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Public Opinion and Presidential Policymaking: Exploring the Impact of the Public's Most
Important Problems on Presidential Executive Orders between 1947 and 2021

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ABSTRACT

Outstanding research on the presidential executive order focuses on institutional and personal decision-making, but it has largely failed to consider the executive order from a policymaking standpoint. My research seeks to understand how the president's national electoral mandate and the public's policy priorities influence their decision-making regarding executive orders. To evaluate the executive order from this lawmaking perspective, I utilize data from *Gallup's Annual Most Important Problem Survey* series and data on the content of executive orders from 1947 to 2021 to understand if changes in the public's policy priorities are reflected in the likelihood of executive order issuance in the modern era. The results suggest that intra-policy changes in the percentage of the public who feel that a certain policy area is the most important do not impact the likelihood of executive order issuance. However, there are notable differences in the likelihood of executive order issuance across different policy areas. Moreover, I find support for several institutional and personal explanations of executive order issuance consistent in the existing literature. Overall, this research has important implications for the future of executive order research in hopes of understanding the increase in presidential power in the modern era more comprehensively.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The American presidency is a unique and complex institution although research into the presidency is relatively a relatively young and narrow field. Data limitations have made it difficult to study the presidency continuously from Washington to the present day. Moreover, significant, characteristic differences exist between the institution before and after FDR. The modern presidency, which most commonly refers to the institution from FDR onwards, has best been characterized as a period of immense growth in the power of the American president. Presidency researchers take a variety of approaches to studying the executive, and the academic discussion is full of debate and contradictory findings. Nevertheless, nearly every study of the modern era addresses this theme of increased power, and they all share a common conclusion: the modern president is significantly more powerful than his pre-modern predecessors.

This consensus is still devoid of sufficiently valid and widely agreed upon explanations. Why this shift occurred when it did, how it occurred, and how best to characterize these increased powers are questions of the utmost importance to presidency scholars. This increased power may be a result of the actions of specific presidents that shifted the paradigm in such a way that the office became irreversibly stronger for future presidents. On the other hand, all presidents may have a vested, institutional interest in expanding their authority, and, in turn, this growth was gradual and inevitable. The first step in answering these questions, however, is to define what these increased powers actually look like.

Unlike pre-modern presidents, modern presidents have an incomparable ability to communicate directly with the public intimately and instantaneously. As commander-in-chief in an ever-expanding geopolitical arena, presidents have a growing authority to conduct foreign affairs and maintain homeland security. And arguably most important, presidents in the modern era have an unrecognizable power to set the legislative agenda and even make policy themselves. As head of the executive branch, presidents have the unilateral authority to issue directives which manage the operations of their branch via executive orders. However, in the modern era, many of these orders have started to look more like legislation rather than just an operational directive. As a result, and alongside recent efforts to codify and characterize executive orders, these unilateral directives have become an important focus of presidency research in hopes of answering the questions surrounding increased presidential power.

Given the similarities between executive orders and legislation passed by Congress, much of the existing research focuses on institutional constraints that may guide presidential decision-making much like it would guide the decision-making of legislators. Some research, however, applies a more traditional framework of presidential persuasion power to analyze the motives behind executive order issuance. Understanding these motivations is key to defining the increased policy making power maintained by the president and, eventually, formulating more comprehensive explanations for increased presidential power in general. My research considers and incorporates many of the existing theories regarding presidential executive order issuance and also considers the importance of the president's national electoral mandate in their decision-making process. As the only nationally elected public official, the president has a unique mandate to consider the entire public's priorities in all of their duties. My research seeks to

understand how this mandate manifests in their authority to issue executive orders and, more generally, make unilateral, quasi-legislative decisions.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction to Presidency and Executive Order Research

For a long time, research on the American presidency lacked the empirical support that rigorous quantitative analyses gave to other questions of political science. Relatively recent efforts to codify phenomenon related to the executive, however, have resulted in a surge in empirical presidency research. Research of presidential executive orders has been one area of presidency research that has enjoyed considerable growth as executive orders were among the phenomena that were relatively easy to quantify. As executive order research has grown, however, enduring theoretical debates in the presidency literature have permeated the executive order debate and have opened the doors to competing and contradictory conclusions.

The most salient debate in presidency research is the question of *institutional* and *personal* characterizations of the office of the president. Neustadt's watershed publication, *Presidential Power* (1968), introduced the idea of a constrained executive who relies on the power to persuade in order to make important policy decisions. This view of the executive—which earned the moniker the 'personal presidency'—became the field standard for presidency research for decades. Studies that investigated these powers of persuasion were framed in a way that largely disregarded institutional factors. It was not until the 1990's when these institutional

factors were brought back into the fold of presidency research. Passionately advocated by Terry Moe (1993) in his book chapter “Presidents, Institutions, and Theory”, the study of the presidency through the institutional framework bestowed a greater degree of importance upon institutional norms, costs, and constraints which, in their own right, guide presidential decision making. The increase in the availability of reliable, quantifiable data on the executive branch complemented this shift towards the institutional approach as concepts like legislative capacity and institutional costs became more easily measured.

These competing theoretical frameworks are echoed in the executive order literature; however, researchers have largely discovered that explanations of the executive order do not fit so squarely into either of these frameworks. Mayer and Price (2002) state this clearly in their analysis of executive orders when they write, “In our view, this dichotomy between “formal power” and “persuasion” is artificial; the two categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive of all possible avenues of presidential influence” (p. 370). In fact, they demonstrate this in their analysis by examining a combination of factors, some of which could be deemed personal (like public approval) and others institutional (like party control of the government).

Legislative Environment and the Strategic Model

Since the institutional/personal presidency debate does not directly translate to executive order theory, it has instead influenced the debate surrounding the executive order in the form of what researchers have deemed the *strategic model*. The strategic model for executive order issuance argues that presidents use executive orders as a means of circumventing the legislative process and enacting their desired policies against a hostile or an ideologically opposed Congress

(Nathan, 1983; Krause & Cohen, 1997). This model proposes a primarily institutional view of the president's behavior with respect to executive order issuance and argues that executive orders are a tool for presidential policymaking that presidents use in a highly calculated fashion.

Deering and Maltzman (1999) favor a "revised strategic model" which stipulates that presidents are likely to issue executive orders to circumvent Congress only if their executive orders are unlikely to be overturned in the legislature— further complicating the president's calculations. There are many executive order researchers, however, who disagree with the model's validity (Gleiber & Shull, 1992; Gomez & Shull, 1995; Mayer, 1999; Mayer & Price, 2002; Howell, 2003).

The empirical evidence for and against the strategic model offers largely contradictory results. The most basic, and most common, measure for the strategic model in the executive order literature is the use of a unified/divided government binary variable. Most researchers find that presidents are significantly less likely to issue executive orders during a divided government (Howell, 2003; Fine & Warber, 2012; Young, 2013; Bailey & Rottinghaus, 2014; Bolton & Thrower, 2016) which would contradict the strategic model; however, some researchers have found evidence for the opposite, and thus, offer support for the strategic model (Deering & Maltzman, 1999; Shull, 2000).

Recognizing that the relationship may be more nuanced than what can be captured by a binary unified/divided government variable, researchers have also included more granular measures of the legislative environment as explanatory variables of executive order issuance. Many researchers have found support for the notion that as a president's party's seat share increases in the House, the likelihood of issuing an executive order increases as well. However, the relationship appears to flip when examining the Senate. According to some studies, as the

seat share increases in the Senate, the likelihood of executive order issuance decreases (Krause & Cohen, 1997; Deering & Maltzman, 1999; Marshall & Pacelle, 2005). Compared with the use of a simple divided/unified indicator variable of party control of government, using a measure like seat share allows researchers to identify trends specific to certain chambers of Congress.

Another, more granular measure of the legislative environment, common in the literature is legislative success. Legislative success has, largely, been found to be positively associated with the likelihood of issuing an executive order contrary to the arguments of the strategic model (Gleiber & Shull, 1992; Gomez & Shull, 1995; Krause & Cohen, 1997; Shull, 2006; Young, 2013). These findings bolster the idea that presidents issue executive orders to supplement legislative victories in Congress rather than to circumvent potential legislative blunders. Only a few researchers have found support for the strategic model using more precise measures of the legislative environment. Deering and Maltzman (1999) found that as ideological distance grows between the president and both chambers of Congress, presidents are significantly *more* likely to issue executive orders. Fine and Warber (2012) found the same trend with respect to major policy executive orders only. And, finally, Brockway and Hollibaugh's (2020) analysis on the impact of legislator pivot certainty add support to the revised strategic model as they find that as uncertainty increases (the potential for opposition in Congress), the likelihood of issuing a policy-relevant executive order decreases.

Nonetheless, the debate over the validity of the strategic model—and the nature of the executive order more generally—does not solely consider institutional factors relating to the legislature. Conditions regarding the president's tenure have been examined. While Krause and Cohen find that presidential tenure is insignificant, some researchers have found that presidents are more significantly likely to issue policy-relevant executive orders during their lame duck

period or in the last month of their presidency (Mayer, 1999; Bolton & Thrower, 2016).

However, Mayer finds that presidents not running for reelection are significantly less likely to issue executive orders in their final year. Similarly, Fine and Warber (2012) find that presidents are less likely to issue executive orders in general during election years compared to non-election years. In addition to presidential tenure, researchers have also considered the impact of the state of the economy on executive order issuance, which has garnered mixed results. (Krause & Cohen, 1997; Marshall & Pacelle, 2005; Bolton & Thrower, 2016). Some analyses even find that Republican presidents are generally less likely to issue executive orders than Democratic presidents (Mayer, 1999; Fine & Warber, 2012).

The most common variable in executive order research that aligns more closely with a personal view of the executive is public approval. Nearly all analyses that include a measure of presidential popularity find significant support that as support for the president decreases, the likelihood of executive order issuance increases (Deering & Maltzman, 1999; Mayer, 1999; Mayer & Price, 2002; Shull, 2006; Fine & Warber, 2012). Krause and Cohen's (1997) findings are insignificant; however, their OLS regression model also suggests that as public opinion of the president decreases, the likelihood of executive order issuance increases. Mayer and Price (2002) summarize the importance of public approval nicely when they write:

Our results show that the use of significant executive orders relates in theoretically tractable ways to a president's political environment. As our statistical findings suggest, presidents who can leverage robust public approval resort to the executive order less frequently than do those who lack strong popular support. (p. 379)

This conclusion invokes Neustadt's understanding of persuasion as a president's primary tool. Public support and persuasion power are positively related, and since public support and the

likelihood of executive order issuance are inversely related, it follows that executive orders may be a mechanism through which presidents compensate for a lack of persuasive efficacy.

Executive Orders as a Legislative Tool

Whether the true nature of the executive order is a tool used by presidents to circumvent a hostile Congress, supplement legislative victories, or a means of compensating for a lack of persuasive efficacy, most researchers agree that, in its most basic form, the executive order can be construed as legislative tool. The legal basis for executive orders is ambiguous. Executive orders are not enumerated in the Constitution but rather an implied power derived from Article II which charges presidents with the duty to faithfully execute the laws enacted by the legislature. This ambiguity, in turn, has allowed the power of the executive order to grow and evolve throughout the course of American history. Moe and Howell write that, “Presidents have incentives to expand their institutional power, and they operate within a formal governance structure whose pervasive ambiguities... give them countless opportunities to move unilaterally into new territory, claim new powers, and make policy on their own authority” (1999, p. 870). These incentives may be what allowed executive orders to evolve into legislative tools rather than simple directives that supplement laws enacted passed by Congress.

This view of executive orders as a lawmaking tool has opened new avenues for executive order research. Its nature as a unilateral power makes for a unique and interesting phenomenon that invites new questions about a president’s motivation for issuing them. Unlike other presidential powers, it is arguable that presidents are motivated to issue executive orders by circumstances more akin to those that motivate Congress to pass certain laws. The content of

policies and the populations they are intended to benefit are incredibly pertinent to lawmaking tools. Relatively new data on executive orders from the *Comparative Agendas Project* offers a classification scheme for the policy areas they address. These policy area classifications align with those used by *Gallup* in their *Most Important Problem Survey* series. In one study, researchers assess the degree to which the public's priorities are reflected in presidential policymaking by combining these two data sources. They have been able to offer measures of correlation between the public's policy preferences and concerns and the frequency of executive orders passed relating to these preferences and concerns. Policy areas like agriculture, environment, and energy were found to have statistically significant correspondence coefficients indicating that as the percentage of the public who express that one of these policy areas is their most important problem increases, so does the frequency of presidential executive orders issued relating to those policy areas (Jones, Larsen-Price, & Wilkerson, 2009). My research builds upon this connection by placing it within the context of the strategic model and controlling for many of the coefficients that have been shown to impact the likelihood of executive order issuance. By incorporating additional factors that influence executive order issuance, I hope to offer even stronger conclusions regarding the impact of the public's priorities on executive order issuance.

Chapter 3

Theory

Most Important Problems

Presidents are unique among elected officials at the federal level as they are the only individuals for whom the entire national population can vote for (alongside their running mates). This gives presidents a national electoral mandate as opposed to congresspeople who have state and local electoral mandates. In theory, at least, state and local policy priorities are assumed to be more homogenous than the policy priorities of the entire national electorate. As a result, presidential lawmaking via the executive order should account for a national population rather than a state or local population. So as the national mood and policy preferences shift, presidents may wish to address these new priorities via their chief policymaking tool. Therefore, my first hypothesis is as follows:

H1: The more important a policy area is to the public, the more likely a president will be to issue an executive order relating to that policy area.

Foreign Affairs and Economic Policy Areas

Presidency research has also offered support for the *two-presidencies hypothesis* which argues that presidents have a greater ability to shape foreign policy than their ability to shape domestic policy given their status as commander-in-chief and their duty to conduct relations with foreign nations (Wildavsky, 1966; Rutledge and Larsen Price, 2014). Policy area classifications can be categorized as relating to foreign affairs or domestic affairs and analyzing them as policy

area groups may be beneficial to assessing the relative impact of the president's policymaking ability in these two spheres. Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Presidents are more likely to issue executive orders relating to foreign policy areas than executive orders relating to domestic policy areas.

The economy, in a similar sense, is also of heightened importance to presidents. Economic indicators are consistently strong predictors of presidential reelection success, the economy is consistently among the public's top priorities, and in political media, economic conditions are often attributed to the president regardless of their true influence. Policy areas can also be categorized as relating to the economy or not to the economy. Therefore, my third hypothesis is as follows:

H3: Presidents are more likely to issue executive orders relating to economic policy areas than executive orders relating to non-economic policy areas.

Presidential Approval Ratings

Within the framework of a national electoral mandate *and* the views of the strategic model of executive order issuance, public opinion is of the utmost importance in considering the likelihood of executive order issuance. As a political decision and a legislative one, presidents are likely to consider their favorability among the American citizenry and what that citizenry feels are the most important problems facing the country. Consistent with most previous studies, my fourth hypothesis is as follows:

H4: The higher a president's approval rating is, the less likely they will be to issue an executive order.

Party Control of the Government and Presidential Party

Previous studies also stress the importance of the party control of the government on the likelihood of a president to issue an executive order. This is the primary question fueling the debate around the validity of the strategic model. While the findings regarding the party control of the government are mixed, my hypothesis is in line with the strategic model and is as follows:

H5: Presidents are more likely to issue executive orders during a divided government than during a unified government.

A few studies also comment on the president's party, examining whether or not presidents of one party are more likely to issue executive orders than presidents of another party. Consistent with the findings of previous studies that examine the impact of presidential party on executive order issuance my final hypothesis is as follows:

H6: Democratic presidents are more likely to issue executive orders than Republican presidents.

Chapter 4

Data and Methods

Data Sources

In order to test my hypotheses, I conducted a two-step quantitative analysis of executive orders between 1947 and 2021. Most of the data I utilized in my analysis came from the *Comparative Agendas Project* (CAP) database. This database includes the list of executive orders between 1947 and 2021 (excluding 1953 and 1955) and the policy area they relate to. It also includes data from *Gallup's Most Important Problem Survey* series and several of the relevant covariates included in the multinomial logit models. The covariates included party control of the government (divided or unified), presidential party (Republican or Democrat), and indicator variables for the first and last years of a president's tenure. The presidential approval rating data came from *The American Presidency Project* which tracks *Gallup's* presidential approval polling. The ideological distance variables for the House and Senate came from *Voteview* data on NOMINATE ideology scores. Finally, I self-coded the wartime/peacetime and incumbency indicator variables.

Dependent Variable

In total there were 4,019 executive orders issued between 1947 and 2021 (excluding 1953 and 1955). The dataset included the policy area classifications for each executive order. In order to match my unit of analysis— which, for the purposes of my logit regressions, was policy-area-years— I needed to create a binary indicator variable that expressed whether or not at least one

executive order was passed in a given year relating to one of the 20 policy areas. To do this, I totaled the number of executive orders passed per policy area, per year, and coded the binary indicator variable as '1' if that summed value was 1 or greater. In total I had 1,460 policy-area-years (20 policy areas multiplied by the 73 years in the analysis) for which 981 of them had at least one executive order issued, or 67.2% of observations. If no executive orders were passed in a given policy-area-year, the indicator variable was coded as '0'.

Independent Variables

The chief independent variable I used in my analysis was the polling data from *Gallup's Most Important Problem* (MIP) survey. This dataset included the percentage of individuals who expressed that a given policy area was, in their opinion, the most important problem facing the nation at the time of the survey. These results are reported in the data annually, and, thus, are already congruent with the unit of analysis of policy-area-years. For example, the value of the MIP polling data variable for the first policy-area-year is 34.8%. This means that in 1947 (the first year surveyed) 34.8% of respondents felt that the macroeconomy (the first policy area) was the most important problem facing the nation. Since the sample is representative of the adult American population, this variable is a good measure for how important certain problems are to the nation as a whole overtime.

While the dataset on presidential approval ratings generally had multiple ratings per year, the dates of approval polls were not consistent from year to year. I used the approval rating from roughly the middle of each year to approximate each president's annual approval rating. These

were simply duplicated for each policy area within a given year to match the policy-area-year unit of analysis.

The dataset of presidential and congressional ideologies included the NOMINATE ideology scores for the president and the average scores for each party in each chamber of the legislature. To calculate the president's ideological distance from each chamber of the legislature per congressional session I subtracted the mean of the NOMINATE first dimension estimates of the majority party in each chamber from that of the same measure for the president. NOMINATE estimates are on a scale given on a scale of -1 to 1 mirroring the left-right ideological spectrum. Thus, negative distances indicate that a president is further, ideologically, left than the majority party in a given chamber and further, ideologically, to the right for positive distances. The scores were calculated and duplicated for each policy area per two years (or roughly aligning with each congressional session).

Finally, indicator variables for party control of the government, presidential party, first and last year of a president's tenure, wartime/peacetime, and incumbency were all duplicated for each policy area in a given year to match the unit of analysis.

Method of Analysis

To conduct my analysis, I began by running three multinomial logit regression models to estimate the log likelihood of an executive order being passed in a given year. The first model only includes the MIP polling percentage variable. The second includes the MIP polling percentage variable, variables for each policy area (with the first policy area, macroeconomy, as a reference), and nine other covariates. The final model replaces the individual policy area

variables with foreign affairs and economic policy area indicator variables and keeps the same covariates used in the second model.

I utilized the second model to calculate the predicted probabilities of executive order issuance to assess my first, fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses. Given the hypothetical importance of party control of the government and presidential party on these likelihoods, I stratified each set of predicted probabilities by these two variables. These sets of predicted probabilities are further segmented by policy area (to better reflect the differences in likelihoods of executive order issuance between policy areas). For these predicted probabilities, the binary covariates (excluding party control of the government and presidential party) were set at their null values. In other words, the predicted probabilities represent a president who is not in their first or last year of their tenure, is not an incumbent, and is not serving during wartime. House and Senate ideological distance variables were set at their mean values for these predicted probabilities. For the MIP polling percentage predicted probabilities (Tables 2 and 6), presidential approval rating was set at its *mean* value. For the presidential approval rating predicted probabilities (Tables 4 and 7), MIP polling percentage was set at its *median* value. For the predicted probabilities based solely on party control of the government and presidential party (Tables 5 and 8), MIP polling percentage was set at its median value and presidential approval rating was set at its mean value.

The predicted probabilities for foreign affairs and economic policy areas required a slightly different approach than the others. Since my second and third hypotheses reflect groups of policy areas rather than individual ones, I needed to create two additional binary indicator variables. These variables grouped policy areas as (1) either relating to foreign or domestic affairs and (2) either relating to economic or non-economic policy areas. The following of the 20 policy areas were categorized as relating to foreign affairs and were coded as '1' for the foreign

policy areas indicator variable: immigration, defense, foreign trade, and international affairs. The other 16 policy areas, including other, were coded as '0'. The following policy areas were categorized as relating to the economy and were coded as '1' for the economic policy areas indicator variable: macroeconomy, agriculture, labor, social welfare, domestic commerce, and foreign trade. The other 14 policy areas, including other, were coded as '0'. Only one policy area (foreign trade) was coded as both relating to foreign affairs and the economy, and 11 policy areas were coded as neither relating to foreign affairs or the economy.

The predicted probabilities for foreign affairs and economic policy area groups (Table 3) utilize the third multinomial logit model. Like the other sets of predicted probabilities, these are also stratified by party control of the government and presidential party, the binary covariates are set at their null values, and the House and Senate ideological distance variables were set at their mean value. Like the predicted probabilities for party control of the government and presidential party, the MIP polling percentage variable was set at its median value and presidential approval rating variable was set at its mean value. Instead of all 20 policy areas represented, the predicted probabilities only show the likelihood of executive order issuance for an executive order relating to a foreign policy area, economic policy area, or neither.

Finally, to best synthesize these predicted probabilities, average likelihoods by party control of the government, presidential party, and the variable of interest for each set of predicted probabilities were calculated. These tables of averages are included in the body of the results section; the full sets of predicted probabilities (with all 20 policy areas) are included in the appendix.

Chapter 5

Results

Most Important Problem Percentages

My first hypothesis states that the more important a policy area is to the public, the more likely a president will be to issue an executive order relating to that policy area. To evaluate this hypothesis, I considered both a multinomial logit model which speaks to the significance of the relationship and associated predicted probabilities which more clearly illustrate the magnitude of the difference in the likelihood of issuing an executive order based how important a policy area is to the public.

Table 1 shows the results of the multinomial logit models predicting the log likelihood of an executive order being issued in a given year for a specific policy area. The first model simply predicts this likelihood based on the MIP polling percentage for a specific policy area. In this model, the MIP polling percentage was found to be a significant, positive predictor of whether an executive order would be issued. In other words, the higher the MIP polling percentage for a specific policy area was, the more likely a president would be to issue an executive order relating to that policy area in any given year. This result would support my first hypothesis; however, this model does not include any relevant covariates, and thus does not offer the strongest support for my hypothesis.

The second model in the multinomial logit regression in Table 1 includes relevant covariates and considers each policy area individually compared to the first and most important problem (according to polling) the macroeconomy. In this model, the MIP polling percentage is

not a significant predictor of the likelihood of a president issuing an executive order. Thus, using this more comprehensive model, I do not find significant support for my first hypothesis.

Table 1: Multinomial Regression Models

	Log Likelihood of Executive Orders Passed		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>MIP Percentage</i>	0.015** [0.007]	0.010 [0.011]	0.016** [0.007]
<i>Foreign</i>			0.516*** [0.154]
<i>Economic</i>			-0.519*** [0.122]
<i>Presidential Approval</i>		-1.375** [0.569]	-1.142** [0.518]
<i>House Distance</i>		-0.038 [0.229]	-0.027 [0.209]
<i>Senate Distance</i>		-0.005 [0.247]	-0.001 [0.226]
<i>Divided Government</i>		0.290* [0.175]	0.243 [0.158]
<i>Republican President</i>		-0.172 [0.283]	-0.150 [0.259]
<i>First 100 Days</i>		0.370* [0.196]	0.313* [0.181]
<i>Lame Duck Period</i>		-0.222 [0.183]	-0.018 [0.166]
<i>Incumbent</i>		-0.502*** [0.140]	-0.415*** [0.126]
<i>Wartime</i>		0.186 [0.188]	0.146 [0.171]
<i>Civil Rights</i>		0.908*** [0.429]	
<i>Health</i>		0.499 [0.439]	
<i>Agriculture</i>		-0.319 [0.466]	
<i>Labor</i>		0.244 [0.460]	
<i>Education</i>		-0.050 [0.452]	
<i>Environment</i>		0.416 [0.461]	
<i>Energy</i>		0.525 [0.457]	
<i>Immigration</i>		-0.965** [0.473]	

<i>Transportation</i>		2.197***	
		[0.550]	
<i>Law and Crime</i>		0.841**	
		[0.427]	
<i>Social Welfare</i>		-0.413	
		[0.442]	
<i>Housing</i>		0.250	
		[0.464]	
<i>Domestic Commerce</i>		1.619***	
		[0.503]	
<i>Defense</i>		4.239***	
		[1.050]	
<i>Technology</i>		0.914*	
		[0.473]	
<i>Foreign Trade</i>		1.618***	
		[0.502]	
<i>International Affairs</i>		3.590***	
		[0.792]	
<i>Government Operations</i>		17.602	
		[455.703]	
<i>Public Lands</i>		1.443***	
		[0.496]	
<i>Constant</i>	0.653***	0.601	1.280***
	[0.062]	[0.523]	[0.307]
Observations	1,460	1,460	1,460
Log Likelihood	-921.120	-751.339	-892.837
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,846.240	1,562.679	1,811.674
Note:	*p<0.1	**p<0.05	***p<0.01

Nonetheless, policy areas themselves are not necessarily insignificant to a president's decision to issue an executive order. In the second model the following policy areas were found to be significant, positive indicators of an executive order being issued when compared to macroeconomy: civil rights, transportation, law and crime, domestic commerce, defense, technology, foreign trade, international affairs, and public lands. Immigration, surprisingly, was found to be a significant, negative indicator of an executive order being passed. In other words, the log likelihood of an immigration executive order being passed was lower than that of a macroeconomic executive order.

The associated predicted probabilities further explain the nature of the relationship between MIP polling percentages and the likelihood of executive order issuance. Table 2 presents the average predicted probabilities of executive order issuance of all 20 policy areas for (1) Republican presidents during a unified government, (2) Republican presidents during a divided government, (3) Democratic presidents during a unified government, and (4) Democratic presidents during a divided government at both 25% and 75% MIP polling percentages. In each instance, the average predicted likelihood of executive order issuance only increases by 0.1%. For example, the average predicted likelihood of a Republican president issuing an executive order during a unified government relating to any of the 20 policy areas in a given year is 62.5% when the MIP polling percentage for that policy area is 25%. When the MIP polling percentage for that policy area increases to 75%, the average predicted likelihood only increases to 62.6% (a 0.1% increased likelihood). Overall, when averaging all four conditions (the different combinations of party control of the government and presidential party), the average predicted likelihood of executive order issuance is 66.7% when the MIP polling percentage is 25% and only 66.8% when the MIP polling percentage is 75%. Again, a difference of only 0.1%. The negligible differences in these average predicted probabilities are to be expected given the insignificance of MIP polling percentage in the second multinomial logit model, and they further cast doubt on my first hypothesis.

Table 2: MIP Polling Percentages (Averages)

Average Predicted Probabilities of Executive Order Issuance by MIP Polling Percentage	
Presidential Conditions	Predicted Probabilities
Unified Republican (25%)	62.5%
Unified Republican (75%)	62.6%
Divided Republican (25%)	67.8%
Divided Republican (75%)	67.9%
Unified Democrat (25%)	65.7%
Unified Democrat (75%)	65.8%
Divided Democrat (25%)	70.8%
Divided Democrat (75%)	70.9%
Averages	
25% MIP Polling	66.7%
75% MIP Polling	66.8%
Difference	
75% to 25% MIP Polling	0.1%

The significance of individual policy areas in the second model is evident in the full list of predicted probabilities by policy area. Table 6 in the appendix presents the full list of predicted probabilities for the four conditions for each of the 20 policy areas (from which the averages were calculated). While the intra-policy area differences resemble the averages, there are noticeable inter-policy area differences in the predicted probabilities. For example, the predicted likelihood of a Republican president to issue executive order relating to the macroeconomy in a given year is 43.1% when the government is unified and only a quarter of the public feel that the macroeconomy is the most important problem facing the country. Like the

averages, the increase in the predicted likelihood is negligible when, in contrast, three quarters of the county feel that the macroeconomy is the most important problem (43.2%). However, these predicted probabilities are much higher than those for a policy area such as immigration (22.5% and 22.6% for 25% and 75% MIP polling percentages respectively). They are also much lower than those for a policy area such as international affairs (96.5% for 25% and 75% MIP polling percentages). While these differences do not explicitly support or contradict my first hypothesis, they do reveal an important trend: presidents *are* more likely to issue executive orders relating to certain policy areas than others.

Foreign Affairs Policy Areas

Based on the *two-presidencies hypothesis* and the extant executive order literature, I also hypothesized that presidents are more likely to issue executive orders relating to foreign policy areas than executive orders relating to domestic policy areas. To evaluate this hypothesis, I used the third multinomial logit model and the associated predicted probabilities. Rather than considering individual policy areas, like the second model, I used indicator variables for foreign affairs and economic policy area groups in the third model (with neither as the reference category for both). This model also included the same covariates as the second.

In this model, the foreign policy areas indicator variable is a significant, positive indicator of executive order issuance. In other words, the log likelihood of a president issuing an executive order relating to a foreign policy area is significantly higher than that of a domestic policy area. This supports my hypothesis that presidents are more likely to issue executive orders relating to foreign policy areas than executive orders relating to domestic policy areas.

Table 3: Foreign and Economic Policy Areas

Predicted Probabilities of Executive Order Issuance for Foreign and Economic Policy Area Groups			
	<i>Foreign</i>	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Neither</i>
Presidential Conditions			
Unified Republican	74.4%	50.8%	63.5%
Divided Republican	78.8%	56.9%	68.9%
Unified Democrat	77.2%	54.6%	66.9%
Divided Democrat	81.2%	60.5%	72.0%
Averages			
Overall	77.9%	55.7%	67.8%
Difference			
Average to Neither	10.1%	-12.1%	-

The predicted probabilities associated with this third model further explain this significant difference. Table 3 shows the predicted probabilities of executive order issuance for foreign policy areas, economic policy areas, and neither. Regardless of the party control of the government or the president's party, presidents are always predicted to be more likely to issue an executive order relating to foreign policy areas than domestic policy areas (as indicated by the neither column). For example, a Republican president during a unified government is predicted to be 74.4% likely to issue an executive order relating to a foreign policy area in a given year while they are only 63.5% likely to issue an executive order relating to a domestic policy area. On average, these likelihoods are 77.9% and 67.8% for foreign and domestic policy areas, respectively. Thus, presidents, on average, are predicted to be 10.1% more likely to issue an executive order relating to a foreign policy area than a domestic policy area in a given year.

Economic Policy Areas

In a similar vein, I also hypothesized that presidents would be more likely to issue executive orders relating to economic policy areas than executive orders relating to non-economic policy areas. In the third multinomial logit model, the economic policy area indicator variable was a significant, *negative* predictor of executive order issuance when compared to non-economic policy areas. This was the opposite relationship from what I hypothesized and thus does not support my third hypothesis.

The second column in Table 3 shows the predicted probabilities of executive order issuance for executive orders that relate to economic policy areas. Regardless of party control of the government or the president's party, presidents are always predicted to be *less* likely to issue an executive order relating to economic policy areas than non-economic policy areas (as indicated by the neither column). On average, these likelihoods are 55.7% and 67.8% for economic and non-economic policy areas, respectively. Overall, presidents, on average, are predicted to be 12.1% less likely to issue an executive order relating to an economic policy area than a non-economic policy area in a given year.

Presidential Approval Ratings

My fourth hypothesis, consistent with the literature, argues that the higher a president's approval rating is, the less likely they will be to issue an executive order. Referring back to the second model in Table 1, the regression output shows that presidential approval rating is a significant, negative indicator of executive order issuance when controlling for policy area and

other relevant factors. This result offers support for my fourth hypothesis and is consistent with the findings of many previous researchers.

Table 4: Presidential Approval Ratings (Averages)

Average Predicted Probabilities of Executive Order Issuance by Presidential Approval Rating	
Presidential Conditions	Predicted Probabilities
Unified Republican (25%)	69.1%
Unified Republican (75%)	56.4%
Divided Republican (25%)	74.0%
Divided Republican (75%)	61.9%
Unified Democrat (25%)	72.1%
Unified Democrat (75%)	59.7%
Divided Democrat (25%)	76.7%
Divided Democrat (75%)	65.1%
Averages	
25% Approval Rating	73.0%
75% Approval Rating	60.8%
Difference	
75% to 25% Approval Rating	-12.2%

Table 4 shows the averages of the associated predicted probabilities of all 20 policy areas for presidents when their approval ratings are 25% and 75%. In contrast to the negligible change observed when the MIP polling percentages changed from 25% to 75%, there are much more significant changes in the average predicted probabilities of executive order issuance when presidential approval ratings change from 25% to 75%. For example, a Republican president with a 25% approval rating has, on average, a 69.1% likelihood of issuing an executive order

relating to a specific policy area in a given year during a unified government. On the other hand, when the president's approval rating increases to 75%, this predicted likelihood drops to 56.4% under the same conditions, a 12.7% decrease. When averaging presidents under the four conditions of party control of the government and presidential party, presidents have a 73% likelihood of issuing an executive order when their approval rating is 25% and only a 60.8% likelihood when their approval rating is 75%, a 12.2% decrease. These differences are consistent with the multinomial logit results for the presidential approval rating variable and further support my fourth hypothesis.

Table 7 in the appendix shows the full list of predicted probabilities for each policy area based on changes in the president's approval rating. Regardless of the party control of the government and the president's party, the results in Table 7 show that presidents are less likely to issue executive orders when their approval rating is higher for all 20 policy areas. For example, the predicted probability of a president issuing an executive order relating to the macroeconomy is 57.8%, on average, when their approval rating is 25%, but they are only 40.9% likely to issue one, on average, when their approval rating is 75%, a 16.9% difference.

When compared to the full set of MIP polling percentage predicted probabilities, the differences in average predicted probabilities for presidents with 25% and 75% approval ratings vary much more across policy areas. For example, presidents are 16.7% less likely to issue an executive order relating to housing, on average, when their approval rating is 75% than when it is 25%. In comparison, this difference is only 6.4% for executive orders relating to transportation. It is worth noting that there are still inter-policy area differences in Table 7. In fact, the more likely a president is to issue an executive order relating to a specific policy area, the smaller the difference tends to be between their likelihoods at 25% and 75% approval.

Party Control of the Government

Across the average predicted probabilities and the full sets, differences in the likelihoods of executive order issuance are apparent based on both the party control of the government and the president's party. The literature also discusses extensively the impact of these two factors on executive order issuance. I argue that presidents are more likely to issue executive orders during a divided government than during a unified government. The output for the party control of the government variable in the second multinomial logit model is significant. Unified government is the reference, and since the coefficient is positive, it indicates that presidents are significantly more likely to issue an executive order during a divided government than during a unified government, supporting my hypothesis and arguments in favor of the strategic model.

Table 5 shows the average predicted likelihoods of executive order issuance of all 20 policy areas by party control of the government and presidential party. Both Republican and Democratic presidents are more likely to issue executive orders during a divided government than during a unified government. Republican presidents have, on average, a 67.9% likelihood of executive order issuance during a divided government but only a 62.6% likelihood, on average, during a unified government. For Democratic presidents, these likelihoods are 70.9% and 65.8%, respectively. When averaged, presidents in general are predicted to be 5.2% more likely to issue an executive order during a divided government than during a unified government. Table 8 shows the relationship between the party control of the government and the president's party for all 20 policy areas. The trends remain the same. For every policy area, the likelihoods of executive order issuance are always higher during a divided government than during a unified government. These differences range from 7.3% to just 0.5% more likely to issue an executive order during a divided government (excluding government operations).

Table 5: Party Control of Government and Presidential Party (Averages)

Average Predicted Probabilities of Executive Order Issuance by Party Control of the Government and Presidential Party	
Presidential Conditions	Predicted Probabilities
Unified Republican	62.6%
Divided Republican	67.9%
Unified Democrat	65.8%
Divided Democrat	70.9%
Averages	
Republican President	65.2%
Democrat President	68.3%
Unified Government	64.2%
Divided Government	69.4%
Overall	66.8%
Differences	
Party Difference	3.1%
Government Difference	5.2%

Presidential Party

For the same reasons discussed above (the differences in predicted probabilities and findings in the existing literature), I also argue that the president's party has an impact on the likelihood of executive order issuance. Specifically, I contend that Democratic presidents are more likely to issue executive orders than Republican presidents. The coefficient for presidential party in the second multinomial logit model is negative, but it is not significant. Since the

reference category is a Democratic president, this coefficient indicates that Republican presidents are predicted to be less likely to issue executive orders than Democratic presidents (albeit not significantly). While I find support in the regression model for the direction of the hypothesized relationship, I do not find support for my hypothesis to a statistically significant degree.

The same tables discussed in the previous section help further understand the nature of the relationship between the president's party and the likelihood of executive order issuance. Table 5 shows that, on average, a Republican president is 3.1% less likely to issue an executive order relating to a specific policy area in a given year than a Democratic president. When compared to party control of the government, the magnitude of this difference is smaller. This is to be expected since the relationship of presidential party to executive order issuance was not significant while the relationship of party control of the government to executive order issuance was. While the relationship was not significant, however, Table 8 shows that regardless of policy area or the party control of the government, Republican presidents always have a lower predicted likelihood of executive order issuance than Democratic presidents. These differences range from 4.3% to just 0.2% (excluding government operations)

Additional Covariates

Finally, the regression model also includes a few additional covariates that I do not directly speak to in my hypothesis but are worth briefly discussing given their significance in the literature. The following covariates I discuss are all from the second multinomial logit model in Table 1. First, I find that neither the president's ideological distance from the House nor the Senate are significant predictors of executive order issuance when controlling for the policy area

of executive orders. The dummy variable to proxy the president's first 100 days is found to be a significant, positive indicator of executive order issuance. In other words, presidents are significantly more likely to issue an executive order during their first 100 days in office than when they are not. On the other hand, the dummy variable to proxy the president's lame duck period is not found to be a significant indicator of executive order issuance. Incumbent presidents were found to be significantly less likely to issue executive orders than presidents in their first and/or only term. And, finally, presidents were more likely to issue executive orders during wartime than peacetime, but this was not a statistically significant relationship.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The findings discussed above show mixed support for my hypotheses overall. While I did not find significant support for my first and most pertinent hypothesis, I did find support for a few others. I found statistically significant support for my second, fourth, and fifth hypotheses. According to my results, presidents were predicted to be (1) significantly more likely to issue executive orders relating to foreign policy areas than domestic policy areas, (2) significantly less likely to issue executive orders as their approval ratings increased, and (3) significantly more likely to issue executive orders during a divided government than during a unified government. I did not find statistical support for my first and sixth hypotheses, however, the direction of the relationship did appear to match the hypotheses. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the first relationship, I cannot confidently say that the results support the contention that as the percentage of the public who feel a policy area is the most important the likelihood of executive

order issuance for that policy area increases. Regarding my sixth hypothesis, the results are a little more mixed. The coefficient for presidential party was not significant, but the differences in the likelihood of executive order issuance between Democratic and Republican presidents were much more noticeable than the differences based on MIP percentage. And while the coefficient for economic policy areas was significant, it was found to have the opposite relationship as I predicted in my third hypothesis. Instead, my results suggested that presidents were significantly *less* likely to issue executive orders relating to economic policy areas than non-economic policy areas.

Apart from my hypotheses, the most important finding was that there are still noticeable differences in the likelihood of executive order issuance based on the policy area the executive order relates to. The relationships between MIP polling percentage, presidential approval, party control of the government, presidential party, and executive order issuance are all consistent across all 20 policy areas. In fact, these inter-policy area differences can be ranked. Consistently, across all sets of predicted probabilities, defense executive orders were the most likely to be issued (excluding government operations) followed by international affairs and transportation. Conversely, immigration executive orders were always the least likely, preceded by social welfare and then agriculture. And the range of these inter-policy area differences is not negligible. Defense executive orders were around 98% likely to be issued in a given year across all tested conditions while immigration executive orders only had between a 26% and 35% likelihood. Even though the percentage of the public who feel a certain issue is the most important does not have a significant impact on executive order issuance, the varying likelihoods for different policy areas suggest that the content of the order (the policy area it relates to) is of some consideration to presidents when deciding to issue an executive order.

As presidency researchers continue to investigate the nature of the president's increased power in the modern era, they should continue to investigate the motivations and circumstances that encourage executive order issuance as executive orders are such key examples of that increased power. My findings, consistent with previous research, offer support for competing theories of presidential decision making as it pertains to executive order issuance. My findings regarding presidential approval ratings offer support for the personal framework of presidential power while my findings regarding party control of the government offer support for a more institutional framework of presidential power. The inter-policy area differences in the likelihoods of executive order issuance only add to the complex nature of executive order decision making and presidential power more broadly. Presidents likely weigh personal, institutional, and policy-related considerations simultaneously when deciding to issue an executive order, and, as a result, future research should look to further understand the nature of these considerations in a more holistic manner.

Appendix

Tables

Table 6: MIP Polling Percentages (Full Set)

Predicted Probabilities of Executive Order Issuance by MIP Polling Percentage for all Policy Areas

	Macroeconomy	Civil Rights	Health	Agriculture	Labor	Education	Environment	Energy	Immigration	Transportation	Law and Crime	Social Welfare	Housing	Domestic Commerce	Defense	Technology	Foreign Trade	International Affairs	Government Operations	Public Lands
Presidential Conditions																				
Unified Republican (25%)	43.1%	65.2%	55.5%	35.5%	49.1%	41.8%	53.4%	56.1%	22.5%	87.2%	63.7%	33.4%	49.3%	79.3%	98.1%	65.4%	79.2%	96.5%	100.0%	76.2%
Unified Republican (75%)	43.2%	65.3%	55.6%	35.6%	49.2%	42.0%	53.5%	56.3%	22.6%	87.2%	63.8%	33.5%	49.4%	79.3%	98.1%	65.5%	79.3%	96.5%	100.0%	76.3%
Divided Republican (25%)	50.3%	71.5%	62.5%	42.4%	56.3%	49.0%	60.5%	63.1%	27.9%	90.1%	70.1%	40.1%	56.5%	83.6%	98.6%	71.6%	83.6%	97.3%	100.0%	81.1%
Divided Republican (75%)	50.4%	71.6%	62.6%	42.5%	56.5%	49.2%	60.6%	63.2%	28.1%	90.1%	70.2%	40.2%	56.6%	83.7%	98.6%	71.7%	83.7%	97.4%	100.0%	81.1%
Unified Democrat (25%)	47.3%	69.0%	59.7%	39.5%	53.4%	46.1%	57.7%	60.3%	25.6%	89.0%	67.6%	37.3%	53.6%	81.9%	98.4%	69.2%	81.9%	97.0%	100.0%	79.2%
Unified Democrat (75%)	47.5%	69.1%	59.8%	39.6%	53.5%	46.2%	57.8%	60.4%	25.7%	89.0%	67.7%	37.4%	53.7%	82.0%	98.4%	69.3%	82.0%	97.0%	100.0%	79.3%
Divided Democrat (25%)	54.6%	74.9%	66.4%	46.6%	60.5%	53.3%	64.5%	67.0%	31.5%	91.5%	73.6%	44.3%	60.7%	85.8%	98.8%	75.0%	85.8%	97.8%	100.0%	83.6%
Divided Democrat (75%)	54.7%	75.0%	66.5%	46.7%	60.6%	53.5%	64.7%	67.1%	31.7%	91.6%	73.7%	44.4%	60.8%	85.9%	98.8%	75.1%	85.9%	97.8%	100.0%	83.6%
Averages																				
25% MIP Polling	48.8%	70.2%	61.0%	41.0%	54.8%	47.6%	59.0%	61.6%	26.9%	89.5%	68.8%	38.8%	55.0%	82.7%	98.5%	70.3%	82.6%	97.2%	100.0%	80.0%
75% MIP Polling	49.0%	70.3%	61.1%	41.1%	55.0%	47.7%	59.2%	61.8%	27.0%	89.5%	68.9%	38.9%	55.1%	82.7%	98.5%	70.4%	82.7%	97.2%	100.0%	80.1%
Difference																				
75% to 25% MIP Polling	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table 7: Presidential Approval Ratings (Full Set)

Predicted Probabilities of Executive Order Issuance by Presidential Approval Rating for all Policy Areas

	Macroeconomy	Civil Rights	Health	Agriculture	Labor	Education	Environment	Energy	Immigration	Transportation	Law and Crime	Social Welfare	Housing	Domestic Commerce	Defense	Technology	Foreign Trade	International Affairs	Government Operations	Public Lands
Presidential Conditions																				
Unified Republican (25%)	52.1%	73.0%	64.2%	44.2%	58.1%	50.9%	62.3%	64.8%	29.5%	90.7%	71.6%	41.9%	58.3%	84.6%	98.7%	73.1%	84.6%	97.5%	100.0%	82.2%
Unified Republican (75%)	35.4%	57.6%	47.4%	28.5%	41.1%	34.2%	45.3%	48.1%	17.4%	83.1%	55.9%	26.6%	41.3%	73.4%	97.4%	57.7%	73.4%	95.2%	100.0%	69.9%
Divided Republican (25%)	59.3%	78.3%	70.6%	51.4%	65.0%	58.1%	68.8%	71.1%	35.8%	92.9%	77.1%	49.1%	65.1%	88.0%	99.0%	78.4%	88.0%	98.1%	100.0%	86.0%
Divided Republican (75%)	42.3%	64.5%	54.7%	34.7%	48.3%	41.0%	52.6%	55.3%	21.9%	86.8%	62.9%	32.6%	48.4%	78.7%	98.1%	64.6%	78.7%	96.4%	100.0%	75.6%
Unified Democrat (25%)	56.4%	76.2%	68.1%	48.5%	62.3%	55.2%	66.2%	68.6%	33.2%	92.1%	75.0%	46.1%	62.4%	86.7%	98.9%	76.3%	86.7%	97.9%	100.0%	84.6%
Unified Democrat (75%)	39.4%	61.7%	51.7%	32.1%	45.3%	38.2%	49.6%	52.4%	20.0%	85.4%	60.1%	30.1%	45.5%	76.7%	97.8%	61.9%	76.6%	95.9%	100.0%	73.4%
Divided Democrat (25%)	63.4%	81.1%	74.0%	55.7%	68.8%	62.2%	72.4%	74.5%	39.9%	94.0%	80.0%	53.4%	68.9%	89.7%	99.2%	81.2%	89.7%	98.4%	100.0%	88.0%
Divided Democrat (75%)	46.5%	68.3%	58.9%	38.7%	52.6%	45.3%	56.8%	59.5%	25.0%	88.7%	66.8%	36.5%	52.7%	81.4%	98.4%	68.4%	81.4%	96.9%	100.0%	78.6%
Averages																				
25% Approval Rating	57.8%	77.2%	69.2%	50.0%	63.6%	56.6%	67.4%	69.8%	34.6%	92.4%	75.9%	47.6%	63.7%	87.3%	99.0%	77.3%	87.3%	98.0%	100.0%	85.2%
75% Approval Rating	40.9%	63.0%	53.2%	33.5%	46.8%	39.7%	51.1%	53.8%	21.1%	86.0%	61.4%	31.5%	47.0%	77.6%	97.9%	63.2%	77.5%	96.1%	100.0%	74.4%
Difference																				
75% to 25% Approval Rating	-16.9%	-14.1%	-16.1%	-16.5%	-16.7%	-16.9%	-16.4%	-15.9%	-13.5%	-6.4%	-14.5%	-16.2%	-16.7%	-9.7%	-1.0%	-14.1%	-9.7%	-1.9%	0.0%	-10.8%

Table 8: Party Control of Government and Presidential Party (Full Set)

		Predicted Probabilities of Executive Order Issuance by Party Control of the Government and Presidential Party for all Policy Areas																				
		Macroeconomy	Civil Rights	Health	Agriculture	Labor	Education	Environment	Energy	Immigration	Transportation	Law and Crime	Social Welfare	Housing	Commerce	Domestic	Defense	Technology	Foreign Trade	International Affairs	Government Operations	Public Lands
Presidential Conditions																						
	Unified Republican	43.2%	65.3%	55.6%	35.6%	49.2%	42.0%	53.5%	56.2%	22.6%	87.2%	63.8%	33.5%	49.4%	79.3%	98.1%	65.5%	79.3%	96.5%	100.0%	76.3%	
	Divided Republican	50.4%	71.6%	62.6%	42.5%	56.4%	49.1%	60.6%	63.2%	28.0%	90.1%	70.2%	40.2%	56.6%	83.7%	98.6%	71.7%	83.7%	97.4%	100.0%	81.1%	
	Unified Democrat	47.4%	69.1%	59.8%	39.6%	53.5%	46.2%	57.8%	60.4%	25.7%	89.0%	67.7%	37.4%	53.7%	82.0%	98.4%	69.2%	82.0%	97.0%	100.0%	79.3%	
	Divided Democrat	54.7%	74.9%	66.5%	46.7%	60.6%	53.4%	64.6%	67.1%	31.6%	91.6%	73.7%	44.4%	60.8%	85.9%	98.8%	75.1%	85.9%	97.8%	100.0%	83.6%	
Averages																						
	Republican President	46.8%	68.5%	59.1%	39.1%	52.8%	45.6%	57.1%	59.7%	25.3%	88.7%	67.0%	36.9%	53.0%	81.5%	98.4%	68.6%	81.5%	97.0%	100.0%	78.7%	
	Democrat President	51.1%	72.0%	63.2%	43.2%	57.1%	49.8%	61.2%	63.8%	28.7%	90.3%	70.7%	40.9%	57.3%	84.0%	98.6%	72.2%	84.0%	97.4%	100.0%	81.5%	
	Unified Government	45.3%	67.2%	57.7%	37.6%	51.4%	44.1%	55.7%	58.3%	24.2%	88.1%	65.8%	35.5%	51.6%	80.7%	98.3%	67.4%	80.7%	96.8%	100.0%	77.8%	
	Divided Government	52.6%	73.3%	64.6%	44.6%	58.5%	51.3%	62.6%	65.2%	29.8%	90.9%	72.0%	42.3%	58.7%	84.8%	98.7%	73.4%	84.8%	97.6%	100.0%	82.4%	
	Overall	48.9%	70.2%	61.1%	41.1%	54.9%	47.7%	59.1%	61.7%	27.0%	89.5%	68.9%	38.9%	55.1%	82.7%	98.5%	70.4%	82.7%	97.2%	100.0%	80.1%	
Differences																						
	Party Difference	4.3%	3.6%	4.1%	4.1%	4.3%	4.3%	4.2%	4.1%	3.4%	1.7%	3.7%	4.1%	4.3%	2.5%	0.2%	3.6%	2.5%	0.4%	0.0%	2.8%	
	Government Difference	7.3%	6.1%	6.9%	7.0%	7.1%	7.2%	7.0%	6.9%	5.7%	2.8%	6.2%	6.9%	7.1%	4.2%	0.5%	6.1%	4.2%	0.8%	0.0%	4.6%	

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