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Effects of Government Education Expenditure on Production and Birth Rate Decline in India

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ABSTRACT

Because education is a positional good, public funding of education may cause credential inflation instead of leveling skewed income distributions. The signaling theory of education suggests that reductions in public funding of education are unlikely to reduce economic growth. A possible consequence of credential inflation is fertility decline caused by competitive parental investment in the status of offspring. If by decreasing their funding of education, states are likely to raise fertility and unlikely to reduce growth or worsen income inequality, they could avoid pension crises caused by high tax burdens on aging populations. In this study, covariation between fertility, economic growth, and funding of education in the states of India is analyzed in order to evaluate this premise. While Indian populations aren't yet ageing very quickly, so that the effects of population ageing can't be studied, the states of India are highly variable in fertility, economic growth, and funding of education, and have been the location of both thorough demographic surveys and a thriving low-cost private schooling industry, so they are an optimal case to study the effect of education funding on production and fertility. While an association between public education funding and low fertility is found, some of the assumptions that underly this study's hypothesis about why such an association might exist contradict the study's findings. Although there is evidence that signaling theory applies to India, the hypothesis that this causes reductions in public funding of later education not to effect production is contradicted.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Population ageing

Since the industrial revolution began in late 18th century Britain, declines in mortality and, in their wake, declines in fertility, have characterized an ever growing number of industrializing nations. While the consistency with which this pattern, called the demographic transition, manifests has arrested 20th century fears of Malthusian catastrophe, the decline of birth rates to levels under two children per couple, the number necessary to maintain stable populations, is cause for concern for the demographic health of nations around the world. As late as 1951, the average number of children born by women in every territory that is now a sovereign state is estimated to have been higher than this level, yet as of 2021, countries with subreplacement aggregate fertility account for nearly half of the world's population ("Fertility Rate: Children Per Woman", "Population", see Figure 1).


The eventual consequence of sustained subreplacement fertility is the gradual inversion of the preindustrial population pyramid, in which there are more people under any age than over it. In this precedent, mature workers provide a small but stable supply of capital kept in high demand by a large number of young people. While a large supply of cheap capital then results from the shift of a population's bulk from young to middle age, which is a demographic dividend that Zeihan (2022, p. 230) and others credit for much of the economic growth of developed countries over the last three decades, the trend of subreplacement fertility entails the retirement of this bulk from the labor force with only smaller generations to replace it. Living on savings and without income to invest, this bulk is then likely to transfer wealth from riskier investments to safer ones, causing credit to become more expensive and economic growth to slow. Its retirement also reduces taxable income, putting in jeopardy the social security programs on which many elderly rely (Zeihan 2022). In fact, the Social Security Administration of the United States predicts that it will be able to pay retirees all of their scheduled benefits only until

2034, when its reserves will be depleted and only 80% of scheduled benefits will be available (“A Summary of the 2023 Annual Reports”).

A consequence of the tendency of industrialization and concurrent demographic transitions to progress more rapidly the later in history that they begin is that the timespan over which they’ve emerged and spread is longer than that over which they’re currently realizing demographic change, so that mass retirements in industrial nations are expected to converge in the 2020s and 2030s on a wider scale than the comparatively long history of industrialization would suggest (Zeihan 2022, p. 230). Population ageing and its effects are thus of pressing importance to policymakers around the world.

Figure 1. 2021 birth rate geography
 (“Fertility Rate: Children Per Woman”)

Fertility rate: children per woman, 2021



Data source: United Nations, World Population Prospects (2022)

OurWorldInData.org/fertility-rate | CC BY

Note: The total fertility rate is the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and give birth to children at the current age-specific fertility rates.

Education supply and birth rates

In this study, a prospect of raising birth rates by lowering the supply of later stages of education by government expenditure is tested. The rationale of this policy is founded in two theories. The first, elaborately explored by Caplan (2019), is that of educational signaling: that, while early education is valued for its production of human capital, it is valued less for this and more for its signal of precedent human capital as it progresses, so that gains in the aggregate supply of early education realize gains in aggregate production, but gains in the aggregate supply of later education only realize gains in demand for later education and impose opportunity costs on how young adults might otherwise spend their time, which pertains to the second theory on which this proposal is founded.

While theories of the demographic transition abound, one advanced by Kaplan (1996) and Shenk (2009, et al. 2013, 2016) is that, while fertility decline in the wake of industrialization initially represents decline in risk averse fertility maximization in reaction to a decline in child mortality, a significant motivation of fertility decline beyond this initial response is competitive parental investment in the embodied capital of offspring, which increases during industrialization and constrains the number of children in which parents are willing to invest.

It potentially follows from these two theories that reduction in the supply of later education by government expenditure should reduce demand for it by parents and thus both lessen the constraint of competitive embodied capital investment on parental fertility and reduce the opportunity costs that later education imposes on child production and fertility, thereby increasing both fertility and production and reducing the costs of population ageing discussed in the prior section. Literature on these theories and their alternatives is discussed in the next chapter.

Hypotheses

Given that the overall hypotheses of this study, that government expenditure positively influences aggregate production less for later stages of education and that it motivates parents to bear fewer children, depend on the coalescence of several underlying phenomena that have not been studied in conjunction on a wide scale in the chosen location of India, the study progresses with a number of tests of the consistency with the case of India of the hypotheses upon which the primary ones are based. Also tested are two alternatives posed by Colleran (hypothesis 4) and Newson et al. (hypothesis 5) to the explanation of fertility decline posed by Kaplan and Shenk. The hypotheses are listed forthwith, together with citations of the papers on which they are based:

1. Kaplan 1996: Parents with the same income but with more embodied capital bear fewer offspring and invest more in each. Shenk et al. 2016: Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.
2. Kaplan 1996: Parents with as much embodied capital but with greater income bear more offspring.
3. Kaplan 1996: Parents invest more in offspring with more embodied capital. Shenk et al. 2016: Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.
4. Colleran 2016: Correlation of low fertility with prestige motivates fertility decline.
5. Newson et al. 2005: Kin dispersion motivates fertility decline
6. Caplan 2019: Premia of the proportions of degrees completed by dropouts are less than those proportions of the premia of full degrees completed by graduates.
7. Caplan 2019: Educational specialization doesn't predict occupational specialization.
8. Caplan 2019: Differences between the individual and aggregate premia of later stages of education are greater than those of earlier stages.
9. Caplan 2019: Government education expenditure motivates people to consume more education.
10. Caplan 2019: Government expenditure on earlier stages of education increases aggregate production

more than expenditure on later stages.

11. Education trades off with the fertility of both parents and offspring.
12. Government education expenditure motivates lower fertility.

The hypotheses are tested using fixed effects models discussed in the chapter about methodology (chapter 3). The following chapter discusses the literature upon which this study is founded, including Kaplan's theory of fertility decline, tests of the theory by Shenk, its alternatives, Caplan's investigation of educational signaling, and empirical investigations of the impact of education policy on production and birth rates.

Chapter 2

Literature review

As a contradiction of the normally realistic assumption in evolutionary biology that resource scarcity is a constraint against which organisms maximize the number of their offspring, the inverse correlation of wealth and fertility in post-transition societies has been a topic of debate among social scientists. If the wealthy are maximizing their fitness, greater wealth must make it more worthwhile to increase the potential fitness of individual children by investing more in each and reducing their quantity than it is to increase the probability of general offspring survival by investing less in each and increasing their quantity. A possible explanation of this conundrum is offered by Kaplan (1994) and found likely by Shenk (2009, et al. 2013) to account for the phenomenon to a greater extent than other theories can. Kaplan's theory, Shenk's findings, and alternative theories are summarized in the following review. The theory of educational signaling advanced by Caplan (2019) is then described and studies more directly related to connections between educational policy and fertility are reviewed. The case of India and the

rationale of choosing it as a study location is then reviewed.

Kaplan: biological and economic motivations of fertility decline

A uniquely comprehensive effort to unite microeconomics and evolutionary biology in a theory of human reproductive decision making is that of Kaplan in his 1996 paper “A Theory of Fertility and Parental Investment in Traditional and Modern Human Societies” in which he frames time allocation to current survival, embodied capital investment, and reproduction as a fitness maximization problem. Here, embodied capital, similarly to human capital in economics, means assets commandeered by an organism that contribute to its ability to maximize its fitness. Kaplan argues that, because energy spent on reproduction can necessarily only be surplus to energy spent on survival and embodied capital investment, the optimization favored in natural selection is that which maximizes the time discounted surplus energy investment in reproduction over the lifespan of an organism. The particular allocation for any organism depends on the relative profitability of time investments into survival, embodied capital, and reproduction. Kaplan discusses how this problem leads in human evolution to a psychology focused on learning the outcomes of various time investments and allocating time to them accordingly while passively making reproductive decisions as current resources allow.

Pertaining to demographic transitions, this reproductive psychology implies that, in order for declines in fertility to occur, the marginal return of parental investment to child income in posttransition contexts must decrease slower than in pretransition contexts enough to counteract the positive effect of greater wealth on the frequency of reproduction. Kaplan proposes two characteristics of modern economies that could explain this increase in marginal return. The first is that, while the marginal return of investment in any skill in a traditional economy without a labor market is likely to decrease as investment progresses, labor markets produce wages that rise linearly with the expected payoffs of labor rather than rising at a decreasing rate. The second is that human capital is an input to its own production,

so that the more human capital is already possessed, the more that further investment is profitable, or conversely, the less human capital is already possessed, the less that further investment is profitable. While this compounding effect of human capital investment counteracts the sublinear return of investment in any one individual in preindustrial contexts so that skills are stably transmitted, the linear returns of skills investments in industrial labor markets release it from that constraint and allow it to produce the large variation in human capital that characterizes industrial societies. This pair of conditions confounds human evolved psychology focused on marginal returns of embodied capital investment and passive reproduction so that the low fertility that characterizes industrial societies, is not fitness-maximizing.

Kaplan identifies three observable outcomes of this theory of fertility decline, which are tested in this study and summarized in the first three hypotheses listed in the prior chapter. They are that greater parental education incentivizes greater offspring education and lesser fertility within income strata, that greater income incentivizes greater fertility within educational strata, and that academic ability in children incentivizes further educational investment by parents. An assumption implicit in Kaplan's suggestion of these outcomes is that education is valued for its production of human capital, an assumption against which the other theory on which this study is founded, that of educational signaling, contends.

Shenk: evidence for economic motivations of fertility decline

Explanations of fertility decline normally approach it from one of three subjects: mortality risk aversion, parental investment motivations, and cultural evolution (Shenk 2009). While these subjects each subsume a number of approaches, they can be generally summarized: Approaches related to risk aversion start from the initial decline of mortality often associated with industrialization and pose that fertility declines because high fertility was a hedge against the risk of child mortality the necessity of which is reduced by increasing child survival. While such approaches can explain the adjustment of fertility rates




Figure 2. Birth and child mortality rates in two demographic transitions
 (“Child Mortality”, “Fertility Rate: Children Per Woman over the Long-Term”)

to levels that would maintain the same number of adult children per woman before the transition as after, what would be an overcompensation in fertility reduction so that the number of surviving children decreases as well, as indicated in the differences between the fertility and mortality lines in Figure 2, must be explained. It is at this point in demographic transitions that other theories of fertility decline become useful (Shenk, personal communication). Such approaches as Kaplan’s related to parental investment observe the competitive pressures to which industrialization exposes parents and their effect on parental benefits and costs for bearing children and investing in them. Thirdly, approaches related to cultural evolution most often start from the fact that fertility decline is first observed in higher social strata and that the importance of prestige in human cultural psychology explains that this psychology is responsible for the spread of low fertility from higher strata Colleran (2016). Another cultural evolution approach

proposed by Newson et al. (2005) theorizes that high fertility is maintained by direct kin support and/or memes adapted to transmission by kin so that when, such economic forces as market integration motivate the dispersal of kin, the decrease in direct kin support and in the influence of kin-transmitted pro-natal memes and increase in influence of non-kin transmitted anti-natal memes lessens fertility.

Shenk evaluates all three general approaches in two studies conducted in urban south India (2009) and in rural Bangladesh (et al. 2013). In the 2009 study, Shenk relates indicators of mortality risk, economic development, and cultural transmission to the age at marriage and number of surviving children of women through the 20th century and finds that, although all three types of predictors changed during the transition, the sequence of changes favored the importance of economic changes in motivating fertility decline. In the 2013 study, Shenk et al. collected indicators used in a number of models in each of the three categories, ranked the models by their parsimoniousness as indicated by the importance of the indicators in determining the models' results, and found that the best economic model outranked the best risk aversion and cultural transmission models.

Educational signaling and credential inflation

While in popular imagination, the value of education is in knowledge and skills that it bestows, this valuation, namely the human capital theory of education, is challenged by the signaling theory of education, which was conceived in the 1970s by such economists as Kenneth Arrow (1973), Michael Spence (1974; 1978), and Joseph Stiglitz (1975), and lately advanced by Bryan Caplan (2019). The signaling theory instead poses that the value of education is in that, rather than producing new human capital, it produces a signal of precedent human capital, which is why the more educated are more frequently employed in better paid jobs (Hanushek & Zhang 2006). Signaling has been argued to account for up to 80% of the value of total education, with the proportion increasing as the education of any individual student progresses. While early education bestows such undeniably valuable skills as literacy

and numeracy, later education increasingly exhibits signs of being valued less as a way of acquiring skills than as a way of signaling them. Such signs include that the wage premiums of the proportions of degrees completed by dropouts are far less than those proportions of the wage premiums of the full degrees completed by graduates, that the education that students purchase is often irrelevant to skills in demand, that students forget most of what they study after they are tested, and that students are able to but rarely audit classes for free. The first two of these consequences are used to test the prevalence of educational signaling in this study. While education may not bestow skills particularly relevant to jobs, qualities necessary for educational success include intelligence, conscientiousness, and conformity, all of which employers value highly (Caplan 2019).

One consequence of education's value as a signal is that its individual premium is greater than its national premium. While individual workers with more education are more likely to work in better paid jobs than are those with less, the total supply of education in an economy has little effect on the productivity of the economy, and what little effect it has might even be negative (Krueger & Lindahl 2001). It is possible that this negative effect is caused by the public funding of education, which, instead of leveling skewed income distributions, simply raises the amount of education that all workers must consume to compete in labor markets (Van de Werfhorst & Andersen 2005), the opportunity cost of which is the time that workers would otherwise spend productively. There is thus reason to believe that the public funding of education, especially advanced education, is more likely to decrease economic growth than increase it. These possibilities are tested in this study.

Related research

Three prior studies are of note in their relevancy to the topic of this one. First is Skirbekk's 2005 study "Why Not Start Younger?" in which he, likewise in reaction to the possibility of negative social and economic outcomes of subreplacement fertility, relates the opportunity cost of education to production

and reproduction and questions the consequences of altering education policy. However, the manner in which he proposes changing education policy is different than the reduction of funding for later stages of education proposed here. Instead, he suggests a reduction in the age at which children begin school and a greater reduction in the age at which they graduate on the basis that children are ready for material earlier than assumed and that later years of education affect aggregate income less than individual income. He defends the proposition using data from Sweden, in which birth month induced variation in age at school entry and exit is found not to affect later productivity, and data from Switzerland, in which the length of schooling varies by canton and is found not to impact aggregate production.

A second study of relevance to this one is Azanert's 2008 study "Free education, fertility, and human capital accumulation" in which he constructs a mathematical model of parental fertility and investment, child human capital accumulation, and aggregate production and finds that free public schooling increases the human capital of children of parents with lower human capital, decreases that of children of parents with higher human capital, and increases fertility of parents with higher human capital, and that human capital and fertility levels converge when an initial skilled proportion of the population is below a threshold, but human capital increases and fertility decreases (asymptotically) indefinitely when the initial proportion is above the threshold. The implications of these findings are that public investment in education is essential for economies with initially low human capital levels to leave poverty, while it decreases production and raises fertility in economies with initially high human capital levels. This contrasts the deduction made in this study that public funding of education raises parental demand for education, thereby trading off with fertility and motivating fertility decline. The mathematical model is based on the assumptions that children's levels of human capital are an increasing function of the levels of public and private schooling and the externality of the economy's general level of human capital and that there are diminishing returns to public and private education, which are perfect substitutes. These assumptions don't contradict those held in this study.

Lastly, a third study related to this one is Lazzari et al.'s 2021 study "Educational composition

and parity contribution...”, in which the authors find that, in six countries with historically minimal fertility, dramatic increases in the education of women accompanied dramatic fertility declines from 1940 to 1970 but, although shifts in educational composition to higher stages did contribute residually to fertility decline, this effect accounted for a significant but small fraction of the effect of education-specific fertility, showing that fertility decline was caused more by fertility behaviors independent of education than by education itself. While the contribution of education consumption to fertility decline is in keeping with this study’s hypotheses, the confounding effect of education specific fertility will be explored in a model of fertility controlled for education consumption.

The case of India

In this study, data about the economies of the states of India and their funding of education are combined with data from demographic surveys to evaluate the hypotheses. India has been chosen as a case study because it is approaching the end of its demographic transition (Roser et al. 2013, Roser 2014), features much historical and current variability in the economic liberalism of and consequent funding of education by its state governments (Aghion et al. 2008) and, like many developing countries, features a thriving low-cost private schooling industry (Tooley 2003). Comprehensive demographic surveys such as the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) (Desai & Vanneman 2010) provide individual and household level data on fertility, education, and control variables such as child mortality, while data on the funding of both public and private education is available in the Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on Education (ABEE) and Statistics of School Education (SSE) reports produced by the Indian government and available on educationforallindia.com.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Data sources

The four main data sources used in this study are the IHDS surveys conducted in 2005 and 2011-2012 (Desai and Vanneman), the Indian Ministry of Education's 2005 and 2011 SSE reports and 2003-2005 and 2009-2011 ABEE reports, and the Reserve Bank of India's "Handbook of Statistics on Indian States" (HSIS). The parts of the IHDS dataset used record a large number of variables for individuals, households, and eligible women (ever married and aged from 15 to 49 years) pertaining to their economic activities, living conditions, education, familial relations, and health.

While the Ministry of Education provides the complete SSE and ABEE reports for 2011 on its website (Kumar et al. 2014, Gupta et al. 2013), it does not provide those for 2005, which were sourced from the website "Education for All in India" maintained by Dr. Arun C. Mehta ("Selected Educational Statistics" 2005, Kapoor et al. 2006). The SSE and ABEE data was cleaned and copied to an excel file, [education.xlsx](#), and the tables from the Reserve Bank of India were copied to another, [production.xlsx](#). Appendix A lists the variable codes used in the IHDS, SSE, ABEE, and HSIS tables.

Experimental design

This study was conducted as a series of fixed effects tests of the 12 hypotheses listed in the introduction. A fixed effects model is a description of a relationship between variables in which other variables thought to affect both dependent and independent variables, and thus to confound the relationship's effect, are held constant. The Python code used to conduct the tests is in a Jupyter Notebook [analysis.ipynb](#) written to be run in Google Drive's Google Colab folder containing [education.xlsx](#), [production.xlsx](#), and the wide IHDS SPSS files. The constructed data tables upon which

the tests were run are in [data.xlsx](#) and the results of each test are in [analysis.xlsx](#). The variables used in each test along with their codes in the datasets are in Table 1, after which the tests are described.

Table 1. Variables used in hypothesis evaluation

Hypothesis	Predictors	Outcomes	Controls
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 parents completed education (ED6 ED5 = 'No 0') - 2005 state Gini index (calculated from XINCOME) - 2005 state completed education income correlation (calculated from XED6 XED5 = 'No 0' and WKEARN) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 offspring completed education (ED6 ED5 = 'No 0') - 2005-2011 offspring born (EW9 – XEW9) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 parents income (XINCOME)
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 parents income (XINCOME) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005-2011 offspring born (EW9 – XEW9) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 parents completed education (ED6 ED5 = 'No 0')
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 education performance (ED2, ED3, ED8, and ED13) - 2005 state Gini index (calculated from XINCOME) - 2005 state offspring completed education and offspring income correlation (calculated from XED6 XED5 = 'No 0' and WKEARN) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 completed education (ED6 ED5 = 'No 0') 	
4a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 correlation of fertility with income (calculated from XEW9 and XINCOME) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - average state 2005-2011 offspring born per woman (calculated from EW9 – XEW9) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 caste prestige (XGROUPS6)
4b	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 correlation of fertility with caste prestige (calculated from XEW9 and XGROUPS6) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - average state 2005-2011 offspring born per woman (calculated from EW9 – XEW9) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 income (XINCOME)
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 cohabiting adults number (NADULTS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005-2011 offspring born (EW9 – XEW9) 	
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 completed education (ED6 ED5 = 'No 0') 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 income (INCOME) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 age (AGE)
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 educational specialization (ED10) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 occupational specialization (WS4) 	
8a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gross enrollment ratio (diachronic) - Education stage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Net state domestic product (NDPPC) 	
8b	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State gross enrollment ratio (synchronic) - Education stage (I-V, VI-VIII, IX-XII) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Net state domestic product (NDPPC) 	
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State government education expenditure (synchronic) - Education stage (I-VIII, IX-XII) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State gross enrollment ratio (synchronic) - Education stage (primary, secondary) 	
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State government education expenditure (synchronic) - Education stage (I-V, VI-VIII, IX-XII) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Net state domestic product change (NDPPC) 	
11a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 completed education (ED6 ED5 = 'No 0') 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 sibling number (EW9 PERSONID = RO10) 	
11b	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 completed education (ED6 ED5 = 'No 0') 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011 offspring number (EW9) 	
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State government education expenditure (synchronic) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005-2011 offspring born (EW9 – XEW9) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2005 offspring number (XEW9)

Hypothesis 1: Parents with the same income but with more embodied capital bear fewer offspring and invest more in each. Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.

In the test of hypothesis 1, completed education of parents was used as a signal of their embodied capital and completed education of children was used as a signal of parental investment, as education prolongs the dependency of children on parents. The effect of parental embodied capital on parental investment and the number of children born from 2005 to 2011 was recorded in an ordinary least squares (OLS) model for each of four quartiles of parental income, the first fixed effect of the models. Also fixed were the states in which subjects resided, as aggregate income and completed education data in each state could be used to record the effect of income inequality and perceived correlation of education and income on the hypothesized effect of parental embodied capital on parental investment and offspring number. The Gini index, calculated as $\text{maximum income} / (2 \times \text{average income}) - 1$, was used to estimate income inequality. Despite completed education being a predictor of offspring outcomes, the variable used was taken from the second IHDS survey rather than the first both because the sample size was consequently widened, the variable doesn't change after education is completed, and few parents were in school while bearing children (0.03% of fathers and no mothers).

Hypothesis 2: Parents with as much embodied capital but with greater income bear more offspring.

In the test of hypothesis 2, an OLS model was fitted to cumulative income of parents as a predictor and the number of their children born from 2005 to 2011 as an outcome for every combination of parents' completed education in years.

Hypothesis 3: Parents invest more in offspring with more embodied capital. Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.

The test of hypothesis 3 was similar to that of hypothesis 1 but with embodied capital held constant and income as a predictor. As completed education, the proxy for embodied capital, is recorded

discretely in years in contrast to income, it was not further quantized as was income for hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 4: Correlation of low fertility with prestige motivates fertility decline.

Both income and caste were used as indicators of prestige for hypothesis 4, so two separate tests were conducted for it, recorded in Table 1 as 4a and 4b. In the first, the correlation of number of children with income was recorded with caste fixed for each state and, in the second, the correlation of caste with income was recorded with income fixed for each state. In both tests, an OLS model was fitted to the data with the average number of offspring born per woman from 2005 to 2011 given the fixed variable for each state as the outcome variable.

Hypothesis 5: Kin dispersion motivates fertility decline.

For the test of hypothesis 5, an OLS model of offspring born from 2005 to 2011 given the number of adults inhabiting their households was fitted.

Hypothesis 6: Premia of the proportions of degrees completed by dropouts are less than those proportions of the premia of full degrees completed by graduates.

For the test of hypothesis 6, the difference between the average income of all individuals who completed a certain number of years of education and that of those who completed one less years was recorded for each number of years with the age of individuals in demidecades fixed.

Hypothesis 7: Educational specialization doesn't predict occupational specialization.

For the test of hypothesis 7, a matrix of occupation and higher education specialization was created and the relevance of degrees to occupations was subjectively judged.

Hypothesis 8: Differences between the individual and aggregate premia of later stages of education are greater than those of earlier stages.

SSE, the dataset of educational statistics of India, has both diachronic data for all of India and synchronic data for Indian states in 2005 and 2011, while HSIS, the dataset of economic statistics, has

diachronic data for each state, so two tests of hypothesis 8 were conducted. In the first, an OLS model was fitted to the gross enrollment ratios of grades I-V, VI-VIII, and IX-XII for all of India between 2007 and 2011 as predictors and net domestic product per capita (NDPPC) of all of India from 2010 to 2014, shifted forward 3 years, as the outcome. The second test was the same procedure conducted for each state in 2005 and 2011 rather than each year. Gross enrollment ratio (GER) is the ratio of enrolled individuals to all individuals in the population in the corresponding age bracket.

Hypothesis 9: Government education expenditure motivates people to consume more education.

For the test of hypothesis 9, an OLS model was fitted to the expenditure of each state on primary and secondary education in 2003 and 2009 as predictor and the GERs of each state for the corresponding grade sets (I-VIII and IX-XII) in 2005 and 2011 as outcome.

Hypothesis 10: Government expenditure on earlier stages of education increases aggregate production more than on later stages.

For the test of hypothesis 10, an OLS model was fitted to the expenditure of each state on primary and secondary education in 2003 and 2009 as predictor and NDPPC for each state in 2006 and 2012 as outcome.

Hypothesis 11: Education trades off with the fertility of both parents and offspring.

As hypothesis 11 is about effects on both parents and offspring, and as the structure of the IHDS dataset made associating individuals both with the numbers of their siblings and with the numbers of their own children computationally intensive, two tests were conducted. In the first, an OLS model was fitted to sibling number + 1 as outcome for all individuals with recorded mothers and, in the second, an OLS model was fitted to offspring number for all eligible women (ever married and aged from 15 to 49 years). In both models, completed education was the predictor.

Hypothesis 12: Government education expenditure motivates lower fertility.

For the test of hypothesis 12, an OLS model was fitted to the 2003 total expenditure of each state on education for each eligible woman in that state to the number of her offspring born from 2005 to 2011. The initial number of children in 2005 was fixed in case lower fertility parents influenced political demand for education.

Chapter 4

Results

This chapter summarizes the results of the tests described in the prior chapter and is structured likewise. For the full results, refer to [analysis.xlsx](#).

Hypothesis 1: Parents with the same income but with more embodied capital bear fewer offspring and invest more in each. Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.

The models created to test hypothesis 1 did not exhibit significant patterns in the effect of parental education on either parental investment or offspring number, regardless of income quartile, income inequality, or education-income correlation. A sample of the results, the OLS coefficients for mothers, is in Figure 3 on the next page.

Hypothesis 2: Parents with as much embodied capital but with greater income bear more offspring.

The models created to test hypothesis 2 did not exhibit significant patterns in the effect of income on number of children. Positive correlations are as frequent as negative ones and their distribution doesn't vary according to parental embodied capital, though variation in the relationship peaks at the extremes of parental education, as is noticeable in Figure 4 on the next page, in which blue and white bubbles are respectively positive and negative relationships, and bubble size indicates relationship strength.

Figure 3. Hypothesis 1 test






Figure 4. Hypothesis 2 test



Hypothesis 3: Parents invest more in offspring with more embodied capital. Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.

The hypothesis 3 test exhibits a clear hierarchy in the correlation of signals of precedent human capital with the amount of education that individuals complete. It is in keeping with the hypothesis that earlier signals of human capital, like secondary grades, correlate more with completed education than do later signals, like postsecondary grades. It is also in keeping that correlations also exhibit a very weak negative correlation with the Gini index and a very weak positive one with the correlation of completed education and income.

Figure 5. Hypothesis 3 test



Hypothesis 4: Correlation of low fertility with prestige motivates fertility decline.


The results of the hypothesis 4 test, displayed in Figure 6, indicate consistently negative correlations of income and offspring number but no significant relationship between them and offspring born per woman from 2005 to 2011. This is not in keeping with Colleran's (2016) hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: Kin dispersion motivates fertility decline.

The hypothesis 5 test found an insignificantly negative (-2%) correlation between the number of cohabiting relatives and the number of children born from 2005 to 2011. This is not in keeping with

Newson et al.'s (2005) hypothesis.


Figure 6. Hypothesis 4 test



Hypothesis 6: *Premia of the proportions of degrees completed by dropouts are less than those proportions of the premia of full degrees completed by graduates.*

The hypothesis 6 test reveals definitive spikes in the premia of certain years of schooling on eventual income, most notably the tenth. This is in keeping with Caplan's (2019) argument.

Figure 7. Hypothesis 6 test



Hypothesis 7: Educational specialization doesn't predict occupational specialization.

The hypothesis 7 test reveals no definitive tendency of well-matched pairs of degrees and occupations (green) to dominate (yellow means a weak match and red no match), although the two most popular categories of degree and occupation seem flexible enough to account for nearly 25% of employed individuals.

Table 2. Hypothesis 7 test

occupation \ degree	arts	science	commerce	vocational	engineering
teaching	934	339	118	22	6
construction	578	77	62	19	10
agricultural labor	528	78	45	11	4
clerical necessary	329	85	138	10	5
clerical supervisory	242	100	93	7	8
sales, shop management	219	47	74	10	0
driving	177	18	30	6	1
electricianship	119	38	26	31	6
police	156	24	17	4	4
computing	78	43	43	6	5
nursing	94	61	13	4	1
accounting	52	22	91	2	0
assembly	71	21	15	16	5
engineering / technology	22	57	5	10	27

Hypothesis 8: Differences between the individual and aggregate premia of later stages of education are greater than those of earlier stages.

The pattern of the OLS coefficients in the hypothesis 8 test (Figure 8) are the opposite of what the hypothesis suggests, which is that the influence of enrollment in later stages of education positively impacts aggregate production less. Rather, the premia of early education enrollment as suggested by the test are negative. Note that the second derivative of the premium decreases in all three models of the aggregate premia of education stages, while the individual premia of education stages, as shown in Figure 9, a revisualization of the hypothesis 6 test, exhibit no such pattern.

Figure 8. Hypothesis 8 test





Figure 9. Hypothesis 6 test revisited



Hypothesis 9: *Government education expenditure motivates people to consume more education.*

In the hypothesis 9 test, the correlations found between primary education expenditure and consumption in 2003 and 2009 are negative (approximately -36% and -31%), while those between secondary education expenditure and consumption in 2003 and 2009 are positive (both approximately 8%). While the positive correlation is expected, the negative one is not, and the difference may lie in the

natures of demand for and public and private supplies of primary and secondary schooling in India.

Hypothesis 10: *Government expenditure on earlier stages of education increases aggregate production more than on later stages.*

In pattern with the results of the hypothesis 8 test and in contrast with expectations, the OLS coefficients of expenditure on primary education for NDPPC in 2005 and 2011 are negative (both approximately -0.1%) while those of expenditure on secondary education are positive (approximately 0.2% and 0.1%). This contradicts the hypothesis, by which the coefficients of expenditure on primary education are expected to be higher than those on secondary education.

Hypothesis 11: *Education trades off with the fertility of both parents and offspring.*

In the hypothesis 11 test, the OLS coefficients relating completed education to sibling and offspring number are both negative (-14% and -10%) as expected.

Hypothesis 12: *Government education expenditure motivates lower fertility.*

Despite the unexpected test results of some of the hypotheses on which it is based, the study's final hypothesis, that government funding negatively influences birth rates, is in keeping with the results of the last test, as all but one of the OLS coefficients of 2003 education expenditure for offspring born from 2005 to 2011 are negative. The positive coefficient may be an outlier but the pattern's concavity would suggest that confounding effects of higher birth rates on education expenditure might correct an otherwise negative effect of education expenditure on fertility. There are also many possible negative confounding effects to be discussed below.

Figure 10. Hypothesis 12 test




Table 3. Results summary

Hypothesis	Test observations
1. Parents with the same income but with more embodied capital bear fewer offspring and invest more in each. Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.	- No pattern is apparent.
2. Parents with as much embodied capital but with greater income bear more offspring.	- OLS coefficients of parental income for number of children are more extreme at the extremes of parental completed education.
3. Parents invest more in offspring with more embodied capital. Greater income inequality and stronger influence of parental investment on offspring income strengthen this effect.	- In correlation with completed education, postsecondary grade < literacy \leq secondary grade < English fluency. - The correlations are very weakly negatively correlated with the Gini index and positively correlated with the correlation of education and income.
4. Correlation of low fertility with prestige motivates fertility decline.	- Correlations of income and offspring number are consistently negative. - The correlations bear no apparent relationship to offspring born per woman from 2005 to 2011.
5. Kin dispersion motivates fertility decline.	- There is an insignificantly negative (-2%) correlation between the number of cohabiting relatives and the number of children born from 2005 to 2011.
6. Premia of the proportions of degrees completed by dropouts are less than those proportions of the premia of full degrees completed by graduates	- The income premium of education spikes during the 10th, 12-13th, and 15th years and dips in the 11th and 14th years.
7. Educational specialization doesn't predict occupational specialization.	- The popularity of any combination of degree and occupation bears no apparent relationship with their intuitive relevancy.
8. Differences between the individual and aggregate premia of later stages of education are greater than those of earlier stages	- The OLS coefficients of I-V GER for NDPPC are negative. Those of VI-VIII and IX-XII GER are positive. - The differences between the coefficients of IX-XII and those of VI-VIII GER are all less than the differences between those of VI-VIII and those of I-V GER. - There is no apparent second derivative of the individual premium of completed education.
9. Government education expenditure motivates people to consume more education.	- Correlations between primary education expenditure and consumption are negative while those between secondary education expenditure and consumption are positive.
10. Government expenditure on earlier stages of education increases aggregate production more than on later stages.	- The OLS coefficients of expenditure on primary education for NDPPC are negative while those of secondary education are positive.
11. Education trades off with the fertility of both parents and offspring.	- The OLS coefficients of completed education for sibling and offspring number are both negative.
12. Government education expenditure motivates lower fertility.	- All but one of the OLS coefficients of educational expenditure for offspring born are negative. - The coefficients vary concavely with initial offspring number.

Chapter 5

Discussion

While the data and methods used in this study are limited in their ability to evaluate its primary hypotheses and those underlying them, the tests have yielded a number of results, some expected and others unexpected:

- A. None but the last of the conditions theorized by Kaplan (1996) to indicate those under which parents should be willing to favor parental investment in fewer offspring if his characterization of their motivations is true are apparent in the first three hypothesis tests. While parents are observed to invest more in children with greater precedent embodied capital and the strength of this effect very slightly varies with income inequality and education-income correlation as is fitting with Shenk's (2016) postulate, parental investment in the embodied capital of their children doesn't vary significantly with their own embodied capital, suggesting that the embodied capital of parents isn't as great of an input to the embodied capital of children as Kaplan thought or that parents don't take this input into account when investing in their offspring. Neither are they observed to bear as many offspring as their income allows, indicating the possibility of constraints on fertility in addition to embodied capital investment.
- B. Neither of the alternative motivations of fertility decline pertaining to cultural transmission given by Colleran (2016) and Newson et al. (2005) are supported by the data. The effects of prestige associated low fertility and of kin dispersal on parental fertility are either insignificant or confounded by other variables.
- C. The data is found to be strongly in keeping with two of the conditions thought by Caplan (2019) to indicate the valuation of education more for its signal of human capital than for its production of human capital, namely that years of education in which students graduate or receive certificates have higher income premia than other years and that educational and occupational specialization are not intuitively dependent.
- D. Aggregate premia of additional years of education were not shown to strictly decrease more quickly

than individual premia. While there was no apparent trend in individual premia from year to year, changes in aggregate premia between cohort brackets were strictly decreasing, and the aggregate premia peaked in grades VI-VII for 2005 data and diachronic data, suggesting that premium of postsecondary years could plausibly be strictly less than that of grades IX-XII, premia were strictly negative in grades I-V and rose on average from that bracket to grades IX-XII. The implausible negative premium of grades I-V is likely a product of the chosen OLS method for estimating aggregate premia, which is admittedly very flawed. A more elegant calculation for the aggregate premia of different stages of education ought to be used in any additional research. As of yet, the results of this test study do not imply that funding of earlier years of education is more aggregately profitable than funding of later years, as is hypothesized.

- E. While consumption of secondary education is positively correlated to its public funding, the opposite is true for primary education. This may result from a large number of low cost private schools enrollment in which is undocumented in the Indian education ministry's data. Tooley (2003) finds that such schools are often favored by parents in India.
- F. Education was observed to trade off with both sibling and offspring number, as was expected.
- G. Government education expenditure is associated with lower fertility as was expected, but the causality of this pattern cannot be determined from present results. A confounding effect of fertility on political demand for government education expenditure is unlikely, as the forward effect was controlled for number of initial offspring.

Limitations of this study's methods include that many potentially confounding effects on its results are unaccounted for, including effects on government expenditure of production (political influence of a wealthier populace) and fertility (political influence of a larger populace). These effects could be tested using higher resolution datasets on education funding and local politics. While Indian populations aren't yet ageing very quickly, so the effects of population ageing on its findings aren't apparent, the findings are still potentially applicable to low fertility settings.

Conclusion

This study tested the hypotheses that public funding of later stages of education motivates parents to bear fewer children and has a null or negative effect on production. While an association between public education funding and low fertility is found, some of the assumptions that underly this study's hypothesis about why such an association might exist contradict the study's findings. Although there is evidence that signaling theory applies to India, the hypothesis that this causes reductions in public funding of later education not to effect production is contradicted. While the study's methods are limited in their ability to evaluate its hypotheses, the government education expenditure, school attendance, and economic datasets constructed for the study are larger and much more readable than what was previously publicly available, so it is the author's hope that they will prove useful in later studies of connections between education, production, and fertility in India.

Appendix

Variable Codes

This appendix lists the table codes of variables in the datasets used in this study, as their sources don't catalogue them concisely. Variables used in the study are highlighted. Cleaned copies of the Statistics of School Education and Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on Education datasets are in [education.xlsx](#). A subset of the variables available in the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States is in [production.xlsx](#). The India Human Development Survey data is freely available in a variety of clean formats at [ICPSR](#).

Statistics of School Education

This report is provided in three tables, two containing synchronic data for states and union territories from the 2005-2006 and 2011-2012 reports and the third containing diachronic data for all of India from the 2011-2012 report. The tables are in the “SSE 2005 geography”, “SSE 2011 geography”, and “SSE 2011 chronology” sheets of education.xlsx, hyperlinked above. Table 2 indicates the temporal coverage of the 2011 diachronic data and the list headings.

SC: scheduled caste
ST: scheduled tribe
GER: gross enrollment ratio
PTR: pupil teacher ratio
GPI: gender parity index
drop: dropout rate

Synchronic variables

state
variables without data
senior secondary schools
secondary schools
upper primary schools
primary schools
preprimary schools
government senior secondary schools
local body senior secondary schools
private aided senior secondary schools
private unaided senior secondary schools
government secondary schools
local body secondary schools
private aided secondary schools
private unaided secondary schools
government upper primary schools
local body upper primary schools
private aided upper primary schools

private unaided upper primary schools
government primary schools
local body primary schools
private aided primary schools
private unaided primary schools
government preprimary schools
local body preprimary schools
private aided preprimary schools
private unaided preprimary schools
preprimary boys
preprimary girls
I boys
I girls
II boys
II girls
III boys
III girls
IV boys
IV girls
V boys
V girls
VI boys
VI girls
VII boys
VII girls
VIII boys
VIII girls
IX boys
IX girls
X boys
X girls
XI boys
XI girls

XII boys
XII girls
preprimary SC boys
preprimary SC girls
I SC boys
I SC girls
II SC boys
II SC girls
III SC boys
III SC girls
IV SC boys
IV SC girls
V SC boys
V SC girls
VI SC boys
VI SC girls
VII SC boys
VII SC girls
VIII SC boys
VIII SC girls
IX SC boys
IX SC girls
X SC boys
X SC girls
XI SC boys
XI SC girls
XII SC boys
XII SC girls
preprimary ST boys
preprimary ST girls
I ST boys
I ST girls
II ST boys

II ST girls
III ST boys
III ST girls
IV ST boys
IV ST girls
V ST boys
V ST girls
VI ST boys
VI ST girls
VII ST boys
VII ST girls
VIII ST boys
VIII ST girls
IX ST boys
IX ST girls
X ST boys
X ST girls
XI ST boys
XI ST girls
XII ST boys
XII ST girls
open secondary boys
open secondary girls
open senior secondary boys
open senior secondary girls
open vocational boys
open vocational girls
open secondary SC boys
open secondary SC girls
open senior secondary SC boys
open senior secondary SC girls
open vocational SC boys
open vocational SC girls

open secondary ST boys
open secondary ST girls
open senior secondary ST boys
open senior secondary ST girls
open vocational ST boys
open vocational ST girls
female senior secondary teachers
male senior secondary teachers
female secondary teachers
male upper primary teachers
female upper primary teachers
male primary teachers
female primary teachers
trained proportion of senior secondary teachers
trained proportion of secondary teachers
trained proportion of upper primary teachers
trained proportion of primary teachers
I-V boys GER
I-V girls GER
I-V GER
VI-VIII boys GER
VI-VIII girls GER
VI-VIII GER
I-VIII boys GER
I-VIII girls GER
I-VIII GER
IX-X boys GER
IX-X girls GER
IX-X GER
XI-XII boys GER
XI-XII girls GER
XI-XII GER
IX-XII boys GER
IX-XII girls GER
IX-XII GER
I-XII boys GER
I-XII girls GER
I-XII GER

I-V SC boys GER
I-V SC girls GER
I-V SC GER
VI-VIII SC boys GER
VI-VIII SC girls GER
VI-VIII SC GER
I-VIII SC boys GER
I-VIII SC girls GER
I-VIII SC GER
IX-X SC boys GER
IX-X SC girls GER
IX-X SC GER
XI-XII SC boys GER
XI-XII SC girls GER
XI-XII SC GER
IX-XII SC boys GER
IX-XII SC girls GER
IX-XII SC GER
I-XII SC boys GER
I-XII SC girls GER
I-XII SC GER
I-V ST boys GER
I-V ST girls GER
I-V ST GER
VI-VIII ST boys GER
VI-VIII ST girls GER
VI-VIII ST GER
I-VIII ST boys GER
I-VIII ST girls GER
I-VIII ST GER
IX-X ST boys GER
IX-X ST girls GER
IX-X ST GER
IX-X GER8
XI-XII ST boys GER
XI-XII ST girls GER
XI-XII ST GER
IX-XII ST boys GER
IX-XII ST girls GER
IX-XII ST GER

I-XII ST boys GER
I-XII ST girls GER
I-XII ST GER
I-V GPI
VI-VIII GPI
I-VIII GPI
IX-XII GPI
I-XII GPI
I-V SC GPI
VI-VIII SC GPI
I-VIII SC GPI
IX-XII SC GPI
I-V ST GPI
VI-VIII ST GPI
I-VII ST GPI
IX-XII ST GPI
I-XII ST GPI
I-V girls per 100 boys
VI-VIII girls per 100 boys
I-VIII girls per 100 boys
IX-X girls per 100 boys
IX-XII girls per 100 boys
I-V SC girls per 100 boys
VI-VIII SC girls per 100 boys
I-VIII SC girls per 100 boys
IX-X SC girls per 100 boys
IX-XII SC girls per 100 boys
I-V ST girls per 100 boys
VI-VIII ST girls per 100 boys
I-VIII ST girls per 100 boys
IX-X ST girls per 100 boys
IX-XII ST girls per 100 boys
I-V boys drop
I-V girls drop
I-V drop
I-VIII boys drop
I-VIII girls drop
I-VIII drop

I-X boys drop
I-X girls drop
I-X drop
I-V SC boys drop
I-V SC girls drop
I-V SC drop
I-VIII SC boys drop
I-VIII SC girls drop
I-VIII SC drop
I-X SC boys drop
I-X SC girls drop
I-X SC drop
I-V ST boys drop
I-V ST girls drop
I-V ST drop
I-VIII ST boys drop
I-VIII ST girls drop
I-VIII ST drop
I-X ST boys drop
I-X ST girls drop
I-X ST drop
6-10 boys
6-10 girls
11-13 boys
11-13 girls
14-17 boys
14-17 girls
6-10 SC boys
6-10 SC girls
11-13 SC boys
11-13 SC girls
14-17 SC boys
14-17 SC girls
6-10 ST boys
6-10 ST girls
11-13 ST boys
11-13 ST girls
14-17 ST boys
14-17 ST girls

Table 4. Temporal coverage of the diachronic data in the 2011 Statistics of School Education report

years accounted						heading	number of variables	frequency
1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000			
						A	27	quinquennial from 1950, annual from 1990 to 2011
						B	15	decennial from 1950, annual from 1990 to 2011
						C	6	decennial from 1960, 1990, 1992, annual from 1995 to 2011
						D	12	1973, 1978, 1986, 1993, annual from 1996 to 2011, no 2000
						E	24	quinquennial from 1980, annual from 1990 to 2011
						F	3	1980, 1990, 1992, annual from 1995 to 2011
						G	27	annual from 1990 to 2011
						H	12	1990, annual from 1995 to 2011, no 2000
						I	6	1990, annual from 1996 to 2011, no 2000
						J	15	annual from 1991 to 2011
						K	8	annual from 2001 to 2011
						L	4	annual from 2003 to 2011
						M	40	annual from 2004 to 2011
						N	12	annual from 2008 to 2011

Diachronic variables

year

A

primary schools
upper primary schools
senior secondary schools
I-V enrollment
I-V boys enrollment
I-V girls enrollment
VI-VIII enrollment
VI-VIII boys enrollment
VI-VIII girls enrollment
XI-XII enrollment

XI-XII boys enrollment
XI-XII girls enrollment
I-V girls enrollment percent
VI-VIII girls enrollment percent
XI-XII girls enrollment percent
teachers per primary school
male teachers per primary school
female teachers per primary school
teachers per upper primary school
male teachers per upper primary school
female teachers per upper primary school
teachers per senior secondary school
male teachers per senior secondary school
female teachers per senior secondary school
female per 100 male primary teachers
female per 100 male upper primary teachers
female per 100 male senior secondary teachers

B

I-VIII GER
I-VIII boys GER
I-VIII girls GER
I-V GER
I-V boys GER
I-V girls GER
VI-VIII GER
VI-VIII boys GER
VI-VIII girls GER
I-V GPI
VI-VIII GPI
primary PTR
upper primary PTR
senior secondary PTR

C

I-VIII drop

I-VIII boys drop
I-VIII girls drop
I-V drop
I-V boys drop
I-V girls drop

D

government primary schools
local body primary schools
private aided primary schools
private unaided primary schools
government upper primary schools
local body upper primary schools
private aided upper primary schools
private unaided upper primary schools
government senior secondary schools
local body senior secondary schools
private aided senior secondary schools
private unaided senior secondary schools

E

1-V SC enrollment
 1-V SC boys enrollment
 1-V SC girls enrollment
 VI-VIII SC enrollment
 VI-VIII SC boys enrollment
 VI-VIII SC girls enrollment
 XI-XII SC enrollment
 XI-XII SC boys enrollment
 XI-XII SC girls enrollment
 1-V ST enrollment
 1-V ST boys enrollment
 1-V ST girls enrollment
 VI-VIII ST enrollment
 VI-VIII ST boys enrollment
 VI-VIII ST girls enrollment
 XI-XII ST enrollment
 XI-XII ST boys enrollment
 XI-XII ST girls enrollment
 1-V SC girls enrollment percent
 VI-VIII SC girls enrollment percent
 XI-XII SC girls enrollment percent
 1-V ST girls enrollment percent
 VI-VIII ST girls enrollment percent
 XI-XII ST girls enrollment percent

F

1-X drop
 1-X boys drop
 1-X girls drop

G

1-V SC GER
 1-V SC boys GER
 1-V SC girls GER
 VI-VIII SC GER
 VI-VIII SC boys GER
 VI-VIII SC girls GER
 1-VIII SC GER
 1-VIII SC boys GER
 1-VIII SC girls GER
 1-V ST GER

1-V ST boys GER
 1-V ST girls GER
 VI-VIII ST GER
 VI-VIII ST boys GER
 VI-VIII ST girls GER
 1-VIII ST GPI
 1-VIII SC GPI
 1-VIII SC GPI
 1-VIII ST GPI
 1-V ST GPI
 VI-VIII ST GPI
 teachers per secondary school
 male teachers per secondary school
 female teachers per secondary school

H

1-VIII SC drop
 1-VIII SC boys drop
 1-VIII SC girls drop
 1-V SC drop
 1-V SC boys drop
 1-V SC girls drop
 1-VIII ST drop
 1-VIII ST boys drop
 1-VIII ST girls drop
 1-V ST drop
 1-V ST boys drop
 1-V ST girls drop

I

1-X SC drop
 1-X SC boys drop
 1-X SC girls drop
 1-X ST drop
 1-X ST boys drop
 1-X ST girls drop

J

secondary schools
 secondary PTR

female per 100 male secondary teachers
 IX-X enrollment
 IX-X boys enrollment
 IX-X girls enrollment
 IX-X SC enrollment
 IX-X SC boys enrollment
 IX-X SC girls enrollment
 IX-X ST enrollment
 IX-X ST boys enrollment
 IX-X ST girls enrollment
 IX-X girls enrollment percent
 IX-X SC girls enrollment percent
 IX-X ST girls enrollment percent

K

IX-XII GER
 IX-XII boys GER
 IX-XII girls GER
 1-XII GER
 1-XII boys GER
 1-XII girls GER
 1-XII GPI
 IX-XII GPI

L

government secondary schools
 local body secondary schools
 private aided secondary schools
 private unaided secondary schools

M

IX-X GER
 IX-X boys GER
 IX-X girls GER
 XI-XII GER
 XI-XII boys GER
 XI-XII girls GER
 1-XII SC GER
 1-XII SC boys GER
 1-XII SC girls GER
 IX-XII SC GER
 IX-XII SC boys GER
 IX-XII SC girls GER

IX-X SC GER
 IX-X SC boys GER
 IX-X SC girls GER
 XI-XII SC GER
 XI-XII SC boys GER
 XI-XII SC girls GER
 1-XII ST GER
 1-XII ST boys GER
 1-XII ST girls GER
 IX-XII ST GER
 IX-XII ST boys GER
 IX-XII ST girls GER
 IX-X ST GER
 IX-X ST boys GER
 IX-X ST girls GER
 XI-XII ST GER
 XI-XII ST boys GER
 XI-XII ST girls GER
 1-XII SC GPI
 1-XII ST GPI
 IX-XII SC GPI
 IX-XII ST GPI
 XI-XII GPI
 XI-XII SC GPI
 XI-XII ST GPI

N

1-X GER
 1-X boys GER
 1-X girls GER
 1-X SC GER
 1-X SC boys GER
 1-X SC girls GER
 1-X ST GER
 1-X ST boys GER
 1-X ST girls GER
 1-X GPI
 1-X SC GPI
 1-X ST GPI

Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on Education

This report is provided in two tables containing synchronic data for states and union territories from the 2003-2005 and 2009-2011 reports. The tables are in the “ABEE 2005 geography” and “ABEE 2011 geography” sheets of education.xlsx, hyperlinked above.

2003-2005

state
 variables without data
 2003 expenditure on education
 2004 expenditure on education
 2005 expenditure on education
 2003 planned expenditure on education by education department
 2003 unplanned expenditure on education by education department
 2004 planned expenditure on education by education department
 2004 unplanned expenditure on education by education department
 2005 planned expenditure on education by education department
 2005 unplanned expenditure on education by education department
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary education
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary education
 2004 planned expenditure on elementary education
 2004 unplanned expenditure on elementary education
 2005 planned expenditure on elementary education
 2005 unplanned expenditure on elementary education
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary administration
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary administration
 2004 planned expenditure on elementary administration
 2004 unplanned expenditure on elementary administration
 2005 planned expenditure on elementary administration
 2005 unplanned expenditure on elementary administration
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary government schools
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary government schools
 2004 planned expenditure on elementary government schools

2004 unplanned expenditure on elementary government schools
 2005 planned expenditure on elementary government schools
 2005 unplanned expenditure on elementary government schools
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary assistance to non government schools
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary assistance to non government schools
 2004 planned expenditure on elementary assistance to non government schools
 2004 unplanned expenditure on elementary assistance to non government schools
 2005 planned expenditure on elementary assistance to non government schools
 2005 unplanned expenditure on elementary assistance to non government schools
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary assistance to local bodies
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary assistance to local bodies
 2004 planned expenditure on elementary assistance to local bodies
 2004 unplanned expenditure on elementary assistance to local bodies
 2005 planned expenditure on elementary assistance to local bodies
 2005 unplanned expenditure on elementary assistance to local bodies
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary teachers' training
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary teachers' training
 2004 planned expenditure on elementary teachers' training
 2004 unplanned expenditure on elementary teachers' training
 2005 planned expenditure on elementary teachers' training
 2005 unplanned expenditure on elementary teachers' training
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary non-formal education
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary non-formal education
 2004 planned expenditure on elementary non-formal education
 2004 unplanned expenditure on elementary non-formal education
 2005 planned expenditure on elementary non-formal education
 2005 unplanned expenditure on elementary non-formal education
 2003 planned expenditure on elementary scholarships
 2003 unplanned expenditure on elementary scholarships

Handbook of Statistics on Indian States

This data consists of tables for each variable, each containing a diachronic record of the variable for every state and union territory in India. The following table lists the variables included in production.xlsx, hyperlinked above. Economic variables are nominal and in 10,000s of rupees. Some are recorded in separate 2004-2014 and 2011-2021 tables. 2004-2014 tables are at factor cost and 2011-2021 tables are at market price.

Table 5. Variables from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States included in production.xlsx

variable	sheet name	temporal coverage
net state domestic product per capita	NDPPC 2004	annual 2004-2014
	NDPPC 2011	annual 2011-2021
gross state domestic product	GDP 2004	annual 2004-2014
	GDP 2011	annual 2011-2021
gross capital formation	GCF	annual 2004-2019
net state value added	NVA	annual 2004-2019
gross state value added	GVA	annual 2004-2019
gross state value added by agriculture	GVA agriculture 2004	annual 2004-2014
	GVA agriculture 2011	annual 2011-2021
gross state value added by manufacturing	GVA manufacturing 2004	annual 2004-2014
	GVA manufacturing 2011	annual 2011-2021
gross state value added by construction	GVA construction 2004	annual 2004-2014
	GVA construction 2011	annual 2011-2021
gross state value added by industry	GVA industry 2004	annual 2004-2014
	GVA industry 2011	annual 2011-2021
gross state value added by banking and insurance	GVA finance 2004	annual 2004-2014
	GVA finance 2011	annual 2011-2021
gross state value added by services	GVA services 2004	annual 2004-2014
	GVA services 2011	annual 2011-2021
consumer price index	CPI	annual 2014-2021
literacy rate	literacy	decennial 1951-2011
birth rate	birth	annual 2004-2021
total fertility rate	total fertility	annual 2003-2020
maternal mortality rate	maternal mortality	1999, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, annual 2014-2017
infant mortality rate	infant mortality	annual 2004-2020
death rate	death	annual 2004-2021

India Human Development Survey

This data is provided in various formats for individuals, households, and eligible women at the ICPSR webpage hyperlinked above. The headings for the links to download data used in this study and its codebooks are “DS3 Individuals - Wide Panel (Public-Use)”, “DS9 Households - Wide Panel (Public-Use)”, and “DS15 Eligible Women - Wide Panel (Public-Use)”. The codebooks provide the codes, titles,

ranges, and statistics of each variable and the prompts used for each variable are available in the questionnaires linked next to the “DS0 Study-Level Files” heading for [the 2005 iteration of IHDS](#) and the “DS1 Individual” and “DS2 Household” headings for [its 2011-2013 iteration](#). In the following list, the code for each variable in the 2011-2012 survey is in capital letters followed by a colon and the variable’s title. Variables in the 2005 survey are not listed but have the same codes, prefixed by an “X”. Variables that are only in the 2011-2012 survey have “[IHDS2 only]” in their titles

Individuals

SURVEY: IHDS1 (2005) or IHDS2 (2012)
 HHBASE: unique multisurvey id of hh at 1st entry
 PBASE: unique multisurvey person id
 HHFAM2: -hhbase = unique HH id in wave 2
 HHFAM2012: -hhfam2 in 2012, IHDS2 subfamily
 STATEID: State code
 DISTID: District code
 PSUID: PSU: village/neighborhood code
 HHID: Household ID IHDS2=3-digit IHDS1=2-digit
 HHSPLITID: Split household ID
 PERSONID: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID in IHDS1/IHDS2 household
 IDPERSON: Person id, unique 12[IHDS2] or 11[IHDS1] byte string
 PID2005: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID within 2005 household, rol
 PID2012: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID within 2012 household, rof
 HHID2005: household id in 2005 (2-digit)
 HHID2012: household id in 2012 (3-digit)
 HHSPLITID2005: split household id for 2005
 HHSPLITID2012: split household id for 2012
 HHWAVES: which surveys hh has been in
 PWAVES: which surveys p has been in
 STDIST01: State + 2001 district id, labeled
 PSUWAVES: which surveys PSU has been in
 URBAN: Census 2001 for IHDS-I; 2011 for IHDS-II
 URBAN2001: Census 2001: village/town
 URBAN4: 4-cat urban/rural from 2001/2011 for IHDS-I/II
 URBAN4_2001: 4-cat urban/rural from 2001 census & IHDS-I vill q
 URBAN2011: Urban residence from census 2011
 URBAN4_2011: 4-cat urban/rural from 2011 census & IHDS-II vill q
 METRO: Largest 6 metro areas 0/1
 METRO6: Largest 6 metro areas 1-6
 RO0: HQ4 2.0 Roster ID IHDS2
 RO1: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID IHDS1
 RO1ID1993: Roster ID in 1993 HDP1 survey
 RO3: HQ4 2.3 Sex
 RO4: HQ4 2.4 Relationship to head
 RO5: HQ4 2.5 Age
 RO6: HQ4 2.6 Marital Status
 RO7: HQ4 2.7 Primary Activity Status [IHDS2 only]
 RO8: HQ4 2.8 Spouse's ID
 RO9: HQ4 2.9 Father's ID
 RO10: HQ4 2.1 Mother's ID
 FM1: HQ7 5.1 HH any owned or cultivated
 FM36Y: HQ10 5.36 Own farm work
 FMDAYS: HQ10 5.37 Farm: days/year
 FM38: HQ10 5.38 Farm: hours/day max=12 [as in IHDS1]
 FMHOURS: HQ10 5.37-38 Farm: hours/year max=4000
 FMEARN: HQ7-10 ind crop net earnings est.
 FMHOURLY: HQ7-10 own farm net hourly wages est.
 WKFARM: HQ14-16 fm12+ work participation farm
 FM39AY: HQ10 5.39a Farm work: is decision maker
 AN6: HQ11 6.6 Animal care: Freq
 AN7Y: HQ11 6.7 Animal care: is decision maker
 AN1: HQ11 6.1 HH Owns livestock
 AN5Y: HQ11 6.5 Animal care work
 NF1: HQ14 8.1 Any nonfarm business, corrected
 NFBN1: HQ14 8(1) Bsns1: hh has 1st business
 NF1ANM: HQ14 8.1a Bsns1: Ind name
 NF1A: HQ14 8.1a Bsns1: Industry
 NF1BNM: HQ14 8.1b Bsns1: Occ name
 NF1B: HQ14 8.1b Bsns1: Occupation corrected
 NF11Y: HQ14 8.11 Bsns1: is worker
 NF12: HQ14 8.12 Bsns1: days max=365
 NF13: HQ14 8.13 Bsns1: hours/day max=16
 NFEARN1: HQ12 7. ind net business#1 earn est.
 NF15Y: HQ14 8.15 Bsns1: is decision maker [IHDS2 only]
 NFBN2: HQ15 8(2) Bsns2: hh has 2nd business
 NF21ANM: HQ15 8.21a Bsns2: Ind name
 NF21A: HQ15 8.21a Bsns2: Industry
 NF21BNM: HQ15 8.21b Bsns2: Occ name
 NF21B: HQ15 8.21b Bsns2: Occupation corrected
 NF31Y: HQ15 8.31 Bsns2: is worker
 NF32: HQ15 8.32 Bsns2: days max=365
 NF33: HQ15 8.33 Bsns2: hours/day max=16
 NFEARN2: HQ15 7. ind net business#2 earn est.
 NF35Y: HQ15 8.35 Business #2: is decision maker [IHDS2 only]
 NFBN4: HQ16 8(3) Bsns3: hh has 3rd business
 NF41ANM: HQ16 8.41a Bsns3: Ind name

NF41A: HQ16 8.41a Bsns3: Industry
 NF41BNM: HQ16 8.41b Bsns3: Occ name
 NF41B: HQ16 8.41b Bsns3: Occupation corrected
 NFS1Y: HQ16 8.51 Bsns3: is worker
 NFS2: HQ16 8.52 Bsns3: days max=365
 NFS3: HQ16 8.53 Bsns3: hours/day max=16
 NFEARN3: HQ14 7. ind net business#3 earn est.
 NFEARN: HQ12-4 7. ind net business earn est.
 NFHOURLY: HQ12-4 7. ind net business earn/hour est.
 NFDAYS: HQ14-16 nf12+ days per year all businesses
 NFHOURS: HQ14-16 nf12+ hours per year all businesses
 NF55Y: HQ15 8.55 Business #3: is decision maker [IHDS2 only]
 IN12Y: HQ17 9.12 Any program income
 IN13S1: HQ17 9.13-1 Old Age Pension Rs
 IN13S2: HQ17 9.13-2 Widows Pension Rs
 IN13S3: HQ17 9.13-3 Maternity Benefit Rs
 IN13S4: HQ17 9.13-4 Disability Pension Rs
 IN13S5: HQ17 9.13-5 Annapurna Rs
 IN13S6: HQ17 9.13-6 Other govt Rs
 IN13S7: HQ17 9.13-7 NGOs Rs
 IN13S8: HQ17 9.13-8 other scheme Rs [IHDS2 only]
 IN18: HQ18 9.18 NREGA card number [IHDS2 only]
 IN19: HQ18 9.19 NREGA: N members on card [IHDS2 only]
 IN20: HQ18 9.20 NREGA: N days eligible [IHDS2 only]
 IN21: HQ18 9.21 NREGA: N days worked [IHDS2 only]
 IN22: HQ18 9.22 NREGA: why not worked [IHDS2 only]
 IN23: HQ18 9.23 NREGA: 1st worker [IHDS2 only]
 IN24: HQ18 9.24 NREGA: 2nd worker [IHDS2 only]
 ED2: HQ19 11.2 Educ: Literacy
 ED3: HQ19 11.3 Educ: English ability
 ED4: HQ19 11.4 Educ: Attended school
 ED5: HQ19 11.5 Educ: Enrolled now
 ED6: HQ19 11.6 Educ: Completed Years, never,<1=0
 EDUC7: HQ19 11.4.6 Educ: Completed Years, 7cats
 ED7: HQ19 11.7 Educ: Ever repeated
 ED8: HQ19 11.8 Educ: 2ndary class
 ED9: HQ19 11.9 Educ: post secondary [IHDS2 only]
 ED10: HQ19 11.1 Educ: Post 2nd subj
 ED11: HQ19 11.1.1 Educ: Attend college/voc
 ED12: HQ19 11.1.2 Educ: Highest degree [IHDS1~IHDS2]
 ED13: HQ19 11.1.3 Educ: Degree class
 MM7Y: HQ22 13.7 uses computer
 MM8: HQ22 13.8 Computer: internet, e-mail [IHDS2 only]
 MM9: HQ22 13.9 Computer: Mostly where? [IHDS2 only]
 MM12: HQ22 13.12 Mobile: Roster ID [IHDS2 only]
 MM12Y: HQ22 13.12 owns mobile [IHDS2 only]
 MM13: HQ22 13.13 Mobile: internet, e-mail [IHDS2 only]
 MM14: HQ22 13.14 Mobile: SMS [IHDS2 only]
 TAQ: HQ34 / EQ37 26.2 Learning test questionnaire
 TA2Y: HQ34 26.2 Was a test child
 TA3: HQ34 26.3 Test child: Ever school
 TA4: HQ34 26.4 Test child: Class
 TA5: HQ34 26.5 Test child: Enjoys school
 TA6: HQ34 26.6 Test child: Teacher nice
 TA7: HQ34 26.7 Test child: Teacher absent [IHDS2 only]
 TA8A: HQ34 26.8 Test: Reading language [IHDS1~IHDS2]
 TA8B: HQ34 26.8 Test: Reading level
 TA9A: HQ34 26.0 Test: Math language [IHDS1~IHDS2]
 TA9B: HQ34 26.9 Test: Math level
 TA10A: HQ34 26.10 Test: Writing language [IHDS1~IHDS2]
 TA10B: HQ34 26.10 Test: Writing level [IHDS1 values]
 CS2Y: EQ4 2.2 Listed student, p4, yesno
 CS3: EQ4 2.3 In school/ college [IHDS2 only]
 CS3Y: EQ4 2.3 In school/ college, yesno [IHDS2 only]
 CS4: EQ4 2.4 School type
 CS5: EQ4 2.5 School distance (Km)
 CS6: EQ4 2.6 Standard (yrs) <1=0
 CS7: EQ4 2.7 Course if above 10 standard [IHDS2 only]
 CS8: EQ4 2.8 Medium of instruction: 4 cat
 CS9: EQ4 2.9 Year English taught
 CS10: EQ4 2.10 School Hrs/week
 CS11: EQ4 2.11 Homework Hrs/week
 CS12: EQ4 2.12 Pvt Tuition Hrs/week
 CS13: EQ4 2.13 Days/month absent
 CS14Y: EQ4 2.14 Mid-day meal
 CS16: EQ5 2.16 Voc: Classes Hrs/week [IHDS2 only]
 CS17: EQ5 2.17 Voc: Standard completed [IHDS2 only]
 CS18: EQ5 2.18 Voc: Current Prog type [IHDS2 only]
 CS19: EQ5 2.19 Voc: Institution type [IHDS2 only]
 CS20: EQ5 2.20 Voc: course [IHDS2 only]
 CS21: EQ5 2.21 Free books

CS22: EQ5 2.22 School fees by govt
CS23: EQ5 2.23 Free uniform
CS24: EQ5 2.24 Scholarship [IHDS2 only]
CS24Y: EQ5 2.24 Scholarship yes/no
CS25: EQ5 2.25 School fees
CS26: EQ5 2.26 Books uniform Rs [IHDS2 only]
CS27: EQ5 2.27 Bus Rs [IHDS2 only]
CS26_27: EQ5 2.26,27 Books, uniform, transport Rs
CS28: EQ5 2.28 Pvt tuition Rs
CHELIGIBLE: Eligible for tests & child section
CHIY: EQ6 3.0 Child: EdHe questions
CH1NO: EQ6 3.0 Child: 1st or 2nd child
CH2: EQ6 3.2 Child: School enrolment
CH3: EQ6 3.3 Child: Start Age in years
CH4A: EQ6 3.4 Child: School choice reason 1 [IHDS2 only]
CH4B: EQ6 3.4 Child: School choice reason 2 [IHDS2 only]
CH5: EQ6 3.5 Child: School admission difficult [IHDS2 only]
CH6: EQ6 3.6 Child: Teacher attendance [IHDS1-IHDS2]
CH6B: EH6 3.4 Ch1.2: Faculty attendance [IHDS1 only]
CH7: EQ6 3.7 Child: Teacher gender [IHDS2 only]
CH8: EQ6 3.8 Child: Local teacher
CH9: EQ6 3.9 Child: Unfair teacher [IHDS1-IHDS2]
CH10: EQ6 3.10 Child: Good teacher [IHDS1-IHDS2]
CH11: EQ6 3.11 Child: Biased teacher [IHDS1-IHDS2]
CH12: EQ6 3.12 Child: PTA participation
CH13: EQ6 3.13 Child: PTA attendance [IHDS2 only]
CH14: EQ6 3.14 Child: # teacher discuss
CH15: EQ6 3.15 Child: Average student
CH16: EQ6 3.16 Child: Enjoy school [IHDS1-IHDS2]
CH17: EQ6 3.17 Child: # Repeats
CH18: EQ6 3.18 Child: Ever praised
CH19: EQ6 3.19 Child: Ever beaten
CH20: EQ6 3.20 Child: Ever scolded [IHDS2 only]
SM2Y: EQ12 8.2 STMorb ID, page 12, yesno [IHDS2 only]
SM3: EQ12 8.3 STMorb Days ill
SM4: EQ12 8.4 Fever
SM5: EQ12 8.5 Cough
SM6: EQ12 8.6 Cough w short breaths
SM7: EQ12 8.7 Diarrhoea
SM8: EQ12 8.8 Diarrhoea with blood
SM9: EQ12 8.9 Liquid intake if Diarrhoea
SM10: EQ12 8.10 ORS given if Diarrhoea
SM11: EQ12 8.11 STMorb Days Unable
SM12: EQ12 8.12 STMorb Treatment
SM14A: EQ15 9.14 minor morb:who 1st [IHDS1-IHDS2]
SM14B: EQ15 9.14 minor morb:where 1st [IHDS1-IHDS2]
SM15A: EQ15 9.15 minor morb:who 2nd [IHDS1-IHDS2]
SM15B: EQ15 9.15 minor morb:where 2nd [IHDS1-IHDS2]
SM16: EQ13 8.16 STMorb Treatment type [IHDS2 only]
SM17: EQ13 8.17 STMorb Days hosp
SM18: EQ13 8.18 STMorb Dr/hosp Rs
SM19: EQ13 8.19 STMorb Meds in cost
SM20: EQ13 8.20 STMorb Medicine Rs
SM21: EQ13 8.21 STMorb Travel Rs
SM22: EQ13 8.22 STMorb Med Insurance Rs [IHDS2 only]
MB2Y: EQ14 8.2 MJMorb line, page 14, yesno
MB3: EQ14 9.3 Cataract
MB4: EQ14 9.4 Tuberculosis
MB5: EQ14 9.5 High BP
MB6: EQ14 9.6 Heart disease
MB7: EQ14 9.7 Diabetes
MB8: EQ14 9.8 Leprosy
MB9: EQ14 9.9 Cancer
MB10: EQ14 9.10 Asthma
MB11: EQ14 9.11 Polio
MB12: EQ14 9.12 Paralysis
MB13: EQ14 9.13 Epilepsy
MB14: EQ14 9.14 Mental illness
MB15: EQ14 9.15 STD or AIDS
MB16: EQ14 9.16 Accident [IHDS2 only]
MB17: EQ14 9.17 Other long term
MB18: EQ14 9.18 MJmorb Days Unable
MB19: EQ14 9.19 MJmorb Treatment
MB21A: EQ15 9.21 MJmorb Who 1st [IHDS1-IHDS2]
MB21B: EQ15 9.21 MJmorb Where 1st [IHDS1-IHDS2]
MB22A: EQ15 9.22 MJmorb Who 2nd [IHDS1-IHDS2]
MB22B: EQ15 9.22 MJmorb Where 2nd [IHDS1-IHDS2]
MB23: EQ15 9.23 MJmorb Treatment type [IHDS2 only]
MB24: EQ15 9.24 MJmorb Days hosp
MB25: EQ15 9.25 MJmorb Cost Dr/hosp
MB26: EQ15 9.26 MJmorb Meds in cost
MB27: EQ15 9.27 MJmorb Cost Medicine
MB28: EQ15 9.28 MJmorb Cost Travel
MB29: EQ15 9.29 MJmorb Med Insurance Rs [IHDS2 only]
AD2Y: EQ16 10.2 ADL ID, page 16, yesno [IHDS2 only]
AD3: EQ16 10.3 Difficulty Walking 1km
AD4: EQ16 10.4 Difficulty Toilet
AD5: EQ16 10.5 Difficulty Dressing
AD6: EQ16 10.6 Difficulty Hearing
AD7: EQ16 10.7 Difficulty Speaking
AD8: EQ16 10.8 Difficulty Far sight
AD9: EQ16 10.9 Difficulty Short sight
TO2Y: EQ17 10.2 smoke, alcohol, yesno
TO3: EQ17 12.3 Smoke cigarettes [IHDS2 only]
TO4: EQ17 12.4 Smoke bidis or hukkah [IHDS2 only]
TO3_4: EQ17 12.3 Smoke cigarettes, bidi, [IHDS1-IHDS2]
TO5: EQ17 12.5 12.5 Chew tobacco / gutkha [IHDS1-IHDS2]
TO6: EQ17 12.6 Drink alcohol [IHDS1-IHDS2]
AP1Y: EQ36 25.3 Anthropometry data
AP3: EQ36 25.3 Anthropometry Birth ID [IHDS2 only]
AP5: EQ36 25.5 Anthropometry Height 1st
AP6: EQ36 25.6 Anthropometry Height 2nd [IHDS2 only]
AP7: EQ36 25.7 Anthropometry Position
AP8: EQ36 25.8 Anthropometry Weight 1st
AP9: EQ36 25.9 Anthropometry Weight 2nd
EW1NO: EW which questionnaire [IHDS2 only]
EWELIGIBLE: HH4 2.3,5,6 Woman 15-49 ever married
EW3Y: EQ19 14.3 has EW questionnaire
DIST11: Census 2011: district id smstate=0
FAMCAT: Family Types

WKANIMAL: HQ11 a5+ work participation animals
WKBUSINESS: HQ14-16 n12+ work participation business
ANEARN: HQ11 ind animal net earn est.
NJOBS: HQ12 7.0 # w/s jobs person
WS2Y: HQ12 7.2 has wages/salary job
WS3NM: HQ12 7.3 Job description -job1
WS4: HQ12 7.4 Occupation -job1
WS5: HQ12 7.5 Industry -job1
WSDAYS: HQ13 7.7 Working days -person total
WS7: HQ13 7.7 Working days -job1
WS8: HQ13 7.8 Work hrs/day -job1
WSHOURS: HQ13 7.5&6.6 Work hrs/yr -person total
WS9: HQ13 7.9 Pay period -job1
WS10: HQ13 7.10 Pay rate -job1
WS10ANNUAL: HQ13 7.10 annual cash wages -person total
WSEARN: HQ13 7.10 annual w/s earnings -person total
WSEARN1: HQ13 7.10 annual w/s earnings -job1
WSHOURLY: HQ13 7.10 hourly wage & bonuses
WS11MEALS: HQ13 7.11 Meals benefit -any job
WS11HOUSE: HQ13 7.11 Housing benefit -any job
WS12: HQ13 7.12 Bonus -person total
WS13P: HQ13 7.13 Any permanent job
WS14R: HQ13 7.14 Any regular govt job -person
WS14N: HQ13 7.14 Any NREGA job -person
WS15: HQ13 7.15 Minutes to workplace -job1
SALARYDAYS: HQ13 7.5 salary position: days/year
SALARYHOURS: HQ13 7.5, salary position: hours/year
SALARYEARN: HQ13 7.8+ salary position: annual wages
WKSALARY: HQ13 7.3 Salary position (5cat)
AGLABDAYS: HQ13 7.5 ag labour: days/year
AGLABHOURS: HQ13 7.5, ag labour: hours/year
AGLABEARN: HQ13 7.8+ ag labour: annual earnings
WKAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 Farm wage labour (5cat)
NONAGDAYS: HQ13 7.5 nonag labour: days/year
NONAGHOURS: HQ13 7.5, nonag labour: hours/year
NONAGEARN: HQ13 7.8+ nonag labour: annual wages
WKNONAG: HQ13 7.3 Nonag wage labour [IHDS2 only]
NONNREGADAYS: HQ13 7.5 nonnrega labour: hours/year [IHDS2 only]
NONNREGAHOURS: HQ13 7.5, nonnrega labour: hours/year [IHDS2 only]
NONNREGAEARN: HQ13 7.8+ nonnrega labour: annual wages [IHDS2 only]
WKNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 Nonnrega wage labour (5cat) [IHDS2 only]
NREGADAYS: HQ13 7.5 NREGA position: days/year [IHDS2 only]
NREGAHOURS: HQ13 7.5, NREGA position: hours/year [IHDS2 only]
NREGAEARN: HQ13 7.8+ NREGA position: annual wages [IHDS2 only]
WKNREGA: HQ13 7.3 NREGA work (5cat) [IHDS2 only]
WKDAYS: HQ work days /year (farm, business, wages/salary)
WKHOURS: HQ work hours /year (farm, business, wages/salary)
WKANY: HQ work participation (farm, business, wages/salary)
WKANYPLUS: HQ work participation (farm business w/s animal)
WKEARNPLUS: Earnings est.: sum w/s farm business animal
WKEARN: Earnings est.: sum w/s farm business
WKHOURLY: Hourly wage est.: w/s farm business
UNEARNED: ind: other hh income
MG3Y: HQ6 4.3 In migration file [IHDS2 only]
MG4: HQ6 4.4 Place of migration [IHDS2 only]
MG5: HQ6 4.5 Rural/ Urban [IHDS2 only]
MG6: HQ6 4.6 Gone alone or with family? [IHDS2 only]
MG7: HQ6 4.7 Gone for how many months? [IHDS2 only]
MG8: HQ6 4.8 How many years ago? [IHDS2 only]
MG9NM: HQ6 4.9 Type of migrant work
MG10: HQ6 4.10 Occupation code [IHDS2 only]
MG11: HQ6 4.11 Name migrated through [IHDS2 only]
MGYEARS: HQ6 4.1 Migrant five years ago or less [IHDS2 only]
MIG5N: HQ6 4.1 # migrations in last 5 years [IHDS2 only]
MGMONTHSS: HQ6 4.7 total months gone in last 5 years [IHDS2 only]
MGYEAR1: HQ6 4.8 Migrant one year ago or less [IHDS2 only]
MIG1N: HQ6 4.1 # migrations in last 1 year [IHDS2 only]
MGMONTHS1: HQ6 4.7 total months gone in last 1 year [IHDS2 only]
HHSUBFAM2: +hhbase = unique HH id in wave 2
AGE: Age in months estimate
AGEFROM: Age estimate from birth history or roster
HAZ: Height for age zscore from zanthro(US) months<=24
LAZ: Length for age zscore from zanthro(US) months<=36
WAZ: Weight for age zscore from zanthro(US)
BMI: BMI from zanthro(US)
BAZ: BMI for age zscore from zanthro(US) months<=24
WHZ: Weight for height zscore from zanthro(US)
HAZFLAG: Height for age zscore out of bounds
LAZFLAG: Length for age zscore out of bounds
WAZFLAG: Weight for age zscore out of bounds
BAZFLAG: BMI for age zscore out of bounds
WHZFLAG: Weight for height zscore out of bounds
NRTYPE: HQ5 3.1 Nonresident type [IHDS2 only]
NR0: Assigned personid for nonresident
NR1: HQ5 3.1 Nonresident type
NR2: HQ5 3.2 ID Household resident member
NR4: HQ5 3.4 Relation of nonresident to HH member
NR5: HQ5 3.5 Sex
NR6: HQ5 3.6 Age
NR7: HQ5 3.7 Marital status
NR8: HQ5 3.8 State of nonresident
NR9: HQ5 3.9 Place of nonresident
NR10: HQ5 3.10 Educ: # classes completed
NR11: HQ5 3.11 Occupation
NR11S: HQ5 3.11 Occupation
NR12: HQ5 3.12 Money sent or received by HH
NR13A: HQ5 3.13a Rs received by hh from nonres last year
NR13B: HQ5 3.13b Rs sent by hh to nonres last year
NOPBASE: NOPBASE
NNOPBASE: NNOPBASE
NSPOUSES: N times respondent listed as spouse, ro8
SPPBASE: unique multisurvey person id
SPPID2005: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID within 2005 household, ro1
SPPID2012: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID within 2012 household, ro0
SPPWAVES: which surveys p has been in
SPRO0: HQ4 2.1 spouse IHDS2 roster ID
SPRO1: HQ4 2.1 spouse IHDS1 roster ID
SPRO3: HQ4 2.3 spouse Sex
SPRO4: HQ4 2.4 spouse Relationship to head
SPRO5: HQ4 2.5 spouse Age

SPRO6: HQ4 2.6 spouse Marital Status
 SPRO8: HQ4 2.8 spouse Spouse's ID
 SPRO9: HQ4 2.9 spouse Father's ID
 SPRO10: HQ4 2.10 spouse Mother's ID
 SPWKFARM: HQ14-16 spouse fm12+ work participation farm
 SPED2: HQ19 11.2 Spouse educ: Literacy
 SPED3: HQ19 11.3 Spouse educ: English ability
 SPED4: HQ19 11.4 Spouse educ: Attended school
 SPED5: HQ19 11.5 Spouse educ: Enrolled now
 SPED6: HQ19 11.6 Spouse educ: Completed Years, never,<1=0
 SPEDUC7: HQ19 11.4.6 Spouse educ: Completed Years, 7cats
 SPWKANIMAL: HQ11 spouse an5+ work participation animals
 SPWKBUSINESS: HQ14-16 spouse n12+ work participation business
 SPWKSALARY: HQ13 7.3 spouse Salary position (5cat)
 SPWKSALAB: HQ13 7.3 spouse Farm wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKNONAG: HQ13 7.3 spouse Nonag wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 spouse Nonag (not NREGA) wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKNREGA: HQ13 7.3 spouse NREGA wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKDAYS: HQ work spouse days /year (farm, business, wage|salary)
 SPWKHOURS: HQ work spouse hours /year (farm, business, wage|salary)
 SPWKANY: HQ spouse work participation (farm, business, w/s, animal)
 SPWKANYPLUS: HQ spouse work participation (farm, business, wage|salary, animal)
 SPWKEARNPLUS: HQ spouse annual earnings est. (farm, business, w/s, animal)
 SPWKEARN: HQ spouse annual earnings est. (farm, business, wage|salary)
 SPNRTYPE: HQ5 3.1 Nonresident type
 SPNSPOUSES: N times R's spouse listed as spouse, ro8
 RO3Y: HH4 2.3 Sex - original
 EW3Y_A: EW3Y_A
 IDHH: Household id, unique 10 byte string
 IDPSU: PSU id unique 6 digit long int =cluster
 DISTO1: District ID corrected Census 2001STATEID2: State codes, collapsed
 WT: 2012 weights
 FWT: Integer 2012 weights
 ID11: HQ3 1.11 Religion
 ID13: HQ3 1.13 Caste category [as in IHDS1]
 GROUPS6: HQ3 1.13-15 Caste & religion
 GROUPS6: HQ3 1.13-15 Caste/religion 6cats
 DEFLATOR: Deflator for converting 2012 prices, CPI based, month adj.
 ASSETS: Total hh assets (0-33)[IHDS2 only]
 ASSETS2005: Total hh assets (0-30) as in IHDS1
 ASSETS5: Total hh assets, quintiles
 COTOTAL: HQ23-25 14. Annual hh consumption expenditure
 COTOTAL5: HQ23-25 14. Annual hh consumption quintiles
 INCOME: HQ Annual income
 INCOME5: HQ tot income quint 0=neg
 INCAG: HH6-10 all ag income (crops, property, animals)
 INCAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 income: farm wage
 INCAGPROP: HQ7 5.14.41 Rs land, other rented out
 INCANIMAL: HQ11.23 net animal income=mk+home-cost
 INCBENEFITS: HQ17 9.5+13.1-8 all gov benefits Rs
 INCBUSINESS: HQ14-16 8.5,25,45 All businesses: Net income
 INCCROP: HQ7-10 Net income from crops
 INCWS: HQ13 7.10-12 annual hh w/s earnings with bonuses
 INCNONAG: HQ13 7.3 income: nonag wage
 INCNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 income: nonag wage not NREGA [IHDS2 only]
 INCNREGA: HQ13 7.3 income: NREGA [IHDS2 only]
 INCOTHER: HQ17 9.1-3 Income from property, pensions
 INCREMIT: HQ5 3.13a Rs received by hh from nonres last year
 INCSALARY: HQ13 7.3 income: salary position
 POOR: Poverty using 2005/2012 Tendulkar cutoffs in IHDS1/2
 POOR1: Poverty using 2004-5 Tendulkar cutoffs
 POOR2: Poverty using 2012 Tendulkar cutoffs [IHDS2 only]
 POOR3: Below poverty line using 2005 definition
 POVLIN2005: Tendulkar 2005 poverty cut off, not inflated
 POVLIN2012: Tendulkar 2012 poverty cut off, adj for intvw date [IHDS2 only]
 NWKANY: HQ10-16 N wk (>=240hrs): any job
 NWKANYPLUS: HQ10-16 N wk (>=240hrs): any job or animal care
 NWKAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): farm wage
 NWKANIMAL: HQ11 an5 N wk (often): animal
 NWKBUSINESS: HQ14-16 n12,13 N wk (>=240hrs): business
 NWKFARM: HQ10 fm37,38 N wk (>=240hrs): farm
 NWKNONAG: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): nonag wage
 NWKNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): nonag wage not NREGA [IHDS2 only]
 NWKNREGA: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): NREGA [IHDS2 only]
 NWKNREGA4: HQ13 7.3 N wk, any hours: NREGA [IHDS2 only]
 NWKSALARY: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): salary position
 NPERSONS: HQ4 2.0 N in hh
 NNR: HQ5 3.0 # hh nonresidents
 NCHILD: HQ4 2.5 # 0-14 boys in hh
 NCHILD: HQ4 2.5 # 0-14 girls in hh
 NTEENM: HQ4 2.5 # 15-20 boys in hh
 NTEENF: HQ4 2.5 # 15-20 girls in hh
 NADULTS: HQ4 2.5 N 21+ in hh
 NADULTM: HQ4 2.5 # 21+ men in hh
 NADULTF: HQ4 2.5 N 21+ women in hh
 NELLDERM: HQ4 2.5 # 60+ men in hh
 NELLDERF: HQ4 2.5 # 60+ women in hh
 NMARRIEDF: HQ4 2.6 N married women in hh
 NMARRIEDM: HQ4 2.6 N married men in hh
 HHEDUC: 11.6 Highest adult educ [max=15]
 HHEDUC7: HQ19 11.6 Highest adult educ, 7 categories
 HHEDUCF: 11.6 Highest female adult educ [max=15]
 HHEDUCM: 11.6 Highest male adult educ [max=15]
 HHLITERATE: HQ19 11.2 Any adult (or head) in hh literate

Households

SURVEY: IHDS1 (2005) or IHDS2 (2012)
 HHBASE: survey wave + complete hh id at first entry into IHDS
 STATEID: HQ0 State codedDISTID: HQ0 District code
 DISTID: HQ0 District code
 PSUID: HQ0 PSU: village/neighborhood code
 HHID: Household ID IHDS2=3-digit HHID1=2-digit
 HHSPLITID: HQ0 Split household ID
 IDPSU: PSU id unique 6 digit long int =cluster
 IDHH: Household id, unique 10 byte string
 WT2005: 2005 weights
 FWT2005: Frequency 2005 weights

REGION: HH0 states grouped into 7 regions
 STATEID2: State codes, collapsed
 DISTO1: District ID corrected Census 2001
 STDISTO1: State + 2001 census district id, labeled
 HHID2005: household id in 2005 (2-digit)
 HHSPLITID2005: split household id for 2005
 HHWAVES: which surveys hh has been in
 HHFAM2: -hhbase = unique HH id in wave 2
 WT2012: 2012 weights
 FWT2012: Integer 2012 weights
 HHID2012: household id in 2012 (3-digit)
 HHSPLITID2012: split household id for 2012
 HC9: HQ1 9 Reinterview household
 HS1: HQ2 1 Agree to interview
 HS2: HQ2 2 Agree youth interviews
 HS3D: HQ2 3 Interview day
 HS3M: HQ2 3 Interview month
 HS3Y: HQ2 3 Interview year
 HS3DATE: HQ2 3 Interview (integer) date
 HS4: HQ2 4a Interview start hour
 HS4B: HQ2 4b Interview start minute
 HS4C: HQ2 4c Interview start AM/PM
 ID11: HQ3 1.11 Religion
 ID12ANM: HQ3 1.12a Caste name
 ID12BNM: HQ3 1.12b Subcaste name
 ID13: HQ3 1.13 Caste category [as in IHDS1]
 GROUPS: HQ3 1.13-15 Caste & religion
 GROUPS6: HQ3 1.13-15 Caste/religion 6cats
 ID14: HQ3 1.14 Main income source
 ID14NM: HQ3 1.14 Other income source
 ID15: HQ3 1.15 Years in place
 ID16: HQ3 1.16 Place of Origin [as in IHDS1]
 ID17: HQ3 1.16 Urban origin [IHDS1 -> IHDS2]
 ID18A: HQ3 1.18a Occ head's father/husb
 ID18ANM: HQ3 1.18a Occ name head's fa/husb
 ID18B: HQ3 1.18b Ind head's father/ husb [IHDS2]
 ID18BNM: HQ3 1.18b Ind name head's fa/husb
 ID18C: HQ3 1.18c Educ head's father/husb
 MG1: HQ6 4.1 HH seasonal migrant work [IHDS2]
 FM1: HQ7 5.1 HH any owned or cultivated
 FM2: HQ7 5.2 Local area unit name
 FM3: HQ7 5.3 Local units/acre
 FM4: HQ7 5.4a-c Owned max [as in IHDS1]
 FM4A: HQ7 5.4a Owned kharif [IHDS2]
 FM4B: HQ7 5.4b Owned rabi [IHDS2]
 FM4C: HQ7 5.4c Owned summer [IHDS2]
 FM5: HQ7 5.5a-c Rented in max [as in IHDS1]
 FM5A: HQ7 5.5a Rented in kharif [IHDS2]
 FM5B: HQ7 5.5b Rented in rabi [IHDS2]
 FM5C: HQ7 5.5c Rented in summer [IHDS2]
 FM6: HQ7 5.6a-c Rented out max [as in IHDS1]
 FM6A: HQ7 5.6a Rented out kharif [IHDS2]
 FM6B: HQ7 5.6b Rented out rabi [IHDS2]
 FM6C: HQ7 5.6c Rented out summer [IHDS2]
 FM7: HQ7 5.7a-c Total holding max [as in IHDS1]
 FM7A: HQ7 5.7a Total holding kharif [IHDS2]
 FM7B: HQ7 5.7b Total holding rabi [IHDS2]
 FM7C: HQ7 5.7c Total holding summer [IHDS2]
 FM8A: HQ7 5.8 Orchards/Plantations
 FM9A: HQ7 5.9 Pastures, permanent fallow
 FM10: HQ7 5.10a-c Fallow max [as in IHDS1]
 FM10A: HQ7 5.10a Fallow kharif [IHDS2]
 FM10B: HQ7 5.10b Fallow rabi [IHDS2]
 FM10C: HQ7 5.10c Fallow summer [IHDS2]
 FM11: HQ7 5.11a-c Cultivated max [as in IHDS1]
 FM11A: HQ7 5.11a Cultivated kharif [IHDS2]
 FM11B: HQ7 5.11b Cultivated rabi [IHDS2]
 FM11C: HQ7 5.11c Cultivated summer [IHDS2]
 FM12Y: HQ7 5.12a-c Any irrigated land [as in IHDS1]
 FM12: HQ7 5.12a-c Irrigated max [as in IHDS1]
 FM12A: HQ7 5.12a Irrigated kharif [IHDS2]
 FM12B: HQ7 5.12b Irrigated rabi [IHDS2]
 FM12C: HQ7 5.12c Irrigated summer [IHDS2]
 FM13A: HQ7 5.13a Irrigation type 1
 FM13B: HQ7 5.13b Irrigation type 2
 FM14A: HQ7 5.14a Cash/Crop rented out
 FM14B: HQ7 5.14b Rs land rented out
 FM14C: HQ7 5.14c Crop % land rented out
 FM14D: HQ7 5.14d Crop Rs land rented out
 FM15A: HQ7 5.15a Cash/Crop rented in
 FM15B: HQ7 5.15b Rs paid land rented in
 FM26A: HQ7 5.26a Crop residue total value
 FM26B: HQ7 5.26b Crop residue sold
 FM26C: HQ7 5.26c Crop residue kept for own use
 FM27A: HQ9 5.27a Hired farm labour days
 FM27B: HQ9 5.27b Hired farm labour Rs
 FM27C: HQ9 5.27c Meals to workers
 FM28A: HQ9 5.28a Seeds Rs
 FM28B: HQ9 5.28b Seeds Homegrown
 FM29: HQ9 5.29 Fertilizers Rs
 FM30: HQ9 5.30 Pesticides Rs
 FM31: HQ9 5.31 Irrigation water Rs
 FM32: HQ9 5.32 Hired Equip/Animals Rs
 FM33: HQ9 5.33 Ag loan repayment Rs
 FM34: HQ9 5.34 Farm miscellaneous Rs
 FM39A: HQ10 5.39a ID farm decision-maker [IHDS2 only]
 FM39B: HQ10 5.39b How land acquired [IHDS2]
 FM39C1: HQ10 5.39c1 Land in whose name #1 [IHDS2]
 FM39C2: HQ10 5.39c2 Land in whose name #2 [IHDS2]
 FM39C3: HQ10 5.39c3 Land in whose name #3 [IHDS2]
 FM40A: HQ10 5.40a Own: Tubewells
 FM40B: HQ10 5.40b Own: Electric Pumps
 FM40C: HQ10 5.40c Own: Diesel pumps
 FM40D: HQ10 5.40d Own: Bullock carts
 FM40E: HQ10 5.40e Own: Tractors
 FM40F: HQ10 5.40f Own: Threshers
 FM40G: HQ10 5.40g Own: Sprayer [IHDS2]
 FM40H: HQ10 5.40h Own: Chaff cutter [IHDS2]
 FM40I: HQ10 5.40i Own: Drip irrigation [IHDS2]
 FM40J: HQ10 5.40j Own: Sprinkler [IHDS2]

FM40K: HQ10 5.40k Own: Seed drill [IHDS2]
 FM40L: HH9 4.32g Own: Bio-gas plants [IHDS1 only]
 FM41A: HQ10 5.41a New farm equip Rs
 FM41B: HQ10 5.41b Rent out equip Rs [IHDS1 != IHDS2]
 FM41C: HQ10 5.41c Other farm income [IHDS2]
 FM41D: HQ10 5.41d Farm production last year [IHDS2]
 AN1: HQ11 6.1 HH Owns livestock
 AN1A: HQ11 6.1a Milch cows
 AN1B: HQ11 6.1b Milch buffalos
 AN1C: HQ11 6.1c Draft animals
 AN1D: HQ11 6.1d Goats
 AN1E: HQ11 6.1e Sheep
 AN1F: HQ11 6.1f Poultry
 AN1G: HQ11 6.1g Other
 AN2A: HQ11 6.2a Milk & milk products Rs
 AN2B: HQ11 6.2b Poultry, eggs, meat Rs [IHDS2]
 AN2BC: HQ11 6.2b.c Poultry, eggs meat + livestock Rs [as in IHDS1]
 AN2C: HQ11 6.2c Selling livestock Rs [IHDS2]
 AN2D: HQ11 6.2d Buy livestock Rs
 AN2E: HQ11 6.2e Current livestock value Rs [IHDS2]
 AN3A1: HQ11 6.3a Feed Purchased
 AN3A2: HQ11 6.3a Feed home grown
 AN3B1: HQ11 6.3b1 Vet services Rs [IHDS2]
 AN3B2: HQ11 6.3b2 Grazing labour Rs [IHDS2]
 AN3B3: HQ11 6.3b3 Other ag expenses Rs [IHDS2]
 AN7: HQ11 6.7 Animal care: Primary ID
 NF1: HQ14 8.1 Any nonfarm business, corrected
 NF1N: HQ14-6 8.1 N nonfarm business, corrected
 NFBN1: HQ14 8(1) Busns1: hh has 1st business
 NF1ANM: HQ14 8.1a Busns1: Ind name
 NF1A: HQ14 8.1a Busns1: Industry
 NF1BNM: HQ14 8.1b Busns1: Occ name
 NF1B: HQ14 8.1b Busns1: Occupation corrected
 NF2: HQ14 8.2 Busns1: Partnership [IHDS2]
 NF3: HQ14 8.3 Busns1: Gross receipts
 NF4A: HQ14 8.4a Busns1: Rent [IHDS2]
 NF4B: HQ14 8.4b Busns1: Utilities, transp [IHDS2]
 NF4C: HQ14 8.4c Busns1: Paid workers
 NF4D: HQ14 8.4d Busns1: Raw materials [IHDS2]
 NF4E: HQ14 8.4e Busns1: Interest [IHDS2]
 NF4F: HQ14 8.4f Busns1: Other expenses [IHDS2]
 NF4G: HQ14 8.4g Busns1: Total expenses [IHDS2 only]
 NF5: HQ14 8.5 Busns1: Net income
 NF6: HQ14 8.6 Busns1: Investments [IHDS2]
 NF7: HQ14 8.7 Busns1: Work place
 NF8: HQ14 8.8 Busns1: Family work [IHDS2]
 NF14: HQ14 8.14 Busns1: Total loss [IHDS2]
 NF15: HQ14 8.15 Busns1: Primary decisions [IHDS2]
 NFBN2: HQ15 8(2) Busns2: hh has 2nd business
 NF21ANM: HQ15 8.21a Busns2: Ind name
 NF21A: HQ15 8.21a Busns2: Industry
 NF21BNM: HQ15 8.21b Busns2: Occ name
 NF21B: HQ15 8.21b Busns2: Occupation corrected
 NF22: HQ15 8.22 Busns2: Partnership [IHDS2]
 NF23: HQ15 8.23 Busns2: Gross receipts
 NF24A: HQ15 8.24a Busns2: Rent [IHDS2]
 NF24B: HQ15 8.24b Busns2: Utilities, transp [IHDS2]
 NF24C: HQ15 8.24c Busns2: Paid workers
 NF24D: HQ15 8.24d Busns2: Raw materials [IHDS2]
 NF24E: HQ15 8.24e Busns2: Interest [IHDS2]
 NF24F: HQ15 8.24f Busns2: Other expenses [IHDS2]
 NF24G: HQ15 8.24g Busns2: Total expenses [IHDS2 only]
 NF25: HQ15 8.25 Busns2: Net income
 NF26: HQ15 8.26 Busns2: Investments [IHDS2]
 NF27: HQ15 8.27 Busns2: Work place
 NF28: HQ15 8.28 Busns2: Family work [IHDS2]
 NF34: HQ15 8.34 Busns2: Total loss [IHDS2]
 NF35: HQ15 8.35 Busns2: Primary decisions [IHDS2]
 NFBN4: HQ16 8(3) Busns3: hh has 3rd business
 NF41ANM: HQ16 8.41a Busns3: Ind name
 NF41A: HQ16 8.41a Busns3: Industry
 NF41BNM: HQ16 8.41b Busns3: Occ name
 NF41B: HQ16 8.41b Busns3: Occupation corrected
 NF42: HQ16 8.42 Busns3: Partnership [IHDS2]
 NF43: HQ16 8.43 Busns3: Gross receipts
 NF44A: HQ16 8.44a Busns3: Rent [IHDS2]
 NF44B: HQ16 8.44b Busns3: Utilities, transp [IHDS2]
 NF44C: HQ16 8.44c Busns3: Paid workers
 NF44D: HQ16 8.44d Busns3: Raw materials [IHDS2]
 NF44E: HQ16 8.44e Busns3: Interest [IHDS2]
 NF44F: HQ16 8.44f Busns3: Other expenses [IHDS2]
 NF44G: HQ16 8.44g Busns3: Total expenses [IHDS2 only]
 NF45: HQ16 8.45 Busns3: Net income
 NF46: HQ16 8.46 Busns3: Investments [IHDS2]
 NF47: HQ16 8.47 Busns3: Work place
 NF48: HQ16 8.48 Busns3: Family work [IHDS2]
 NF54: HQ16 8.54 Busns3: Total loss [IHDS2]
 NF55: HQ16 8.55 Busns3: Primary decisions [IHDS2]
 IN1: HQ17 9.1 Inc: renting property
 IN2: HQ17 9.2 Inc: interest
 IN3A: HQ17 9.3a Inc: Govt pension
 IN3B: HQ17 9.3b Inc: Pvt pension
 IN4A: HQ17 9.4a Inc: sale non-ag land
 IN4B: HQ17 9.4b Inc: sale ag land
 IN5: HQ17 9.5 Inc: scholarship/gift
 IN6: HQ17 9.6 Inc: other govt source
 IN7: HQ17 9.7 Inc: other source
 IN7NM: HQ17 9.7 Inc: other source name
 IN11S1: HQ17 9.11-1 N Old Age Pension
 IN13S1: HQ17 9.13-1 Old Age Pension Rs
 IN11S2: HQ17 9.11-2 N Widows Pension
 IN13S2: HQ17 9.13-2 Widows Pension Rs
 IN11S3: HQ17 9.11-3 N Maternity Benefit
 IN13S3: HQ17 9.13-3 Maternity Benefit Rs
 IN11S4: HQ17 9.11-4 N Disability Pension
 IN13S4: HQ17 9.13-4 Disability Pension Rs
 IN11S5: HQ17 9.11-5 N Annapurna
 IN13S5: HQ17 9.13-5 Annapurna Rs
 IN11S6: HQ17 9.11-6 N Other govt
 IN13S6: HQ17 9.13-6 Other govt Rs

IN11S7: HQ17 9.11-7 N NGOs
 IN13S7: HQ17 9.13-7 NGOs Rs
 IN11S8: HQ17 9.11-8 N other [IHDS2]
 IN13S8: HQ17 9.13-8 other Rs [IHDS2]
 IN14: HQ17 9.14 Better off last 6-7 yrs
 IN15A: HQ18 9.15a Life Insurance govt/pvt [est. as in IHDS1]
 IN15A1: HQ18 9.15a Life Insurance govt [IHDS2]
 IN15A2: HQ18 9.15a Life Insurance pvt [IHDS2]
 IN15B: HQ18 9.15b Health Insurance govt/pvt [est. as in IHDS1]
 IN15B1: HQ18 9.15b Health Insurance govt [IHDS2]
 IN15B2: HQ18 9.15b Health Insurance pvt [IHDS2]
 IN15C1: HQ18 9.15c Crop Insurance govt [IHDS2]
 IN15C2: HQ18 9.15c Crop Insurance pvt [IHDS2]
 IN15D1: HQ18 9.15d Latrines, toilets: govt [est. as in IHDS1]
 IN15D2: HQ18 9.15d Latrines, toilets: pvt [IHDS2]
 IN15E1: HQ18 9.15e Kisan credit card
 IN15F1: HQ18 9.15f Indira Awas Yojana [IHDS2]
 IN15G1: HQ18 9.15g Girl child registration [IHDS2]
 IN16: HQ18 9.16 N NREGA cards [IHDS2]
 IN17: HQ18 9.17 NREGA application [IHDS2]
 IN25: HQ18 9.25 NREGA wait [IHDS2]
 RC1: HQ18 10.1 Ration card
 RC1A: HQ18 10.1a Ration cards N [IHDS2]
 RC1B1: HQ18 10.1b BPL card [IHDS1==IHDS2]
 RC1B2: HQ18 10.1b APL card [IHDS1==IHDS2]
 RC1B3: HQ18 10.1b Antodaya card [IHDS1==IHDS2]
 RC1B4: HQ18 10.1b Annapurna [IHDS2]
 RC1C: HQ18 10.1c Ration card N listed
 RC1D: HQ18 10.1d Ration card used
 RC1E: HQ18 10.1e Ration card why not used
 RC1F: HQ18 10.1f Ration card voucher [IHDS2]
 RC2: HQ18 10.2 Ration card why none
 RC3A: HQ18 10.3a Photo ID [IHDS2]
 RC3B: HQ18 10.3b Proof of residence [IHDS2]
 RC3C: HQ18 10.3c RSBY card [IHDS2]
 RC3D: HQ18 10.3d Jati certificate [IHDS2]
 RC4: HQ18 10.4 Aware of Aadhar ID [IHDS2]
 RC4A: HQ18 10.4a Has Aadhar ID card [IHDS2]
 MM1M: HQ22 13.1m Radio regular Men
 MM2M: HQ22 13.2m Newspaper regular Men
 MM3M: HQ22 13.3m TV regular Men
 MM4M: HQ22 13.4m TV hrs/day Men
 MM1W: HQ22 13.1w Radio regular Women
 MM2W: HQ22 13.2w Newspaper regular Women
 MM3W: HQ22 13.3w TV regular Women
 MM4W: HQ22 13.4w TV hrs/day Women
 MM1C: HQ22 13.1c Radio regular Kids
 MM2C: HQ22 13.2c Newspaper regular Kids
 MM3C: HQ22 13.3c TV regular Kids
 MM4C: HQ22 13.4c TV hrs/day Kids
 MM5: HQ22 13.5 Computer knowledge [IHDS2]
 MM10: HQ22 13.10 Own: mobile phone [IHDS2]
 CO1A: HQ23 14.1a Rice: kg
 CO1B: HQ23 14.1b Rice: homegrown
 CO1C: HQ23 14.1c Rice: market price
 CO1D: HQ23 14.1d Rice: PDS kg
 CO1E: HQ23 14.1e Rice: PDS price
 CO1M: HQ23 14.1 Rice: market kg
 CO1X: HQ23 14.1 Rice: total Rs
 CO2A: HQ23 14.2a Wheat: kg
 CO2B: HQ23 14.2b Wheat: homegrown
 CO2C: HQ23 14.2c Wheat: market price
 CO2D: HQ23 14.2d Wheat: PDS kg
 CO2E: HQ23 14.2e Wheat: PDS price
 CO2M: HQ23 14.2 Wheat: market kg
 CO2X: HQ23 14.2 Wheat: total Rs
 CO3A: HQ23 14.3a Sugar: kg
 CO3B: HQ23 14.3b Sugar: homegrown
 CO3C: HQ23 14.3c Sugar: market price
 CO3D: HQ23 14.3d Sugar: PDS kg
 CO3E: HQ23 14.3e Sugar: PDS price
 CO3M: HQ23 14.3 Sugar: market kg
 CO3X: HQ23 14.3 Sugar: total Rs
 CO4A: HQ23 14.4a Kerosene: Lts
 CO4B: HQ23 14.4b Kerosene: purchased=2
 CO4C: HQ23 14.4c Kerosene: market price
 CO4D: HQ23 14.4d Kerosene: PDS lts
 CO4E: HQ23 14.4e Kerosene: PDS price
 CO4M: HQ23 14.4 Kerosene: market lt
 CO4X: HQ23 14.4 Kerosene: total Rs
 CO5A: HQ23 14.5a Other cereals: kg
 CO5B: HQ23 14.5b Other cereals: homegrown
 CO5C: HQ23 14.5c Other cereals: price
 CO5D: HQ23 14.5d Other cereals: PDS kg
 CO5E: HQ23 14.5e Other cereals: PDS price
 CO5M: HQ23 14.5 Other Cereals: market kg
 CO5X: HQ23 14.5 Other Cereals: total Rs
 CO6A: HQ23 14.6a Pulses: kg
 CO6B: HQ23 14.6b Pulses: homegrown
 CO6C: HQ23 14.6c Pulses: price
 CO6T: HQ23 14.6T Pulses: Rs
 CO6X: HQ23 14.6 Pulses: total Rs
 CO7A: HQ23 14.7a Meat: kg
 CO7B: HQ23 14.7b Meat: homegrown
 CO7C: HQ23 14.7c Meat: price
 CO7T: HQ23 14.7T Meat: Rs
 CO7X: HQ23 14.7 Meat: total Rs
 CO8A: HQ23 14.8a Sweeteners: kg
 CO8B: HQ23 14.8b Sweeteners: homegrown
 CO8C: HQ23 14.8c Sweeteners: price
 CO8T: HQ23 14.8T Sweeteners: Rs
 CO8X: HQ23 14.8 Gur & sweets: total Rs
 CO9A: HQ23 14.9a Edible oil: lts
 CO9B: HQ23 14.9b Edible oil: homegrown
 CO9C: HQ23 14.9c Edible oil: price
 CO9T: HQ23 14.9T Edible oil: Rs
 CO9X: HQ23 14.9 Oil: total Rs
 CO10A: HQ23 14.10a Eggs: dozens
 CO10B: HQ23 14.10b Eggs: homegrown
 CO10C: HQ23 14.10c Eggs: price

CO10T: HQ23 14.10t Eggs: Rs
CO10X: HQ23 14.10 Eggs: total Rs
CO11A: HQ23 14.11a Milk: lts
CO11B: HQ23 14.11b Milk: homegrown
CO11C: HQ23 14.11c Milk: price
CO11T: HQ23 14.11t Milk: Rs
CO11X: HQ23 14.11 Milk: total Rs
CO12B: HQ23 14.12b Milk products: homegr
CO12T: HQ23 14.12t Milk products: Rs
CO12X: HQ23 14.12 Milk Prod: total Rs
CO13B: HQ23 14.13b Cereal products: homegr
CO13T: HQ23 14.13t Cereal products: Rs
CO13X: HQ23 14.13 Cereal Prod: total Rs
CO14B: HQ23 14.14b Vegetables: homegrown
CO14T: HQ23 14.14t Vegetables: Rs
CO14X: HQ23 14.14 Vegetables: total Rs
CO15: HQ24 14.15 Salt/spices Rs
CO16: HQ24 14.16 Tea & coffee [IHDS2]
CO17: HQ24 14.17 Processed foods [IHDS2]
CO16_17: HQ24 14.16,17 Tea, coffee, & processed [est. as in IHDS1]
CO18: HQ24 14.18 Paan/tobac/intox Rs
CO19: HQ24 14.19 Fruits/nuts Rs
CO20: HQ24 14.20 Eating out Rs
CO21: HQ24 14.21 HH fuel Rs [IHDS2]
CO22: HQ24 14.22 HH electricity Rs [IHDS2]
CO21_22: HQ24 14.21,22 Fuel, electricity [est. as in IHDS1]
CO23: HQ24 14.23 Entertainment Rs
CO24: HQ24 14.24 Telephone Rs
CO25: HQ24 14.25 Toiletries Rs
CO26: HQ24 14.26 HH itmes Rs [IHDS2]
CO27: HQ24 14.27 Soap, detergents Rs [IHDS2]
CO26_27: HQ24 14.26,27 Household items, soap [est. as in IHDS1]
CO28: HQ24 14.28 Transportation Rs [IHDS2]
CO29: HQ24 14.29 Petrol, maintenance Rs [IHDS2]
CO28_29: HQ24 14.28,29 Transportation, petrol [est. as in IHDS1]
CO30_TOT: HQ24 14.30a,b House, other rent [est. as in IHDS1]
CO30: HQ24 14.30 Home rent, Society Rs [IHDS2]
CO30A: HQ24 14.30a House loan Rs [IHDS2]
CO30B: HQ24 14.30b Other rent Rs [IHDS2]
CO31: HQ24 14.31 Consumer tax/fees Rs
CO32: HQ24 14.32 Services servants Rs
CO33: HQ24 14.33 Medical out-patient Rs
CO34: HQ25 13.34 Medical in-patient Rs
CO35: HQ25 14.35 School Rs [IHDS2]
CO36: HQ25 14.36 Private Tuition Rs [IHDS2]
CO35_36: HQ25 14.35,36 School + pvt. tuition [est. as in IHDS1]
CO37: HQ25 14.37 School books Rs
CO38: HQ25 14.38 Clothing/bedding Rs
CO39: HQ25 14.39 Footwear Rs
CO40: HQ25 14.40 Furniture/fixtures Rs
CO41: HQ25 14.41 Crockery/utensils Rs
CO42: HQ25 14.42 HH appliances Rs
CO43: HQ25 14.43 Recreation goods Rs
CO44: HQ25 14.44 Jewellery Rs
CO45: HQ25 14.45 Transport equipmt Rs
CO46: HQ25 14.46 Therapeutic app Rs
CO47: HQ25 14.47 Personal care, hh Rs
CO48: HQ25 14.48 Other personal Rs
CO49: HQ25 14.49 Repair/ maintenance Rs
CO50: HQ25 14.50 Insurance premiums Rs
CO51: HQ25 14.51 Vacations Rs
CO52: HQ25 14.52 Social Functions Rs
COTOTAL: HQ23-25 14. Annual hh consumption expenditure
COTOTAL5: HQ23-25 14. Annual hh consumption quintiles
CG1: HQ26 15.1 House own/rent [as in IHDS1]
CG1A: HQ26 15.1a Rental agreement [IHDS2]
CG2: HQ26 15.2 N books owned [IHDS2]
CG3: HQ26 15.3 Poor/ Middle-/ comfortable [IHDS2]
CG4: HQ26 15.4 Own: Cycle/bicycle
CGVEHICLE: HQ26 15.4.8,21 hh owns any vehicle
CG5: HQ26 15.5 Own: Sewing machine
CG6: HQ26 15.6 Own: Generator set
CG7: HQ26 15.7 Own: Mixer/grinder
CG8: HQ26 15.8 Own: Motor cycle
CGMOTORV: HQ26 15.8..21 hh owns motor vehicle
CG9: HQ26 15.9 Own: B/W TV
CGTV: HQ26 15.9,10 hh owns TV
CG10: HQ26 15.10 Own: Colour TV
CG11: HQ26 15.11 Own: Air cooler
CGCOOLING: HQ26 15.11,22 hh owns cooler or AC
CG12: HQ26 15.12 Own: Clock/watchC
G13: HQ26 15.13 Own: Electric fan
CG14: HQ26 15.14 Own: Chair/table
CG15: HQ26 15.15 Own: Cot
CG16: HQ26 15.16 Own: Telephone
CG17: HQ26 15.17 Own: Cell phone
CG18: HQ26 15.18 Own: Refrigerator
CG19: HQ26 15.19 Own: Pressure cooker
CG20: HQ26 15.20 Own: Cable/Dish T.V [IHDS2]
CG21: HQ26 15.21 Own: Car
CG22: HQ26 15.22 Own: Air conditioner
CG23: HQ26 15.23 Own: Washing machine
CG24: HQ26 15.24 Own: Computer
CGCOMPUTER: HQ26 15.24,25 hh has computer or laptop [IHDS2]
CG25: HQ26 15.25 Own: Laptop [IHDS2]
CG26: HQ26 15.26 Own: Credit card
CG27: HQ26 15.27 Own: Microwave [IHDS2]
CG28: HQ26 15.28 Own: 2 clothes
CG29: HQ26 15.29 Own: Footwear
ASSETS: Total hh assets (0-33)[IHDS2 only]
ASSETS5: Total hh assets, quintiles
ASSETS2005: Total hh assets (0-30) as in IHDS1
DB1: HQ27 16.1a Debt: any loan last 5 years
DB1A: HQ27 16.1a Debt: bank [IHDS2]
DB1B: HQ27 16.1b Debt: micro-finance [IHDS2]
DB1C: HQ27 16.1c Debt: money lender [IHDS2]
DB1D: HQ27 16.1d Debt: employer [IHDS2]
DB1E: HQ27 16.1e Debt: relatives, friends [IHDS2]
DB1F: HQ27 16.1f Debt: other [IHDS2]
DB2: HQ27 16.2 N loans last 5 yrs

DB2A: HQ27 16.2a Yrs ago largest loan
DB2B: HQ27 16.2b Loan largest amount
DB2C: HQ27 16.2c Loan purpose [revised]
DB2CNM: HQ27 16.2c Loan purpose: other
DB2D: HQ27 16.2d Loan source [revised]
DB2DNM: HQ27 16.2d Loan source: other
DB2E: HQ27 16.2e Loan monthly rate
DB2F: HQ27 16.2f Loan annual rate [IHDS2]
DB2G: HQ27 16.2g Loan repayment
DB3: HQ27 16.3 Inherited fathers loans [IHDS2]
DB4A: HQ27 16.4a Land sold to pay
DB4B: HQ27 16.4b Jewellery sold to pay
DB5: HQ27 16.5 Outstanding HH debt
DB6: HQ27 16.6 Debt with shopkeeper
DB6A: HQ27 16.6 Rs debt shopkeeper
DB7: HQ27 16.7 Credit due to the HH
DB8A: HQ28 16.8a Apply to bank [IHDS2]
DB8B: HQ28 16.8b Apply to micro finance [IHDS2]
DB8C: HQ28 16.8c Apply to money lender [IHDS2]
DB8D: HQ28 16.8d Apply to employer [IHDS2]
DB8E: HQ28 16.8e Apply to relatives, friends [IHDS2]
DB8F: HQ28 16.8f Apply to others [IHDS2]
DB9A: HQ28 16.9 Bought property [IHDS2]
DB9B: HQ28 16.9b Expanded property [IHDS2]
DB9C: HQ28 16.9c Bought securities [IHDS2]
DB9D: HQ28 16.9d Fixed Deposit [IHDS2]
DB9E: HQ28 16.9e Bank savings [IHDS2]
DB9F: HQ28 16.9f Credit society [IHDS2]
DB9G: HQ28 16.9g Post Office Account [IHDS2]
DB9H: HQ28 16.9h Pension, LIC, other [IHDS2]
DB9I: HQ28 16.9i Gold, jewellery? [IHDS2]
SN1: HQ28 17.1 Mother tongue [IHDS2]
SN1NM: HQ28 17.1a Mother tongue other [IHDS2 only]
SN2A1: HQ28 17.2a Netwk Doctors in community [IHDS2]
SN2A2: HQ28 17.2a Netwk Doctors outside [IHDS2]
SN2B1: HQ28 17.2b Netwk Health in community [IHDS2]
SN2B2: HQ28 17.2b Netwk Health outside [IHDS2]
SN2A3: HQ28 17.2a-b Netwk Doctors, health workers [as in IHDS1]
SN2C1: HQ28 17.2c Netwk Teachers in community [IHDS2]
SN2C2: HQ28 17.2c Netwk Teachers outside [IHDS2]
SN2D1: HQ28 17.2d Netwk School in community [IHDS2]
SN2D2: HQ28 17.2d Netwk School outside [IHDS2]
SN2C3: HQ28 17.2c-d Netwk Teachers, school workers [as in IHDS1]
SN2E1: HQ28 17.2e Netwk Officer in community [IHDS2]
SN2E2: HQ28 17.2e Netwk Officer outside [IHDS2]
SN2F1: HQ28 17.2f Netwk Govt in community [IHDS2]
SN2F2: HQ28 17.2f Netwk Govt outside [IHDS2]
SN2G1: HQ28 17.2g Netwk Elected in community [IHDS2]
SN2G2: HQ28 17.2g Netwk Elected outside [IHDS2]
SN2H1: HQ28 17.2h Netwk Party in community [IHDS2]
SN2H2: HQ28 17.2h Netwk Party outside [IHDS2]
SN2I1: HQ28 17.2i Netwk Inspector in community [IHDS2]
SN2I2: HQ28 17.2i Netwk Inspector outside [IHDS2]
SN2J1: HQ28 17.2j Netwk oth police in community [IHDS2]
SN2J2: HQ28 17.2j Netwk oth police outside [IHDS2]
SN2K1: HQ28 17.2k Netwk Military in community [IHDS2]
SN2K2: HQ28 17.2k Netwk Military outside [IHDS2]
SN2E3: HQ28 17.2e-k Netwk Govt, politicians, police, military [as in IHDS1]
SN2E4: HQ28 17.2e-f Netwk Govt [as in IHDS1]
SNETWORKS: HQ28 17.2a-k N types of networks (0-3) [as in IHDS1]
ME1: HQ29 18.1 Member Mahila mandal
ME2: HQ29 18.2 Member Youth/Sports/Read
ME3: HQ29 18.3 Member Union/Bussn
ME4: HQ29 18.4 Member Self Help
ME5: HQ29 18.5 Member Credit/Savings
ME6: HQ29 18.6 Member Religious [IHDS2]
ME7: HQ29 18.7 Member Social [IHDS2]
ME6_7: HQ29 18.6,7 Member Religious or Social [est. as in IHDS1]
ME8: HQ29 18.8 Member Caste Assoc
ME9: HQ29 18.9 Member Development/NGO
ME10: HQ29 18.10 Member Cooperative
ME11: HQ29 18.11 Member Political Party [IHDS2]
ME12: HQ29 18.12 Member Fraternal [IHDS2]
ME13: HQ29 18.13 Attend public meeting
ME14: HQ29 18.14 Panchayat member in hh [IHDS1--IHDS2]
ME14A: HQ29 18.14a Panchayat official close to hh
TR1: HQ29 19.1 Conflict in village
TR2: HQ29 19.2 Solve local problems
TR3: HQ29 19.3 Conflict among jatis
TR4A: HQ29 19.4a Practice untouchability [IHDS2]
TR4B: HQ29 19.4b Problem if SC in kitchen [IHDS2]
TR4C: HQ29 19.4c SCs: experienced untouch. [IHDS2]
LC1: HQ29 20.1 Theft
LC2: HQ29 20.2 Breaking in
LC3: HQ29 20.3 Attack/threat
LC4: HQ29 20.4 Harassment of girls
CI1: HQ30 21.1 Confidence: Pals
CI2: HQ30 21.2 Confidence: Military
CI3: HQ30 21.3 Confidence: Police
CI4: HQ30 21.4 Confidence: State govt
CI5: HQ30 21.5 Confidence: Newspapers
CI6: HQ30 21.6 Confidence: Panchayats
CI7: HQ30 21.7 Confidence: Govt Schools [IHDS2]
CI7S: HH26 19.7 Confidence: Schools [IHDS1 only]
CI8: HQ30 21.8 Confidence: Pvt Schools [IHDS2]
CI9: HQ30 21.9 Confidence: Govt hospitals [IHDS2]
CI9M: HH26 19.7 Confidence: Medical [IHDS1 only]
CI10: HQ30 21.10 Confidence: Pvt hospitals [IHDS2]
CI11: HQ30 21.11 Confidence: Courts
CI12: HQ30 21.12 Confidence: Banks
MI1: HQ30 22.1 Major illness/Accidents [IHDS2]
MI2: HQ30 22.2 Drought, Flood, Fire [IHDS2]
MI3: HQ30 22.3 Loss of job [IHDS2]
MI4: HQ30 22.4 Marriage [IHDS2]
MI5: HQ30 22.5 Crop Failure [IHDS2]
MI6: HQ30 22.6 Death [IHDS2]
MI7: HQ30 22.7 Other loss [IHDS2]
MI7NM: HQ30 22.7 Other loss specify
OH1B: HQ32 24.1b ID Primary resp
OH2A: HQ32 24.2 Other resp 1 ID

OH2B: HQ32 24.2 Other resp 2 ID
 OH2C: HQ32 24.2 Other resp 3 ID
 OH2D: HQ32 24.2 Other resp 4 ID
 OH3: HQ32 24.3 Non-HH at interview
 OH4: HQ32 24.4 Obs: Purpose
 OH5: HQ32 24.5 Obs: Understanding
 OH6: HQ32 24.6 Obs: R looked at intvwr [IHDS2 only]
 OH7: HQ32 24.7 Obs: Response clarity [IHDS1 != IHDS2]
 OH8: HQ32 24.8 Obs: Knows expenditure
 OH9: HQ32 24.9 Obs: Confidence
 OH10: HQ32 24.10 Obs: Reliability [IHDS2]
 OH11: HQ32 24.11 Obs: Remember 2005 intvw [IHDS2]
 OH12D: HQ32 24.12 Interview Completion Day [IHDS2]
 OH12M: HQ32 24.12 Interview Completion Month [IHDS2]
 OH12Y: HQ32 24.12 Interview Completion Year [IHDS2]
 OH12DATE: HQ32 24.12 Interview (integer) date [IHDS2]
 OH13A: HQ32 24.13 Interview end hour
 OH13B: HQ32 24.13 Interview end minute
 OH13C: HQ32 24.13 Interview end (AM/PM)
 WE1NO: Eligible Woman No
 GE9: EQ1 9 Reinterview Household
 CD1: EQ2 1 Agree to interview
 CD2: EQ2 2 Agree to youth interview [IHDS2]
 CD3D: EQ2 3 Interview day
 CD3M: EQ2 3 Interview month
 CD3Y: EQ2 3 Interview year
 CD3DATE: EQ2 3 Interview (integer) date
 CD4A: EQ2 4 Interview start hour
 CD4B: EQ2 4 Interview start minute
 CD4C: EQ2 4 AM/PM Int. time [IHDS1] EQ3 1.11 Intvw Language Code
 MP1A: EQ8 4.1a Marry daughter natal vill
 MP1B: EQ8 4.1b Marry daughter cousin
 MP1C: EQ8 4.1c Widow remarriage [IHDS2]
 MP2A: EQ8 4.2a Intercaste marriage [IHDS2]
 MP2B: EQ8 4.2b Divorce in community [IHDS2]
 MP3A: EQ8 4.3a Boy's wed exp-lower
 MP3B: EQ8 4.3b Boy's wed exp-upper
 MP4A: EQ8 4.4a Girl's wed exp-lower
 MP4B: EQ8 4.4b Girl's wed exp-upper
 MP5A: EQ8 4.5 # invited by bride [IHDS2]
 MP5B: EQ8 4.5 # invited by groom [IHDS2]
 MP6A: EQ8 4.6a Wed Gift: gold
 MP6B: EQ8 4.6b Wed Gift: silver
 MP6C: EQ8 4.6c Wed Gift: land
 MP6D: EQ8 4.6d Wed Gift: car
 MP6E: EQ8 4.6e Wed Gift: scooter
 MP6F: EQ8 4.6f Wed Gift: TV
 MP6G: EQ8 4.6g Wed Gift: Fridge
 MP6H: EQ8 4.6h Wed Gift: Mobile [IHDS2]
 MP6I: EQ8 4.6i Wed Gift: Furniture
 MP6J: EQ8 4.6j Wed Gift: Pressure cook
 MP6K: EQ8 4.6k Wed Gift: Utensils
 MP6L: EQ8 4.6l Wed Gift: Mixer/Grinder
 MP6M: EQ8 4.6m Wed Gift: Bedding
 MP6N: EQ8 4.6n Wed Gift: Watch
 MP6O: EQ8 4.6o Wed Gift: Bicycle
 MP6P: EQ8 4.6p Wed Gift: Sewing m/c
 MP6Q: EQ8 4.6q Wed Gift: Livestock
 MP6Q1: EH8 4.5q Wed Gift: Tractor [IHDS1 only]
 MP6R: EQ8 4.6r Wed Gift: Washing machine [IHDS2]
 MP6S: EQ8 4.6s Wed Gift: LPG [IHDS2]
 MP6T: EQ8 4.6t Wed Gift: Flat [IHDS2]
 MP6U: EQ8 4.6u Wed Gift: Cash
 MP6V: EQ8 4.6v Wed Gift: Computer [IHDS2]
 MP7A: EQ8 4.7a Wed Gift: Cash amount low [IHDS2]
 MP7B: EQ8 4.7b Wed Gift: Cash amount high [IHDS2]
 MP7MID: EQ8 4.7a Wed Gift: Cash amount midpoint [est. as in IHDS1]
 WA1A: EQ9 5.1a Water source: usual
 WA1B: EQ9 5.1b Water source summer
 WATER: EQ9 5.1a,b indoor piped drinking water
 WA2A: EQ9 5.2a Water within house
 WA2B: EQ9 5.2b Water in house summer
 WA3A: EQ9 5.3a Water supply hours
 WA3B: EQ9 5.3b Water supply hours in summer [IHDS2]
 WA4A: EQ9 5.4a Walking time to water
 WA4B: EQ9 5.4b Time to summer water
 WA5A: EQ9 5.5a Water Avail: usual
 WA5B: EQ9 5.5b Water Avail: Summer
 WA6A: EQ9 5.6a Get Water women
 WA6B: EQ9 5.6b Get Water men
 WA6C: EQ9 5.6c Get Water girls
 WA6D: EQ9 5.6d Get Water boys
 WA7: EQ9 5.7 Purify water
 WA8: EQ9 5.8 Drinking water storage
 WA8A: EQ9 5.8a Drinking water stored with lid
 WA8B: EQ9 5.8b Drinking water pouring
 SA1: EQ10 6.1 Number of rooms
 SA2: EQ10 6.2 Cooking place
 SAKITCHEN: EQ10 6.2 separate kitchen in the hh
 SA2A: EQ10 6.2a Vent in cooking place
 SA3: EQ10 6.3 Household servant
 SA4: EQ10 6.4 Household Toilet [revised]
 SA4X: EQ10 6.4 Household Toilet [original]
 SATOILET: EQ10 6.4 hh has a flush toilet
 SA5: EQ10 6.5 Access to public toilet
 SA6: EQ10 6.6 Handwash aft defecation [IHDS2]
 SA6D: EQ10 6.6 Handwash after defecation [est. as in IHDS1]
 SA6A: EQ10 6.6a Use in handwash
 FU1: EQ10 7.1 HH electricity
 FU1A: EQ10 7.1a Electricity hours
 FU1B: EQ10 7.1b Electricity Payment [revised]
 FU1C: EQ10 7.1c Electricity Rs
 FU2: EQ10 7.2 Meals per day
 FU3: EQ10 7.3 Hours burning stove
 FU4: EQ10 7.4 Non-vegetarian [IHDS2]
 FU4A: EQ10 7.4a Non-vegetarian at home [IHDS2]
 FU5A: EQ10 7.5a Cook id [IHDS2]
 FU6: EQ10 7.6 HH chulha type
 FU7: EQ11 7.7 Firewood use
 FU7A: EQ11 7.7a Firewood source
 FU7B: EQ11 7.7b Firewood Rs
 FU8: EQ11 7.8 Dung use
 FU8A: EQ11 7.8a Dung source
 FU8B: EQ11 7.8b Dung Rs
 FU9: EQ11 7.9 Crop residue use
 FU9A: EQ11 7.9a Crop residue source
 FU9B: EQ11 7.9b Crop residue Rs
 FU10: EQ11 7.10 Kerosene use
 FU10A: EQ11 7.10a Kerosene source
 FU10B: EQ11 7.10b Kerosene Rs
 FU11: EQ11 7.11 LPG use
 FULPG: EQ11 7.11 hh uses fuLPG
 FU11A: EQ11 7.11a LPG source
 FU11B: EQ11 7.11b LPG Rs
 FU12: EQ11 7.12 Coal/ charcoal use
 FU12A: EQ11 7.12a Coal/ charcoal source
 FU12B: EQ11 7.12b Coal/ charcoal Rs
 FU13A: EQ11 7.13 Fuel distance
 FUCOLLECT: EQ11 fu8a-10a, collects any fuel
 FU14A1: EQ11 7.14a1 Fuel freq women [IHDS2]
 FU14A2: EQ11 7.14a2 Fuel Coll women [IHDS2]
 FU14A3: EQ11 7.14a1,2 Fuel collect women: minutes/week [IHDS2 est.]
 FU14B1: EQ11 7.14b1 Fuel freq men [IHDS2]
 FU14B2: EQ11 7.14b2 Fuel Coll men [IHDS2]
 FU14B3: EQ11 7.14b1,2 Fuel collect men: minutes/week [IHDS2 est.]
 FU14C1: EQ11 7.14c1 Fuel freq girls [IHDS2]
 FU14C2: EQ11 7.14c2 Fuel Coll girls [IHDS2]
 FU14C3: EQ11 7.14c1,2 Fuel collect girls: minutes/week [IHDS2 est.]
 FU14D1: EQ11 7.14d1 Fuel freq boys [IHDS2]
 FU14D2: EQ11 7.14d2 Fuel Coll boys [IHDS2]
 FU14D3: EQ11 7.14d1,2 Fuel collect boys: minutes/week [IHDS2 est.]
 QC1: EQ17 11.1 Visit Hospital
 QC2: EQ17 11.2 Med treatment who [revised]
 QC3: EQ17 11.3 Med treatment where
 QC4: EQ17 11.4 Illness type
 QC5M: EQ17 11.5 Med treatment Month
 QC5Y: EQ17 11.5 Med treatment Year
 QC6: EQ17 11.6 Med treatment sex
 QC7: EQ17 11.7 Doctor's behaviour
 QC8: EQ17 11.8 Med treat wait time
 QC9: EQ17 11.9 Med treat accompanied
 QC11: EQ17 11.11 Health facility ID [IHDS2]
 O1A: EQ18 13.1 Obs: respondent ID
 O2A: EQ18 13.2a Obs: Other respondt 1
 O2B: EQ18 13.2b Obs: Other respondt 2
 O2C: EQ18 13.2c Obs: Other respondt 3
 O2D: EQ18 13.2d Obs: Other respondt 4
 O3: EQ18 13.3 Obs: Non-HH present
 HQ1: EQ35 23.1 Obs: House Type
 HQ2A: EQ35 23.2a Obs: House Excrement
 HQ2B: EQ35 23.2b Obs: Stagnant water
 HQ3: EQ35 23.3 Obs: Animals kept in
 HQ4: EQ35 23.4 Obs: Wall type
 HQWALL: EQ35 23.4 Wall: brck, metal, stone, concrete
 HQ5: EQ35 23.5 Obs: Roof type
 HQROOF: EQ35 23.5 Roof: asbestos, metal, brick, stone, concrete
 HQ6: EQ35 23.6 Obs: Floor type
 HQFLOOR: EQ35 23.6 Floor: not mud, wood
 OG1: EQ35 24.1 Obs: Purpose
 OG2: EQ35 24.2 Obs: Understanding
 OG3: EQ35 24.3 Obs: Looked at interviewer [IHDS2]
 OG4: EQ35 24.4 Obs: Clarity [IHDS2]
 OG4C: EH37 24.3 Obs: Clarity & Looked at intvwr [IHDS1 only]
 OG5: EQ35 24.5 Obs: Knows expenditure
 OG6: EQ35 24.6 Obs: Confidence
 OG7: EQ35 24.7 Obs: Reliability [IHDS2]
 OG8: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion day [IHDS2]
 OG8M: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion month [IHDS2]
 OG8Y: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion year [IHDS2]
 OG8DATE: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion (integer) date [IHDS2]
 OG9A: EQ35 24.9 Interview end hour
 OG9B: EQ35 24.9 Interview end minute
 OG9C: EQ35 24.9 AM/PM Int. time
 OG10: EQ35 24.10 Completion status
 POVLIN2005: Poverty line 2005, Tendulkar
 POVLIN2012: Poverty cut off Tendulkar Method, adj for interview date
 DEFLATOR: Deflator for converting 2012 prices, CPI based, month adj.
 PSUWAVES: which surveys PSU has been in
 URBAN: Census 2001 for IHDS1; 2011 for IHDS2
 URBAN2001: Census 2001: village/town
 URBAN2011: Urban residence from census 2011
 URBAN4: 4-cat urban/rural from 2001/2011 for IHDS-I/II
 URBAN4_2001: 4-cat urban/rural from 2001 census & IHDS-I vill q
 URBAN4_2011: 4-cat urban/rural from 2011 census & IHDS-II vill q
 METRO: Largest 6 metro areas 0/1
 METRO6: Largest 6 metro areas 1-6
 DIST1: Census 2011; district id smstate=0'
 INCCROP: HQ7-10 Net income from crops
 INCAGPROP: HQ7 5.14,41 Rs land, other rented out
 INCANIMAL: HQ11.23 net animal income=mkt+home-cost
 INCAG: HH6-10 all ag income (crops, property, animals)
 INCBUSINESS: HQ14-16 8.5,25,45 All businesses: Net income
 INCOTHER: HQ17 9.1-3 Income from property, pensions
 INCWS: HQ13 7.10-12 annual hh ws earnings with bonuses
 INCNONAG: HQ13 7.3 income: nonag wage
 INCAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 income: farm wage
 INCNSALARY: HQ13 7.3 income: salary position
 INCNREGA: HQ13 7.3 income: NREGA
 INCNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 income: nonag wage not NREGA
 INCBENEFITS: HQ17 9.5+13,1-8 all govt benefits Rs
 INCREMIT: HQ5 3.13a Rs received by hh from nonres last year
 INCOME: HQ Annual income
 INCOME5: HQ tot income quint 0=neg
 HOUSING: HOUSING
 NPERSONS: HQ4 2.0 N in hh
 NADULTS: HQ4 2.5 N 21+ in hh
 NADULTM: HQ4 2.5 # 21+ men in hh
 NADULTF: HQ4 2.5 N 21+ women in hh
 NCHILD: HQ4 2.5 # 0-14 boys in hh
 NCHILD: HQ4 2.5 # 0-14 girls in hh

NTEENM: HQ4 2.5 # 15-20 boys in hh
 NTEENF: HQ4 2.5 # 15-20 girls in hh
 NELDERM: HQ4 2.5 # 60+ men in hh
 NELDERF: HQ4 2.5 # 60+ men in hh
 NMARRIEDM: HQ4 2.6 N married men in hh
 NMARRIEDF: HQ4 2.6 N married women in hh
 NWKANY: HQ10-16 N wk (>=240hrs): any job
 NWKANYPLUS: HQ10-16 N wk (>=240hrs): any job or animal care
 NWKNONAG: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): nonag wage
 NWKAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): farm wage
 NWKSALARY: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): salary position
 NWKNREGA: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): NREGA
 NWKNREGA4: HQ13 7.3 N wk, any hours: NREGA
 NWKNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): nonag wage not NREGA
 NWKBUSINESS: HQ14-16 nf12,13 N wk (>=240hrs): business
 NWKFARM: HQ10 fm37,38 N wk (>=240hrs): farm
 NWKANIMAL: HQ11 an5 N wk (often): animal
 NNR: HQ5 3.0 # hh nonresidents
 HHILITERATE: HQ19 11.2 Any adult (or head) in hh literate
 HHEDUC: 11.6 Highest adult educ [max=15]
 HHEDUC7: HQ19 11.6 Highest adult educ, 7 categories
 HHEDUCM: 11.6 Highest male adult educ [max=15]
 HHEDUCF: 11.6 Highest female adult educ [max=15]
 POP01: Census place population size (collapsed)
 OH9H: HH28 22.9 Interview end time: hour
 OH9M: HH28 22.9 Interview end time: minutes
 OG6H: EH37 24.6 EdHealth interview end, hour
 OG6M: EH37 24.6 EdHealth interview end, minutes
 OG6A: EH37 24.6 EdHealth interview end, an/ypm
 POOR1: Below poverty line using 2005 definition
 POOR1: Poverty using 2004-5 Tendulkar cutoffs
 POOR2: Poverty using 2012 Tendulkar cutoffs
 POOR: Poverty using 2005/2012 Tendulkar cutoffs in IHDS1/2

Eligible women

SURVEY: IHDS1 (2005) or IHDS2 (2012)
 HHBASE: unique multisurvey id of hh at 1st entry
 HHFAM2: 2012 subfamily for this 2005 individual
 PBASE: unique multisurvey person id
 STATEID: State code
 DISTID: District code
 PSUID: PSU: village/neighborhood code
 HHID: Household ID IHDS2=3-digit IHDS1=2-digit
 HHSPLITID: Split household ID
 PERSONID: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID in IHDS1/IHDS2 household
 EWWAVES: EW in which surveys
 IDPSU: PSU id unique 6 digit long int=cluster
 IDPERSON: Person id, unique 12 byte
 HHID2005: household id in 2005 (2-digit)
 HHID2012: household id in 2012 (3-digit)
 HHSPLITID2005: split household id for 2005
 HHSPLITID2012: split household id for 2012
 PID2005: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID within 2005 household, ro1
 PID2012: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID within 2012 household, ro0
 HHWAVES: which surveys hh has been in
 PWAVES: which surveys ph has been in
 REGION: HH0 states grouped into 7 regions
 STATEID2: State codes, collapsed
 CD1: EQ2 1 Agree to interview
 CD2: EQ2 2 Agree to youth interview [IHDS2]
 CD3D: EQ2 3 Interview day
 CD3M: EQ2 3 Interview month
 CD3Y: EQ2 3 Interview year
 CD3DATE: EQ2 3 Interview integer date
 CD4A: EQ2 4 Interview start hour
 CD4B: EQ2 4 Interview start minute
 CD4C: EQ2 4 AM/PM Int. time
 EW1NO: EQ questionnaire: eh/supp
 EW3Y: EQ19 14.3 has EW questionnaire
 EW4A: EQ19 14.4a in 2005
 EW5: EQ19 14.5 Rel to HH head
 EW6: EQ19 14.6 Age
 EW7D: EQ19 14.7a Day of birth
 EW7M: EQ19 14.7b Month of birth
 EW7Y: EQ19 14.7c Year of birth
 EW7DATE: EQ19 14.7 Integer date of birth
 EW8: EQ20 14.8 Education
 EW9: EQ20 14.9 # children
 EW10: EQ20 14.10 General health
 EW11: EQ20 14.11 Childhood residence [IHDS2]
 EW12A: EQ20 14.12a Mother alive [IHDS2]
 EW12B: EQ20 14.12b Father alive [IHDS2]
 EW12C: EQ20 14.12c Mo-in-law alive [IHDS2]
 EW12D: EQ20 14.12d Fa-in-law alive [IHDS2]
 EW13A: EQ20 14.13a Mo in hh [IHDS2]
 EW13B: EQ20 14.13b Fa in hh [IHDS2]
 EW13C: EQ20 14.13c Mo-in-law in hh [IHDS2]
 EW13D: EQ20 14.13d Fa-in-law in hh [IHDS2]
 EW14A: EQ20 14.14a Mo attended school [IHDS2]
 EW14B: EQ20 14.14b Fa attended school [IHDS2]
 EW14C: EQ20 14.14c Mo-in-law attended school [IHDS2]
 EW14D: EQ20 14.14d Fa-in-law attended school [IHDS2]
 EW15A: EQ20 14.15a Mo educ [IHDS2]
 EW15B: EQ20 14.15b Fa educ [IHDS2]
 EW15C: EQ20 14.15c Mo-in-law educ [IHDS2]
 EW15D: EQ20 14.15d Fa-in-law educ [IHDS2]
 EW16A: EQ20 14.16a Mo literate [IHDS2]
 EW16B: EQ20 14.16b Fa literate [IHDS2]
 EW16C: EQ20 14.16c Mo-in-law literate [IHDS2]
 EW16D: EQ20 14.16d Fa-in-law literate [IHDS2]
 EW17A: EQ20 14.17a # brothers [IHDS2]
 EW17B: EQ20 14.17b # sisters [IHDS2]
 EW17C: EQ20 14.17c Husband: # brothers
 EW17D: EQ20 14.17d Husband: # sisters
 EW18A: EQ20 14.18a Brother highest educ [IHDS2]
 EW18B: EQ20 14.18b Sister highest educ [IHDS2]
 EW18C: EQ20 14.18c Brother-in-law highest educ

EW18D: EQ20 14.18d Sister-in-law highest educ
 HB1: EQ21 15.1 Belief Daily milk
 HB2: EQ21 15.2 Belief Male sterilistn
 HB3: EQ21 15.3 Belief 1st thin milk
 HB4: EQ21 15.4 Belief Chulha smoke
 HB5: EQ21 15.5 Belief Diarrhea
 HB6: EQ21 15.6 Belief Impure water [IHDS2]
 HB7: EQ21 15.7 Belief Malaria [IHDS2]
 HB8: EQ21 15.8 Belief pregnancy [IHDS1=IHDS2]
 A11: EQ21 16.1 AIDS Awareness
 A11A: EQ21 16.1a AIDS Needle
 A11B: EQ21 16.1b AIDS Mosquito bite
 A11C: EQ21 16.1c AIDS Transfusion
 A11D: EQ21 16.1d AIDS Sex
 A11E: EQ21 16.1e AIDS Food sharing
 A11F: EQ21 16.1f AIDS Clothing sharing [IHDS2]
 A12: EQ21 16.2 AIDS Information source [IHDS2]
 A13: EQ21 16.3 AIDS Known person
 A14: EQ21 16.4 AIDS Test [IHDS2]
 GR1A: EQ22 17.1a Cooking Respondent
 GR1B: EQ22 17.1b Cooking Husband
 GR1C: EQ22 17.1c Cooking Sr male
 GR1D: EQ22 17.1d Cooking Sr female
 GR1E: EQ22 17.1e Cooking Other
 GR1F: EQ22 17.1f Cooking No One
 GR1G: EQ22 17.1g Cooking Most Say
 GR2A: EQ22 17.2a Purchase Respondent
 GR2B: EQ22 17.2b Purchase Husband
 GR2C: EQ22 17.2c Purchase Sr male
 GR2D: EQ22 17.2d Purchase Sr female
 GR2E: EQ22 17.2e Purchase Other
 GR2F: EQ22 17.2f Purchase No One
 GR2G: EQ22 17.2g Purchase Most Say
 GR3A: EQ22 17.3a # children Respondent
 GR3B: EQ22 17.3b # children Husband
 GR3C: EQ22 17.3c # children Sr male
 GR3D: EQ22 17.3d # children Sr female
 GR3E: EQ22 17.3e # children Other
 GR3F: EQ22 17.3f # children No One
 GR3G: EQ22 17.3g # children Most Say
 GR4A: EQ22 17.4a If sick Respondent [IHDS2]
 GR4B: EQ22 17.4b If sick Husband [IHDS2]
 GR4C: EQ22 17.4c If sick Sr male [IHDS2]
 GR4D: EQ22 17.4d If sick Sr female [IHDS2]
 GR4E: EQ22 17.4e If sick Other [IHDS2]
 GR4F: EQ22 17.4f If sick No One [IHDS2]
 GR4G: EQ22 17.4g If sick Most Say [IHDS2]
 GR5A: EQ22 17.5a Buy land Respondent [IHDS2]
 GR5B: EQ22 17.5b Buy land Husband [IHDS2]
 GR5C: EQ22 17.5c Buy land Sr male [IHDS2]
 GR5D: EQ22 17.5d Buy land Sr female [IHDS2]
 GR5E: EQ22 17.5e Buy land Other [IHDS2]
 GR5F: EQ22 17.5f Buy land No One [IHDS2]
 GR5G: EQ22 17.5g Buy land Most Say [IHDS2]
 GR6A: EQ22 17.6a Wedding expense Respondent [IHDS2]
 GR6B: EQ22 17.6b Wedding expense Husband [IHDS2]
 GR6C: EQ22 17.6c Wedding expense Sr male [IHDS2]
 GR6D: EQ22 17.6d Wedding expense Sr female [IHDS2]
 GR6E: EQ22 17.6e Wedding expense Other [IHDS2]
 GR6F: EQ22 17.6f Wedding expense No One [IHDS2]
 GR6G: EQ22 17.6g Wedding expense Most Say [IHDS2]
 GR7A: EQ22 17.7a Child ill Respondent
 GR7B: EQ22 17.7b Child ill Husband
 GR7C: EQ22 17.7c Child ill Sr male
 GR7D: EQ22 17.7d Child ill Sr female
 GR7E: EQ22 17.7e Child ill Other
 GR7F: EQ22 17.7f Child ill No One
 GR7G: EQ22 17.7g Child ill Most Say
 GR8A: EQ22 17.8a Child's wed R
 GR8B: EQ22 17.8b Child's wed Husband
 GR8C: EQ22 17.8c Child's wed Sr male
 GR8D: EQ22 17.8d Child's wed Sr female
 GR8E: EQ22 17.8e Child's wed Other
 GR8F: EQ22 17.8f Child's wed No One
 GR8G: EQ22 17.8g Child's wed Most Say
 GR9AY: EQ23 17.9a Permission health centre
 GR9B: EQ23 17.9b Perm husband: health centre
 GR9C: EQ23 17.9c Perm Sr male: health centre
 GR9D: EQ23 17.9d Perm Sr Female: health centre
 GR9E: EQ23 17.9e Perm others health centre
 GR9F: EQ23 17.9f Visit health centre alone
 GR10AY: EQ23 17.10a Permission Friend home
 GR10B: EQ23 17.10b Perm husband Friend home
 GR10C: EQ23 17.10c Perm Sr male Friend home
 GR10D: EQ23 17.10d Perm Sr Female Friend home
 GR10E: EQ23 17.10e Perm others Friend home
 GR10F: EQ23 17.10f Visit Friend home alone
 GR11AY: EQ23 17.11a Permission Kirana shop
 GR11B: EQ23 17.11b Perm husband Kirana shop
 GR11C: EQ23 17.11c Perm Sr male Kirana shop
 GR11D: EQ23 17.11d Perm Sr Female Kirana shop
 GR11E: EQ23 17.11e Perm others Kirana shop
 GR11F: EQ23 17.11f Visit Kirana shop alone
 GR12AY: EQ23 17.12a Permission bus trip [IHDS2]
 GR12B: EQ23 17.12b Perm husband bus trip [IHDS2]
 GR12C: EQ23 17.12c Perm Sr male bus trip [IHDS2]
 GR12D: EQ23 17.12d Perm Sr female bus trip [IHDS2]
 GR12E: EQ23 17.12e Perm others bus trip [IHDS2]
 GR12F: EQ23 17.12f Bus trip alone [IHDS2]
 GR13A: EQ23 17.13 Been to metro city [IHDS2]
 GR14A: EQ23 17.14 Been to a town [IHDS2]
 GR15A: EQ23 17.15 Been to a village [IHDS2]
 GR16A: EQ23 17.16 Been to another stated [IHDS2]
 GR17A: EQ23 17.17 Been abroad [IHDS2]
 GR18A: EQ23 17.18a Member Mahila Mandal [IHDS2]
 GR18B: EQ23 17.18b Member Self-help [IHDS2]
 GR18C: EQ23 17.18c Member Savings group [IHDS2]
 GR18D: EQ23 17.18d Member Political org [IHDS2]
 GR19: EQ23 17.19 Attended panchayat [IHDS2]
 GR20: EQ24 17.20 Purdah Practise

GR21: EQ24 17.21 Purdah only relatives [IHDS2]
GR22: EQ24 17.22 Family outing
GR23A: EQ24 17.23a Shopping Respondent
GR23B: EQ24 17.23b Shopping Adult men
GR23C: EQ24 17.23c Shopping Adult women
GR23D: EQ24 17.23d Shopping Children
GR24A: EQ24 17.24a Homework Respondent
GR24B: EQ24 17.24b Homework Adult men
GR24C: EQ24 17.24c Homework Adult women
GR24D: EQ24 17.24d Homework Children
GR25: EQ24 17.25 Family meal taking
GR26: EQ24 17.26 Cash-in-hand
GR27A: EQ24 17.27a Family bank account
GR27B: EQ24 17.27b Resp account holder
GR28: EQ24 17.28 House papers: Woman
GR29A: EQ24 17.29a Discuss: Work/farm
GR29B: EQ24 17.29b Discuss: Expenditure
GR29C: EQ24 17.29c Discuss: Politics
GR30: EQ24 17.30 Natal family visit [IHDS1--IHDS2]
GR31: EQ24 17.31 Natal family freq [IHDS2]
GR32: EQ24 17.32 Natal family talk [IHDS2]
GR33: EQ24 17.33 Natal family nearby
GR34: EQ25 17.34 Beat if leaves w/o permit
GR35: EQ25 17.35 Beat if extramarital
GR36: EQ25 17.36 Beat if no dowry
GR37: EQ25 17.37 Beat if House neglect
GR38: EQ25 17.38 Beat if not respectful [IHDS2]
GR39: EQ25 17.39 Beat if bad cooking
GR40: EQ25 17.40 Widow support
GR41: EQ25 17.41 Live with in old age
GR42: EQ25 17.42 Would live w daughter
GR43: EQ25 17.43 Financial support
GR44: EQ25 17.44 Support: daughter
GR45: EQ25 17.45 Harassment of girls
GR46: EQ25 17.46 Worked for wage [IHDS2]
GR46A: EQ25 17.46a Worked for NREGA [IHDS2]
GR46B: EQ25 17.46b Working for wage [IHDS2]
GR47: EQ25 17.47 Working: who decides [IHDS2]
GR48: EQ25 17.48 Willing to work [IHDS2]
GR49: EQ25 17.49 Allowed to work [IHDS2]
MH1A: EQ26 18.1a Age at marriage
MH1B: EQ26 18.1b Month of marriage
MH1BY: EQ26 18.1b Year of marriage
MH1BMONTH: EQ26 18.1b century month of marriage
MH1C: EQ26 18.1c Age at Gauna
MH1DM: EQ26 18.1d Month of Gauna
MH1DY: EQ26 18.1d Year of Gauna
MH1DMONTH: EQ26 18.1b century month of gauna
MH1E: EQ26 18.1e Age at Menarche
MH1F: EQ26 18.1f Menarche after wed
MH2: EQ26 18.2 Marriage status
MH3: EQ26 18.3 Knew husb before wed
MH4A: EQ26 18.4a Marriage choice
MH4B: EQ26 18.4b Choice R say
MH5A: EQ26 18.5a Had met husband [IHDS2]
MH5B: EQ26 18.5b Had talked to husband [IHDS2]
MH5C: EQ26 18.5c Had seen husband photo [IHDS2]
MH5D: EQ26 18.5d Had emailed husband [IHDS2]
MH6: EQ26 18.6 Husband same vill
MH7: EQ26 18.7 Husband same caste
MH8A: EQ26 18.8a Live after marriage
MH8B: EQ26 18.8b Years with inlaws [IHDS2]
MH9: EQ26 18.9 Distance natal family
MH10: EQ26 18.10 Natal fam married husb fam
MH11: EQ26 18.11 Natal fam married same vill
MH12: EQ26 18.12 Husband blood rel
MH13: EQ27 18.13 Econ stat husb fam
MH14: EQ27 18.14 Husb Marriage 1+
MH15: EQ27 18.15 R Marriage 1+
MH16: EQ27 18.16 R # marriages
MH17A: EQ27 18.17a 1st marriage Age
MH17BM: EQ27 18.17b 1st marriage Month
MH17BY: EQ27 18.17b 1st marriage Year
MH17BMONTH: EQ26 18.1b century month of 1st marriage
MH18A: EQ27 18.18a 1st marriage Age gauna
MH18BM: EQ27 18.18b 1st marriage Month gauna
MH18BY: EQ27 18.18b 1st marriage Year gauna
MH18BMONTH: EQ26 18.1b century month of 1st gauna
MH19: EQ27 18.19 1st marriage Status
FH2S: EQ27 19.2 N sons with R
FH3S: EQ27 19.3 N sons elsewhere
FH4S: EQ27 19.4 N sons died
FH5SM: EQ27 19.5 N sons bom (entered)
FH2D: EQ27 19.2 N daughters with R
FH3D: EQ27 19.3 N daughters elsewhere
FH4D: EQ27 19.4 N daughters died
FH5DM: EQ27 19.5 N daughters bom (entered)
FH2CM: EQ27 19.2 N children with R (entered)
FH3CM: EQ27 19.3 N children elsewhere (entered)
FH4CM: EQ27 19.4 N children died (entered)
FH5CM: EQ27 19.5 N children bom (entered)
FH5S: EQ27 19.5 N sons born (entered) [IHDS2]
FH5D: EQ27 19.5 N daughters born (entered) [IHDS2]
FH2C: EQ27 19.2 N children with R (entered) [IHDS2]
FH3C: EQ27 19.3 N children elsewhere (entered) [IHDS2]
FH4C: EQ27 19.4 N children died (entered) [IHDS2]
FH5C: EQ27 19.5 N children bom (calc son+daughter/2+3+4)
FH6: EQ27 19.6 # still births
FH7: EQ27 19.7 # miscarriages
LB17G: EQ31 22.17g LB Premature [IHDS2]
LB17H: EQ31 22.17h LB Other problem [IHDS2]
LB18: EQ31 22.18 LB Place of delivery
LB19A: EQ31 22.19a LB Urged medical: doctor [IHDS2]
LB19B: EQ31 22.19b LB Urged medical: nurse [IHDS2]
LB19C: EQ31 22.19c LB Urged medical: health worker [IHDS2]
LB19D: EQ31 22.19d LB Urged medical: anganwadi [IHDS2]
LB19E: EQ31 22.19e LB Urged medical: ASHA [IHDS2]
LB19F: EQ31 22.19f LB Urged medical: NGO [IHDS2]
LB19G: EQ31 22.19g LB Urged medical: husband [IHDS2]
LB19H: EQ31 22.19h LB Urged medical: family [IHDS2]
LB19I: EQ31 22.19i LB Urged medical: friends [IHDS2]
LB19J: EQ31 22.19j LB Urged medical: self [IHDS2]
LB19K: EQ31 22.19k LB Urged medical: others [IHDS2]
LB20: EQ32 22.20 LB Govt worker accompanied [IHDS2]
LB21: EQ32 22.21 LB Govt money for delivery [IHDS2]
LB21Y: EQ32 22.21 LB Any gov money for delivery [IHDS2]
LB22: EQ32 22.22 LB Govt money for transport [IHDS2]
LB22Y: EQ32 22.22 LB Any gov money for transport [IHDS2]
LB23: EQ32 22.23 LB Transport type [IHDS2]
LB24: EQ32 22.24 LB Arranged transport [IHDS2]
LB25: EQ32 22.25 LB Why home delivery [IHDS2]
LB26A: EQ32 22.26a LB delivery: doctor
LB26B: EQ32 22.26b LB delivery: Nurse
LB26C: EQ32 22.26c LB delivery: Midwife
LB26D: EQ32 22.26d LB delivery: Friend
LB26E: EQ32 22.26e LB delivery: Others
LB27: EQ32 22.27 LB Size of child
LB28: EQ32 22.28 LB Type of Delivery
LB29: EQ32 22.29 LB Birth certificate [IHDS2]
LB30: EQ32 22.30 LB Post-natal checkup
LB31: EQ32 22.31 LB when post-checkup
LB32A: EQ32 22.32a LB Vaginal bleeding
LB32B: EQ32 22.32b LB Back pain [IHDS2]
LB32C: EQ32 22.32c LB Very high fever
LB32D: EQ32 22.32d LB Pelvic inflammation [IHDS2]
LB32E: EQ32 22.32e LB Foul smelling discharge [IHDS2]
LB32F: EQ32 22.32f LB any others [IHDS2]
LB33: EQ33 22.33 LB Immunization card
LB34AD: EQ33 22.34a LB Immun BCG day
LB34AM: EQ33 22.34a LB Immun BCG month
LB34AY: EQ33 22.34a LB Immun BCG year
LB34ADATE: EQ33 22.34a LB Immun BCG integer date
LB34BD: EQ33 22.34b LB Immun Polio0 day
LB34BM: EQ33 22.34b LB Immun Polio0 month
LB34BY: EQ33 22.34b LB Immun Polio0 year
LB34BDATE: EQ33 22.34b LB Immun Polio0 integer date
LB34CD: EQ33 22.34c LB Immun DPT1 day
LB34CM: EQ33 22.34c LB Immun DPT1 year
LB34CY: EQ33 22.34c LB Immun DPT1 year
LB34CDATE: EQ33 22.34c LB Immun DPT1 integer date
LB34DD: EQ33 22.34d LB Immun DPT2 day
LB34DM: EQ33 22.34d LB Immun DPT2 month
LB34DY: EQ33 22.34d LB Immun DPT2 year
LB34DDATE: EQ33 22.34d LB Immun DPT2 integer date
LB34ED: EQ33 22.34e LB Immun DPT3 day
LB34EM: EQ33 22.34e LB Immun DPT3 month
LB34EY: EQ33 22.34e LB Immun DPT3 year
LB34EDATE: EQ33 22.34e LB Immun DPT3 integer date
LB34FD: EQ33 22.34f LB Immun Polio1 day
LB34FM: EQ33 22.34f LB Immun Polio1 month
LB34FY: EQ33 22.34f LB Immun Polio1 year
LB34FDATE: EQ33 22.34f LB Immun Polio1 integer date
LB34GD: EQ33 22.34g LB Immun Polio2 day
LB34GM: EQ33 22.34g LB Immun Polio2 month
LB34GY: EQ33 22.34g LB Immun Polio2 year
LB34GDATE: EQ33 22.34g LB Immun Polio2 integer date
LB34HD: EQ33 22.34h LB Immun Polio3 day
LB34HM: EQ33 22.34h LB Immun Polio3 month
LB34HY: EQ33 22.34h LB Immun Polio3 year
LB34HDATE: EQ33 22.34h LB Immun Polio3 integer date
LB34ID: EQ33 22.34i LB Immun Measls day
LB34IM: EQ33 22.34i LB Immun Measls month
LB34IY: EQ33 22.34i LB Immun Measls year
LB34IDATE: EQ33 22.34i LB Immun Measls integer date
LB35: EQ33 22.35 LB Vacc not recorded
LB36: EQ33 22.36 LB Vacc No card
LB37: EQ33 22.37 LB BCG given
LB38: EQ33 22.38 LB # DPT given
LB39: EQ33 22.39 LB Polio frequency
LB39A: EQ33 22.39a LB First polio time
LB40: EQ33 22.40 LB Measles vaccine
LB41: EQ33 22.41 LB Vaccine Centre
LB42: EQ33 22.42 LB mos. Vitamin A
LB43: EQ34 22.43 LB Ever breastfed
LB44: EQ34 22.44 LB 1st breastfeeding
LB45: EQ34 22.45 LB Squeeze milk
LB46Y: EQ34 22.46 LB Still breastfeeding
LB46: EQ34 22.46 LB Breastfeeding dur
LB47AY: EQ34 22.47a LB no milk supplements yet
LB47A: EQ34 22.47a LB Age at diet supp
LB47BY: EQ34 22.47b LB no solid foods yet
LB47B: EQ34 22.47b LB Age at Solid food
LB48: EQ34 22.48 LB AWC beneficiary
LB49A1: EQ34 22.49a LB AWC:Immunization
LB49A2: EQ34 22.49a LB AWC:Immun freq
LB49B1: EQ34 22.49b LB AWC:Health check
LB49B2: EQ34 22.49b LB AWC:Checkup freq
LB49C1: EQ34 22.49c LB AWC:Grow monitor
LB49C2: EQ34 22.49c LB AWC:Growth freq
LB49D1: EQ34 22.49d LB AWC:Educ
LB49D2: EQ34 22.49d LB AWC:Educ freq
LB49E1: EQ34 22.49e LB AWC:Food
LB49E2: EQ34 22.49e LB AWC:Food freq [IHDS1 -- IHDS2]
OG1: EQ35 24.1 Obs: Purpose
OG2: EQ35 24.2 Obs: Understanding
OG3: EQ35 24.3 Obs: Looked at interviewer
OG4: EQ35 24.4 Obs: Clarity [IHDS2]
OG5: EQ35 24.5 Obs: Knows expenditure
OG6: EQ35 24.6 Obs: Confidence
OG7: EQ35 24.7 Obs: Reliability [IHDS2]
OG8D: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion day [IHDS2]
OG8M: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion month [IHDS2]
OG8Y: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion year [IHDS2]
OG8DATE: EQ35 24.8 Interview completion integer date [IHDS2]
OG9A: EQ35 24.9 Interview end hour
OG9B: EQ35 24.9 Interview end minute
OG9C: EQ35 24.9 AM/PM Int. time
OG10: EQ35 24.10 Completion status
FHCHK: EQ27 19 One+ live births
BHED: EQ28 20 Birth: Total Boys & Girls [IHDS2]

FPWHO: EQ29 21 Others present
 PSUWAVES: which surveys PSU has been in
 URBAN: Census 2001 for IHDS-I; 2011 for IHDS-II
 URBAN2001: Census 2001: village/town
 URBAN2011: Urban residence from census 2011
 URBAN4: 4-cat urban/rural from 2001/2011 for IHDS-I/II
 URBAN4_2001: 4-cat urban/rural from 2001 census & IHDS-I vill q
 URBAN4_2011: 4-cat urban/rural from 2011 census & IHDS-II vill q
 METRO6: Largest 6 metro areas 1-6
 NEWQ: # completed woman q, incl. non eligibles
 NEWELIGIBLE: HQ4 2.3,5,6 # eligible women in hh
 EWQELIGIBLE: HH4 2.3,5,6 EW q and 15-49 ever married in
 NEWQELIGIBLE: HQ4 2.3,5,6 # EW q of eligible women in hh
 NEWPSU: HQ4 2.3,5,6 # eligible women in psu
 NEWQELIGIBLEPSU: HQ4 2.3,5,6 # eligible EW q in psu
 NEWADJQPSU: # of eligible ew q's in psu: wt by within hh coverage
 WTEW2012: Weight for eligible women, IHDS2 (with zero wts)
 AGERANK: HQ4 2.5,6 Rank # of ever married woman within hh
 SENFEM: HQ4 2.5,6 Senior female
 ONLYFEM: HQ4 2.5,6 Only female
 JUNFEM: HQ4 2.5,6 Junior female
 EWPOSITION: HQ4 2.5,6 age position in hh
 ABSENSEN: HQ4 2.5,6 only/sr female, husb absent
 ABSENTJUN: HQ4 2.5,6 junior female, husb absent
 FORMERSEN: HQ4 2.5,6 only/sr female, widow/separated
 FORMERJUN: HQ4 2.5,6 junior female, widow/separated
 MARRIEDSEN: HQ4 2.5,6 senior female, husband present
 MARRIEDJUN: HQ4 2.5,6 junior female, husband present
 MARRIEDONLY: HQ4 2.5,6 only married female, husband present
 FIRSBIRTH: EH27 19.5 months since first birth
 LASTBIRTH: EH27 19.5 months since last birth
 ROO: HQ4 2.0 Roster ID IHDS2
 RO1: HQ4 2.1 Roster ID IHDS1
 RO1ID1993: HH4 2.1 1993 member ID
 RO3: HQ4 2.3 Sex
 RO4: HQ4 2.4 Relationship to head
 RO5: HQ4 2.5 Age
 RO6: HQ4 2.6 Marital Status
 RO8: HQ4 2.8 Spouse's ID
 APIY: EQ36 25.3 Anthropometry data
 AP3: EQ36 25.3 Anthropometry Birth ID [IHDS2]
 AP5: EQ36 25.5 Anthropometry Height 1st
 AP6: EQ36 25.6 Anthropometry Height 2nd [IHDS2]
 AP7: EQ36 25.7 Anthropometry Position
 AP8: EQ36 25.8 Anthropometry Weight 1st
 AP9: EQ36 25.9 Anthropometry Weight 2nd
 HAZ: Height for age zscore from zanthro(US) months<=24
 HAZFLAG: Height for age zscore out of bounds
 LAZ: Length for age zscore from zanthro(US) months<=36
 LAZFLAG: Length for age zscore out of bounds
 WAZ: Weight for age zscore from zanthro(US)
 WAZFLAG: Weight for age zscore out of bounds
 WHZ: Weight for height zscore from zanthro(US)
 WHZFLAG: Weight for height zscore out of bounds
 BMI: BMI from zanthro(US)
 BAZ: BMI for age zscore from zanthro(US) months>=24
 BAZFLAG: BMI for age zscore out of bounds
 AGE: Age in months estimate
 AGEFROM: Age estimate from birth history or roster
 EWELIGIBLE: HH4 2.3,5,6 Woman 15-49 ever married
 WKANY: HQ work participation (farm, business, wage/salary)
 WKANYPLUS: HQ work participation (farm business w/s animal)
 WKANIMAL: HQ11 an5+ work participation animals
 WKBUSINESS: HQ14-16 nf12+ work participation business
 WKAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 Farm wage labour (5cat)
 WKFARM: HQ14-16 fm12+ work participation farm
 WKNONNAG: HQ13 7.3 Nonag wage labour (5cat)
 WKNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 Nonnrega wage labour (5cat) [IHDS2]
 WKSALARY: HQ13 7.3 Salary position (5cat)
 WKNREGA: HQ13 7.3 NREGA work (5cat) [IHDS2]
 AN7Y: HQ11 6.7 Animal care: is decision maker
 NF15Y: HQ14 8.15 Busn1: is decision maker [IHDS2]
 NF35Y: HQ15 8.35 Busn2: is decision maker [IHDS2]
 NF55Y: HQ15 8.55 Busn2: is decision maker [IHDS2]
 WKHOURS: HQ work hours /year (farm, business, wage/salary)
 NFHOURS: HQ14-16 nf12+ hours per year all businesses
 AGLABHOURS: HQ13 7.5, ag labour: hours/year
 NONAGHOURS: HQ13 7.5, nonag labour: hours/year
 SALARYHOURS: HQ13 7.5, salary position: hours/year
 NONNREGAHOURS: HQ13 7.5, nonnrega labour: hours/year [IHDS2]
 NREGAHOURS: HQ13 7.5, NREGA position: hours/year [IHDS2]
 WKDAYS: HQ work days /year (farm, business, wage/salary)
 NFDAYS: HQ14-16 nf12+ days per year all businesses
 AGLABDAYS: HQ13 7.5 ag labour: days/year [IHDS2]
 NONAGDAYS: HQ13 7.5 nonag labour: days/year [IHDS2]
 SALARYDAYS: HQ13 7.5 salary position: days/year [IHDS2]
 NONNREGADAYS: HQ13 7.5 nonnrega labour: days/year [IHDS2]
 NREGADAYS: HQ13 7.5 NREGA position: days/year [IHDS2]
 NFEARN: HQ12-4.7 ind net business earn est.
 ANEARN: HQ11 ind animal net earn est.
 SALARYEARN: HQ13 7.8+ salary position: annual wages
 NONAGEARN: HQ13 7.8+ nonag labour: annual wages
 AGLABEARN: HQ13 7.8+ ag labour: annual earnings
 WKEARNPLUS: Earnings est.: sum w/s farm business animal
 WKEARN: Earnings est.: sum w/s farm business
 UNEARNED: ind: other hh income
 SPROO: HQ4 2.1 spouse IHDS2 roster ID
 SPRO1: HQ4 2.1 spouse IHDS1 roster ID
 SPRO3: HQ4 2.3 spouse Sex
 SPRO4: HQ4 2.4 spouse Relationship to head
 SPRO5: HQ4 2.5 spouse Age
 SPRO6: HQ4 2.6 spouse Marital Status
 SPRO8: HQ4 2.8 spouse Spouse's ID
 SPRO9: HQ4 2.9 spouse Father's IDSPRO10: HQ4 2.10 spouse Mother's ID
 SPWKANY: HQ spouse work participation (farm, business, wage/salary)
 SPWKANYPLUS: HQ spouse work participation (farm, business, wage/salary, animal)
 SPWKANIMAL: HQ11 spouse an5+ work participation animals
 SPWKBUSINESS: HQ14-16 spouse nf12+ work participation business
 SPWKAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 spouse Farm wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKFARM: HQ14-16 spouse fm12+ work participation farm

SPWKNONAG: HQ13 7.3 spouse Nonag wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 spouse Nonag (not NREGA) wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKNREGA: HQ13 7.3 spouse NREGA wage labour (5cat)
 SPWKSALARY: HQ13 7.3 spouse Salary position (5cat)
 SPWKHOURS: HQ work spouse hours /year (farm, business, wage/salary)
 SPWKDAYS: HQ work spouse days /year (farm, business, wage/salary)
 AN1: HQ11 6.1 HH Owns livestock
 NF1: HQ14 8.1 Any nonfarm business, corrected
 GROUPS: HQ3 1.13-15 Caste & religion
 GROUPS6: HQ3 1.13-15 Caste/religion 6cats
 AN7: HQ11 6.7 Animal care: Primary ID
 DIST11: Census 2011: district id smstate=0'
 MP1A: EQ8 4.1a Marry daughter natal vill
 MP1B: EQ8 4.1b Marry daughter cousin
 MP1C: EQ8 4.1c Widow remarriage [IHDS2]
 MP2A: EQ8 4.2a Intercaste marriage [IHDS2]
 MP2B: EQ8 4.2b Divorce in community [IHDS2]
 MP3A: EQ8 4.3a Boy's wed exp-lower
 MP3B: EQ8 4.3b Boy's wed exp-upper
 MP4A: EQ8 4.4a Girl's wed exp-lower
 MP4B: EQ8 4.4b Girl's wed exp-upper
 MP5A: EQ8 4.5 # invited by bride [IHDS2]
 MP5B: EQ8 4.5 # invited by groom [IHDS2]
 MP6A: EQ8 4.6a Wed Gift: gold
 MP6B: EQ8 4.6b Wed Gift: silver
 MP6C: EQ8 4.6c Wed Gift: land
 MP6D: EQ8 4.6d Wed Gift: car
 MP6E: EQ8 4.6e Wed Gift: scooter
 MP6F: EQ8 4.6f Wed Gift: TV
 MP6G: EQ8 4.6g Wed Gift: Fridge
 MP6H: EQ8 4.6h Wed Gift: Mobile [IHDS2]
 MP6I: EQ8 4.6i Wed Gift: Furniture
 MP6J: EQ8 4.6j Wed Gift: Pressure cook
 MP6K: EQ8 4.6k Wed Gift: Utensils
 MP6L: EQ8 4.6l Wed Gift: Mixer/Grinder
 MP6M: EQ8 4.6m Wed Gift: Bedding
 MP6N: EQ8 4.6n Wed Gift: Watch
 MP6O: EQ8 4.6o Wed Gift: Bicycle
 MP6P: EQ8 4.6p Wed Gift: Sewing m/c
 MP6Q: EQ8 4.6q Wed Gift: Livestock
 MP6Q1: EH8 4.5q Wed Gift: Tractor [IHDS1 only]
 MP6R: EQ8 4.6r Wed Gift: Washing machine [IHDS2]
 MP6S: EQ8 4.6s Wed Gift: LPG [IHDS2]
 MP6T: EQ8 4.6t Wed Gift: Flat [IHDS2]
 MP6U: EQ8 4.6u Wed Gift: Cash
 MP6V: EQ8 4.6v Wed Gift: Computer [IHDS2]
 MP7A: EQ8 4.7a Wed Gift: Cash amount low [IHDS2]
 MP7B: EQ8 4.7b Wed Gift: Cash amount high [IHDS2]
 MP7MID: EQ8 4.7a Wed Gift: Cash amount midpoint
 QC1: EQ17 11.1 Visit Hospital
 QC2: EQ17 11.2 Med treatment who [IHDS1 -- IHDS2]
 QC3: EQ17 11.3 Med treatment where
 QC4: EQ17 11.4 Illness type
 QC5M: EQ17 11.5 Med treatment Month
 QC5Y: EQ17 11.5 Med treatment Year
 QC6: EQ17 11.6 Med treatment sex
 QC7: EQ17 11.7 Doctor's behaviour
 QC8: EQ17 11.8 Med treat wait time
 QC9: EQ17 11.9 Med treat accompanied
 QC11: EQ17 11.11 Health facility ID
 STLAB01: H1sp: State name (2001 census)
 DILAB01: Census: 2001 district name
 SAMPTYPE: NCAER: 2004 IHDS sample type
 PRICE2004: Sector specific price indices for 2004-5 [IHDS2]
 PRICE2012: Sector specific price indices for 2011-12, adj for int date [IHDS2]
 DEFATOR: Deflator for converting 2012 prices, CPI based, month adj.
 HHFAM2012: 2012 subfamily for this 2005 individual
 APD: HH29 23.dt Anthropometry date
 APDD: HH29 23. Day of anthropometry interview
 APDM: HH29 23. Month of anthropometry interview
 APDY: HH29 23. Year of anthropometry interview
 APDDATE: HH29 23. Date (integer) of anthropometry interview
 POORT: Poverty using 2004-5 Tendulkar cutoffs
 FHO: EH27 any fertility history
 CD3CM: EH2 0.2 imputed date of interview (century month calendar)
 IDHH: Household id, unique 10 byte string
 DIST01: District ID corrected Census 2001
 WTHH: hh weight in IHDS1 or 2, not for ew analyses
 ID1: HQ3 1.11 Religion
 ID13: HQ3 1.13 Caste category [as in IHDS1]
 ASSETS: Total hh assets (0-33) [IHDS2]
 ASSETS2005: Total hh assets (0-30) as in IHDS1
 ASSETSS: Total hh assets, quintiles
 COTOTAL: HQ23-25 14. Annual hh consumption expenditure
 COTOTALS: HQ23-25 14. Annual hh consumption quintiles
 INCOME: HQ Annual income
 INCOMES: HQ tot income quint 0=neg
 POOR: Poverty using 2005/2012 Tendulkar cutoffs in IHDS1/2
 POOR1: Poverty using 2004-5 Tendulkar cutoffs
 POOR2: Poverty using 2012 Tendulkar cutoffs [IHDS2]
 POOR3: Below poverty line using 2005 definition
 POVLIN2005: Poverty line 2005, Tendulkar
 POVLIN2012: Poverty cut off Tendulkar Method, adj for interview date [IHDS2]
 FM1: HQ7 5.1 HH any owned or cultivated
 NWKANY: HQ10-16 N wk (>=240hrs): any job
 NWKANYPLUS: HQ10-16 N wk (>=240hrs): any job or animal care
 NWKAGLAB: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): farm wage
 NWKANIMAL: HQ11 an5 N wk (often): animal
 NWKBUSINESS: HQ14-16 nf12,13 N wk (>=240hrs): business
 NWKFARM: HQ10 fm37,38 N wk (>=240hrs): farm
 WKNONNAG: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): nonag wage
 WKNONNREGA: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): nonag wage not NREGA [IHDS2]
 WKNNREGA: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): NREGA [IHDS2]
 NWKSALARY: HQ13 7.3 N wk (>=240hrs): salary position
 NPERSONS: HQ4 2.0 N in hh
 NNR: HQ5 3.0 # hh nonresidents
 NCHILD: HQ4 2.5 # 0-14 boys in hh
 NCHILD: HQ4 2.5 # 0-14 girls in hh
 NTEENM: HQ4 2.5 # 15-20 boys in hh

NTEENF: HQ4 2.5 # 15-20 girls in hh
NADULTS: HQ4 2.5 N 21+ in hh
NADULTM: HQ4 2.5 # 21+ men in hh
NADULTF: HQ4 2.5 N 21+ women in hh
NELDERM: HQ4 2.5 # 60+ men in hh
NELDERF: HQ4 2.5 # 60+ women in hh
NMARRIEDF: HQ4 2.6 N married women in hh
NMARRIEDM: HQ4 2.6 N married men in hh
HHEDUC: 11.6 Highest adult educ [max=15]
HHEDUC7: HQ19 11.6 Highest adult educ, 7 categories
HHEDUCF: 11.6 Highest female adult educ [max=15]
HHEDUCM: 11.6 Highest male adult educ [max=15]
HHLITERATE: HQ19 11.2 Any adult (or head) in hh literate
ED2: HQ19 11.2 Educ: Literacy
ED3: HQ19 11.3 Educ: English ability
ED4: HQ19 11.4 Educ: Attended school
ED5: HQ19 11.5 Educ: Enrolled now
ED6: HQ19 11.6 Educ: Completed Years, never,<1=0

EDUC7: HQ19 11.4.6 Educ: Completed Years, 7cats
TA2Y: HQ34 26.2 Was a test child
FM39AY: HQ10 5.39a Farm work: is decision maker
FMHOURS: HQ10 5.37-38 Farm: hours/year max=4000
WSDAYS: HQ13 7.7 Working days -person total
FMEARN: HQ7-10 ind crop net earnings est.
WSEARN: HQ13 7.10 annual w/s earnings -person total
SPED2: HQ19 11.2 Spouse educ: Literacy
SPED3: HQ19 11.3 Spouse educ: English ability
SPED4: HQ19 11.4 Spouse educ: Attended school
SPED5: HQ19 11.5 Spouse educ: Enrolled now
SPED6: HQ19 11.6 Spouse educ: Completed Years, never,<1=0
SPEDUC7: HQ19 11.4.6 Spouse educ: Completed Years, 7cats
WTEW: Weight for eligible women, IHDS1, best weight
FWTEW: Weight (integer) for eligible, IHDS1, best weight

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