of gambling for resurrection. While scholars such as Croco (2011) and Downs and Rocke (1994) explore the dangers of gambling for resurrection by a central executive such as the president, the other members of government, especially the legislature, do not bear as large a burden for a promised outcome. As foreign policy and war is viewed as an executive issue, members of Congress are less in peril of individual scrutiny unlike the Presidential executive. In such issues, Congress is viewed as a whole, not the individual members, or in certain circumstances, as two parties, but rarely are individual members scrutinized in such foreign policies, especially in their individual votes. Thus, gambling for resurrection

falls upon the executive of the nation, but members of Congress in theory maintain the ability to impose pressure to end wars without the same negative electoral consequences.

While Congress may have the ability and, to some extent, incentive to restrain the President and terminate wars, other incentives may also come into play. According to Schultz (1998, 2001), Congress does have the ability to have a restraining effect on the president, however, there are internal factors as to their incentive for doing so. Schultz develops a model which defines democracy in terms of public competition for office involving a legitimate opposition party. This opposition has access to the same information available to the government and both are purely office and power seeking, creating a zero-sum competition for power between the government and opposition. This opposition party can influence the government in power's decisions in war and foreign policy. If the government wins the war and the country benefits, the government will earn more credit than the opposition will, even if the opposition supported the government in their policies. On the other hand, if active opposition to war can reduce the magnitude of the government's political gain from waging war, the opposition may have an incentive to oppose a war that it expects to be unpopular.

Similarly, Levy & Mabe (2004) suggest that due to the opposition knowing this potential gain, the opposition may employ methods that may prevent the government from garnering the gains that would follow from a successful war. In weak presidential systems such as the United States, there are greater opportunities for oppositions to reap success due to the lesser autonomy of the executive and dependence of voter preferences. Teo & Shea (2014) speak about the underestimation of the constraining effect that domestic opposition can have on a government. They speak about how oppositions possess political resources that can help deter the government from backing down after a threat has been challenged. The opposition has incentives for using the political power in war to exploit the stronger position of their executives and implement policies and institutional changes. Due to this, oppositions may constantly look for issues to help differentiate themselves from the current government and seek incentives to try to block decisions for wartime decisions of the current government, however beneficial. Ultimately, this research suggests that whether Congress restrains the president from pursuing long wars will depend on Congress members' own political incentives.

I argue that in the US political context, members of Congress from the president's own party will have the incentive to support his wartime ventures in order to retain party political power and appear strong to voters. In these cases, in order to retain power, Congress will actually have the political motivation to continue these long wars until they become the parties that "wins" those wars. If they become known as the party that lost the war, then they will risk losing power in upcoming elections. Even in such cases where the opposition party controls Congress in comparison to the President, there can be the incentive to not look weak on security and additionally, to use the war to their own domestic political advantage. If the opposition party chooses to end a war which the public believes that they are winning, they will be shooting themselves in their political votes. However, if they are losing the war, the opposition party can call out the Executive branch and party and consistently remind the public of their consistent failures in the war. They can consistently repeat this process until another election comes up and can use it to gain even more domestic political power.

However, even in cases where Congress seeks to end a prolonged war, I argue that they will not have a meaningful ability to do so. Due to the President's extraordinary power in foreign policy, Congress does not serve as a significant check on the Executive branch to end long wars. I argue that the Executive Branch will use Constitutional and Legislative loopholes and the impact of domestic politics to manipulate policy to their advantage to preserve long wars. The Executive will keep Congress in the dark for foreign policies to best twist Congress to their advantage. They will use the fact that Congress is slow in legislation and debate to further their initiative quicker than Congress can react to. The impact of domestic politics will enforce the President's incentives and it will be used to steer Congressional members of the President's party to support their endeavours, when if they may not agree. Coupled with the use of the Executive Branch's power on foreign policy, Congress does not have significant power to meaningfully affect long wars. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *Congressional activity will not significantly influence the duration of wars.*

Hypothesis 2: *Congress members from the president's own party will be less likely to oppose the continuation of war.*

Hypothesis 3: *When Congress attempts to bring war to an end, its efforts will fail because the Executive Branch will exploit legal loopholes in its favour.*

Research Design

I will test my hypotheses in case studies of the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars because these are the two longest wars that the United States has fought. The United States' wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam share a lot of similarities. In both instances, the United States became involved in these regions to dispel left-wing powers and ideologies. Eventually, the United States became involved militarily in both of these regions for over nineteen years and across multiple presidencies. Both of these wars eventually sparked strong criticisms for the United States' continuous involvement within them and were said to overstay within these wars. Both of these wars were predicted to end unfavourably for the United States, made even more apparent within the Pentagon and Afghanistan papers, yet the United States continued its efforts within these regions. The cost in terms of economic and material wealth in addition to the hundreds of thousands of military, contractor, and civilian casualties also shows that the cost of remaining in these wars is high. Therefore, it is necessary to explore why Congress was not able to bring an end to these wars sooner.

My main dependent variable is the length of time that the United States remained in these wars, as well as the resources that it spent on these wars such as troops, money, and technology. This is the main outcome that I seek to explain for purposes of testing Hypothesis 1. However, a secondary dependent variable is the reaction of the Executive Branch to Congressional actions. Examining this will enable me to more clearly determine the relationship between Congressional activity and war duration and test Hypothesis 3.

My main independent variable for testing Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 is the level of support among Congressional representatives for the continuation of war. I chose this independent variable because the decisions of these representatives impact bills that continue the United States' efforts in the specified wars. The representative support would also affect the president and potentially impact his

decisions to end a war. They can also have an effect upon the public and how they view the continuation of war within the regions.

To measure support for the war in Congress, I will be looking for instances in which Congress has put forth legislation to end or support prolonged wars or calling for the end of wars. When this legislation comes to light, I will be looking for the effectiveness of such legislation and debates and how the president reacted to it. That effectiveness will primarily be measured based on whether it affected the Executive Branch's power on waging war or was the Executive Branch was able to ignore or get pass the legislation. In addition to legislation, I also track meetings between the Executive and Congress focused on the war, speeches made, and testimonies between the Executive to their advisors speaking about their concerns of Congress.

Additionally, the party in control of Congress should affect the Congressional activities. I expect the Executive Branch and Congress to work with each other if they are of the same party, meaning that they will both continue to support the increasing duration of war. However, if they are of different parties, they are expected to clash, resulting in more Congressional opposition to the war. Therefore, for purposes of testing Hypothesis 2, support for the war in Congress (described above) also functions as a dependent variable, and the independent variable predicting this is which party controls Congress.

Chapter 4

Vietnam Background

During the Second World War, Japanese forces invaded and occupied Vietnam. In opposition to the Japanese and French occupation, communist political figure Ho Chi Minh, inspired by Chinese and Soviet communist ideology, formed the Viet Minh to fight for Vietnam's independence. After Japan's defeat in 1945, Japan withdrew their forces from Vietnam. Sensing a power vacuum, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh took over the northern Vietnamese city of Hanoi. They declared the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam modelled under a communist ideology. In response, French-backed Emperor Bao set up the state of Vietnam in July 1949 with the city of Saigon as its capital, modelled after the economic and cultural aspects of the West.

U.S. involvement in Vietnam began many years later, in 1954. With the Cold War in full effect, the United States maintained a hard-line of any communist sympathizers and by 1955, President Eisenhower pledged his firm support to new Southern anti-communist Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem. The United States then began pouring military equipment and CIA training into Diem's forces to engage against the Viet Cong.

In 1961, President Kennedy sent a team to report on conditions in South Vietnam. They advised for there to be a build-up of American military, economic, and technical aid to South Vietnam. Following the "domino theory", Kennedy increased U.S. aid to just short of a large-scale military intervention, reaching over 9,000 troops (HISTORY, 2009)

After a military coup killed Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu in 1963, the ensuing instability in South Vietnam persuaded President Johnson to further increase U.S. military and economic support. In another act of furthering U.S. military support in Vietnam, in August of 1964, after Viet Cong torpedo boats allegedly attacked two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson ordered the retaliatory bombing of military targets in Northern Vietnam. Congress then passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave President Johnson vast war-making powers who then implemented regular bombing raids. By June of 1965, there were 82,000 combat troops stationed and approaching 500,000 by the end of 1967 (HISTORY, 2009).

By the end of 1967, U.S. casualties has exceeded 15,000 killed and 109,000 killed, with soldiers mistrusting their reasons for being there and claims that the war was being won (HISTORY, 2009). A robust anti-war movement emerged in the coming years, with massive protests and over half a million military personnel deserting over the course of 1966 to 1973. Public opinion started majorly shifting after the Democratic Republic of Vietnam launched the Tet Offensive, a coordinated series of attacks on over 100 South Vietnamese territories, stunning the American public.

After the Tet Offensive, and even more carnage being revealed to the public, such as the My Lai Massacre, where U.S. soldiers slaughtered over 400 unarmed civilians, more and more anti-war protests continue to build (HISTORY, 2009). The protests grew to an even further degree after a leak from the Department of Defense of U.S. political and military involvement in Vietnam was published in the New York Times in 1971, known as the Pentagon Papers. These papers revealed that the U.S. had secretly enlarged the scope of its actions in the Vietnam War without public disclosure, causing even more public outrage and eroding any remaining support for U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Eventually, in 1973, the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam and within two years, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam captured Saigon and prevailed over South Vietnam. The United States ended up spending more than \$120 billion in Vietnam and the United States public no longer viewed the nation as strong or invincible (HISTORY, 2009).

Table 1 summarizes Congressional activity on the Vietnam War. Initially, Congress was supportive of the war. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed with little debate in Congress and only 2 Senators dissenting. Other major bills supporting the war included slightly more controversies although many problems ranged among party lines. Despite this, these other bills similarly did not have too much debate. Overall, Table 1 shows that up through 1965, the vast majority of bills passed by Congress on the Vietnam War were supportive of the war. However, the tide began to turn after 1965. Table 1 shows that 100 percent of bills passed between 1966-1973 reflected opposition to the war. A major turning point was the Senate Fulbright Hearings. These hearings included testimonies that questioned and brought to light the realities of U.S. involvement in the war. Some of the most prominent anti-war bills included the Goodell Resolution, the Cook Amendment, Cooper-Church Amendment, Paris Peace Accords, War Powers Act, and the Clark Amendment.

Table 1: Summary of Congressional Bills Passed on Vietnam

Date	Amount of Bills passed on Vietnam	Pro-War or Negative
1954	1	Pro
1955	1	Pro
1956	1	Pro
1961	1	Pro
1962	2	Neg
1963	1	Pro
1964	3	Neg
1965	9	Pro (8 Pro, 1 Neg)
1966	4	Neg
1967	10	Neg
1968	5	Neg
1969	5	Neg
1970	2	Neg
1971	2	Neg
1972	2	Neg

1973	3	Neg
1974	1	Neg
1975	2	Neg

Note: Bills were identified using Congress Collection (n.d.), Gibbons (1995), and Olson (2014).

Chapter 5

Analysis of Vietnam

Vietnam proved to be a highly divisive issue amongst all administrations. This section will show how Congress attempted to influence and intimidate the Executive to end the Vietnam War and how the Executive reacted. It will show that although there were some pressures placed upon the Executive, the threat of domestic politics allowed the Executive to force Congress to continue supporting the war. It will show how even when Congress finally united against the war, the extraordinary power of the Executive allowed it to escape Congressional action until the ultimate end of the war nineteen years after the first involvement of the United States.

In the case of the Vietnam War, Congress did initially support the Executive in the involvement of the United States. In 1954, Eisenhower invited Legislative Leaders to comment on whether the US should use its military to rescue beleaguered French forces at Dien Bien Phu (Gibbons, 1995). Then in 1955, a Vietnam Lobby consisting of Joseph Kennedy and Francis Cardinal Spellman created the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) and helped to persuade the Eisenhower administration to support Diem in Spring. Later, U.S. Representative turned Senator Mansfield was among the first to criticize the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam publicly and sent cautionary memos to the Kennedy Administration in January of 1961 (Olsen, 2014). In 1962, Mansfield was one of the first to bring these cautions to the public, speaking at Michigan State University about the situation in South Vietnam. This caused ripples in the administration and led Kennedy to be challenged at a press conference about his Vietnam policy (Olsen, 2014). Kennedy was now put on damage control and was forced now to put additional pressure on Vietnam and to make noticeable process in Vietnam to justify his stay. As momentum gained, the South Vietnam Ambassador visited Mansfield's office and admitted that the Diem government was in trouble. Now it is seen that Congress is starting to oppose Kennedy.

While Republicans attacked Kennedy's foreign policy on Vietnam, Democrats struggled to hold onto the Presidency. The Democrats and GOP and Kennedy knew that the 1964 presidential race locked on being soft on communism and foreign policy (Johns, 40). As such, the incentive was for the Democrats to hold onto Kennedy and his foreign policies. They could not afford to be fragmented when

control of the Presidency is so tenuous. Vietnam was the most divisive issue in the Kennedy administration but Kennedy was highly cognizant and concerned with domestic politics as they related to his foreign politics and could not afford dissension (Johns, 17).

Kennedy perceived that domestic political consequences of withdrawal of Vietnam is too great of a risk for one's Presidential career (Johns, 25) The fear of being branded as an appeaser in the wake of WWII shaped the Kennedy administration's response to the instability in SouthEast Asia (Johns, 18) Kennedy knew that any mistakes or perceived weaknesses in his foreign policies would draw increasing attacks from Republicans to undermine his administration and authority, creating an implicit incentive for him to perform well in Vietnam (Johns, 14). Kennedy knew that his tenure as President was strained and that his next election could be in jeopardy. As such, Kennedy called for strong rhetoric in US foreign policy on his election trail and after his election, he rejected any likelihood of toned-down policy owing to his political insecurity, lack of widespread popularity, and concern over a domestic political backlash if he softened his position in a communist world after a narrow presidential victory (Johns, 16). The administration's failures in other foreign policy sought Kennedy to go for a win and with continuing problems in South Vietnam. Kennedy then approved National Security Action Memorandum 52 which committed the US to Vietnam but not unequivocally (Johns, 23) This approach set a precedent for the current administration to follow and that LBJ and Nixon would replicate in their own deliberations about policy towards Southeast Asia. Republican attacks on failures of Vietnam served only to fortify the Kennedy administration's resolve to force the Saigon regime to see any type of improvement (Johns, 37). Thus, through the Kennedy Administration, the Executive showed some concern for the views of Congress, but the main role of Congress was to increase support for the war.

As control of the Presidency changed, domestic political pressure did not. Johnson was assertive on Vietnam very early in his presidency and told Henry Cabot Lodge shortly after the assassination of Kennedy "I am not going to lose Vietnam, I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went." (Johns, 45) David Halberstam explained "If LBJ seemed weak as a president in dealing with Vietnam, he was sure it would undermine him politically.... Well, he did not want the blame for losing Vietnam." Johnson was aware that his opponents in Congress would capitalize on any weakness in Vietnam and destroy the rest of his political career. Johnson expressed to Doris Kearns

“Everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I’d be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II... that would shatter my Presidency, kill my administration, and damage our democracy.” Therefore, the Executive’s main concern continued to be with acting tough due to fear of Congressional criticism.

Despite this, some people in Congress became concerned about the war. House Minority leader Ford made a speech challenging the President's conduct of the war and said he had grave misgivings about the way the war was going. However, Johnson said that he was not going to do what Ford said, disregarding these members and pursuing further actions on the war. Ambassador Talor was concerned and argued that an infusion of American forces into the war “would simply encourage the South Vietnamese armed forces to let the United States carry the full burden of the war effort... would raise the specter of French colonialism and encourage a majority of the population to turn against the United States.” Other Congressmen were also skeptical about the introduction of ground troops. Despite this, Johnson believed that the “who lost China” debate and McCarthyism would be “chickenshit compared with what might happen if we lost Vietnam.” Johnson knew that the political ramifications could be disastrous if he was seen to be losing Vietnam and ignored such concerns and misgivings. Congress was aware of these concerns and many members were also subject to the same pressures.

Despite knowledge of a losing war, Congress faced political incentives preventing their challenge of the Executive. Despite concerns, Congress had something else looming over them, the 1966 midterms. In the midterm election, Vietnam loomed in the background for voters and contributed significantly to several key congressional races (Johns, 120) Congressmen tried to rally on showing how they did well or could improve on the situation in Vietnam to appear strong to the public. They knew that signs of weakness could spell the end of their political career and despite internal misgivings, many Congressmen knew that they would have to put on some display of strength. Ford commented that “Vietnam was going to be a liability to any incumbent” in November. Thus, incumbents needed to show that there is some progress being made in Vietnam and often rallied towards this progress despite their personal views (Johns, 121). Because of these political pressures, most members of Congress continued to support the war rather than oppose it.

Congress also faced pressures of the credibility of the United States which Presidents Johnson and Nixon were aware of and could take advantage of. Congress felt a responsibility, of which the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations felt and committed millions of troops and billions of dollars to support South Vietnam lest the U.S. lose its international credibility (Johns, 39). This credibility not only was a reputation of the United States, but of Congress members as well, leading Congress members to be open to the accusations of being responsible for the loss of the war in upcoming elections, ruining future prospects of re-elections. Therefore, not only were members of the president's own party reluctant to oppose the war, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, but members of the opposition party as well.

Vietnam was one of the most important issues in the 1968 election (Johns, 131). The Tet Offensive in that same year led to increased anti-war sentiment among the public. The war held the key to the Oval office and Republican optimism and Democratic uncertainty hinged as much on Vietnam as any other issue (Johns, 132). Evidence points that the candidates' positions on the Vietnam war proved to be pivotal in the 1968 election (Johns, 133). As the GOP attempted to regain the White House, Republicans like George Romney and Nixon realized that they had to define for themselves a position on the war that would appeal to the majority of the party and the electorate (Johns, 185). This is an instance where a potential and eventual Executive, Nixon, was actively concerned about the position of Congress. Knowing that the war going on could be used to attack the other side, Nixon believed that Republicans should stress Democratic mismanagement of the war against Johnson (Johns, 109) The domestic political implications of the war and its resolution then dominated Nixon's early months as president and he understood the consequences he would face if he could not demonstrate progress toward an honorable victorious peace by 1972 (Johns, 239). Nixon asserted that the greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker (Johns, 240).

However, this aspiration quickly put Nixon at odds with Congress, which had shifted to a determined anti-war stance. This was a result of shifting public opinion, but in keeping with Hypothesis 2, Congress also now had less incentive to support the Executive because Democrats maintained control of Congress, but Nixon himself was a Republican. In response to Congressional pushback, Nixon continued his aspirations of forcing the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table. Kissinger and Nixon

frequently withheld information about foreign initiatives that might have been controversial from Congress, that made Congress misinformed and meaningless (Haley, 28). The bombing of Cambodia drew massive public outcry and a bill was passed to withdraw troops and disallow engagement in Cambodia. However, the Nixon administration retained the ability to attack in Cambodia using a presidential loophole (Haley, 29). Despite Congress's intentions, Nixon exploited flaws in legislation in order to continue engagement in Cambodia before Congress could rectify. Presidents Johnson and Nixon emphasized that repeated congressional appropriations of funds for the conduct of the war assured its legitimacy (Haley, 30). However, whenever Congress would prohibit direct American combat support, the Nixon administration would defy them. Nixon initially vetoed the first prohibition of combat but that administration was compelled to accept the ban as Congress refused to pass any supplemental appropriations. (Haley, 42)

As shown above, and in keeping with Hypothesis 3, Nixon and Kissinger were using the war as a method to conducting foreign policy in a crisis atmosphere without congressional approval. (Haley, 43). Nixon knew that the immediacy of war could dominate public opinion and if he was able to be known as the winner of the Vietnam war and the victor of communism, then his political career would be set. Nixon and Kissinger believed they could take extremely important actions based on deterrence without first making sure of their support in Congress as if deterrence failed, they could rely on a foreign enemy to frighten or anger the American people and Congress into acquiescing in a drastic response formulated by the president (Haley, 44). It can be seen that due to the power of the Executive, which Nixon used to its full potential, Congressional action and reprimand could be skirted and ignored in terms of long wars.

It was clear that Nixon was aware of Congress's concerns. Between the years of 1970-1972 especially, many leaders of Congress and Nixon met and many pressed him consistently for a quick end to the war, which he rejected. The Cambodia Incursion caused even further Congressional outrage and Congress tried to limit Nixon's power over them. The Cook Amendment placed a limit on use of funds in Vietnam and the Cooper-Church amendment declared that U.S. no longer had a legal basis to remain in Vietnam and any funds appropriated by Congress should be used to withdraw soldiers. In 1973, Congress then passed the War Powers Act and then the Clark Amendment in 1975, when U.S.

involvement in the war finally ended. However, this took the course of several years, allowing the Executive to hold power over Congress until this point, despite Congress's clear disapproval of the war.

It can be seen in the case of the Vietnam War that in instances of war, Congress is incentivized to put a united front with the President, despite any internal misgivings. In such instances, domestic politics greatly limit the amount that Congress is able to restrict the President as they risk appearing weak to potential voters. The war will be used as a political point on which party would be the best party to win and the party that loses risks the future of their political career and control of the Legislative and Executive branches. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. Even in the cases where Congress is united against war and places restrictions upon the Executive, the opportunity remains for the Executive to ignore such restrictions through the Executive's influence on foreign policy and the exploitation of loopholes. This allows the Executive to buy time to further prolong wars in the hopes of waiting for elections to potentially change the tide in the hopes of maintaining their political power or in the hopes of flipping the issue onto a different Executive. This provides moderate support for Hypothesis 3 as it can show that there are instances where the Executive does ignore Congress and Congress is incentivized to agree with the Executive. Yet Congress may try time and time again to rectify these loopholes to end the war. These actions may take a long time and eventually may have enough influence to end the war in the case of the Vietnam War. Ultimately though, there is more supportive of Hypothesis 1 as although Congress made significant efforts in attempting to affect the duration of the war, it was not significantly effective.

Chapter 6

Afghanistan Background

In July of 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted Operation Cyclone in Afghanistan, an operation where Central Intelligence agents armed and trained insurgent Afghans, known as the Mujahideen from which the Taliban and Al-Qaeda would emerge, to force the Soviet Union into a political and economic situation from which would contribute to its collapse (Billard). Decades later, on September 11th, 2001, al-Qaeda hijacked and crashed four U.S. jetliners into the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania; creating the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history totalling nearly 3,000 deaths (CFR).

In the aftermath of what was to be known as 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush signed a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for 9/11. This resolution will become the legal rationale for the administration's decision to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism, including the invasion of Afghanistan which became known as Operation Enduring Freedom. The Taliban regime quickly disintegrated and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden escaped. As Kabul fell, the United Nations endorsed a transitional government as al-Qaeda leaders hide out in the mountains. President Bush then calls for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the U.S. military created a civil affairs framework to coordinate redevelopment and expand the authority of the Kabul government.

In May of 2003, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to "major combat" and started transitioning to reconstruction with eight-thousand soldiers stationed. However, U.S. reconstruction was struggling and despite minor victories, such as establishing a new constitution and electing a new president, problems continued to resurface. One such problem was the resurfacing of Osama bin Latin, officially taking credit for the 9/11 attacks on the United States. This led to a joint declaration between Afghan President Karzai and U.S. President Bush to pronounce each other strategic partners, allowing U.S. forces to use Afghan military bases to prosecute a war against terrorism and extremism. Violence escalated throughout the country, exponentially rising through the summer of 2006. As violence escalated, the Afghan government quickly fell apart and many Afghans pointed to the lack of basic services and difficulties with security and police forces.

In 2008, a U.S. gunship killed dozens of Afghan civilians as collateral damage, drawing condemnation from Afghan President Karzai and bolstering the peoples' support of the Taliban. With resistance growing from the Taliban, newly elected U.S. President Obama announced plans to send 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan on top of the 37,000 present as of January 2009. President Obama then announced a new strategy, linking success in Afghanistan to a stable Pakistan. As more U.S. and NATO troops flowed into Afghanistan, U.S. marines launched a major offensive upon Southern Afghanistan. By the end of 2009, there were 68,000 troops in place in Afghanistan, with President Obama announcing an additional 30,000. At a Lisbon summit, NATO member countries signed a declaration to hand over full responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan forces by the end of 2014 with the transition process beginning in 2011.

In May of 2011, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in Pakistan. Congressional lawmakers increasingly called for a hastened drawdown of U.S. troops and President Obama outlines a plan to withdraw 33,000 troops by the summer of 2012. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced the Pentagon's plan to conclude combat missions by as early as mid-2013 and to shift to a primarily security assistance role in Afghanistan. Afghan President Karzai also further called for foreign troops to be withdrawn from village outposts and confined to military bases.

In April of 2017, newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump dropped its most powerful non-nuclear bomb on suspected self-proclaimed Islamic State militants at a cave complex in eastern Nangarhar Province, as well as the recommitment of several thousand troops to Afghanistan. As the Taliban grew stronger, the U.S. military described the war as a stalemate and President Trump outlined his commitment to press ahead with an open-ended military commitment. As U.S. presence escalated, so did the Taliban as they carried out a series of major attacks in Kabul in 2018. However, by this time, Trump switched his rhetoric and described that the Afghan war was a failure and proposed for talks such that the United States can extract its troops.

After failed negotiation and more escalations, in 2020, U.S. envoy Khalilzad and Taliban's Baradar signed an agreement that paved the way for a significant drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and included guarantees from the Taliban that the country would not be used for terrorist

activities. Representatives of the Taliban and the Afghan government finally met face to face for the first time in Doha, Qatar and established a framework for Afghan society after U.S. troops withdrew.

In April of 2021, President Biden announced a plan for full withdrawal from Afghanistan by September 2021 regardless of whether progress is made in intra-Afghan peace-talks between the Taliban. As U.S. troops withdrew, the Afghan Government quickly collapsed as Taliban fighters overrun the capital of Kabul and take over the presidential palace.

Table 2 summarizes Congressional activity on the Afghanistan War. Initially, Congress was supportive of the war, similar to Vietnam. However, it appears that Congress began to switch its position on the war in 2008, the same year in which SIGAR was created. It also appears that legislation passed in the immediate years after the positions were changed increased to 2014. It may be relevant to notice the correlation where NATO had planned to withdraw all troops by 2014, corresponding with Congressional bills. Some of the most prominent acts of Congress which were pro-war were the Patriot Act, the Joint Resolution for Force, and the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Act. Prominent acts of Congress which were anti-war are the Inspector General Reform of 2008, the calling of SIGAR to conduct deep-dive research in 2014, and the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act.

Table 2: Summary of Congressional Bills Passed on Afghanistan

Date	Amount of Bills passed on Afghanistan	Pro-War or Negative
2001	3	Pro
2003	13	Pro
2005	5	Pro
2006	13	Pro
2007	8	Pro
2008	9	Con
2009	16	Con
2010	12	Con
2011	15	Con
2012	10	Con
2013	4	Con
2014	14	Con
2015	2	Pro
2016	5	Con
2017	6	Con
2018	5	Con
2019	4	Con
2021	12	Con
2022	8	Con

Note: Bills were identified using *Congress Collection* (n.d.).

Chapter 7

Afghanistan Analysis

Initially in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States stood on a united front between the public, the executive, and the legislative branches to strike back against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Shown through the passing of the PATRIOT Act and Congress's Joint Resolution of Force, the United States quickly invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban government. President Bush then called for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Congress stood behind him, commending the troops and reaffirming their support behind Bush and the President of Afghanistan. For the first few years, Congress stood united with the President in terms of the Afghan war.

However, all was not as it seemed to Congress and the American public. Despite promises of progress in reconstruction and the war on terror, such progress was exaggerated. President Bush recognized the similarity to Vietnam that the Afghan War had but didn't want to say that it was or was going to be another Vietnam and so chose to lie to the public (Woodward, 209). Bush recognized that they were not doing much or making any progress in Afghanistan but due to the domestic threat and fear sweeping throughout the nation of anthrax, Bush recognized that he was in a rough spot politically (Woodward, 212). As such, Bush chose to withhold information which could be used against him politically and focused on his domestic image. As such, it can be seen that the power that the Executive has in terms of withholding/manipulating foreign information. Bush knew the importance of reputation for both the United States and for his own presidency. Bush talked about how they are losing the public relations war in terms of Afghanistan and recognized that threat of that on the United States and his presidency (Woodward, 279). He acknowledged that his warfighting strategies were flawed and the attempt to remake Afghanistan into a modern nation was a waste. Yet, he was unable to publicly knowledge failure in the United States as he spoke about how the United States filled and must maintain the reputation as the only superpower (Woodward, 280). Because of that, the Executive branch choose to provide explicit and sustained efforts to deliberately manipulate and mislead the data to make it appear that the United States was winning the war when it is not the case (The Afghanistan Papers). Again, this

shows the power that the Executive can have on divulging information and using that power to mislead to maintain support for their foreign policies.

It's seen that the misleading of information was effective on Congress as there were uniform and unhampered support within Congress until 2008, despite instances where it appears that reconstruction was not working, such as the record high of Opium Production within the region in 2007. However, in 2008, more difficulties became apparent of the presence in Afghanistan. The creation of SIGAR was made, meaning the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, was charged with interviewing and finding out more about the activities within Afghanistan. Afterwards, collateral killings of United State troops on Afghan civilians became public and mounted in number and a U.S. gunship was found to have killed Afghan civilians. At this point, support for Afghanistan was starting to waver and newly elected President Barack Obama had to make his decision on what to do. President Obama's decided to recommit to Afghanistan and to provide the COIN (Counter-Insurgency) doctrine and dispatched an additional 30,000 troops due to his generals' recommendations (Barry, 24). There have been accounts of Obama's 2009 decision to surge US troops into Afghanistan showing that he used the National Security Council as a vehicle for extended deliberations over US strategy assessing the multiple factors that affected the war (Barry, 48). It was scrutinised and challenged the military recommendations for implementing a COIN strategy and the need for a surge of troops.

In 2010, Congress directly passed a bill to direct the President to remove troops from Afghanistan. Pressure further increased upon the executive when WikiLeaks releases thousands of stolen classified U.S. military documents of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama saw this pressure and announced a tentative plan to withdrawal troops by 2014. This corresponded with further NATO pressure that declared to hand over full responsibility for security to Afghanistan for security to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. After Osama Bin Ladin was killed in 2011, Congress increasingly called upon Obama for a hastened drawdown of troops along with a great majority of Americans.

However, Obama felt a pressure to protect the US reputation. Obama said people saw him as the most powerful person in the world, the Executive in charge of the remaining superpower of the world and asked why isn't he doing anything about Afghanistan (Woodward, 12) Obama's campaign aids saw the prominence of Patraeus as a potential presidential candidate when Patraeus become a well-

recognized military commander that saw Afghanistan was going badly for America (Woodward, 17). Obama became focused on the pressures of domestic politics and focused on the campaign promises he made, which was Afghanistan would be the new priority (Woodward, 24). Biden and Obama's cabinet focused on votes they could gain/lose from Afghanistan and the Democratic party now faced a dilemma whereas the election year approached, they needed to maintain their power in the Executive (Woodward, 69). Despite wishing to withdraw from the war, the Democratic Party in Congress was now in a bind to stand behind united with Obama. Obama and intelligence knew that there was no way to win the war in Afghanistan (Woodward, 77) However, the presidential campaign appeared to be a bidding war of who could do the most in Afghanistan (Woodward, 80). With the Democratic party and Obama showing a united front, the news commended Obama on political decisions in Afghanistan that Bush wasn't able to do (Woodward, 113). This supports Hypothesis 2, which claimed that members of the president's own party will be less likely to oppose continuation of war.

After the 2012 election and Obama's re-election, conflict still raged within Afghanistan without any real progress being shown. In 2013, the only major development was in accordance to NATO's plan and Obama's plan, Afghan forces took lead in security responsibility and the United States shifted from active military conflict to a more training and special operations role. However, presence has not decreased. In 2014, Congress expressed further pressure upon the Executive and called upon SIGAR to conduct deep-dive research on the effects of Afghanistan. Due to the Congressional pressure, President Obama announced a timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops by the end of 2016, however, this was announced before when Obama announced the plan to withdraw troops by 2014. It is seen here that although Congress can pressure the Executive and the Executive may appear to agree, there is no enforcement placed upon the Executive. This in turn, supports Hypothesis 3.

Conflict within Afghan continued to fail to decrease, Afghan opium poppy cultivation reached record levels and recruitment within the Taliban appeared never-ending. There was further disagreement within Congress with Obama about the transfer of Afghan leaders and the repercussions of negotiating with terrorists. However, once again, it appeared ineffective to adjust the Executive's process.

After the 2016 election, when President Donald Trump first assumed office, the Taliban controlled or contested more than 1/3 of Afghanistan. President Trump then signaled the drop of the

MOAB (Mother of all bombs) upon Afghanistan and signaled a prolonged Afghan war and pledged to loosen restrictions despite Congress's pushback. However, eventually, President Trump did change his position to one that better fit Congress's viewpoint and wished to pull troops out of Afghanistan. Despite this, there were occasions where Trump clashed with Congress, such as at the end of his term when he vetoed the William M. Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, which included provisions about Afghanistan, but Congress was able to pass over the veto.

Finally, with President Donald Trump launching the effort to officially remove troops from Afghanistan and winner of the 2020 election President Joseph Biden carrying out the removal and evacuation of troops, in accordance with Congress, the United States finally withdrew from Afghanistan. However, the process of withdrawal shows even more of the pressures of domestic politics. As Democratic President Joseph Biden carried out the evacuation formally supported by Congress and President Trump, the Republican party saw a chance to attack the decisions and execution of the ending of the war by Biden and took to enforcing a stance that they disagreed with merely a year ago. As such, this is a primary instance that shows that whoever ends or loses a war, even if such war is unpopular, will become a target that can be scrutinized and used as talking points against the Executive to gain favour amongst domestic voters for the opposing party.

In regards to Hypothesis 1, ultimately, Congressional action did not effectively affect the duration of the war. Congress began leaning towards the negatives in terms of war throughout the 2010s, and yet, the full withdrawal of troops did not occur until the 2020s. In all, the Executive had more power than Congress over negotiations and was able to use their power to extend the war until they reached a consensus with Congress and the Taliban. As for Hypothesis 3, while explicit loopholes regarding certain legislation in Congress was not needed to be used, the Executive was still able to manipulate Congress as seen with President Obama's promise of withdrawing troops when directed to but simply making a promise without a need to follow through. Additionally, the Executive had the power to manipulate Congress through withholding information and only providing certain details to impact Congress's understanding of the war. In terms of Hypothesis 2, it is important to note that in the early years of the Obama administration, Democrats controlled a majority in both the Senate and Congress. However, after the years of 2014, when President Obama postponed withdrawal of troops further, the

amount of bills passed in opposition to war decreased. This could be as a result to wishing to continue the support of their own party, where beforehand, there was an understanding that troops would be withdrawn with NATO in 2014. The phenomenon of Congress being divided among party lines is also shown in the Biden administration. During such time, Republicans were in direct opposition of President Biden when he attempted to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. During this time, Republicans viciously attacked President Biden for the withdrawal of troops, despite being supportive of President Trump when he attempted to withdraw troops at the end of his term. This is in support of Hypothesis 2 as it supports that party lines play a large role in the continuation and opposition of wars to the Executive.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

It is shown that during the instances of Vietnam and Afghanistan, Congress had prior information about the ineffectiveness of the United States in these overseas theatres and yet was ineffective in its influence over the Executive to end these wars. Throughout the course of this research, it was shown that the Executive had a large amount of influence on foreign policy. In part, this was due to the pure power of foreign policy placed in the Executive, its influence on their political party, domestic politics, and the maintenance of reputation. Whenever the Executive is placed under individual scrutiny and faces the pressures of gambling for resurrection, it ultimately pulls Congress down with it. In the cases of Vietnam and Afghanistan, these wars were perpetrated and kept going by the Executive, even when Congress had prior information of the inability of the United States to win these wars, they were restrained by the power of the Executive to enact war-ending actions. Nixon was shown to ignore Acts of Congress and to use loopholes in order to prolong the war effort. Nixon was also found to withhold information about the status of the Vietnam War to Congress and this strategy was only found to be repeated in the Afghanistan War, with generals and officials only giving the best possible viewpoint of how the war was going.

Should the United States not learn from its earlier lessons and take a more active role in the Ukrainian War, then there is the possibility that history may repeat itself again here. While the Ukrainian War is still in early stages, it is important to understand that should it prolong itself further, and should the United States send direct aid, then they risk repeating history. While the sending of foreign aid is an important role for the preservation of a nation's sovereignty, the risk of direct combat can spell disaster for all parties involved. The United States must evaluate how it handled the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars incorrectly and in the cases of future wars, instead of focusing on reputation and domestic politics, they must focus purely on the war and have a consensus between both the Executive and Congress.

In terms of policy, consistently throughout history in such cases has Congress granted the President with more and more power in terms of wars. It is something to consider for Congress to

remove some of the power given to the President. While the President is considered to be the Commander-in-Chief for wars, it was clear in the Constitution that Congress should have some say in wars, with them being granted the power to wage wars. Removing some of the power given to the President by earlier Acts of Congress would place the President more level with Congress and thus the President would have to listen and appease them more. Aside from Congress, instituting other supervisory measures about how wars are going, such as SIGAR in the case of the Afghanistan War, can be useful to understand if wars are to be considered beneficial. It is important for these institutions to have their information shown to Congress and in certain cases, the public, however. In this respect, the Executive would not be able to limit the information given as they have been shown to have the power to do. Only in such circumstances can there be pressure upon the Executive to end such wars.

Appendix A

Timelines

Table 3: Afghanistan Timeline

Note: These tables showcase major events and bills passed relating to the Afghanistan and Vietnam War.

Title of Bill/Event	Year (Color Coded)	Month	Approved in House	Approved in Senate	Became Law	"Significant"	"Pivotal"	Unanimous	Is Afghanistan the Main Focus
9/11	2001	September	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Congress Joint Resolution of Force	2001	September	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Initial Invasion of Afghanistan	2001	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Taliban Government Overthrown	2001	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Bush Statements on History of Military Conflict	2002		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Bush calls for Reconstruction of Afghanistan	2002	April	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
g troops and Reaffirm that Congress stands with President	2003	March	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Access for Afghan Women Act	2003	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
National Defense Authorization Act	2003	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Act	2003	April	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
National Defense Authorization Act for 2004	2003	April	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
H.Ces. Res. 136 Introduced	2003	April	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Secretary of Defense Declares end to "major combat"	2003	May	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
H.Ces.Res.477	2003	May	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004	2003	July	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
NATO assumes control of ISAF in Afghanistan	2003	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HR3104	2003	September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction	2003	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Osama Bin Ladin Returns	2004	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,	2005	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Afghan President and Bush Joint Strategic Partners	2005	May	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
missions, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations	2005	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
NATO expands ISAF	2005	September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
"Thank our Defenders Week"	2005	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006	2006	January	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,	2006	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HRRes.861	2006	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007	2006	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ans' Housing Opportunity and Benefits Improvement Act of	2006	June	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HRRes.895	2006	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Intense Fighting and Violence Erupts across Afghanistan	2006	July	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
NATO expands ISAF	2006	July	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
O expands ISAF and command of the International Military	2006	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year of	2006	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5th Anniversary of 9/11 Sense of the House	2006	September	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act of 2006	2006	November	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HR.4436	2006	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
pressing the sense of Congress that no funds should be cut or	2007	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Designating a post office for Afghanistan Heroes	2007	May	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
troop Readiness and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act	2007	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ease the Number of Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters	2007	July	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007	2007	July	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Un Reports Opium Production at a record high	2007	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
emerging Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of	2007	August	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
condemning the Nov. 6 2007 terrorist bombing in Afghanistan	2007	November	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2008	2007	November	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Consolidated Appropriations Act	2007	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
of SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Recon	2008	January	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008	2008	January	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
rganizing the Exceptional Sacrifice of the 69th Infantry Regiment	2008	February	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Supplemental Appropriations Act	2008	February	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
atal Killings Mount; US Gangship found to have killed Afghan	2008	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
st 5 years of deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom	2008	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Extension for Certain Authorities of Department of State	2008	September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
an Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year	2008	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Inspector General Reform Act of 2008	2008	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates testifies to Congress	2009	January	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Obama Recommits to Afghanistan	2009	February	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009	2009	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Obama's New Strategy for Afghanistan	2009	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Bill to Provide additional personal authorities for SIGAR	2009	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
sense of Congress of violation of human rights of women in	2009	June	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PEACE Act of 2009	2009	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
US Afghanistan Forces to number between 60,000 to 68,000	2009	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
al and Provincial Afghan elections tainted by Taliban and chi	2009	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
be Government of Afghanistan should ensure that women fid	2009	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010	2009	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ounces major escalation and sets July 2011 as start of troop	2009	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
al-Qaeda double agent kills CIA officials	2009	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DOD Appropriations Act of 2010	2009	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010	2009	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Commanding soldiers stationed at Fort Gordon	2009	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Directing the President to remove troops from Afghanistan	2010	March	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Commanding to modernize Agriculture in war-torn counties	2010	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010	2010	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
continue support to monitor Fertiliser used in explosives in Afg	2010	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
inds of stolen classified U.S. military documents of Operation	2010	July	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010	2010	July	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Veteran's Benefit Act of 2010	2010	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal year 2010	2010	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ring Lives of Humanitarian Aid who died in Northern Afghan	2010	September	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
onoring National Guard of Oklahoma and Sacrifice since 9/11	2010	September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011	2010	September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Table 4: Vietnam Timeline

Title of Bill/Event	Year (Color Code)	Month	Approved in House	Approved in Senate	Became Law	"Significant"	"Performative"	Unanimous	Is Vietnam the Main Focus
Eisenhower invites Legislative Leaders to comment on whether Vietnam Lobby (Joseph Kennedy and Francis Cardinal Spell	1954		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JFK (as a senator) delivered a speech and exaggerated Diem's s	1956	April	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mansfield started sending cautionary memos to Kennedy Ad	1961	January	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mansfield was one of first members of Congress to publicly s	1962	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mansfield spoke at Michigan State University about South Vi	1962		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Lyndon Johnson assumed presidency	1963		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gulf of Tonkin	1964	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
AIC (American Conservative Union) founded and focused a	1964		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
McNamara visits Vietnam and says "The situation is very det	1964	December	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
With the belated American recognition of the important neu	1965		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
President Johnson Americanized the war and the US assumed	1965		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Beginning of Direct American Involvement, heralded by U.S.	1965	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ambassador Taylor was concerned and argued that an infusion	1965	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
LBJ Spoke at Johns Hopkins and announced he was ready for	1965	April	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Request from President for supplemental appropriation of \$1	1965	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
President invited all the members of House and Senate to off	1965	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
White Paper published by the Republican organization in the	1965	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Congress and president agree to condemn anti-war protests a	1965	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Congress continues to provide strong support for U.S. policy	1966		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Menamara's pessimistic report to the President after visiting V	1966	October	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings (Fulbright Hearings)	1966	January	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mansfield proposes to the Senate that the US should make a r	1966	April	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Greece Military Coup -> Sentiment of demanding a cutoff of	1967		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Robert F. Kennedy addressed Vietnam as an uncompromising	1967	February	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Tax Increase Debate to pay for Vietnam	1967		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Public openly turned against the war but Conservatives did n	1967		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Senate Foreign Relations Committee arranged to meet with U	1967	March	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Church and a group of 16 Senators issued a statement that ha	1967	May	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Senator Pdl made a major Senate speech on the importance of	1967	May	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
House Minority leader Ford made a speech challenging the P	1967	August	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
A barrage of congressional criticism and proposals to conmi	1967	September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Efforts to correct the imbalance between the Executive and th	1967	November	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Tet Offensive constituted a clear shift in opinion	1968	January	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Reagan vision of unity did not involve acceptance of the argu	1968		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Half a million US troops involved in Vietnam	1968		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Reagan confides to his aides that he does not believe there is a	1968		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Buckley outlined conservatives' expectations of the Republic	1968	June	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Pro-war leaders still determined to reconcile peace with their o	1969		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Senator McGovern met with North Vietnamese leaders and p	1969	July	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Goodell Resolution introduced requiring US troops to withd	1969	September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
300 members of the House supported a resolution commendi	1969	November	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
59 Senators signed a letter to Nixon's chief negotiator in the p	1969	November	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Many leaders of Congress and Nixon met and many pressed h	concess 1970-1972		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Conservative Leaders' demand for outright victory in Vietnam	1970		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Cambodia Incursion -> Congress Outrage	1970		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Cook Amendment placed a limit on use of funds in Vietnam	1971		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Cooper-Church amendment declared that US no longer had	1971		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Congress Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relatio	1972		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Nixon and Kissinger met with his staunchest Congressional s	1972	November	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Paris Peace Accords greeted with bipartisan acclaim	1973		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Cut Funding for US Operations in Vietnam	1973		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
War Powers Act	1973		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Turkey Embargo	1974		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Denial of SVN Aid	1975		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Clark Amendment	1975		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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DAVID NGUYEN

PERSONAL PROFILE

I'm a college student where helping others has always been my goal in life and I aim to achieve that goal through the law. I'm a dedicated and persevering worker and have a thirst for learning. I am excellent at leadership and speaking and maintain good organizational behaviour.

ACTIVITIES

- Student Advocacy Board on Student Poverty
- Centre Helps Hotline Agency
- Penn State International Affairs and Debate Association (PSIADA)
- Pennsylvania High School United Nations Conference (PHUNC)
- Pennsylvania Collegiate United Nations Conference (PUNC)
- Psi Chi
- Penn State Justice Association
- Penn State Forensic Science Club
- Pre-Law Society
- Relay for Life
- Minorities in College of Liberal Arts
- Penn State Dance Marathon (THON)

SKILLS

Microsoft Office, C-SSRS Suicide Assessment Certification, Certified Mandated Reporter, CITI Research Certification, Adobe Creative Cloud, WordPress, Canva, English, Spanish, Vietnamese, Presenting

INTERESTS

- Traveled Internationally and throughout the West and East Coast
- Planned and Attended multiple Charity events and Retreats
- Created Photo Videos and Collages
- Founded a High School Archery Club

EXPERIENCE

REPRESENTATIVE

Penn State Student Advocacy Board on Student Poverty 2021 to 2023

- Selection of 12 Candidates of 150+ applications
- Research and Compiles comprehensive data and solutions regarding Student Poverty
- Conduct interviews and interest groups with local organizations and students
- Advised and worked with University Administration to provide a comprehensive extended strategic document identifying issues regarding Student Poverty and a model spanning multiple years to eradicate such issues

INTERN

Thurston County Prosecutor Office 2020 to 2021

- Assisted legal support, victim advocates, community outreach specialist, paralegals, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, and administrative staff through the use of referral reports and general assistance
- Trained by PAO Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys and Judges in topics ranging from trial strategies and approaches in court to the impact of mental health on Criminal Justice
- Drafted and Charged real criminal referrals to be sent to a judge
- Organized and Consolidated a state-wide referral code Master-Key
- Combed and Redacted 500+ records to release to the public

CREW WORKER | BARISTA | LINE CHEF

Penn State Student Dining 2019 to 2021

- Operated heavy-duty kitchen appliances to produce and serve food
- Crafted a variety of caffeinated beverages by order at the Espresso Bar
- Memorized and served a variety of food to 100+ customers each shift
- Maintained excellent customer service and a clean work environment

TUTOR

Kumon Math and Reading Center of Olympia - NorthWest 2018 to 2019

- Helped advance 20+ children ranging from ages 4-16 on Math and Reading beyond their current grade level
- Graded and Corrected 100+ worksheets per shift
- Cultivated and Maintained a clean and positive learning environment