A House Divided: Future Prospects of European Unification

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Abstract

The European Coal and Steel Commission (ECSC) was founded in 1951 with the goal of preventing war on European soil by creating economic cooperation between former adversaries. Another intention of this partnership was to one day form a unified state, with each of the member states integrating their governments and institutions into a singular bloc. This integration process can be seen in the various treaties and agreements signed between the member states of the current European Union (EU). My goal in this analysis is to determine to what degree the member states have integrated into the EU. I studied five factors across five time periods to discern what influences the integration process, and what may lie in the future for the further integration of the member states. Overall I concluded that the integration process of the EU has leveled out in the past decade, and will most likely remain at the same level in the future unless drastic changes occur.

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<u>Introduction</u>

        That people sometimes put their differences aside and join together in large-scale

cooperation is a phenomenon that both confounds and inspires. We have seen this in many

circumstances, between individuals and between nations. I wanted to explore this phenomenon in

one of the more recent attempts to create a permanent partnership between states: the European

Union (EU). Over the last seventy years, we have seen this union form from the hope of

preventing war, and evolve into a supranational entity with institutions that govern economics

and social policies for each member state. This has been done through the integration process, a

transfer of power from member states to the presiding authority of the EU and a dissolution of

many barriers that separated the member states. My goal, through this analysis, is to determine

what factors provide the greatest incentive for integration.

        I initiated my analysis by reading other studies on integration and the creation of states to

figure out which factors might be the most significant. I came upon two past studies I believed

would be relevant to my own: Karl Deutsch et.al.'s *Political Community in the North Atlantic*

(1957) and Joseph M. Parent's *Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics* (2011).

Deutsch et.al., while an older study, has been pivotal to many other studies of integration and

was written around the time the original intentions of European integration came into being.

Parent's analysis was useful regarding my analysis of the contemporary period of the EU, as his

framework provides a unique perspective for examining the integration process. These studies

together helped shape my own analysis, and gave me the tools to guide my efforts to better

understand the potential path of the EU.

        To measure the integration process and potential influencing factors, I decided to use

historical cases for my analysis. This enabled me to examine the trend of integration throughout

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the history of the EU. I used several different cases to delineate different periods for the EU, based on the presence of treaties and agreements that contributed to integration. The integration process is a gradual transition, and requires the foundation of each addition to be laid before the process can be continued. The historical cases were also important for tracking the membership of the EU, as the growth of the union through new members was also something I considered regarding the integration process.

To categorize the level of integration, I chose to use the amount of treaties as a basis. In my analysis, I found that the EU has been shaped into the supranational entity it is today through the various treaties that have been signed and ratified by the member states. For the historical cases, I used the amount of treaties signed in each case to pinpoint the path of the integration process throughout the cases. I operated with the logic that the greater the number of treaties, the higher the level of integration. This approach is not without limitations, because it could be that at some point a high threshold is reached, and after that there could be no more formal documentation necessary to continue the integration process. Considering that the EU remains a separate entity from the government of each member state, I believe there are still more treaties and agreements that could be created to further integrate the member states. From this, I modeled my analysis with the expectation that the highest point of integration has not been reached yet.

Historical Cases

In order to evaluate the hypotheses (developed below), I have chosen to analyze the European Union through a set of five historical cases. Each case provides a way for me to see what the process of integration has looked like for the EU historically, and hopefully help me gain insight into what may happen in the future. There are five selected cases based on key points in the history of the EU: 1945-1950, 1951-1970, 1971-1989, 1990-2010, 2011-Future. These cases encompass pivotal moments in the development of the EU, from treaties to legislation that furthered the institutions and oversight of the EU. The diagram below, Figure #1, shows the timeline of EU membership throughout most of these historical cases. [1]

Figure #1
A timeline of EU membership between 1957 and 2019

[1.] The sources for this section included information available on the EU website, as well as *A Chronological History of the European Union, 1946-2001*, by Wim F.V. Vanthoor

Case #1: 1945-1950

In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the previously defined status quo that existed in Europe experienced an upheaval. Much of Western Europe was forced to establish a new balance of power for the continent, especially considering the once great power of Germany was split into two separate states, East and West Germany. The horrific circumstances of the war that scared almost every European country caused much fear of a subsequent conflict, and the top priority became preventing any recurrence of war. By May, 1950, there were talks of a system that might perform such a duty. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman put forth the Schuman Declaration, which would become one of the key founding documents for the EU (European Union).

The Schuman Declaration, later known as the Schuman Plan, suggested the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to take the first step towards ensuring peace within Europe. This economic organization was designed to regulate the "Franco-German production of steel and coal." Schuman chose these specific materials because they had become focal points of previous conflicts, and by placing these resources under what he called "a Higher Authority," the competition for access became less violent (both quotes from the European Union website cited in footnote 1). This occasion would mark the official beginning of the institutions that would become the European Union, promoting further integration and the creation of additional institutions for the years to come.

Case #2: 1951-1970

The 1950s through 1960s saw a wave of integration for the member states of the ECSC, as well as an uptick in economic growth. The treaty establishing the ECSC was formally ratified

in 1952 by Luxembourg, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. This economic coalition prompted further cooperation between the member states, as the European Economic Coalition (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were formed by several treaties in 1957. By 1958, the European Parliament was formed as well, with Robert Schuman acting as its President. Economic coordination continued to increase into the 1960s, as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was created in 1962. This agency was created to "promote free trade and economic integration..." Common policies were established to give the EEC control over agricultural production (quotation from the European Union website cited in footnote 1). The Yaoundé Convention was the first international trade agreement the member states signed through the EEC that included trade with states beyond Europe, which opened up trade with the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) (Institute for Contemporary History).

The ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom eventually merged into The Commission and the Council in 1965. The Commission served as the administrative branch, and the Council served as the executive branch of the expanding European community. This decade marked a good deal of economic growth for the ECSC and other member countries, which is partially attributed to the removal of customs duties between member states. These duties were applied to imports into the member states, and their removal encouraged trade between members (European Union).

Case #3: 1971-1989

The economic prosperity of the previous decade for the EEC countries was temporarily halted by the increase in oil prices from the Arab-Israeli War and OPEC oil shocks after 1973.

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As a response to this, the EEC developed a fund for each of the member states, allowing for capital to be put towards infrastructure and jobs. The EEC welcomed three new member states, with Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joining on January 1st, 1973. In 1975, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created to help offset any "imbalances" within the EEC, and this fund continues to operate into the present day, 2023. In 1979, the European Parliament held the first direct elections from EEC citizens (European Union). The majority of this decade demonstrated the growing cooperation between member states and the supranational institutions, as well as encouraging new members to join in the union.

For the 1980s, the EEC worked towards establishing cooperative frameworks that would be used in the following decade. This included the Single European Act, which sought to clarify national regulations between member states to prepare the way for a single, European market. This took place over a six year long program (European Union). The Schengen Agreement was written in 1985, which "eliminated border control" between certain member states (Vanthoor, 111). These acts and agreements laid the foundation for the greater movements toward integration in the 1990s.

Case #4: 1990-2010

The time period of this case includes some of the most integrative measures taken. In February of 1992, the EEC signed the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty changed the name of the supranational entity from the EEC to the European Union (EU), laid the groundwork for establishing a single currency, and worked towards fostering cooperation on matters of security and "justice and home affairs." Following this treaty, the single market was put into play, guaranteeing the "free movement of people, goods, services and money." This market

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encapsulates the internalized economic and industrial cooperation between member states that remains active to the present day. The European Economic Area (EEA) went into effect in January of 1994, which extended the market of the EU to other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). EU citizens started to experience "border-free travel" in 1995 as the Schengen Agreement went into effect (all quotes in this paragraph from the European Union website cited in footnote 1).

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed to revise the previous Maastricht Treaty and related treaties. It focused on preparing certain aspects of the EU in its current status for future integration by further defining citizens' rights and reforming institutions. The Euro currency was instituted in 1999; The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden all opted to hold on to their previous currency instead of switching to the Euro. The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, served a similar purpose to the Treaty of Amsterdam as it worked towards giving EU institutions greater oversight and having more direct elections in the case of more integration. This trend continued with the signing of the EU constitution by each of the 25 member states in 2005. The last treaty to come from this time period was the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended all previous treaties and sought to create a framework for the EU to address serious issues, such as sustainable development and security. The intention also included attempting to make the EU more "democratic, efficient and transparent" (European Union).

Case #5: 2011-Future

Into the 2010s and beyond the EU continues to integrate, although several crises hit the union simultaneously. In 2012 the EU itself was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "promoting peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights." As of 2013, the EU reached 28 member

states when Croatia joined the union. France experienced a severe series of terrorist attacks in 2015. These caused many member states to question matters of joint security. Later that same year, as many as one million refugees arrived at European borders from Syria and other countries. This influx has many members reevaluating border policies and control, and even spurred cooperation with bordering, non-EU states to address the issue. In 2016, the "Brexit" vote occurred, and the United Kingdom seceded from the EU. This action excised them from the customs union and single market and has created more trade and economic barriers between the UK and the EU (European Union). In the time since Brexit, the EU has felt the drastic economic and social consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. So far it is unclear to what degree this has impacted integrative efforts, but time will tell how firmly the union will hold together.

Theory and Hypotheses

My expectations about which factors have contributed to greater integration in Europe are drawn from previous studies and analyses on the subject area of integration more broadly. I used these works to help refine my own predictions for European integration, and how this process might be influenced or impacted. I focused on two specific trains of thought regarding the study of integration: those associated with Karl Deutsch and with Joseph M. Parent. Between these two, I formulated my own understanding of what makes further unification more likely, and thus what we might expect as possible in the future for the supranational entity of the EU.

Political Community and the North Atlantic Area by Karl W. Deutsch et.al. (1957) seeks to tackle the question of "How can men learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution?" (Deutsch et.al., 3). Their suggested answer is that we can learn to eliminate war through integration of various nations into a single bloc, which would promote peaceful resolution of crises and other cooperative efforts. Deutsch et al.'s focus is on the North Atlantic Area, which includes Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the United States and Canada. They use several terms within their study that require defining for readers unfamiliar with their work: Security Community, a group of integrated people, Integration, when a territory achieves a "Sense of Community" to the degree they can expect peaceful change within their area. In this context, the Sense of Community relies on the expectation that social problems can be addressed without large-scale violence and through peaceful change over time. Deutsch et.al. also classified two types of security-communities for their study: Amalgamated and Pluralistic. Amalgamated was the merging of two or more units into a common, larger government; Pluralistic is a type of union in which the units retain autonomy, usually through two or more systems of government persisting at the unit and security community levels. Deutsch et.al. classified the unification

cases as successful if they became a security community, and unsuccessful if the integration process ended in secession or civil war. Deutsch et.al. analysis was historical, focusing intensively on 10 cases within Western Europe and North America ((Deutsch et. al., 5-10).

For their Background Conditions, Deutsch et al. focused on clarifying the context in which they made their analysis, and laid the foundation for their discoveries as they introduced some of their initial findings. Some of the most noteworthy elements include how the amalgamation of small political units can increase the available resources and integration of a bloc, yet also weaken the new unit's ability to handle external matters around their borders and internationally. A balance of power must also be introduced to all member states of a larger unit. They argued that military conquest was a weak option for spurring integration. Pluralistic security-communities were more easily maintained than were their "amalgamated counterparts." That is, pluralistic security communities integrated with greater ease compared to amalgamated security-communities. In fact, pluralism appeared to be more successful overall in the cases they examined. Throughout this section of their book they began narrowing down which conditions pertaining to integration were essential for the formation of a new integrated unit. They determined, from their analysis, that the order in which the essential conditions were completed was not relevant, only that each be achieved at some point during the process. Successful integration required that the "capabilities" of participating units increase during and after the process to ensure continued integration success. That is, the integrating units had to gain from the process in order to persist with it. These capabilities most important for continued participation concern the efficiency of a state to "act" in matters of economy and administration, and the ability of a state to "control and redirect its own attention" regarding matters of

importance. Lastly, the units must be able to offset the costs of processing integrative efforts to promote the appeal of the process (Deutsch et.al., 21-45).

Within their discussion of Background Conditions conducive to integration, Deutsch and the other researchers identified some essential conditions for amalgamated security communities to exist. Each condition was found within the successful case studies they viewed. These include Value and Expectations, Capabilities and Communication Processes, Mobility of Persons, Multiplicity and Balance of Transactions, and Mutual Predictability of Behavior. Value and Expectations refers to the "compatibility" of participating members of the integration based on values they hold. These shared values had the most efficacy when presented through political behaviors that helped encapsulate a standard of living typical to a certain country. Expectations, usually in terms of what was the expected result of the integration, only needed to be partially completed by demonstrating for participants "tangible gains." from the unification. Capabilities and Communication Processes most encapsulate the administrative capacity a state can work with during an amalgamation. Mobility of Persons talks about the ability of an individual to freely move within and across the amalgamated territories. That is, the higher the mobility is, the greater the likelihood of successful integration. Multiplicity and Balance of Transactions details the wide range of functions an amalgamated security community must maintain in order to be successful. This includes balancing the passing of information and goods between participating units and rewarding each unit equally during the integration process. Mutual Predictability of Behavior exists when each participating state can reasonably predict the future choices and actions of the other participants. Specifically, this relies on a "national character" that links participant states culturally and through similar ideals. This condition demonstrated a great deal of variability across Deutsch et.al.'s case studies, but the presence of some predictability was

deemed essential for integration. Some lesser conditions that aided the process were also noted by Deutsch and his collaborators. These include introducing excessive burdens, increased political participation of previously passive constituents, increase in "ethnic or linguistic differentiation," and more (Deutsch et.al., 46-59).

Within their Main Findings chapter, the researchers described the results of their analysis from their historical cases. They found that the process of integration was aided if the participating units experienced a decrease in their interest to prepare for and wage war against other units involved in the integration process. Similar political alignments in governments across the borders of participating units was a positive factor as well. In their findings they found an answer to a question of whether the merging of government functions between units benefits or hinders the overall process of integration. They used the term "functionalism" to describe the sequential interconnections of governmental institutions between units. Deutsch et.al.'s hypothesized effect of this functionalism was that the earlier merging of institutions would decrease the effectiveness of later measures to promote the integration process. However, their conclusion was that this possible issue was non-existent. Another focal point that Deutsch et al. found as beneficial for successful integration was the value of political leaders capable enough to help guide the process, especially in their capacity for executing compromises between uneasy parties involved in the integration. Such leaders must also diligently promote integration and the benefits of doing so through campaigning, propaganda, and other methods of influence. In fact, the proponents of the integration plan had to place the integration at the forefront of all matters, stressing the importance of integration relentlessly in order to increase the odds of success (Deutsch et.al., 70-95).

Joseph Parent's (2011) *Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics* analyzes potential causes for why certain states come together in what he describes as "voluntary unions." These unions are formed without the threat of force or coercion between the states that voluntarily unify, and similarly are unions not dictated by external intervention. That is, voluntary unions, according to Parent, are not instances where one state forces another to join it, nor are they where two states join because a third state forces them to do so. Instead, voluntary unions are just that, voluntary involvement between the states that choose to participate. Parent chose to narrow his focus to the growth of power brought from voluntary unions. Parent also classified the importance of an established hierarchy within voluntary unions. He categorizes unions between two categories across a four square diagram: Equal or Unequal Unions, and Self-Help or Forced Unions. Equal or Unequal Unions refers to whether unions were founded between members of roughly equal strength or instead involve two or more unequally powerful states. Self-Help or Forced Unions are unions that were either formed independently or were formed by external intervention from an outside state. Of the four conceptual types, Parent chose to only focus on Equal, Self-Help Unions, which includes the unions that resulted in the United States, Switzerland, Sweden-Norway, and Gran Colombia (Parent, 1-9).

Parent's argument focused on what might cause a voluntary union to form. In his mind, the most likely cause is external security threats. When examining the cases of voluntary unions, he found a proverbial "goldilocks zone" within which the states had to respond to the security threat. In this zone the external threat was great enough to spur urgency and action from the participating states, but not too great that the threat had overridden rational decision making. If the threat is too small or too distant, Parent suggests an alliance would be formed instead of a voluntary union. For voluntary union to occur, the external threat must persist and be

symmetrical in the distribution of the threat across the participating states. Parent emphasizes the importance of pro-union activists and elites to make a firm campaign for unification, using arguments to contextualize the gravity of the union for citizens. He also draws a comparison between the creation of institutions and the forming of voluntary unions, pointing out that state institutions thrive for longer in cases of a constant external threat and are more likely to dissolve without one. Parent also considered potential arguments for voluntary unions, including the argument proposed by Karl Deutsch that I reviewed above. Parent's approach focuses on the causes for unifying based on three mandatory conditions: background conditions (preliminary matters that signify a period of a security threat), crisis trigger (a specific event/moment that can cause a shift in foreign policy spurred by pro-unification elites), and elite persuasion (Parent, 17-27).

After exploring his case studies, Parent dedicates a portion of his study to analyzing the possibility of the European Union becoming a formalized voluntary union. At the time of his work, Europe by his suggestion had faced no threat great enough to warrant a legitimate security threat. When the Soviet bloc was still whole, the ECSC/EEC/EU member states were able to rely on the external protection of the United States, which could account for the lack of unification before the collapse of the USSR. Parent's prediction is that the most likely source of a security threat for Europe is Russia, but still the likelihood of a singular state threatening Europe was low in Parent's estimation. Parent based his belief mostly on the prospects of a hegemonic power tipping the balance of the EU, either intentionally or unintentionally, to the point where integration becomes more viable. He does propose that relations with the United States may not always be favorable, and through this the potential for a true unification of Europe could be

founded. Without the backing of a superpower like the United States, Parent believes that the European States might have a vested interest in unifying (Parent, 131-143).

Using the theoretical argument and empirical claims Karl Deutsch and his collaborators provided in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,* I suggested a variety of possible causes of further integration within the European Union. First, the emphasis on pervasive and determined pro-unionist promoters as a key element suggests that this is an important condition throughout the entire integration process. This brings me to my first hypothesis.

Hypothesis (H1): Greater integration within Europe is more likely if important European leaders prioritize and campaign for this outcome.

The best way to find potential leaders in the EU is by finding any figures the union considers important. These leaders could be classified by their contributions to treaties or agreements, or the efforts they made from within their own countries to benefit the EU. The key leaders I am looking for are prominent, pro-unionist advocates who were renowned for their work towards the integration process. These can be leaders within the institutions of the ECSC/EEC/EU, or members of member state governments that advocated for integration. I also want to look at newspaper articles to see if any leaders were highlighted by public media. This can include articles on committee meetings, agreements or deliberations between member states. If any potential leaders were honored by the EU in some way, then I would classify them as key for the integration process, as their contributions are considered important for how the EU has developed.

Another factor for the process of integration that Deutsch et al. categorized was the "Mobility of Persons," which was a consistent facet of the security-communities they analyzed. I

suppose that this factor in particular, the degree to which an individual can move freely within the EU member states, is a valuable avenue for analysis.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): As mobility of individuals increases in Europe, further integration is more likely.

To determine the level of mobility for EU citizens, I will research any legislation or policies that are related to mobility and travel between member states. By examining the trend of EU law regarding these matters, I could determine the dependency of the integration process on this area of study. The degree towards which citizens of the region could travel and relocate could be an indicator of the stage at which EU unification stands. Personally, I believe this avenue is especially useful in understanding the current status of the EU. Moreso, this avenue has the potential to aid in specifying a potential trend for the integration process. I will also be looking at the frequency of laws and regulations that promote mobility for EU citizens over restricting movement.

One avenue that could indicate a greater likelihood of unification could be the formation of "core areas." Karl Deutsch mentions the presence of core areas, which were strong and powerful units that were an important part of the integration process. A core area could be identified by a group of units with distinct levels of administrative and economic capacity that help lead integrative efforts. The participating units, who have the resources to help form a core area, aid in the overall process of integration by bearing a larger portion of the cost necessary to complete the process. This was one of the indicators that he did not consider utterly necessary for pluralistic communities, but it presents an avenue of potential interest for my analysis.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Further unification within the EU is more likely if France and Germany become more cooperative with each other within the EU.

Within the EU, there are several member states that are seen as important actors within the system. Most notably, France and Germany, are strong presences behind the decisions of the EU and its institutions, and they have been since the formation of the ECSC. My expectation is that France and Germany, two founding members of the EU, could form a partnership akin to the model presented by Deutsch that would propagate the integration for the European Union. A way to measure this would be an in-depth look into the policies supported by France and/or Germany regarding the history of the EU, and which policies were focused on increasing the responsibility or power of the institutions of the EU. To measure this, any particular doctrines put forth by either Germany or France regarding EU institutions or integration would be noted and categorized, and then from there the possibility of these two member states spurring greater integration could be determined.

Joseph M. Parent's *Uniting States,* suggests a different theoretical argument and thus difference hypothesis about further integration within Europe. As described above, a symmetrical threat presents a risk for all states and increases the likelihood that they will pursue unification. He also discusses an asymmetrical security threat as something that disproportionately affects certain units of a potential union more so than other members. This type of threat reduces the chances of unification, because only the states who are facing the threat head on may think unification is a worthy pursuit. He suggests that this is best described as a foreign military threat, but this concept has more potential in additional forms. I especially believe that an asymmetrical security threat could be more than a simple military presence. In particular, the refugee crisis that has been an ongoing problem for the Mediterranean Area has sparked considerable deliberation

about how the European continent can handle this issue. Many EU member states in the

Mediterranean, like Italy, Spain, and Greece, bear the majority of migrants entering Europe .

Hypothesis 4 (H4): The Migration Crisis provides an asymmetrical security threat that could cause a disruption to EU integration.

Mass immigration into the EU could present a potential threat for further integration. This

"threat" is less of a military threat and more so a potential burden for member states that is

disproportionate across the union. The threat present is the costs of having to allocate resources

towards caring for migrant and refugee populations, which may strain the Southern Member

States (SMS) of the EU versus more so than the Northern Member States (NMS) of the EU who

are less likely to directly receive entering migrants. The greater the disparity the SMS see in the

number of entering migrants compared to the NMS, the less enthusiasm they will have for

participating in the integration process. If there is a disparity in the number of entering migrants

the SMS experience compared to the NMS, then they may be less interested in being involved

with the integration process of the EU.

In investigating this likelihood, I might look at descriptive data about where migrants

enter and where they are over the course of the past decades and look for differences across

regions within Europe. In addition, I will search for any available data that may indicate the

preferred destinations of entering migrants. This data would enable me to understand what states

may be more likely to receive migrants, and in turn would be required to provide resources for

these migrants. What I will be coding here is how equal or unequal the burden across EU

member states is. In terms of the outcome variable, the effect on potential future integration, I

will construct a timeline of sentiments from the respective governments from each

Mediterranean member state. If they suggest the EU is not helping them with the crisis, that would be an indication of a cooling of interests towards the EU and its institutions.

Turning from asymmetric to symmetric security threats, Parent considers them the best source of inspiration for the formation of voluntary unions. He holds doubt about a singular state posing as a significant threat to Europe, but considering recent events, I figure it would be best to test this notion if possible. The position of Russia currently could be perceived as a threat towards the European Union, as Russia has begun to expand westwards into Ukraine at a pace unseen since the Soviet Union drew the Iron Curtain. Whether they pose a significant enough threat to spur union in the EU member states remains the question. To answer this question, I will address the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Russian aggression has increased the willingness of EU states to consider greater integration within their community.

Throughout the existence of the EU, it has faced a proverbial threat from the East for almost its entire duration. When the supranational entity was defining itself during the 1950s, the USSR was ramping up Cold War aggression and expanding control over the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. My expectation with this hypothesis is that whenever the USSR/Russia presented a significant military threat to the European continent, there would be an increased push for integration. There would also be an increase in integrative efforts at the height of the Cold War, and then another increase during periods in which Russia became militarized again. Considering the ECSC as a prevention of armed conflict, I am curious to see if aggression from an external threat would spur a similar response from the modern EU.

Research Design

In order to properly evaluate the hypotheses, I will be breaking down the timeline of the European Union from the European Coal and Steel Commission in 1950, to the EU in 2022 and beyond. The analysis will be done through a series of case studies, with each case study being a time period for the history of the EU. To perform this analysis I will measure the independent variables by drawing on publications, and data available for the time period of each case.

The dependent variable for each case study is the rate of integration for the European Union. This is a measurement for how much the EU has accumulated powers and responsibilities from its member states, who willingly conceded these factors. To properly measure this, I have decided to focus on the frequency of signed treaties and agreements that ratify more authority and power towards the EU. These include key interactions between member states that bolstered the overarching system through the allotment of governance and responsibility for the EU. The greater the number of relevant treaties signed, the greater the degree of integration.

The first independent variable, for H1, is the presence of leaders and politicians who press forcefully for integration and have public support. I will begin by identifying the most vocal supporters of EU integration within both the EU proper and member state governments. This will help me categorize where the most effective promotion of integration would originate, and what the status of the "unionist" movement was within each case. In this case, the "Leaders" would be politicians who openly call for integration and are held in high regard within the EU. For each case this may include pivotal parts of integration that may have been spearheaded by certain individuals. To test this, I will look into whatever examples or data I can find to reveal the public opinion of these leaders and the potential reception of the EU population towards unifying under a common banner. This might be from articles highlighting pivotal moments in the careers

of these politicians that relate to integration, to figures commemorated in honorable mentions from the EU institutions. If there are officials who are pro-integration and high ranking within a case, then the Leaders variable will be marked as present. If there are no prominent supporters of integration, or only advocates without official positions, then the Leaders variable will be marked as absent. My goal is to determine which pro-integration politicians were popular with their constituents and weighing if they were "successful" in their career goals.

For H2, the first independent variable is the level of mobility for EU citizens within the EU. This simply comes down to the ease of access EU citizens have in crossing borders of other member states for various purposes. In each case study the level of movement between member states will be noted. This can be defined as the amount of work visas issued, data on EU citizens traveling for tourism, and alterations in residency across the EU. In addition, the second independent variable helpful in evaluating H2 is the presence or absence of EU legislation related towards migration to measure potential shifts in policy between member states. This variable can be categorized as the overall amount of legislation and EU citizens in moving, work, and residency across each case. I will compare these measures across each case study to see if there are increases or decreases across the EU.

For H3, the independent variable is the willingness of France and Germany to participate cooperatively in the EU. This comes down to the eagerness of France and Germany to support measures that increase EU authority and enhance their integration into the greater bloc. To measure this, I look for treaties that were either proposed or adopted by France and/or Germany. Any treaties that were openly supported by either member will also be considered. Within each case, I will see if I can identify parts of the integration process that were spearheaded by France or Germany, because that would represent these most important member states expressing keen

interests in further integrating the European Union. The hypothesis relies on the fact that these states lead by example for other member states to follow, so for this case the frequency at which France and Germany took an active role in EU matters is highly relevant.

In order to test H4, the independent variable I will employ is the amount of refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean Member States compared to the Northern Member States of the EU. This is embodied in the initial destination of the migrants, and which member states must front the cost of handling their presence upon arrival. The objective is to determine if there is any "imbalance" between EU member states in terms of the refugees they accept and provide lodging for, and if so, member states may reconsider their membership in the EU and become opposed to further integration efforts.

The independent variable for H5 is the level of threat from the East. This measurement comes down to the level of risk that a military conflict would emerge from the Eastern border of the EU. The most likely candidate on this side would be the USSR for the first two cases, and Russia in the last three cases. I conceive of a number of relevant variables to quantify this perceived threat., I will begin by looking at the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) between USSR/Russia and EU member states. In addition, I will also examine studies on the Russian Federation and the EU for the end of Case #5, as the MID dataset only goes until 2014. Each aspect should help in understanding whether or not the EU has, or will face, a significant security threat from the East.

I will apply each independent variable across the historical cases to determine whether they affected the integration process of the EU. For H1, I will examine the presence of key leaders of integration in each case. For H2, I see if the level of mobility parallels the level of integration. For H3, I will determine if France and Germany have developed a core area for the

EU. For H4, I will gauge how external migratory patterns have shifted the integration process. And for H5, I will see if there is a presence of a security threat from the East that spurred integration efforts. Through each hypothesis, I hope to paint a picture of how the EU may develop in the years to come.

Analysis

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Greater integration within Europe is more likely if important leaders prioritize and campaign for this outcome

In classifying key leaders, I began my search through prominent leaders highlighted by published studies and official EU websites. The European Commission on their website detailed a list of " Pioneers" who acted as leaders in the creation of the EU, and subsequent efforts to promote integration. I used the Pioneers list to provide data for the Leader variable. I also referenced several articles and biographies of other figures that could be considered leaders. From these resources, I could begin to gauge the impact each leader gave for the EU, and the significance they have posed in promoting the integration process across the historical cases. Some leaders were in office across several of the cases, but I chose to place them based off of when they entered office and/or when they made significant contributions to integration. I primarily found politicians that fit the criteria in the first three cases. In Case #4, I found three key leaders, and Case #5 I was unable to find any particular politicians who fit the criteria of a leader. For Case #5, I do not find this surprising, as there may not be enough time in this case so far to identify key leaders.

In Case #1, I searched for information about figures who were at the center of the initial talks and discussions of European integration. The post-war period saw many figures in Europe discussing measures of reducing the likelihood of future wars, and this spurred many politicians in Europe to voice their support for some kind of formal union. I narrowed down my search to best determine which figures contributed the most to fostering the ideas of integration, and I found three figures who were at the forefront of the integration process: Winston Churchill, Robert Schuman, and Aldice de Gasperi. Churchill was one of the first world leaders in Europe

to directly call for a "United States of Europe," and he helped found the Council of Europe in 1948. Aldice de Gasperi served a pivotal role in the mediations between France and Germany during his tenure as Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The last key leader I found within this case was perhaps the most pivotal in the formation of the ECSC. Robert Schuman, is most well-known for his Schuman Declaration, a speech which called for steel and coal to be monitored under a singular authority. This was because France and Germany had initiated wars over these resources in the past, which caused the conflicts to spread throughout Europe. From his speech, he spurred further support from many leaders in Europe at the time, including Prime Minister Aldice De Gasperi and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (European Commission).

Most of the figures that fit the criteria of a "leader" in Case #2 were present for the creation of the ECSC in 1952, as much of the groundwork was laid prior to 1950. I am considering Schuman and De Gasperi as leaders present in this case as well because their work continued into the late 1950s, as the initial process of starting the ESCS took several years to come to fruition. The first president of the ESCS was Jean Monnet, who worked alongside Schuman and other leaders to coordinate the efforts of the organization. His own contributions include the "Action Committee for the United States of Europe," which focused on promoting interest in European integration. Monnet was dedicated to the concept of a unified Europe, and a definitive leader of this case as he primed the ECSC to take a more active role in integration with its member states (European Commission). The key leaders present in this time frame were active into the late 1950s, and by the 1960s, most of the "founding fathers" of the ESCS had left office.

I found that in Case #3, as the supranational entity developed from the ESCS to the EEC, the number of key leaders present appears to have decreased. Nevertheless, several figures that

represented the interests of integration for the era in my research. One such was Altiero Spinelli, an Italian politician who joined the European Commission in 1970. Having a history of promoting European federalism, Spinelli was an active voice and advocate for European integration during his time in the Commission. He joined the European Parliament in 1979 and subsequently convinced other members of the European Parliament to draft a proposal to create a Constitution for a new European Union. This initiative was coined the Spinelli Plan. His plan was not successful, but was the groundwork from which the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 were built (European Commission). Spinelli is a definitive leader present in Case #3, as he coordinated the institutions and members of the EEC to collaborate through integration. His framework would become the scaffolding upon which some of the most pivotal treaties of the EU would be written.

Case #4 features a series of leaders who had roots as activists and joined the EU as the supranational organization began to receive more authority and power within Europe. Anna Lindh, Swedish Foreign Minister, was a prominent human rights activist who had garnered much respect within the European community. She became a vocal advocate of the adoption of the euro around the early 2000s, especially within Sweden. She convinced several other foreign ministers to be open to the currency, including Joschka Fischer, foreign minister of Germany (European Commission) . Fischer became a supporter of the Euro, and soon after spoke of a European federation "...as Scuhman suggested 50 years ago" (Cohen). From this he envisioned creating a treaty that led to a constitution for a European state, as well as an executive institution that would behave as a government for all member states (Cohen). One last figure who helped define the hopes of integration for this period was Nicole Fontaine, a politician who served the EU in many fashions from 1989 to 2018. She served as Vice President, President, and as a

member of European Parliament. She helped found many joint programs between member states through negotiations. Fontaine was known for having the ability to have sway with other members of the EU, and in "canvassing cross-party support…teasing out compromise" (European Commission). She continued her work into the 2010s, even writing a novel in response to the talks of Brexit to understand what must be done to address public dissatisfaction with the EU (European Commission).

Regarding Case #5, no particular figures appear to fit the description of a key leader from 2011 to the modern day. Fontaine appears to be a possible contender, but most of her contributions, besides the novel she wrote for the Brexit Referendum, were accomplished during her time in office within the EU. For this reason, I classified the leader variable as absent for this case.

H1 Summary

Based on my findings for H1, I found there were Key Leaders present in all but Case #5. In Case #1 there were three leaders. Case #2 had one new leader, although I considered Schuman and De Gasperi from the previous case count here as well because of their leadership in the ECSC into the 1950s. Case #3 had only one leader, with Alterio Spinelli. Case #4 had two leaders, and Case #5 had no key leaders present. With the majority of cases displaying key leaders, there does appear to be support for H1 and the integration process. I was unable to find any key leaders in Case #5 during my research. Table #1 below shows the breakdown listed here.

Table #1
A breakdown of the results from the analysis of H1

Cases	Presence of Leaders
Case #1: 1945-1950	3 Leaders Present
Case #2 1951-1970	3 Leaders Present, only 1 new
Case #3 1971-1989	1 Leader Present
Case #4 1990-2010	2 Leaders Present
Case #5 2011-Future	No Leaders Present

Hypothesis 2 (H2): As mobility of individuals increases in Europe, further integration is more likely.

For H2, I decided to focus on the frequency of laws regarding mobility during the years of each case. The idea remains that more legislation for ease of mobility should equate to greater integration for the EU. I counted the number of treaties or policies issued in each case that enhance the ability of Europeans to move between member states, for reasons of travel, work, and more. I primarily used the database of the European Parliament for EU policies, treaties and legislations. I searched this database using keywords like migration, mobility, workers, and visas. I used the Schengen Visa Info website to track Schengen Area policies and contemporary membership in the area. Lastly, I referred to a study by Ettore Recchi to examine the trends of EU workers in Case #4. In terms of migration legislation, these types of policies were less frequent in the first two cases, but gradually increased throughout the third and fourth case, as the union began to expand in authority and scope.

For Case #1, no legislation exists about the mobility of Europeans between member states as by this point, the ECSC was not yet formed. For this case, I concluded that there was no mobility-related legislation present.

For Case #2, there was the Treaty of Rome (1957) that created a common market and enabled the freedom of movement for workers within the ECSC. Title IV of the treaty covers the "Free Movement of Persons, Services, and Capital." This portion of the treaty allows workers to move across member states for reasons of employment within the private sector. In 1968, coal and steel workers of the ECSC were guaranteed the right to have employment across the Member States in the same capacity as resident workers (European Parliament). The first two cases focused more so on economic policies over mobility policies, although the roots of intra-union migration can be seen within the Treaty of Rome.

Case #3 features some major additions for migration policy for the EU. In 1985, Germany, France, and the Benelux Community (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) signed the Schengen Agreement. This established the Schengen Area, a zone throughout the member states that aimed to ease the travel between and through each state. This included streamlining visa checkpoints, or eliminating them entirely in some cases (European Parliament). The intention of this legislation was to ensure enhanced mobility of EU citizens across the EEC, and this agreement went into effect in 1995 (Schengen Visa Info). Figure 2 below shows the membership of the Schengen Area as of 2016, as well as members of the EU who are potential candidates for the future (Peet).

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Figure #2
A depiction of which countries participate in the Schengen Zone, and what relationship they have with the EU

In Case #4, several more migration policies were established off the foundation laid by the Schengen Agreement. By 1992, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece joined the Schengen Area. In 1995, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the Benelux Community all discontinued internal border checks (Schengen Visa Info). Besides the Schengen Area, the transition from the EEC to the EU was a special consideration for the opportunities presented for workers in the new EU. The Treaty of Maastricht (also known as the Treaty on European Union) in 1992 created the European Social Fund. This fund focused on making "...the employment of workers easier and to increase their geographical and occupational mobility within the Community…" (European Parliament). As new legislation and policies emerged to promote mobility amongst EU citizens, there appears to be an uptick in the number of European nationals migrating between member states for various purposes. In the time frame between 1987 and 2004, member states collectively saw a 48.7% increase in the residency of EU non-nationals (citizens of the EU from other

member states). Within a similar time frame, member states like Germany, France, and Belgium saw more than a 50% increase in the number of nationals living abroad in other member states. Ettore Recchi remarks that the presence of "...pro-mobility policies..from the 1980s" and the introduction of EU citizenship in 1993 helps explain the trends found within the data (Recchi, 205).

In 1993, the European Commission released the "Report on Citizenship of the Union." This report describes the prospects of citizenship for EU member states, citing past treaties to establish the framework of citizenship. They specifically cite the Treaty establishing the European Community. This treaty ensures the "Right to Free Movement," through which citizens are granted the ability to move freely between member states (European Commission). This treaty in particular was established alongside the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon determined that the EU citizenship would be "additional" to the national citizenships present of each Member State, meaning the citizens of the European Union would retain their national citizenships from the member states alongside the EU citizenship. Internal border controls were also abolished by this treaty, although security measures were ensured in regards to potential threats (European Parliament).

In Case #5, there is a distinct decrease in the amount of significant legislation regarding mobility of EU citizens, although precedents created by past legislation have been implemented where necessary. In 2011, the freedom of movement for workers declared in 1968 was codified as an official EU regulation. In 2019, a regulation was created to issue identity cards for EU citizens with the interest of protecting their freedom of movement (European Parliament). Another point worthy of note is that in 2023, Croatia joined the Schengen Area, meaning

Croatian citizens now enjoy the freedom of movement across the area as citizens of other Member States have had previously (Schengen Visa Info).

<u>H2 Summary</u>

Throughout the cases, H2 appears to have been supported. Case #1 showed no mobility legislation, which is not surprising as this is before the formal creation of the ECSC. Case #2 had the Treaty of Rome mentioning the mobility of workers in the ESCS, and a guarantee for the right to employment in 1968. Case #3 had only one major piece of legislation, the Schengen Area, a major addition to the mobility of citizens between member states. Case #4 had two significant pieces of legislation that aided in the mobility of EU citizens, as well as establishing a formal EU citizenship, and further additions to the Schengen Area. It is worthy of note that the data I found for Case #4 were indicative of the effectiveness of the policies previously established, although I was hard pressed to find similar data for the other cases. Case #5 displayed one new piece of legislation through the issuing of identity cards for EU citizens, as well as codifying the 1968 workers legislation. Case #5 also had an addition to the Schengen Area: Croatia. Overall, there does appear to be correlation between the mobility of citizens and increases in integration. I am unsure what additions could be made for mobility into the future, but it appears any future legislation would benefit the integration process. Table #2 below displays the results of the analysis for H2.

Table 2
A breakdown of the results of the analysis of H2

Cases	Major Mobility Legislation
Case #1 1945-1950	None
Case #2 1951-1970	2 Pieces of Legislation
Case #3 1971-1989	1 Piece of Legislation
Case #4 1990-2010	2 Pieces of Legislation
Case #5 2011-Future	No new Pieces of Legislation, reconfirmation of two past policies

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Further unification within the EU is more likely if France and Germany act as models of integration.

In order to identify how prolific Franco-German cooperation within the EU has been, I decided to narrow my search for specific agreements and measures promoted and supported by these two states alone. From there, I found that the European Commission provided a report on their website on the Fouchet Plan, a failed attempt from the French government to unify France and Germany. I referred to the website of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs for the Elysee Treaty and Aachen Treaty, which detailed the significance of both treaties for Franco-German relations. I also found several articles detailing French and German efforts at greater integration, which gave me further insight for Case #4 and Case #5.

I found nothing of significance within Case #1 that would suggest the formation of a core area. In subsequent cases, however, there were several joint ventures between France and

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Germany suggesting both states have a possibility of becoming an unified state within the European Union.

In Case #2, there were two attempts in Franco-German relations regarding integration, with one failing and one succeeding. In 1960, President Charles De Gaulle of France suggested a union between France and Germany, one that would lead to the creation of a Franco-German state within Europe. He entered talks with Chancellor Adenauer of Germany over this possibility. Members of the EEC met to discuss the ramifications of this kind of political union, and Christian Fouchet of France drafted the Fouchet Plans for the process. Ultimately, other members of the EEC opposed the decision, and the plans were turned down (European Commission). While this stalled unification talks for the EU proper, France and Germany continued to foster good relations between each other. In 1963, De Gaulle and Adenauer signed the Elysee Treaty that serves as a representation of the commitment France and Germany have made in political and regional matters. This treaty created the Franco-German Council of Ministers, which involves heads of each state and several ministers from each country who meet once or twice a year. The council discusses economic and defense policies, as well as contemporary political matters that concern both France and Germany (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs).

For Case #3, I was unable to find any significant interactions between France and Germany that would suggest the formation of a state. For this case, I marked that no progress was made towards France and Germany becoming a model state for the EU.

For Case #4, I found no significant agreements or treaties between France and Germany regarding integration. Around the time the Euro was adopted, however, the French government was interested in leading integration efforts alongside Germany. In 2000, Suzanne Daley of the New York Times wrote an article about a speech from French President Jacques Chirac to the

German Parliament. Chirac hoped to spur Franco-German relations off the success of the Euro, in what was described as a "cooler" period between the two nations. Despite his efforts, elements of both governments were in disagreement regarding how the future EU would look (Daley). German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was one voice within the German government in favor of further integration while speaking on the introduction of the Euro. What is unclear is whether he sought cooperation with France in this manner.

In the later years of Case #5 I found several treaties and talks that may indicate future pursuits of integration between France and Germany. In 2019, on the 56th Anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, Germany and France signed the Aachen Treaty. The Aachen Treaty reaffirmed the goals set forth by the Elysee Treaty, alongside additions to bolster cooperation between both states. This includes an enhancement of mobility of citizens between France and Germany, collaborating on research and technology, and working together on EU financial services and markets. The Franco-German Council of Foreign Ministers also created thirteen new goals regarding joint programs and further economic cooperation between France and Germany (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs). An article from Pierre Vimont of Carnegie Europe in late 2022 describes that France and Germany have stalled in their goals of cooperation stated by the Treaty of Aachen. This began when the Council decided to postpone their 2022 meeting. Instead, President Macron and Chancellor Scholz met in person to clear the air. A series of disagreements on several key economic decisions appeared to have strained the relationship between both countries. A change in government in both France and Germany has also shifted priorities since the writing of the Aachen Treaty. Despite the shift in relations, many remained hopeful for Franco-German partnership, as this bond has shown to withstand hindrances before (Vimont).

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Based on the findings, I conclude that there is only weak support for H3. Case #1 displayed no formal agreements or treaties that would interest France or Germany in unification. Case #2 had the first significant agreement with the Treaty of Elysee, as well as the failed attempt through the Fouchet Plan. Case #3 had no treaties that progressed the relationship between France and Germany. Case #4 had no treaties as well, although members of both governments expressed interest in continuing the Franco-German Partnership. Case #5 had a significant treaty in the form of the Aachen Treaty from 2019, which appeared to rejuvenate interest in France and Germany over cooperating with each other. In 2022, however, there appears to have been a stalling of this goal due to differing interests from both governments. Currently, I cannot see a Franco-German Core Area forming within the EU unless both France and Germany reconcile and continue with the plans set forth from the Treaty of Aachen. Table #3 below details the trajectory of Franco-German relations throughout the cases.

Table #3
A breakdown of the analysis of H3

Cases	Treaties indicating a Franco-German Partnership
Case #1 1945-1950	None
Case #2 1951-1970	1 Treaty
Case #3 1971-1989	None
Case #4 1990-2010	None (Expressed Interest in Continued Partnership)
Case #5 2011-Future	1 Treaty (Disagreements between both governments over Partnership)

Hypothesis 4 (H4): The Migration Crisis generates disagreements that could cause a disruption to EU integration.

In regards to H4, I focused on finding data that would allow me to cross-reference migration patterns between Northern and Southern EU Member States. Northern Member States (NMS) include : France, Germany, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (until 2019). Southern Member States (SMS) were chosen based on their proximity with the Mediterranean Sea: Italy, Greece (after 1981), and Spain (after 1986). I primarily referenced the Migration Policy Institute (MPI)'s heat map of population spread across the globe, which in turn used the United Nations Population Division dataset from 2019. This dataset defines the number of migrants based on "...people who change their residence," and it is measured in five-year intervals from 1950 through 2020. This dataset does not provide a breakdown of the nationality of migrants entering or departing from a country, as this variable combines the migration

numbers of both native and foreign born residents in the dataset (Migration Policy Institute). To enhance my analysis, I also examined several studies on EU labor migration patterns. This was to determine how influential the economic opportunities present in a member state were for the destination of migrants within the EU.

In regards to Case #1, there were no available data I could find for migration into the member states. Italy is the only SMS member state at this time, but no data could be found that would suggest they were facing immigration at a disproportionate level to the other member states. This suggests we should not expect EU integration to be impeded by a migration crisis in Case #1.

Case #2 and Case #3 offered no support for the hypothesis either, as the NMS saw either greater or equal numbers of migrants entering compared to Italy, and most of the studies on the subject of migration did not appear until the time period of Case #4, where member states saw a collective rise of migration into the EU (Migration Policy Institute).

Case #4 exhibited a large increase in the net total of migrants entering EU member states, according to the MPI heatmap. Despite this, only Spain and Italy saw an increase in the number of migrants throughout the entire case. Spain absorbed nearly 3 million migrants between 2000 and 2005, and during this five-year interval it surpassed even the largest NMS in the total number of entering migrants. This interval is the only part of Case #4 where a SMS surpasses the number of entering migrants compared to the NMS (Migration Policy Institute). In terms of labor, some members of the SMS have become sources of "low-skilled labor" for migrants. Italy and Spain rely on the labor migrants can provide in certain sectors, and have also been inconsistent with their migration policy, which fluctuates with the political orientation of the national party in power (more on this below). The EU's attempts to address the rapid increase in

migration were not seen until the later part of Case #4. The Commission created the Blue Card program, which went into effect in 2009. This program was designed to give migrants access to positions in fields of skilled labor for a time period between one to four years. The Blue Card is one way the EU has sought to reconcile the EU policies on migration and member states' policies on migration. The friction caused by these policies often occurs when a right-leaning government is in power, such as with Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy between 2001 and 2006, although as stated earlier, the opposition to migrant-friendly policies are often short lived because of changes in government (Boswell and Geddes, 91-99). Due to the lack of a disparity in the number of entering migrants in SMS, and inconsistency with member state opposition to EU migration policies, I found no migration crisis in Case #4 and no reason to expect an obstacle to EU integration due to this factor.

For Case #5, there is partial support for H4 demonstrated by the data. In 2018, the Migration Policy Institute released a report evaluating the response of the EU to the Migration Crisis. The report claims the EU's response was ineffective, partially due to the tension between the supranational institutions and member state governments over what constitutes the jurisdiction of the EU's involvement. The EU started several joint ventures with member states in an attempt to limit the loss of life migrants and refugees experienced crossing the Mediterranean. The Commission worked with Italy and Greece to create "hotspots" to help regulate the flow of migrants into both countries by situating arriving migrants in concentrated areas to help organize relief efforts. This initiative ultimately floundered, as the waves of migrants began to outpace what the EU was prepared for, and the Italian and Greek governments disagreed with the Commission over the mission of the hotspots. The EU tried to provide expert consultants through the European Union Regional Task Forces (EURTFs) to aid Greece and Italy

with their response to asylum seekers. These experts were not given much time to prepare, and faced hesitation from the Italian and Greek governments to receive any authority to act (Migration Policy Institute, 10-16). The coldness between Italy and Greece to the EU over the Migration Crisis response seems to be one of poor communication and general unease instead of indicating deeper opposition to the EU's presence. The MPI heatmap also showed how Spain and Greece saw a sharp decline in migrants entering and an increase in migrants departing, and while Italy saw a steady rate, NMS like France and Germany saw greater numbers of entering migrants (Migration Policy Institute).

H4 Summary

Through my analysis, I found no evidence of entering migrants in the SMS negatively affecting the integration process for these member states. This is because there was little or no evidence of an asymmetric crisis during these cases. Case #4 displayed some signs of difficulties for SMS with the rise of migration after 2000, but none posed significant enough issues to threaten integration efforts. Case #5 had more signs present, but these appeared less deliberate and more a symptom of poor communication and management of the Migration Crisis than the actual evidence of dampened enthusiasm for European integration. The opposition found in the SMS's governments was often short lived, and nowhere near intense enough to suggest opposition to the integration process with the EU. If these sentiments were allowed to fester, there is a chance more opposition could arise to EU integration. Unless there is a drastic shift in the pattern of entering migrants in the coming years, I do not foresee this situation posing a significant threat to the integration of the Southern Member States. Table #4 depicts the case-to-case breakdown of the analysis of H4.

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Table #4
A breakdown of the analysis of H4

Cases	Migratory Crisis
Case #1 1945-1950	No Crisis Present
Case #2 1951-1970	No Crisis Present
Case #3 1971-1989	No Crisis Present
Case #4 1990-2010	No Crisis Present (difficulties were found in the interaction between SMS and EU)
Case #5 2011-Future	Partial Crisis Present (Miscommunication and Mismanagement between member states and EU caused friction)

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Russian aggression has increased the willingness of EU states to consider greater integration within their community

To represent the potential threat from the East, I referred to the Correlates of War (COW) dataset on militarized interstate disputes (MID). The dataset covers MIDs between 1816 and 2014. The MIDs were classified by participating states, start and end years, and hostility level on a scale between 0 and 5, with (0 representing rising tensions, and 5 indicating full military incursion between the states (Palmer et.al.). This allowed me to detect if there were any military actions or shows of force between the USSR/Russia and another European State across my five historical cases. I chose to use MIDs to gauge the relationship between the USSR/Russia with other European States, and to note the presence of any hostility between these states. The higher

the frequency of MIDs, and the higher the Hostility Level for each participating state, the greater the threat the EU faces. I included non-EU states in the MIDs, because the threat the USSR/Russia poses for one European State could be felt by all other states on the continent. For contemporary references (after MID coverage ended in 2014) between the EU and Russia under Vladimir Putin, I used a report issued by the International Centre for Defense and Security on EU-Russian Relations. I also referred to a report by the European Parliament on the Eurobarometer survey from 2022, which has a section focused on the effects of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the life of EU Citizens.

In Case #1, there were several MIDs that ranged between low to high levels of hostility. I found one MID in 1946 that was between the USSR, the UK, and Iran, with a hostility of 3 between the USSR and the UK. There was another MID between 1948 and 1949 that involved the USSR, the USA, the UK, and France. This MID was coded with a hostility level of 4 for every participating state. Another MID was present between the years of 1949 and 1951 as well, with the USSR, Hungary and Yugoslavia at a hostility level of 1 (the level was 0 between the USSR and Yugoslavia). I found the overall level of hostility low for this case, as there were only three cases and only two with significant levels of hostility (Palmer et.al.). The MIDs in Case #1 may still have influenced early talks of integration in Europe, as in the wake of WWII the USSR began to act.

I found a rapid series of MIDs in Case #2 of various levels of hostility. There were seventeen MIDs between the USSR and other European States. Most of these MIDs involved Eastern European States with the USSR, but a good portion also involved Western European States like France and the UK. The 1950s had a higher frequency of MIDs compared to the 1960s. I placed the overall hostility level for this case as very high, as there were many MIDs

with hostility levels above 3 and 4 for each participating state (Palmer et. al.). With the frequency

of MIDs in this case, and the high level of hostility across the MIDs, this likely had an impact on

integration efforts at the time. The interests of the founding members revolved around preventing

future conflicts, and the surge of hostility of the USSR in Europe could have made this goal more

appealing considering the circumstances.

For Case #3, I found no relevant MIDs in the 1970s but in the 1980s I saw eight MIDs.

These were of varying hostility levels, ranging from 1 to 4. I rated the overall hostility level of

this case as moderate, as while the frequency of cases was low, the hostility level of the cases

present did reach high levels (Palmer et.al.). In regards to integration, there is a case that the

presence of a threat could have had an impact. The 1970s had few treaties or agreements towards

integration, while the 1980s had several large contributions to the integration process. The

support for H5 in this case is weaker because the level of threat does not match the level of

integration in the latter half of the case. Despite this, there is a parallel between the presence of

MIDs and frequency of integration efforts within the EU.

Case #4 saw the transition from the USSR to the Russian Federation (the MID dataset

maintained the same country code for both states). Despite the transition from the USSR to the

Russian Federation, Russia continued to have frequent MIDs with several Eastern European

States, as 14 MIDs were reported. Russia had three MIDs with Ukraine, with varying levels of

hostility between them. I found that this case had a high level of hostility across the MIDs, as

Russia was involved in many MIDs with European States, but only two of them reached over

level 4 in hostility (Palmer et.al.). The threat present in this case matches more so with the level

of integration that occurred at this time, as Russia continued to participate in frequent MIDs after

the dissolution of the USSR. To what degree the MIDs affected the integration process for the

EU I cannot say with certainty, but the presence of such incidents in my mind would only serve to convince the member states of the value of integration.

The COW Dataset continues only until 2014, so to get a better understanding of the Eastern threat from Russia in Case #5, I examined several studies to determine the relation of the EU to Russia. In the three years covered by the dataset within this case, I found 6 MIDs between Russia and Scandinavian countries (like Norway) and Eastern European Countries. Two MIDs were documented between Russia and Ukraine, both of which correspond with the Russian invasion of Crimea in the Spring of 2014. The overall hostility level for Case #5 was high, this is because the frequency of MIDs in such a short period, combined with the invasion of Ukraine clearly indicates a lot of military threat (Palmer et.al.). To get an idea of how the EU perceived Russia in the later years of Case #5, I referred to a study conducted by the International Centre for Defense and Strategy (ICDS) on EU-Russian relations from 2018. The study states how Putin's Russia does not appear to have much interest in maintaining its relations with the EU. After 2014, the EU appears to see Russia as a threat to matters of security in Europe. The EU has taken an interest in maintaining defenses, working closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on this matter, although the study does not tell the specifics of this effort. Ukraine was a main point of contention, as the EU struggled to figure out the best method of handling the situation with pro- and anti-Russian voices offering conflicting resolutions. At this point in time the EU also remained one of Russia's biggest economic partners, in terms of general trade and natural energy resources, like gasoline (Racz and Raik, 1-10). In light of recent events, I reviewed a survey published by the European Parliament from Spring 2022 that covered the perception of EU citizens of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and what it means for the union. The survey asked whether citizens would prioritize "'defending freedom and democracy,'" or

"'maintain price and cost of living:'" 59% were in favor of the first option, and 39% were in favor of the second (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 58). Citizens were surveyed on their level of optimism for the future of the EU regarding the invasion, and about 64% were optimistic (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 66). The survey also asked citizens how future EU enlargement with new member states should be continued, and 58% of citizens were in favor of increasing the speed of the process (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 87). Case #5 seems to show some support for H5 with a discernible threat from Russia towards Europe, one that has stifled relations between Russia and the EU. This threat has spurred more interest in defending the EU and bolstering membership with new states. However, this increased threat from the East has not coincided with concrete efforts at greater unification within the EU.

H5 Summary

Ultimately, I found there was support for H4. Case #1 displayed 4 MIDs, three with higher levels of hostility. Case #2 had the largest number of MIDs, with 17 MIDs, with a high level of hostility across the MIDs. Case #3 saw 7 MIDs in the 1980s and a moderate level of hostility between the participating states. Case #4 had more MIDs than Case #3, and a higher level of hostility, which may have impacted integration efforts in this case . Case #5 only had partial coverage from the COW dataset, and the 6 MIDs of note here resemble more hostile disputes. Two of these disputes categorized the Russian invasion of Crimea in the Spring of 2014. The subsequent study and survey referred to in Case #5 detailed how the EU had increasingly strained relations with Russia after 2014, and citizens of the EU were in favor of defending the values of the EU after the Russian Invasion of 2022. The interest in hastening EU enlargement could represent an interest in pushing forward with integration with respect to the

threat Russia poses. Overall, I found that the frequency of MIDs matched the frequency of

significant treaties from the EU partially, as Case #2 saw a positive relationship. Case #4

featured a similar relationship with the frequency of integration treaties in this time period. Case

#5 shows that the EU considers Russia a security threat, and that citizens may be in favor of

further integration as a response. Table #5 below breaks down the results of my analysis for H5.

Table #5
A breakdown of the analysis of H5

Cases	Threat from the East
Case #1 1945-1950	4 MIDs (low level of Hostility)
Case #2 1951-1970	17 MIDs (High level of Hostility)
Case #3 1971-1989	8 MIDs (Moderate level of hostility)
Case #4 1990-2010	11 MIDs (High level of hostility)
Case #5 2011-Future	6 MIDs (strained EU-Russian Relations and shown presence of Russia as a threat to EU values)

Conclusion

From my analysis, I conclude that the likely future of EU integration remains steady, without a great deal of change in the next decade. Out of the five hypotheses, I found full support for H1, H2 and H5, partial support for H3, and no support for H4. The variables for each hypothesis were helpful in my analysis, as they provided context for the integration process in each time period of the EU. I believe more work could be done in studying certain variables, like the Migration Crisis and mobility of citizens. I will go into greater detail for this later.

The limited time frame and available information for Case #5 prevented my analysis from having a greater insight into the future of the EU. This remains a simple limitation of this kind of analysis, and I had an idea that this would be troublesome when I started my research. Nevertheless, the hypotheses and variables still provided me with an understanding of how the EU may develop in the near future, and my analysis highlighted several trends that I can see shaping the union for many years to come.

The variable of key leaders was one that I believed would have a big impact on the integration process. The materials provided by the European Parliament's website helped me narrow down the potential candidates for each case. This was an important factor for me because this showed that the EU institutions valued these individuals as vital to their overall goal of integration, and this was beneficial in determining the level of impact each leader had. I was unable to find much information of public opinion on leaders, barring later ones like Joschka Fischer of Germany and President Nicole Fontaine of the European Union. I would have liked to include more news articles in my analysis, because these would help me in seeing the public's opinion of each key leader. Another factor I had not considered at the start of my analysis was the public opinion of EU citizens, as the polls and surveys I came across in my research helped

show me opinions on different matters for the EU. These particular factors would have been useful in not just H1, but all the other hypotheses as well.

H2 represents a unique scenario where the variable has a limit on the amount of legislation and policies that exist for mobility. This comes from the fact that once a new, more liberal standard of mobility and migration is set for the EU, no more additions are necessary to make the citizens "more free to move." I believe the EU still has a little while before they reach this point of peak mobility, but when they do, it will come at a late stage in the integration process. The ease of travel between member states for EU citizens has come to define the European Union way of life over the past few decades. Any more additions to the mobility of citizens would only serve to strengthen the integration process of the union.

H3, while only partially supported, helps to define the key actors in the EU system. Labeling the partnership between France and Germany as a core area was difficult because the concept itself is broadly defined by Deutsch et.al. with examples on a much smaller scale than a continent. This core area could be better described as a Franco-German state, a scenario where France and Germany unified could help encourage other member states of the EU to integrate further. Another possible side effect of this kind of union could lead to member states not having an interest in integration, like how we saw with the Fouchet Plan in the 1960s. The current relationship between France and Germany is too cold for this to happen in the next few years. If they are able to reconcile their disagreement, then the future of the EU could be greatly shaped by a Franco-German state.

My analysis for H4 was by my account insufficient to properly grasp the relevancy of the immigration crisis. During my research for H4, I felt that there was a deeper trend here that does pertain to the future of the EU in some manner. At a first glance, an analysis on the effects of the

Migration Crisis to integration appears case sensitive to Case #4 and Case #5. The introduction of the Schengen Area in the 1980s shows a concern of not only the internal movement of borders within the EU, but also the security of external borders. The MPI heat map may have been insufficient in determining migration patterns, because it did not break down the demographics of incoming and outgoing migrants. The heat map also is not helpful in finding the final destination of migrants. For example, the reason Greece saw an increase in leaving migrants while other SMS saw an increase in entering migrants could be because the migrants leaving the country are greater than the number entering, so the true number of arriving migrants is skewed. I was unable to fully determine whether the Migration Crisis had a negative effect on the integration crisis of the EU. From my analysis, I believe this subject area could be examined better by considering the reactions of member state governments and populations to incoming migrants in the context of EU integration and values. From what my research showed, no study of this degree exists yet.

There is still more work that could be done on the analysis of H4, at least regarding the subject of the Migration Crisis and integration. This variable was only present during the last two decades for the member states. so the historical cases were most likely not the best method. The MPI heatmap did not give information about the country of origin of the migrants, so determining the pattern of non-EU migrants entering the member states was difficult. The heatmap was not helpful in discerning the final destination of the migrants, as the migrants may have entered the SMS but then moved on to Central or Northern member states for various reasons. This particular practice could explain how Greece saw an increase in migrants leaving for most of Case #4 and Case #5. The reactions of the SMS in Case #4 and Case #5 suggests that the Migration Crisis could be impacting the relationship between the EU and the SMS. A more

in-depth analysis of these time frames could be worthwhile, especially in a sociological context that reviews the opinions of politicians and citizens of SMS regarding migration and the EU.

I found that my analysis of H5 was on par with my expectations, although with a few shifts that I did not foresee. The COW dataset helped me get a picture of the level of activity the USSR and Russia had with other European States with militarized disputes. The dataset does not list the cause and context of each MID, so it was difficult to understand the potential gravity of each incident. A full scale analysis of each MID would require a whole other study, so the trends that the dataset provided were beneficial for the scope of my own analysis. Similar to what I found for H1, the inclusion of more journalistic coverage would have helped depicting the mentality of member states in each case, and give more context behind the data. One factor that I was unable to incorporate into my analysis was the compatibility of an EU armed force with the founding principles of the supranational entity. The ECSC was formed out of an interest in preventing wars, and creating a defense force for the broad EU now could be seen as a perversion of one of the core principles of the union. I cannot predict an "EU army" forming in the next few years, as defense of the EU appears to partially hinge on the NATO membership of many of the member states, as well as standing armies of other member states. Ultimately, if Russia continues expanding Eastward into Europe following their invasion of Ukraine, the pressure could have more vocal supporters of concrete defenses for the EU itself.

My analysis of H5 met my expectations of how the EU will react to aggression from Russia. For the purpose of this analysis, the MID dataset from the Correlates of War project gave a brief but useful summary of each of the disputes between the USSR/Russia and other European States. More work can be done on the study of each dispute, but I do not feel that is necessary for the type of analysis I performed. The study of H5 in Case #5 had more available material than I

initially anticipated. The report I referenced helped give context to the reaction of the EU in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Crimea, and the EU poll conducted in 2022 depicted the growing tensions between the EU and Russia after their invasion of Ukraine. This situation is still developing, so the full effects it will have on the security of the EU remains to be seen. I found no mentions of the member states forming an armed force for the EU proper, which would have been a good indicator of what the next step the EU plans to take. The union certainly seeks to stand against Russia encroaching on European States, although the exact details of their plan are not clear. I can predict integration being the basis of their plan, as EU membership was a topic considered important by the poll of EU citizens. This particular subject depends on the result of the war on Ukraine, and what potential side effects may lie in its wake.

My analysis shows that the EU will most likely remain at a similar level of integration for the next few years. Some situations for the EU have a chance of either spurring more integration, like the threat from Russia, or slowing the integration process due to member state opposition, like with my intuitions about the Migration Crisis. Both situations are still ongoing, so determining their effect on the union cannot be fully done at this time. Barring no extreme circumstances, the union will most likely see a static level of integration throughout the coming years, with more key leaders promoting the benefits of integration and additional migration policies allowing citizens to connect between member states. France and Germany may be the birthplace of a truly integrated EU through their own efforts of unifying. A lot remains to be seen for the future of the European Union, but the vision of a unified, European state stands behind it all.

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Ethan Smith

Leadership Experience
The Underground PSU   **May 2021-PRESENT**
Managing Editor / Copy Editor
- ❖ Communicating with editors, writers, and other organizations to handle stories and outreach.
  Maintaining recruitment efforts to ensure the growth of our newspaper
- ❖ Performing fact-checking and proofreading of all published work from the newspaper. Combined with frequent community outreach regarding current events and possible leads

Re-entry Conditions Project/Community Discussion   **June 2022 - August 2022**
- ❖ Lead a project through internship at the GreenLight Fund Philadelphia. Organized over the course of four weeks of interviews and research, the focus was establishing the conditions for previously incarcerated individuals within the city of Philadelphia and the greatest obstacles for reentry
- ❖ Presented findings and research to a group of community activists and social workers, and held a discussion about the subject matter following the presentation that helped foster connections between members of the social justice and advocacy efforts in Philadelphia

Campus Involvement
PSU Sustainability Scholars   **December 2021 - May 2022**
- ❖ Researched the applicability of United Nations Sustainable Development goals across differentiating governments
- ❖ Concentrated on addressing inequality, climate action, and legal justice during semester abroad in Rome, Italy, and how these can be addressed both within Italy and the United States

Penn State Mock Trial   **September 2019 - February 2021**
- ❖ Coordinated with a team to create a case theory and effective method of handling the case, which allowed for a firm, cohesive unit that fostered a strong effort out of all team members
- ❖ Developed a strong, factual presentation of evidence while determining the appropriate measure to combat weaknesses within said evidence

Phi Alpha Delta Pre-Law Fraternity   **September 2020 - September 2022**
- ❖ Participated in the local chapter refounded here in 2020, and prepared for LSAT test and law school admissions alongside other prospective law students
- ❖ Continues to establish connections with other members, and remains active in reaching out to branches and chapters at law schools across the United States